Blackwill thinks the United States needs to accept the “least bad option” in Afghanistan and he explains several reasons for it: first, because the U.S government needs to spend billions of dollars and military to maintain the security in Afghanistan. In the future, these numbers may keep going up economy inside the United States. Second, American military’s intervention has a lot of differences with the local people. Therefore, the foreign troops make the wars worse. In other words, the troops can only maintain their security but cannot reassure them.
For Blackwill ’s recommendation, he suggests America should let the local “correlation of forces” to take the course about “the U.S. air power and Special Forces to forecast what could happen in the future to the Afghan army and the government in Kabul” and make sure the North and West are not controlled by the Taliban. He thinks ‘de facto partition’ is the best option.
Moreover, Blackwill talks about three alternatives: first, “would be to stay the counterinsurgency course in Afghanistan no matter how long it takes, and perhaps even expand the existing commitment” (Blackwill 6). However, this alternative is not good because the U.S spends an excess amount of time and money to deal with the small group of terrorists each year. This does not make sense for the U.S interests in Afghanistan. Second, American military leaves Afghanistan in the next several years. In the meantime, this method also has the disadvantages because it will speed up the civil war. The last alternative is negotiating with the Taliban to “achieve stability in Afghanistan”. Nevertheless, Taliban does not seem interested in reconciliation.
I agree with Blackwill that the ‘de facto partition’ is the best option nowadays. Americans can spend less money on the outside military and focus more on the domestic problem in the U.S. The U.S should give