Should the US have a taken firmer response to Russia’s intervention in Ukraine?

The conflict in Ukraine has exposed the dark side of interdependence as the international community struggles to ratchet up sanctions against Russian aggression in Crimea Peninsula. Although a firm action on part of the US might be justifiable, it will not serve American interests. This paper will first discuss why strict action might lead to undesirable consequences, followed by three final set of recommendations presenting future course of action. 1. Why serious sanctions might backfire: Collective sanctions announced have already put enough pressure on the Russian’s to de-escalate the situation, but further penalties might just end up doing the opposite (Lorber, 2014). Eastern European and Central Asian states poses valuable natural resources and firm sanctions might lead to further Russian adventurism. Moreover, Germany gets more than 30% of oil and gas from Russia, and other European countries including former Soviet blocks with already fragile economies are 100 percent dependent on Russian energy (BBC, 2014). With European reluctance, any unilateral firm action may divide us leading to further instability. In other words, US should carefully design safer sanctions so that European states are less affected than the Oligarchs close to Putin.

2. Further, sanctions have brought China- an emerging power- much closer to Russia. With $400 billion gas deal Russia will have alternate markets for its exports. In that sense, a firm response whether it be sanctions or military action may no longer prove to be a viable option in a multipolar world (Halligan, 2014). 3. Another firm response that has been debated is about providing arms to Ukraine. Such an idea might be helpful in the long term, especially providing more finance to former Soviet blocs, but not in a short term as its consequences might intensify the ongoing conflict resulting in a situation similar to the Cold War, which will seriously affect the global markets (Pifer, 2014; Lorber and Gottlieb, 2014).

Recommendations 1 Russian invasion does not pose a serious security threat; rather it stands isolated. Indeed, the emergence of new international players limit US’s strategic and political interests, but it is important to note that our strength has always been rooted in our long standing commitment to principles, institutions, and alliances, which Moscow undoubtedly lacks (Nexon, 2014). Therefore, our priority must be to have close relationship with allies and strengthening of institutions such as UN. 2 Targeting close elites to Putin and stopping Western technology has already expressed our strong displeasure (BBC, 2014). However, a long term policy of addressing economic challenges faced by East Asian and energy dependent states will be key in defining our alliances. Therefore, export of LNG from other sources than Russia should be considered (Pifer, 2014). But putting visa ban on Putin’s inner circle must continue until the resumption of diplomatic talks.

3 Finally, it is likely that the crisis in Ukraine will continue, but Russia will want to de-escalate the situation as it has overplayed its hand (Nexon, 2014). An article written by Russian ambassador to the UK gives an indication of that, but it also summarizes the legitimate interests that Russia have in Ukraine (Yakovenko, 2014). Addressing Russian concerns will improve our image, not theirs.

Bibliography

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