Introduction
Following the end of the Marcos dictatorship in 1986, a new hope had dawned in the eyes of the Filipino people. A new president was put into power, along with a list of demands and requests by citizens, ultimately seeking a new direction leading to a better life. One of the issues needed to be tackled was the longstanding problems in the agriculture sector. Considered an integral part in the country’s economy, the agriculture sector accounts a significant portion of the total employment, which ranged from 45-50% during the 1980s. On the other hand, this sector also attributed significant portions of the total poor in the country for decades. Thus, in June 1988, the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) was signed into law, paving the way for extensive land distribution and reforms which communist insurgencies urged during the Marcos regime. Consequently, the initial stages of the implementation process of CARP was met with apparent complications, expectedly so given that such a policy entailed a wide scope, whilst rural landlords provided staunch opposition in seizing their ownership to government. However, as the years passed and administrations would change, the promises of sweeping agrarian reform have remained unfinished, otherwise, significantly watered down. Such arbitration would be considered a detrimental factor to the current pitfalls that have hindered the development of Philippine political economy. In that, this paper questions what led to this failure of comprehensive agrarian reform and in pronouncing these mistakes, did other countries experience who also employed land reforms if they experienced similar dilemmas. We argue that deeply seated class structures have inevitably played a role in this development policy outcome, particularly elite groups and landlords who have established themselves in the political arena.
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