(Porsche case) Introduction:
For its first few decades, Porsche AG lived by the philosophy of Ferry Porsche, Ferdinand s son. Ferry created the Porsche 356 because no one else made a car like he wanted. They did no market research, had no sales forecasts, no return-on-investment calculations. None of that ,he very simply built his dream car and figured that there would be other people who share that dream. So, really, Porsche AG from the beginning was very much like its customers: an achiever that set out to make the very best. But as the years rolled on. These are challenging questions to answer; even Porsche owners themselves don't know exactly what motivates their buying. But given Porsche s low volume and the increasingly fragmented auto market, it is imperative that management understands its customers and what gets their motors running.

The problem:
The absence of real strategy, market research,sales forecasting and the absence of vision and taking the risk of changing segmentation strategy, . They considered these entry-level models to be cheap and underperforming. Most loyalists never really accepted these models as real Porsches. In fact, they were not at all happy that they had to share their brand with a customer who didn t fit the Porsche owner profile. They were turned off by what they saw as a corporate strategy that had focused on mass over class marketing. This tarnished image was compounded by the fact that Nissan, Toyota, BMW, and other car manufacturers had ramped up high-end sports car offerings, creating some fierce competition. In fact, both the Datsun 280-ZX and the Toyota Supra were not only cheaper than Porsche s 944 but also faster. A struggling economy threw more sand in Porsche s tank. By 1990, Porsche sales had plummeted, and the company flirted with bankruptcy.
Actions been took to treat the problem:
Quickly they recognized