Public crimes take place on a much larger scale than private crimes and the author identifies the fact that many people in public officers act as representatives for large institutions as one of the main reasons. He argues that morality in public offices impacts the actions of the people working in them because employees feel protected by the larger framework they are part of and responsibilities are shared on such a large scale that the sense of personal responsibility fades. Moreover, the people in public office roles have been depersonalized, creating the notion that they are somehow a more objective and neutral person. This however leads the public to believe that personal morals do not affect the professional actions of an individual in public office and as the author points out, this is a big mistake. Exercizing power is a form of individual expression and therefore also guided by personal morality. Demands placed on the individual often cause a divide between the person’s individual and professional morality. The author attempts to determine whether professional morality is derived from personal morality.
The author provides two theories for professional morality linked to personal morality; the first states that there is derivability to some extent although it is possible that public morality is a weaker version of the personal version. The other option he presents is that public and personal morality are not linked. An explanation for the second option could be that people in public offices need to make decisions people normally do not need to make, and therefore do not possess the morality framework in their personal lives to apply in their professional roles. Another explanation could be that people in public office are able to get away with behavior that would be incorrect morally speaking in their private lives. Both the theory of derivability as well as the alternative could explain the disconnect between personal and professional morality. The author continues to investigate which theory is more applicable. He concludes that while he thinks professional morality is not derived from personal morality, they are still connected. He dismisses the theory of derivability because different restrictions exist in private life than do in public offices, and therefore the morality that applies in private life cannot apply in public office. For public officers, many moral choices are removed through the obligation they have to serve the state, and this is a good illustration of the degree to which the private situation is different. However, some similarities can be found as well; in private life, people serve the interests of individuals or groups of people as well, although the individual’s choice is left free. It is the author’s belief that the added power that comes with a high level public position, should be used solely to serve the interests of the institution the employee represents. Tying one’s professional morality directly to the institution he or she represents however can be risky. Morality can be guided by two different concerns, either by concern regarding the outcome of one’s actions, or concern about the actions themselves. This interaction between result oriented and action oriented aspects of morality is present in private life as well, however, when applied to public offices, the outcome is not the same. The responsibilities in a public office are shared among so many employees that any one individual does not feel the full responsibility of his or her actions. This mitigates the employee’s concern about actions and their consequences, and gives morality in public offices a somewhat impersonal character. The outcome of actions in public office is much more important than it is in one’s private life and therefore it is the driving force behind morality in public office. As a result, the action centered aspect of morality in public office is weaker than it is in private life because the outcome bears more importance than the actions through which that outcome is achieved. There are exceptions to this rule, one of which is the judiciary system in which individual rights are heavily protected. The author describes Rawls’ point of view that utilitarianism justifies actions in public office that would not be permissible in private life. The author himself however believes that actions should still be guided by morality that is acceptable to every individual and not merely guided by what might be best for a larger group of people. To drive home his point that institutions’ morality is driven by outcome and a need to serve the greater good, he uses the examples of income taxation and conscription. Both these practices are considered acceptable when implemented by the state, but when applied on a smaller personal scale, they are illegal and entirely unacceptable. To implement such measures, the state needs to take an impersonal stance and be focused on the overall outcome. The author concludes his article by stating that morality should continue to be criticized and defended to ensure it maintains a high standard. He implies that public officers who have acted in conflict with morality should be judged more harshly than they currently are, as the extent to which their actions can be diffused by mitigating factors such as shared responsibility, should be correlated to their power and independence.