I would have to say it like this if you cannot have peanut thoughts--cannot, that is, think that, or wonder whether, something is a peanut--without standing (or having stood) in causal relations to peanuts, then it seems to follow that to know, in that special authoritative way we call introspection, that you are thinking about the thoughts are in our head (just as words are in books), but what gives them their content (just as what gives words their meaning) isn't there. In other words this, we are told,in part, of relations that exist between the thinker (or thought) and other parts of the world? Therefore, if, as some externalists hold,peanuts is to know, in that same authoritative way, that there are (or were) peanuts creates a problem. Furthermore, it appears to be incompatible with the kind of knowledge we have of what is going on in our own mind. How can we know, in the special, authoritative, way that we do, that we are thinking about peanuts or if thinking about peanuts consists, . But however, one cannot know, not at least in that way (by, so to speak, gazing inwardly) that there actually are (or were) peanuts. So thinking about peanuts cannot consist of relations, causal, functional, and informational, or whatever) to peanuts. It cannot depend on there being, or having been, peanuts. It cannot consist of any relations of the sort externalists propose since this would imply that we could know, in the same way we know that we are thinking about peanuts, that we stand (or stood) in these relations to the independently existing conditions that (according to externalism) make such thoughts