Amanda Yellen
Mr. Rowe

Psychological Egoism

In this paper I will argue against psychological egoism. More specifically, I will argue against hedonistic psychological egoism, a popular form of psychological egoism. Hedonistic psychological egoism is the view that the ultimate motive for human action is the desire to experience pleasure or avoid pain. I will begin by contrasting psychological egoism with ethical egoism. I will then discuss arguments that support psychological egoism, and refute those arguments using Rachels’ and Feinberg’s view’s against the theory. I will conclude by arguing that psychological egoism is implausible as it is incapable of being falsified, and fails to distinguish critical terms proposed in the theory.
I will begin by defining psychological egoism. Psychological egoism is the view that people always act according to their self-interest. According to this view, our only intrinsic desires are desires for the advancement of our own self-interest. But we can still have instrumental desires for other things. Instrumental desires are desires that you have only because you believe that satisfying that desire will help you satisfy some other desire. For example, I may desire to write this paper only because I believe that by writing this paper I will get a good grade, and I desire to get a good grade; I don’t intrinsically desire to write this paper.
Now that I have defined psychological egoism, I will contrast the theory with ethical egoism. Psychological egoism and ethical egoism differ in that psychological egoism is a descriptive view of human motivation stating that humans act to fulfill their wants and desires. For example, if Bob wanted to eat a hamburger, an explanation for this action would be that he had the desire to do so, and acted to fill that desire. Ethical egoism is a normative view stating that humans ought to seek the fulfillment of their wants and desires. For example, if Bob wanted to lie in order to benefit in some way, ethical egoism states that this is the right thing for Bob to do.
Psychological egoism can be defended due to its simplicity. The theory can be seen as plausible if we accept actions are made from a person’s own motives or desires which are indeed their own motives and nobody else’s. This statement reassures that one is always pursuing their own ends or trying to satisfy a desire when they act. Therefore, if this description of one demonstrates selfish actions, and if the description applies to all actions, then all actions are considered selfish. At this point, we need to consider the following objection from Rachels.
Rachels’ objects to the view that people always do what they want to do, and act upon their strongest desire. Rachel provides two arguments; people can act from duty against their wants and wanting to help others is unselfish. In the first argument, people can act from duty against their wants simply means that people aren’t always doing what they want, but acting from duty. In this case, one may feel a sense of obligation and act upon it. For example, one could visit their angry sick grandfather in the hospital. Rachel asserts that this type of action may be conducted because the person feels it is right, not because it is their self-interest to do so. The second argument, wanting to help others is unselfish, argues that psychological egoism has a mistaken view of selfishness. Selfish actions result in actions done to help yourselk, while unselfish actions are actions that help others. Rachels’ argues that whether an action is selfish or unselfish relies on what the object of the desire is. For example, donating to charity is an unselfish action. Although one is acting upon their own desire to donate, the object of their desire is to help starving people.
In this section, I will propose another view in support of the theory. Psychological egoism has also been supported where it has been argued that we always do what makes us feel good. This view claims that the only reason we help others is to receive a good feeling from doing so or avoid a bad one. Here, the actions are only made for this good feeling and is seen as selfish since it is only benefitting ourselves. While it may be true that when a person gets what they want, they usually feel pleasure. Psychological egoists suggest that many people only want their own pleasure and pursue other things only as a means. However, psychological egoists still fail to distinguish a clear meaning for the word pleasure. Next, I will present Feinberg’s argument against this matter.
Feinberg tears apart the second argument against hedonistic psychological egoism by stating that the hedonist’s definition of ‘pleasure’ has two separate meanings; sensation and satisfaction. Feinberg claims the first meaning of pleasure is not supported by any facts, while the second leads to infinite regress. Therefore, he claims psychological hedonism is unbelievable.
Feinberg begins with pleasure as a sensation. He states that ‘pleasure’ is an ambiguous term. The term can stand for a certain indefinable, but specific kind of sensation. In other words, ‘pleasure’ can be a property of sensations where it is associated with the senses. Feinberg supports this assumption with examples such as, “certain taste sensations such as sweetness” and “tactual and kinesthetic sensations from a good massage.” For the sake of his argument, he calls ‘pleasure’ the converse of physical pain.
Feinberg moves on to distinguish the second meaning of pleasure from the hedonist’s view as satisfaction. Satisfaction is reached by desire fulfillment, and can be defined as a sense of feeling we receive after getting what we want. Feinberg makes it clear that “satisfaction” does not necessarily fulfill one’s desires, but provides individuals with a sense of gratification after completing a certain action. An example of pleasure in this sense may be originated from knowledge or religious experience. Conversely, a person who is a masochist seeks enjoyment or pleasure from physical pain. However, it is important to clarify that Feinberg does not view satisfaction as a feeling one receives from an action. This second meaning of ‘pleasure’ as satisfaction goes on forever and gives no helpful statement of view. For example, if desire fulfillment always yields satisfaction, it says that we always get what we want when we get what we want leading into infinite regress.
After analyzing both meanings of the term ‘pleasure,’ the view states, “it is one’s own pleasure (satisfaction) and not merely pleasure (pleasant sensation) that is the sole ultimate objective of all voluntary behavior.” This view states that intrinsic satisfaction is the only desire we want to be satisfied. The argument ultimately demonstrates how the word “pleasure” in its first sense receives no support from facts if it is said that one’s own pleasure is the ultimate objective of all of one’s behavior. The term cannot be tested or stated without paradox. Furthermore, the second “pleasure” cannot be formulated as it leads to infinite regress. For example, one could say “I desire only satisfaction of my desire for satisfaction of my desire for satisfaction...”
After offering two distinct definitions of pleasure, Feinberg proceeds to refute the psychological hedonist’s claim. He evaluates their claim as, “the desire for pleasure is the sole ultimate desire of all people and the sole desire capable of providing a motive of action.” This claim states that people simply act according to their own self-interest in order to receive pleasure. He distinguishes the hedonist’s view as false because it is inaccurate to claim people only act for their own pleasure, and that it goes against common sense and everyday experiences. Feinberg represents this point by providing an example of taking a hot bath. He explains how he usually receives pleasure from taking a hot bath and may also bathe for the sake of sensations. While this may be true for the majority of people, it doesn’t apply to those who take baths for other motives such as cleansing the body. If we were to relate this to intrinsic and instrumental desires, one may take a bath for their intrinsic desire of feeling well, but an instrumental desire can be that one takes a bath in order for that long term desire to be clean. Feinberg’s assertion goes against the hedonistic view, offering that there are other actions we pursue that are not solely acting upon our desires.
An argument I believe to make psychological egoism less attractive is that it is unfalsifiable, or not capable of being proved false. The statement from psychological egoism, “All voluntary behavior is selfish,” is unfalsifiable. This statement disallows the theory from being a genuine, and credible scientific theory. The main problem lies where any altruistic action, an action that benefits others, cannot be declared as an unselfish act. For instance, if one decided save a boy drowning in the water, most people would regard that action as unselfish. However, from a psychological egoist point of view, they would see this action as simply benefitting the one who donated as it gave them pleasure or satisfaction. That is, the savior has an ultimate desire that is not egoistic. The theory does not allow for anything to falsify it making it difficult for readers to believe the points made by the egoists are true.
The principle of falsifiability states that for a statement to be true, there must be things said about the statement that can make the statement false. Feinberg stated, “Until we know what they [psychological egoists] would count as unselfish behavior, we can’t very well know what they mean when they say that all voluntary behavior is selfish.” This point by Feinberg explains that the egoists don’t exemplify any examples of unselfish behavior. Nevertheless, the theory still lacks a definition of “selfish.” It is also true that people aren’t always voluntarily doing what they want to do, but acting upon a sense of obligation.
I strongly agree with Feinberg in that psychological egoism is not a credible theory. Psychological egoism’s generalizations do not allow the view to have any counter-examples. The view that “all people act solely in their own interest” cannot be testified. The uncertainty lies where we are unable to prove whether that individual’s action was or was not made in their self-interest. The claim fails to be supported by any factual content and contains terms such as “pleasure” and “selfish” that lack clear meaning. While an egoist may state that all people are indeed selfish, simply seeking own pleasure, there is no proof behind it. Self-interested people may also look out for the interests of others, in which they wouldn’t be considered selfish. Thus, one tends to feel good when they get things they already value, as opposed to finding the value of something by guessing how they would feel if they had it. The good feelings that arise come from the fact that one believes it is good, even if they don’t have it. Although psychological egoism aims to provide a single formula that explains human behavior, it cannot be seen as a credible theory since it is based off of an unrealistic view of human nature.

Bibliography: 1. Feinberg, Joel. “Psychological Egoism.” In Reason and Responsibility, edited by Joel Feinberg and Russ Schafer-Landau, 493-505. Belmont: Wadsworth/Thomason, 2005.

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[ 1 ]. Feinberg, pg. 499
[ 2 ]. Feinberg, pg. 500
[ 3 ]. Feinberg, pg. 501
[ 4 ]. Feinberg, pg. 499
[ 5 ]. Feinberg, pg. 503