According to law that dates back to 1648, nations have the right to govern within their borders in whatever manner determined fitting. Some states, although granted this right that is inherent to the foundation of the international system, fail to protect their citizens from harm. Too often in recent history have governments neglected to protect their people during conflicts or crises, and with a world with increasing visibility and communication, states have responded with a basic plan to prevent mass crimes such as Bosnia and Rwanda. Thus, Responsibility to Protect (R2P) was developed as a caveat for the international community to intervene when a government fails to protect its own citizens from mass atrocities. Genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and ethnic cleansing are the four conditions under which the international community is authorized to intervene, should a state fail to protect its citizens (Rudolph 2014). In the past 20 years, R2P has been under construction and constantly under evolution from theory to practice. While parameter definition and norm building continue to cycle from lessons learned, the three foundational pillars upon which the R2P model dangles from remains the same:
“Pillar 1: Every state has the responsibility to protect its populations from the four mass atrocity crimes
Pillar 2: The wider international community has the responsibility to encourage and assist individual states in meeting that responsibility
Pillar 3: If a state is manifestly failing to protect its populations, the international community must be prepared to take appropriate collective action, in a timely and decisive manner and in accordance with the UN Charter.” (Nasser-Eddine 2012, 16)
Despite a global summit for clarification in 2005, much of R2P remains controversial as to whether it can ever be employed properly and effectively, and unfortunately R2P is marred more by failure than by success. R2P suffers from several problems, some which are contradictory to the model of the international system.
This paper seeks to assess the roles and responsibilities of state, regional, and international actors in an arena in which state interests are juxtaposed with that of “the greater good.” Maintaining the framework of Westphalian statehood while also preventing humans suffering at the hands of an irresponsible government is problematic in nature and lend to why peace operations are difficult to conduct. Though R2P is a fairly new concept that most nations have expressed varying levels of approval for, the success rate is low, and contributing factors will be discussed. A greater agreement amongst the international community regarding R2P’s employment is critical for the sake of R2P’s survival.
Through the discussion of case studies, this paper will discuss the inherent flaws of R2P and what prevents its effectiveness. Examples will also be used to analyze how the abuse of R2P has crippled the concept and whether any hope for it remains. Despite the changing role of states and blurred boundaries in a modern, globalized world with greater transnational concerns, R2P heavily struggles from foundational contradictions and strategic state aspirations.
This paper also discusses R2P’s likelihood for success by quantifying data in terms of an empirical study, and its status and survivability compared to other humanitarian aid programs. This is conducted by studying case studies in context of a three-step cycle and identifying at what stage a program fails. The study will begin with an analysis of journals that briefly discuss the history of R2P’s inception. Conflicts will be discussed along with why no action was taken by the international community.
Inception and Development
ECOWAS and The African Union Africa’s large-scale human crime has created an imperative for collective security organizations to cooperate in hopes of creating an attitude of “non-indifference.” Between 1990 and 2005, Africa contributed to the statistic of over half of the world’s battle-related deaths (Piiparnen 2012, 393). Empirical data attributes R2P’s roots to ECOWAS in 1975 and the nascent work of the African Union; the Constitutive Act of 2000 authorizes AU intervention under extreme situations of genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes (Piiparnen 2012, 394). Albeit underdeveloped and lacking resources, the ideology to protect citizens remained and lent its foundation to the United Nations.
Rwanda
Cases like the Rwandan genocide in 1994 have pushed the international community to develop R2P; Rwanda became the very paragon of mass human suffering as a result of no international response. Prior to World War II, the Belgians colonized Rwanda and created class disparity when they divided privileges between ethnic groups; the Tutsis, having western influence, were supplied greater privileges. With no room for social class change and decades of bitter resentment, the Hutus rose to power and attempted to kill off the Tutsi race. An estimated 800,000 people were killed in a 100-day period, yet the international community did nothing to intervene during this slaughtering, though afterwards nations agreed that atrocities like this should never happen again.
Inherent Flaws of R2P
The Prioritization of State Sovereignty In an article titled “How R2P Failed Syria,” Minerva Nasser-Eddine discusses the limitations of R2P in a world built on state sovereignty; so long as state interests still exist, R2P will never be a priority of the two. Syria, a political and ethnic hotbed and a proxy ground for an agglomerate of states, is a prime example; the Assad regime is bolstered with aid from Russia, Iran, and China while Turkey, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and Israel view the Assad regime as a threat (Nasser-Eddine 23). The current international climate makes Syria undesirable for intervention, along with its overwhelming air defense system. The US arms the oppositionists, and Gulf States also pass weapons to insurgents through Lebanon, Turkey, Iraq, and Jordan (Nasser-Eddine 26). All parties are interested in Syria’s strategic location, and its hostilities are far from being grounds that are conducive for R2P. Australia’s Foreign Minister Bob Carr states, “There isn’t an appetite, and not a budget, in the Western world for the sort of intervention that would be involved here.”
The Power of Veto The Harvard Law Review (2014) discusses the UN draft resolution’s repeated veto and also attributes the failure to pass a resolution to national interests that assume priority over an ethical need to intervene. Since 2011, the UN has attempted four times to pass a resolution for UN intervention in Syria, and each time Russia and China vetoed the resolution. While many states in the UN are wary of R2P’s effect on sovereignty after the removal of Qaddafi from Libya, Harvard Law Review suspects that Russia and China have their own reasons, as these two nations also go as far to “obstruct” means of nonviolent intervention. For one, Russia’s last military base outside of its former Soviet Union is in Syria, and Assad is a premier client for Russian armament purchases. In return, Moscow sent almost one billion dollars in aid to the Assad regime in 2011 (Harvard Law Review 2014, 1061). China’s is suspected to veto with a two-fold reason. First, China does large amounts of business with Syria, China’s third largest exporter of goods in 2010. Harvard Law Review speculates that China’s own conflict with Tibet and desire for foreigners to respect its sovereignty also abate any support of R2P in Syria.
R2P has an even larger flaw in its system: its execution is dependent UN Security Council vote; one veto can render any resolution utterly obsolete; R2P, though agreed upon by almost every nation in the world, is merely a guiding principle for resolution and can be halted with any Security Council member veto. With terms like these, R2P cannot serve its intent. R2P is still a theoretical concept without an official set of hard-and-fast guidelines agreed upon by the international community; though almost all UN members have agreed to the value of R2P, agreeing upon its terms is a conundrum as “nobody has a monopoly over what constitutes human rights” (Snetkov and Langteigne 2015, 119).
To actually utilize R2P, Harvard Law Review offers two possible solutions. One is to expand R2P to allow delegated forces to intervene anyway, whether a specific state or a regional organization. While this protects the UN from locking itself out by veto and ultimately rendering itself ineffective, doing so undermines the legitimacy of the UN Security Council’s authority. Another solution is to restrain veto power for situations declared mass atrocities; no member would receive an option to vote, and the Secretary General of the UN would make the decision. All Security Council members would be coerced to comply. Though the UN could accomplish R2P without the political tensions of each state voting, receiving buy-in for this option is an extreme challenge; conflicting national interests prevent states from an “all-in” attitude. Without this second option, however, R2P will likely always lose to national interests and fall flat at the veto table, thereby defeating the purpose of R2P’s framework upon which the international community is called to act.
State Ideology as an Influencing Factor
Veto power can be contingent upon something even deeper than international law. Russia often perceived as the “bad guy” with its infamous use of the veto. According to “The Loud Dissenter and its Cautious Partner,” Russia’s tendency to veto R2P is inherent to its state doctrine (2014). In fact, Russia’s decision-making process as a member of the Security Council is not based solely on case-by-case relationship with other states and its desire to keep western power in balance. Russia’s security policy reflected onto the world stage is influenced by Boris Yeltsin’s emphasis on “sovereignty, regime stability, and noninterference in the internal affairs of these states” (Snetkov 119, 2014).
As the world increasingly becomes multipolar with different global powers and types of government, Russia sees itself as a defender of international law that protects the sovereign power of states; Russia views the US as a disruptive force that attempts to push its values and political system on all states as it attempts to “dilute the interstate character of the Council” (Snetkov 120, 2014). Russia view international law through a black-and-white lens, and any disregard of its decision-making authority as part of the UN Security Council is considered not only a challenge to its authority but more importantly to that of the international system.
R2P warrants skepticism from Russia, given its obdurate stance on state sovereignty and R2P’s blatant abuse by politically driven western states. As “nobody has a monopoly over what constitutes human rights,” R2P is subject to interpretation, and the western powers’ loose and generous overuse of R2P in Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya for political gain provided fodder for Russia to veto intervention in Syria; the west’s historical use of R2P often incited regime change, and a veto for R2P intervention in Syria would ideally prevent western states from further abusing the R2P norm. One must ask, however, how Russia could possibly justify its invasion of Georgia in 2008 and ongoing crisis in Crimea while pointing the finger at western states for abusing R2P; Putin called upon R2P when invading Crimea and insisted that the annexation of Crimea was to protect Russian-speaking Ukrainians from mass atrocities. R2P is no longer a tool for just western powers to abuse but is clearly subject to being equally abused in the international community.
Some could argue that R2P is an idea of western idealists. Others believe that R2P is a world concept and not one of western values. The article “In Defense of the Responsibility to Protect,” argues that R2P is not a vehicle for delivering western liberal values (2013); author Luke Glansville points out that R2P’s genesis stemmed from the African Union’s agreement in 2000 to protect populations from mass atrocity as a result of genocides and the lack of international intervention.
R2P Out of Context
Burma
R2P’s purpose is very specific and was designed to validate intervention under one of the four categories. Over time, crises have cropped up and challenged the urgency for the United Nations to react, though uncertain as to what the supporting legitimate reason for intervention would be. One example of this is the unnecessary suffering created by the Burmese government after a disastrous tornado in 2008 that displaced millions of people and left 100,000 to 200,000 dead. When the Burmese government prevented timely aid distribution to victims, was the United Nations authorized to step in under R2P? As international aid flooded in, the Burmese government insisted on controlling all operations and refused to grant access to foreign aid workers even though ten days after the natural disaster, less than one-fourth of the donated international aid was being distributed. Burmese operations were ineffective and unsuccessful, advocates such as French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner, founder of Medicins sans Frontieres (MSF), urged the United Nations to invoke R2P so that aid could be distributed effectively before even more lives were lost through inefficiency and waste.
Members of the UN were torn, and some states feared that invoking R2P was “unnecessarily confrontational” and would disturb ongoing humanitarian efforts and mediation from ASEAN. Finally UN commissioners ruled that Burma’s crisis was outside of R2P’s parameters. The Burmese government’s refusal to allow external help during their flail was not sufficient enough to trigger R2P; had their failure led to mass displacement and death, R2P would be a legitimate to intervene. R2P is a fine balance of obeying its doctrine while mitigating the amount of suffering among the masses. R2P cannot act as a blanket excuse for other states to intervene, and neither should it be; doing so renders R2P illegitimate. Unfortunately, R2P has been used liberally in recent years as an invitation to enter another state unwelcomed. Superpower abuse of R2P perverts the UN power to shield those that are suffering from R2P’s four protective categories.
Russia
One infamous offender of R2P abuse is Russia. The declaration of R2P as justification to enter both South Ossetia during the Russo-Georgia War in 2008 and the current annexation of Crimea, an ongoing conflict without a ceasefire in sight, were unfounded and a direct abuse of R2P in pursuit of strategic state interests. Russia still continues down its current trajectory with Crimea.
Ironically, Russia perceives itself in the United Nations as a sentry of international law. Russia identifies itself as a force needed to prevent “actors seeking to impose foreign models of behavior onto other international actors (Snetkov and Lanteigne 2015, 120). Interestingly enough, Russia’s “protection” of its ethnic groups in South Ossetia and Crimea do not invoke the proper channels incited by the UN. Additionally, the use of military force should never be used as a first option for R2P.
Research for this section was conducted while viewing Russian case studies through objective means; one potential roadblock is the desire to overlook America’s role as an abuser of R2P as the US proudly champions itself a leader of values, human rights, and democracy. While Russia is reprimanded with great distaste by much of the world for its abuse of R2P, the United States is just as guilty. The abuse of R2P creates a two-fold problem: impeding the ability to help populations in genuine peril and also validating the behavior of other superpowers as equal opportunists to exploit R2P.
Iraq
One reason for R2P’s failure is that gross misuse has harmed its legitimacy in the international community. “Misrepresenting R2P and Advancing Norms” analyzes case studies of R2P used out of context, and one notable example being the US invasion of Iraq in 2003. Shortly after R2P’s inception, the United States used military force to invade Iraq and claimed that the US had a “right to protect” Iraqis from Weapons of Mass Destruction. Despite resolution veto by the Security Council, the US proceeded and dethroned Saddam Hussein.
The United Nations admonished the US for “disingenuous humanitarian rationalizations” (Badescu and Weiss 2010, 361). All 12 of the ICISS commissioners repudiated the US’ overt misuse of R2P and documented that the first condition (“gravity of the threat”) was never met. (Later Commissioner Michael Ignatieff wrote a caveat, which declared that even misuse would still benefit the stabilization of R2P’s model through the development of norms.) Previous Iraqi conflicts, such as the Kurds in the 80s and Shiites in the 90s, however, would likely have met the “gravity of threat” condition. If R2P was a concept in existence then, external intervention could likely be justified to prevent mass killings (Badescu 2010, 361).
Such an illegitimate intervention by the US nearly strangled R2P’s development as a new concept and left the international community skeptical of whether R2P could realistically be employed without becoming another avenue for larger nation-states to accomplish political objectives.
Libya
Though America lauds itself as the champion of freedom, ethics, and values, precedents of the US in Iraq in 2003 and Libya in 2011 have negative consequences that displaced R2P’s legitimacy. In “How R2P Failed Syria” (2012), Nasser-Eddine discusses how western intervention in Libya affected intervention in Syria. Libya was a controversial resolution, and a third of the UN Security Council elected to abstain from a vote (Nasser-Eddine 20); Resolution 1973 for the 2011 invasion of Libya referenced past resolutions for intervention that commonly stated to “protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence” as a reason for intervention. The new Resolution 1973 removed the world “imminent” and added “to take all necessary measures to protect civilians and civilian-populated areas under threat of attack.” Many voting states hesitated at the Resolution’s wording ambiguity, questioned the political intent of the permanent council members, and doubted the probability of mission success (Nasser-Eddine 20).
Resolution 1973 passed with the support of the Arab League, who proceeded the resolution vote by calling on the Security Council to “bear its responsibilities towards the deteriorating situation in Libya […] the protection of the Libyan people and foreign nationals residing in Libya.” (Piiparinen 2012, 396) Between the collective lobbying of the Arab League and US persuasion of African non-permanent members, the veto passed (Piiparinen 2012, 396). Russia and China chose to abstain rather than veto, however, likely since the Arab League fully supported a call to action.
Despite Arab League support, R2P intervention in Libya was not so straightforward; western states had the intent of deposing the Qaddafi government. Many critics point out that NATO overstepped its UN mandate by using force to drive a regime change. How R2P was interpreted is entirely questionable, as forces sought the use of military force before utilizing other intervention tools such as preventative diplomacy, economic sanctions, and civilian protection missions (Nasser-Eddine 21). By utilizing military force so quickly, international powers questioned the intent of R2P in Libya. The two separate objectives to protect civilians- the point of R2P- and to dethrone a tyrant were no longer distinguishable.
R2P and National Interests in Syria
A resolution for R2P intervention in Syria has already gone to vote four times at the UN Security Council and vetoed each time by Russia and China. Both nations utilize their authority as UNSC members in different ways to protect their own national interests, yet doing so juxtaposes legitimacy and legality yet again. Russia and China’s veto against a resolution to protect the Syrian people is a mark of politics that epitomize the problem of legality without consideration for the very humanity that R2P tries to protect. Additionally, other reasons exist why the international scene is hesitant to intervene in Syria, such as the security issue Assad presents. Regardless, R2P is “morally laudable” but not a tool that can be successfully implemented into a real world with politics (Nasser-Eddine 2012, 23).
Perhaps in a warzone of what appears to be no compromise and no end, the only answer is to compromise. Simply punishing Assad’s regime for brutality and using chemical weapons does not appear to make sense; instead if negotiations prove ineffective, the Assad regime should be degraded to a point it can no longer harm civilians. This is unlikely unless all proxy war participants cease to exacerbate the situation and choose instead to prioritize civilian life above a political war. Perhaps leaving Assad in power is the only solution to compromise; while possibly satisfying Russia marginally, choosing this course suggests that the external states arming the Syrian opposition forces prioritize R2P and civilian well being over interests to subvert the Assad regime. An agreement to ceasefire is imperative and should be accomplished through a mix of keeping an open threat on Assad while negotiating the discontinued use of chemical weapons.
The Future of R2P and Possibilities
Authorized Military Intervention
Another controversial discussion about R2P is whether military force can be used successfully on behalf of R2P. Military force should only be pursued when physical force demonstrates that more good than harm will occur and will assist in further protecting civilians. Glansville discusses how at the 2009 World Summit, most states expressed a commendable amount of support for the use of military force to protect populations as long as the 2005 Summit’s R2P parameters were met; only North Korea, Cuba, Iran, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Sudan, and Venezuela objected and insisted that such an option enables large states to manipulate weak ones for political gain (Glansville 173, 2013).
Manipulating military force is argued as not feasible as the parameters for using force have not expanded and stay the same: all requests must still be sent through the United Nations for Security Council approval. One inherent problem exists, however: states, in self-interest, intervene with military force anyway despite a lack of UN approval. In 2008 Russia invaded South Ossetia, Georgia without consulting the UN, and the US also received resounding disapproval from the UN yet continued its course in Iraq.
Hope for R2P
Some scholars and R2P activists think that R2P still has hope and that examples of R2P gone wrong are still progressive for the development of international norms, but the damning legalities are close to snuffing out R2P potential as states continue to “advance” normalcies via inappropriate usage. Michael Ignatieff discusses the double-edged sword of legitimacy:
“If there is no legality, there cannot be legitimacy, and if there is no legality, any use of force in defiance of the Security Council weakens international law […] The fact is that what law forbids, conscience may still demand. What law forbids, international peace and security might require.” (Ignatieff 2013, 91)
To discover R2P’s progress and compare its success in relation to other humanitarian programs, Cristina Badescu analyzed several case studies and broke their formation down to be categorized in a three-phase life cycle: norm emergence, broad acceptance, and internalization. In analyzing these studies, Badescu discovered that although R2P is at a much earlier position in its cycle than other humanitarian campaigns like banning land mines, its success rate and development lags behind other programs that were at the same point (Badescu 2010, 359). Rather than compare case studies on a one-for-one basis, Badescu suggests that R2P is different and that its growth is best discovered through the misapplication of R2P instead of its successes (Badescu 2010, 361). The question is whether the international community is willing to continuously invest faith into a concept that is learning from its misuse and abuse.
National Interests
R2P will never be fully achieved as long as national interests control the international community (Ignatieff, 2013). As weapons flood into Syria from Iran, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Gulf States, and Hezbollah, the gravity of danger only gets worse for the civilians that are in caught between Syrian cross-fire. R2P’s doctrine reaffirms that supplying weapons only increases danger and worsens tensions. In discussing Russia and China’s repeated veto of a Syrian resolution, Ignatieff suggests that Russia and China are uninterested in participating since R2P seems like an infringement upon international law, and “if there is no legality, there cannot be legitimacy.” Despite the cornerstones of the international system, however, sometimes “what law forbids, conscience may still command.” (Ignatieff 2013, 91).
The Role of Morality
When assessing the morality behind R2P, one must note the difference exists between legality and legitimacy, and what may be the right answer could be a contradiction of the very foundational blocks of the international system. What might be considered illegal could very well be legitimate all the same. Ignatieff presents the idea that vetoing a moral intervention resulting in a human massacre could hardly be referenced as “legitimate.” To say that such a veto would strengthen and validate international law would be ludicrous. Glansville does note that the biggest limitation of R2P is its reliance on the international community to obey a moral imperative to assist others in crisis situations. In that case, R2P will always remain subject to the political will of states while suffering from the overshadow of strategic state interests (Glanville 2013, 179).
The United Nations’ decision to incorporate the “Responsibility to Protect” (R2P) into its decision matrix for intervention is not famed for its effective call to action. The numbers of chalk marks on the R2P Board of Success are few and far between, and its failure results from several sad truths inherent to international law.
These works cited all point to one common topic: R2P is a much-needed moral yardstick that should prevent mass atrocities such as genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity, but conflicting political interests prevent R2P from being of value and instead inhibits the ability to help those that are in need. The historical abuse of R2P has created a poor precedent for justifying legitimate interventions, and Security Council members are quick to veto a resolution for several possible reasons. Unless states can learn to prioritize human life over state sovereignty, R2P will continue to suffer. Despite the growth and cooperation of the transnational community, this will never happen. R2P will continue to linger as lip service and nothing more unless fundamental changes to the structure of R2P and UN resolutions occur.
RESOURCES
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Harvard Law Review. “Recent Draft Resolution.” Harvard Law Review Vol. 128 (2014): 1055-1062
Piiparinen, Touko. “Norm Compliance by Proximity.” Conflict, Security & Development 12:4 (September 2012): 387-415.
Rudolph, James P. “How Putin Distorts R2P in Ukraine.” Canadian International Council. http://opencanada.org/features/the-think-tank/comments/how-putin-distorts-r2p-in-ukraine (accessed April 20, 2015).
Snetkov, Aglaya and Marc Lanteigne. “’The Loud Dissenter and its Cautious Partner’- Russia, China, Global Governance and Humanitarian Intervention.” International Relations of the Asia-Pacific 15 No. 1 (2014): 113-146
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