Student: Natalie Hallinan

Review of Bent Flyvbjerg’s book Making Social Science Matter: Why social Inquiry fails and how it can succeed again

Advanced Organisation and management Theorising

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The “science wars” of the mid to late 1990s appears to have been an ideological contest of wills between the natural and social sciences. The natural science ‘camp’ included such heavyweights as a Nobel prize-winning physicist and a Harvard biologist and geneticist. The latter, R.C. Lewontin in the New York Review of Books harshly chided the U.S. National Opinion Research Center sexual practices study authors. “It is frightening to think that social science is in the hands of professionals who are … deaf to human nuance”. He concluded that social scientists’ propensity to impersonate natural science “can only engender the scorn of natural scientists”(p2). Given the apparent harshness of this critique, it may seem surprising to find a social scientist seeming to agree with the positioning of the natural scientists.

This is precisely what Bent Flyvbjerg’s appears to do, albeit with a different premise, in the first chapter of his book ‘Making Social Science Matter: How Social Inquiry Fails and How it can Succeed Again’. Flyvbjerg articulates the case for a revision of the theoretical underpinnings of social science and the development of a new version of an old concept through a return to and reinterpretation of the Aristotelian concept of ‘phronesis’, or practical wisdom. Flyvbjerg argues for a re-routing of social science away from its position as mimic to natural science’s ‘context – independent’ epistemology because

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“social science is locked in a flight it cannot hope to win” (P3). The natural and social sciences operate in very different paradigms so a comparison of epistemic qualities is arguably unhelpful. Flyvbjerg assesses the respective strengths and weaknesses of the natural and social sciences and sees potential for a complementary relationship where each plays to its respective strengths. For the natural sciences this is explanatory and predictive theory whereas the natural sciences contribute “to the reflexive analysis and discussion of values and interests” (p3). Sensibly, Flyvbjerg stays on the periphery of the ‘science wars’ debate using it only as a springboard for the development of social science methodology and its expansion from imitator of natural science to reformation as a practical, meaningful and relevant discipline for people and societies. In Making Social Science Matter, Flyvbjerg essentially asks the social sciences community to step back and look at itself from a fresh perspective and offers a sound methodology with which the community can move forward in a practical and meaningful way.

Flyvbjerg’s analysis starts in Part one with an examination of where the social sciences have been before examining in Part two where social science could be heading. He teases the social sciences apart before carefully reconstructing them through examination of Aristotelian, Nietzscean and Foucauldian

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analytics in order to develop a methodological praxis that is relevant, grounded and prudent. Flyvbjerg hesitates against offering however, a

prescriptive solution for the future direction of the social sciences and does not envisage a ‘one size fits all’ approach. With a fair degree of humility, Flyvbjerg concedes his approach “phronetic social science” is but a “first step” and “should be considered only one attempt among many possible” (P 5).

The natural sciences have experienced sovereignty over knowledge in western culture and society since the Enlightenment with a focus on ‘instrumental rationality’ that is predictive, context-independent and rule driven. Flyvbjerg argues that context independent social science models cannot effectively predict, understand or describe how humans will behave in context dependent situations. ‘Value rationality’ is a more appropriate foundation for the context driven, experiential and visceral social sciences as they require an understanding of the role of knowledge and judgment in human and societal behaviour. The second chapter asks: “How do people acquire knowledge and skills?” and Flyvbjerg answers the question through the adoption of Herbert and Stuart Dreyfus’ hierarchical phenomenology of human learning. The five tier model demonstrates progression in human learning: Novice, Advanced

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Beginner and Competent Performer followed by Proficient Performer and Expert. The three earlier stages rely on prescribed rules and rationality while the latter two stages can only be reached through experience. Flyvbjerg reasons that the lower 3 levels are relevant to the natural sciences dependent as they are on the procurement of facts. Tiers four and five on the other hand are experiential and intuitive as the expert’s skills are embodied and are therefore more relevant to the social sciences. The virtuoso actor is not conscious of the precise decisions behind actions and is rarely able to reduce their discipline to a methodical set of rules - their skills set is simply performed without conscious consideration. Social science theory needs to be “reasoned and capable of action” if it is to be universally applicable as Flyvbjerg asserts it could be. It involves “judgments and decisions made in the manner of a virtuoso actor” (P26) and requires utilitarian applicability.

The goal of the early chapters was to dismantle the foundational premise that social science should emulate the conventional scientific ideal of contextindependence and theory despite the temptation to do so. Despite the natural sciences’ prolonged and prestigious role in western society borne of its ability to predict and control nature, the study of society “is not, never has been, and probably never can be, scientific in the conventional meanimeaning of the word

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“science”; that is its epistemic meaning” (P25). It is therefore not useful to discuss ‘theory’ under its traditional scientific modality despite the “logical simplicity” of the natural science paradigm (p26). Flyvbjerg warns, however, against black and white “either-or” dualisms. He criticizes only the domination of logic, rules and rationality but does not argue for their ‘amputation’ from discourse.

Whereas in Part one, Flyvbjerg disassembles the traditional scientific ideal of the social sciences, in Part two ‘How social science can matter again” he reassembles a viable theoretical basis for social science using and extending Aristotle’s division of knowledge with particular focus on ‘Phronesis”. Aristotle conceived three “intellectual virtues”: episteme, techne and phronesis (P55). “Episteme’ refers to the ubiquitous and unvarying ‘traditional’ scientific ideal and concerns a “theoretical know-why” whereas “Techne” refers to the application of technical knowledge or “know-how”. “Phronesis” on the other hand concerns pragmatism and “practical” common sense, knowledge and ethics. Flyvbjerg effectively argues that social science needs to practice science that is sensible, possible, workable, applicable to day-to-day life and capable of enabling distinctive insight and change. Flyvbjerg claims that phronetic social science is strong where natural science is weak and suggests that its focus on

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‘value rationality’ acts as a counter weight to the ‘instrumental rationality’ of the natural sciences.

While acknowledging that to appose Habermas and Foucault into a common framework would be “futile”, Flyvbjerg uses both to enhance the readers’ understanding of power and its role in social and political change Flyvberg contrasts the “discourse ethics” of Habermas and the “power analytics” of Foucault in order to evolve phronesis to include relations of power - essentially contrasting consensus with conflict. Habermas’ ethos is centred in consensual universal morality however human beings and society are far more complex than the homogeneity of Habermas’ democracies allows. His prescriptive constitution does not allow for the malleability of democracies to the struggles and conflicts of people and society. Foucault repudiates universality and visualizes the minimization of tyranny through an understanding of the exercise of power relations. Power, traditionally and mistakenly seen as a possession, is best seen as strategy, a game plan that can be both negative and positive in its influence.

Fyvbjerg expands Aristotle’s definition of phronesis to include Nietzsche and Foucault’s premise that power is ever present in human and societal relations

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and is both discursive and interpretative. It manifests through the likes of struggle, conflict and battle not through proprietorship alone. Flyvbjerg argues that Phronesis is practical commonsense, know-how, wisdom and prudence. In the latter chapters Flyvbjerg develops the methodology of phronesis and draws the book together through a case study analysis of the Aarlborg project.

Flyvbjerg develops his thesis by addressing the common view of ‘case study’ methodology as unreliable, biased and misleading and responds to the five criticisms of case study research in order to redress the balance. As the reader will see in chapter ten, Flyvbjerg uses a powerful example of case study methodology in phronetic social science to draw together and conclude the book. Flyvbjerg asserts that case study methodology has been misunderstood and underutilized in the social sciences and can offer detail and depth whereas large random samples offer breadth. Once again, Flyvbjerg offers a balanced perspective - “both approaches are necessary for a sound development of social science” (p87). It is in the minutiae of day - to - day life that social science can seek to understand the issues of social and political organization.

The Aarlborg project is an archetype of phronetic social science and its inclusion enables the reader to better understand the development of the

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phronetic social science methodology. Briefly, Aarlborg, an urban centre of half a million citizens in northern Denmark, was overrun with cars and associated pollution and accidents. The city’s council voted on a stratagem to reduce the traffic and pollution thereby improving the area’s social and physical environment. Flyvbjerg, demonstrated years later that despite considerable work and financial input into the project, accidents and pollution increased. He examined the intricacies of power dynamics between the main players and stakeholders during the development and implementation stages of the project and demonstrated that despite a democratically elected council’s best efforts, power and influence had swayed the project. Different stakeholders had varying perspectives on what was ‘good’ for Aarlborg dependent on their particular motivation and those with the greatest political might held sway. Flyvbjerg’s research, pragmatic to its core through clear articulation of the issues, laid the groundwork for the future revision of the Aarlborg project into a European Planning Prize winning success. The opaque machinations of the initial project were revised into a transparent process that involved citizens and interest groups in a level playing field. It is this very case that draws the book to its conclusion and effectively demonstrates phronesis in action. Through utilising case study methodology. Flyvbjerg seeks to demonstrate how

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the social sciences can progress from the domain of natural sciences’ poor (very) distant relative to a rational, practical and sense giving domain.

Flybjerg’s book is a thought provoking, clearly articulated piece of writing that engages the reader from beginning to end. He provides a clearly drafted pathway to a re-enchanted social science capable of making a difference in ways more suited to its unique praxis. Flybjerg hesitates to argue in

imperatives and he consistently and quite respectfully acknowledges the role and importance of natural science in modern discourse throughout his book. He plainly entreats the reader to consider three possible actions for social science. First, the social sciences need to drop the pretense that social and natural sciences are two peas in a pod. As tempting as it may be to mirror the methodological successes of the natural sciences, the social sciences have unique strengths independent of the natural sciences’ frames of reference. Second, social science needs to address issues of significance to the communities it serves – albeit local, national or global – in ways that are relevant and context dependent. Finally, the research results need to be digestible by its audience – society. Social science needs to effectively

communicate research results to the community and welcome the feedback it offers (2012: 25).

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Flyvbjerg reminds the reader that his is but one approach and avoids offering universal and prescriptive applications of phronesis. It is the practicality of his approach that makes his book so exciting to read – particularly if the reader is a budding social or political scientist looking for ways to make a difference. Having said that, Flyvbjerg’s audience is potentially far reaching as he avoids esoteric, difficult to understand concepts and phraseology - writing in an approachable yet disciplined way. By demonstrating his methodology through case study example, Flyvbjerg cleverly draws the reader in, demonstrates his own enthusiasm for the subject and exhibits an almost palpable passion for his subject. He asks important questions and is not afraid of the answers. He gives credit where it is due and offers alternative approaches to natural and social scientists alike – even those whose epistemological positioning is ‘dyed in the wool’ positivist in nature. There may be some for whom the ‘science wars’ remains a grandiose intellectual minefield. For those who want the social sciences to progress in a meaningful and practical way, Flyvbjerg’s ‘Making Social Science Matter’ is a great leap forward.

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Reference Flyvbjerg, Bent . “Making Social Science Matter” in Social Science and Policy Challenges: Democracy, values and capacities edited by George Papanagnou, 2012 pp 25-56

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