People vs. Burgos (G.R. No. L-68955 September 4, 1986) G.R. No. L-68955 September 4, 1986 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. RUBEN BURGOS y TITO, defendant-appellant. Facts: Defendant is charged with illegal possession of firearm in furtherance of subversion (tasks such as recruiting members to the NPA and collection of contributions from its members) and found guilty by the RTC of Digos, Davao del Sur. From the information filed by the police authorities upon the information given by Masamlok, allegedly a man defendant tried to recruit into the NPA, the police authorities arrest defendant and had his house searched. Subsequently, certain NPA-related documents and a firearm, allegedly issued and used by one Alias Cmdr. Pol of the NPA, are confiscated. Defendant denies being involved in any subversive activities and claims that he has been tortured in order to accept ownership of subject firearm and that his alleged extrajudicial statements have been made only under fear, threat and intimidation on his person and his family. He avers that his arrest is unlawful as it is done without valid warrant, that the trial court erred in holding the search warrant in his house for the firearm lawful, and that the trial court erred in holding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violation of PD 9 in relation to GOs 6and 7. Issue: If defendant’s arrest, the search of his home, and the subsequent confiscation of a firearm and several NPA-related documents are lawful. Held: Records disclose that when the police went to defendant’s house to arrest him upon the information given by Masamlok, they had neither search nor arrest warrant with them—in wanton violation of ArtIV, Sec 3 (now Art III, sec 2). As the Court held in Villanueva vs Querubin, the state, however powerful, doesn’t have access to a man’s home, his haven of refuge where his individuality can assert itself in his choice of welcome and in the kind of objects he wants around him. In the traditional formulation, a man’s house, however humble, is his castle, and thus is outlawed any unwarranted intrusion by the government. The trial court justified the warrantless arrest under Rule 113 Sec 6 of the RoC: a) When the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is about to commit an offense in his presence; b) When an offense has in fact been committed, and he has reasonable ground to believe that the person to be arrested has committed it; c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another and the confiscation of the firearm under Rule 126, Sec 12: A person charged with an offense may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything

which may be used as proof of the commission of the offense. However, the trial court has erred in its conclusion that said warrantless arrest is under the ambit of aforementioned RoC. At the time of defendant’s arrest, he wasn’t in actual possession of any firearm or subversive document, and was not committing any “subversive” act—he was plowing his field. It is not enough that there is reasonable ground to believe that the person to be arrested has committed a crime in a warrantless arrest. An essential precondition is that a crime must have beenin fact or actually have been committed first; it isn’t enough to suspect a crime may have been committed. The test of reasonable ground applies only to the identity of the perpetrator. The Court also finds no compelling reason for the haste with which the arresting officers sought to arrest the accused. We fail to see why they failed to first go through the process of obtaining a warrant of arrest, if indeed they had reasonable ground to believe that the accused had truly committed a crime. There is no showing that there was a real apprehension that the accused was on the verge of flight or escape. Likewise, there is no showing that the whereabouts of the accused were unknown. In proving the ownership of the questioned firearm and alleged subversive documents, assuming they were really illegal, the defendant was never informed of his constitutional rights at the time of his arrest; thus the admissions obtained are in violation of the constitutional right against self-incrimination under Sec 20 Art IV (now Sec 12, Art III) and thus inadmissible as evidence. Furthermore, the defendant was not accorded his constitutional right to be assisted by counsel during the custodial interrogation. His extra-judicial confession, the firearm, and the alleged subversive documents are all inadmissible as evidence. In light of the aforementioned, defendant is acquitted on grounds of reasonable doubt of the crime with which he has been charged. Subject firearm and alleged subversive documents have been disposed of in accordance with law. The Court also maintains that violations of human rights do not help in overcoming a rebellion. Reiterating Morales vs Enrile, “while the government should continue to repel the communists, the subversives, the rebels, and the lawless with the means at its command, it should always be remembered that whatever action is taken must always be within the framework of our Constitution and our laws.”