Sarbanes Oxley: An Antidote To Executive Greed? | May2011 | “Today I sign the most far-reaching reforms of American business practices since the time of Franklin Delano Roosevelt. This new law sends very clear messages that all concerned must heed. This law says to every dishonest corporate leader: you will be exposed and punished; the era of low standards and false profits is over; no boardroom in America is above or beyond the law”- George W. Bush | |

INTRODUCTION
Since the initial separation of corporate ownership from corporate management, the abuse of power by management has been a concern. Early in the last century a small number of Industrialists owned and controlled the major corporations. Slowly, as these individuals aged and retired, their vast holdings were transferred to a large number of decedents who were, for the most part, disinterested in managing the firms in which they held an ownership share. The shareholders relied on experienced managers to direct their corporations. This transfer of power gave rise to agency problems wherein the agent of the organization (manager) is likely to place their own interest above those of the actual owners of the firm. There is a vast body of literature addressing the issues of agency problems and clearly defined Agency Theory to which the majority of scholars subscribe (Van Ness, Miesing, and Kang, 2009) The original attempt to create an antidote to agency problems was the formation of corporate boards of directors (Van Ness and Seifert, 2007). These directors were given the legal authority to oversee executive decision-making and strategic actions. Nevertheless, they have demonstrated a lack of enthusiasm or motivation to effectively oversee management decisions and actions. Proactive boards, those that are conscientious about their fiduciary responsibilities and fulfill them, effectively