University of Kassel
Governance of the World Market:
Institutions, Instruments and Experiences (MCC III)
Prof. Christoph Scherrer
Winter Semester 2015/2016

The Analytical difference in Conceptualising the Russia-Ukraine Conflict in Realist and Materialist Terms

Kofi Adu Frimpong Kholmati Kholik
Global Political Economy Global Political Economy
33423968 33420343 kadfrimpong@yahoo.com kkholik@gmail.com

15/03/2016

Abstract
The so called Euromaidan revolution – Ukraine’s struggle to move one step further to closer ties with Europe by liberating itself from the Russian orbit, have created the Russia-Ukraine Crisis. It has re-established and heightened the tensions between Russia and West. Realism has been on the fore front of the academic discussion in explaining the crisis as the power competition between Russia and the West. Alternatively, Materialism has provided a different yet deeper analytical perspective on the conflict by attributing it to the broadening of the transnational class capitalism. This paper will seek to explain and scrutinize the analytical differences in conceptualizing this crisis in Realist and Materialist terms.

Keywords: Ukraine crisis, Realism, Security, Materialism, Lockean heartland, Contender states

Table of Contents 1 Introduction 4 2 Theoretical framework 5
2.1 Theoretical underpinnings of the Realist school of thought 5
2.2 Theoretical underpinnings of Materialism: Amsterdam School Approach 7 2.2.1 The Lockean Heartland 8 2.2.2 Contender States 9 2.2.3 Ex-contender states, aspirant states, and capitalist class fraction 10 3 The Russia-Ukraine conflict 12
3.1 Russia-Ukraine conflict in Realist terms 12 3.1.1 NATO expansion 13 3.1.2 European Union (EU) expansion eastward 15 3.1.3 Spread of Democracy 16
3.2 Russia’s containment policies to the Western affront 17 3.2.1 Annexation of Crimea 17 3.2.2 Economic Sanctions on Ukraine 18 3.2.3 Separatist Movements 19
3.3 Importance of Ukraine to Russia 20 4 Russia-Ukraine conflict in Materialist terms 21 4.1 The Lockean Heartland (the West) 21 4.2 The Contender state (Russia) 22
4.3 The clash between the West and Russia –The Ukraine conflict 23 5 Conclusion 26 References 28

1 Introduction

Crisis between countries and also within nations are often analysed to know the causes and the way-forward in conflict resolution. Usually, political theorists conceptualise these crisis based on their school of thought. Many have written on the Russia-Ukraine crisis in Realist, Materialist and Idealist terms. This paper seeks to conceptualise the analytical difference of this crisis in realist and materialist terms.

In order to better understand the reasons behind the Russia-Ukraine Crisis, general background information about the crisis will be presented as a first step. Secondly, since the main aim of this paper is to analyse the crisis in Realist and Materialist - mainly Amsterdam School approach - the main assumptions and historical underpinnings of these two theories will be examined. Subsequently, the paper will analyse the difference in conceptualising the conflict while applying the two theories to the Russia-Ukraine Crisis. The conclusion will summarize the crisis in both materialist and realist paradigms.

The Ukraine, which means borderland in Russian language, is wedged between Europe on the West and Russia on the East. The country has been pulled between both sides for a long time which dates back to Catherine the Great’s time. Even though Ukraine gained its independence after the disintegration of Soviet Union, it has largely remained dependent under the political and economic influence of Moscow (Debardeleben, 2009). Since its independence, Ukraine experienced weak governance, high level of corruption and more importantly a one-sided economy which was dictated by oligarchs with connections and heavy reliance on Russia. The country did not succeed in establishing stable political institutions, and this hindered its capability to implement economic reforms and overcome corruption (Wilson, 2014: 10-12; 90).

The first attempt to bring reforms and decrease the dependency towards Moscow took place with the occurrence of the Western backed Orange revolution. However, the promising post-revolutionary government, led by Viktor Yushchenko, ultimately broke down in conflicts and corruption scandals. As a result of this, Viktor Yanukovych’s pro-Russian government came to power through democratic elections (Mearsheimer, 2014).

Ukraine’s most fatal and protracted crisis since its independence began when president Yanukovych rejected a broad pro-EU treaty in favour of closer ties with Russia. In November 2013, this consequently sparked up large demonstrations in Kiev. The protests resulted in a coup (or the flight of an autocrat) against Yanukovych’s government, which brought a pro-Western government to power consisting of leading opposition parties (Mearsheimer, 2014: 2-4).

In the concern of its national security, North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) expansion to its boarders, losing its military stronghold and important economic interests in Ukraine, Russia responded by swiftly annexing Crimea and supporting pro-Russian separatist rebels in eastern Ukraine (Mearsheimer, 2014: 2-4). Considering all these developments, the crisis has incited a global standoff between the West and Russia and their relations have hit a post-Cold War nadir. The following section of this paper will look at the theoretical underpinnings of this paper.

2 Theoretical framework

The theories of Realism and Materialism will be explored to conceptualize and to analyse the crisis. This would enable us to determine how the two theories differ, using a concrete case of the Ukraine conflict. First, Realism will be examined in order to ground the conflict into the theory. Secondly, Materialism which we would focus narrowly on the Amsterdam school of thought will be explored to conceptualise the conflict.

2.1 Theoretical underpinnings of the Realist school of thought

Realism is a widely used political philosophy that attempts to describe the behaviour of the states vis-a-vis one another in international politics. This theory contends that sovereign states are rational and unitary actors in international politics. Being self-interested in nature, states tend not to recognise any authority higher than its own. Thus, the international system is commonly called anarchic with no central authority to regulate the actions of states. It is filled with injustice and limited morality, which is manifested as active or potential conflict among states (Donnelly, 2000: 7-14).

The state’s power is the essential end of its political actions and the interests are preserved through the use of power, as international politics is also defined by contending power bases. The level of the power of the states affects their strategies and outcomes of their International Relations (IR) policies. Hence, states always seek to maintain and increase their power in order to ensure their own survival, national security and the ability of being self-sufficient. This character of the states brings to a security dilemma by which when a state strives to increase its power it brings bigger instability as the other states will interpret it as a threat to their survival and they would also build up their power in response. Therefore, the zero-sum game becomes the issue of security and in this setup relative gains can be made (Donnelly, 2000: 7-14). Thus, less powerful states counterbalance power by forming alliances with other states (Goldstein and Pevehouse, 2013: 43-45). Moreover, foreign policy is considered to be a tool for the survival of states (Donnelly, 2000: 8).

The realist school of thought includes diverse approaches along with its theoretical tradition. It moves back to the times of Thucydides (460-400 BC) who, along with Niccolo Machiavelli (1469-1527) and Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679), is regarded to be the founding father of this school of thought. In Thucydides’ book – the History of Peloponnesian War, one can see all the elements of realism, such as, state actors, anarchy, security, power and morality. In the events (and the dialogues) throughout the Peloponnesian War one can see that in the anarchic international arena, the powerful states are the rule setters and the only right is the right of the stronger to command the weaker. According to Thucydides it was the growth of the Athenian power that raised Sparta’s concern about its own security which consequently pushed them into war (Korab-Karpowicz, 2006: 232-244). Comparing Russia-Ukraine crises to this event of the change in distribution of power, one could explain Russia’s concern about its own national security.

Later on, Niccolo Machiavelli introduced a more radical nature of political realism by separating politics from morality. In his book The Prince, Machiavelli argues that there is no rule of ethics in international politics. The world is a self-help system and states ought to always strive to exploit every possible avenue to maintain and increase their own power relative to other states or achieve certain political ends even if it is at the expense of others, thus ensuring their own survival. His radical approach to realism is applied both in domestic and international affairs (Meinecke, 1998: 355-357).

Thomas Hobbes, another influential political thinker, has contributed and expanded this school of thought. In his book Leviathan he argues that, it is the egoistic human nature that is the starting point for realism. He acknowledges that politics is governed by objective laws that have their roots in self-centric human nature (Donnelly, 2000: 7). Sovereign states like independent individuals are enemies by nature, competitive, asocial and there is no moral limitation on their behaviour. He concludes that the state of nature is a state of war (Yurdusev, 2006: 305).

Realism was introduced as an approach to the study of international relations by Hans Morgenthau (Snyder, 2002: 149). In recent times, Neorealism where Mearsheimer can be found as either offensive or defensive. But taking a close look at his works, he prefers the defensive neorealism. As realism emphasizes international relations as a competition for power among self-interested nation states, one can understand the root causes of the Russia-Ukraine crisis.

2.2 Theoretical underpinnings of Materialism: Amsterdam School Approach
While the realist school of thought considers nation states to be the relevant agents in international politics, Marxist theories focuses on classes. The major underpinnings of Materialism and the Amsterdam School approach in particular, the proponent of which is Kees van der Pijl, will be explored in the following part of this paper.
First, Historical materialism, which was developed by Karl Marx (1818-1883), uses the transformation of productive forces and class struggles to reveal history. According to this theory, the society’s structure, ways of thinking and its evolution are shaped and determined by the material conditions of the society’s modes of production (ways of producing and reproducing social production relations).The theory asserts that economic forces are the principle forces that drive man over history as social classes interact (Shimp, 2009: 41-43). Applied to politics, this theory argues that both international and domestic politics emerge from the uneven relationships of the classes based on their location in the mode of production. Thus the external politics of a state is shaped and defined by the domestic economic attribute/aspect of its society (Goldstein and Pevehouse, 2013: 103-104).

Coming from neo-Gramscian critical approach, Kees van der Pijl also moves above state centric analysis, and looks deeper by recognizing the development and structure of the state and international politics as moments of transnational dynamics of global capital accumulation and class formation (Pijl, 1998: ix; 10).

The hegemony of liberal or Lockean Heartland is the key idea for Kees van der Pijl’s argument which is named after the ideologue of the England’s 1688 “Glorious Revolution”, John Locke. The heartland is explained as ‘organically consolidated body of states at the centre of international political economy’ (Pijl, 1998: 65). The heartland contains a transnational society which began to take shape in the course of 17th and 18th centuries, taking its roots from British Isles (with the ‘crystallisation of capital and state society/complex’) (ibid). And since the industrial revolution in England the major parts of the world was turned into its periphery and that only a small number of societies have succeeded in withstanding the pressure towards peripherisation and achieve an autonomous catch up development (ibid; 66).

2.2.1 The Lockean Heartland

The Lockean Heartland’s leading states, first U.K. and U.S. later, have formed and developed an advanced capitalist block that has become the hub of global capitalism. The majority of the other states that reached to become developed states were absorbed into the system of the heartland (coercively or by passive revolutions), and became its periphery. Furthermore, only small number of societies could resist peripherisation and attain somewhat sovereign catch up development (Van der Pijl, 1998: 66). These societies are termed as the Hobbesian contender states (due to its authoritarian nature) which challenges the hegemony of the Lockean Heartland (Pijl, 1998: 65) in the global political economy and international politics.

The characteristics of the societies in Lockean Heartland is explained as possessing unique capitalist social relations which come from its common law tradition, protracted self-regulating society, occupied with embedded attitudes towards authority and law, ideology of passive individualism, and missionary perception of its role in the world (i.e. Puritanism influence) (Pijl, 2006: 13).

The state structure and the way of governance vary considerably in Lockean Heartland and contender states. The Lockean countries can be characterized as democratic with developed civil society, where power arises from society. The social ruling class through its ownership of productive/financial assets influences the government. The cadre who manages every day affairs of the state and its economy is dependent on the consent and support of the social ruling class to manage businesses, or organize for election campaigns and govern when elected (Pijl, 2008: 36). Lockean Heartland with its more advanced state society complex, dynamics of capital accumulation combined with institutional and ideological progress created transnational society that has already occupied the international field commercially and culturally (Pijl, 1998: 79).

2.2.2 Contender States

While in the Lockean Heartland the rise of the bourgeoisie benefited from a steady tradition of local self-government, in the countries resisting peripherisation by the Lockean Heartland, the strong state, ‘once put in place, proved less easy to transcend’ (Van der Pijl, 1998: 79).

The states which challenge the hegemony of Lockean Heartland in global political economy are called contender states. In order to catch up with the leading social system of production and development level of the heartland (Pijl, 1998: 80) the contender state mobilizes its resources and society around the state’s control (behind its catch up effort), because as Van der Pijl says it offers a shorter (but usually more brutal) route to social integration and modernisation (Pijl, 2006: 14).

Thus, in contender states the power resides with the state ruling class. It is the state that, as the main institution, shapes and drives forward the social formation and institutions and most importantly controls the key spheres of economy. Therefore, it is the sovereign state rather than the capital that determines the status of social actors and their constraints (Pijl, 1998: 81). Even local capitalist firms relate not to the self-regulating market as comprehensive social structure (Pijl, 2008: 36), but to the state first and the ‘state by definition prevails over social initiative, public over private’ (Pijl, 1998: 81); Moreover, the socialization of labour is mainly shaped by territorial confines of the state (ibid).

As capitalism has spread to almost every corner of the world, the contender states who are also capitalistic, challenge the hegemony of the Lockean Heartland within the capitalist scheme. The contender states also, in order to expand their bloc, strive to assemble a group of states around themselves and try to bring about larger sphere of influence. Van der Pijl argues that ‘if capital’s needs to expand are part of the driving forces of a contender state’s foreign policy, it too is subordinated to this plan, adding the dimension of competition for world market shares to the confrontation’ (1998: 85). This point becomes useful for one to understand Russia’s motives and actions in international politics, as it too is counted as a contender state.

The Table 1 below summarises the major differences between the Lockean Heartland and the contender state.

Table 1
The Lockean and Hobbesian state/civil society complexes | Lockean | Hobbesian | Privileged terrain of social action | Civil Society | State | Framework for interest articulation | Transcendent Comprehensive Concept of Control | Explicit Doctrine of National Interests | Ruling Class | Bourgeoisie (with governing class) | State Class | Mode of Regulation | Self-Regulating Market (civil law) | Centralized Administration | Mode of expansion | Transnational | International |
Source: (Pijl, 1998: 84)

2.2.3 Ex-contender states, aspirant states, and capitalist class fraction

The contender states began to evolve from the 18th century starting from France, followed by Germany and Italy as well as Japan. But along the time they were either co-opted or coercively through wars were forced to stop existing as contender states. They have been absorbed and incorporated into the expanding heartland without entirely overcoming the earlier fault lines. The above mentioned countries can be categorized as ex-contender states (Pijl. 2006; 14). Apart from this, there are a group of aspirant states like Ukraine, who pursue to develop, but as time passes they are persuaded either coercively or voluntarily into being vassals to the Lockean Heartland. And they are used as a Western policy as active balancing against the contender states. (Pijl, 2008: 35).

Another important aspect of Kees van der Pijl’s argument is the notion of capitalist class fractions. This idea is that there is no single bourgeoisie class, but rather sub-classes within the bourgeoisie class. These sub-classes, in order to achieve their interests compete among each other. This leads to economic and political struggles, depending on the existing propensity of capital accumulation and social development. Previously the accumulation was of industrial capital; capital accumulation today is geared towards financial capital instead (Pijl, 1998: 3-8). This argument also can give one an idea to understand the internal division and conflicts in Ukraine.

These disparate class fractions operate transnationally by trying to collaborate with likeminded classes that share common interests. The dominant class fractions in the Lockean Heartland venture beyond trying to seek a wider sphere of influence and access to ‘confiscated’ society of the contender states or current/potential aspirant states through trade, credit operations, investment or just setting cultural standards and make them to submit to the ‘capitalist discipline’ (Pijl, 2008: 36). The above mentioned factors play an important role in explaining the domination of the Lockean Heartland in the capitalistic system over its rivals.

Now, the theoretical underpinnings of Realism and Materialism have been explained above, the two theories will be applied to the Russia-Ukraine conflict as the analytical tools. 3 The Russia-Ukraine conflict

Ukraine,which was part of the erstwhile Soviet Union, shares several cultural and economic ties with Russia. Nikita Khrushchev, a former premier of Soviet Union, gave Crimea as a present to Ukraine in 1954 (Butterworth, 1992: 659-671). There are a number of Russians living in Eastern part of Ukraine; and there is now a “proxy war” in Eastern Ukraine that is believed to be financed by Russia but it has never been admitted (The Economist, 2015).

The Maidan or Euromaidan Revolution which is also referred to as the Revolution in Dignity (Shveda & Park, 2016: 1)began in 2013 and was the beginning of the turmoil in Ukraine. The aim was to end the rampant government corruption and also to align Ukraine with the more prosperous West (Metre et al. 2015). The revolution succeeded in a way by making President Viktor Yanukovych flee from Ukraine in February 2014. President Putin in a quick response used this external provocation as a means for annexing Crimea, a peninsula which Russia expected to be the hub of a NATO’s naval base (Mearsheimer, 2014: 1).

The Russia-Ukraine conflict intensified with the annexation of Crimea and also when the pro-Russian Eastern Separatists occupied major government buildings in the eastern part of the country (Mearsheimer, 2014: 4). The crisis concurrently reproduces the trend of conflicts in the past decades within the ex-soviet blocs, for instance the Estonian and Georgian conflicts (Metre et al. 2015). In the following sections of the paper, the Russia-Ukraine conflict will be conceptualised in Realist and Materialist terms and the analytical difference between these two theories will also be discussed.

3.1 Russia-Ukraine conflict in Realist terms

The Realist theorists have been in the centre of discussion in the Russia-Ukraine conflict. Theorists, including Henry Kissinger, Stephen Cohen, Michael Chossudovsky, John Mearsheimer, and Nicholas Gvosdev, among others have written comprehensive essays on the conflict in Realist terms. According to some Realist theorists, the argument by some scholars and commentators that Russia’s annexation of Crimea was as a result of its age-old desire to recapture soviet territory, is false (Mearsheimer, 2014: 1). But rather the trio of western policies which includes the NATO expansion eastward, European Union’s (EU) enlargement eastward and the Western effort to spread democracy and other western values is considered to be the remote cause of the conflict. These triple western actions have been directly reacted to by Russia by annexing Crimea in order to put a check on NATO and the EU (Gardner, 2014: 2). Concurrently, Russia is looking for a Eurasian geostrategic, economic and political alliance, the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and a Russian Chinese military alliance to be a counter hegemonic bloc to these developments (ibid). These western policies which most Realists believe are the cause of the conflict will be extensively reviewed in the subsequent sections.

3.1.1 NATO expansion

The NATO expansion is the root cause of the Russia-Ukraine conflict (Mearsheimer, 2014:1) and it is a deliberate attempt by the West to integrate Ukraine into its system and further weaken the Russian course i.e. to resuscitate the Soviet empire (ibid). There has been high level of anticipation by the West that Russia would one day look forward to recapture the control of the post-soviet countries. In reaction to that, there has been a persuasive drive for the admission of new member states into the NATO and there is the high speculation of even inviting more members into it, in order to close the geopolitical vacuum between Germany and Russia (Weinrod, 1996: 2). To the NATO, its expansion is not primarily to defend an attack on its members but rather to deter any future threat from occurring. The Article 5 of the NATO treaty says that any armed attack against one or more member states is considered to be an attack against the community, which have to be followed by a collective/collaborative counteraction. It is a deterring factor to defend an attack on their members and some scholars and commentators assert it is the only reason why Russia has not attacked any of the Baltic States. Therefore, it is an insurance policy against uncertainties (ibid). In the mid 1990’s, the Clinton administration started a push for NATO enlargment and in 1999 Hungary, Czech Republic and Poland were admitted as members of NATO. In 2004 a second set of countries namely Estonia, Latvia, Romania, Lithuania, Slovakia, Bulgaria and Slovenia were admitted into the alliance. Croatia and Albania were subsequently added on in 2009 (Mearsheimer, 2014: 2).

Russia’s history reveals that, with experiences from the Napoleon 1812 invasion, there will always be an attempt by the West to include it on western terms in order to weaken its power (Black, 2000: 5). This anxiety of elimination has made Russia come out with defensive mechanisms to meet all these attempts to make it weak (Mearsheimer, 2014: 6). As early as September 6, 1995, ex-President Boris Yeltsin warned that a NATO expansion "would plunge Europe into the flames of war" and also Alexander Ivanovic Lebed, a Russian military officer and politician made a statement that it “would mark the beginning of World War III” (Weinrod, 1996: 3). In these same line of forecasting, General Leonid Maiorov, a former deputy secretary of the Russian security council in a journal of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs said the eastward expansion of the NATO is a realistic threat of splitting up Europe and has a possibility of an impasse spiral (Black, 2000: 169).

In response to NATO’s expansion eastward, in November 1993, Russian strategists signed the “Basic Provisions of Russian Federation Military Doctrine” into law (Black, 2000: 164). This law was to give Russia the permission to strike a nuclear weapon in its weak position of having NATO place missiles in the “Visegrad States” (Black, 2000: 156). Russia’s unhappiness and confusion heightened with the 1995 Bosnian Serbs bombing and the 1999 Kosovo bombing. This was because Russia had sympathy for its Slavic kin and also had warned the US and the NATO about the use of military force in the region (Black, 2000: 14). In 2008, Russia further threatened proactive actions in response to NATO’s integration of countries in the Caucasus region (Gardner, 2014: 5). In the April 2008 Bucharest summit, NATO’s offer for Ukraine and Georgia to join it worsened the NATO-Russian relations (ibid). This eastward movement was opposed by Germany and France who are also strong NATO members, for the simple fact that, it will antagonise Russia but the US supported the movement and subsequently a statement was issued that Ukraine and Georgia will become NATO members (Mearsheimer 2014).

The key point Realists raised about the NATO’s expansion eastward was its failure to consider the security concerns of Russia. Geopolitics 101 will suggest to you that great powers are always sensitive to other powers next to its boarders (Mearsheimer, 2014: 4). Therefore, the possible admission of new members (Ukraine and Georgia) who are on the borders of Russia are real threats to Russia’s security(Gardner, 2014: 6). According to Mearsheimer, leaders of the alliance tend to believe that Realism as a political theory has no importance in 21st century but the happenings in Ukraine shows that Realism or realpolitik still has a place in the academic discourse and in this era as well (Mearsheimer, 2014: 1).

3.1.2 European Union (EU) expansion eastward

In 1957, the European Economic Community (EEC) was established with Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands signing the Treaty of Rome (European Commission, 2007). The EU which originated from the EEC with its initial membership of 6 in the 1950s has grown to include 28 member states. The enlargement of the EU in 2004 and 2007 has been a great achievement in the European integration (Polański & Winkler, 2008: 6). According to Štefan Füle, the former European Commissioner for Enlargement and European Neighbourhood Policy, the EU is the home of about 500 million people from the Black Sea to the Atlantic and its policy of fostering peace and stability in the region is still relevant today. The EU’s focus is to consolidate rule of law, promote democracy and also promote fundamental human rights and freedoms of all aspirant countries (ibid). In 2004 the Czech Republic, Cyprus, Hungary, Estonia, Latvia, Malta, Lithuania, Poland, Slovenia and Slovakia joined the EU. Also, in 2007 Romania and Bulgaria became members of the EU (European commision 2007).

The EU’s eastward enlargement has been met with disaffection by Russia although not that vociferously objected to, as in the case of NATO (Debardeleben, 2009: 45). Whereas the EU saw this enlargement as a positive sign politically, economically and also very necessary; Russia had its own interpretation of this enlargement/expansion. Initially Russia was with the expectation that the admission of post-Soviet countries into the EU will inject pro-Russian concepts into the EU. Later, when other Baltic countries were admitted and the movement of Russians were restricted into the EU region by requiring a Schengen visa, then Russia had a different perception to the EU enlargement (ibid: 46).

One of the major contributing factors to the Russia-Ukraine conflict is the 2009 EU Eastern Partnership Initiative (EPI) which appears to be a flashback of the 1948 US Marshall Plan (Gardner, 2014). The Marshall Plan which was an economic recovery programme for Western Europe also sought to prevent the spread of communism. The EU EPI was originally pioneered by Poland, and later Sweden, in their proposal on the 28th May 2008 (Debardeleben, 2009: 48) for an opportunity to discuss issues of trade, travel agreements and economic strategies. This initiation was unsurprisingly opposed to by Russia (Mearsheimer, 2014: 3). Sergey Lavrov, a Russian Foreign minister saw this initiative as an avenue of the EU to generate some level of control in the eastern sub region and also to serve as “spy” for the NATO (ibid). Under the auspices of the Eastern Partnership Initiative the EU signed free trade agreements with the countries. In 2013 President Yanukovych (Ukraine) refused to sign this agreement due to Russian pressure, since Russia planned to integrate Ukraine to its own free trade bloc. As a consequence, the Ukrainian people went out to the street and the Euromaidan protest began. This EPI policy sought to by-pass Russia and to make its neighbouring countries as a focal point for the EU. Russia saw this partnership as a move to restrain its impact and control over these Eastern European countries and thus Moscow began to oppose this partnership (Gardner, 2014: 6).

3.1.3 Spread of Democracy

According to the Realists, the Western desire for the spread of democracy and other western values in Ukraine and other Eastern European countries has been a contributing factor to the Russia-Ukraine crisis (Mearsheimer, 2014: 3). There has been deliberate attempt by the West to promote democracy in Ukraine and this can be witnessed in the tremendous funding of pro-western politicians, individuals and in some instances organisations (ibid). Further to promote democracy and civil societies, the US through its National Endowment for Democracy, a non-profit making organization, has financed 60 projects in Ukraine alone (Mearsheimer, 2014: 3).

In November 2004 to January 2005, the Ukrainian Orange Revolution which was a series of protests against undemocratic electoral practices and corruption in Ukraine had a negative impact on Russia because their preferred candidate, Yanukovych, did not win the elections (Quinn-Judge and Zarakhovich, 2004). Viktor Yushchenko emerged as the winner of the elections. The perceived pro-western Ukrainian President Yushchenko’s government was antagonised by Russia and there was a movement called an anti-democratic engineering which pushed for the candidature of Viktor Yanukovych who emerged as the winner in the April 2010 elections (Gardner, 2014: 7).

Russia sees this Western social influence as a threat to its own security, and fears that it might be the next target for this social engineering (Mearsheimer, 2014: 3). This fear is borne out of having a democratic Ukraine as its neighbour - what then happens if the people in Russia also push for this Western value? Then Putin would be on the losing side. Putin as a strategist would not allow this to happen and therefore has to be counter strategies to stop these western policies (ibid).

3.2 Russia’s containment policies to the Western affront

The three western policies to which Realists believe is the cause of the Russia-Ukraine conflict has been met with containment policies or counter strategies by Russia. Among these policies are three main strategies adopted. First, it is the annexation of Crimea. Second, the imposition of Economic sanctions on Ukraine and thirdly, the use of Separatist movement in Donbas (Mearsheimer, 2014: 4). These three policies will be reviewed in the following sections.

3.2.1 Annexation of Crimea

It is important to note that the Budapest Memorandum signed in 1994 by countries with nuclear weapons (among which was Russia and USA) and former Soviet States (like Belarus, Ukraine, and Kazahstan) which aimed at making the former Soviet states give up the nuclear weapons on their territories to Russia. In exchange, Russia would respect and honour the territorial integrity of these countries. Russia’s annexation of Crimea is a breach of this memorandum (Budapest Memorandum 1994).

Russia’s plan to annex Crimea has been in the pipeline for over two decades as Sergei Karaganov, a Russian geopolitical strategist (1997: 300) predicted a likely break-down of Ukraine and the occupation of some its parts by Russia. The 2014 annexation of Crimea was a swift proactive intervention by Russia to further prevent another Euromaidan government in Ukraine with the fear of throwing out the Russian Black Sea fleet from their naval base in Sevastopol (Gardner, 2014: 2). The Yanukovych government and Russia in 2010 had signed an agreement, i.e. the Kharkiv Accords or Kharkiv Pact, to lease Sevastopol to Russia up until 2042 but the new government in Kiev were trying to re-negotiate or better still annul the whole agreement and consider an offer from the EU. Russia had to take strategic steps to weaken and to put a check on the EU-Ukrainian ties and also the NATO membership aspiration of Ukraine (ibid). Russia in the light of all these developments, after 22nd February 2014, had to annex Crimea as a first stepin its own defensive mechanism to survival (Mearsheimer, 2014: 4).

President Putin in a statement challenged Ukraine’s territorial authenticity after the NATO summit in Bucharest in 2008 to admit Ukraine and Georgia as members to the NATO. He indicated that Ukraine as a country is “an artificial creation” and that the eastern and southern territory of Ukraine including Crimea was handed over to Ukraine at Russia’s expense by the Soviet Communist Party Central Committee (Gardner, 2014: 5). Even the transfer of Crimea to Ukraine under the Stalin’s constitution of the Soviet Union was illegal and breached the Article 14 and 18 (Bebler, 2015: 202). Crimea historically has been an essential part of Russia’s empire and it has been close to Russian Military’s heart for geostrategic benefits (ibid: 199).

The annexation was not that difficult compared to that of Georgia’s invasion in 2008 (Bebler, 2015: 205). It was well rehearsed and professionally executed by 2000 Russian marines, 15000 troops and 7000 special troops (ibid) and a number of other military personnel who were already stationed in the naval base of Sevastopol (Mearsheimer, 2014: 4). The geographical occupants of Crimea are 60% ethnic Russians and that gave the annexation a further boost (ibid). Dmitri Medvedev, the Prime Minister of Russia, in a statement called Crimea a non-negotiable territory and therefore, a “closed chapter” (Bebler, 2015: 219). Here, Machiavelli’s argument that states will do anything possible to ensure on maintaining their power and guaranteeing their national security even if it is in the expense of other states, can be relevant.

3.2.2 Economic Sanctions on Ukraine

Russia as part of its containment policies to the Western affront has imposed economic sanctions on Ukraine (Mearsheimer, 2014: 4). President Putin’s effort to make Ukraine weaker economically in order to discourage it from joining the West has tightened Russian-Ukrainian economic deals by astronomically increasing prices of natural gas it supplies to Ukraine and also demanding prompt payment of past exports (ibid).Gazprom, a large Russian natural gas company, in 2009 demanded payment of a substantial debt owed to it from 2006, from an insolvent Ukraine and later decided to stop all supplies into Ukraine (Gardner, 2014: 7). Russia threatens Ukraine of preventive measures in the Russia-led Customs Union where Ukraine has most of its exports (60%) revenues from namely Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus (Gardner, 2014: 8). In 2013, Russia further imposes trade blockages on Ukraine leading to significant Ukrainian Exports and industrial production drops (ibid).

3.2.3 Separatist Movements

Separatists are Russian sponsored armed men and women who are pushing for civil war in Ukraine. Russia has bankrolled the salaries, social security and pensions for the local military officials in the separatists area and it is estimated that if this payment is maintained Russia is going to incur over $1 billion annually (Crisis group, 2016). Putin, in order to achieve this aim of destabilising Ukraine, has provided these separatist groups with diplomatic support, arms and advisers who determine the next line of their actions. To further worsen Ukraine’s security, Russia has put on the borders of Ukraine large armies who threaten to descend on Ukraine if there is any attempt by the Kiev government to attack these rebels (Mearsheimer, 2014: 4).

The above discussed containment policies are placing massive pressure on Ukraine and aims to discourage it from joining the West. An alliance with the West at the doorstep of Russia is a threat to Russia’s survival and therefore, Russia would rather prefer the non-existence of Ukraine as a country to an alliance with the West (Mearsheimer, 2014: 4). The subsequent section of the paper examines the importance of Ukraine to Russia in Realist terms and why it sees its own survival attached to the neutrality of Ukraine or having Ukraine by it side.

3.3 Importance of Ukraine to Russia

First and foremost, in Realist terms, Ukraine serves as a buffer zone between the West and the East (Mearsheimer, 2014: 7). It was through Russia’s Western neighbours that imperial Germany, Napoleonic France as well as Nazi Germany attacked Russia, therefore no Russian leader will sit idly by to see Ukraine been integrated into the West which Russia sees as its mortal enemy (ibid: 4). Prior to the EU enlargement eastward, Ukraine was outside the EU’s influence and it was largely influenced by Russia politically and economically (Debardeleben, 2009: 48). Insofar as this buffer zone may not be logical to some scholars and the West, Russia as in the case of any great power sees potential threats near their territory (Mearsheimer, 2014: 4).

Secondly, as has already been mentioned earlier in this paper, Crimea stations Russian Naval base in Sevastopol (Mearsheimer, 2014: 4). It also houses Russia’s fleets and gives Russian access to the Black sea, the Mediterranean and the Atlantic. Crimea which is a multi-ethnic region has native Russians as its majority occupants and has historically gone through series of conflicts over who controls this important region (Aliu & Jashari 2015). Russia has one of its largest military industry outside Russia in Crimea (Klein 2009).

Furthermore, Ukraine is a home for many ethnic Russians and as a means of catering for Russians abroad there is a need for Russia to have influence in Ukraine. President Putin in statement claimed 17 out of 45 million Ukrainians are Russians and therefore it is the duty of Russia to see to it that they steer the affairs of these people (Gardner, 2014: 5). In Crimea alone, President Putin claimed that 90% of the inhabitants are Russians (ibid). Many of these people belong to the Ukrainian Communist Party and are against the westernisation of Ukraine (Black, 2000: 191).

In essence, the Russia-Ukraine conflict is as a result of the use of different theories of International Relations by the West and Russia. On the one hand, the West is adhering to liberal ideas and thinks that in modern day international politics trade plays a key role. On the other hand Russia is strongly acting as Realists would say to deter western expansion towards its sphere of influence and maintain its power in order to guarantee its national security and its survival. This conflict should better be seen as a geopolitical matter (Mearsheimer, 2014: 5).

The following section reviews the second aim of this paper i.e. the conceptualisation of the Russia-Ukraine conflict in Materialist terms (an alternative to the mainstream Realist view of the crisis). This paper will stick to the Amsterdam School of thought of Materialism in reviewing the conflict. The theoretical framework laid down in the earlier parts of the paper will be used to explain the conflict.

4 Russia-Ukraine conflict in Materialist terms

In chapter 2, the theoretical framework by Kees van der Pijl, who is the prominent contributor to Amsterdam School of thought, a distinct genre of IR and IPE theory, views the world to be comprising of two broad entities in which each grouping has specific characteristics (Pijl 2008).The Materialist view of the Russia-Ukraine conflict has not been at the forefront of the academic debate like the Realist perspective. On one hand is the Lockean Heartland and on the other hand is the Contender State. These two extreme blocs battle fiercely for the control of global political economy and also the greater access to raw materials (Pijl, 2008: 35).In between these two extreme blocs are the intermediary states which comprise of the secondary contenders, vassals, colonies and semi-colonies (ibid: 35). These countries do not entrap themselves with the core rivalry between the core and the primary contenders and some examples of such countries are Brazil and Turkey among others. In the following sections of the paper the Lockean Heartland and the contender states will be reviewed in the simplest form in order to conceptualise the Russia-Ukraine conflict in Materialist terms.

4.1 The Lockean Heartland (the West)

This is a historical formation of a capitalist class which Robert Cox (1986: 205) argued that forms the core of international relations. The Lockean Heartland which will sometimes be referred to as the Core or the West in this paper is primarily a group of Anglophone Atlantic countries namely Britain, USA and Canada (Pijl, 2006). In the Lockean Heartland, there is the transnational society which has liberal space open to transnational capital to move freely (Pijl, 2008: 34). Transnational capital is not restricted in the Lockean Heartland but rather it moves from the core into the contender state through trade (in the case EU expansion), investment (in the case of NATO military investment) and sometimes the spread of western values (Pro-democratic movements in Ukraine) (ibid: 36). In the Lockean Heartland, there are attempts by various class that use state power to work together to fight any opposing power that rises against the heartland (Pijl, 2006).

NATO and EU have been used as a means of integrating Ukraine into the Lockean Heartland. These two western arms have contributed immensely to the Russia-Ukraine conflict as has been argued above in Realist terms. NATO which is a military alliance originally for English speaking Atlantic countries aims at securing a continental westernised Europe devoid of intra-European rivalries and also to mobilise a working class military base (Pijl, 2008: 34). The EU is seeking a free trade Europe and a Europe which is based on Western values. There are countries within NATO which years ago were part of the contender states but through political rivalry they have been integrated into the Core (ibid: 35).

4.2 The Contender state (Russia)

As mentioned earlier, the contender state which is often referred to as primary contender or the latecomer is the opposing force which gives the Lockean Heartland competition in the global political economy. This bloc has organised countries around itself and they challenge the core by preventing entry of Western goods and sometimes resort to radical preventive means (Pijl, 2008: 35). As stated above, unlike the Lockean Heartland, power resides in the state class, in which they control both political and economic affairs of the state. Also, the public prevails over the private. This does not imply that private ownership of property is forbidden in the contender state but this capitalist form does not qualify it for transnational capitalism (ibid: 36). There is some form of capitalism in the contender state but it differs from the capitalism of the Lockean heartland. For the purpose of this paper, Russia, which qualifies as the primary contender, would be characterised as such in the modern structure of the global political economy. In the same way the Lockean Heartland seeks to integrate other countries into it, the contender state, i.e., Russia is expanding through the Eurasian Customs Union. As the EU has not clearly defined what it means by Europe, Russia has been seeking to reintegrate the former soviet countries around itself through political and economic means. The Eurasian Customs Union comprises of Belarus, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Armenia. There are attempts by Russia to integrate Moldova, Tajikistan and Ukraine into it (Gardner, 2014 :7).

4.3 The clash between the West and Russia –The Ukraine conflict

One major reason for the Russia-Ukraine crisis is the EU Eastern Partnership Initiative (EPI). In 2009, the EU’s EPI which aimed at promoting free trade in the eastern corridors of Europe met a stiff opposition from Russia (Mearsheimer, 2014: 2). The Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA) which was been pushed by the European Union for a trade partnership with Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova was declined by Yanukovych for a counter offer by Russia (Kramer, 2013). The government in Kiev in January 2014 approved an economic partnership with the Eurasia Customs Union which is led by Russia that was expected to be in operation until 2020. This agreement was not meant for Ukraine to be part of the body but rather to have economic and other important trade ties in industries such as ship building, aerospace industry, agriculture, tourism and most importantly the energy sector (Goldthau, 2014). Russia being the giant in trade in the eastern part of Europe automatically saw the need to challenge any attempt by the West to freely trade in the Balkans and the Caucasus. Russia's fear is that a closer relationship between Ukraine and the EU will give EU’s goods free access into the Ukrainian market, with no import duties, and a further export into Russia. If this happens, these goods will be competing with the domestically produced goods in Russia and it will weaken Russian economy (Gardner, 2014 :6). Also, the American and European transnational companies will outclass the pro-Russian Ukrainian firms in the military industry and other high technological areas which are mostly found in the Eastern part of Ukraine (ibid). This programme of cooperation between either the EU or the Eurasia Customs Union has led to instability in Ukraine. And in so far as the Lockean Heartland wishes to expand its bloc, the contender state market shrinks (Pijl, 2008).

Secondly, the fractures in the nation state of Ukraine have contributed to the Russia-Ukraine conflict. The contender state, in order to uphold its sovereignty, in the midst of social, ethnic and religious divide, resorts to state-controlled economy (Pijl, 2008: 36). The West on the other hand, pushes to destabilise a country which does not open up to western cultures and also make capital accessible to its society. They also take advantage of these fractures and exploit these societies by making capital accessible to the section which aligns itself with them (ibid). The Ukrainian instability and conflict is as result of these fractures. Ukraine, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, has been characterised with embedded capitalist fraction which a section hold ties with Russian market and the other section bonds with the EU market or the western market. The eastern part of Ukraine which is mainly pro-Russian has metallurgical and mining industries and it contributes about half of the country’s GDP. The livelihood of these inhabitants are linked to the Russian economy because most of their commercial exchanges are with Moscow (Trenin 2014). The Western part on the other hand, which is pro-Western is poorly industrialised compared to the east. Apart from Kiev and a few other big cities, most of the cities in this region are rural and represent the most depressed parts of Ukraine. With the rampant corruption and debt stock of Ukraine, a section of the state class are eager to integrate the country into the West (ibid). According to Vysotskaya (2014) the international position of Ukraine can never be discussed without the consent of Russia. And what the West failed to acknowledge is the fact that Ukraine was born out of Russia and the two countries are historically and culturally bonded together.

Moreover, the quest for the West to seek aspiring bourgeoisie (Pijl, 2008: 37) in Ukraine contributed to the conflict. After the conquest of the Louis and Napoleonic France, the Anglophone West requests countries seeking to modernise to wield their power and entrepreneurship into the hands of the social ruling class (ibid: 39). This social ruling class exerts pressure on their countries to open up their markets and also to embrace the free market capitalism way of life. This is a means of promoting a system where people will no longer depend on the state for major political and economic needs. Inasmuch as the NATO Expansion and the EU enlargement in Ukraine were to promote security and trade, it was also seeking a new set of a social ruling class who did not belong to the existing state class, to control production, control labour and finally control the market (ibid: 37).

Furthermore, the Lockean Heartland, in order to neutralise Russia’s state-led class through NATO and EU, are pushing for neoliberal strategies in Ukraine (Pijl, 2008: 41). Countries such Hungary and Czech Republic among others who opened up their economies for neoliberal strategies have seen transnational companies from the West capitalising on them and investing in their economies (ibid: 42). Ukraine, which according to Macedo (2010), is a transit route from Asia to Europe and also transports energy and other mineral resources between these two continents and is therefore of great importance to the Lockean Heartland and the contender state at the same time.
The expansion of NATO to the east is considered as the West taking advantage of the collapse of the Soviet Union. Robert Hunter who was a US Ambassador to NATO asserted that an eastward expansion will be an occupation of the eastern civil space (Pijl, 2008: 44). This will give the United States and its allies the edge to control the civil space in order to launch air attacks on its rivals as was in the 1995 case of Bosnian Serbs. Russia in the case of Kosovo had no say although it was on the UN Security Council; the US bypassed the council and launched an attack. Considering all these previous happenings, Russia as a former world power would not sit idly for the NATO to control the eastern civil space and therefore would rather destabilise Ukraine or better still in Putin's words see to it that Ukraine will cease to exist (Mearsheimer, 2014: 2).

Lastly, the material base of Ukraine is the driving force of the Russia-Ukraine conflict. According to the US Central Intelligence Agency (2014), Ukraine is one of the best post-Soviet countries which possess better economic prospects and for the Lockean Heartland (Pijl, 2008) there is always the need to locate new markets. The country's natural resource endowments range from coal, shale gas, iron, uranium to other precious minerals. These natural resources and their corresponding industries are state-controlled (World Bank, 2014) and therefore a push by the West to integrate Ukraine into it will open the floodgates for privatisation, and Western transnational capital will find its way into the Ukrainian economy and its cheap skilled labour. Russia on the other hand, benefits from these state-led policies of Ukraine and therefore sees the privatisation of these industries as a threat to its own economic fortunes (Trenin, 2014: 5).It is important to note that most of the Russian gas passes through Ukraine to Europe. There is one other pipeline in the Baltic Sea to Germany too, but for example Hungary and other Central Europeans get it through Ukraine. Therefore, the control over Ukraine for Russia is crucial since Ukraine can use its taps any time (ibid: 3-6).

5 Conclusion

The current down-tone of the Russia-Ukraine conflict cannot be seen as the end to this conflict. The future of the crisis is difficult to predict. The United States and the EU considers the annexation of Crimea (a city within a sovereign state) as illegal and sees Russia's actions (Realism) as illogical in 21st century. Russia as a former hegemon in this moment of economic difficulties would struggle to maintain at least regional power. Since the Russian policy-makers have the mind-set of a former hegemon, they have created the Eurasia Customs Union (Materialist) which would serve as a counter trade bloc to the EU. This trade body has faced tremendous challenges after the ousting of Viktor Yanukovych (Wilson, 2014).

The two theories which we have reviewed above show the causes of the conflict through different perspectives. The Realist on one hand, attributes the conflict to the trio western policies namely, NATO eastward expansion, EU enlargement and the spread of democracy. To the Materialist, on the other hand, the contributing factors to the conflict are the desire of both the Lockean Heartland and the Contender state to control and also to have access to the material base of Ukraine.
Looking at the above analysis of this paper, Materialism has the upper hand in understanding the Russia-Ukraine crisis over Realism. Whereas Realism plays emphasis on competition for power among the states, Materialism reveals the impact of extension of Western capitalism in the happenings of Ukraine. The conflict is more for the control of markets and economy than the mere survival of Russia.
In sum, Table 2 summarises the main aim of this paper i.e. the conceptualisation of the Russia-Ukraine crisis in Realist and Materialist terms.

Table 2 | Realism | Materialism | Primary Actors | State | Transnational class | Primary Focus | Security | Mode of production | Foreign policy | Survival | Extension of capitalism | Contextualization | Anarchy | Lockean Heartland vs contender states |

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