INTRODUCTION
It is the summer of 530 and Rome is facing the possibility of war with the growing Persian Empire. The Roman fort in the city of Dara, which is close to Persian territory, is seen as a major threat to the Persian Empire. Strategically, the importance of the city of Dara was very considerable since it covered a major route into Roman Mesopotamia and beyond into north Syria or northwestwards into Asia Minor (Haldon, 2008). The Battle of Dara takes place outside the city walls in the summer of 530. It is at this pivotal battle that the Roman forces reinforce the small force theory that is used on the modern battlefield (Leonhard). The Roman Commander Belisarius had proven himself a resourceful commander, known to do a great deal with very little. History has shown that Belisarius takes his soldiers into battles vastly outnumbered and yet they end up victorious.
THESIS
The intent of this battle analysis is to highlight three key events, causes, effects, and lessons learned as it relates to the battle tactics that the Romans used at the Battle of Dara. It has been argued by historians that the larger force usually end the battle victorious. By examining this Battle, we will prove that warfare has evolved throughout the years. Small forces of highly trained and disciplined soldiers can out maneuver and be victorious in armed conflict against a much larger force despite having limited resources.

KEY EVENT 1
The previous year relations between the Roman emperor and the Persian king had started to deteriorate drastically. The Persian king viewed the outpost at Dara as a direct threat to the Persian Empire. Dara was located along a major route into Roman Mesopotamia and north Syria. King Kavadh of Persia was determined to remove the Romans from this strategic location. As a result, the Emperor of Rome ordered the walls of Dara strengthened in anticipation of an attack from the Persian forces.
CAUSE: The Roman army was encamped just outside the walls of the city. Why did Belisarius choose this location? He would rather fight them head on than to risk a siege by a force with almost unlimited resources. He also had another reason for choosing to fight outside the city. He wanted to use the walls of the Dara to protect the rear of his army. The Persian army was extremely large and be able to encircle his forces and attack from the rear quite easily if he met them in an open field.
EFFECT: The effects of his decision were that he was able to focus his military firepower in one direction during the battle with limited concern for the rear being compromised. The Persian army would have to attack directly to the front of the Roman line or to the flanks where the strongest of Belisarius forces were waiting. The victory, which ensued, re-established the Romans’ bargaining power (Haldon 2008).
LESSONS LEARNED: The lesson learned from Belisarius decision is that, in open battle, the protection of the soldiers rear will afford those soldiers confidence that they are not vulnerable to attack from behind. It is to some extent a very good confidence builder for the soldiers. A very good defense opens the door to an even better offense.

CURRENT DOCTRINE: FM 3-21.20, The Infantry Battalion, clearly states that well planned defensive operations defeat an enemy attack, buy time, economize forces, or develop conditions favorable for offensive operations. Belisarius was able to exploit the time allotted to him and his soldiers to prepare the terrain to his advantage. Defensive actions alone are not decisive; they must be combined with or followed by offensive action.

KEY EVENT 2
Belisarius used the environment to his advantage by digging trenches along his front between his forces and those of the Persians. He also placed an element of his Hunnic cavalry on the right side behind a hill and out of the sight of the Persian army. His prior knowledge and experience from previous battles his predecessors had with the Persians gave him the advantage he needed.
CAUSE: He knew that the Persians would utilize their mounted cavalry against his less disciplined infantry. By placing his infantry on the opposite side of the trenches from the advancing Persian army, he would protect his infantry until he truly needed them. Should the Persian army attack through the trench they would be at a great disadvantage and highly vulnerable to the defending Roman army on the other side. He placed his strongest soldiers along the sides of his line and the trenches. This would force the Persians into battle with his strong cavalry units on either wing or risk annihilation by his infantry if they attempted to pass through the trenches.
EFFECTS: The immediate effects of this defensive tactic were felt on the second day of the Persian attack. The Persian general ordered a general assault along the entire Roman line. On the right side of the attack, the Persians were able to push the defending Romans back. Unbeknownst to the Persians, Belisarius had ordered his forces that were hiding behind the hill to attack the advancing Persians from the rear while his right side defenders counterattacked. The Persians lost some three thousand cavalry in the Roman counterattack. The Persian general ordered his main attack on his left side. Due to the limited freedom of movement for his much larger force, the Persian general made a decision that cost him the battle. His forces were split into two uneven groups as Belisarius forces regrouped and counter attacked. During this critical part of the battle, the Persians lost a captain and a rout ensued. The Persians lost approximately five thousand soldiers during this time and they began to flee from the battlefield.
LESSONS LEARNED: Preplanning, area reconnaissance and preparation are all aspects to be exploited by any commander. Belisarius used what information he possessed along with his knowledge of the terrain, and even man made obstacles to control the way he would have his army fight the battle. Surprise delays enemy reactions, confuses his C2, and reduces the coherence of his defense.
CURRENT DOCTRINE: Commanders can use bad weather, seemingly impassable terrain, feints, demonstrations, and false communications to lull the enemy into false perceptions. Commanders must then exploit the situation before the enemy realizes what occurred (FM 3-90).

KEY EVENTS 3
Prior knowledge of the opposing forces tactical posture and mindset. This was evident when Belisarius was able to incorporate his defenses into his offensive tactics. He was able to anticipate their every move and counterattack each time thus giving him the decisive victory for which he strived.

CAUSE: Defense should only be used as a temporary measure to deny the opposing force freedom of movement whilst allowing for counter attack options for the defending army. Several times throughout the battle, the Persian army was able to push the Romans back. The Romans were able to fix and flank the much larger Persian force to regain the advantage throughout the battle.
EFFECTS: His defensive/offensive combination was felt when the Persians attacked his left wing initially. As the cavalry under Bouzes command fell back, Pharas attacked just as Belisarius ordered him to do from behind the hill. The result was the Persian cavalry was subsequently killed when Bouzes units counterattacked from the front while Pharas cavalry attacked from the rear.
LESSONS LEARNED: As a commander, there is never enough intelligence about the enemy size, structure, location, and capabilities. This is information that can aid you in the preparation of your attack and defense. Decisive operations depend primarily upon the simultaneous, synchronized delivery of devastating precision effects and exploitative maneuver to control terrain, to defeat enemy forces and to control populations and resources that leave the enemy bereft of the physical and moral capabilities of resistance (FM 3-90).
CURRENT DOCTRINE: Defensive operations have several purposes: defeat or deter an enemy attack; gaintime; achieve economy of force; retain key terrain; protect the populace, critical assets, and infrastructure; and develop intelligence (FM 3-0 and FM 3-90). The Roman army at Dara achieved these elements through command, control, and discipline.

CONCLUSION: The belief that the possessor of the larger army is guaranteed the victory is not favored. There are other elements that can and will assist in the overall outcome of battle. In the end, leadership, mobility, firepower, and tactical durability usually win the day (Leonhard). The tactics used by Belisarius ensured his forces the decisive victory on the fields outside the city of Dara. The Persian general over confident because of his large army which doubled the size of the Roman forces committed his forces carelessly. This led to his forces being overwhelmed by the disciplined forces of Belisarius. Current doctrine will focus on small units who are trained in using the terrain and other key elements to achieve their ultimate objectives. We examined how Belisarius was able to use what was available to him to his advantage thus giving his army the victory they yearned for. Although the man made and environmental elements were available to him, he also used excellent battlefield tactics with timing. He was not over confident but he was resilient and stayed focused on his task. He anticipated his opponents’ moves and exploited their weaknesses. Current doctrine tends to favor the use of small highly mobile and well-trained soldiers. These elements would engage larger forces and the predicted result is that they would emerge victorious. Despite the fact that much of the technology that is being utilized on today’s battlefield was not available during battles such as the Battle for Dara.

References
Rome and Persia at war, 502-532 (1998).Greatrex.
Haldon, J. (2008). The byzantine wars.
Leonhard, R. (n.d.). Belisarius and small force theory
The Mounted Brigade Combat Team, FM 3 – 90, (2001) HQ of The Army.