Table of Contents
1. Introduction..............................................................................................3
2. János Kádár before the revolution in 1956...............................................4
3. János Kádár during the revolution in 1956............................................6
4. Hungarys situation from 1956 to 1963....................................................7 a. External effects............................................................................7 b. Internal effects...............................................................................8 i. Economy............................................................................8 ii. Politics................................................................................10
5. Conclusion..........................................................................................13
6. Bibliography.......................................................................................15
7. Appendix............................................................................................16
Why did János Kádárs dictatorship change in 1963?
János Kádár was one of the most significant single-party state rulers in the Eastern-bloc of the USSR in the second half of the twentieth century. He was the premier of Hungary from 1956 to 1958 and from 1961 to 1965. In addition, he was the first secretary of Hungarian Socialist Workers Party from the revolution of 1956 to 1988, when he became sick and his days were numbered.[1] As he was set up by the Soviet leader, Nikita Khrushchev, Kádár was strongly communist oriented. However, his dictatorship counts as being tough from 1956 to 1963 and being soft from 1963 to 1988. Why did his dictatorship change in the year 1963? By examining the events of the years before the revolution and the ones during the period from 1956 to 1963, we realise that the change in Kádár’s dictatorship was deeply influenced by his past and both external and internal events. To support my thesis statement, I will explore Kádár’s role before and during the revolution, together with the effect of external and internal events on Hungary’s economical and political situation from 1956 to 1963.
The examination of single-party state rulers shows that they generally never changed their policies during their rule. The reforms were usually brought by their successors, when sometimes it was already too late. However, János Kádárs dictatorship changed under his leadership and thus it is considered special. My curiosity led me to investigate the reasons how and why this transformation happened and so I decided to choose this as my extended essay topic.
As this is a complex topic which includes both Hungarian and foreign events, there is an immense necessity for internal and external documents to support the ideas. An interview was made with a former doctor of Kádárs politburo, nonetheless the limitation of the source is that it is too subjective. Therefore, historical books from both domestic and foreign authors concerning the period from 1956 to 1963 and Kádár as well as internet articles and encyclopaedias were required.
Janos Kádár before the revolution of 1956
In the first half of the 20th century in Hungary, people generally were employed based on the status of their families. The fact that János Kádár was born in a poor family, within the workers class, in 1912 had a big influence on his later employment. As Kádár became unemployed in 1930 because of the impact of the Financial World Crisis on Hungary, his passions made him participate in a revolt against the regime, because of the big redundancy and low salaries. Shortly after the uprising, he entered the Organisation of Young Communist Workers through an old friend.[2] The events of the 1930s made Kádár a public enemy, and therefore he was arrested. [3] “I stopped being a child and turned into a real communist the moment I got into the hands of the class enemies,” said Kádár about the memory of his arrest.[4] This quotation reflects the brutality of the former police and regime. As he was imprisoned, he lost his membership at the Organisation of Young Communist Workers. It is important to mention that not his incarceration led to his discharge from the organisation, but his cooperation with the regime and treason.[5] Nevertheless, shortly after his release, in 1942 he became the first Chief Secretary of the Communist Hungarian Party, which can be mainly attributed to his acquaintance with Mátyás Rákosi.[6] As during World War II, Horthy’s regime was governing the country and communist ideologies were clandestine. Therefore, the Communist Hungarian Party changed its illegal name to Peace Party, maintaining the same aims with Kádár as the Chief Secretary.[7] Now as Kádár was legally a party leader, he became more and more influential; therefore, he became disturbing in the eyes of the actual regime and Kádár was arrested at the first opportunity by the German troops while he was travelling to Yugoslavia.[8] Meanwhile, the group of leaders living in exile, such as Mátyás Rákosi, Ernő Gerő and Imre Nagy came back from Moscow and established the Hungarian Communists Party. Kádár was replaced by Ernő Gerő and by that became deputy of the Chief Captain of Budapest Police Department.[9] By applying the methods, he learned and experienced during the imprisonments, he quickly went up the ladder and after a few months became a member of Rákosi’s Politburo.[10] In addition, in 1948, he was proclaimed the Minister of Interior, by which his influence and popularity among the citizens grew.[11] In Hungary during these tense years after World War II, the leaders who became too influential and seemed too dangerous to the regime and especially to Rákosi, were liquidated. This can be observed in Kádár’s career too, especially in 1951 when he was arrested, deprived from his ranks, and sentenced to a life sentence.[12] However, by the fact that Imre Nagy became the Chairman of Council of Ministers of the People’s Republic of Hungary in 1953, Kádár was set free and regained respect within the Hungarian Communists Party.[13] By 1956, he became a member of the Politburo and Central Committee.[14]While the party members were satisfied with his work in the party, he secretly joined Imre Nagy and pretended to agree with him on his ideologies.
Altogether, by analysing the events he went through, and the people he was acquainted with, it can be said that he experienced the brutality and cruelty of this world and because of this, he was prepared for governing a country.
János Kádár during the revolution of 1956
During the revolution in 1956, Kádár played a two-faced game. First, he kept good relationships with the other members of the Politburo, as only they were capable of removing him. As Kádár was well acquainted with Rákosi and his brigade, he well knew his own possibilities and limits. On the other hand, he supported Imre Nagy’s ideologies that were contradictory to the regime. On 23rd of October of 1956, the population wanted Kádár to replace Ernő Gerő as Chief Secretary of the Hungarian Communist Party; however, Kádár refused and stood next to Gerő, mainly because he already experienced the cruelty of the Hungarian Communist Party and their methods.[15] Nevertheless, two days later he held a speech in the radio, where he gave the right to the demonstrators.[16] The situation became even more tense the next day, when on a Politburo meeting, Kádár stated that the military conflicts were not the problem, but rather the governing system.[17] This can be considered as the moment where Kádár totally turned to Imre Nagy and his supporters and claimed that the government needed Nagy as a Prime Minister. He supported the idea that the Soviet troops should retreat from the country and asserted his will to calm the situation with the rebellions.[18] On 30th October when the communists from the old regime, such as Rákosi and Gerő, were sent to Moscow, the situation started cooling down; however, the citizens still did not trust in Imre Nagy and János Kádár.[19] The next day on a meeting with Mikolaj and Suslov, members of the Soviet Politburo, there was a discussion about the acceptance of a democratic system of voting, the removal of the Soviet troops from Hungarian lands and the secession from the Warsaw Pact.[20] In addition, Kádár changed the party’s name from Hungarian Communists Party to Hungarian Socialist Workers Party.[21] In the eyes of the soviet communists, these were too radical reforms; therefore, they decided to “bring” him to Moscow to have a personal meeting with Khrushchev, the premier of the USSR.[22] After Kádár exposed his opinion about Hungary’s situation and Imre Nagy to the premier of the USSR, they concluded that János Kádár was the right person for governing Hungary, as his reputation was still high within the population comparing to Ernő Gerő and Mátyás Rákosi. When Kádár came back to Hungary on the 4th of November, he became the Prime Minister of Hungary, as promised, but could only commence with his political reforms three days later.[23]
Hungary’s situation from 1956 to 1963
After the revolution, a more oppressive control over the population was necessary. As Kádár came to power and the Soviet troops remained, there was no will to resist. The Soviet military troops, and the Soviet delegates who remained in Hungary, had a big influence over the country’s internal affairs until the 1960s. As the soviet historians Sereda and Stikalin, would say, “Malenkov and Suslov were the ones governing Hungary in these years.”[24] In addition, the economical change and development that occurred in these years also influenced the Hungarian political life.
External effects
As mentioned before, the external events had a large impact on the internal ones. On the eve of 1960s, Hungary was still mainly depending on the USSR. On the other hand, the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party and Kádár were not yet recognised internationally or by the United Nations.
Three features were expected to be completed by the Hungarian government in order to be recognised internationally. First, they had to make a democratic voting system, which would give the population the possibility of electing between few parties. Second, the UN asked for the retreat of the Soviet troops and for the amnesty of all participants of the revolution of 1956. As Kádár did not want to complete these commands, and turned to the Soviets, discontent was the word describing Hungary in the west.[25] This led to a political isolation, however it decreased in 1957, when the possibility of travelling within the other communist and socialist countries already existed.[26] In 1960, on a meeting of the Politburo, ambassador Stikov and János Kádár, the ambassador gave negative criticisms about the development of the Hungarian industry. As Kádár felt the reducing influence of the USSR, his answer to the claim was that Hungary will never follow the policies of a Soviet Communist Party, and Khrushchev agreed, however to avoid any conflicts, Stikov was removed.[27] It could be felt in these years that Kádár felt the decrease of the Soviet influence in the country. The dismissal of Ernő Gerő and Mátyás Rákosi from the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party meant an end to the strict communist dictatorship and for Khrushchev, Hungary became an example in the Eastern bloc.[28]
Internal effects
Economy
During the Kádár era, especially from 1956 to 1963, the domestic economical policies had a large impact on the political life. After the revolution, the regime received large loans from the USSR to rebuild the destroyed factories and therefore stabilise the industry. By February of 1957, the revenues from the industry increased by 6% compared to 1955.[29] It was mainly caused by the development of the technology that was introduced from the loans received from the USSR.
The other problem the Hungarian economy was struggling with was the question of the privatized peasants. These landowning peasants were one of the biggest opponents of the regime, since the Rákosi-era, as they refused the collectivization, which the government asked from them.[30] As the question of peasants was one of the main causes of the revolutions in 1956, Kádár and his reforms had to be moderate. As a large percentage of the population was still working on the land, the regime was anxious about introducing reforms, which would drastically affect the peasants. Nevertheless, after Khrushchev’s visit in 1958, on a Central Committee meeting of the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party, Kádár declared that the socialist reconstruction would be introduced in agriculture.[31] A part of the agricultural socialist reform was that it was prohibited for the governmental enterprises to buy products from the privatized peasants. Therefore, after a certain time, the land workers realised that it would cost them less to work in a collective than to be deprived from their benefits. Thus, by 1961, 75% of peasants worked in collectives and their lands belonged to the state.[32]
As Kádár’s reputation was still low within the population in Hungary, he decided to raise the salaries and lower the taxes of the citizens, in order to increase his status.[33] However, the state was still obtaining huge external loans that increased the government’s debt, while the industrial and economic sources were too small to cover the credits. By 1962, the percentage of the population living from their salaries increased to 70%, while in 1949 it was around 50%.[34] As many reforms were introduced, the social levels started changing, and by 1962, 54% of the population belonged to the working class, while 16% was part of the intellectual social class.[35] In addition, the percentage of the population working in the agriculture was reduced to 30%, while it was around 41% two years earlier.[36] These changes indicated the improvement of the standard of living, even though the country’s economy was getting in a deeper debt every day.
Politics
The events of the economic reconstruction and change from 1956 to 1963 had a huge impact on Hungary’s political life. As previously mentioned, Kádár’s reputation in the eyes of the working class, the intellectuals, and the peasants was low, as he replaced Imre Nagy, who was the favourite of the people, since he was against the soviet ideologies and manipulation. In order to reduce the hatred towards him, Kádár declared that the soviet troops were slowly going to withdraw. However, shortly afterwards, he introduced the pro-soviet Hungarian Revolutionary Force of Arms, which were to replace the external troops in controlling the citizens.[37] This step led the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party’s status to increase within the population. It happened for two reasons: first, the inhabitants realised what a big force the system had, and this instilled fear in them. Second, they started to be biased towards the party because it showed the will to expel the soviet troops, even though, behind the closed doors of the politburo, this was never a plan during these years.[38] The passions felt towards the party resulted in its growth; from December of 1956 to February of 1957, the number of members increased from 30,000 to 120,000 people.[39] Still, in the opinion of Kádár and his party, the oppression was not enough, and as the State Security Department, known as ÁVH, was dismissed because of its brutal methods of torture, a new organization was introduced with the name Workers’ Militia, being controlled by the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party.[40]
With these military steps, Kádár and Hungarian Socialist Workers Party were prepared for the reprisal of enemies. The population realised the situation but did not even try to take any further steps.[41] For these reasons, between 1956 and 1958, many people fled to the west, many were sentenced to death, such as Imre Nagy, and even more were imprisoned, frequently without any evidence.[42] Generally, these requitals heavily reduced the number of intellectuals, as they were the most dangerous rivals of the system. On the eve of 1958, when the biggest rivals, Imre Nagy and his company, were executed, and some significant departments were resurrected, the reprisal was publically over.[43]
As most of the foes were expelled, dead, or imprisoned, Kádár’s next aim was to consolidate the leftover society. There still were adversary groups, which caused difficulty to the regime. These were, for instance, the clergy and its supporters, the intellectuals, poets and composers, such as Zoltán Kodály, and the peasantry, see part Economy.[44]
As the retaliations were over, Kádár and his followers had to exploit other methods to influence or reduce the enemy. Nevertheless, as the party’s reputation was growing, the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party did not want to spoil everything they had achieved. Therefore, they applied less painstaking techniques and enhanced strategic steps. First, to quell the passions felt by the clergy and its supporters, the government decided to appoint new archbishops and bishops who would support the new socialist ideologies. In addition, they promised financial support, to show their gratefulness and solidarity. However, these steps were still not enough for the clergy to accept the new government as it was. For that reason in 1959, Kádár agreed on the constitution of liberty of religious practices, which finally solved the difficulties between the clergy and the regime.[45] Second, the Writers Society was dismissed in 1957, so the intellectual class did not have space to express its adversary opinion. Nonetheless, they still caused much unrest, with their anti-socialist and anti-oppression writings and compositions. As a result, Kádár and the Politburo of the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party decided to re-establish the Writers Society with the hope of attracting them to the socialist regime. However, some writers refused, so the regime had to offer them more. Kádár suggested to the Central Committee, and together with their agreement, they proposed personal amnesty to those writers who were living in exile or were imprisoned for years and decades.[46] With these stages, the party attained the respect of the intellectuals and was capable of dealing with the most problematic peasantry.
The party established several youth groups in order to prevent the growth of adversary opinions in the future and to assure the education towards the support of the socialist ideologies. For the pupils in primary school, an organisation of scouts existed that taught the great features of the socialist systems through motivating and joyful games, as the regime advertised it. Additionally, the Association of Young Hungarian Communists, known as KISZ, was founded for the adolescents that were above the age of 14.[47] However, the importance of these youth organisations was not the teaching of socialism, but the educational opportunities. The members of these associations generally had more advantages than the ones who were excluded or simply refused to enter the association. For instance, a youth who was member of the KISZ had a bigger chance of getting into a good university than the ones who refused to join it. Consequently, for the state it was positive, as they considered that the people who were satisfied with the party would remain in it even after university. These measures meant the reduction of the enemy, and the improvement of the party’s reputation.
The elimination of enemies and the reduction of the adversary opinions together with the improving industry and social standard led to a climax in 1962, when Kádár claimed, “The one who is not against us, is with us!”[48] By this assertion, it can be assumed that Kádár was confident with his actions and had no doubts about any further revolutionary acts. In 1963, he declared amnesty for all participants of the revolution of 1956 and the people who participated in anti-governmental activities in the aftermath of the unrest.[49] As a result, by 1963, the institutions were consolidated, the soviet troops started leaving the country and general amnesty was proclaimed for the participants of the revolution. Thus, Kádár and his government were finally accepted both internally and externally.[50]
Conclusion
By analysing Kádár’s involvement before the revolution, during the revolt in 1956 and his active participation from 1956 to 1963, it can be concluded that he went through hard times, which drastically affected the change in 1963. Before he became the Prime Minister of Hungary, he experienced the viciousness of political life, which influenced his treatment of people and political stance. As Kádár was born in poor workers family, he had the chance to meet the cruelty of the world very early. After his participations in rebellions against the regime, he became a public enemy, and shortly after was arrested. During his imprisonment, he met the brutality of Horthy’s regime, and therefore turned into a communist. As he was set free, and was acquainted with the torture methods experienced during the incarceration, he was prepared for the suppression of any revolt. In 1956, Kádár seemed to be the perfect choice of the USSR to become the Prime Minister of Hungary, as he went through different social levels, and was favoured by the population.
By 1963, Kádár achieved most of his primary goals, which led to the transformation of his dictatorship. For instance, the reprisals from 1956 to 1958 decreased the number of his most influential enemies, such as Imre Nagy, by whom he feared, because of his high reputation within the population. By the introduction of different military departments, he embedded fear in the citizens, but at the same time gained some respect, as he seemed to eliminate the soviet troops. These events led to the consolidation of the population and the resurrection of the institutions, such as the Workers Militia, which was one of his primary aims. Second, his government was accepted both internally and externally, and the soviet influence was reduced as Khrushchev’s supremacy decreased after the Cuban crisis.
Therefore, it can be concluded that Kádár’s dictatorship changed in 1963 mainly because he completed his primary goals, both internal and external. In addition, his experience played an important role and for that reason, he was capable of coming to this position and keeping the situation under control. After all Kádár can be considered as being successful politician considering the period from 1956 to 1963, as he achieved his goals, kept the rebellions down and showed example to other Eastern bloc countries. However, whether his methods of achieving the goals were moral, is another topic to discuss.
Bibliography
1. Roger Gough, A good comrade Kádár János, [ford. Rákócza Richárd]Kádár János a jó elvtárs?,Budapest, JLX kiadó, 2006
2. Huszár Tibor, Kádár János politikai életrajza, Budapest, Kossuth Kiadó, 1. 2001
3. Huszár Tibor, Kádár János politikai életrajza, Budapest, Kossuth Kiadó, 2. 2003
4. Huszár Tibor - Szabó János, Restauráció vagy kiigazítás, Budapest, Zrínyi Kiadó, 1999
5. Szabolcs Ottó, Magyarország története, Budapest, Gondolat kiadó, 1976
6. Romsics Ignác, Magyarország története, Budapest, Akadémiai kiadó, 2007
1. Could you feel the influence of the USSR?
The influence of the USSR was very strong in the aftermath of the Second World War, however after 1956 the pressure reduced. The causes of the change are not be searched in the events of the revolution in 1956, but in the ruling class of the USSR, as Khrushchevs dictatorship was softer than the antecedents such as Stalin, Malenkov or even Bulganin. The soviet will was felt everywhere.
2. Did the establishment of Workers Militia seem good or bad? Why?
The establishment of the Workers Militia has evoked fear everywhere, as they were present everywhere, in schools, hospitals and industry. They were the military force of the ruling party.
3. Did the retaliations scare the population?
Yes, especially in Budapest as, the citizens were mostly on the side of the revolution, as many of us participated in these revolts with or without guns. 4. Did you feel free of suppressed during the period from 1956 to 1963?
There was no word of freedom. We hoped Kádár will be softer than his predecessors, as he felt their cruelty and was imprisoned by the previous regime, but we were wrong. 5. How did you see Kádár from 1956 to1963?
He was cruel. The countless incarceration, of famous writers, scientists, the case of Imre Nagy and the death penalties that regarded many were all approved by János Kádár personally. He was demonstrated as the perfect follower of the soviet regime. 6. Did János Kádárs reputation increase or decrease during the period?
In 1959, when the main leaders of the revolution in 1956 were sentenced to death, imprisoned, or expelled, his dictatorship softened. Sometime he refused the will coming from the USSR, and this could be felt more and more until 1963 and after.
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[1] http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/309432/Janos-Kadar
[2] Huszár Tibor, Kádár János politikai életrajza, Budapest, Kossuth Kiadó, 1. 2001 pg. 28
[3] Ibid. pg. 43
[4] Ibid. pg. 32
[5] Ibid pg 43
[6] Ibid pg 50
[7] Ibid pg. 56
[8] Huszár Tibor, Kádár János politikai életrajza, Budapest, Kossuth Kiadó, 1. 2001 pg. 66
[9] Ibid. pg. 75
[10] Ibid. pg. 92
[11] Ibid. pg . 125
[12] Appendix, Interview
[13] Huszár Tibor, Kádár János politikai életrajza, Budapest, Kossuth Kiadó, 1. 2001 pg. 223
[14] Ibid. pg. 263
[15] Roger Gough, A good comrade Kádár János, [ford. Rákócza Richárd]Kádár János a jó elvtárs?,Budapest, JLX kiadó, 2006 pg. 154
[16] Ibid. pg. 158
[17] Ibid. pg. 159
[18] Ibid. pg. 164
[19] Ibid. pg. 169
[20] Ibid. pg. 170
[21] Roger Gough, A good comrade Kádár János, [ford. Rákócza Richárd]Kádár János a jó elvtárs?,Budapest, JLX kiadó, 2006 pg. 174
[22] Ibid pg. 182
[23] Ibid. pg. 194
[24] Huszár Tibor, Kádár János politikai életrajza, Budapest, Kossuth Kiadó, 2. 2003 pg.8
[25] Romsics Ignác, Magyarország története, Budapest, Akadémiai kiadó, 2007pg. 890
[26] Huszár Tibor - Szabó János, Restauráció vagy kiigazítás, Budapest, Zrínyi Kiadó, 1999 pg. 32
[27] Roger Gough, A good comrade Kádár János, [ford. Rákócza Richárd]Kádár János a jó elvtárs?,Budapest, JLX kiadó, 2006 pg. 249
Appendix, Interview
[28] Romsics Ignác, Magyarország története[pic]()*+=>FKoîØÂج–„r`J4J*h²>[hÂî5?>*[pic]CJ$OJQJaJmH, Budapest, Akadémiai kiadó, 2007 pg. 896
[29] Szabolcs Ottó, Magyarország története, Budapest, Gondolat kiadó, 1976 pg. 395
[30] Romsics Ignác, Magyarország története, Budapest, Akadémiai kiadó, 2007 pg.. 894
[31] Roger Gough, A good comrade Kádár János, [ford. Rákócza Richárd]Kádár János a jó elvtárs?,Budapest, JLX kiadó, 2006 pg. 243
[32] Romsics Ignác, Magyarország története, Budapest, Akadémiai kiadó, 2007 pg. 895
[33] Ibid. pg 892
[34] Szabolcs Ottó, Magyarország története, Budapest, Gondolat kiadó, 1976 pg. 404
[35]Szabolcs Ottó, Magyarország története, Budapest, Gondolat kiadó, 1976 pg. 404
[36] Romsics Ignác, Magyarország története, Budapest, Akadémiai kiadó, 2007 pg. 895
[37] Ibid. pg. 891
[38] Ibid. pg. 892
[39] Ibid.
[40]Romsics Ignác, Magyarország története, Budapest, Akadémiai kiadó, 2007 pg. 891
Szabolcs Ottó, Magyarország története, Budapest, Gondolat kiadó, 1976 pg. 395
[41] Appendix, Interview
[42] Romsics Ignác, Magyarország története, Budapest, Akadémiai kiadó, 2007 pg. 892
[43] Ibid. 894
[44] Ibid.
[45] Romsics Ignác, Magyarország története, Budapest, Akadémiai kiadó, 2007 pg. 894
[46] Roger Gough, A good comrade Kádár János, [ford. Rákócza Richárd]Kádár János a jó elvtárs?,Budapest, JLX kiadó, 2006 pg. 249
[47] Romsics Ignác, Magyarország története, Budapest, Akadémiai kiadó, 2007 pg. 893
[48] Romsics Ignác, Magyarország története, Budapest, Akadémiai kiadó, 2007 pg 896
[49] Ibid.
[50] Ibid.
