The problem of evil is no problem at all In religious texts the world over the Abrahamic God possesses three inherent traits. He is omnibenevolent, omniscient, and omnipotent. God's omnibenevolence is one of the most appropriate reasons for worshiping him. But with that being said one finds it hard to view God as omnibenevolent when there is so much evil and suffering in the world. Some Atheists, perhaps unjustly, wield this discrepancy between idealistic dogma and perceived reality as strong evidence against the existence of God. First assume God exists. Along with his other powers, and most importantly for our species, God is supposed to possess omnibenevolence. Imagine a world created by an omnibenevolent god. What would this world look like? Most simply stated it would probably be a world like our own but with the absence of malevolence and suffering. This is a problem however, because by definition it does not match the world in which we exist. By imagining a universe without evil surely an omnipotent being could create such a thing if he so chose. God does not seem to have created such a universe, therefore he cannot be said to possess omnibenevolence. Or perhaps God wished to create such a universe but was incapable, refuting his omnipotence. Some atheists have used this line of thought to argue against any notion of a benevolent, all powerful God. At face value some might find this completely plausible but it is not as firm an argument as an atheist would hope. The modern atheist example of the logical problem with evil follows along these lines: God exists and is omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent. An omnibenevolent being would want to prevent all evils. An omniscient being knows every way in which evils can come into existence. An omnipotent being has the power to prevent that evil from coming into existence. A being who knows every way in which an evil can come into existence, who is able to prevent that evil from coming into existence, and who wants to do so, would prevent the existence of that evil. If there exists an omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent God, then no evil would occur. Evil does exist, therefore one finds contradiction in the notion of God's eternal benevolence. Based on the premises, a sound, reasonable argument might be made. Unfortunately, when one thinks critically, already in the second line of the argument one finds problems. The second premise states that an omnibenevolent being would want to prevent all evils. This seems to follow from the assumption that all evils are detrimental and negative in nature. But anyone can look out into the world and see that sometimes inherently evil things or processes beget good things and so to prevent all evil things would also prevent some, if not many, good things as well. Given that line of thought one could say that to try and prevent all evils would itself then be an evil task, unbecoming of an omnibenevolent being. An example of this would be a sculptor setting out to craft a masterpiece sculpture. He must first remove the block of stone from its natural environment. Then he must go to work chipping away at it, continually breaking off, piece by piece, everything that made it whole. Once he is finished he might have his beautiful masterpiece to inspire and captivate the masses, but it comes at the cost of ruining that natural beauty the stone inherently possessed. What if, by definition, a universe like ours could not be created, by any deity, without some suffering or evil? Is it possible that preventing some evil creates other evils? Furthermore what if the inherent evil in the world has purpose? Can it still be said to be truly evil? The foremost question might lead one to argue that if evil has duality and purpose, then the creator deity cannot be said to have omnipotence. This answer leaves the questioner wanting because of the implausibility or untenability of any deity, omnipotent or otherwise, being able to create things inherently contradictory, like a round square or a married bachelor. So, to press on, is there a greater good to having evil at work in the universe? John Hick, while not the first to put forth an argument to the greater good of some evils, has argued a refined version of the greater goods defense. Hick believes that humanity was created as a work in progress and that humans have a hand in the very process of completing this work. “Personal life is essentially free and self directing. It cannot be perfected by divine fiat, but only through the uncompelled responses and willing co-operation of human individuals in their actions and reactions in the world in which God has placed them”. What Hick means by this is that humanity could not be ready made as finite perfect beings. To achieve one's finite perfection one must work towards it with the tools the creator bestowed upon them. One must master temptations and make good, responsible choices throughout one's life. Evil and temptations are specifically inherent in the system of the universe for this purpose, to better all of mankind. Hick's greater goods defense has been criticized as an “all or nothing” fallacy. While Hick certainly seems to commit this fallacy, arguing about exactly how much and what kinds of evil can be attributed to building the greater good and what kinds of evil are simply wanton is a nebulous effort at best. Who is to say exactly how much suffering one has to endure to achieve divine levels of compassion and empathy when you cannot know the mind of others absolutely. The notion that just some small percentage of the current suffering would suffice is a very subjective argument that is not based on objective evidence. God might never have intended for everyone to reach the finite perfection described by Hick. Many people may need to suffer for perfection to be achieved by some. Many more may need to suffer to provide the necessary opportunities for others to achieve this perfection or to give reason for this perfection to be achieved. Because of one's confinement in this system, one is incapable of being objective and specific about the necessity of suffering for the system, and the people of it, to grow and make souls. This problem of evil is much too complex to be mapped out absolutely and objectively. The problem of evil may leave a thinker uneasy as to the true nature of one's universe. God, assuming he exists, can be shown to have a reason for creating a universe with this inherent amount of evil. Hick's arguments show just one way in which evil might just be the solution and not the problem. Furthermore Hick's critics are merely trying to argue a subjective notion of how much suffering is necessary, as if there were evidence out there that some objective amount of suffering would always amount to an ideal ratio of soul-making to soul-breaking. Any argument weighing heavily on this unknowable ideal ratio does not bolster the argument against evil.