The Rise of Canadian Military Professionalism in World War 1

Paul Dickson in his article “The End of the Beginning: The Canadian Corps in 1917,” attempts to answer the question of what factors were responsible for the turnaround in professionalism and capability of the Canadian Expeditionary Force (CEF) during the later half of the First World War.

The author’s thesis is that the Canadian Corps that fought at Vimy Ridge was not the superlative force that the Canadian public thought they were. In fact, during the early period of World War I, before 1916, the Canadian Corps was still in its infancy and definitely undergoing teething troubles, even though the beginning of a firm and solid base was slowly developing. “The Canadian Corps that took Vimy Ridge was not the “elite” formation it would become in 1918, but the foundation was firmly in place.” Prior to 1916, the author explains that the key ingredients to success that are described as “good habits” and a “good organizational culture” , were not fully in place and prevented the CEF from reaching its maximum operational effectiveness.

Dickson is intrigued with the CEF in that there was an element that made them unique to both their Allied and Axis counterparts allowing them to reach this “elite” plateau, as the “Canadian Expeditionary Force (CEF) shared many of the problems encountered by other armies on the Western Front…” . He attempts to explore this question and seek answers. Was it better equipment, demographic or genetic differences? Dickson explores this and notes that from a battlefield perspective, CEF soldiers were faced with the same challenges that the British, French and German forces faced in particular concerning the rapid advances in battlefield technologies. As well, the Canadian soldier was “…not far different from the BEF (British Expeditionary Force) at the beginning of the war… (as)…enlistment standards were similar.” Therefore, from a tactical and genetic perspective, there simply does not appear to be any notable denominator that can attribute the sudden change.

In any conflict, attrition of soldiers, in particular ones leadership, can have a detrimental effect on the ability for an army to have success. Here, the CEF may have had a slight advantage over the BEF in terms of lower casualty rates and leadership turnover. Dickson provides evidence that the casualty rates from both the CEF and BEF were astronomically high. Among the CEF, the rate through 1915 and 1916 was approximately eighty-seven percent casualties while among the BEF, one study had estimated around ninety-seven percent. Both rates are extremely high, and although it could be argued that the CEF may have an edge concerning this area over the BEF, when any military force is losing close to 90% of its force there simply isn’t the levels of continuity to give one an edge. The CEF with such a high casualty rate as well, would only have a slight advantage over their counterparts, yet it would certainly be negligible.

The author also explores another area in examining the equipment used, in an attempt to see whether this may have been a factor, yet quickly discovers that all things considered, the CEF certainly did not have an advantage in this area either. With such poor equipment such as their main infantry weapon the Ross Rifle which jammed at critical moments, the famous shovel with a hole in it, and the combat boots and webbing that would shred and fall to pieces, The CEF certainly did not hold an advantage in this regard, and in fact the CEF quickly sought to replace the Ross Rifle with the British Lee Enfield as soon as they could convince the Canadian government through the casualty statistics.

The single factor that Dickson believes contributed to a turnaround for the CEF was the change in military culture that now began to encourage; with the approval of Canadian political ministers, a break from all the rigid conventions of the British Army. The result of this was that Canadian commanders were given far more liberty to begin making their own decisions on the battlefield, and just as importantly, had the freedom to begin to do things differently. Equally important, CEF commanders were rewarded for displays of innovation creating an entirely different shift of culture that would lead to battlefield successes.

The author has illustrated how important a strong individual culture can be in the overall effectiveness of a military. By breaking away from its Allies and nurturing its own individual identity, the CEF began the process of growth with its own identity. As Dickson indicates, once this was in place, the CEF developed its “elite” status.

References:

Paul Dickson, “The End of the Beginning: The Canadian Corps in 1917,” in Course Reader (Lesson 5), p.31.