What was the role of internal resistance in East Timor’s independence from Indonesia in October 1999? East Timor’s much-deserved independence from Indonesia was a multidimensional achievement, with a wide range of economic and political implications. Internal resistance was certainly not the sole contributing factor – there was great interplay between numerous forces, such as the actions of Indonesian armed forces and paramilitary affiliates, Jakarta’s evolving political environment, and pressures from governments abroad, which led to the nation’s independence. However, internal resistance as a part of the independence struggle was particularly unique in East Timor as it manifested in two forms – violent resistance and non-violent resistance – each creating impacts of varying magnitudes. I chose the role of internal resistance as the focus of my research due to the intriguing nature of this very distinction. This essay will attempt to demonstrate that internal resistance of both forms worked to strengthen nationalism and unity among the East Timorese, and garnered crucial international support that was necessary for East Timor’s independence.
Historically, a nation’s first response to an invasion is armed resistance, whether it is sanctioned by the government, or carried out by guerilla forces. Such was also the case in East Timor, where The Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor (Fretilin) became the face of East Timorese armed resistance upon Indonesia’s invasion in December 1975. Following the invasion, Fretilin successfully established a “functioning society” in the mountains by late 1976, which became the base out of which they coordinated and led their armed resistance efforts.
Fretilin’s armed resistance challenged Indonesian forces, which fueled the flames of a ‘war’ that led to a bloody stalemate. In late 1978, Indonesia finally broke the stalemate and ended the war – this was accomplished through the employment of cruel warfare techniques, such as chemical weaponry, and by launching a ruthless and effective ‘encirclement and annihilation’ campaign that quelled the Fretilin militia and chased away its supporters – at least for the time being. This was a harrowing defeat in a war that claimed thirty percent of the East Timorese population.
However, Fretilin forces grit their teeth and continued their armed resistance efforts through sporadic fighting, particularly in the border areas, and in eastern areas. This was possible made possible by the survival of central committee members such as Gusmao and Hunu, as well as the strong traditional networks in villages and hamlets that came together to support and connect the pockets of resistance. Many Indonesian officials were initially skeptical that any armed resistance groups still existed, but their doubts were slashed after a six-hour ambush on an Indonesian military post in eastern Dili confirmed the reemergence of the independence movement. Going into the 1980’s, the Fretilin resistance had found a way to regroup and devise a new military strategy to confront the Indonesian troops once more.
The East Timorese’ armed resistance was impressive, particularly in how it managed to reestablish itself after Indonesia’s annihilation campaigns. Several comparative studies on armed struggles for independence argue that guerilla warfare is most likely to succeed when supported by three key elements – a land border with a friendly state, an external weapons supplier, and a safe, liberated area to rest and recover in between operations. The rebel forces in East Timor lacked all of these resources and advantages, which suggests that their armed resistance would have been ineffective at pushing for their independence. Sadly, this comes very close to truth – despite their relentlessness, the armed resistance did little to create lasting change. Each time their front was reestablished, the Indonesian troops would retaliate with even greater force. Fernandes summarizes this dynamic very well, stating that “This pattern would continue for the first half of the 1980s: a Falintil attack on a legitimate target such as an Indonesian military unit was followed by a severe and indiscriminate military response against combatants and non-combatants alike, then deportation to Atauro”.
Yet, one should not overlook the fact that this perseverance strengthened the sense of nationalism amongst the East Timorese, encouraged stronger ties within the smaller communities, and brought hope to the locals in the face of bleak circumstances. These were crucial achievements, without which East Timor’s crucial non-violent resistance efforts could not have prevailed in the midst of the volatile 80’s.
This brings us to the more unconventional, yet important form of internal resistance in East Timor – non-violent resistance. This approach gained traction in the mid-1980’s, with Fretilin at the forefront once more. The new policy began after resistance leaders realized that while it was impossible to defeat the Indonesian military, it was possible to pressure the Indonesian government by garnering international attention and support.
East Timorese resistance leaders implemented this policy by establishing ‘solidarity networks’ with political institutions in influential countries such as Portugal, Britain, Ireland, Germany, Australia, Canada, and the United States. These institutions leveraged their reputations and networks to coordinate support for East Timor’s liberation movement. For instance, the Portuguese activists in conversation with Fretilin leaders lobbied to ensure that Portugal “participated in a common front of Lusophone countries in support of East Timor’s right of self-determination”. Similarly, British activist organizations like the British Campaign for an Independent East Timor stirred support for East Timor’s self-determination by making relevant information more accessible to the media and to the members of parliament.
Another key component of their non-violent struggle is how the resistance front reformed their image in the eyes of the international community. The National Council of Maubere Resistance (CNRM) was formed just prior to 1999 to act as a “legitimate” contact point for the “promoters of self-determination in the UN and other international bodies”. The purpose was to add a greater sense of legitimacy and trustworthiness to the liberation movement within East Timor itself.
This policy shift clearly impacted Indonesia’s treatment of East Timor. As the Indonesian government was then able to devote fewer resources to fighting off armed attacks, policymakers gained room to consider broader, more nuanced political objectives. Coupled with mounting international pressures, this shift led to a loosening of Indonesia’s policies – in December 1988, Indonesia announced the “re-opening” of East Timor, involving an easing of travel restrictions in and out of the region, and greater freedom of the press. This was a spectacular development, as more transparency and communication meant that an even wider international audience could learn of East Timor’s struggles and be compelled to push for change and intervention more aggressively. These forces – international pressures and changes in Jakarta’s position – interplayed, and intensified one another.
In essence, it is clear that internal resistance, by strengthening the local communities and garnering the necessary international support, played an important role in ending Indonesia’s twenty-four year occupation of East Timor. The success of the nation’s struggle for independence is a testament to the effectiveness of peaceful diplomacy in settling political disputes – tools that are particularly surprising and impressive, considering the extremely young nature of East Timor and its institutions. Though internal resistance is just one key factor in their struggle for independence, it paints a poignant picture of the strength and resourcefulness of the East Timorese people. My highest hope is for this same perseverance and strength to prevail as this nation continues to rebuild and develop itself going forward.

Works Cited
Anderson, Benedict R. O. Violence and the State in Suharto's Indonesia. Ithaca, N.Y.: Southeast Asia Program Publications, Southeast Asia Program, Cornell University, 2001.
Fernandes, Clinton. The Independence of East Timor: Multi-dimensional Perspectives -Occupation, Resistance, and International Political Activism. Brighton [England]: Sussex Academic Press, 2011.
Neher, Clark D. Southeast Asia In the New International Era. 4th ed. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 2002.
Schwarz, Adam. A Nation In Waiting: Indonesia In the 1990s. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1994.
Taylor, John G. East Timor: The Price of Freedom. London: Zed Books, 1999.

Note: Clark Neher’s book served primarily to provide a better understanding of the narrative/ background of the countries involved in the occupation. It is not directly cited in the paper.

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[ 1 ]. Fretilin was initially conceived as “a front that united nationalist and anti-colonial groups under one vision – the liberation of Timorese from colonialism”; after the Indonesian invasion, its mission became the liberation of East Timor from Indonesia (Fernandes 13).
[ 2 ]. Clinton Fernandes, The Independence of East Timor: Multi-Dimensional Perspectives - Occupation, Resistance, and International Political Activism (The Sussex Library of Asian Studies) (Sussex Academic Press, 2001), 45.
[ 3 ]. John G. Taylor, East Timor: the Price of Freedom (Politics in Contemporary Asia) (New York: Zed Books Ltd., 2000), 85-88.
[ 4 ]. Fernandes, 47.
[ 5 ]. Taylor, 114.
[ 6 ]. Taylor, 115
[ 7 ]. Fernandes, 64.
[ 8 ]. Fernandes, 1.
[ 9 ]. Benedict R. O'G. Anderson, ed., Violence and the State in Suharto's Indonesia (Ithaca, NY: Southeast Asia Program Publications, 2001), 160.
[ 10 ]. Fernandes, 65.
[ 11 ]. Fernandes, 76-98.
[ 12 ]. Fernandes, 78.
[ 13 ]. Fernandes, 79.
[ 14 ]. Fernandes, 82.
[ 15 ]. Anderson, 160.