To what extent can “ethnic cleansing” in Bosnia be attributed to the manipulative influence of elites?

In the years before the disintegration of Yugoslavia in 1990-91, ethnic relations were neighbourly and cooperative.
However, Yugoslavia had been made up of six republics and it was a multi-ethnic country in which ‘nations and nascent states did not coincide’. Bosnia in particular was multi-ethnic. Its population consisted of Serbs, Croats and Muslims. There was undoubtedly potential for ethnic conflict and with the failure of communism and the disintegration of Yugoslavia, ethnic relation deteriorated rapidly. This was in large part due to the manipulative influence of elites who sought to establish nation states. Serbian nationalists looking to create a “Greater Serbia”, and Croatian nationalists attempting to establish a “Greater Croatia” manipulated ethnic relations with repetitive propaganda and “expert” opinion. Added to this, the fear and uncertainty created by the disintegration itself was a factor that led to ethnic cleansing, spawning nationalist ideologies and giving credibility rumours spread by elites. Furthermore, a history of ethnic cleansing in the Balkans made the transition from nationalism to ethnic cleansing short and easy, as well as making people more receptive to the influence of elite propaganda. Existing communal conflicts in Bosnia were also in small part responsible for the levels of ethnic cleansing however these were exaggerated and intensified again by the influence of political and military elites.
To a great extent, ethnic cleansing in Bosnia can be attributed to the manipulative influence of elites. ‘Elite crisis discourse resonated at the grass roots, made for ethnic polarization, and got nationalists elected’. Elite discourse was one of the main factors that led to ethnic cleansing in Bosnia. Before its disintegration, there didn’t seem to be any problems with ethnic relations in Yugoslavia. Survey research into ethnic relations in mid-1990 found that in a national sample of 4,232 Yugoslavs, only 7 per cent believed that the country would break up into separate states, and 62 per cent reported that the “Yugoslav” affiliation was very or quite important to them. Also for ethnic relations in neighbourhoods, 57 per cent answered “good”, 28 per cent “satisfactory”, and only 12 per cent answered “bad”. The rapid descent into ethnic cleansing would be hard to explain then if the population was not influenced or manipulated in some way. However, combined with the manipulative influence of elites, a sense of fear and threat created during the disintegration of Yugoslavia was one of the main reasons for ethnic cleansing in Bosnia. When Yugoslavia collapsed, so did any sense of authority, identity and ideology. Due to uncertainty, fear, powerlessness and alienation, ‘individuals and groups resorted to their religious or ethnic identities to reinforce their sense of belonging’. Consequently, nationalist ideologies resurfaced and in the crucial elections of 1990, nationalist parties won majorities in all the republics of the former Yugoslavia. Fear and uncertainty led to nationalism and then to aggression that was carefully harnessed by elites. These nationalist ideologies in the Balkans, which resurfaced due to feelings of alienation and uncertainty, enabled ruling groups and elites to mobilize and manipulate the people for ethnic attacks.
From 1991 onwards, electoralism was joined by militarism and paramilitarism in the descent to murderous cleansing. Militarism ‘wielded its distinctive coercive powers to silence doubts within the people’. Both Serbian and Croatian nationalist paramilitaries spread fear and threatened moderates and minorities to back down and choose sides. For example, Milar Pupovac, a Serb party leader in Croatia who stood for Serb-Croat dialogue and conciliation, was vilified by both Croat and Serb nationalists. Meanwhile, ‘Armed Serb raiding bands terrorized Croatia and Bosnia’ and coerced the Bosnian Serb population into making a choice between “them or us” (Muslims or Serbs).
Once in power, nationalists and elites manipulated fears and uncertainties into ethnic rivalries and conflicts with the aim of creating ethnically pure nation states. Elites constructed ethnic victimization in election campaigns and through mass media, popular culture and social movements. For example, Milosevic managed to create mass media propaganda by gaining control of the state broadcasting organisations. As well as creating further insecurity and fears in Serbia, ‘the regime’s lock on the media minimized Serbian opposition to the war’and to the ethnic cleansing that was taking place. In both Serbia and Croatia, TV fabricated and shamelessly circulated war crime stories. The same victims would be identified on Zagreb screens as Croats and on Belgrade screens as Serbs. This served to create rifts between previously friendly neighbours of different ethnicities. Politicians and elites also ‘played on fears of oppression and annihilation’. They highly inflated and exaggerated figures of the ethnic killings in the Second World War. Serbs claimed that there were 700,000 casualties in the Jasenovac camp alone when a more accurate estimate would be 100,000 of who half were Serbs. Croats also made similarly inflated claims for the Bleiburg massacres. ‘Fear of extinction polarized ethnic relations’ between Serbs and Croats in Bosnia who had previously been living happily as neighbours. Repetitive propaganda and “expert” opinion such as this had the effect of mobilizing people into ethnic conflicts. Elites, such as Milosevic and Karadzic, ‘activated and amplified’ ethnic conflicts. They reintroduced terms such as Chetnik and Ustasha that reactivated legacies of the Second World War and its conflicts which seemed to have been left in the past by the majority of the Yugoslav population. The deputy mayor of Prijedor (a north-west district of Bosnia) justified the Omarska camp where Croats and Muslims were put to death as payback for the Second World War Jasenovac camp where thousands of Serbs died.

Due to this previous history of ethnic cleansing in the Balkans, ‘the transition from nationalism to ethnic cleansing proved to be very easy’. Ethnic cleansing was not a new phenomenon in the Balkans. During the Second World War, both Croatian nationalists, the Ustashas, and the Serbian royalists, the Chetniks, used ethnic cleansing – the Ustashas, to “purify” Croatia of Serbs, Jews and Gypsies, and the Chetniks, to “cleanse” Muslims from eastern Bosnia. Previously held nationalist identities and ideologies in Yugoslavia, no matter how weak they were by the late 1980s, made the people more receptive to the influence of elites. This lingering nationalism was to a lesser extent responsible for ethnic cleansing. It was simply harnessed by ruling groups and elites, enabling them to more easily mobilize and manipulate the people for ethnic attacks.

Although much has been made of the fact that ethnicized vendettas were responsible for ethnic cleansing in Bosnia, the notion that ‘Serbs and Croats, above all, held ancient and enduring animosities’ is somewhat false. Historian, Damir Mirkovic, argues that Serbs and Croats are not enemies historically but that this is an oversimplification frequently prompted by both Serb and Croat nationalist elites. In the years before the disintegration of Yugoslavia, ethnic relations were cooperative and neighbourly. Nevertheless, ethnic cleansing can be attributed, to a certain extent, to communal conflict. In some rural areas of Bosnia for example, ethnic cleansing stemmed from local vendettas and a long standing conflict between Franciscan friars and diocesan priests. However, these conflicts were not widespread. To a far greater extent than existing communal conflicts and ethnicized vendettas, the manipulation of ethnicity by elites was responsible for ethnic cleansing in Bosnia. Serbian and Croatian political elites manipulated and intensified ethnic rivalries, which had been insignificant for decades up until the late 1980s, with the aim of the creation of ethnically pure national states. Ethnic cleansing in Bosnia can be to a large extent attributed to the manipulative influence of elites. Nationalist elites, mainly from Serbia and Croatia, constructed ethnic victimization in a number of ways. By gaining control of state broadcasting organisations, they were able to create repetitive propaganda and spread lies. They fabricated news stories of ethnic conflicts and violence, inflated figures of past ethnic victimization, and reactivated ethnic rivalries and legacies from the Second World War. However, elites would not have been able to influence people into ethnic cleansing if the people in Bosnia were not receptive to their propaganda and lies. Ethnic cleansing can be in part attributed to the social conditions in Bosnia in the early 1990s. The fear and uncertainty created in Bosnia by the disintegration of Yugoslavia itself was an important factor that led to ethnic cleansing. Feelings of fear, uncertainty, powerlessness and alienation amongst the Bosnian population spawned nationalist identities and gave credibility to elite propaganda. Combined with the presence of paramilitaries, this coerced people into taking sides in the ethnic conflict as it was deemed dangerous not to. A history of ethnic cleansing in the Balkans and existing communal conflicts in Bosnia were also in part responsible for the rapid deterioration of ethnic relations. However, ‘ the real causes of Bosnia’s destruction came from outside Bosnia itself’. The manipulative influence of Serbian and Croatian elites with a specific agenda; the creation of two ethnically pure nation states (Greater Serbia and Greater Croatia) was the main cause of ethnic cleansing in Bosnia. Other factors were simply catalysts for ethnic cleansing; the influence of elites was the instigator.

Bibliography

Secondary Sources: Books
Howard, M., and Luis WM. R., The Oxford History of the Twentieth Century, (Oxford, 1998)
Malcolm, N., Bosnia: a Short History, (London, 1994)
Mazower, M., Dark Continent: Europe’s Twentieth Century, (London, 1998)
Secondary Sources: Articles
Bax, M., ‘Warlords, Priests and the Politics of Ethnic Cleansing: A Case Study from Rural Bosnia Hercegovina’, Ethnic and Racial Studies 23 (2000), pp. 16-36
Mann, M., ‘The Dark Side of Democracy: The Modern Tradition of Ethnic and Political Cleansing’, New Left Review 235, (1999), pp. 18-45
Mirkovic, D., ‘Ethnic Conflict and Genocide: Reflections on Ethnic Cleansing in the Former Yugoslavia’, Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 548 (1996), pp. 191-199
Oberschall, A., ‘The Manipulation of Ethnicity: from Ethnic Cooperation to Violence and War in Yugoslavia’, Ethnic and Racial Studies 23 (2000), pp. 982-1001

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[ 1 ]. Michael Howard and WM. Roger Luis, The Oxford History of the Twentieth Century, (Oxford, 1998), p. 329
[ 2 ]. Anthony Oberschall, ‘The Manipulation of Ethnicity: from Ethnic Cooperation to Violence and War in Yugoslavia’, Ethnic and Racial Studies 23 (2000), p. 999
[ 3 ]. Ibid, p. 998
[ 4 ]. Damir Mirkovic, ‘Ethnic Conflict and Genocide: Reflections on Ethnic Cleansing in the Former Yugoslavia’, Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 548 (1996), p. 195
[ 5 ]. Michael Mann, ‘The Dark Side of Democracy: The Modern Tradition of Ethnic and Political Cleansing’, New Left Review 235, (1999), p. 21
[ 6 ]. Ibid
[ 7 ]. Oberschall, The Manipulation of Ethnicity, p. 995
[ 8 ]. Howard and Luis, The Oxford History of the Twentieth Century, p. 329
[ 9 ]. Mark Mazower, Dark Continent: Europe’s Twentieth Century, (London, 1998), p. 398
[ 10 ]. Oberschall, The Manipulation of Ethnicity, p. 993
[ 11 ]. Ibid, p. 998
[ 12 ]. Ibid, p.990
[ 13 ]. Ibid, p. 989
[ 14 ]. Ibid
[ 15 ]. Mirkovic, Ethnic Conflict and Genocide, p. 191
[ 16 ]. Ibid
[ 17 ]. Howard and Luis, The Oxford History of the Twentieth Century, p. 329
[ 18 ]. Mirkovic, Ethnic Conflict and Genocide, pp. 191-199
[ 19 ]. Oberschall, The Manipulation of Ethnicity, p. 989
[ 20 ]. Mart Bax, ‘Warlords, Priests and the Politics of Ethnic Cleansing: A Case Study from Rural Bosnia Hercegovina’, Ethnic and Racial Studies 23 (2000), p.17
[ 21 ]. Noel Malcolm, Bosnia: a Short History, (London, 1994), p. 251