To what extent was the nuclear arms race a stabilising factor in the Cold War between 1949 and 1963? (June 2011)

The view that the nuclear arms race was a stabilising factor in the Cold War between 1949 and 1963 is a view that should be viewed as correct as the stabilising factors outweigh the de-stabilising factors because a nuclear weapon was never used aggressively. It allowed the Cold War to be just that, a Cold War, and not one of direct aggression between the USSR and the United States. Despite this, the anxiety of both nations increased drastically and there were also de-stabilising factors such as the pressure of domestic politics and the fear of each other from both nation’s publics. Also, the ‘hot wars’ in Korea and Vietnam show that indirect aggression remained. Moreover, Mutually Assured Destruction, or MAD, shows how the nuclear arms race was much more a stabilising factor than a de-stabilising one.

There were many de-stabilising factors that occurred due to the nuclear arms race. The secrecy of the two countries was a major issue as it led to constant beliefs that one was in front of the other. An example of this is the ‘missile gap’ of 1957 that led to many Americans believing they were behind Russia in the arms race and therefore pressurised the increased development of nuclear missiles therefore costing the U.S a lot of money. This also shows de-stabilisation as it meant that the missile stockpiles continued to unnecessarily increase therefore unnecessarily increasing the risk of total destruction. Dulles’ policy of Brinkmanship was also extremely de-stabilising as it had the potential to be devastating if the U.S.S.R retaliated. Other key events also had the potential to be devastating such as the Cuban Missile Crisis that saw the two major countries go eye to eye in 1962. Although, this eventually led to the agreement that the missiles in