Williamson said the Washington Consensus was originally formulated not as a policy prescription for development, but was a lists of policies that were widely held in Washington in 1989 that were desirable for implementation in Latin America. He noted there were other development policies that he thought were useful, but were not included in the Washington Consensus since they did not enjoy widespread support. He suggested the Washington Consensus had three different meanings. First, was his original list of ten specific policy reforms. The second understanding was that the Consensus was a set of economic policies advocated for developing countries in general by official Washington, such as the IMF, Bank and US Treasury Department. These policies augmented the original policies advocated by Williamson, and emphasized institutional reforms. The third meaning was espoused by critics of the IMF and Bank who suggested these were policies imposed on client countries, and were an attempt to minimize the role of the state. Williamson criticized the third view as one not grounded in fact. In retrospect, he added that he was wishful in his thinking about a consensus on the issue exchange rate policies. He was also strongly critical of the IMF’s move to rapidly dismember capital controls in Asia during the financial crisis of the late 1990’s.

Williamson then discussed the ten policy reforms of the Consensus. First, was that budget deficits should be small enough be financed without recourse to the inflation tax. He said the view that widely held was that macroeconomic stability was an indispensable precondition for growth, the reasonable price stability was an essential aspect of macroeconomic stability and in most of Latin America price stability had been undermined by excessive budget deficits. Therefore, restoration of fiscal discipline was essential and there should be