From March 1973 until the fall of Saigon on April 30, 1975, the South Vietnamese army (ARVN) tried desperately to save the South from political and military collapse.
The signing of the Paris Peace Accord failed to resolve the Vietnam conflict; whilst it marked the withdrawal of US forces from Vietnam, North and South Vietnamese forces breached the cease fire agreement as they tried to gain control of as much territory as possible.1 The fighting was not large scale, despite involving a three-phase campaign of four divisional attacks, destined to capture vital ground. It was initially at least for the North Vietnamese, limited to small-scale operations to consolidate authority of the local government or by way of causing political agitation against the South Vietnamese President.2 At the end of 1973, the Hanoi leadership discussed military policy, as the Lao Dong party assessed progress. General Van Tien Dung, Chief of Staff, of the Peoples Army of Vietnam (PAVN) and the Defence Minister Vo Nguyen Giap urged the use of conventional military operations, believing that morale would be affected if a more passive approach was adopted.3 Premier Pham Van Dong worried that resuming operations would drain resources. The result was the formation of ‘Resolution 21’.4Bibliography

Dougan, C. and Fulgham, D. (1985), The Fall of the South, Boston: Boston Publishing Company.

Giap, Vo Nguyen and Van Tien Dung. (1976), How We Won the War, Philadelphia: RECON Publications.

Goodman, Allen E. (1978), The Lost Peace, Stanford CA: Hoover Institute Press.

Joes, Anthony J. (1989), The War for South Vietnam. New York: Praeger.

Herrington, Stuart A. (1983), Peace with Honor? An American Reports on Vietnam, Presidio Press, Part II - Life Under The Paris Agreement.

Isaacs, Arnold R. (1983), Without Honor, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Le Gro, Col. William E.