This policy behind this case is based on two principles: (1) property rights do not mean anything until we make them mean something (Metropolitan Opera), and (2) the right to property is essentially the right to exclude others. Whenever property rights are discussed, the central inquiry is one of the relationship between people with respect to property. In examining the case at bar, the court was confronted with that issue: the relationship between Wiggins (“the libellants”) and Beavers and Burchard (“the claimants”) with respect to the salvage marble. The case is premised on an understanding that “to whom the marble belongs” means little until these two parties seek the court to declare the right. Each party is then seeking to exclude the other from using it. The claimants want to exclude others from using the marble based on a letter government granting them title, while the libellants want to exclude the claimants based …show more content…
The claimants seek to base their title on the government granting it to them in a letter. The government having title in the first place is premised on the statutory condition where such abandoned property, like the shipwreck, escheats to the state since abandoned property has no relationship to anyone. When this happens, the government has good title to it and may, therefore, properly convey title to someone else. Claimants argue the Virginia statute allowing for this should apply. However, the court noted that the statute allowed the government to do this only when the shipwreck interfered with navigable waterways, which was not the case here. Thus, the Court here in 1960 was forced to solve the manner based on the property rights and nature of abandoned property. Abandoned property from an economics stand point means there has ceased to be a relationship between two people that involves that