(4525819) Unit Code: BGP8022 CEO DUALITY-THE COMBINATION OF CHAIRMAN AND CEO ROLES A literature review of different theories and empirical research about CEO Duality. INTRODUCTION Recent financial scandals like Enron, Mobily and WorldCom arise a demand for a better monitoring and controlling structure within the organizations. Conflict of interest between the shareholders and the managers is an on going debate in the literature of corporate governance. In
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A Blueprint for Corporate Governance Fred R. Kaen AMACOM AMERICAN MANAGEMENT ASSOCIATION A Blueprint for Corporate Governance This Page Intentionally Left Blank A Blueprint for Corporate Governance Strategy, Accountability, and the Preservation of Shareholder Value Fred R. Kaen American Management Association New York • Atlanta • Brussels • Buenos Aires • Chicago • London • Mexico City San Francisco • Shanghai • Tokyo • Toronto • Washington, D. C. Special discounts on
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Cornell University ILR School DigitalCommons@ILR CAHRS Working Paper Series Center for Advanced Human Resource Studies (CAHRS) 1-1-2003 Strategic Compensation: Does Business Strategy Influence Compensation in High-Technology Firms? Yoshio Yanadori Cornell University Janet H. Marler University at Albany - S.U.N.Y, marler@albany.edu Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/cahrswp Part of the Human Resources Management Commons This Article is brought
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a world without taxes, firms are indifferent to funding their investment programs from internal or external funds. However, there is a rapidly growing body of literature examining the possible existence of imperfections in capital markets and their effects on firms' financial and real decisions. In this paper we provide some econometric evidence on the impact of financial factors like cash flow, debt, and stock measures of liquidity on the investment decisions of U.K. firms. These variables are introduced
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The theory and practice of corporate finance: Evidence from the field John R. Grahama, Campbell R. Harveya,b,* aFuqua School of Business, Duke University, Durham, NC 27708, USA bNational Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA 02912, USA (Received 2 August 1999; final version received 10 December 1999) Abstract We survey 392 CFOs about the cost of capital, capital budgeting, and capital structure. Large firms rely heavily
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C H A P T E R 1 The Nature and Scope of Managerial Economics chief of Omaha, W arren E. Buffett, the renowned chairman andstartedexecutive officerpartnership Nebraska-based Berkshire Hathaway, Inc., an investment with $100 in 1956 and has gone on to accumulate a personal net worth in excess of $30 billion. It is intriguing that Buffett credits his success to a basic understanding of managerial economics. Berkshire’s collection of operating businesses includes the GEICO Insurance Company, Buffalo
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WITH SHAREHOLDER-MANAGER CONFLICTS * * AGENCY VERSUS CONTRACT * * FURTHER READING: Agency theory suggests that the firm can be viewed as a nexus of contracts (loosely defined) between resource holders. An agency relationship arises whenever one or more individuals, called principals, hire one or more other individuals, called agents, to perform some service and then delegate decision-making authority to the agents. The primary agency relationships in business are those (1) between
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Empirical Capital Structure: A Review Christopher Parsons1 and Sheridan Titman2 1 2 University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, USA, Chris Parsons@kenan-flagler.unc.edu University of Texas at Austin, USA, Sheridan.Titman@mccombs.utexas.edu Abstract This survey provides a synthesis of the empirical capital structure literature. Our synthesis is divided into three parts. The first part examines the evidence that relates to the cross-sectional determinants of capital structure. This literature
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customs” ( laureate Milton friedman) According to OECD( organization for economic cooperation and development) Corporate Governance is a set of relationship between the company ‘s directors, its shareholders and other stakeholders. It also provides the structure through which the objectives of the company are set and the means of obtaining those objectives and monitoring performance are determined. NOTE THAT: there is a difference between corporate governance and management, the latter refers to day-to-day
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ultimately exacerbates the very agency problem it is purported to solve. KEY WORDS: executive compensation, distributive justice, pay disparity, incentive alignment Introduction Few academic theories have been adopted as widely as the application of agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) to the structure of executive pay in modern corporations. After prominent suggestions that the inherent conflict of interest that exists between stockholders and corporate managers – or ‘agency problem’ – could be mitigated
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