Unit I

Foreign Policy

What is Foreign Policy?

Foreign policy has many exegesis as there are internationalist who attempt to define this most intriguing subject of international relations. Initially, it has been define as a “ statement of national goals limited both absolutely and relatively by national power”. The Foreign Service Institute of the Philippines prefers to allude to it as “ set of guidelines articulated by the government to a country in order to promote its national interest through the conduct of its relations with other countries”

The Foreign Service Institute of the Philippines has likewise quoted a dictum ascribed to President Ferdinand E. Marcos that:

The foreign policy of a nation is the articulation of its fondest needs and aspiration, and in international affairs, it is its sole weapon for the promotion of national interest.

Foreign Policy is a “part of the general program of government. It is furthermore an extension of its domestic policy”.

The term “system” when used in the context of an organization, implies an entity composed of a set of parts and created to accomplish certain, objectives. The aim of the system is the coordination of human efforts and material resources to produce desired results in a dynamic organization.

An organization, as social system, has certain inherent characteristics:

1) it has subsystem and, is part of a suprasystem in continual interaction with one another 2) It has define objectives to accomplish 3) There is an inflow-transformation-outflow cycle of Human and material resources 4) There are performance evaluation measures 5) Management is essential for its operation.

FOREIGN POLICY SYSTEM

In combining the elements of “Foreign Policy” and the “System Theory” the compound would be produce the concept of what may be termed as “Foreign Policy System” to denote an organization of a set or sets of its parts as guidelines to promote the national interest through the conduct of its relations with other countries.”

The study of the Philippine Foreign Policy System would include an analysis of three sets of parts including the following:

1) The Procedural System a) Formulation b) Implementation c) Revaluation

2) Substantive System a) Security b) Economic c) Cultural 3) Directional a) Bilateral b) Regional c) Multilateral

FORMULATION OF FILIPINO FOREIGN POLICY

1. WHO FORMULATES FILIPINO FOREIGN POLICY?

The principle that it is the President of the Philippines who has the authority and the responsibility to conduct our foreign relations is settled both in Constitutional and International Law.

Put in another way.” diplomatic power” lies in the hands of the Philippine President alone.

The conduct of the Philippine foreign affairs is the sole responsibility of the President. He has the power- with the concurrence of the Senate- to make treaties. He appoints our ambassadors, ministers and consuls with the consent of the Commission on Appointment. Usually the President seeks the advice of his political party men on the foreign polices that his administration pursues. , However the actual implementation of these policies is his responsibility. This has been clear since 1946. Although there has been attempts to wrest the leadership in the Philippines I foreign affairs from the President, the President still remains as the country’s’ spokesman.

In one of the most enlightening studies on the American Presidency, Clinton Rossiter described the powers of the American President by describing how the American President is Chief o State, Chief Executive, Chief Diplomat, Commander in Chief and Chief Legislator.

The powers given to the American President by the Constitution of the United States are powers given to the Philippine President by the 1935 Constitution of the Philippines.

The 1935 Philippine Constitution in Article VIII, Section 10 paragraph 7 provided that “The President shall have the power, with the concurrence of all members of the Senate, to make treaties and with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, he shall appoint ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls. He shall receive ambassadors and other public ministers duly accredited to the Government of the Philippines”

HOW THE PRESIDENT FORMULATES NATIONAL POLICY?

The President formulates the guidelines of national policy. In practice, the President formulates national policy after consultation as the case be, with:

1) The leadership and members of the ruling party; 2) The Executive Committee and Cabinet 3) The Foreign Policy Council 4) The General Military Council 5) The National Security Council

WHAT ARE THE POWERS BESTOWED TO THE PHILIPPINE PRESIDENT UNDER THE PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION?

1) Executive Power 2) Formulation of National Policy 3) Legislative Direction 4) Program of Government 5) Economic Development Plan 6) Power of Control over Ministers 7) Regulation and Review 8) Commander –in-Chief Powers 9) Power to Mobilize for National Defense 10) Power to Maintain Peace and Order 11) Power to suspend the Writ of Habeas Corpus 12) Power to Declare Martial Law 13) Emergency Powers 14) Treaty Making Power 15) Diplomatic Power 16) Contractual Power 17) Pardoning Power 18) Amnesty Power 19) Power to Convene Congress 20) Enactment of Laws 21) Referenda 22) Veto Power 23) Decree Making Power 24) Others

WHAT IS THE ROLE OF THE DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS?

The main job of determining and executing foreign polices lie within the President. His chief adviser is the secretary of Foreign Affairs who is the head of the Department of Foreign Affairs. Moreover, he is assisted by the Foreign Policy Council in the analysis and resolution of foreign policy problems. While the more definite responsibility rest on the President for foreign policy making, the Legislature shares this function

It is a common failing among the uninitiated to think Foreign Policy formulation is the sole prerogative of the Department of Foreign Affairs. Especially in a situation where the personality of the Secretary of Foreign Affairs is rather dominant other government agencies would look to him for everything that is related to foreign relations.

Secretaries of Foreign Affairs, being members of the Presidents Cabinet and the “premier department” as that, are alter egos of the President and it is sometimes difficult to discern when they are speaking for themselves or when they are articulating for the President.

The Foreign Service Institute of the Department of Foreign Affairs has defined the three-fold role of the Department of Foreign Affairs in Foreign Policy-making as follows”.

1) To provide necessary information to the President and defines policy options for his decision; 2) To articulate the foreign polices of the country; 3) To implement policy decisions through negotiations and other diplomatic means.

WHAT IS THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE PHILIPPINE PRESIDENT OR CHIEF EXECUTIVE AND THE PHILIPPINE CONGRESS IN FOREIGN POLICY MAKING?

Suffice it to say that while policy-making is formally lodged primarily in the legislature, the Congress of the Philippines, the President plays a great, sometimes dominant, role. His role derives partly from the Constitutions powers given to him and partly from the influence he acquires as both party and national leader. Administrative agencies and judicial bodies may also contribute to the policy process.

Under the Constitution of the Philippines, legislative power is vested in the Legislature or Congress of the Philippines. As direct representatives of the severing people, they exercise plenary powers.

An example of Constitutional provisions which recognizes the “diplomatic powers” of Congress is found in the following quoted provisions, drawn form the Philippine Constitutions of 1935, 1973 and 1987:

The President shall have the power, with the concurrence of the 2/3 of all Members of the Senate, to make treaties, and with the consent of Commission of Appointment, he shall appoint ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls. He shall receive ambassadors and other public ministers duly accredited to the Government of the Philippines.

Except as otherwise provided in this Constitution, no treaty shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by a majority of all members of National Assembly.

NO treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by the at least 2/3 of all members of the Senate.

Although Congress has plenary powers and is basically a policy-determining bodt by enacting status and laws and passing resolutions the President, who is the sole spokesman for the entire nation, is vested with the special power of formulating foreign policy.

WHAT ARE THE ROLES OF PUBLIC PRESSURE GROUPS, POLITICAL PARTIES AND INTEREST GROUPS AND THE MASS MEDIA AND PUBLIC OPINION IN FOREIGN POLICY MAKING?

Much too often, it is forgotten that in a democracy, real sovereignty resides in the Filipino people. Of course the President and members of Congress are powerful figures and carry awesome influence. However, at least in theory, these are only servants of the people” as Government is nothing but the agency through which the sovereign will of the people is expressed and carried out.

A leading Filipino constitutionalist had opined that even the “ordinary man on the street, exercising his rights as a citizen, is free to air his views on matters of foreign affairs”. He is quoted as saying:

“ The ordinary man on the streets exercising his rights as a citizen of this republic, is free to air his views on matters of foreign affairs. He can group with others of similar thinking and pass a resolution suggesting to the President certain positions in our dealing with particular countries. These are his prerogatives under his constitutional rights to free speech and assembly and petition”.

The political parties, pressure groups and interest groups and the mass media and public opinion in general bear influence upon the direction of the bureaucracy. The usual vehicles used by these groups and institutions includes the elections, lobbying, newspapers and radio, and materials or non-material inducement. These groups influence the appointment or removal of personnel, the promulgation, enforcement or the non-execution of public policies, administrative orders, and other decisions vital to them. The forceful political party that triumphs adopted and implemented by the bureaucracy through the appointment of its men and the use of its political superiority. Pressure groups dangle material of administrative orders. The mass media (like newspapers, magazines, radio and TV) compel the bureaucracy to perform efficiently. Mass media possess a deep reservoir of critical accounts for tirades against erring officials or agencies. Invariably the bureaucracy is responsive to the actuation of the mass media.

IS THE MAKING OF PHILIPPINE FOREIGN POLICY A BUSINESS OF ONLY FEW INDIVIDUALS?

It is no exaggeration to say that the process involve everybody. To a large-extent, foreign policy, after all, is an extension of domestic policy. It is the product of national experience, needs and aspirations.

The people should and do express their views on our external relations. These views may take the form of criticism of present policies or suggestion as in future policies. They may be conveyed directly to the decision-makers. Or they may be conveyed indirectly through the mass media and through their representatives is like the local leaders and members of the Congress.

This process is but natural in nature in a democratic society such as ours. This means that the people’s participation in public policy decision, including foreign policy, becomes inevitable and even desirable. In the long run, a policy the enjoys a broadly based popular support will prove enduring and sound.

WHAT ARE THE FOREIGN POLICY CONSTRAINTS?

In formulating Filipino Foreign Policy, the policy must be always ware of the constants or permanent situations or factors in the Philippines. This inlcueds,

1. That the Philippines is an Asian state strategically located in Pacific Ocean; thus it has interest in developing ASEAN as an economic regional organization. (and in active cooperation with the industrial nations in the Pacific (Japan, USA, Canada, Australia, New Zealand);

2. That is a developing agricultural and insustrial economy and therefore fshares a common interst with the Third World nations to work for a new international economic order;

3. That it has mineral resources of value in industries as well as developing nations such as gold, coppers, niche, iron, ores, silver, cobalt, chrome, etc.

4. That it has non-oil based sources of energy such as hydro and geothermal power with good potentials for oils, natural gas and uranium.

5. That there are 85 millions Filipinos (13th largest in the world) with relatively high degree of literacy

6. That it is one of the biggest world producer and exporter pf basic food products such as sugar, bananas, copra, tuna and pineapples.

7. That the Philippines has a charter member of the United Nations has minimum obligation in the maintenance of international peace and security as well as to promote higher standard of living, full employment and conditions of economic and social progress and development.

WHAT ARE THE FOREIGN POLICY VARIABLES?

1.That it is still dependent on OPEC (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, UAE, Iraq, Indonesia) and non-OPEC (China, Mexico and Malaysia) states foe s steady supply of petroleum;

2. That like most developing nations, it is dependent upon US and Japanese, China and European capital resources for its economic and social development projects;

3. That like all members of the World bank, IMF, UNDP, ADB, the Philippines is entitled to borrow funds and obtain loans and credits from these international financial institutions, in case of need and in accordance with their normal operations and within self-imposed statutory limits;

4. Like most developing nations, the industrial and developing worlds, the Philippines is confronted with a foreign-based secessionist terrorist movement in 10 southern provinces.

5. Until world disarmament is achieved, the Philippines has an interest to monitor the activities of the Non-aligned Movement.

6. That like most developing nations, the industrial markets of Japan, USA and Europe are indispensable for its export trade outlets and as sources for its tourism industry;

WHAT ARE THE STAGES OF FILIPINO POLICY MAKING?

1. Period of Initiation (1946-1957)- It was during this period which our leaders were primarily occupied with national reconstruction and rehabilitation Philippine diplomacy was concerned primarily with political issues that were of peripheral importance to basic Filipino interests more than on economic, trade and financial matters that were crucial to the economic and social development of the nation

Presidents:

Manuel A. Roxas (1946-1948) Elpidio Quiriono ( 1948-1953 Ramon Magsaysay (1953-1957

2. Period of Immobilisme- The period from 1957-1965 during which Philippine Diplomacy was said to have lapsed into immobilisme. Ferment was observed inother parts of the world. Geopolitics instead of economics was the other main preoccupation of the Filipino actors in diplomacy.

Presidents:

Carlos P. Garcia ( 1957-1961) Diosdado Macapagal (1961-1965)

3. Period of Innovation- The period of from 1966-1981 which correspondents to the first and second elective terms of President Marcos thereby ensuring continuity and stability in national planning. The President declared that henceforth, Philippine foreign policy was to be decided by the Filipinos themselves and on the basis of national interest alone. Steps were gradually taken to correct imbalance of our foreign policy direction.

President:

Ferdinand E. Marcos (1965-1969) –Election Ferdinand E. Marcos (1969-1973)- reelection Ferdinand E. Marcos (1974-1981)

3. Period of Integration- The period from 1981 to 1991 characterized by an integrated, economic, and development policy. The main thrust of Philippine diplomacy was redirected toward the promotion and expansion of Philippine exports, attraction of foreign tourists to visit the Philippines, the promotion of investments of Philippine enterprises and the protection of advancement of the interest of the Filipino migrant workers within the jurisdiction of the mission

President:

Ferdinand E. Marcos ( 1981-1986) Corazon C. Aquino (1986-1991)

4. Period of Consolidation. Envisioned to be the period from 1991 onwards to the 21st century.

WHAT IS NATIONAL INTEREST?
WHAT ARE ELEMENTS OF NATIONAL POWER?

Unit II

Foreign Policies of Philippine Presidents

President Emilio Aguinaldo

The Department of Foreign Affairs was created on June 23, 1898 through a decree of Emilio Aguinaldo, who appointed Apolinario Mabini as the Philippines’s first Secretary of Foreign Affairs. In effect, the DFA became the first government department to be established following the proclamation of the First Philippine Republic in Malolos City in Bulacan. Realizing the need for international recognition to support the legitimacy of his government, Aguinaldo assigned Mabini the difficult task of establishing diplomatic relations with friendly countries. Members of the Hong Kong Junta, a group of Filipino exiles in Hong Kong, served as the country’s envoys for this purpose.

Post-War Philippines

During the period when the Philippines was a colony of the United States, the Government did not take an active role in the crafting and execution of its foreign policy. This was also the case during Japan's occupation of the Philippines from 1942 to 1944. The country regained full control of foreign affairs and diplomatic matters on July 4, 1946, when Commonwealth Act No. 732 was passed creating the Department of Foreign Affairs. On September 16, President Manuel Roxas issued Executive Order No. 18, which provided for the organization and operation of the DFA and the Foreign Service. The main tasks of the DFA then were to assist in postwar rehabilitation, formulate policies for the promotion of investment, and re-establish diplomatic relations with neighboring countries.
The DFA also proposed amendments to the Bell Trade Act, the RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty, and the Laurel-Langley Agreement with the United States, which helped to strengthen trade and military relations with the US, and at the same time initiating the Philippines into the arena of independent foreign policy.
The DFA had its heyday during the post-war years, with its increased participation in the international arena. At that time, the international environment was beginning to change, requiring that new thrusts and priorities in Philippine foreign policy be determined. During the Cold War, against the backdrop of the Korean War in 1950 and rising communism in China, the Philippines projected an increasing internationalist foreign policy. The Philippines helped forge the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade or GATT in 1949, became a founding member of the United Nations and one of the drafters of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and was among the early proponents of disarmament and non-interference in the internal affairs of free peoples. The Philippines' greater participation in global matters culminated in Carlos P. Romulo’s election as the first Asian President of the UN General Assembly in 1952.
Realizing the importance of foreign relations, President Elpidio Quirino pushed for the passage of the Foreign Service Law in June 1952, as embodied in Republic Act (RA) No. 708. During the post-war period, the Department of Foreign Affairs focused on institution-building, while simultaneously increasing Philippine global exposure. In 1953, Secretary Raul S. Manglapus instituted the Foreign Service Officers examination to professionalize the Foreign Service and improve the recruitment and selection of new FSOs.

The Estrada Administration

The Estrada administration upheld the foreign policy thrusts of the previous administration, focusing on national security, economic diplomacy, assistance to nationals, and image-building. The Philippines continued to be at the forefront of the regional and multilateral arena. It successfully hosted the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting in July 1998 and undertook confidence-building measures with China over South China Sea issue through a meeting in March 1999. President Estrada strengthened bilateral ties with neighboring countries with visits to Vietnam, Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, Hong Kong, Japan, and South Korea.
The DFA also played a major role in the forging of a Visiting Forces Agreement with the United States, which was ratified in the Senate. The country also sent a delegation of 108 observers to the Indonesian parliamentary elections, and engaged in cooperative activities in the areas of security, defense, combating transnational crimes, economy, culture, and the protection of OFWs and Filipinos abroad.

List of Secretaries/Ministers of Foreign Affairs

|Name |Term of Office |President(s)/Government Served Under |
|Hong Kong Junta* |December 1897 – May 1898 |Emilio Aguinaldo |
|Apolinario Mabini |1898 – 1900 |Emilio Aguinaldo |
|Elpidio Quirino |1946 – 1948 |Manuel Roxas |
|Joaquin Miguel Elizalde |1948 – 1950 |Elpidio Quirino |
|Carlos P. Romulo |1950 – 1952 |Elpidio Quirino |
|Joaquin Miguel Elizalde |1952 – 1953 |Elpidio Quirino |
|Carlos P. Garcia |1953 – 1957 |Ramon Magsaysay |
|Felixberto M. Serrano |1957 – 1961 |Carlos P. Garcia |
|Emmanuel Pelaez |1961 – 1963 |Diosdado Macapagal |
|Salvador P. López |1963 |Diosdado Macapagal |
|Carlos P. Romulo |1963 – 1964 |Diosdado Macapagal |
|Mauro Mendez |1964 – 1965 |Diosdado Macapagal |
|Narciso Ramos |1965 – 1968 |Ferdinand E. Marcos |
|Carlos P. Romulo |1968 – 1984 |Ferdinand E. Marcos |
|Manuel Collantes* |1984 |Ferdinand E. Marcos |
|Arturo M. Tolentino |1984 – 1985 |Ferdinand E. Marcos |
|Pacifico A. Castro* |1985 – 1986 |Ferdinand E. Marcos |
|Salvador Laurel |1986 – 1987 |Corazon Aquino |
|Manuel Yan |1987 |Corazon Aquino |
|Raul S. Manglapus |1987 – 1992 |Corazon Aquino |
|Roberto Romulo |1992 – 1995 |Fidel V. Ramos |
|Domingo Siazon, Jr. |1995 – 2001 |Fidel V. Ramos, Joseph Estrada |
|Teofisto Guingona |2001 – 2002 |Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo |
|Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo |2002 |In concurrent capacity as President |
|Blas Ople |2002 – 2003 |Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo |
|Franklin Ebdalin* |2003 |Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo |
|Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo |2003 |In concurrent capacity as President |
|Delia Albert |2003 – 2004 |Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo |
|Alberto Romulo |2004 – Present |Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo |

(*) Acting Capacity
COMMONWEALTTH GOVERNMENT (Nov.15,1935- July 3, 1946)

During this period, American flag still flew over the Philippines, and the Filipino merely shared in the exercise of sovereignty. The U.S retained control over foreign affairs, defenses and finance.
Pres. Quezon: A. National Security – became the most p[pressing problem of the commonwealth and the American officials in the Philippines. Dominated for Japanese pressure for lebensraum.

- Japanese Annexation of Manchuria (1932)

- Invasion of China proper (5 years later) made war between the U.S and Japan imminent.

- The next Japanese move this time to Indo China (made war inevitable)

The situation is truly alarming. The military equation in the pacific was drastically shifting from the arrangement under the Washington Naval Disarmament conference of 1921- 1922 (which had a ratio of 3 Japanese capital ships for every 5 American. (Japan was gathering strength militarily; the U.S was experiencing a relative military decline.
Solutions:
1. He had commonwealth Act. No.1 the National Defense Act, enacted.

2. Secured the appointment of General. Douglas Mac Arthur (the chief of staff of the U.S Army) as military adviser with the rank of the field marshal of the Philippine Army.

Defense Plan: Revalued around the concept of an economical system of strong Naval, air, and ground defenses which would improve a cost of conquest of any invader that will exceed any hope he may logically entertain of p[political or economic advantage. a. Ground force – would consist of small, highly mobile units trained to make maximum use of native resources to any invader from the water’s edge to the remotest mountain retreat.

b. There would be a fleet of small but speedy torpedo boats (mosquito boats) which would harass large war ships and compel cautions enemy approach by small detachments.

c. The development and maintenance of an air force of reasonable size as sup[port for naval and ground units.

Mac Arthur had in mind- a defense force of hit and run bombers, speedy torpedo boats, and a semi- guerilla army based on trained citizens reserves. To implement the plan – Mac Arthur ask Quezon for a standing 19,00 men, a fleet of 50 to 100 torpdeo boats, and an air force of about 250 light bombers. As mobilization back up, a reserve force of 40,000 would be created. Mac Arthur proposed to accomplished the entire preparation in ten years, with a total expenditure of $80 million or $8 million per year.
The National Defense Act define the national defense policy of the Philippines and give flesh to Mac Arthur’s plan.

The three principles of the Act: 1. The defense of the state was the duty of every Filipino citizen and all resources may be used by the state in the interest of National security.

2. The National defense system would be providing actual security.

3. That economy would be observed in building the nation’s military establishing by emphasizing, initially, its defensive character.

It made mandatory the training of 20 years old male Filipino citizens for military service. Criticized: High Com. Frank Murply Gen. Hagood – former commanding General of the Philippine Dep’t of the U.S Army 1937- 36,601 Filipino had been trained the provisions of the 1938- 33, 247 lack of modern arms Due to Quezon’s fear (that a small state would be no match against a resolute military and industrial power. It created an embryo air force and a small navy labeled the “off show patrol”
Quezon - went to Japan to seek reassurance and to broach the idea of neutralizing the Philippines. - For a brief interlude, soon Quezon changed his tine, he began stressing the ultimate responsibility of the U.S for the defense of the country. (Before the Philippine Congress 1941)

- Took concrete steps to obtain more troops and Modern Military equipment from the U.S. He requested the U.S Congress to appropriate more funds for the defense of the islands out of the sugar excise tax collection and profits from the devaluation of the American dollar.

- The commonwealth government intensified the domestic effort to raise the level of the country’s defense.

RESPONSE TO QUEZON’S please: 1. Small regular army force was sent as re-enforcement to the Philippines, along with the National Guard Units and 50 pieces of artillery.

2. Corregidor, guarding the entrance of Manila Bay, was buttressed by new troops and fortification.

3. Under the guidance of American Military adviser and utilizing newly arrived equipment, green Philippine Army divisions the nucleus of the defense forces took shape.

B. Problems of Japanese Activities in the Philippines

(i.e. – the Japanese penetration of Davao, the influx of Japanese immigrants, and the growing Japanese political interference in domestic affairs. a. systematic expansion of the Japanese population which had ground to 18,000 and which owned nearly 60,000 has of abaca plantations and other agricultural lands. (The substantial Japanese population and increasing economic participation in the development of Davao led many Filipinos to fear Japanese domination of the economy.

Report of the Commission: - That Philippine economy was disorganized. Everywhere there was physical destruction of industrial plants, buildings and other infrastructure and livestock.

- Postwar inflation was attributed partly to the issuance of was notes to guerilla units, and perhaps inaccurately to the “Mickey Mouse” money (Japanese war Notes).

Tidings recommend repayable load should be extended for a period of 3 years to conserve the governments revenues and that the sum of $100,000,000.00 be given to the country for rehabilitation and reconstruction

Solutions: 1. In 1940 legislation was enacted restricting Japanese entry to 500 annually.

2. The commonwealth government also had to content with Japanese politician agitation, 60 well as with influential Japanophiles in the ranks of the Mass Media.

3. Quezon as leader and the spokesman of the Filipino tried to influence international opinion on the plight of his country. (1936 -1937) – Quezon went on a trip around the world visiting Europe, Asia, and America – bringing in his train a host of diplomatic and protocol problems.

4. Quezon accepted Japanese economic assistance.

5. Quezon sought to advance the date of independence but the American response was negative in view of the growing tension between the U.S and Japan.

THE JAPANESE OCCUPATION
The roots of Japanese aggression in Southeast Asian in 1941 are traceable as much to hostile Western policies as to Internal factors. 1. They are trying to eliminate Japan as an economic rival.

2. They tried to check the growth of Japan as a military power.

3. In 1992 imposed limitations on her naval armaments.

4. Progressively denied access to the raw materials of SEA to feed her factories and discriminated against in Western Markets. Japan felt that her status as a first class power was gravely threatened.

As a consequence – she was force by economic necessity to invade and occupy Manchuria as a major source of raw materials. Japan was suffering from the effects of the Great Depression as well as experiencing the impact of a population explosion (under the influence of a small clique of ambitions and ultra nationalistic officers, Japan was poised to embark upon a program of territorial expansion).
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Sergio Osmeña A leader in the movement for an independent Philippines, Sergio Osmeña served as speaker of the assembly from 1907 to 1916 and helped gain commonwealth status for the Philippines in 1935.

Osmeña, Sergio (1878-1961), Philippine independence leader and statesman, born on Cebu. Trained as a lawyer, he was elected to the first Philippine assembly, became its speaker (1907-1916), and later served as senator from Cebu. Osmeña headed several missions to the United States to argue for Philippine independence and was instrumental in gaining commonwealth status for the Philippines in 1935. Twice elected vice-president of the commonwealth (1935 and 1941), he became president of the government in exile when President Manuel Quezon died in 1944. He was, however, defeated (1946) in the first elections of an independent Philippines.

Problems: a. To secure immediate rehabilitation aid and financial assistance.

Priorities: - Relief operations to ease human suffering. - The restoration of public service. - Stabilization of the economy.
U.S. response: a. setting up temporary relief operations. b. followed later by a program of rehabilitation. c. financial assistance.

Philippine Rehabilitation Communism (nine- man group) headed by Millard Tydings “to investigate all matters affecting the postwar economy, trade finance, economic stability and rehabilitation of the Philippine islands”.

Solutions as far as Osmeña Administration:

In October 1945 Pres. Osmeña went to the U.S in an effort to obtain rehabilitation aid in kind such as the setting up of heavy industries steel mills, cement plants, sugar central, etc. and assurance from the U.S. of 20 years of free trade on the bases diminishing quotas or excise taxes. Filipinos were impatient from American assistance. “They had imagined as immediate heaven after liberation. Peace, order, prosperity, happiness would be set right again without delay.” Though the Philippines was flooded with promises of assistance, little was done to redeem them. Slow legislations/ too much precious time were spent in gathering “first hand information” on the plight of the Filipinos. Therefore Americans were procrasting secure advance Filipino acceptance of conditions which would protect American trade, investment and other special interests as quid pro quo for AID.
1st Support was Financial Assistance:
Needed not really to be saved or rescue but also Filipino needed to rebuild himself.
($71,500,000 for “general purposes) – refused of $6,000,000 – was deposit between the war as of Mil.
PRESIDENT Laurel, Jose P. (1891-1959)

Laurel, Jose P. (1891-1959), president of the Japanese-sponsored government in the Philippines (1943-1945), during the Japanese occupation of World War II. Born in Batangas Province, Laurel studied law at the University of the Philippines before graduating from Yale University as a Doctor of Civil Law in 1920. After returning to the Philippines, he worked for the Executive Bureau, before becoming Secretary of the Interior in 1922. The following year, in protest against US General Leonard Wood’s policies against Filipino independence, Laurel resigned. In 1925 he was elected as senator, a post he held until 1931. President Manuel Luis Quezon appointed him associate justice of the Supreme Court in 1936.

Following the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941, Quezon and many other officials fled to the United States. Laurel remained in Manila. His criticism of US rule in the Philippines ensured his popularity with the Japanese, and he was rewarded with a series of high-ranking posts, becoming president of the new pro-Japanese government in 1943. The government was unpopular: the Filipino voters had no say, and the officials were unable to enforce their own policies. Laurel’s controversial period in power was short-lived, as following the surrender of the Japanese, the exiled government returned to Manila. In 1946 he was charged with collaborating with the enemy during the occupation, but an amnesty on such charges from the new president, Manuel Roxas, meant that Laurel was never tried. An attempt to become president in 1949, as the candidate for the Nationalist Party, failed when Laurel was defeated by Elpidio Quirino.

|PRESIDENT Manuel Roxas (1946-1948) |
|[pic] |
|[pic] |
|5th President of the Philippines |
|3rd President of the Commonwealth of the Philippines |
|1st President of the 3rd Philippine Republic |
|In office |
|May 28, 1946 (as Commonwealth President until July 4, 1946, as Republic President |
|thereafter) – April 15, 1948 |
|Vice President |Elpidio Quirino |
|Preceded by |Sergio Osmena |
|Succeeded by |Elpidio Quirino |
|[pic] |
|Born |January 1, 1892(1892-01-01) |
| |Capiz (now Roxas City), Capiz |
|Died |April 15, 1948 (aged 56) |
| |Clark Air Base, Angeles, Pampanga |
|Political party |Nacionalista (1919–1945) |
| |Liberal Party (1945–1948) |
|Spouse |Trinidad de Leon |
|Occupation |Lawyer |
|Religion |Roman Catholic |
|Signature | |

Manuel Acuña Roxas (January 1, 1892 – April 15, 1948) was the first president of the independent Republic of the Philippines. He served as president from the granting of independence in 1946 until his abrupt death in 1948.

Early life and career

Roxas was born on January 1, 1892 in Capiz, Capiz, a city that was renamed in his honor, to Rosario Acuña. His father, Gerardo Roxas, died before he was born. He had Spanish, Mexican, and Chinese blood: he was a descendant of Basque-Spanish settler in the Philippines Antonio de Ayala, Domingo Roxas, and Mexican settler in the Philippines Antonio Fernandez de Roxas and Acuñas have Chinese blood.
Roxas studied college in University of Manila, and law at the University of the Philippines College of Law, where he was a member of the college's first ever graduating class in 1913. He placed first in the bar examinations held later that year. He was immediately drawn into politics, and began what became a lifelong career in government service as a provincial fiscal. In 1921, he was elected to the House of Representatives. The following year he was elected House Speaker.
After the Commonwealth of the Philippines was established (1935), Roxas became a member of the unicameral National Assembly, and served (1938–1941) as the Secretary of Finance in President Manuel L. Quezon's cabinet. After the amendments to the 1935 Philippine Constitution were approved in 1941, he was elected (1941) to the Philippine Senate, but was unable to serve until 1945 because of the outbreak of World War II.
Having enrolled prior to World War II as an officer in the reserves, he was made liaison officer between the Commonwealth government and the United States Army Forces in the Far East headquarters of General Douglas MacArthur. He accompanied President Quezon to Corregidor where he supervised the destruction of Philippine currency to prevent its capture by the Japanese. When Quezon left Corregidor, Roxas went to Mindanao to direct the resistance there. It was prior to Quezon's departure that he was made Executive Secretary and designated as successor to the presidency in case Quezon or Vice-President Sergio Osmeña were captured or killed. Roxas was captured (1942) by the Japanese invasion forces. After a period of imprisonment, he was brought to Manila and eventually signed the Constitution promulgated by the Japanese-sponsored Philippine Republic. He was made responsible for economic policy under the government of Jose P. Laurel. During this time he also served as an intelligence agent for the underground Philippine guerrilla forces. In 1944 he unsuccessfully tried to escape to Allied territory. The returning American forces arrested him as a Japanese collaborator. After the war, Gen. Douglas MacArthur cleared him and reinstated his commission as an officer of the US armed forces. This resuscitated his political career.
When the Congress of the Philippines was convened in 1945, the legislators elected in 1941 chose Roxas as Senate President. In the Philippine national elections of 1946, Roxas ran for president as the nominee of the liberal wing of the Nacionalista Party. He had the staunch support of General MacArthur. His opponent was Sergio Osmeña, who refused to campaign, saying that the Filipino people knew his reputation. However, in the April 23, 1946 election, Roxas won 54 percent of the vote, and the Liberal Party won a majority in the legislature. When Philippine independence was recognized by the United States on July 4, 1946, he became the first president of the new republic.
Roxas married Trinidad R. de Leon of Bulacan. They had two (2) children - Rosario "Ruby", married to Vicente Roxas; and Gerardo "Gerry" who married Judy Araneta.

Presidency

[pic]

In this photo taken hours before his fatal heart attack on April 15, 1948, President Manuel Roxas (3d from left) is seen watching an air show at Clark Air Base.
In 1948, Roxas declared amnesty for those arrested for collaborating with the Japanese during World War II, except for those who had committed violent crimes.
Manuel Roxas was married to Doña Trinidad de Leon-Roxas and had two children Ruby and Gerardo M. Roxas who became congressman and a leader of Liberal Party while Mar Roxas is the grandson. He died on April 15, 1948 at the age of 56, after suffering a fatal heart attack after delivering a speech at Clark Air Base in Angeles City. He was succeeded by his vice president, Elpidio Quirino.
Philippine Foreign Policies of Presidemt Roxas

Bell Trade Act

The Bell Trade Act of 1946, also known as the Philippine Trade Act was an act passed by the United States Congress specifying the economic conditions governing the independence of the Philippines from the United States.
The United States Congress offered $800 million for post World War II rebuilding funds if the Bell Trade Act was ratified by Philippine legislature, which duly approved the measure on July 2, two days before independence from the United States of America.[1]
According to Filipino nationalists, the Bell Trade Act had provisions that tied the Philippine economy to the United States economy:[1] • The Philippine currency, the peso, was to be pegged to the US dollar. • The Bell Trade Act required that the Philippine constitution be revised to grant U.S. citizens and corporations equal access to Philippine minerals, forests and other natural resources. • The Bell Act stipulated that free trade be continued until 1954; thereafter, tariffs would be increased 5 percent annually until full amounts were reached in 1974. • This act allowed the U.S. to import whatever products/goods it wanted with no import duties.
Parity Right
The parity clause required an amendment relating to the 1935 Philippine Constitution's thirteenth article, which reserved the use of natural resources for Filipinos. Filipino nationalists denounced the Bell Trade Act. Even the reliably pro-American Philippine President Sergio Osmena called it a "curtailment of Philippine sovereignty, virtual nullification of Philippine independence." Since the Bell Trade Act was unpopular to Filipino nationalists, a revised United States-Philippine Trade Agreement (the Laurel-Langley Agreement) was negotiated to replace Bell Act. This treaty abolished the United States authority to control the exchange rate of the peso, made parity privileges reciprocal, extended the sugar quota, and extended the time period for the reduction of other quotas and for the progressive application of tariffs on Philippine goods exported to the United States.

MILITARY BASES AGREEMENT

Bilateral relations with the US overwhelmingly influenced Philippine foreign relations after the Second World War. These relations were further reinforced with the signing by the Philippine and American governments of agreements governing their economic, trade and security relations. To many critics, these agreements were lopsided, primarily serving American economic and security interests in the Asia Pacific region. One of most significant of these treaties is the Philippine-American MBA which was signed on 14 March 1947, only months after the declaration of Philippine independence by the US. The Philippine-US MBA was “a military agreement by which the former granted the latter the right to retain the use of bases in the Philippines for a period of 99 years, to permit the US to use such bases as the latter may determine according to military necessity, and to enter into negotiations with the US concerning the expansion of such bases. ”Under the terms of the MBA, the Philippines gave outright support to the forward deployment of US forces in the Pacific region – a key pillar of regional stability, by hosting US military bases, mainly Clark Air Base and Subic Naval Base. Clark Air Base, located north of Manila, was a logistical hub for the US Thirteenth Air Force while Subic Naval Base was an extremely valuable repair and re-supply facility for the US Seventh Fleet. The US maintained that both bases were vital for power projection in the Western Pacific, Indian Ocean, and Middle Eastern theaters. The utility of the US bases sprang from its strategic location in the Asia-Pacific region and the depth and range of crucial support facilities and inexpensive workforce these bases provided.19 When the US forces withdrew from Vietnam, American facilities in the Philippines served as the only US overseas bases in the Southeast which supported American forward defense strategy in Asia and the Pacific. After several years of operation, the US bases, which had long been regarded as the“linchpin of a partnership built around a network of bilateral and multilateral arrangements between the Philippines and the US”, was set to expire on September 1991.21 With emotional issues of Philippine nationalism often outweighing economic or strategic arguments, the Philippine Senate rejected the proposed Philippine-American Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Security that could have extended the stay of US forces in the country. Consequently, the Americans withdrew its forces from the Philippines. Both countries tried to project normalcy in their security relations, but neither party could conceal that this once close and vibrant bilateral alliance had been relegated to the sidelines.

THE PHILIPPINE REHABILITATION ACT-prohibiting payments above $500 for war damage compensation prohibiting Philippine acceptance of the Bell trade Act. This condition was not in the original bill passed by the U.S Senate; it was inserted in the House version and the text was prepared in the High Commissioner office. I offered the Philippines $120 million for the reconstruction of highways, port, and harbor facilities etc., $100 million worth of surplus military property, and $400 million dollars for the compensation of property losses and damages suffered by Filipinos, Americans, citizens of friendly nations, religious and private organizations. Tying up war damage payments to the Bell trade Act insured that President Roxas would do everything in his power to make Congress and the Filipino people accept parity and all the other onerous provisions of the Act. War payments were necessary for the rehabilitation of private industry, a cornerstone of the Roxas Administration
| |
|President Elpidio Quirino (1948-1953) |
|[pic] |
|[pic] |
|6th President of the Philippines |
|2nd President of the 3rd Republic |
|In office |
|April 18, 1948[1] – December 30, 1953 |
|President |Manuel Roxas |
|Vice President |Fernando Lopez (1949-1953) |
|Preceded by |Manuel Roxas |
|Succeeded by |Ramon Magsaysay |
|[pic] |
|3rd Vice President of the Philippines |
|2nd and Last Vice President of the Commonwealth |
|1st Vice President of the 3rd Republic |
|In office |
|May 28, 1946 – April 17, 1948 |
|Preceded by |None[2] |
|Succeeded by |None[3] |
|[pic] |
|Secretary of Foreign Affairs |
|In office |
|September 16, 1946 – April 17, 1948 |
|Preceded by |Restored[4] |
|Succeeded by |Joaquin Miguel Elizalde |
|Born |November 16, 1890(1890-11-16) |
| |Vigan, Ilocos Sur |
|Died |February 29, 1956 (aged 65) |
| |Quezon City |
|Political party |Liberal Party |
|Occupation |Lawyer |
|Religion |Roman Catholic |
|Signature | |

Elpidio Rivera Quirino (November 16, 1890 – February 29, 1956) was the sixth President of the Philippines. He served from April 17, 1948 to December 30, 1953. Elpidio Quirino was a Roman Catholic and was the first president of Ilocano descent. He also has Spanish ancestry.

Early life and career

Born in Vigan, Ilocos Sur to Mariano Quirino and Gregoria Rivera, Quirino spent his early years in Aringay, La Union. He received secondary education at Vigan High School, then went to Manila where he worked as junior computer in the Bureau of Lands and as property clerk in the Manila police department. He graduated from Manila High School in 1911 and also passed the civil service examination, first-grade.
Quirino attended the University of the Philippines. In 1915, he earned his law degree from the university's College of Law, and was admitted to the bar later that year. He was engaged in the private practice of law until he was elected as member of the Philippine House of Representatives from 1919 to 1925, then as Senator from 1925 to 1931. He then served as Secretary of Finance and Secretary of the Interior in the Commonwealth government.
In 1934, Quirino was a member of the Philippine Independence mission to Washington D.C., headed by Manuel Quezon that secured the passage in the United States Congress of the Tydings-McDuffie Act. This legislation set the date for Philippine independence by 1945. Official declaration came on July 4, 1946.
During the Japanese invasion during World War II, he became a leader of the underground rebellion and was captured and imprisoned.[citation needed] During the Battle of Manila in 1945, his wife, Alicia Syquía, and three of his five children were killed as they were fleeing their home.
After the war, Quirino continued public service, becoming president pro tempore of the Senate. In 1946, he was elected first vice president of the independent Republic of the Philippines, serving under Manuel Roxas. He also served as secretary of state.

Presidency

President Quirino presenting a gift to U.S. President Harry S. Truman at the Oval Office on September 13, 1951. Ambassador Joaquin Elizalde looks on.
Quirino assumed the presidency on April 17, 1948, taking his oath of office two days after the death of Manuel Roxas. The next year, he was elected president on his own right for a four-year term as the candidate of the Liberal Party, defeating Jose P. Laurel of the Nacionalista Party.
Since Quirino was a widower, his surviving daughter Vicky would serve as the official hostess and perform the functions traditionally ascribed to the First Lady.
Quirino's administration faced a serious threat in the form of the communist Hukbalahap movement. Though the Huks originally had been an anti-Japanese guerrilla army in Luzon, communists steadily gained control over the leadership, and when Quirino's negotiation with Huk commander Luis Taruc broke down in 1948, Taruc openly declared himself a Communist and called for the overthrow of the government.
His six years as president were marked by notable postwar reconstruction, general economic gains, and increased economic aid from the United States. Basic social problems, however, particularly in the rural areas, remained unsolved, and his administration was tainted by widespread graft and corruption.
Although ill, Quirino ran for re-election in 1953, but he was overwhelmingly defeated by Ramon Magsaysay.

Post-presidency

Following his failed bid for re-election, Quirino retired to private life in Quezon City, Metro Manila. He died of a heart attack on February 29, 1956.

Relatives

TV host and fitness expert Cory Quirino is the granddaughter of Elpidio Quirino. The husband of singer Kuh Ledesma, Luisito "Louie" Gonzalez is a grandson.

FOREIGN POLICIES OF PRESIDENT QUIRINO

1.Commited to the fullest possible to the United States of America on all materes that are essential to mutual security
2. Philippines is committed to the fullest support of peoples of Asia and elsewhere in their struggle for freedom and independence. 4. Committed to the fullest possible to the United Nations

PRESIDENT RAMON MAGSAYSAY

[pic] Ramón Magsaysay Ramón Magsaysay was elected president of the Philippines in 1953 and served four years in office. Magsaysay was a strong opponent of the Communist-led Huk guerrillas, and he reorganized and strengthened the armed forces in a campaign to crush them. He was killed in a plane crash in 1957.

Magsaysay, Ramón (1907-1957), Philippine statesman, born in Iba, and educated at the University of the Philippines and José Rizal College. From 1942 to 1945, during World War II, he organized and led the guerrilla force that fought the Japanese. He was elected (1946) and re-elected (1949) on the Liberal party ticket to the Philippine House of Representatives. An advocate of stronger government action against the Communist-led Hukbalahap (Huk) guerrillas, he was appointed secretary of national defence in 1950. He reorganized and strengthened the army and the constabulary and intensified the campaign to crush Huk resistance, waging one of the most successful antiguerrilla campaigns in modern history by winning over the peasantry and preserving tight military discipline. In 1953 Magsaysay resigned his post as defence secretary and became the presidential candidate of the Nationalist party after criticizing the Liberal government. He was elected president of the Philippines in November 1953, but his efforts to reform the country were frustrated by wealthy landowner interests in the national congress. He died in a plane crash.

Pres. Ramon Magsaysay (Dec.30, 1953- March 17_________)
Problems:
1. Communist Aggression (the Huks)

2. He faced the challenge over the controversy, of the delimitations and Jurisdiction of the U.S. military bases in the country.

3. Economic stability of the country (due to the equalities in the Bell Trade Act0 (onerous effect of the Bell Trade Act of 1946).

4. The impact of Cold War.

Solutions: 1. Communist Aggression (Huks)

- (He is pushing through the regional collection security pact) SEATO

- He continues the tasks of suppressing the Huks.

- Worker had to affect rural uplifment.

Pres. Magsaysay said the country must assure for its citizens the social and economic conditions that would enable (the people) to live in decency, free from ignorance, disease and want.

a. Employment

b. Education

c. Health

d. Foods

2. Economic stability – (effects of Bell Trade Act)

-Pres. Magsaysay sent a Mission to the U.S. under the Chairmanship of Sen. Jose P. Laurel for the purpose of the working the removal of the patent in equalities in the Bell Trade Act.

With three broad instructions namely:

1. The mission was to reexamine Philippine United States Trade Relations with particular reference to the existing executive agreement on the trade.

2. It was to work for the settlement of all financial claims of the Philippines on the U.S. as recommended in the Bell Report of 1950;

3. It was to take up with the U.S. delegation in Washington D.C., other general matters relating to the Philippine economy.

(3 months later Laurel – Langley Agreement) dec.15, 1954

Provisions of the Laurel – Langley Agreement 1. Yielding to the Philippine control over its currency.

2. The granting on a reciprocal base to citizens of one state.

3. The right to do business in the other.

4. The naming of the “parity rights” reciprocal for citizens of each country in the territory of the other.

5. The imposition of quantitative restriction on a reciprocal basis.

6. The end of the probation against the Philippines having exult taxes

7. Made for the increase in the tariff preferences of the U.S. goods entering the Philippines.

8. Termination of the quota allocation limitation on Philippine products subject to quota’s in the U.S. markets

9. For the increase of the duty free quotas of the Philippine products that are subject to declining duty – free quota’s for products in the termination of absolute quotas on product to the U.S.

10. Called for the end to the Philippine exchange tax and its substitute by an import long to be gradually reduced and ended.

11. Full tariffs on its others products would come into effect in 1974.

Note: (Laurel –Langley agreement) – did not abrogate the “parity amendments”. 3. U.S military Bases – (major irritancy of the Philippine U.S. military Relations).

- RP – U.S. Bases Talks – to priority consideration of the problem of bases and jurisdiction conflicts.

- To take up the turnover of the temporary installations of the U.S. government to the Philippine government.

4. Impact of Cold War (concern over the inadequacy of the defense arrangement)

- U.S. assured the defense of the Philippines under the Mutual Defense Treats.

5. Communist success in Viltran.

(SEATO)

Recto wants to have a separate foreign policy from the United States
US_RP Military Bases have the same provisions in the North Atlantic treaty provision which provides for automatic declaration of war not according to the constitutional processes of the U.S. criticized the Japanese peace treaty by making Japan an ally to the U.S. in the cold war and assured its security in which the Phils is part of it and attached with it is the war reparations of Japan to the Phils with the amount of 8 billion dollars subject for future negotiations but meanwhile the treaty must be signed.

Confrontation with Magsaysay Recto criticizes the Philippine subservience to the U.S. and advocated the Asia for Asians meant that Asian should solve their own problems without interference from colonial masters.
From Pressures to Confrontation Recto vehemently opposed to American government claim as ownership rights to military and naval bases it occupied before 1946 and seeking title for it.
Recto contented that: 1. American ownership of the bases would impair the territorial integrity of the Philippines thus making her independence incomplete.

2. If the U.S. believed that they have the rightful claim of the bases or land why did it lease them from the Philippine government for 99 years “free of rent” as provided in the bases agreement?

3. If the U.S. pressed their claim of the bases he would seek repeal for the RP-U.S. bases.

What is the Legal Declaration of Independence?

SC made it clear that American laws can operate in the Philippines only upon express consent of the Philippine government.

Question of Vietnam

Recto clashed with Magsaysay in the subject of the Indochina for Americans wanted the Philippines to send troops to Vietnam, Recto retaliated the war in Vietnam is purely civil and if the Philippines will send troops it would be a proof that the Philippines is a puppet to the U.S.

According to him U.S. began to mobilize her allies and client stated for collective defense against the “Communist menace” to Southeast Asia through the formation of the following:

1. U.S.- Phil Mutual Defense Treaty

2. SEATO

3. Pressure to recognition in South Vietnam

4. Support for U.S. policy on Formosa

According to Recto it as intervention for the Philippines is not a part of the treaty between U.S. and Taiwan, therefore the Philippines should not be consulted on the matters of Taiwan. He confronted Magsaysay for committing the Philippines beyond the legitimate requirements of the treaty. Filipinos would not be sent abroad to fight abroad. He was vehemently opposed against the commitment of Filipino troops in foreign wars particularly in Indo China but Magsaysay recognized South Vietnam and reported that it received the overwhelming support for Vietnamese people. Recto said “that’s the problem with you, you read only American papers”.

Breaking point Recto describe the Philippine foreign p[policy in these words: “They order and we obey, they say jump and ask “how high”. The order may come in the form of suggestion and our compliance in the form of assent, but we look at, we toe the line in close U.S. assistance in withheld. Described Magsaysay received $250,000 fir a campaign fun result Recto was excluded from the Nationalista Party.

Rizal Bill Recto proposed to make Noli Me Tangere and El Filibusterismo compulsory reading in the state universities to develop nationalism along the people but it was vehemently opposed by the church clergy.
The “Dictatorship��? of Ramon Magsaysay
October 15, 1955 by Teodoro M. Locsin
FIRST, Sen. Claro M. Recto, the Nacionalista “guest candidate” of the Liberal Party, called President Ramon Magsaysay a puppet of the Americans. Then, when the President said he would not support Recto’s bid for re-election, the Batangueño called the President an interloper, impudent, presumptuous, a bully, a wrecker, a bungler, and corny. When the President got the Nacionalista executive committee to exclude Recto from the party’s senatorial ticket, the senator called the President a dictator.
Is Ramon Magsaysay a dictator? He had his way. Is to have your way to be dictatorial or merely evidence that you are smart? Recto is smart. Is it a crime to be smarter than Recto?

Speaking at a Liberal rally, Recto attacked Nacionalista leaders for having “lost their courage. . .They excluded me from the ticket, all because of the ire of one man whom I personally helped to get into the party; I worked for his victory.” The truth is, said Recto, that Magsaysay “wanted conformity within his circle and that all discussions must be carried on by a select group of ‘yes-men.’ Even granting that I was wrong in my opposition to his policies, the least that the President have done was to uphold my right to criticize by insisting on my inclusion in the NP ticket.”
In short, after being called a lot of names by Recto, Magsaysay, in the opinion of Recto, should have insisted on having Recto included in the Nacionalista senatorial lists which Magsaysay was expected to support. At this point, one might note that Recto would seem to have confused Magsaysay with Jesus Christ. Christ said:
“Ye have heard that it hath been said, ‘An eye for an eye, and a tooth for a tooth.’ But I say unto you. ‘Resist not evil: but whosoever shall smite thee on thy right cheek, turn to him the other also. . . .Ye have heard that it hath been said, “Thou shalt love thy neighbor, and hate thine enemy.’ But I say unto you, ‘Love your enemies, bless them that curse you, do good to them that hate you, and pray for them which despitefully use you, and persecute you. . . .’”
Having been cursed by Recto, Magsaysay should have given him his political blessing. In Magsaysay’s place, one is led to presume, Recto would have done just that. He would have done as Christ would have him do. Because Magsaysay, having been hit, decided to hit back.
“A small dictator—a banana dictator!” cried Recto over the radio.
The senator, in another speech, accused President Magsaysay of “thought control, decisions by impulse, meditated indecisions, personal rule, militarized government, foreign mentors, infant advisers, party dictation, and political prosecution.
Recto said he would run against Magsaysay in 1957 “to save the country from a militarized government.”
Unless Magsaysay was defeated in the next presidential election, the country would face dictatorial rule, according to the senator. Even while Magsaysay was merely secretary of national defense, he had already displayed dictatorial tendencies.
Yet Recto himself, by his own admission, had personally helped this secretary of national defense with “dictatorial tendencies” get into the Nacionalista Party and had even worked for his victory in the 1953 presidential poll.
A Betrayal
The same Recto who personally helped Magsaysay into the Nacionalista Party and worked for his victory against Quirino in 1953 called the action of Magsaysay “a political betrayal without parallel in our political history in sordidness of motives, crudeness of execution, and callousness with which it was excused and justified.” The accomplice accuses the principal!
In an interview with this writer early in 1953, while Laurel could not make up his mind whether to step aside for Magsaysay or not, Recto expressed impatience at Laurel’s dilatory tactics. The main enemy was Quirino; his administration was the greatest calamity that had ever befallen the Philippines; under that abominable regime, Recto’s witness in his case of bribery against Quirino’s secretary of national defense and justice had been shot to death like a dog; Recto himself had been accused of living in concubinage with his wife. Quirino and his gang must go!
And, it seemed fairly evident, the only one who could rid the country of Quirino & Co. was Ramon Magsaysay. Liberals could not use the army against him; he was much too popular with the army; the Nacionalistas must nominate Ramon Magsaysay for president as a matter of self-preservation; Laurel must step aside for him. Laurel finally did.
Now according to Recto, that constituted “a political betrayal without parallel in our political history in sordidness of motives, crudeness of execution, and callousness with which it was excused and justified.”
Times change, indeed, and men with them. But this is not new. It is, as Recto himself would put it, ‘corny.” And it does not answer the question: Is Ramon Magsaysay a dictator, or a man with dictatorial tendencies? Because the overwhelming majority of the delegates in the Nacionalista convention expressed a preference for the President over Recto, and because the Nacionalista executive committee, when asked to choose between the two, chose the President—does that make Ramon Magsaysay a dictator?
Sufficiently Free
Hitler was a dictator, so was Mussolini, so was Peron. Is Ramon Magsaysay a Hitler, a Mussolini? A Peron, perhaps? But Peron, under the guise of helping the poor, robbed them; in the name of charity, he accumulated millions of dollars worth of jewelry. If any Nacionalista is getting rich in office today, it is not Ramon Magsaysay; he had to sell an old house of his, with the lot, to pay for the expenses of his wife’s trip to the United States to have her sinus treatment. There are no free elections in Spain today, under Franco; in the Philippines, the election are sufficiently free for Recto and his friends in the Liberal Party to call the President of the Philippines all sorts of names—sufficiently free to make the election of Recto a certainty.
“Recto will win,” is the opinion of an independent voter and political observer for whose opinion we have every respect. “Recto will win—with Pacita M. Warns and ‘Soc’—Servant of Christ—Rodrigo.”
But how did the President get the Nacionalista executive committee to exclude this sure winner from the party’s senatorial ticket, in the first place? Did the President use dictatorial methods?
The President did not use a gun. He did not threaten to send the whole committee to a concentration camp if the members did not do his will. There was no mention of a Philippine Siberia. They did what they did because they lost courage, if we are to believe Recto. When asked to choose between Recto and the President, they chose the President. If the Nacionalista executive committee is a bunch of cowards, does that make the President totalitarian? Perhaps, the committee was merely being practical—as practical as Recto when he became a guest candidate of a party which had consistently voted for the foreign policy of Ramon Magsaysay which Recto had denounced as one of shameless subservience to the United States. Is it cowardly to be practical? If the Nacionalista executive committee is practical, is Ramon Magsaysay to blame?
Actually, it was Recto’s lack of self-control that got him excluded from the Nacionalista ticket. He disagreed with the President in matters of foreign policy; he expressed his disagreement in elevated language. But his colleagues in the Senate, Liberal, Nacionalista, and Democrat, voted him down with what can only be described as maddening regularity. They were for the President. The constant rebuff must have infuriated Recto. From exposition he descended to diatribe, from disagreement to vilification. The President was not only wrong, according to Recto; the President was despicable. He had sold his country down the river — to the Americans. He was a puppet, a marionette.
Had Recto but restrained himself, had he moderated his language, the President would have found it difficult if not impossible to get the Nacionalista executive committee to exclude Recto from the ticket. But after having been called the names Recto called him, after being accused of what amounted to treason to the Republic, of being a helpless tool, a pitiful puppet, a slave of the Americans by Recto, the President could confront the Nacionalista leaders with the question: “In my place, what would you do?”
Be Generous
They appealed to the President’s sense of Christian forgiveness; they asked him to be generous, to be magnanimous. At the same time, Recto went on calling him names.
In the President’s place, what would the Nacionalista leaders have done? Could they have consented to the inclusion of Recto without admitting that Recto was right, without pleading guilty to all the charges brought by Recto against the President?
Had Recto but merely disagreed with the President. . . . But the senator did not confine himself to disagreement; from disagreement he went to accusation. . . . He made it impossible for his colleagues in the Nacionalista Party to defend him. He made defense untenable, then accused those who gave in to the President of losing their courage.
The President moved with care; at first, it was thought that he had been outwitted. He called merely for a vote of confidence in his policies by the Nacionalista executive committee. The committee, which was more or less openly sympathetic personally to Recto, gave the President the vote he asked for. The committee was careful not to say that it was against the President, that was all. Recto, it was generally believed, would still be included in the Nacionalista senatorial ticket.
The President refused to be “humored.” Was the executive committee for the Philippine commitments in SEATO, the President’s declaration that the occupation of Formosa by the Communists would be a serious threat to the Philippine security, and the recognition of Vietnam? the President asked. What could the executive committee say but yes, it was for all these? After all, a Nacionalista Senate had voted overwhelmingly for them. Yes, the executive committee said. . . But it was for these various stands, how could it be for Recto, who had denounced them as evidence of servility to a foreign power?
As a matter of fact, the President went on, Recto should be ashamed to run as a candidate of a party whose foreign policy he holds in such utter contempt. Of course, if Recto had changed his mind and would subscribe to that foreign policy, the President would be the first to nominate him and work for his reelection. . . .
The Guest
Recto, naturally, could not say he had changed his mind. That would be to crawl. He announced his intention to run for the Senate as an independent. (The President said that he knew how difficult it would be to run as an independent, offered to help Recto, if he chose to run alone, in the distribution of his sample ballots.) In the end, Recto joined the Liberals, as a “guest candidate” of a party whose leaders had voted for the foreign policy Recto had denounced.
In all this, it is difficult to see where the President had been dictatorial. If his intention was to prevent the reelection of Recto by having him excluded from the Nacionalista ticket, and if Recto wins, the President will have been proven wrong, but not dictatorial. Recto’s victory would be the best evidence of the absence of any dictatorial tendencies in the President; all the President would have to do to prevent the victory of Recto is to repeat 1949. (Recto is now with the accomplices if not principals to that rape of democracy.) But Laurel can confidently say that the victory of Recto is a “foregone conclusion.” The story of 1949, when Laurel was cheated of the presidency by mass frauds and terrorism by Recto’s new political friends, will not be repeated. From reports, it would seem that more Nacionalistas are being shot than Liberals these days. The President himself, we are told, is expecting Recto to win.
Because Recto lost his head in the face of total rejection of his foreign policy views by Nacionalistas, Liberals, and Democrats, does that make the President a dictator? Because the Nacionalista national convention and executive committee when it came to a vote, freely expressed preference for the President over Recto, does that prove dictatorship?
Let us use words carefully; let us not speak from the side of our mouths. Where, precisely, lies the alleged dictatorship of the President?

A man’s real possession is his memory. In nothing else is he rich, in nothing else is he poor._A. Smith

FOREIGN POLICIES

MUTUAL DEFENSE TREATY

To complement and further strengthen the 1947 MBA, the Philippines and the US concluded a MDT on 30 August 1951. The 1951 MDT provides the overall framework of the defense relationship between the Philippines and the US. Significantly, it provides that “each Party recognizes that an armed attack in the Pacific area on either of the Parties would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common dangers in accordance with its constitutional processes.”24 To effectively achieve the objective of the treaty, the parties separately and jointly, by self-help and mutual aid, agreed to maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack.25 The security alliance, with the MDT as cornerstone, had been tested in the crucible of the Korean and Vietnam War, and the Cold War.

Proponents and supporters of the 1951 MDT maintained that the bilateral Philippine – US defense relationship provided for the Philippines external defense and contributed in maintaining regional security. On a practical level, the MDT gave the Philippines, to a considerable extent, deterrence against potential aggressors. Likewise, through the military training and exercises conducted, the Philippines was given the opportunity to develop its defense capabilities .Despite the termination of the 1947 MBA in 1992, the 1951 MDT remained in effect as the latter is an independent treaty, and as such, the Philippines and the US remain defense allies. In fact, the 1951 MDT is the only legal framework guiding Philippine-American security relations in the post-bases period, with both countries repeatedly re-affirming the MDT to be the anchor of their security relations. However, the US downgraded its political and military relations with the Philippines as it could not guarantee the external defense of the country since American forces lost a significantfacility from which they could operate.

PRESIDENT García, Carlos Poléstico (1957-1961)

García, Carlos Poléstico (1896-1971), Filipino politician, President of the Republic of the Philippines (1957-1961). García was born in the city of Talibon in the Visayan Islands of the central Philippines. He attended Silliman University and Silliman Institute, in Dumaguete, and later studied at the Philippine Law School in Manila. García practised law and became a teacher. He entered politics in 1926 as a member of the Philippine House of Representatives, and served until 1932. García was the governor of Bohol in the southern Philippines, from 1932 to 1942, and was a member of the Philippine Senate from 1942 to 1953. During World War II, he resisted the Japanese occupation as a member of guerrilla forces based in Bohol. In 1946 he became Senate minority leader.

In 1953 García was nominated for vice-president as part of the Nationalist ticket headed by Ramón Magsaysay. They won a decisive victory, and in 1954, García became vice-president and minister of foreign affairs. In March 1957 García became president after Magsaysay was killed in a plane crash, and he won an elected term as president in November 1957. While in power, García’s government negotiated the transfer of unused United States military base areas to Philippine control. Criticized for inefficiency and corruption, García was defeated by Diosdado Macapagal when he ran for re-election in 1961.

Besides his accomplishments as a statesman, García was a recognized poet in his native dialect, Visayan.

Pres. Carlos P. Garcia (March 18, 1957 – Dec. 30, 1957) (Dec. 30, 1957- Dec.20, 1961)

Problems: 1. Economic problems a. Graft and corruption in the government bureaucracy.

2. Threats of the Communism (internal and international)

3. U.S. military bases remained the source of irritants of the Philippine – American relations.

4. RP – U.S. Relations suffered strain when differences arose between the two countries over the Philippines claim to war damages.

Solutions:

1. Economic problems

a. Pres. Garcia went to the U.S. to ask for economic assistance of $500 M only received $75 Million.

b. Pres. Garcia enunciated the “Filipino First” policy heralded the resurgence of Filipino Nationalism. This was done against foreign businessmen who dominated Philippine economy. It was realized that even the Central Bank discrimination against Filipino businessman in the allocation of $’s for imports and the facts that about 70% of the domestic trade and 80% of foreign trade were in the hands of Aliens (Chinese and American) (dated August 21, 1958) (All Filipino businessman were give preference in all matters pertaining to economic development of the country. Pres. Garcia – favored selective controls in order to arrest the expansion of credit for non- productive activities.

Resisted foreign control over our affairs

Called for the adoption of guidelines giving preferential treatment to Filipinos Qualified Filipinos who applied for foreign exchange allocations to established commercial or industrial enterprises were to be given preference. Joint venture of 60% capital stock ownership and suppressed feelings of nationalism began to surface and demanded for the extension of the progress. Producers and exporters association urged that Filipino First be extended to the disposition of natural resources. Educators move to suggest application of the concept of Philippine education.

Reaction

Provoke protest from foreign business quarters, notably American and Chinese and according to them Filipinos willfully destroy existing industry for it reduce economic control.

External Pressures Garcia was forced to abandon the policy for it is protested by the pro- Americans and made a coup de tat against the government maneuvered by the CIA supported by the Americans. c. He (Pres. Garcia) himself oppose to a move for a return of free enterprise in the Philippine economy because it meant the prevention of alien domination of the national economy.

d. Pres. Garcia (1959) idea of regional cooperation in the economic and socio- cultural fields in the foundation of the Southeast Asian Association of states for mutual assistance.

e. It believed that it must work first its problem of internal development.

2. Threats of Communism on its security: (Internal as well as International)

Solution: a. Pres. Garcia’s administration – passes the anti-subversion law which outlawed communism in the Philippines.

b. Philippines recognized the role and importance of the SEATO and U.S. Military bases in the country in deterring the aggressive intentions of international communism check and maintain balance of power in the world its therefore a condition of peace.

c. Anti- Communist attitude of the Philippines was reflected in its policy towards Laos. It hold that “no free territory can be surrendered of any aggression without inviting further aggression in other free areas of the world.

d. The Philippines National Security Council in the resolution stated; that SEATO should take military action in Laos as all means of achieving a peaceful settlement has been exhausted.

e. Organization of Association of Southeast Asia on (July 31,1961) – to bring the Philippine closer to her Asian neighbors as well as to open new areas of Cooperation particularly security pact.

In relation with this his (Pres. Garcia) policy of foreign closer relations he received heads of states of South Vietnam, Malaya, and strengthened bonds of friendship with Laos, Cambodia, Indonesia, and Burma and he visited Japan.

f. The Philippines (Pres. Garcia Time) has been ardent supporter of the United Nations. The Philippines supported consistently acceptance of New Members to the United Nations as another taken of the extension of the frontiers of freedom and liberty.

The question of Criminal Jurisdiction over the U.S. Military bases in the Philippines was another irritant.

Solutions: Exploratory talks on diplomatic levels were being held to reconcile points of divergence on the questions of the Military bases in the Country, refining the mutual defense concept and readjusting Phil. America defense arrangements. As a result: Bohlen- Serrano Agreement – was concluded which provided for: 1. Reduction of the term of base leaves from 99 to 25 years;

2. The relinquishment by the U.S. of approximately 118,000 hectares of the base lands and the transfer of the Olongapo community to the Philippines;

3. Prior consultant with the Philippine government on the Military operational use of the bases for purposes other than mutual defense of both countries.

4. Prior consultation with the Philippine government before the U.S. could put up a missile launching site in the Philippines.

5. The creation of the Mutual defense Board and the placement of the Filipino liason officers in American bases in the Philippines.

3. July 15, 1960 – Sec. for foreign Affairs Felixberto Serrano conferred U.S. Ambassador John D. Hickerson on the revision of the criminal jurisdiction prevision of the Phil. U.S. Military Bases Agreement.

On this particular issue the Philippine Courts will b of on- base offense. Under the term of the present pact, it is the U.S. servicemen who had commited on base offense against a Philippine National or resident. The certifiacation of the base commander may be received by the Phil. Secretary of Justice and the Chief of Jusmag but in case of conflict of opinions, the certification of the base commander stands.

4. RP - US relation suffered strain when differences arose between the two countries over the Philippine claim to war damages

SOLUTIONS: Pres. Garcia went to the U.S. in June 1958. His two objectives were the following: 1. To further improve the friendly relations between the Philippines and the United States.

To ask the American people to help his country attain economic stability and make it real, substantial and effective democracy in this part of the world. He asks for 500 million dollars but got only 75 million dollars (This statement draw attention to the fact that the Philippine had received much less economic aid from the U.S. than other Asian countries.
Document #1488; March 30, 1960
To Carlos Polestico Garcia
Series: EM, AWF, International Series: Philippine Islands ; Category: Cable
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The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower, Volume XX - The Presidency: Keeping the Peace
Part IX: Shattered Dreams; March 1960 to July 1960
Chapter 21: "Progress in a knotty problem
Dear Mr. President: I have received your telegram of March 17 asking that I increase the Philippine sugar quota. As you know, the sugar quotas are determined by Congress and any modification would require Congressional action. Since the Sugar Act of 1948 as amended in 1956 expires this year, Congress is expected to consider its extension during the present session.1
The Administration has been giving considerable thought to what recommendations it should make to Congress for its consideration. After weeks of most careful study of this problem, I have concluded that the time is not propitious to recommend any change in the present structure of quotas assigned to foreign countries.2
Accordingly, I have recommended to the Congress only certain minimum changes in the present Sugar Act. The most important of these would give me the authority to reduce the quota for a calendar year for any foreign country, except, of course, the Philippines, and to make required replacements from any source when I determine it to be in the national interest or necessary to insure adequate supplies of sugar. I have requested this authority primarily to enable me to protect our sugar consumers should our supplies of sugar from foreign sources be endangered for any reason. The final decision as to whether I am to be given this authority, however, rests with Congress.3 I regret therefore that it has not been possible for me to comply with the wishes of the Philippine sugar producers. I wish to assure you, however, that the position of the Philippines has been given full consideration by the Administration in arriving at the position which I have recommended to Congress.4
With assurances of my continued esteem, Sincerely
1 The Sugar Act determined a quota system for the amount of sugar that could be sold to the United States by both domestic and foreign producers (for background see Congressional Quarterly Almanac, vol. XVI, 1960, pp. 208 - 16). President Garcia had cabled Eisenhower asking that the Philippines’ quota be increased by as much as two hundred thousand tons, which, he said, could help stabilize and boost his country’s economy (Mar. 17, AWF/I: Philippine Islands).
2 In the letter accompanying State’s draft of this response, Herter had explained that a previous statement made by Eisenhower had led Philippine growers to assume that the United States would raise their country’s quota. Since Garcia had released his request to the public, Herter had recommended that Eisenhower also make his response public, which he would do on April 4 (Herter to Eisenhower, Mar. 28, 1960, AWF/I: Philippine Islands; Public Papers of the Presidents: Eisenhower, 1960 - 61, pp. 331 - 32; New York Times, Mar. 17 and Apr. 5, 1960).
3 The Administration had sent its bill to Congress on March 16. The request for discretionary authority was understood to be a response to increasingly tense relations with Cuba, the nation’s largest foreign supplier of sugar (Congressional Quarterly Almanac, vol. XVI, 1960, pp. 208 - 16). Eisenhower denied that this proposal was intended as a "reprisal" against Cuba’s Castro regime and maintained that it provided means to protect the nation’s sugar supply (Public Papers of the Presidents: Eisenhower, 1960 - 61, p. 298; see also pp. 452 - 53). For background on relations with Cuba see no. 1370, and Bonsal, Cuba, Castro and the United States, esp. pp. 136 - 37.
4 Herter had advised that it was not considered feasible to raise the quota of any foreign country given the difficulty of the situation with Cuba (Herter to Eisenhower, Mar. 28, 1960, AWF/I: Philippine Islands). Eisenhower had initialed a memo written by Don Paarlberg, Special Assistant for Economic Affairs, explaining that although Garcia’s request had merit, it could lead to demands from other countries to divide the Cuban allotment among themselves, a step that would be "unfortunate from a diplomatic standpoint" (Paarlberg to John S. D. Eisenhower, Mar. 31, 1961, AWF:/I Philippine Islands). For developments see nos. 1578 and 1582; see also State, Foreign Relations, 1958 - 1960, vol. XV, South and Southeast Asia, pp. 961 - 62.

.

President Diosdado Macapagal (Dec. 30, 1961 - Dec. 30, 1965)

When Macapagal assumed the president of the Philippines is back on the track for he lifted exchange controls and received free enterprise. Central Bank floated the pesos on the free market until the rate reach $3.90; 1 peso. He proudly announces that U.S. government private banking and institutions lend $304 m as a stabilization fund to support decontrol program; $55 IMF and $93m war reparations damage. U.S. has allowed the imposition of foreign exchange and import controls only a temporary measure to check severe economic deterioration. The protection gives the Filipino entrepreneurs to set up light industries to supply commodity barred from importation. 1960 the economy was able to put up food, wood, pharmaceutical, cement, flour, textile, paint, paper glass, chemical, fertilizer, tele communication, appliance, electronics, plastic, fuel, refinery, motor vehicle and a machine parts industry. Investors in the country with the highest investment are the Filipinos with $1,400m; Chinese $425m and $31m Americans Many American firms incorporated in the Philipopines by simply adding “Philippines” to the name of the mother corporation. These firms produced toiletries, detergents, pharmaceuticals, batteries, aluminum products, wares, cables, lumber, paper veneer, dais products.

Americans agitate the lifting of controls.

In 1957, went the Philippine government asks for $25m for stabilization the IMF rejected. U.S. stated department wanted for the Philippines to devalue the peso and remove exchange controls.
Decontrol begins Put an end to the protection of Filipino enterprises or unlimited inflows of consumer goods subjected to Philippine manufactured goods to crippling competition giving colonial buy “stateside”.
Devaluation
Increased the advantages of foreign business enterprises more expensive that before and encourage exports with its promise of large profits.
1962 P2: 1$ - important of capital goods P3.90: 1$ - machinery Made it chapter for foreign investors to do business in the Philippines for simple reason their dollars would now be able to buy more dollars.
Enter Global Corporations Devaluation made it cheaper for foreign investors to do business in the Philippines for simple reasons that their dollars would be able to buy more. Clearest example how devaluation worked against Filipino industries in favor of foreign owned enterprises was the case of FILOII Corporation set up in 1959 by Filipino entrepreneurs was bankrupt and taken over by GUl foil.
Problems
1. Problem of restoring economic stability in the country 2. “Phil Omnibus Claims” to the U.S was one of the irritants in the Phil- U.S. relations aside from the controversy over the issue of jurisdiction in the U.S. military bases (war damage issue). 3. The Philippines severed its realtions with Malaysia as she pursued the claim of Borneo, particularly Sabah. 4. Communist China likewise remained a source of apprehension with regard national security. 5. The revision of the provisions concerning criminal jurisdiction over the U.S. bases in the country.
Solutions:
1. Economic Stability a.) Omnibus claims 2. Communist China likewise remained a source of apprehension with regard national security.
- Maphilindo (regional organization) (July 31, 1963)
- A constant advocate of the UN Charter and UN Resolution. The Philippine supporter the right of self- determinants of all Nation.
- Resolution on disarmament
- Acceptance of new UN members
- opposed the acceptance of communist China to the UN.

Analysis:

Americans in Agriculture

1949- There was 28 registered corporations engaged in agriculture; 19 were owned by Americans, their investments include:
a.) logging, fishing, livestock, poultry, copra, abaca, sugar, rice, coffee, citrus, banana, rubber

Companies owned by Americans
1. Firestone Tire and Robber Corporation
2. Goodrich Philippines Inc.
3. Goodyear Tire and Rubber- dominate the rubber industry.

Six biggest timber industries
1. Weyer Hauser Corp.
2. Boise- Cascade Corp.
3. Gegia- Pacific Corp.
4. Paper Industries Corp.
5. Insular Lumber Corp.
6. Fidlay Miller Timer Company The pineapple plantations in the Mindanao are considered the largest in the world.
For decades Filipinos has been taught to regard Mindanao as the Land of Promise. The island has fulfilled its promise but the beneficiaries are the giant foreign agricultural corporations and Japanese.
Philpak
Dolfil

|Ferdinand Edralin Marcos |
|[pic] |
|Official Malacañang Portrait of Marcos since 1986 |
|[pic] |
|10th President of the Philippines |
|6th President of the 3rd Republic |
|1st President of the 4th Republic |
|In office |
|June 12, 1978 – June 30, 1981 |
| | |

Ferdinand Emmanuel Edralín Marcos (September 11, 1917 – September 28, 1989) was President of the Philippines from 1965 to 1986. He was a lawyer, member of the Philippine House of Representatives (1949-1959) and a member of the Philippine Senate (1959-1965). During World War II he claimed to be the leader of Ang Maharlika, a guerrilla force in northern Luzon. In 1963 he became Senate President. As Philippine president and strongman, his greatest achievement was in the fields of infrastructure development and international diplomacy. However, his administration was marred by massive government corruption, despotism, nepotism, political repression and human rights violations. In 1986 he was removed from power during the People Power Revolution after it was revealed he had invested hundreds of millions of dollars in the United States.

Early life

Marcos was born on September 11, 1917 in Sarrat, a small town in Ilocos Norte. Named by his parents, Mariano Marcos and Josefa Edralin, after Ferdinand VII of Spain, baptized into the Philippine Independent Church, Marcos was a champion debater, boxer, swimmer and a wrestler while in the University of the Philippines.
Marcos graduated cum laude with a law degree from the U.P. College of Law in 1939 and was elected to the Pi Gamma Mu international honor society. As a young law student of the University of the Philippines, Marcos was indicted and convicted of the murder of Julio Nalundasan, the man who twice defeated his father for a National Assembly seat. While in detention, he studied for and passed the bar examination with one of the highest scores in history. He appealed his conviction and argued his case before the Supreme Court of the Philippines. His father, who had an important voice due to his political position, coerced the Supreme Court to acquit him of the charges.[1]
When the Second World War broke out, Marcos was called to arms in defense of the Philippines against the Japanese. He was a combat intelligence officer of the 21st Infantry division. He fought in the three-month Battle of Bataan in 1942, and was one of the victims of the Bataan Death March, a Japanese war crime in which thousands of prisoners of war were forcibly transported after being defeated. He was released later. Though he was captured once more at Fort Santiago, he escaped and joined the guerrilla movements against the Japanese. He claimed to have been one of the guerrilla leaders in Luzon and that his greatest exploit was the Battle of Besang Pass, though the veracity of his claims had been widely questioned. However, genuine photos taken right after the war showed Marcos with decorations on his chest: a Distinguished Service Cross, a Bronze Star and a Purple Heart [5]. Subsequent claims to other awards proved to be a point of contention among historians.

Presidency

First term (1965-1969)

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The Marcos Years

President Ferdinand Marcos redefined foreign policy as the protection of Philippine independence, territorial integrity and national dignity, and emphasized increased regional cooperation and collaboration. He placed great stress on being Asian and pursued a policy of constructive unity and co-existence with other Asian states, regardless of ideological persuasion. In 1967, the Philippines launched a new initiative to form a regional association with other Southeast Asian countries called the Association of Southeast Asian Nations or ASEAN. It was also during this period that the Philippines normalized economic and diplomatic ties with socialist countries such as China and the USSR, which he visited in 1975 and 1976, respectively. The Philippines also opened embassies in the eastern bloc countries, and a separate mission to the European Common Market in Brussels.
Throughout the 1970s, the DFA pursued the promotion of trade and investment, played an active role in hosting international meetings, and participated in the meetings of the Non-Aligned Movement. The Foreign Service Institute was created in 1976 to provide in-house training to Foreign Service personnel.The leaders of the SEATO nations in front of the Congress Building in Manila, hosted by Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos on October 24, 1966.
…The Filipino, it seems, has lost his soul, his dignity, and his courage. We have come upon a phase of our history when ideals are only a veneer for greed and power, (in public and private affairs) when devotion to duty and dedication to a public trust are to be weighted at all times against private advantages and personal gain, and when loyalties can be traded. …Our government is in the iron grip of venality, its treasury is barren, its resources are wasted, its civil service is slothful and indifferent, its armed forces demoralized and its councils sterile., We are in crisis. You know that the government treasury is empty. Only by severe self-denial will there be hope for recovery within the next year.[3]
To rally the people, he vowed to fulfill the nation’s “mandate for greatness:”
This nation can be great again. This I have said over and over. It is my articles of faith, and Divine Providence has willed that you and I can now translate this faith into deeds.[4]
In his first State of the Nation Address (SONA), President Marcos revealed his plans for economic development and good government. President Marcos wanted the immediate construction of roads, bridges and public works which includes 16,000 kilometers of feeder roads, some 30,000 lineal meters of permanent bridges, a generator with an electric power capacity of one million kilowatts (1,000,000 kW), water services to eight regions and 38 localities.
He also urged the revitalization of the Judiciary, the national defense posture and the fight against smuggling, criminality, and graft and corruption in the government.
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Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos with Lyndon Johnson and Lady Bird on September 12, 1966.
To accomplish his goals “President Marcos mobilized the manpower and resources of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) for action to complement civilian agencies in such activities as infrastructure construction; economic planning and program execution; regional and industrial site planning and development; community development and others.”[5] The President, likewise, hired technocrats and highly educated persons to form part of the Cabinet and staff.[6]The employment of technocrats in key positions and the mobilization of the AFP for civic actions resulted in the increasing functional integration of civilian and military elites.[7] It was during his first term that the North Diversion Road (now, North Luzon Expressway) was constructed with the help of the AFP engineering construction battalion.[8]

Second term (1969-1972)

In 1969, President Marcos was reelected for an unprecedented second term because of his impressive performance or, as his critics claimed, because of massive vote-buying and electoral frauds.
The second term proved to be a daunting challenge to the President: an economic crisis brought by external and internal forces; a restive and radicalized studentry demanding reforms in the educational system; rising tide of criminality and subversion by the re-organized Communist movement; and secessionism in the South.
Economic situation - Overspending in the 1969 elections led to higher inflation and the devaluation of the Philippine peso. Further, the decision of the oil-producing Arab countries to cut back oil production, in response to Western military aid to Israel in the Arab-Israeli conflict, resulted in higher fuel prices worldwide. In addition, the frequent visits of natural calamities brought havoc to infrastructures and agricultural crops and livestock. The combined external and internal economic forces led to uncontrolled increase in the prices of prime commodities.
A restive studentry– The last years of the 1960s and the first two years of the 1970s witnessed the radicalization of the country's student population. Students in various colleges and universities held massive rallies and demonstrations to express their frustrations and resentments. On January 30, 1970, demonstrators numbering about 50,000 students and laborers stormed the Malacañang Palace, burning part of the Medical building and crashing through Gate 4 with a fire truck that had been forcibly commandeered by some laborers and students. The Metropolitan Command (Metrocom) of the Philippine Constabulary (PC) repulsed them, pushing them towards Mendiola Bridge, where, hours later, after an exchange of gunfire, four persons were killed and scores from both sides injured. Tear gas grenades finally dispersed the crowd. ”.[9] The event is known today as the First Quarter Storm.
Violent students protests did not end. In October 1970, a series of violent events occurred on numerous campuses in the Greater Manila Area, cited as “an explosion of pillboxes in at least two schools.” The University of the Philippines was not spared when 18,000 students boycotted their classes to demand academic and non-academic reforms in the State University, ending in the ‘occupation’ of the office of the President of the University by student leaders. Other schools in which scenes of violent student demonstrations occurred were San Sebastian College, the University of the East, Letran College, Mapua Institute of Technology, the University of Santo Tomas, Feati University and the Philippine College of Commerce (now Polytechnic University of the Philippines). Student demonstrators even succeeded in “occupying the office of the Secretary of Justice Vicente Abad Santos for at least seven hours.”[10] The President described the brief “communization” of the University of the Philippines and the violent demonstrations of the Left-leaning students as an “act of insurrection."
The re-emergence of the Communist movement – The re-emergence of the Communist movement and the threats it poised to the Philippine Republic may be best narrated by the Supreme Court in Lansang vs. Garcia on December 11, 1970, excerpts:
In the language of the Report on Central Luzon, submitted, on September 4, 1971, by the Senate Ad Hoc Committee of Seven – copy of which Report was filed in these cases by the petitioners herein – “The years following 1963 saw the successive emergence in the country of several mass organizations, notably the Lapiang Manggagawa (now the Socialist Party of the Philippines) among the workers; the Malayang Samahan ng Magsasaka (MASAKA) among the peasantry; the Kabataang Makabayan (KM) among the youth/students; and the Movement for the Advancement of Nationalism (MAN) among the intellectuals/professionals. The PKP has exerted all-out effort to infiltrate, influence, and utilize these organizations in promoting its radical brand of nationalism. Meanwhile, the Communist leaders in the Philippines had been split into two (2) groups, one of which- composed mainly of young radicals, constituting the Maoist faction – reorganized the Communist party of the Philippines early in 1969 and established a New People’s Army. This faction adheres to the Maoist concept of the “Protracted People’s War” or “War of National Liberation.” In the year 1969, the NPA had – according to the records of the Department of National Defense – conducted raids, resorted to kidnappings and taken part in other violent incidents numbering 230, in which it inflicted 404 casualties, and in turn, suffered 243 loses.

Declaration of Martial Law

1972- 1978 Marcos attempted to legitimize martial law through constitution and Supreme Court, patronage and NEW- Society style elections (referenda) He used the police and military to silence opposition voices through control of the media, prohibition of organized political activity, imprisonment (often torture and assassination and failed resorted to changing the legislature).
Imposition of New Constitution After Sept. 23, 1972- hundreds of presidents enemies and suspected enemies were arrested (more than a dozen other went underground or fled the country) A set of transitory provisions for the new constitution was drafted in Malacañang confirming the legitimacy of all presidential order, decreed and giving Marcos the powers of the President in the old constitution and those of the prime minister in the new.

The rectification posed a dilemma for Marcos for opposition to the draft constitution soon became so widespread and plebiscite might him. December he postponed the plebiscites and reimposed all previous restraint on free press and speech. On the last day of martial day of 1972, Marcos decreed the existence of “Citizens Assemblies” composing 15 year old or over and capable of acting a quorum of 1/5. In almost all cases voting is viva voce and usually police or military men re posted about the premises and gained the turn out of 90% yes even though the assemblies did not met. Certified resulted forwarded with uncanny speed and Marcos announced the ratification of the constitution. Opposition placed their hope on the Supreme Court, or believed that a protest before the court had some meaning. Six cases had been filed in early December to enjoin COMELEC from proceeding with the plebiscite. Pleading with the court to “save the Republic from the stark reality of dictatorship”. The decision of the court voted 6- 4 to dismiss the case. The chief voted against the president on all issues and retired.

THE CONTINUING SEARCH FOR LEGITIMACY: REFERENDA AND PLEBISCITES In preparation for second barangay referenda, on July 1973, Marcos ordered “it shall be the obligation of every qualified citizen to vote and register and cast his vote”. Failure to vote was to be punished by 1 to 6 months in prison. The question for referenda was simple and leading. “Do want President Marcos to continue beyond 1973 and finish the reforms he has initiated under martial law? Claiming 80% turnout with the newly registered voters. The next use of referenda, Feb 1975 and needed referendum to enhance hid legitimacy abroad. Needing more American investment he promised a referendum Chase in Manhattan in 1974, he claimed that he would return the country if the people no for the continuation of marital law and it was challenge by SC for the referendum is merely consultative. Dec. 17, 1974 Senator Jovito Salonga issued a manifest for the lifting of martial law and restoration of freedom of speech and press. The alleged boycott of the referendum made Marcos postpone the referendum. Marcos had been abandoned traditional campaign technique, for instance a Mayor of the town near Manila was told that President would make his town or city if he report good results in referendum. The mayor then called together all barangay officials and school teacher serving polls and clerks to insist the Marcos should win whatever happens. Feb 13 they received telegram from Marcos saying that he will appoint them in his authority to appoint local officials is confirmed in the referendum. October 16, 1976 another referendum. During the annual meeting of the board of directors of governors of the World Bank and IMF and turn out Yes “Do you want martial to be continued?”.

SUPRESSING PRESS FREEDOM AND HUMAN RIGHTS

Marcos took strong measures to insure that messages critical to the regime would not reach the public. He muzzled the press and used arrest, detention and even torture used for creating image of support for a new society. Before declaration of martial law the Philippines press had earned the reputation of being freest in Southeast Asia perhaps in the Third world. All media outlets were closed down. Scores of journalist including the rest known columnist were arrested along with he largest publisher Joaquin Roces of the Manila Times and was the tenacious defender of the press freedom. The only media allowed to reopen were those operated by relatives of friends of Marcos but Lopez Family which owned Manila Chronicle and broadcasting network suffered a high degree of confiscation.

POLITICAL PRISONERS

Jail was not only for erring journalist by 1977 some 70,000 Filipinos has been imprisoned for their political actions and beliefs at one time or another after martial was declared and President claiming only 6,000 in TV. In the first four years of martial law more than 50 priest and several Protestant pastors and as well as nuns were among those held without trial for hours or years. For instance in Dec.11, 1974 Marcos announced in TV that he released 622 though only 475. Very few detentions were reported and Marcos insisted that “no one”, but no one has been tortured. Problems:
1. National Unity- out of sense of separate national identity and specified grievances, a large segment of Filipino Muslims forged armed insurrection which requires momentous decisions, great risks, and sacrifices.
2. Land Conflicts- Christian migration in Mindanao continued to escalate in the late 1960’s; more than three thousand disembarked every week; seeking land. The government defined all unregistered land by Moro custom and thus capable being parceled out to settlers who satisfied certain requirements. Muslims long bewildered by little deeds, were treated with heavy land by Christian law enforcement officers who favored Christian land claimants. Legal system became a tool for land grabbers with necessary papers from Manila, immigrants could legally evict Moro farmers from and their families had occupied for generations. Land disputes seldom gained such attention in Manila until it covers 20,000 hectares in 1962
3. Precipitating rebellion Violent conflict between Muslims and Christians was already common when in 1968 confrontation precipitated by several incidents. A. Jabidah Massacre – which took place in the island of Corregidor in March. More than a score of young trainees from Sulu in established were killed by Christian officers, allegedly for mutiny. Opposition of Marcos came to believed that he was training a secret army to invade Sabah. In any case the people of Sulu were grief stricken and when the officers responsible for the “massacre were acquitted by court martial, grief turns to rage. Nur Misuari organized demonstration to protest what they called the worst crime of the century. The scandal shocked the whole Filipino Muslim community; this incident provoked a cry for Moro solidarity. In May 1968 a former governor of Cotabato province, Datu Udtong Matalam announced the formation of Muslim Independence Movement, probably triggered by the shooting of one of his sons by the NBI agent in nightclub, he gave the idea of the old idea of Moro independence new inputs. Christians were frightened. In March 1970 a gun battle in Upi, Cotabato brought to light the existence of the Ilagas, a well disciplined , well armed, and particularly bloodthirsty gang attacking Muslim victims organized and supported by a group of Christian Mayor. Moro politicians organized in turn, Muslim gangs, called “Baracudas” and gang warfare escalated before the locale elections of Nov. 1971. Even in early 1971 over 30,000 civilian refugees had fled fames and villages to avoid armed attack. 500 had been known killed in the incidents and many more. The Manili massacre when Christian soldiers killed nearly 60 men, women, and children huddled in mosque for no other purpose other than revenge-confirmed Muslim beliefs about the nature of the conflict. Despite the rising violence, many educated Muslim hopes for constitutional means to address their grievances through Concon but the declaration of martial laws and suspension of Concon shattered Muslim hopes. The dream of constitutional protection for their culture was killed and they were asked to lay down all arms- a combination that looked like a plan for cultural genocide, and gave to the formation of MNLF.
THE MNLF Nur Misuari, the MNLF chairman, had been respected intellectual among radicals in UP in 1960’s. In July 1968, Misuari’s leagues newspaper endorsed Matalams independence manifesto and put up the Bansa Moro. After the declaration of martial law events moved rapidly. On October 21, a force of nearly 1,000 well armed men attacked Marawi City on Lake Lanao, 75 died. The attackers called themselves the Mindanao Revolutionary Council for Independence used Muslim slogans and killed some Christian hostage, but it was not the doing of Misuari. It was led by the police chief of Marawi. It was pressure from the oil-rich Arab world, however that pushed toward political negotiations, a Ministerial level team representing Libya, Saudi Arabia, Senegal and Somalia toured the South.

Negotiations Tripoli Agreement Islamic Conference

How is the Philippines affected with the intercommunal conflict? Iran which supplied 5% of the Philippine oil imports, suspended shipment on October 1979 because of the: “oppression of Muslims in the Philippines”. Every conflict becomes institutionalized over time, creating interests that favor its prolongation. In Mindanao and Sulu such interests existed on both sides. There were nearly 1 Million refugees and more than 50,000 died. Both Christian and Muslim traditions extolled the obligation of revenge, and so the dead themselves fueled the struggle.
Agrarian Policy
P.D. 27 was great improvement over previous legislation because all tenants whose landlords owned more than 7 hectares were to be sold the land and they tilled at a price two and a half times the average annual production. CLT
Goals of Marcos’s Foreign Policy Opening to the Left
Opened an embassy in Beijing in June 1975 breaking all ties with Taiwan. Chinese promised small but steady shipments of oil to the Philippines at a time when Arabs were showing their displeasure with military action against Moros.
Diplomatic exchanges were made with Vietnam, Kampuchea, and Laos Opening to the Third World
ASEAN
Settled in Malaysian conflict over Sabah U.S. Bases

Martial law and the New Society

Proclamation of ma-Chief of all the armed forces of the Philippines

General Order No. 2 – The President directed the Secretary of National Defense to arrest or cause the arrest and take into his custody the individuals named in the attached list and to hold them until otherwise so ordered by the President or by his duly designated representative, as well as to arrest or cause the arrest and take into his custody and to hold them otherwise ordered released by him or by his duly authorized representative such persons who may have committed crimes described in the Order;
General Order No.3 – The President ordered that all executive departments, bureaus, offices, agencies and instrumentalities of the National Government, government owned or controlled corporations, as well all governments of all the provinces, cities, municipalities and barrios should continue to function under their present officers and employees, until otherwise ordered by the President or by his duly designated representatives. The President further ordered that the Judiciary should continue to function in accordance with its present organization and personnel, and should try and decide in accordance with existing laws all criminal and civil cases, except certain cases enumerated in the Order.
General Order No. 4 – The President ordered that a curfew be maintained and enforced throughout the Philippines from twelve o’clock midnight until four o’clock in the morning.
General Order No. 5 – All rallies, demonstrations and other forms of group actions including strikes and picketing in vital industries such as in companies engaged in manufacture or processing as well as in production or processing of essential commodities or products for exports, and in companies engaged in banking of any kind, as well as in hospitals and in schools and colleges are prohibited.
General Order No. 6 – No person shall keep, possess or carry outside of his residence any firearm unless such person is duly authorized to keep, possess or carry any such Philippines except to those who are being sent abroad in the service of the Philippines.

1976 Amendments to the Constitution

On October 16-17, 1976 majority of barangay voters (Citizen Assemblies) approved that martial law should be continued and ratified the amendments to the Constitution proposed by President Marcos.[11]
The 1976 Amendments were: an Interim Batasang Pambansa (IBP) substituting for the Interim National Assembly, the President would also become the Prime Minister and he would continue to exercise legislative powers until martial law should have been lifted. The Sixth Amendment authorized the President to legislate:
Whenever in the judgment of the President there exists a grave emergency or a threat or imminence thereof, or whenever the Interim Batasang Pambansa or the regular National Assembly fails or is unable to act adequately on any matter for any reason that in his judgment requires immediate action, he may, in order to meet the exigency, issue the necessary decrees, orders or letters of instructions, which shall form part of the law of the land.

The Batasang Bayan

Main article: Batasang Bayan
The Interim Batasang Pambansa was not immediately convened. Instead, President Marcos created the Batasang Bayan through Presidential Decree No. 995 on September 21, 1976. The Batasang Bayan is a 128-member legislature that advised the President on important legislature measures it served as the transitory legislature until convening of the Interim Batasang Pambansa in 1978[12] The Batasang Bayan was one of two temporary legislative bodies before the convening of the Regular Batasang Pambansa in 1984.

First national election under martial law

On April 7, 1978, the first national election under martial law was held. The election for 165- members of the Interim Batasang Pambansa resulted to the massive victory of the administration coalition party, the “Kilusang Bagong Lipunan ng Nagkakaisang Nacionalista, Liberal, at iba pa” or KBL. First Lady Imelda Marcos, KBL Chairman for NCR, won the highest number of votes in Metro Manila. Only 15 opposition candidates in other parts of the country won. Among them were: Francisco Tatad (former Secretary of Public Information to Pres. Marcos), Reuben Canoy (Mindanao Alliance), Homobono Adaza (MA), and Aquilino Pimentel, Jr. None of the members of Laban ng Bayan of former Senator Benigno Aquino, Jr. were elected. The Opposition denounced the massive votebuying and cheating in that elections. The opposition Liberal Party boycotted the elections as a futile exercise.
On April 21, 1978, the election of 14 sectoral representatives (agricultural, labor, and youth) was held.
On June 12, 1978 the Interim Batasang Pambansa was convened with Ferdinand E. Marcos as President-Prime Minister and Querube Makalintal as Speaker.

1980 and 1981 amendments to the Constitution

The 1973 Constitution was further amended in 1980 and 1981. In the 1980 Amendment, the retirement age of the members of the Judiciary was extended to 70 years. In the 1981 Amendments, the parliamentary system was modified: executive power was restored to the President; direct election of the President was restored; an Executive Committee composed of the Prime Minister and not more than fourteen members was created to “assist the President in the exercise of his powers and functions and in the performance of his duties as he may prescribe;” and the Prime Minister was a mere head of the Cabinet. Further, the amendments instituted electoral reforms and provided that a natural born citizen of the Philippines who has lost his citizenship may be a transferee of private land for use by him as his residence.

Lifting of martial law

After putting in force amendments to the Constitution and legislations securing his sweeping powers and with the Batasan under his control, President Marcos lifted martial law on January 17, 1981. However, the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus continued in the autonomous regions of Western Mindanao and Central Mindanao. The Opposition dubbed the lifting of martial law as a mere "face lifting" as a precondition to the visit of Pope John Paul II.

1981 presidential election and the Fourth Republic

On June 16, 1981, six months after the lifting of martial law, the first presidential election in twelve years was held. As to be expected, President Marcos ran and won a massive victory over the other candidates – Alejo Santos of the Nacionalista Party (Roy Wing) and Cebu Assemblyman Bartolome Cabangbang of the Federal Party. The major opposition parties, Unido (United Democratic Opposition, a coalition of opposition parties, headed by Salvador Laurel) and Laban, boycotted the elections.
In an almost one-sided election, President Marcos won an overwhelming 88% of the votes, the highest in Philippine electoral history. The Nacionalista candidate Alejo Santos garnered only 8.6% of the votes and Cabangbang obtained less than 3%.
On June 30, 1981, President Marcos was inaugurated in grandiose ceremonies and proclaimed the “birth of a new Republic.” The new Republic lasted only for less than five years. Economic and political crises led to its demise.

The Aquino assassination

[pic]

The Manila Bulletin headline, August 22, 1983.
After seven years of detention, President Marcos allowed former Senator Benigno S. Aquino, Jr. to leave the country.
After three years of exile in the United States, Aquino decided to return. The First Lady tried to dissuade him but in vain.
On August 21, 1983, former Senator Aquino returned to the Philippines. He was shot dead at the tarmac of the Manila International Airport while in the custody of the Aviation Security Command (AVSECOM).
About two million people attended the funeral of the late senator from Sto. Domingo Church to Manila Memorial Park.
Meanwhile, President Marcos immediately created a fact-finding commission, headed by Supreme Court Chief Justice Enrique Fernando, to investigate the Aquino assassination. However, the commission lasted only in two sittings due to intense public criticism. President Marcos issued on October 14, 1983, Presidential Decree No. 1886 creating an independent board of inquiry. The board was composed of former Court of Appeals Justice Ma. Corazon J. Agrava as chairman, Amando Dizon, Luciano Salazar, Dante Santos and Ernesto Herrera.
The Agrava Fact-Finding Board convened on November 3, 1983. But, before it could start its work. President Marcos charged the communists for the killing of Senator Aquino: “The decision to eliminate the former Senator, Marcos claimed, was made by none other than the general-secretary of the Philippine Communist Party, Rodolfo Salas. He was referring to his earlier claim that Aquino had befriended and subsequently betrayed his communist comrades. “ The Agrava Board conducted public hearings, and invited several persons who might shed light on the crimes, including AFP Chief of Staff Fabian Ver and First Lady Imelda R. Marcos.
After a year of thorough investigation – with 20,000 pages of testimony given by 193 witnesses, the Agrava Board submitted two reports to President Marcos – the Majority and Minority Reports. The Minority Report, submitted by Chairman Agrava alone, was submitted on October 23, 1984. It confirmed that the Aquino assassination was a military conspiracy but it cleared Gen. Ver. Many believed that President Marcos intimidated and pressured the members of the Board to persuade them not to indict Ver, Marcos’ first cousin and most trusted general. Excluding Chairman Agrava, the majority of the board submitted a separate report – the Majority Report – indicting several members of the Armed Forces including AFP Chief-of-Staff Gen. Fabian Ver, Gen. Luther Custodio and Gen. Prospero Olivas, head of AVSECOM.
Later, the 25 military personnel, including several generals and colonels, and one civilian were charged for the murder of Senator Aquino. President Marcos relieved Ver as AFP Chief and appointed his second-cousin, Gen. Fidel V. Ramos as acting AFP Chief. After a brief trial, the Sandiganbayan acquitted all the accused on December 2, 1985. Immediately after the decision, Marcos re-instated Ver. The Sandiganbayan ruling and the reinstatement of Ver were denounced by several sectors as a “mockery” of justice.

The failed impeachment attempt

On August 13, 1985, fifty-six Assemblymen signed a resolution calling for the impeachment of President Marcos for graft and corruption, culpable violation of the Constitution, gross violation of his oath of office and other high crimes.
They cited the San Jose Mercury News exposé of the Marcoses’ multi-million dollar investment and property holdings in the United States. The properties allegedly amassed by the First Family were the Crown Building, Lindenmere Estate, and a number of residential apartments (in New Jersey and New York), a shopping center in New York, mansions (in London, Rome and Honolulu), the Helen Knudsen Estate in Hawaii and three condominiums in San Francisco, California.
The Assemblymen also included in the complaint the misuse and misapplication of funds “for the construction of the Film Center, where X-rated and pornographic films are exhibited, contrary to public morals and Filipino customs and traditions.”
The following day, the Committee on Justice, Human Rights and Good Government dismissed the impeachment complain for being insufficient in form and substance:
The resolution is no more than a hodge-podge of unsupported conclusions, distortion of law, exacerbated by ultra partisan considerations. It does not allege ultimate facts constituting an impeachable offense under the Constitution. In sum, the Committee finds that the complaint is not sufficient in form and substance to warrant its further consideration. It is not sufficient in form because the verification made by the affiants that the allegations in the resolution “are true and correct of our own knowledge” is transparently false. It taxes the ken of men to believe that the affiants individually could swear to the truth of allegations, relative to the transactions that allegedly transpired in foreign countries given the barrier of geography and the restrictions of their laws. More important, the resolution cannot be sufficient in substance because its careful assay shows that it is a mere charade of conclusions.

Cabinet and judicial appointments 1965-73

The Cabinet appointments of President Marcos can be divided into three periods: his first two constitutional terms (1965-1973), the New Society appointments from 1973-1978, and the change from departments to ministries from 1978 to the end of his government.

What are the FOREIGN POLICIES OF MARCOS?

Ferdinand Marcos was President of the Philippines form 1965 to 1986, the longest serving Filipino President since independence.

The tenure of twenty-one years gave full play to President Marcos innovativeness, daring and foresight in formulating Philippine foreign policy.

The following quotations relevant to the Philippine Foreign Policy is recounted here to show the depth and breathe of Marcos diplomacy.

In his first Inaugural Address on December 30, 1965, President Marcos declared:

Today, as never before, we need a new orientation toward Asia: we must intensify the cultural identity with our ancient kin, and make common cause with them in our drive towards prosperity and peace. For this we shall require the kind knowledge that can only be faired through unabating scholarship on our histories, cultures, social forces and aspirations and through more active interaction with our friends and neighbors.”

With a sense of history, President Marcos began his first term with an awareness of our Asian’s and toll care to highlight this in his first unveiled his “7 Postulates of Philippine Foreign Policy” quoted as follows:

1. Protection of Philippine independence territorial integrity and national dignity.

2. Resistance to communist aggression, infiltration and subversion.

3. Reverence to the rule of law.

4. Unswerving support of the United Nations as well as the maintenance of defensive alliances and mutually beneficial relations with the United States and our allies.

5. Increased regional cooperation and collaboration in mutually beneficial endeavors.

6. Accelerated programs of economic development

In 1969 Marcos wrote a book entitled New Filipinism: the Turning Point which contained a copy of his 7 postulates of Philippine Foreign Policy.

The 7 Postulates follows:

1. Foremost is the national interest. Our foreign policy is always governed by our unswerving commitment to the welfare and dignity of the Philippines, by the need to protect our independence, territorial integrity and national dignity;

2. In protecting and promoting national welfare, we have at the same time strengthened our links with Asia;

3. Consideration of national welfare also compel us to establish strong safeguards against the threat of communist aggression, infiltration and subversion. At the same time, we have an open mind concerning relations with Socialist countries, particularly those of eastern Europe.

4. We are firm in our belief in the rule of law. We have a rich tradition of freedom and civil liberties. Our foreign policy will uphold this tradition.

5. We have always supported the United Nations. We believe in viable and mutually advantageous regional defense arrangements.

6. Peace and security are inseparable. We believe that progress in Asia is the countries of the region.

7. Their cooperation for prosperity and stability is possible only in a period of peace. We are resolute about accelerating economic development. We aim to overcome poverty not only in the Philippines but in the other countries in Asia as well.

In 1978 President Ferdinand E. Marcos enunciated his well known Eight Major Foreign Policy Guidelines as follows:

1. To strengthen the United Nations through a review of its Charter and the adoption of other measures to increase its efficiency and effectiveness.

a. Revision of the United Nations charter making the Philippines as active participant in the U. N.

b. Promulgation of an International Code of Ethics in the United Nations

c. Traditional support for the rights of people who are still under colonial rule to self-determination, independence and eventual membership in the United Nations

d. Support international measures to put an end to terrorism (Example: Conflicts between Israel and Palestine, Korean War, Vietnam War and Cold War)

e. Adherence to the traditional Philippine support for World Disarmament.

2. To Intensify efforts to make ASEAN a Strong and Viable Regional Organization and Expand Bilateral Relations with Members of ASEAN.

3. To seek closer identification with the Third World with whom we share similar problems.

a. The Philippines established diplomatic relations both on a resident and non-resident basis with the other developing countries of Asian, Latin America, the Middle east and Africa.

b. Through the UN and other international bodies, the Philippines has been in the forefront of the fight against Apartheid and all forms of racism.

c. More Philippine embassies are being considered to be opened in Africa and the Arab States.

4. To Pursue more vigorously mutually beneficial relations with Socialist States

a. The Philippines open diplomatic relations with eastern Europe and the Communist World of China and the Soviet Union.

b. In 1972, the Philippines opened diplomatic relations with Romania and Yugoslavia on a non-resident basis. In 1973, it was followed by the establishment of non-resident embassies I with East Germany, Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria. In 1974, Calros P. Romulo made official visits to these countries to foster closer relations with them. Trade and cultural agreements were signed in succession with these respective states.

c. In 1975, the President made a visit to Beijing following the opening of diplomatic relations between Beijing and Manila

d. In 1976, Philippines opened diplomatic relations with the Socialist republic of Vietnam and opened diplomatic relations with Cuba

e. In 1977 the Philippines opened diplomatic relations with Berlin on a non-resident basis

5. To Clarify and Update the Guidelines Under Which beneficial relations with Japan will Continue.

a. Philippine Japan relations had improves since the conclusion of the World War II in 1945. In 1960, the Treaty of Amity, Commerce and navigation between the two countries was signed but was not ratified until 1973, which shows a protracted ambivalence in Filipino attitudes towards the Japanese.

6. To reorient trade as well as security relations with the United States

a. Dynamic pragmatism towards opening diplomatic and consular relations with the Socialist States such as the Soviet Union, China, Eastern Europe and Cuba carried with it the corresponding veering away from the United States and the west.

7. To seek firmer bases for vigorous trade and cultural relations with Europe

8. To support the Arab countries in their struggle for a just and enduring peace in the Middle East.

a. Israel occupation of Arab land is tantamount to an act of aggression in violation of the United Nations Charter;

b. Israeli forces must withdraw from all Arab lands in accordance with the UN Security Council resolution No. 424 of November 22, 1967; and

c. Restore the legitimate rights of the people of Palestine.

Highlights of Foreign Policy implementation

1) travel ban to communist countries was relaxed; 2) diplomatic relations claim to Sabah was safeguarded 3) ASEAN was formally launched in 1967. 4) Diplomatic relations with Malaysia was restored. 5) The Philippines opened diplomatic missions in Eastern European countries 6) Diplomatic relations was established with the Soviet Union and China. 7) Participation in various important international conferences such as UNCTAD, GATT, and IMF and others. In some of these, the Philippines played host and in others. The President of the Philippines was elected as spokesman of the Third World Countries.

After Senator Claro M. Recto, perhaps the second man to influence Philippine foreign policy most as it is articulated today is President Ferdinand E. Marcos himself.

Marcos was elected President of the Philippines in 1965 and reelected in 1969. He declared martial law in 1972 and held on to political power until 1986 when Corazon C. Aquino wrested power from him in the so-called EDSA-REVOLUTION.

In 1969, President marcos devised an innovative approach to Philippine diplomacy which he called the “New Development Diplomacy”

1. Assertion of Philippine identity 2. Embodied the Ideals of United nations 3. Call for less dependence upon the United States 4. Emphasis on regionalism 5. Non –aligned and neutralism with respect to the superpower rivalry 6. The need for self- reliance and self-reliance 7. Termination of Laurel-Langley Agreement

PRESIDENT CORY AQUINO

[pic] Corazon Aquino Corazon Aquino became the first woman president of the Philippines in 1986 when she defeated Ferdinand E. Marcos. After she became president, she abolished the National Assembly and replaced the constitution with a new one that was adopted by popular vote in 1987. She had been married to Benigno Aquino, who was assassinated in 1983.
Aquino, Corazon (1933- ), Philippine political figure and President of the Philippines (1986-1992). Born Corazon Cojuanco (known as Cory), Aquino was the daughter of a wealthy landed family and was educated in Manila and at Roman Catholic convent schools in the United States. She graduated from Mount St Vincent College in New York and studied law at Far Eastern University in Manila. She married Benigno Simeon Aquino (Ninoy) in 1954.
She moved with her husband to the United States following his release from prison in 1980. After his assassination at Manila Airport in 1983, Aquino went to the Philippines for her husband’s funeral and stayed to work in the legislative election campaign. The opposition won one-third of the seats in 1984. Marcos called presidential elections for February 1986, and she became the opposition candidate for president. Marcos, declaring himself victor in the February 7 election, was inaugurated on February 25. An army revolt under Fidel Ramos and others, and demonstrations on her behalf, led to Aquino’s inauguration on the same day, in the so-called EDSA Revolution. Marcos accepted asylum in the United States, while Aquino formed a provisional government. She implemented a new constitution ratified by a landslide popular vote, and held legislative elections in 1987, but opposition within the military, a continuing Communist insurgency, and severe economic problems plagued her presidency. She declined to run for a second term in 1992, yielding the presidency to her favoured candidate Ramos. In 1995 she ran a “Never Again” campaign during national elections to prevent the election of Marcos’s son, Ferdinand Marcos, Jr., and the former army colonel and coup plotter Gregorio Honasan. In 1996 she campaigned to prevent President Ramos from changing the constitution to permit a second presidential term.

[pic] "People Power" in the Philippines

In the Philippine capital of Manila, hundreds of thousands of people staged a massive four-day uprising against the dictatorial regime of President Ferdinand Marcos in February 1986. Some protesters, including those shown here, surrounded the barbed-wire fence erected to protect the Presidential Palace. Troops loyal to Marcos refused to fire on the human barricades of protesters, and the "People Power" movement triumphed with the removal of Marcos.
People Power, popular uprising in the Philippines in 1986, and the political spirit embodied by it. The concept of “people power” emerged in the Philippines during the events of the EDSA Revolution, in which the mobilization of thousands of people helped to drive President Ferdinand Marcos from power. Hundreds of thousands of people gathered outside the army's Camps Crame and Aguinaldo to protect leaders of a military revolt against Marcos. Unable to use armed force against such a large assembly of people, Marcos lost authority and international credibility, and fled from the Philippines. In contrast to other political events in the Philippines, the exercise of “people power” was marked by its bloodless character. Fewer people lost their lives in February 1986 than, for instance, in the 1988 local elections. This has given rise to the belief that “people power” was a uniquely Filipino—and peaceful—way to bring about change. The “people power” movement drew wide support from across the social spectrum in the Philippines. However, the common purpose and unity displayed in the EDSA Revolution could not be institutionalized, and the movement evaporated in the subsequent re-emergence of conventional party politics based on landed and business wealth. Political parties—such as that organized by President Fidel Ramos during his election campaign in 1992—are, however, often called “people power” parties. The concept continues to exert a powerful hold over the imagination in the Philippines, leading President Ramos, for instance, to talk of “empowerment” as one of the priorities of his presidency.
Foreign Policies
The 1986 EDSA Revolution saw the re-establishment of a democratic government under President Corazon Aquino. During this period, the DFA once again pursued development policy, in the active pursuit of opportunities abroad in the vital areas of trade, investment, finance, technology and aid. The DFA also revived its efforts to boost the Philippine’s role in the Asia-Pacific region.
During this period, the Philippines became one of the founding members of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation or APEC in November 1989, and an active player in regional efforts to establish the ASEAN Free Trade Area. In 1990, the DFA proposed the establishment of more diplomatic missions to the Middle East to improve existing ties with Arab states and to respond to the growing needs of Overseas Filipino Workers in the region.
In 1991, the Philippine Senate, heeding the growing nationalist sentiments among the public, voting against the extension of the Military Bases Agreement. This symbolized the severance of the political and ideological ties which had long linked the country to the United States. Also in 1991, President Aquino into law R.A. 7157, otherwise known as the New Foreign Service Law, which reorganized and strengthened the Foreign Service. It instituted a Career Minister Eligibility Examination as a requirement for promotion of FSOs to the rank of Minister Counsellor, thereby ensuring the professional selection of those who would eventually rise to the level of career ambassadors.

[pic] Fidel Ramos Endorsed by the outgoing president Corazon Aquino, former defence minister Fidel Ramos narrowly won the 1992 presidential elections in the Philippines. His government successfully enacted economic liberalization measures, invigorating the Philippines’ economy. He also negotiated a peace treaty with the Muslim rebel group in Mindanao, ending a long-standing uprising there.

Ramos, Fidel Valdez (1928- ), Filipino soldier and politician, President of the Philippines (1992-1998), and one of the leaders of the 1986 EDSA revolution in the Philippines that drove President Ferdinand Marcos from power. Fidel “Eddie” Ramos was the son of a diplomat and legislator who served as secretary of foreign affairs. After winning a government scholarship to the United States Military Academy at West Point and studying engineering at the University of Illinois, he saw active service in the Korean War and was chief of staff to the Philippine Civil Action Group in Vietnam from 1966 to 1968.

His service to the state continued through the Marcos years, during which he headed the Philippine Constabulary (now the Philippine National Police) and served as vice-chief of staff of the armed forces for five years. Ramos was also identified as one of the “Rolex Twelve”, the group of close associates of the president. However, he switched sides in the struggle for power in February 1986, aligning himself with Corazon Aquino and the “People Power” movement against Marcos. He and Juan Ponce Enrile led the resistance to Marcos centred on two military camps. He was rewarded with promotion to chief of staff and then, in January 1988, with the post of defence minister in Aquino’s government. He increased his popularity during these years by helping to defeat a series of coup attempts against Aquino.
Aquino nominated Ramos as her choice for president in the 1992 elections. Ramos won a narrow victory to become the 12th president of the Philippine Republic. His immediate priorities were to deal with the energy crisis and the economy; he tackled economic problems through policies of fiscal transparency and deregulation, as well as less popular methods such as extending value added tax. Ramos also sought to end insurgencies by Communist and Muslim rebels, and formed a National Unification Commission in August 1992 to oversee this. In the same month he gave permission for the return of Ferdinand Marcos’s remains to the Philippines. Legislative elections held in June 1995 that were presented by Ramos as a referendum on his administration led to overwhelming victory for his supporters; by this time, his policies had reformed the Philippine economy and lifted its growth rate closer to that of other Pacific Rim “tiger economies”. In October he took personal charge of the government’s campaign against organized crime. The withdrawal of the Lakas ng Edsa party from the ruling coalition weakened Ramos’s support, but he was still able to put through an important economic liberalization package in March 1996. In September the government concluded a landmark agreement with the Muslim secessionist Moro National Liberation Front in Mindanao, ending the long-term insurgency there. Congressional opposition to suspected moves by Ramos to amend the constitution, allowing him to stand for a second term in 1998, led to the ousting in October 1996 of the Senate president Neptali Gonzales, a firm Ramos supporter.
In March 1997 the Philippines Supreme Court rejected a campaign by Ramos supporters to allow a second presidential term, confirming its decision in June. In September 1997 a mass rally in Manila, attended by Cardinal Jaime Sin and Corazon Aquino among others, demonstrated against all efforts to change the constitution to allow Ramos a second term. In December, Ramos duly endorsed his chosen presidential candidate. However, the presidential elections in May 1998 were won by Ramos’s former vice-president, Joseph Estrada. Ramos’s efforts towards boosting the country's international trade relations while in power were recognized in 2001 when he was appointed as a special envoy for foreign investment by President Gloria Arroyo.

Foreign Policies

Under Fidel V. Ramos

The Ramos administration from July 1992 to June 1998 defined four core areas of Philippine foreign policy: the enhancement of national security, promotion of economic diplomacy, protecting Overseas Filipino Workers and Filipino nationals abroad, the projection of a good image of the country abroad.
The Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995 provided the framework for stronger protection of Filipino workers abroad, with the creation of the Legal Assistance Fund and the Assistance-to-Nationals Fund, and the designation in the DFA of a Legal Assistant for Migrant Workers’ Affairs, with the rank of Undersecretary.
Among the other significant events in foreign affairs during the Ramos years were the adoption by ASEAN in 1992, upon Philippine initiative, of the Declaration on the South China Sea, aimed at confidence-building and the avoidance of conflict among claimant states; the establishment of the Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines (BIMP)-East Asia Growth area in 1994; the establishment of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in 1994 as the only multilateral security dialogue in the Asia-Pacific region conducted at the government level, and the signing between the Philippine Government and the MNLF on September 2, 1996 of the Mindanao Peace Agreement.

[pic] Joseph Estrada Filipino film actor and director Joseph Estrada was elected Vice-President of the Philippines in 1992 and President in 1998. He was forced to resign from the Presidency in January 2001, and the following April was arrested on a charge of economic plunder.

[pic] Gloria Arroyo Gloria Macapagal Arroyo became president of the Philippines in 2001 when President Joseph Estrada was ousted from office amid a corruption scandal.

Arroyo, Maria Gloria Macapagal (1947- ), Philippine politician, President of the Republic of the Philippines (2001- ). Arroyo was born in Manila, the daughter of Diosdado Macapagal.

Arroyo graduated from the Assumption College in the Philippines, and later gained a master’s degree in economics from Ateneo de Manila University and a doctorate in economics from the University of the Philippines. After periods spent teaching economics, and then as under-secretary of trade and industry in the government of President Corazon Aquino, Arroyo was elected as a senator in 1992 and 1995. When the populist candidate Joseph Estrada was elected president in May 1998, Arroyo became vice-president in a landslide election victory.

Estrada’s presidency, however, was soon the subject of serious corruption charges. In January 2001 the impeachment process against Estrada collapsed when Senate judges decided against the inspection of his bank accounts. Massive street protests followed, and after several days the military lent its support to Arroyo, who had distanced herself from Estrada. On January 20 Estrada left the presidential palace, and the Supreme Court swore in Arroyo as the new president. Although Arroyo’s People Power Coalition (PPC) did not take power with overwhelming popular support, her programme of a further opening-up of the Philippine economy, greater privatization, and a reduction of government spending was welcomed by many in the international community. In elections to the Senate in June, which saw over 100 people killed in rioting, the PPC took sufficient seats to achieve a working majority.

In July 2003 a group of around 300 soldiers seized a shopping centre in Manila in an apparent coup attempt. Arroyo declared a “state of rebellion” but managed to successfully negotiate an end to the revolt without bloodshed. The soldiers had been protesting at army corruption, and alleged that senior officers had colluded with Muslim and Communist rebels to create the circumstances for a declaration of martial law that would enable Arroyo to remain in power beyond the scheduled 2004 election. Arroyo had maintained that she would not seek a further term of office.

In October Arroyo announced that she had decided to postpone her retirement and would contest the presidential election scheduled for May 2004. In the same month she welcomed President George W. Bush to Manila, where he addressed a joint session of the legislature. Arroyo had closely aligned the Phillipines with American foreign policy, sending a small contingent of soldiers to assist in the occupation of Iraq and fighting Islamic separatists in the south of the country (see Moro).

FOREIGN POLICIES
Overview

The United States and the Republic of the Philippines (RP) maintain close ties

stemming from the colonial period (1898-1946). Beginning in 2001, cooperation in the global war on terrorism brought the United States and the Philippines, two treaty allies, closer together nearly a decade after the United States closed its military bases in the RP. During President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo’s state visit to Washington in
May 2003, the United States pledged increased military assistance to the RP and designated the Republic of the Philippines as a Major Non-NATO Ally.1 Despite general agreement on the importance of U.S.-RP relations and the U.S.-led war on terrorism, some bilateral frictions occasionally have arisen as the Philippines has become more assertive regarding its self-interests and sovereignty.
The main pillars of the bilateral relationship are the U.S.-RP security alliance, shared democratic values, counter-terrorism efforts, trade and investment ties, and extensive people-to-people contacts. Filipino-Americans number approximately 2.4 million, making them the second-largest Asian-American group, and comprise the largest number of immigrants in the United States armed forces,2 while over 100,000
Americans live in the Philippines. Two measures have been introduced in the 110th
Congress, H.R. 760 and S. 57, that would grant full veterans benefits to all Filipino
World War II veterans, who fought with the U.S. Armed Forces against the Japanese military, similar to those received by U.S. veterans.

Policy Options for Congress Broad U.S. policy objectives include maintaining the U.S.-RP alliance as the bilateral relationship matures and evolves into one of equal partners, assisting the
Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) in counter-terrorism efforts, and helping the
RP to develop stable and responsive democratic institutions and achieve broad-based economic growth. In support of these goals, Congress may consider a number of policy options. It has been argued that increasing appropriations for Foreign Military
Financing (FMF), military training (IMET), and anti-terrorism assistance (NADR) to the AFP would help the Philippine military fight militant and terrorist groups as well as promote democratic principles in the military. Some experts have called for a more aggressive role for U.S. forces in Philippine counter-terrorism efforts.

However, many Filipinos maintain that the RP constitution prohibits the use of foreign troops for combat and that U.S. forces in joint-military activities should be limited to a non-combat role. The Bush Administration has expressed concern over the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), an Islamic separatist and insurgent group with alleged terrorist ties and activities, but has supported peace talks between the
Arroyo government and the MILF.

Some analysts contend that separatist and terrorist movements are fueled by political corruption, poverty, and economic inequality. One policy option for
Congress could involve providing greater assistance for development programs in
Muslim Mindanao that help provide livelihoods for former guerrilla fighters and education for their children. In support of economic growth and in light of China’s growing economic influence in the RP, another option is to support a U.S.-
Philippines Free Trade Agreement (FTA).

The United States government has taken several steps to help address the problem of extra-judicial killings in the Philippines, largely through foreign assistance programs. U.S. plans and activities include providing additional funding to the Philippine Commission on Human Rights, training Philippine investigators and prosecutors, educating military and law enforcement personnel in the areas of human rights and civil liberties, supporting judicial system improvements, and aiding civil society groups. The Bush Administration has expressed some satisfaction with the steps that President Arroyo has taken to tackle the problem.3 Some policy makers argue that foreign assistance to the Philippines, including military and Millennium
Challenge Account funding, should be linked to the RP government’s progress in prosecuting and trying perpetrators of extra-judicial violence.

Political Developments

Since 2005, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo has faced popular protests

calling for her resignation, disgruntlement within the lower ranks of the military, and two failed impeachment bids. According to one poll, Arroyo’s popularity has risen somewhat, from a satisfaction-dissatisfaction rating of 34-47 in November 2006 to
39-42 in July 2007, due in part to an improving economy.4 The government’s successful fiscal reforms, lack of popular leadership alternatives, support from the top ranks of the military, and the relative quiet of the Catholic church of the
Philippines, have helped to prevent various opposition movements from gathering momentum. Arroyo has been plagued by the scandal surrounding her election to a six-year term in 2004. Arroyo, daughter of former Philippines President Diosdado
Macapagal, former RP Senator, and former Vice-President to Joseph Estrada, assumed the top office in 2001 when President Estrada resigned amid a corruption scandal and popular uprising. Having survived a military coup attempt in July 2003,
Arroyo won the presidential election of May 2004. In 2005, she faced allegations that she had “rigged” the 2004 presidential race against Fernando Poe. In a recorded telephone conversation that occurred prior to the end of vote counting, Arroyo reportedly told an election commissioner that she wanted to secure a million-vote margin. In June 2005, President Arroyo publicly apologized for a “lapse in judgment” but vowed to remain in office and to allow the controversy to be
“mediated through the constitutional process,” thus favoring risking impeachment over resigning.5 This scandal followed accusations earlier in the year that the
President’s husband, son, and brother-in-law had received kickbacks from illegal lottery operators.

2006 Coup Plot

In February 2006, President Arroyo, with the help of military leaders, declared a week-long state of emergency following the uncovering of a coup plot. The event showed not only the intensity of opposition to Arroyo but also the tenuous nature of
Philippine political institutions. Various groups were alleged to have been involved in the aborted plan, including junior officers from the armed forces, leftists, loyalists to Joseph
Estrada, and some former government leaders. In March2006, 36% of respondents in a poll said they would favor a military coup, with 33% against it, while 48% said they would support a “people power” revolt, with only 27% opposing.6 Some experts contend that Philippine politics are prone to instability and abuses of power. The political system is dominated by a socioeconomic elite whose influence reaches back to Spanish colonial times. Political groupings tend to be fragmented and shifting. Political parties are driven more by sectoral and geographic interests than unifying ideologies. According to some analysts, the legislature acts

Republic of the Philippines (RP) in Brief
Capital: Manila
Area (comparative): slightly larger than Arizona
Government: unitary republic, presidential system, bicameral legislature, independent judiciary
Population: 91 million
Religions: Roman Catholic — 80.9%; other
Christian — 7%; Muslim — 5%; other —
7%
Ethnic groups: Malay (95%); Chinese (2%);
Meztizo (Malay-Chinese or Malay-Spaniard, and other) (2%); Other (1%)
Labor force by occupation: agriculture — 36%; industry — 15%; services — 49%
Public debt: 61% of GDP
Unemployment rate: 7.9%
Literacy: 92%
Life expectancy: 70 years (total population)
GDP per capita (PPP): $5,000
Human Development Index Ranking: 84 (out of
177)
Source: Central Intelligence Agency World
Factbook (2007)

2007 Congressional Elections
The May 2007 mid-term elections reportedly were marred by violence, intimidation, fraud, disenfranchisement, and other voting irregularities in some areas, particularly in the south. Over 100 persons reportedly were killed in campaign and election-related violence.8 However, according to other observers, the 2007 elections were carried out honestly overall and represented an improvement over the 2004 elections. Arroyo gained strength in the lower House following the elections, thus helping to avoid another impeachment bid. However, pro-Arroyo parties lost their narrow majority in the Senate. This may make it more difficult for the President to carry out her policy agenda, according to some experts, including her effort to further reduce the budget deficit.9

Charter Change
Arroyo’s advocacy of a fundamental change of the Philippine constitution and political system (“charter change”) has become a centerpiece of her presidency. The restructure the government from a /xs/s//sx with a bicameral legislature to a federal, parliamentary system with a unicameral assembly. According to backers of the change, such as former President Fidel Ramos, the new system would help produce more competent candidates for executive office through the elimination of presidential campaigning, reduce corruption, foster more stable political party alignments, and facilitate economic reform legislation.
Furthermore, a federal system would provide more autonomy to and reduce tensions among restive ethnic groups in the south. Some analysts argue that charter change, which may be viewed as a panacea by some, would not fundamentally alter some of the main characteristics that plague Philippine politics. The upper house (Senate) is unlikely to support the initiative since it would terminate the chamber’s existence.
The plan reportedly has little support outside the capital — roughly two-thirds of
Filipinos reportedly are opposed to or indifferent to the proposal.

Politically-Motivated Violence and Extrajudicial Killings

The numbers of extrajudicial killings of individuals linked to leftist groups and politically-motivated acts of violence against mass media personalities have risen since Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo assumed the presidency in 2001. According to estimates, 50 journalists reportedly have been killed since 2001. Without Borders placed the Philippines in the “Difficult Situation” category for press freedom.11 Many experts attribute the deaths of media hosts to local power struggles and inter-personal feuds, rather than to a systematic crackdown on media freedom directed by Manila. However, critics of the government complain that in many cases, the media personalities had exposed local government corruption or human rights abuses, the police were often beholden to local elites and did not perform proper investigations, and higher levels of government did not aggressively pursue or prosecute those responsible for the violence. Six journalists reportedly were killed in the Philippines in 2006. Since 2001, between 136 and 800 mostly leftist political, trade union, farmer, church, and human rights activists have been killed, according to Philippine police and human rights groups. Many reports have attributed most of these deaths to the
Armed Forces of the Philippines. Some experts suggest that the AFP has been so dedicated to eradicating the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) and its New
People’s Army (NPA), which are on the U.S. list of terrorist organizations, that it has cast an excessively wide net over leftist activists. The government’s February 2006 proclamation of an “all out war” against communist insurgents and other “enemies of the state” gave further license to the AFP’s unrestricted campaign against perceived leftist security threats. Many analysts contend that Arroyo has been reluctant to discipline the military; its top ranks have provided her with needed political support. AFP officials have largely rejected the claims that extrajudicial killings have occurred or that the military is culpable, as well as the notion that the alleged victims were innocent. Some military officials have responded to allegations with counterclaims that the deaths were a fabrication of the CPP, that activists were killed as part of a CPP intra-organizational purge, and that legal political and social organizations of whom many alleged victims were members, such as the National
Democratic Front, Bayan Muna, and Karapatan, were fronts for the Communist
Party.14 Furthermore, some AFP leaders argue, any efforts to investigate the army would undermine its counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism efforts.
In 2006, partially in response to the outcry from human rights groups, the
Catholic Church of the Philippines, and European countries, President Arroyo created a special task force to investigate the political killings and invited the United Nations
Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, Philip
The task force (Melo Commission) and the Special Rapporteur released findings in January 2007 and February 2007, respectively.15 Both studies implicated the Philippine armed forces but not the government. They largely rejected the assertions that many leftist activists were linked to the Communist Party and killed by the CPP as part of an internal organizational purge, or that they died in military combat between the AFP and the New People’s Army. Some RP officials dismissed Alston’s conclusions, while the
AFP criticized the Melo report as “unfair.”16 Some critics of President Arroyo contend that the studies did not go far enough in probing the government’s own involvement or complicity. In March 2007, Arroyo called for the creation of special courts to hear cases of killings of left-wing activists and media personnel and ordered the military to revise its rules on command responsibility. In June 2007, a team of
EU experts traveled to Manila to discuss possible technical assistance to Philippine courts involved in cases of alleged extra-judicial killings.

United States Responses. The Bush Administration has expressed some satisfaction with the steps that the RP government has taken to investigate the killings.17 The U.S. Department of State’s 2006 human rights report highlighted the problems of political killings of local mass media personnel, extra-judicial killings of leftists and social activists, and the “climate of impunity” that has allowed many perpetrators of violence to go unpunished. In contrast to the Melo report and
Alston’s preliminary findings, however, the State Department suggested that the CPP may have been responsible for many of the killings of activists.18 On August 1, 2007,
Representatives James L. Oberstar and Joe Pitts sent a letter to President Arroyo, signed by 49 Members of Congress, expressing concern over the extra-judicial killings, “a growing environment of impunity,” and the possibility that U.S. assistance “is being used to support, directly or indirectly, those within the [police] and [armed forces] who are responsible for the killings.”19

Economic Conditions

During the post-World War II period, the Philippines, with its American influenced political institutions and culture, well-educated and talented workforce, and widespread use of English, was considered by some observers to be the second most-developed country in East Asia, after Japan; however, the country has fallen behind other developing nations in the region. Under President Arroyo, the economy has experienced its strongest growth since the Asian financial crisis (1997-98), foreign investment is rebounding, and the poverty rate has declined. Nonetheless, the
Philippines has slipped below China both in terms of gross domestic product (GDP) per capita ($5,000 in the Philippines compared to $7,700 in China)20 and “human development.” The United Nations Development Program’s Human Development
Index (HDI) ranks the Philippines 84th and China 81st in 2006.21

Analysts argue that the Philippine economy has been hampered since the 1950s by numerous factors, including political corruption, bureaucratic incompetence and red tape, an entrenched economic oligarchy (“crony capitalism”), public and foreign debt, and poor infrastructure. On an international scale measuring perceptions of corruption, the RP lies near the bottom 25th percentile.22 The government reportedly has prosecuted corrupt officials in some high-profile cases, but the problem reportedly remains pervasive at middle bureaucratic levels. About one-third of the government budget goes toward marking payments on debt. Other obstacles to development include a high population growth rate,23 wide disparities of wealth, the emigration of talented professionals, and violent crime.

Many observers have given credit to President Arroyo’s fiscal reform policies, which have included streamlining government operations, privatizing the public sector, and reducing public debt through expanding and more aggressively collecting taxes, for the country’s positive economic performance of the past few years. The last president to carry out sustained economic reform was Fidel Ramos (1992-1998), who lifted controls on foreign exchange, permitted foreign banks in the country, busted monopolies, and deregulated airlines and telecommunications companies.24
Under the Arroyo administration, the government budget deficit has declined, agriculture, export industries (electronics), and business process outsourcing have performed well, and remittances from abroad have surged. Real growth in gross domestic product averaged 5% during 2004-2006 and is expected grow by 6% in
2007. Foreign direct investment (FDI) rose by 18% in 2006, to $2.35 billion, although investment inflows as a percentage of GDP remain lower than those of comparable developing countries in the region, such as China, Thailand, and
Vietnam.25

The Philippine economy is highly dependent upon remittances from abroad. In
2006, nearly 8 million overseas Filipino workers (OFWs) remitted $12.8 billion (over
10% of GDP or more than half the government budget), compared to $10.7 billion in 2005. While this source of income is a boon to the economy, some observers argue that it promotes consumption over long-term economic development.
Furthermore, the flight of educated professionals represents a brain drain and the depletion of the middle class which has long been considered the bulwark of democracy in the Philippines. Each year, nearly 900,000 Filipinos leave the country for find work abroad, 70% of them categorized as professionals, skilled technicians, and high-end service workers. Leaders of the Philippine medical community have warned that the country could face a healthcare crisis due to the outflow of doctors
(an estimated 5,000-6,000 physicians since 2001) seeking work as nurses in the
United States, Europe, and the Middle East. In addition, roughly 100,000 nurses have left the Philippines in the past decade.

The RP’s largest trading partners are China (not counting Hong Kong), the
United States, and Japan. China, the United States, and Japan are the largest foreign investors. Philippine merchandise exports are dominated by electronics, garments, and machinery. In 2006, U.S.-RP trade ($17.2 billion) showed signs of picking up after stagnating for several years. Philippine exports to the United States (electronic components, machinery, garments, and furniture), were valued at $9.6 billion in
2006, compared to $11.3 billion in 2001.27 In 2006, the RP exported $14.6 billion worth of goods to China, and boosted its trade surplus with China to $8.7 billion.28
Business process outsourcing, including call centers, is the fastest growing industry in the RP, earning $3.8 billion in 2006.

Promoting U.S. Trade and Investment
Some foreign policy makers advocate greater U.S. trade with and investment in the Philippines as a means toward keeping the country economically competitive in the region as well as helping to promote social and political stability. The
Philippines welcomes U.S. investment in infrastructure, power generation, mining, and global sourcing (business process outsourcing, call centers, medical transcription, etc.). In 2002, the Bush Administration inaugurated a trade initiative with the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (Enterprise for ASEAN Initiative or EAI) which offers the prospect of bilateral free trade agreements (FTAs) with countries that have demonstrated a commitment to economic reform and openness. The United
States has concluded a Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA) with the
Philippines as a foundation for a possible future FTA. The expiration, on July 1,
.
Terrorist, Separatist, and Communist Movements

The Muslim terrorist and insurgency situation in the southern Philippines has become increasingly complex since 2002 when Philippine and U.S. forces conducted a relatively successful operation against the Abu Sayyaf terrorist group on Basilan island off the southwestern tip of the big southern island of Mindanao.29 The operation reduced Abu Sayyaf’s strength from an estimated 1,000 active fighters to an estimated 200-400 in 2005. Another apparent positive development in the southern Philippines is that the cease-fire between the Moro Islamic Liberation Front and the Philippine government and AFP has held, and negotiations for a settlement are ongoing in Malaysia. However, there are other developments of a decidedly negative nature that could worsen the overall situation in the southern Philippines and even the Philippines as a whole. One is the growing cooperation among Abu
Sayyaf, several major MILF commands, and elements of Jeemah Islamiah (JI) on
Mindanao. JI, the Southeast Asian Muslim terrorist organization with ties to Al
Qaeda, appears to have made Mindanao a primary base for building up its cadre of terrorists. Moreover, this cooperation among the three groups appears to be transforming Mindanao into a significant base of operations rather than just a site for training; and these operations appear to increasingly target the Philippines for terrorist attacks. This, too, is related to another new development — the emergence of a group of Filipino Muslim converts in the northern Philippines, the Rajah
Solaiman Movement, which is working with Abu Sayyaf and JI. The result has been an increase in terrorist bombings since 2002, both in number and destructiveness, and an increase in the level of bombing targets in the northern Philippines, including
Manila.

The Abu Sayyaf Group
Abu Sayyaf is a small, violent, faction-ridden Muslim group that operates in western Mindanao and on the Sulu islands extending from Mindanao. It has a record of killings and kidnaping and has had past, sporadic links with Al Qaeda.30 In May
2001, Abu Sayyaf kidnaped three American citizens, including the Burnhams, a U.S. missionary couple. One of the Americans, Guillermo Sobero, was beheaded. In June
2002, Filipino army rangers encountered members of the Abu Sayyaf group holding the Burnhams. In the ensuing clash, Mr. Burnham and a Filipina female hostage were killed, but Mrs. Burnham was rescued.

Philippine military operations since 2001, supported by the United States, have weakened Abu Sayyaf on Basilan island and in the Sulu islands. However, under the leadership of Khadafi Janjalani, Abu Sayyaf reoriented its strategy and appears to have gained greater effectiveness as a terrorist organization. Janjalani de-emphasized kidnaping for ransom and instead emphasized developing capabilities for urban bombings. He improved ties with key military factions of the MILF and established cooperation with JI. He also re-emphasized the Islamic nature of Abu Sayyaf. Thus, even though Abu Sayyaf’s armed strength has fallen from an estimated 1,000 in 2002 to 200-400 in 2005, the capabilities of the organization may be growing.31 Khadafi
Janjalani moved some of its operations and leadership to the mainland of western
Mindanao. There it reportedly has established links with elements of JI, using several MILF base camps where the two groups reportedly engage in joint training with an emphasis on bomb-making and urban bombings.32 Two key JI leaders from
Indonesia also relocated to Jolo island in the Sulu island chain southwest of Basilan.
In March and April 2003, Abu Sayyaf, JI, and MILF cadre carried out bombings in
Davao on Mindanao, which killed 48.

By mid-2005, Jemaah Islamiah personnel reportedly had trained about 60 Abu
Sayyaf members in bomb assembling and detonation.33 Since March 2004, the
Philippine government reportedly has uncovered several Abu Sayyaf plots to carry out bombings in Manila, including the discovery of explosives. One reported target was the U.S. Embassy. In February 2005, Abu Sayyaf carried out three simultaneous bombings in three cities, which indicated a higher level of technical and operational capability. In April 2004, police officials reportedly determined that a February 2004 bombing of a Manila-based ferry, in which 194 people died, was the work of Abu
Sayyaf and the Rajah Solaiman Movement, a group of Filipino Muslim converts from the Manila area. According to Philippine national security officials, Abu Sayyaf is training Rajah Solaiman members to carry out terrorist bombings in Manila and several other cities.

U.S. Policy Toward Abu Sayyaf

Within a few months after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attack on the United
States, the Bush Administration moved to extend direct military support to the
Philippines in combating Abu Sayyaf. The United States committed 1,300 U.S. military personnel in 2002 to support Philippine military operations against Abu
Sayyaf on Basilan island. This force completed its mission by the end of 2002. In
2005, the Philippines and the United States developed and implemented a combined

Rajah Solaiman Movement (RSM)

The emergence of the RSM in 2005 presented a new terrorist threat to the
Philippines. Unlike Muslims of the southern Philippines, the RSM appears to be composed primarily of Filipinos from the northern Philippines. The RSM has emerged from the estimated 200,000 Filipinos who have converted to Islam since the
1970s; many of these are Filipino who worked in the Middle East where they converted. The RSM’s manpower strength is unknown, but Philippine intelligence reports indicate that it has cells throughout the main island of Luzon, including metropolitan Manila.35 Thus, the RSM potentially expands the reach of Islamic terrorism to Manila and other parts of the northern Philippines. The RSM has cooperated with Abu Sayyaf in several bomb plots, including the February 2004
Manila ferry bombing. A Manila bomb plot uncovered in March 2004 involved the
RSM, according to Philippine intelligence officials. The RSM also has received financial support and training from elements within the MILF. The RSM leader,
Ahmed Islam Santos, reportedly underwent training in bombing in the MILF’s Camp
Bushra on Mindanao in December 2001.36
MNLF and MILF

The U.S. focus on Abu Sayyaf is complicated by the broader Muslim issue in the southern Philippines, including the existence of two much larger groups, the
Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front
(MILF). Both groups have been in insurrection against the Philippine government for much of the last 30 years. The MNLF signed a peace treaty with Manila in 1996, which granted limited autonomy to four Mindanao provinces. The MILF, with an estimated armed strength of 10,000, has emerged as the larger of the two groups. Its main political objective has been separation and independence for the Muslim region of the southern Philippines.

MILF leaders deny links with JI and Abu Sayyaf, but there are many reports linking some local MILF commands with these terrorist organizations. Evidence, including the testimonies of captured Jemaah Islamiyah leaders, has pointed to strong links between the MILF and JI, including the continued training of JI terrorists in
MILF camps. This training appears to be important to Jemaah Islamiyah’s ability to replenish its ranks following arrests of nearly 500 cadre in Indonesia, Malaysia, and
Singapore. Despite over two years of negotiations with the RP government and disavowing links with JI, the MILF has not captured any JI cadre.37 A stronger collaborative relationship has developed between these MILF commands and Abu
Sayyaf since 2002.

Zachary Abuza, an expert on Islamic terrorism in Southeast Asia, has identified four of eight MILF base commands as sites of active MILF cooperation with Abu
Sayyaf and JI. He also has identified the MILF’s Special Operations Group as facilitating joint training and joint operations with Abu Sayyaf. JI uses these MILF base camps to train both MILF and Abu Sayyaf cadre. Khadafi Janjalani and other
Abu Sayyaf leaders reportedly received sanctuary in at least one MILF base camp.38
An ambush of Philippine troops on Basilan in July 2007 reportedly was carried out by a combined MILF-Abu Sayyaf force.

The MILF has had tenuous cease-fire agreements with Manila. The RP government and the MILF concluded a new truce agreement in June 2003, which has resulted in a substantial reduction in violence and armed clashes. However, the cease-fire apparently has not reduced the movement of terrorist personnel and materials between Mindanao and the Indonesian island of Sulawesi under the direction of JI.39 Under the truce, a Malaysian observer team visited MILF camps in
March 2004 and warned MILF leaders to end ties to Jemaah Islamiyah. The
Malaysian team was a forerunner of a larger team of international observers that began to monitor the cease-fire in October 2004 — and presumably MILF-JI relations. A new round of Philippine government-MILF political talks has begun.
In May 2003, the Bush Administration promised U.S. financial support of $30 million to support a negotiated settlement between the MILF and the Philippine government.40 The negotiations between the MILF and the government have been protracted and inconclusive. A main issue of disagreement is over “ancestral domain,” the size the geographical configuration of an autonomous Muslim political entity. The MILF has proposed a unified area geographically on Mindanao. It is traditionally Muslim but includes locales where Christians are the majority. The government has proposed a smaller, “leopard spot” configuration with no geographical unity that is more supportive of Christian populations and powerful Christian political families. The
MILF has rejected a government proposal for a census and plebiscite in locales to determine which would be included in the Muslim autonomous entity. Another issue is the constitutional-political system in an autonomous Muslim entity; whether an electoral democracy or a traditional system led by Muslim religious and tribal leaders. The issue of elections is particularly important, given the history of extensive vote fraud in the Muslim areas of Mindanao, often with the connivance of
Filipino political parties and leaders. The nature of security forces remains to be resolved, including the jurisdiction of the AFP and the Philippine National Police
(PNP) in the Muslim entity. The MILF also seeks agreement on a referendum to be held to determine the final political status of the Muslim entity; such a plebiscite could include an option for full independence.

The future roles of the MNLF, other non-MILF political groups, and powerful
Muslim families may give rise to further potential points of dispute.41 The MNLF still has political influence in parts of Mindanao and the Sulu islands. An
Autonomous Region for Muslim Mindanao, negotiated between the Philippine government and the MNLF in 1976, remains in existence, although the government of the Autonomous Region is considered weak and ineffective. Powerful Muslim political families remain independent of the MILF and MNLF and have connections with the government in Manila and Filipino political leaders.

There are divisions between military (AFP) and civilian authorities over strategy toward the MILF. The AFP favors a more aggressive strategy and is suspicious of a negotiated settlement. The collaboration between elements of the MILF, JI, and
Abu Sayyaf also suggests that key MILF commanders may not support any agreement between the MILF leadership and the Philippine government that does not include outright independence for the Muslim areas of the southern Philippines. In that scenario, the MILF could fracture with hardline elements joining even more closely with JI and Abu Sayyaf, which would give rise to a high level of terrorist operations despite a settlement agreement. The Arroyo Administration and presumably the
Bush Administration are operating on the assumption that the MILF leadership sincerely wants a peace compromise and opposes collaboration with JI and Abu
Sayyaf. However, there is another view that the MILF leadership has a relationship with the hard-line MILF commands similar to that between the political organization,
Sinn Fein, and the armed wing of the Irish Republican Army. According to this view, the MILF leadership is acting as a front for the hard-line commands, shielding them from moves against them by the Philippine government and the AFP.43

U.S. Policy Toward the MILF

The Bush Administration has expressed growing concern over MILF links with
JI and JI’s use of the Mindanao-Sulawesi corridor as well as doubts about the RP government’s ability to end Muslim terrorism on Mindanao The United States government has considered placing the MILF on the U.S. list of terrorist organizations. However, the Arroyo Administration has opposed such a move as potentially jeopardizing the peace negotiations.45 Recently, the Bush Administration also has voiced support for the Philippine-MILF peace negotiations as the best means of de-linking the MILF from JI. This support boosts the Arroyo Administration’s position against the AFP’s advocacy of a militarily-aggressive strategy toward the
MILF. Moreover, a breakdown of the negotiations and the cease-fire likely would confront the Bush Administration with policy decisions regarding a U.S. role in a wider war. The AFP could be expected to propose increased supplies of U.S. arms and military equipment; and it likely would argue for a more direct U.S. military role.
The Philippine government might change its previous policy of opposition to a U.S. military role against the MILF and encourage U.S. actions against the MILF similar to those in the joint exercises against Abu Sayyaf.

However, if significant elements of the MILF opposed a peace agreement and moved closer to JI and Abu Sayyaf, and if they were able to continue or expand terrorist operations, the Bush Administration would be faced with a different kind of challenge, but one that could include similar pressures for greater U.S. military involvement. There also would be the challenge of maintaining the U.S. commitment of financial aid to support a settlement. This commitment, too, could confront the Administration with a policy decision of whether or not to employ U.S. pressure on the Philippine government to implement faithfully its obligations under a peace agreement. This scenario is plausible, given the reputed poor performance of Philippine governments in implementing the 1977 and 1996 agreements with the
MNLF.

Philippine Communist Party (CPP)

The CPP has directed an insurgency under its New Peoples’ Army (NPA) since the late 1960s. NPA armed strength reached over 25,000 in the early 1980s and was a factor in the downfall of President Ferdinand Marcos in 1986. After Marcos fell and democracy was restored, the NPA declined in strength. However, in recent years, the insurgency has made a slight recovery, reaching an estimated armed force of 8,000 in 2004-2005 and operating in 69 of the Philippines’ 79 provinces.
Estimated strength in mid-2007 was 7,000.48 The CPP also has called for attacks on
American targets. In August 2002, the Bush Administration placed the CPP and the
NPA on the official U.S. list of terrorist organizations. It also pressured the government of the Netherlands to revoke the visa privileges of Communist Party leader, Jose Maria Sison, and other CPP officials who have lived in the Netherlands for a number of years and reportedly direct CPP/NPA operations. In December 2005, the European Union placed the CPP/NPA on its list of terrorist organizations. This could place greater pressure on the Netherlands government to restrict Sison’s communist exile group. In June 2007, the Commander of the U.S. Pacific
Command, Admiral Timothy Keating, offered a more direct U.S. support role in AFP operations against the NPA.

Foreign Relations

RP-U.S. Security Ties and Military Relations
The Republic of the Philippines is a treaty ally of the United States under the
1951 Mutual Defense Treaty, and relies heavily upon the United States for its external security. In 1991, the Philippine Senate voted 12-11 to revoke the Military
Bases Agreement between the RP and the United States. However, in 1995,
President Ramos invited U.S. forces back on a limited basis, partially in response to
China’s occupation of Mischief Reef (Spratly Islands) in the South China Sea. The
Philippines and China each claim sovereignty over Mischief Reef, which is one of approximately 100 reefs and islands disputed by five Southeast Asian countries. A
Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) allowing joint Philippine-U.S. military operations was signed by the two countries in 1998 and ratified by the RP Senate in 1999, despite protests by the Catholic Church of the Philippines, leftists, and other groups.
In January 2000, the first annual joint military exercises (“Balikatan” or Shoulder-to-
Shoulder) between the RP and the United States in five years took place under the
VFA.

Following the September 11, 2001 attacks in the United States, Manila offered ports and airports for use by U.S. naval vessels and military aircraft. On March 20,
2003, President Arroyo announced Manila’s support for the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq and sent a peacekeeping and humanitarian contingent of nearly 100 soldiers and other personnel. During President Arroyo’s official state visit to the White House on May
19, 2003, the United States announced a new $65 million training program for AFP battalions as well as economic aid for Mindanao, and designated the Philippines a
Major Non-NATO Ally.

RP-U.S. Operations on Basilan and Jolo Islands

The 2001 terrorist attacks in New York City and Washington, D.C., prompted concern over Al-Qaeda’s links to Abu Sayyaf as well as greater U.S.-Philippine military cooperation. President Arroyo and President Bush agreed on the deployment of U.S. military personnel to the southern Philippines to train and assist the
Philippine military against the terrorist Abu Sayyaf group. In November 2002, the
Arroyo administration signed a Military Logistics and Support Agreement (MLSA) allowing the United States to use the Philippines as a supply base for military operations throughout the region. In February 2002, the United States dispatched
1,300 U.S. troops to provide training, advice, and other non-combat assistance to
1,200 Filipino troops against Abu Sayyaf on the island of Basilan. In consideration of the Filipino Constitution’s ban on foreign combat troops operating inside the country, Washington and Manila negotiated special rules of engagement for the
Balikatan exercise. U.S. military personnel took direction from Filipino commanders and could use force only to defend themselves.

The Balikatan exercise reportedly resulted in a significant diminishing of Abu
Sayyaf strength on Basilan. Abu Sayyaf’s estimated manpower fell to 200-400, but it continued to operate in the Sulu islands south of Basilan and in western Mindanao.
In addition, the AFP operations improved as a result of U.S. assistance in intelligence gathering, the supplying of modern equipment, and aid in the planning of operations.
The United States and the Philippines negotiated a second phase of U.S. training and support of the AFP, beginning in late 2002, with an objective of training light infantry companies for use against both Muslim insurgents and the NPA.

Continued Abu Sayyaf bombings led the Defense Department to consider a more extended U.S. assistance program in the southern Philippines, focusing on the
Abu Sayyaf concentrations in western Mindanao and on Jolo Island in the Sulu chain.
In 2005, the Philippines and the United States developed and implemented combined operations against elements of Abu Sayyaf operating in western Mindanao and Jolo.
The operation apparently has three objectives: (1) neutralize Abu Sayyaf-Jeemah
Islamiah training; (2) kill or capture leaders of Abu Sayyaf; and (3) root out the Abu
Sayyaf forces and organization on Jolo in a similar fashion as the successful campaign on Basilan in 2002. The U.S. role in western Mindanao reportedly involved intelligence and communications support of the AFP, including the employment of U.S. P-3 surveillance aircraft; deployment of Navy Seal and Special
Forces personnel with AFP ground units; and rules restricting U.S. personnel to a non-combat role (although such rules normally would allow U.S. personnel to defend themselves if attacked).

U.S. troops landed on Jolo in 2005. The number of U.S. troops on the island has ranged between 180 and 250. Their mission has been to support 7,000 Filipino troops (ten battalions) on the island against Abu Sayyaf. U.S. military personnel live within Philippine military camps and always operate with AFP units. They can use their weapons only when fired upon.53 U.S. military support on Jolo has the following main components:

! Training of AFP battalions in conducting operations. This has emphasized training for night combat.

! Providing equipment to the Philippine battalions, including communications equipment and night vision goggles.

! Providing intelligence-gathering technology to the AFP.

! Providing aerial intelligence reconnaissance to locate Abu Sayyaf units and personnel in Jolo’s jungles.

! Conducting civic action programs with the AFP aimed at the local populace. U.S. troops have repaired and built piers for fishermen and have constructed roads, water purification installations, and farm markets. They have renovated schools and provided medical care.
! Support USAID projects on Jolo and on neighboring Tawi Tawi island, including a new market for Jolo town (the market was destroyed by Abu Sayyaf bombing in 2006) and a major pier on
Tawi Tawi.

Reports indicate major successes for the AFP operation on Jolo backed by the
United States, but Abu Sayyaf has not been eliminated. Abu Sayyaf strength on Jolo is down to an estimated 200-300. It has been pushed back to remote areas on the island. Senior leaders have been killed, including Khadafi Janjalani and Abu
Solaiman. However, JI leaders Umar Petek and Dulmatin remain at large on the island. Security has improved in many parts of the island as the AFP has established a permanent presence in many of the areas cleared of Abu Sayyaf. New businesses have emerged in the main towns, and people now venture out at night. The incidence of bombings and ambushes has declined. The attitude of the people of Jolo toward the U.S. military generally has been positive. As on Basilan in 2002, U.S.-conducted and supported civic action projects have been well received by the people.

Another potential U.S. policy decision could come out of the December 2005 agreement among the Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Brunei for joint maritime patrols in the waters separating them. The agreement specifically covers Mindanao and the Mindanao-Sulawesi corridor. Any future programs to establish maritime interdiction cooperation between the Philippines and its neighbors likely would produce proposals for expanded U.S. military aid and training for the Philippine
Navy.

Military Cooperation with Australia

Since 2002, Australia has provided some training to AFP troops and Philippine police. In May 2007, the Philippines and Australia signed a Status of Forces
Agreement (SOFA) allowing for joint military exercises under similar conditions as the RP-U.S. Visiting Forces Agreement, including Australian participation in
Balikatan. The SOFA, which must be ratified by the RP Senate, does not set the stage for the establishment of Australian military bases in the Philippines.

Philippines-China Relations
The Philippines’ relationship with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has improved markedly since the Mischief Reef Incident in 1995. In the past decade, the
Philippines has pursued stable and friendly political and economic relations with
China, while relying upon the United States and the Association of Southeast Asian
Nations (ASEAN) as security and diplomatic counterweights to the PRC.55 Faced with pressure from ASEAN, China promised to abide by the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea, which states that countries with overlapping claims must resolve them by good faith negotiation. In 2002, Beijing and ASEAN signed the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC), which many hope will evolve into a formal code of conduct that promotes a peaceful resolution. In 2003, China acceded to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in
Southeast Asia (TAC), which renounces the use of force and calls for greater economic and political cooperation. In May 2005, Manila and Beijing signed two agreements aimed at fostering better military and security cooperation, including allowing Filipino soldiers to train in China, annual defense and security dialogues, and Chinese technical assistance to the AFP.
China’s economic growth has helped to spur Philippine exports — the RP is running trade surpluses with both China (mainland) and Hong Kong. RP-PRC trade has grown by an annual rate of over 30% in the last three years, according to PRC data.56 The Philippines exported an estimated $19 billion worth of goods to China and Hong Kong combined in 2006, compared to $9 billion in exports to the United
States and $7.2 billion to Japan.57 Major Philippine export items to China include both manufactured and agricultural products, including electronics, machinery, and minerals.58 In January 2007, PRC Premier Wen Jiabao and RP President Arroyo signed 20 economic agreements, including a contract for a Chinese company to build and renovate railroads, investment in agriculture, and loans for rural development.

U.S. Foreign Assistance
Since 2001, the Philippines, a “front-line state” in the global war on terrorism, has received the most dramatic increase in U.S. foreign assistance in the East Asia-
Pacific region, particularly Foreign Military Financing (FMF) (see Table 1). The
United States Agency for International Development (USAID) also has attempted to address some of the underlying causes of violence in Muslim Mindanao, including lack of rural development and basic education. According to the State Department,
60% of Economic Support Funds (ESF) for the Philippines finance local development programs in Mindanao which are intended to maximize the economic and social benefits of the 1996 peace agreement between Manila and the MNLF.60
Such programs would be made available to the MILF as well if a peace agreement with that group is reached. According to some experts, clan and tribal conflicts have hindered economic development and democratic governance in Mindanao and exacerbated tensions between local communities and the government. USAID has funded programs that promote peaceful resolution of disputes and more effective and transparent governance in the region.

U.S. Assistance to Philippines, 2001-2008
(Millions of U.S. dollars)
Total U.S. assistance to the Philippines in 2004, 2005, and 2006 was $111 million, $127 million, and $116 million, respectively. Of the major funding priorities, about 42% of the aid was allocated for health and development assistance,
28% for military assistance, and approximately 18% for security-related programs using Economic Support Funds (ESF).62 Other program areas include human rights, anti-corruption, trade and investment, and environmental management. For FY2008, the U.S. State Department requested $87 million in assistance to the RP, reflecting a decrease in support for health programs and Foreign Military Financing.63 Some
Members of Congress have expressed interest in linking military assistance to the
Philippines to the Arroyo government’s progress in stemming extra-judicial killings.64 The Millennium Challenge Corporation has selected the Philippines as a
Millennium Challenge Account (MCA) “threshold country,” which qualifies the RP to receive assistance in meeting criteria for full MCA funding.

Filipino Veterans

Many Filipino veterans of World War II, who fought with the U.S. Armed
Forces against the Japanese military, claimed that the United States government promised them U.S. citizenship and full veterans’ benefits.66 However, following the war, congressional legislation granted full veterans benefits only to Regular (“Old”)
Philippine Scouts while limiting eligibility among three groups — the “New”
Philippine Scouts, Recognized Guerrilla Forces, and Commonwealth Army of the
Philippines. Congress expanded benefits to these three groups over the years. In
December 2003, the Bush Administration signed a measure that extended Veterans
Affairs health benefits to all Filipino veterans living in the United States. Filipino veterans organizations continued to push for legislation that would provide more complete veterans benefits, including health care to veterans living in the Philippines.
In 2007, fewer than 20,000 of 200,000 Filipino WWII veterans reportedly were still alive, including 10,000 residing in the United States, according to some estimates.67
Two measures have been introduced in the 110th Congress, H.R. 760 and S. 57, that would grant full veterans benefits to the New Philippine Scouts, Recognized
Guerrilla Forces, and Commonwealth Army of the Philippines, similar to those received by U.S. veterans and “Old” Philippine Scouts.68 Two other measures, H.R.
1287 and S. 671, would exempt children of certain Filipino World War II veterans from the numerical limitations on immigrant visas. Provisions of S. 671 were incorporated into S. 1348, the Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act of 2007, as
Amendment No. 1186 (Akaka Amdt.).