Ferry, and continuing his campaign deeper into Maryland, thereby threatening the Capitol itself. In the final week prior to Antietam, Lee expected the Army of the Potomac would take significant time to refit after their defeat. Additionally, when he heard of McClellan’s command, he was further assured in his decisions to split his armies. His objectives were to seize Harper’s Ferry, a critical supply hub, as well as to secure Catoctin Mountain and South Mountain, which were key terrain features from which to mount raids into Pennsylvania. At this juncture, Lee assumed great tactical risk by dividing his armies into three columns with disparate objectives and decentralized mission command on a tight timetable. All were to concentrate …show more content…
Taking most of the burden of the operations process, McClellan conducted reconnaissance personally and isolated himself in decision-making. It was clear that Lee’s armies developed strong defensive positions on key high terrain on the west bank of Antietam Creek. A cavalry and artillery reserve held the creek. The middle and lower bridges were fortified with gunners, and heavily wooded high terrain stood behind that. Using the principles of preparation and depth for an area defense of a linear obstacle, Lee tied his battle positions to terrain. By selecting terrain which allowed for subsequent and strong point battle positions, Lee leveraged his relatively weak force to a near parity of combat power. He limited McClellan’s forces avenues of advance by utilizing high ground and forcing McClellan’s troops to navigate a creek and adjacent open ground while in heavy weapon direct fire range. Lee’s flanks also tied into key terrain features, which forced McClellan into a frontal attack regardless of where he chose to penetrate. Additionally, in his preparations, Lee incorporated interior lines, a necessity because of his numerical inferiority. This give him the flexibility to order reinforcements around the battlefield to rapidly mass effects wherever McClellan …show more content…
Overestimating his opponent’s strength, McClellan assumed Confederate troops were at least 30,000 strong, with Jackson enroute from Harper’s Ferry with 40-50,000 more. In reality, Lee had a mere 18,000 troops on hand, with Jackson bringing another 9,000 depleted and poorly resourced soldiers. Concealed battle positions and meteorological effects prevented accurate observation of actual size and strength of Confederate forces. The Confederate infantry aided this deception by displaying every regimental flag and artillery piece, despite extreme attrition to their actual numbers. Lee advertised a large, healthy force through consistent cannon fire. McClellan and his staff were inclined to believe this farce, partially because they could not imagine the audacity of a commander choosing to defend with such a small force. The boldness of Lee’s plan maximized his advantages as a defender and bought him time; the ruse caused General McClellan to delay the attack until 16 September to permit force consolidation and to integrate an assault plan. Unwilling to give ground on the Maryland campaign, General Lee stood his ground with 18,000 weary troops, successfully disrupting McClellan’s offensive plan long before first