Many battles could have had a different outcome if we would put more trust in or rely on intelligence without needing to validate the intelligence with another intelligence source. The Battle of Kamdesh was certainly one of those battles. The battle took place just before 0600 on October 3, 2009 on Combat Outpost (COP) Keating and nearby Observation Post (OP) Fritsche in the Kamdesh district of Nuristan Province, Afghanistan. Nearly 60 Soldiers of Bravo Troop, 3rd Squadron, 61st Cavalry Regiment, along with Afghan National Army Soldiers (ANA), fought an enemy force of about 300 Anti-Afghan Forces (AAF) fighters. [1,2] The battle took place in the Consolidation II portion of the Operation Enduring Freedom Campaign in Afghanistan. The AAF likely attacked COP Keating in an effort to stem the flow of …show more content…
The COP was located near a river and surrounded by high ground, with limited over watch protection from nearby OP Fritsche. The mission for COP Keating during the rotation of Bravo Troop was unclear to the Soldiers, but due to the limited number of Soldiers on the COP and the tactical reach off the compound, the mission devolved into one of base defense. By mid-2009, there was no tactical or strategic value to holding the ground occupied by COP Keating. [1] The weather is this area of Afghanistan is able to produce hot summers with a monsoon season and cold winters with the capability of ice and snow. The weather had little impact on the battle the day the attack occurred. They were able to get air support overhead within half an hour of the attacked troops' call for help. Air support did encounter problems such as small arms fire from AAF that hindered any sustained counter attack. Smoke from fires lit by the AAF obscured vision on the ground and in the air, and the narrowness of the valley hobbled any intense close air support.