BEIJING FOREIGN POLICY IN WEST AFRICA (Yang Jiechi Policy)

Foreign Policy Article: Published by Kingsley C. Onyenankeya December 5, 2011 SUNY EMPIRE STATE

Kingsley: Beijing Foreign policy in West Africa 1

Contents

Executive Summary

Concept and Assumptions

Methods of Argumentation

Theoretical and Policy Prescriptions

Conclusion

References

Kingsley: Beijing Foreign policy in West Africa 2 Executive Summary

China's increase involvement in West Africa over the past decade is one of the most significant recent developments in the region. It appears to redirect the idea of marginalization of West Africa and Africa as a continent, which brings significant political consequences. Beijing's West Africa interest is part of a recently more active strategy based on its booming economic growth, the need to search for a new source of raw materials, and a new source to market its manufactured goods. Beijing more recent policy practice in West Africa has been the one of multi-polarity and non-intervention.
As a global demand for energy continues to rise, major economic powerful nations like China, the United States, the European Union and Japan move to secure long term energy supplies. Beijing as its economy booms, it is committed in getting the resources needed for the maintenance of its rapid economic growth, and is taking the search to close down sources of raw materials and oil in West Africa and Africa as a continent. As part of an effort to lock down sources of raw materials, Beijing has turned to West Africa, an abundant place of raw materials and oil, whose risk and challenges has caused it to be mostly abandoned and economically overlooked.
Increased aid, debt cancellation, and a recent explosion of trade transactions with a strategic focus on oil, have proven mutually advantageous to Beijing and West African states (Africapractice, Isaac idun-Arkhust and James Laing, p.7). By offering aid without preconditions or strings attached, Beijing has presented an alternative to Western conditional aid and gained influence and Kingsley: Beijing Foreign policy in West Africa 3 diplomatic support to defend its international interest in the continent.
However, a general relationship differing from past African- Western patterns, alongside support of authoritarian regimes and governments at the expense of human rights, make the economic consequence of increased Beijing involvement in West Africa and Africa as a continent intertwined at best, while the political outcome will prove to be unsustainable.
China's economy has grown at an average rate of 9 per cent annually since the last 3 decades and its energy consumption has tripled and outstrips its domestic energy production (Stephanie Hanson, Council on Foreign Relations, June 6 2008, p.14). Within the decade from 2000-2011, China's consumption of aluminum, copper, nickel and iron ore has increased from 15 per cent to 25 per cent and has been growing rapidly. China's industrialization has led to overproduction and Chinese companies and industries are looking to cultivate new export markets for its manufactured goods and new foreign sources of raw material, and more importantly oil.
In search for raw materials and new grounds for export markets, Beijing has turned to West Africa and Africa in general, which command significant untapped natural resources, including oil, natural gas, metal ores and cotton. Most of the world’s resource- dependent economies are in Africa. Beijing is also seeking alliances with West African countries to enhance its global status in the world as a newly emerged global player and counter Western influence in world institutions, such as the United Nations, International Monetary Fund, World Trade Organization, and the World Bank, etc.
Beijing seeks to build solidarity with West African governments and to Kingsley: Beijing Foreign policy in West Africa 4 showcase itself as a reliable partner between developing countries and developed countries (Africapractice, Isaac Idun-Arkhurst and James Laing, p.2). Beijing pledges large enormous amount of aid to West Africa, it also aid in building infrastructure, and in most cases, in areas where the western traditional powers have neglected, and it’s doing it with no strings attached, except the withdrawal and rejection of diplomatic relations with Taiwan (Africapractice, Isaac Idun-Arkhurst and James Laing, p.2).
In the past, Beijing presence was noted by lavish infrastructure buildings in the coastal countries of West Africa, Beijing building of huge Olympic style stadiums were at the apex of Chinese donations to West African countries. Throughout the past 2 decades, Beijing provided technical assistance to West African nations, scholarships, and various kind of promotional aid. Before Beijing political influence never waned in West Africa, during the 1980's though it was not able to compete of influence with Western countries through diplomatic aid programs, but non recognition of Taiwan was its main priority. In the 21st century Beijing returns to West Africa as a significant global player, with the resources, ready to play the game in all sorts, economically and politically.
Through diplomacy, trade agreements, large aids, investment deals, debt forgiveness and infrastructure development with no strings or conditions attached, except the withdrawal and non recognition of Taiwan, Beijing has gained considerable amount of leverage and access to West African resources and consumer markets. Beijing now receives approximately 20 per cent of its import from West Africa. Beijing has become a major actor in the energy Kingsley: Beijing Foreign policy in West Africa 5 sector in West Africa, which has become the largest producer of oil in the continent, since Ghana discover its own offshore oil. Nigeria, Ghana and Equatorial Guinea are the main producer of oil in the region and Beijing has become main actor in those countries.
Some West African governments, who are angered and dislikes by the conditional offers and aids imposed on them by the western countries and the international financial systems, see Beijing as a reliable and non-interfering alternative partner that offers other sources to development which is critically needed to West African states. Most of the weakened economies in West Africa are seen re-emerged because of Beijing economic assistance and demand for exports of raw materials. There are also, statistical analysis that Beijing economic commitment is lifting millions of people out from poverty and subsistence in the last few decades in West Africa.
On the whole, there are concerns for the West Africans populations on the negative sides of imbalance in economic terms, trade, and market practices. But weighing generally, on the Beijing presence and policy in West Africa, it is considered by many as been positive for the continent, but the buck stops with the West African governments and African governments as a whole. Since statistically, West African countries see Chinese presence as positive, West African governments could maximize the benefits of Sino-West African commitments, but only if they adopted and promoted policies and rules of engagement to deal and address issues that matters most to them, regarding its economies, domestic trade, balance trade, labor standards and domestic trade policies. As for the western Colonial and traditional powers, it is time to Kingsley: Beijing Foreign policy in West Africa 6 acknowledge the change in the rules and styles of the game. The emergence of China as a major great power reshaped West Africa from the status-quo placed on it by its colonial West. It is though the time, that Western nations engage China as global player with powerful economic strength, in formulating the rules of international economic system and redraw aid commitments to West African nations to be able to identify which is best for the West African people and its development. On the other hand, Beijing needs to redress its policy in the region to enhance and secure its long term strategic interest in aspects of economy and influence, by promoting stable democratic reforms, institutional reforms, and in depth long term investments, to promote sustainability and stability in a side of the world, that is ridden with instability and conflict, but rich in resources.

Concepts and Assumptions
In combining economic assistance, debt relief, and expanding market access for West African countries, such as Ghana, Nigeria, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Beijing’s commitment is in a way similar to the Western traditional powers. But Beijing is unique in its way, because, however it significantly depends on its active involvement through its national companies and corporations. Beijing also uses its strategy in West Africa to develop the skill of its corporations in an effort to advance its comparative advantages, gain access to needed sectors, open new markets abroad for its manufactured goods, create global Chinese brand and help China to becoming overly dependent on export led development. According to Washington Quarterly Summer 2007, the Chinese Kingsley: Beijing Foreign policy in West Africa 7 government promotes business ties with West African countries by providing them with needed information, coordination mechanisms and financial assistance for Chinese companies and Chinese investors in West Africa. For example Chinese construction companies operating in West Africa and Africa as a whole receive export credit for feasibility studies, receive guaranteed loans support, and exports credit for financing operational cost of their projects.
Beijing encourages national oil companies (NOC's) to increase purchases in West African markets. Beijing also facilitates the acquisition of oil reserves abroad through sweetener deals with West African governments (Ian Taylor, China's new role in Africa, p.5). In Ghana by the first nine months of 2009, Chinese companies launched 14 projects in Ghana and topped the list of foreign firms registered in terms of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in the country (Wenran Jiang and Jing Jing, China Brief 2010, p.1). This trend follows in line with Beijing Commitment in the rest of West Africa. According to the Ministry of Commerce of the People's Republic of China (PRC), In 2009 Chinese investment in West Africa and Africa as a whole rose to 77.5 per cent to $875 million from January to October (Ghanabusinessnews.com, p.1).
On December 30, 2009, “The Agreement on Economic and Technical Cooperation between Beijing and Accra” was signed at the Ghanaian Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning in Accra Ghana. According to the agreement, China will provide two concessional financial facilities including a grant and an interest free loan to the government of Ghana in 2010 (Gh.china-embassy.org, January1). At the same time, state owned China National Offshore Oil Company (CNOOC) made bid for share of U.S based Kosmos Energy assets in Kingsley: Beijing Foreign policy in West Africa 8
Ghana Jubile oil field in October 2009 (Chinadaily.net, October 13, 2009).
Ghana together with Nigeria and Guinea is rising in terms of its strategic economic importance to the energy seeking Beijing, as the recent economic development in that area of the continent moves to consolidate their development. Due to the economic importance of China to the West African countries,
Nigerian Central Bank Governor Lamido Sanusi said in Beijing on the September 6, 2011, that Africa's top oil exporter will be converting as much as 10 per cent of its $3.3 billion in foreign reserves from US dollars to Chinese Yuan (Drew Hinshaw, September, 6 2011). Central Banks use foreign reserves to manage their own currency value. This recent development in Nigerian Central Bank policy proves the extent through which Beijing policy influences West African governments. In the case of Nigeria, Converting 3.3billion to Chinese Yuan isn’t such a huge sum, not at least for the rich oil exporting country, but what is enormous, economists say, is the decision of the Central Bank of Nigeria. Beijing has also acquired 45 per cent stake in Akpo oil field Nigeria for $2.27 billion (An Africapractice report, Isaac Idun-Arkhust and James Laing, p.11). In July 2005, Beijing and Nigeria signed an $800 million crude oil sale agreement setting in motion an annual purchase of oil by Beijing of 30,000 barrels a day for five years. Much more significant is that Beijing has won a license to operate four of Nigerian oil blocs, “as part of an incentive to build a hydro power station” (Princeton Lyman, July 21, 2005 p.2/6). Beyond this is the China's willingness to takeover privatized oil refinery in Nigeria, a money losing investment that no Western company would likely engage. Kingsley: Beijing Foreign policy in West Africa 9
In Conakry, Guinean government will soon be signing a $5.8 billion mining deal with a Chinese state owned fund, In return for digging rights to a plot outside the capital, Reuter’s reports. China Power Investment would finance the construction of a coal power plant, deep water port, and a refinery long sought by the nation's rulers (Drew Hinshaw, September 6 2011). The West African newest democracy boasts of half of the world’s reserves of bauxite, the key ore used in aluminum manufacturing. The West African Country has been hampered by the activities of its past brutal dictators, until having democracy in 2010. Now the former French colony is looking to redress its lost years by quickly embracing the economic opportunities from Beijing.
Approximately some 40 per cent of Africa's export to China, are from five West African countries (Nigeria, Niger, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, and Ghana), according to the World Bank (WB). But Beijing interest in West Africa and Africa as a region goes beyond oil, Beijing now ranks as the second highest trading partner in the region, behind the United States, and ahead of France and Great Britain. From 2002 to 2003, trade between China and West Africa doubled and tripled by 2007, expected to reach 73 billion. Much of the growth was due to increase oil import from Nigeria, Ghana, Guinea and Guinea Bissau. But Chinese companies also import a large significant of non-oil commodities, such as timber, copper, and diamonds as, West Africa are truly enriched in those mineral resources. Beijing recently began to import some West African manufactured goods, such as processed foods and household consumer goods.

Experts such as Ian Taylor and Stephanie Hanson say that Beijing see West Africa as both an excellent market for their low cost consumer goods and an

Kingsley: Beijing Foreign policy in West Africa 10

area enriched with untapped raw materials (Stephanie Hanson, June 6 2008). However China's foreign direct investment (FDI) in West Africa and Africa as a region is still at only 3 percent of China's total FDI, according to the United Nations report. Experts, such as Ian Taylor and Stephanie Hanson, suggest, that the need to secure natural resources, whether oil, metal or timber is the driving force of Beijing foreign policy in West Africa. China's manufacturing sector has created enormous demand for aluminum, copper, nickel, iron ore, and oil. In 2005, David Zweig and Bin Jianhai wrote in foreign affairs “that China has been able to adapt its foreign policy to its domestic development and manufacturing strategy to an unprecedented level by encouraging state controlled companies to seek out exploration, resource and supply contracts with West African states and African countries that produce oil, gas and other natural resources. At the same time Beijing aggressively courts the government of those countries with diplomacy, trade deals, debt forgiveness and aid packages.

Methods of Argumentation

Beijing began seriously pursuing market socialism in the 1970's under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping. It marked the acceleration of a slow acceptance of change to capitalist practices as the foundation of the PRC's socioeconomic development. But Beijing political relationship with West Africa and Africa as a region goes way back as 1950's, when relations between the two relied on mutual ideological struggle against major Western powers (Africapractice,

Kingsley: Beijing Foreign policy in West Africa 11

Isaac Idun-Arkhurst and James Laing, p.14). China proclaims itself as the leader of the developing world. Beijing sees itself as a developed and developing world, and as a result, Beijing is presenting itself to West Africans as a partner who would understand the challenges of the West African people. Beijing is presenting itself as a partner who will defend its West African Counterparts in the international stages, since it possesses the economic strength and political material to defend its West African interest. Through Beijing Assistance program, Beijing has weakened the influences of its Asian rivalry (Japan), both on the international stage and in West Africa. Beijing has tried and successfully blocks Japan from a permanent membership seat in the United Nation Security Council (UNSC) (Evan S. Medeiros, p.136). Beijing by presenting itself as a leader of the developing world, Beijing is promoting the interest of the West Africa and other developing countries within United Nations, including adding an African country as a permanent member of the United Nation Security Council; in return Beijing is winning the support of countless Africans. Major Western countries like the United States refuse to deal with some West African countries, such as Equatorial Guinea, for being corrupt and not respecting human rights, for Beijing is just an opportunity to fill the void, since the same United States can still be supporting an authoritarian regime in the gulf such as Saudi Arabia, with little or no human rights records. Beijing established early relations with West African States, shortly after West African countries gained independence. In the case of Ghana, after Ghana established diplomatic relations with China in 1960, Accra received the first $12 million concessional loan from China in 1964. In the

Kingsley: Beijing Foreign policy in West Africa 12

following decades, Ghana received aid from China in various forms, such as loans, grants, and educational funds. Most loans and funds are related to infrastructure building in Ghana. Beijing assisted Accra in the construction of Ghanaian National Theater, the Bui Hydro-Electric Power Dam, the Afafe Irrigation project, the Dangame East District (Wenran Jiang and Jing Jing, February 18 2010,p.1) Hospital, the Ghanaian police and Military Barracks, the Kumasi Youth Center, the Office block of the military of Defense, and the assistance of rural schools building. Among all these projects, the construction of Bui Dam, was financed by China Export-Import (EXIM) Bank (Mofep.gov.gh, September 25 2007, p.1).

Secondly, China's export credit and guaranteed agency is the single largest Chinese financial commitment to Ghana till date, and has contributed significantly in the development of the power generation capacity in Ghana (Mofep.gov.gh, September 25 2007, p.1).

However it is obviously a well known fact to scholars and foreign policy analyst, that Beijing principal interest in the region is access to its mostly untapped natural resources. Beijing trade with West Africa and Africa as a region has risen sharply, from $10 billion in 2003 to $20 billion in 2005 and rises to tremendously 50 per cent increase in 2005 (Princeton Lyman, July 21, 2005). The Chinese manufactured goods are flooding the West African markets, much to the concern of local domestic companies and employment sector in the region. The primary focus is textile industries, where growth in Chinese imports has hampered the local domestic companies. According to Ian Taylor, an expert in the region, African imports from China rose 712%, it jump

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from $895 million in 1996 to 7.3 billion, much at the cost of African companies who are dying and moving out of business. Since the international pressure in Africa, has led to the creation of AGOA (African Growth and Opportunity Act), which offered incentives for African countries to open their economies and build free markets. The modification made from AGOA permitted least developed African and West African countries to employ materials from the cheapest contractors worldwide. The effect of the AGOA act, was the fact that foreign global economies took advantage of the initiative to penetrate African Markets. Later, due to the increasing problem a quota system was introduced known as MFA (Multi-Fibre Agreement). The MFA allocated export quotas to low cost developing countries and limiting amount of imports for states whose domestic textile industries were negatively affected. As a result of MFA agreement, a system of triangular production was developed by Asian industries particularly, China, who start to produce its markets in West Africa and Africa as a region. The result of the triangular production leads to the collapse of MFA in January 1, 2005, which was blamed to Beijing, because a much larger part of the fabric in production was actually Chinese. As a result exports fabric materials from Africa to the European Union and United States fell.

In Nigeria, low cost imports have largely devastated the textile and other consumer products industries in the Northern region of Kano and Kaduna (Ian Taylor). In these northern Muslim dominated area, which a member of the parliament, from the northern region laments about the rise in unemployment in a region mostly underdeveloped and politically fragile. The idea of Nigeria

Kingsley: Beijing Foreign policy in West Africa 14

getting to compete with China in that sector for now is largely unthinkable. In Nigerian neighboring country of Ghana, the same phenomenon has been alarming and leads to the threat of closure in most of the leading industries. In the oil rich region of Nigeria's Niger Delta, local communities have taken their anger towards the Chinese companies, they have at sometime attack Chinese oil workers, and there has also been a bomb attack in Chinese oil companies. The aggrieved locals have sometime ransacked and kidnapped Chinese engineers and workers for ransom.

Nevertheless, there have been cases of positive responses particularly from West African governments, for example, in Ghana, Mr. G.D Boateng, Executive Secretary at Ghana's Secretariat of the Chinese Funded Bui Dam project was bullish about Beijing presence: He was quoted as saying “With the Chinese assistance, old development plans that were jettisoned at the instance of development partners are now being revived and are being executed at a much lower costs,” (Isaac Idun-Arkhust and James Laing, April 26 2007, p17). He went ahead to say that before the Chinese assistance, “the Bui Dam project had been on the shelf since 1960's. We had expressions of interest from a number of Western companies in the 1990's and in 2001, but they all fell through because those companies didn't see the project as bankable, now with the Chinese assistance the project has gone off the shelf to the ground and this time it is an integration that includes the building of a new city around Bui and the idea came from previous projects in China”. Chinese companies operating in West Africa and Africa as a region are subsided by Beijing and are instructed to keep profit margins at a very low rate, sometimes at 3 per cent

Kingsley: Beijing Foreign policy in West Africa 15

low that is never the case with Western companies operating in Africa who set their profit margins at 15 per cent. Generally, there are growing satisfaction of Chinese presence in West Africa and Africa as a region. “To most of the Africans, as most people in the Western world would say God bless America, most Africans will say, God bless China”. There is no doubt that increase competition of assets in West Africa is rising, sometimes through overpayment for equity positions, which releases more resources for local development (Isaac Idun-Arkhust and James Laing, April 26, 2007, p17). But on the other-side, there is a concern that such an overpayment may end up providing “extra windfalls for corrupt officials instead of benefiting local communities.

Theoretical and Policy Prescriptions

Beijing’s policy and economic expansion in West Africa and Africa as a region, is causing waves of unrest in the Western world, which see Africa, not only as their former colonial offshoot but also as their sphere of influence. The Western concerns about Beijing presence in West Africa ranges from preserving the normative ideas, such as political freedoms, human rights and fear of diminishing Western political influences in the region. The Booming Chinese economy allows Beijing to get back to West Africa in the 21st century able to play the game with cash at hand and also the political will to follow it up. But as the Chinese activities expand in West Africa and Africa as a region, the reactions from the locals are mixed, though there are negative perceptions of Chinese activity in West Africa. Beijing has been accused by other powers as

Kingsley: Beijing Foreign policy in West Africa 16

exercising “irresponsible global leadership” because of its energy resource interest, particularly oil. But same goes to the United States and other major powers in exercising their own global leadership. The United States plays a double standard game when it comes in applying morality in its leadership role. For example, trying to enforce democracy to some countries, such as in Belarus or Iraq and supporting authoritarian regimes in the gulf, such as in Saudi Arabia, is not morality. Beijing has been accused of hiding a commitment to a non-interfering policy to pursue a predatory foreign policy in West Africa, grabbing Africa's resources without any “moral Scruples” about the conflict that plague many countries in the region (africapractice report, Isaac Idun-Arkhust and James Laing, p.22). There are growing voices in West Africa that see China as a neo-colonial power that has come to extract African resources. The Chinese construction companies employ few local workers, and large number of Chinese workers, that will remit money back to China, all these to the resentment of most of the local West African populations. Most of the Chinese export goods that go to West Africa are low quality goods. There has been trade friction between Beijing and West African nations, because they cannot compete with China, and as a result, run trade deficit in their dealings with Beijing. Most of the local merchants and industrialist in West Africa has gone out of business, because of China, mostly in textile industries due to the importation of cheap Chinese goods. There are concerns in the West that because of Chinese aid practices in West Africa; the traditional Western donors are losing influence in the region. Experts such as, Todd Moss, Senior Fellow at Washington-based Center For

Kingsley: Beijing Foreign policy in West Africa 17

Global Development (CGD) and one of the experts who designed Nigeria's Paris Club debt relief package, the “Chinese Invasion” is helping to “diversify” Africa's trade and development partners and to the extent that this promotes economic development, it is good for Africa, but it may also be “wrecking all the cooperation that the donors have worked so hard to build on environmental and governance standards, human rights and transparency initiatives (africapractice, Isaac Idun and James Laing, p. 23).As Beijing engagement in West Africa expands, it established a strategy of relying on state-owned corporations to advance its broad political and strategic interest in the region, but the strategy is increasingly becoming problematic to Beijing. Beijing encourages national oil companies (NOC's) to expand its purchases of oil in West African markets. The ability of Beijing to tell the National Oil Companies (NOC's) what to do is limited. Beijing lacks a central ministerial agency overseeing the oil industries (Ian Taylor, China’s new role in Africa, p.6). Beijing has been incapable of enforcing a geographical division of labor on the main NOC's (Ian Taylor, China’s new role in Africa, p.6). This development results in competition and overlapping between the national oil companies (NOC's). The notable of these companies, are, the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), the China Petroleum and Chemical Corporation (Sinopec), and China National Offshore Oil Company (CNOOC). The China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), and China Petroleum and Chemical Corporation (Sinopec), always compete against each other, such as in

Sudan. The Chinese National Oil Companies view each other as rivals, competing not only for natural resources, such as oil and gas, but they also vie

Kingsley: Beijing Foreign policy in West Africa 18

for political supremacy. The more highly assets a company acquires, the more likely it is to obtain diplomatic and financial support from Beijing for its subsequent investment (Ian Taylor, China’s new role in Africa, p.10). In this case the Sinopec and CNPC have more political influence, than CNOOC, though the inter-firm competition is part of the Western capitalist system but it is endangering the strategic interest of Beijing in West Africa and African continent. Beijing has also been constantly accused of paying bribe to secure its interest. International observers say the way China does business-particularly its willingness to pay bribes, as documented by Transparency International and attach no conditions for aid money-undermines local efforts to increase good governance and international efforts at macroeconomic reform by institution like the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (Stephanie Hanson, June 6 2008). At the same time, there are irrational hostility towards Beijing dealings in West Africa, Chinese trade with West Africa has become normalized in most ways, in most cases multiple actors are involve rather than state controlled corporations. Much of West Africa's manufacturing industries collapsed well before the Chinese appearance, but all is counted towards Beijing. If West Africa is to move from been dependent economy, it has to start manufacturing and move from being the exporter of primary commodities. Most of the local resentment to Beijing in West Africa is just “Irrational”. Domestic problems constitute much of West African problems, plus the huge importation of Chinese goods by West African citizens. Most of the

West African industries have poor organizational procedures, inadequate management and low level of skill. Ghanaian manufacturers of textiles have to

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face the imposition of an illegal 20%duty by Cote d' Ivoire, a “transit tax” collected at Benin and extortion by Nigerian authorities (Ian Taylor, China’s new role in Africa, p.25). Most of the West African industries have poor quality standards, poor finishing, poor packaging, and inability to meet up export demands on scheduled time. There are still a lot of challenges facing the West African government. There are so much institutional failings, bureaucratic incompetence, and unpredictable policies, such as unpredictable property rights, ineffectiveness and corrupt judiciary systems. Manufacture goods imported from China arrives into the West African markets at a very much lower prices, at much less domestic competition, but Beijing are blamed for it, instead of blaming the West African governments and its policy makers, for its failure to adopt the right policy choices.

Conclusion

It is a palpable fact, that recent Chinese engagement in West Africa, is driven by Beijing desperate need to find natural resources, more especially oil, to be able to sustain its booming economy, and also create a new market in West Africa for its manufactured goods. Beijing emergence as one of the West African largest trading ally has reshaped the traditional system and attracted attention of the global world. Beijing recent activities in West Africa, especially in Nigeria, Ghana, and Guinea Bissau are significant, though there are many implications beyond the good side of the game. Clearly Beijing from the extraction of West African raw material and importation of Chinese

Kingsley: Beijing Foreign policy in West Africa 20

manufactured goods, Beijing has enormous leverage over Western competitors in African markets, because its value demands, with investment, infrastructure building, debt forgiveness, and aids, provides a comfortable ground and gives it access into the West African markets and its resources. Beijing because of its critical economic interest, political interest, and the establishment of itself as an emerged super power that will defend West African governments in the international stage, gave it an overwhelming leverage ahead of Western traditional powers, who view West Africa and Africa as a region as their colonial offshoot and their spheres of influence. Beijing has a long term commitment in its dealings with West African governments, and has through its commitments nurture a potential market ground for its manufactured goods. West African natural resources are untapped and its markets are strategically open for Beijing. Though Chinese economic activities in West Africa has produced mixed effects and reactions. West African governments are happy that most of their dying economies are resuscitated by high Beijing demand for their natural resources exports and large Beijing investments on infrastructure and basic sectors neglected by Western powers. However there are sections of the local industries badly affected by the surge of Chinese manufactured goods, such as textile industries, which as a result, cause unemployment and a decline in local domestic made products. Some sections of the population are outrage by the environmental effects, businesses, and human rights concern. Most of the Chinese companies, don't employ local domestic workers, in most cases, the local population are not allow to learn the technicalities needed to sustain the industries when Beijing left, many employers in Chinese companies are

Kingsley: Beijing Foreign policy in West Africa 21

Chinese migrant workers that will remit money back to China, all to the resentment of the local population. Beijing also faces pressure and criticisms from Western countries, they criticize Beijing for supporting repressive regimes, then undermining international efforts to bring economic and political sanity to the region. On the other hand, Beijing aid practices are lifting millions of West Africans from poverty, and their market activities are creating a growing middle class, for example in Nigeria, where its economy are growing sharply, not because of its richness in oil resources, but because of its growing domestic consumption. The Question is, whether Beijing engagements in West Africa, for the long term, that can help the region to develop its industries and human resources or is it going to be like the past colonial activities in West Africa? This I left for its conscience to examine. Because of Beijing extraction of West Africa's natural resources, and its heavy trade activities in the region, it weighs heavily in the region's development. Its investment and resource exploitation could be an opportunity for the region to accelerate its economic capacity and develop its human resources and industry, but only if the West African governments adopt and implement the right policy choices needed for development. But until then, an over influx of Chinese manufactured goods and irresponsible extraction of resources could potentially devastate the already fragile region and its economies. Generally, majority of West Africans, believe that Beijing have a positive impact in West African development, but it is left for the governments to address the negative aspect of the business practices. As for the traditional Western donors, it is time, to accept the fact that China has emerged and establish itself as a major player,

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with the resources to play the game, so it has to engage Beijing in recreating the rules of international economic system and review most of Beijing activities in the region to see if it is good for the development of the region.

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