rIssues & Studie s© 45, no. 4 (December 2009): 159-188.

Status for Sale: Taiwan and the Competition for Diplomatic Recognition
TIMOTHY S. RICH

Diplomatic recognition is generally seen as fundamental to the modern state system. The traditional views of recognition however focus almost exclusively on political or ideological rationales, ignoring other foundations on which other countries base establishing diplomatic recognition. Focusing on the Republic of China (Taiwan) suggests a more complicated view where economic self-interest on one side and national pride on the other may undermine traditional conceptions of recognition. Using the ROC-PRC diplomatic battle as a case study, this paper hopes to shed light on two questions: why, despite the PRC's rise as a global power, a country would continue to formally recognize the ROC and secondly what does the ROC receive in exchange for such high-cost endeavors to maintain recognition. In this case mutual ideological rationales have greatly diminished while I contend that economic factors have predominantly maintained this diplomatic battle. In addition, previous research often focuses on major world powers granting or withholding formal recognition to smaller states. In this situation, poor countries with typically little political influence are the major players, suggesting different rationales behind recognition. Methodologically, this paper blends qualitative and quantitative analysis to uncover factors affecting recogni-

T IMOTHY S. RICH is a doctoral student in political science at the Indiana University. His previous rese arch analyzed Taiwan's democratization and cross-Strait relations. His dissertation analyzes electoral reform in East Asia . In 2009, Timothy received a National Science Foundation grant to conduct research in Taiwan regarding recent electoral reforms. The author can be reached at .
© Institute

of International Relations, National Chengchi University, Taipei, Taiwan (ROC).

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tion. The existing literature is almost entirely qualitative, focusing only on relations between two countries or within a particular region. Furthermore, most studies only cover a short time span, usually no more than a decade. This paper intends to analyze most of the post-civil war period, identifying broad trends which may be overlooked in previous research.
K EYWORDS : diplomatic recognition, Taiwan, China, dollar diplomacy, sove reignty.

* * * State sovereignty remains a core element of international relations, with states seeking reaffirmation of such claims through ½× formal diplomatic recognition. Traditional views of recognition, however, presume political or ideological foundations, ignoring other rationales which may underpin these relations. Focusing on the Republic of China (ROC) on Taiwan suggests a more nuanced view where economic self-interest on one side and national pride on the other may undermine traditional conceptions of recognition. Despite a cross-Strait diplomatic truce since 2008, the context of diplomatic recognition in this case may still create conflict between the two sides due to the incentives of other countries. For most of the period following World War II, the ROC on Taiwan and the People's Republic of China (PRC) both claimed to be the sole legitimate government of China. Accordingly, a country could not successfully maintain diplomatic relations with both governments.1 Diplomatic recognition based on Cold War ideologies began to unravel after the SinoAmerican rapprochement and the seating of the PRC in the United Nations. Having once been recognized by the majority of nations, the ROC now has formal relations with only 23, compared to 169 that recognize the PRC, leaving the former more diplomatically isolated than many previous pariah states such as apartheid-era South Africa. 2 Although the ROC dropped its

1France

attempted dual recognition in 1964, until the PRC objected and France cut ties with the ROC. In 2003, the PRC maintained its diplomatic mission in Kiribati for three weeks after the island nation recognized the ROC, hoping to entice it to switch bac k. 2Only Bhutan has no formal relations with either side. Despite India controlling much of its

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claim to the mainland and has been open to dual recognition since 1991, the PRC's position remains unchanged and this has prevented the island from making any significant progress in increasing formal recognition. This article proposes that while diplomatic recognition is normally stable, it may break down when each side has fundamentally different rationales for granting recognition. Using the ROC-PRC diplomatic battle as a case study, this article highlights often ignored rationales behind recognition. In doing so, it is hoped to also shed light on two questions: why, despite the PRC's rise as a global power, a third country would continue to formally recognize the ROC, and secondly what does the ROC receive in exchange for such high-cost endeavors to maintain recognition? Diplomatic recognition is rarely controversial, but when controversies have arisen they have usually been based on conflicting ideologies or the desire to shape another state's behavior. In this case, however, I contend that ideological rationales have greatly diminished this diplomatic battle while economic factors have predominantly maintained it. In addition, previous research often focuses on major world powers granting or withholding formal recognition to smaller states. In the present case, poor countries with typically little political influence are the major players, suggesting different rationales behind recognition. Looking at the ramifications of diplomatic recognition in this case may allow some insight into future points of conflict between the ROC and the PRC while potentially suggesting a reconceptualization of diplomatic recognition itself. In addition to addressing diverging motives for diplomatic recognition, this article's major contribution is the blending of qualitative and quantitative analysis to uncover patterns affecting recognition. The literature on the subject is to the best of my knowledge entirely qualitative, often focusing only on relations between two countries or on a particular region.3 Furthermore, most studies only cover a short time span, usually no

externa l relations, Bhutan has been in ne gotiations with the PRC since 1984 regarding their shared borde r and has consistently supported Be ijing's position on Taiwan. 3Bih-jaw Lin, "The Republic of China and Africa: A Case of Positive Adaptation," in Foreign Policy of the Republic of China on Taiwan: An Unorthodox Approach, ed. Yu San Wang

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more than a decade. This article analyzes most of the post-civil war period, identifying broad trends which may have been overlooked in previous research. The first part of this article will consist of an examination of traditional theories and rationales behind diplomatic recognition. This is followed by a case study analysis of the historical progression of the diplomatic recognition battles between the ROC and PRC. Next is a quantitative analysis of diplomatic recognition, illuminating the underlying motivations as well as structural conditions which may perpetuate this battle. In conclusion, this article hopes to show an alternative and more nuanced conception of recognition which contrasts with political rationales.

Recognition Regardless of whether diplomatic recognition is a legal or political act, 4 the act of recognition itself is a reflection of state sovereignty and thus the "golden ring that political leaders hope to grasp.5 "Internal sovereignty can be defined as a government having exclusive de facto control over a specific area and its citizens generally accepting this rule (Montevideo Convention). Clearly the ROC, since democratization at least, as well as other disputed territories (e.g., Somaliland and Abkhazia), meet these minimalist requirements. However, international recognition is rarely based solely on internal sovereignty, especially when other states lay
(Ne w York: Praeger, 1990); Phillip Liu, "Cross-Strait Sc ramble for Africa: A Hidde n Agenda in China-Africa Cooperation Forum," Harvard Asia Quarterly 5, no. 2 (2001): 1-9; and Richard. J. Payne and Cassandra. R. Vene y, "Taiwan and Africa: Taipei's Continuing Search for Inte rnational Recognition," Journal of Asian and African Studies 36, no. 4 (2001): 437-50. 4Edwin Borc hard, "Recognition and Non-Recognition," American Journal of International Law 3, no. 1 (1942): 108-11; and Hans Kelsen, "Recognition in International Law: Theoretical Observations," American Journal of Inte rnational Law 35, no. 4 (1941): 605-17. 5Stephen D. Krasner, "Who Gets a State, and Why?" Foreign Affairs 88, no. 2 (2009): http:// www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/64872/stephen-d-krasner/who-gets-a-state-and-why (a ccessed May 1, 2009).

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claim to the territory.6 External legitimacy is considerably more complex. Hedley Bull states that a political community that claims sovereignty, even if judged by outsiders as legitimate, cannot be called a state if in practice it cannot assert this right.7 To strengthen sovereignty claims, many entities attempt the perception of statehood by mirroring the actions of recognized states. For example, many disputed states (including Taiwan) declare their consent to international agreements of which they were not signatories as a means of propping up claims to statehood. Although there may be degrees of external sovereignty, 8 a more explicit indicator is diplomatic recognition. Newnham asserts that diplomatic recognition is crucial to the very definition of state sovereignty.9 Simply put, sovereignty is partially determined by other states and the greater number of states extending diplomatic recognition to a country, a greater sense of external legitimacy that country exhibits. Here the ROC is on shaky ground, with less than a quarter of nations explicitly recognizing its claims to sovereignty. This lack of external legitimacy leaves the ROC insecure as few are willing to openly challenge Beijing's claim that the island is a renegade province. The near universal recognition of foreign governments can be viewed as an international norm, with sovereign equality an underlying principle of international relations. 10 In the past century, sovereign equality as a normative concept may have "attained an almost ontological status in the structure of the international legal system. 11 "Once a state's independent

Kolsto, "The Sustainability a nd Future of Unrecognized Quasi-States," Journal of Peace Research 43, no. 6 (2006): 725-40. 7Hedle y Bull, The Anarchical Soc iety: A Study of Order in World Politics (Ne w York: Columbia University Press, 1977), 8. 8Christopher Clapha m, "Degrees of Sovereignty," Review of International Studies 24, no. 2 (1998): 143-57. 9Randall E. Newnham, "Emba ssies for Sale: The Purchase of Diplomatic Recognition by West Germany, Taiwan, and South Korea," International Politics 37 (2000): 260. 10Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: Random House, 1979), 88. 11Thompson argues, however, that only with the United Nations did states rhetorically accept the notion of e quality among states. See He len Thompson, "The Case for External Sovereignty," European Journal of International Relations 12, no. 2 (2006): 256.

6Pal

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status has been informally acknowledged, most governments quickly formalize this status through recognition.1 2 Timor-Leste, for instance, received diplomatic recognition from the United States, China, and Portugal within days of declaring independence and both the United States and the Soviet Union recognized the state of Israel within hours of its formation. Some states have even made this process virtually automatic, such as Mexico with its long-standing Estrada Doctrine which condemned the notion of recognition tied to moral judgments as undermining state sovereignty. Once granted, recognition traditionally has been very stable, revoked only rarely, such as when a new government is believed to have gained control of the state through illegitimate means (however defined) and often after an initial suspension of relations. Although recognition is commonplace, there is no obligation to extend recognition to a new government once it effectively rules a state, and after 1917 non-recognition lasting more than twenty years seemed commonplace. 13 Many Western and non-aligned countries even avoided recognizing the Soviet Union until the 1970s,14 while Spain and Yugoslavia were similarly denied recognition until the mid-1970s. When recognition has been withheld or revoked, this has usually been based on only a few factors. Since the nineteenth century, most of these cases have been based on the method by which a government came to power (such as coups and revolutions, as in Cuba and Iran), the level of foreign influence on the new government that brings into question its de facto independence (e.g., Northern Cyprus, the Baltic states during the Cold War, and the Bantustans in apartheid-era South Africa), or beliefs that the other government is

12How

a c ountry reaches this level is contentious and beyond the scope of this paper. See Robert H. Jac kson, Quasi-states: Sovereignty, International Relations, and the Third World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); and Bene dict Kingsbury, "Sovereignty and Inequality," European Journal of International Law 9, no. 4 (1998): 599-625. 13M. J. Peterson, "Political Use of Recognition: The Influenc e of the International System," World Politics 34, no. 3 (1982): 325, 47. 14M. J. Peterson, "Recognition of Governments Should Not Be Abolished," American Journal of International Law 77, no. 1 (1983): 32; William G. Gray, Germany's Cold War: The Global Campaign to Isolate East Germany, 1949-1969 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Pre ss, 2003), 3.

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illegitimately occupying part or all of the land under its control. For example, in 1907 five Central American countries (Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua) refused to recognize governments that came to power without democratic support, a stipulation the United States has also occasionally followed.15 Most Middle Eastern countries do not recognize Israel based on territories occupied since 1967. Even the means by which colonies became independent could be grounds for withholding recognition, as in the case of Rhodesia.16 In the ROC-PRC case, early non-recognition of the PRC was largely tied to hesitation in acknowledging the Nationalists' de facto loss of control, even after their retreat to Taiwan. In virtually all cases, diplomatic recognition was based on claims of legitimate rule over a specific territory and revoked or withheld based on domestic actions altering this vaguely defined status quo. What sets Taiwan apart is not the long-term breaking off and/or withholding of recognition from a large number of geographically diverse countries. Ideological rationales for withholding recognition were broadly used after World War II. 17 Ideological conflict has been an excellent predictor of the number of expressions of opinion on diplomatic recognition decisions. Throughout the Cold War, opposing sides routinely withheld recognition, especially in the cases of divided nations where the option of dual recognition was rejected. By the 1960s recognition was viewed as a sign of approval of a regime. Today, with few exceptions (i.e., the United States' non-recognition of Cuba), purely ideological rationales have fallen out of favor. Regardless of the stated rationale, the underlying goal of withholding recognition has been to coerce states to act in a manner favorable to another state. Peterson stated that as long as regimes seek recognition, other gov-

15Peterson,

"Recognition of Governments," 38. minority Rhodesian Front government de clared independence in 1965, ignoring Great Britain's policy of no independence for African colonies without African majority rule. No country extended recognition to the state (now Zimbabwe) until ele ctions in 1980. 17Peterson, "Political Use of Recognition," 347.
16The European

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ernments can exploit this need. 18 Since coercion requires power, withholding recognition has generally been a tool used by powerful states against weaker states. For example, the United States withheld recognition from several Caribbean nations as a means to extract concessions, and most Western powers did the same (in order to maintain extraterritoriality) before recognizing the ROC in 1911. In divided states, the intent was explicit: to coerce the non-recognized party to consent to unification under its counterpart's control. In general, recognition flowed from stable powerful countries to states whose status, if not in dispute, was still comparatively weak. Recognition, however, should not be conflated with substantive relations. Diplomatic recognition itself is a low cost activity, consisting of little more than public announcements, while deeper connections are more costly, requiring at least the stationing of diplomats. Great Britain, for example, did not follow diplomatic recognition of Albania or China with exchanges of ambassadors for over twenty years. 19 A simple concrete measure of the depth of bilateral relations is the establishment of embassies. Extensive relations necessitate in-country embassies, whereas less important relations or limited resources can manage with accredited diplomats covering several countries in a region.2 0 Although recognition implies sovereign equality, the number of embassies per country belies this. Out of 194 countries, the average number of embassies per country is only 44, with only 17 countries having 100 or more embassies in country and 33 less than 10.

18M.

J. Peterson, Recognition of Governments: Legal Doctrine and State Practice, 18151995 (New York: St. Martin's, 1997), 3. 19Eberhard Sandschneider, "China's Diplomatic Relations with the States of Europe," in China and Europe since 1978: A European Perspective, ed. Richard Louis Edmonds (New York: Cambridge University, 2002), 35. 20For instance, Andorra often has one diplomatic mission covering multiple countries, such as its mission to Brussels that covers Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Germany, and Poland. Others allow for proxy ambassadors, such as Liechtenstein which allows Switzerland to represent its interests in countries where it does not have a diplomatic mission. Likewise the diplomatic missions to the Holy See and Tuvalu all reside in another country (Italy and Fiji, respectively).

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The Two Chinas The present situation between the PRC and the ROC provides a unique case where the rationale for granting recognition has evolved over time. Where once both sides claimed to be the legitimate government of all of China and recognition was often based to a large extent on Cold War ideological rationales, the situation has evolved into a carefully crafted debate on Taiwan's status (independent state versus renegade province), in which recognizing states have few if any ideological imperatives.21 The battle for recognition has now been limited to relatively powerless countries, some of which barely qualify as sovereign states. 22 Many of these states cannot afford or simply chose not to establish consulates once recognition is granted. 23 Whereas the average number of embassies per country is forty-four, among the ROC-recognizing countries, the average is only thirteen.24 While the ROC has an embassy in every country but Tuvalu, Tuvalu and three other countries have yet to establish embassies in Taiwan (see table 1). Several countries had no relations with either side directly after 1949, presumably waiting for a final settlement.2 5 As many as sixteen countries

21Technic ally, no

country recognizes Taiwan as an inde pendent nation, but rather recognizes the ROC as the legitimate government of China, even if direct referenc es to such claims ha ve large ly ceased. 22Two of the ROC's diplomatic allies, the Marsha ll Islands and Pala u, were both UN trust territorie s administered by the United States until 1994. Under the Compac t of Free Association the United States remains in control of the sec urity a nd defense of the islands. This does not ensure long-term recognition for Taipei, howeve r. The Cook Islands, which have a similar "fre e a ssoc iation" relationship with Ne w Zealand, c hose in 1997 to switch recognition to the PRC. 23Most consulates in Taipei are paid for by the ROC. See Jie Chen, Foreign Policy of the New Taiwan: Pragmatic Diplomacy in Southeast Asia (Northampton: Edward Elgar, 2002), 29. 24This increases to sixteen if the missions to the Holy See based in Rome (seventy-two) are included. 25James C. Hsiung, "China's Recognition Practice and Its Implications in International Law," in China's Practice in International Law, ed. Jerome Allen Cohen (Cambridge, Mass.: Harva rd University Press, 1972), 54-55.

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Table 1 Countries Recognizing the ROC and Number of Embassies in-Country, 2008
Country Belize Burkina Faso Dominican Republic El Salvador Gambia Gua temala Haiti Holy See (Vatican City) Honduras Kiribati Muarshall Islands Nauru Embassies 12 22 32 27 8 35 17 0 24 3 3 1 Country Nicaragua Palau Panama Para guay Saint Kitts and Nevis Saint Luc ia Saint Vincent and the Grenadines Sao Tome and Principe Solomon Isla nds Swaziland Tuvalu Embassies 32 4 36 23 3 5 3 7 6 4 0

Italics denotes country does not have an embassy in Taiwan Source: Embassypages.com

immediately recognized the PRC, including the United Kingdom, in part due to concerns over Hong Kong. Meanwhile, only thirty-seven countries formally recognized the ROC, and of those, only seven had permanent missions in Taiwan, while many diplomats remained in Beijing despite their country not formally recognizing the PRC. 26 However, with the start of the Korean War, anti-communist policies and renewed U.S. support for the ROC allowed the ROC to maintain and even gain some diplomatic representation post-1949. Anti-communist sentiment increased recognition, which in turn helped the ROC maintain its seat in the UN. From mid-1950 to mid-1955, the PRC received no additional recognitions. In the 1960s only one Latin American country, Cuba, recognized the PRC. Similarly, the ROC fared well in Africa, receiving recognition from thirteen out of twenty-three African countries from 1960 to 1963, compared to only five

26Donald

Klein, "Formosa's Diplomatic World," The China Quarterly, no. 15 (1963): 45-50.

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for the PRC and five which recognized neither. 27 Even as international support for seating the PRC in the UN increased, the ROC resisted changing its "one China" policy. Between 1971 (the year the PRC was seated in the UN Security Council) and 1979 the ROC unilaterally cut ties with 44 countries that recognized the PRC— without significant pressure from Beijing. This is not unusual, however, among divided states; West Germany revoked recognition of seven countries that increased ties with its counterpart following the proclamation of the Hallstein Doctrine. 29 After the United States formally recognized the PRC in 1979, most other holdouts followed suit, leaving only a few countries retaining official relations with the ROC. Ironically Beijing's own Taiwan policy shift at the time may have indirectly propped up recognition of the ROC. With Sino-American rapprochement, the PRC ended references to the "liberation" of Taiwan and thus suggested the possibility of a peaceful resolution of the dispute. This subtle policy shift could be viewed as signaling a continuation of the status quo, thus encouraging the ROC to continue efforts to maintain recognition under a "one China" framework— which the PRC grudgingly accepted— rather than pursue recognition through a formal declaration of independence. While Cold War tensions strengthened many of the ROC's relations, the end of the Cold War removed much of the ideological motivation to maintain them. Indonesia reinstituted diplomatic relations with Beijing in 1990 after a twenty-five-year hiatus. Saudi Arabia switched recognition in 1992. Singapore, traditionally hesitant about recognizing the PRC because of its own large Chinese population, and South Korea, perhaps the most

27Despite

the competition ten countries in the UN recognized neither government in 1963: Austria, Central African Republic, Ethiopia, Iceland, Ireland, Ivory Coast, Malaya, Niger, Sierra Leone, and Tunisia . See ibid., 49-50. 28Francoise M engin, "The Foreign Policy of the ROC on Taiwan since 1971: An Overview," in The Republic of China on Taiwan in International Politics, ed. Marie-Louise Nat (Berlin: Peter Lang, 1998), 21-22. 29Lawrence L. Whetten, Ge rmany East and West (New York: New York University Press, 1980), 43, 190.

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anti-communist state in Asia, recognized the PRC in 1990 and 1992, respectively. Today only the Holy See seems to base its recognition of the ROC on explicit ideological grounds. With anti-communist appeals evaporating, the ROC shifted its diplomatic strategy. One crucial step was acknowledging the legitimacy of the PRC on the mainland and thus opening up the possibility of dual recognition. Although impractical due to Beijing's continued opposition, this prevented a self-imposed isolation. Furthermore, with democratization, Taiwan attempted to define recognition in terms of democratic principles, a definition reiterated by some current diplomatic allies. This achieved some success as the number of diplomatic allies increased under Lee Tenghui's (§õµn½÷) presidency (1988-2000) from twenty-two to twenty-eight; however, the number of independent countries also increased during the same time frame. Taiwan thus altered the stated rationale for recognition while only slightly changing the recognition playing field. Whereas recognition usually confers legitimacy and is only revoked under severe conditions, recognition of the ROC is often granted and withdrawn without a clear political motive. This instability is apparent from the number of countries that have switched recognition more than once. The most extreme examples, Senegal and the Central African Republic, have switched five times since both originally forged diplomatic ties with the ROC in 1962. Ten other countries— Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad, the Gambia, Lesotho, Liberia, Nauru, Nicaragua, Niger, and St. Lucia— switched diplomatic recognition more than once, eight of them at least once in the last fifteen years. Two others recognized the ROC for only days before switching back. ROC-Vanuatu relations lasted ten days in 2002 and Papua New Guinea's recognition lasted sixteen days in 1999, culminating in a scandal over a reported US$2.5 billion loan which ultimately led to the resignation of Papua New Guinea's prime minister.30 Ideological rationales may have stabilized diplomatic relations previously, but without a Cold War framework, Taiwan's remaining diplomatic ties appear unstable.

30"A

Cargo from Ta iwan," The Economist, July 10, 1999.

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One also sees evidence of thin diplomatic relations in terms of the establishment of embassies. Although currently the ROC has embassies in most of the countries that recognize it, this has not always been the case. Nine years elapsed between recognition and the establishment of an embassy in Haiti and more than six elapsed in the cases of Guatemala, Nicaragua, and Uruguay. Similarly the PRC waited seven years after recognition of Vanuatu to establish an embassy there in 1989. This could be a wait-andsee response, hoping to avoid closing an embassy shortly after its establishment due to the host country switching recognition, as happened with the ROC in Mali (1960) and Laos (1962) within four months of recognition.

Checkbook Diplomacy Economic interests have traditionally played some role in recognition in that recognition encourages interaction and decreases the informational costs of trade. The economic cost of non-recognition can be high as foreign firms are wary of investment where international conventions are not binding. Enticing others to also forego recognition can be just as costly, as seen in U.S. subsidies to Japan in part to compensate for the loss of potential trade with the PRC.3 1 Such rationales are not unique to capitalist countries. Shortly following the Bolshevik Revolution, Lenin desired diplomatic recognition from the United States for the economic benefits it could bring.32 In the late 1980s, South Korea promised aid packages and increased trade if the Soviet Union extended recognition, supported the former's entry into the United Nations, and no longer sold weapons to North Korea. 33 Within one year of recognition, trade tripled between the

31Edgar

Snow and Shao-Chang Hsu, "Recognition of the People's Republic of China ," Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 324 (1959): 79. 32Todd Pfannestiel, "The Soviet Bure au: A Bolshevik Strategy to Secure U.S. Diplomatic Recognition through Economic Trade," Diplomatic History 27, no. 2 (2003): 171-92. 33Miles Kahler and Scott .L. Kastner, "Stra tegic Uses of Economic Interdependence: Enga gement Policies on the Korean Peninsula and Across the Taiwan Strait," Journal of Peace Research 43, no. 5 (2006): 523-41.

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two countries while in 1991, South Korea provided a US$3 billion aid package, the largest in the country's history. In the ROC-PRC case, however, the role of economics appears more explicit. Since 1961, the ROC has implicitly or explicitly connected aid packages to recognition, much like South Korea and West Germany before dual recognition. 34 According to Taiwan's 2009 White Paper on Foreign Aid Policy, official development assistance (ODA) exceeded US$430 million in 2008. Development assistance has been particularly important to island microstates whose economic viability may otherwise be in question. Taiwan remains the largest single donor to Haiti, Grenada, St. Kitts and Nevis, and St. Vincent and the Grenadines, and was Dominica's greatest benefactor before it switched recognition. 35 With aid packages equaling a fifth of the Haitian government's annual budget, it should have come as no surprise when a Haitian cabinet minister stated that Taiwan does not "give us any reason to look after continental China."3 6 Conversely, one official in the Foreign Ministry even suggested that the ROC could purchase recognition from a Third World country for about US$20 million.37 However, unlike the Korean and German cases, both the ROC and PRC are now willing to tie large assistance packages to recognition. Although both sides regularly condemn checkbook diplomacy, their track record in the past fifteen years belies this. Beijing offered large investment and aid packages to the Bahamas, St. Lucia, and Dominica shortly after each switched recognition to the PRC. 38 Taipei granted Niger a US$50 million loan in 1992 shortly before recognition and US$35 million

34Robert

A. Madsen, "The Struggle for Sovereignty Between China and Taiwan," in Problematic Sov ereignty: Contested Rules and Political Possibilitie s, ed. Stephen D. Krasner (Ne w York: Columbia University, 2001); and Gray, Germany's Cold War. 35Maria Lynch, "Taiwan Lavishes Aid to Secure Solid Caribbean Ba sin Allies, " Miami Herald, Decembe r 7, 2003. 36VOA News Report, "Haiti and Taiwan" (May 27, 2003), http://www.globalsecurity.org/ wmd/library/news/taiwan/2003/ta iwan-030527-2ad06368.htm (accessed November 10, 2008). 37Weiqun Gu, Conflicts of Divided Nations: The Cases of China and Korea (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1995), 128. 38See note 35 above (Lynch, "Taiwan Lavishes Aid").

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in assistance to Gambia in 1995, more than all other donors to the country combined that year.3 9 Taipei offered Costa Rica nearly US$50 million in assistance in 2003-2004, only to see the country switch recognition in 2007.4 0 Taipei responded with increased assistance to Nicaragua to prevent another loss in the region. 41 Beijing accused Taipei of offering Sao Tome and Principe US$30 million in aid in exchange for recognition in 1997, with Taipei making similar claims about Beijing's US$100 million assistance package to Guinea-Bissau in 1998.42 Taiwan denied Dominica's request for US$65 million in 2004, only to have the Caribbean country switch recognition for double that amount of aid. The PRC offered Nauru, with less than fourteen thousand citizens, over US$100 million in aid for recognition in 2003, only to have the island switch again in 2005. 43 The convergence of interests, which Payne and Veney argue is behind many of Taiwan's ties, breaks down once the PRC is willing to offer similar aid packages. 44 China's investment strategy has also evolved, and Beijing has adopted a more regional approach to economic enticements despite preferring bilateral agreements rather than working through organizations like the African Union. Crucial to China's continued economic development is access to energy inputs, especially oil and metals. Access to these resources has pushed the PRC to develop relations which previously amounted to little more than small development projects under checkbook diplomacy. Specifically China appears to be mirroring Taiwan's regional success in main-

39Niger switched 40See

back to recognizing the PRC in 1996. note 35 above (Lynch, "Taiwan Lavishes Aid"). 41Iris Liu, "The Big China and Taiwan Tussle: Dollar Diplomacy Returns to Latin America," The Panama New 14, no. 18 (September 22, 2008). http://www.thepanamanews.c om/pn/ v_14/issue_18/opinion_10.html (accessed January 20, 2010). 42Gary D. Rawnsley, Taiwan's Informal Diplomacy and Propaganda (New York: St. Martin's, 2000), 32. 43See Shelle y Rigger, "Taiwan in 2002: Another Year of Political Droughts and Typhoons," Asian Survey 43, no. 1 (2003): 45; Elizabeth Freund Larus, "Taiwan's Quest for International Recognition," Issue s & Studies 42, no. 2 (2006): 49. 44Payne and Veney, "Taiwan and Africa," 443.

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taining diplomatic relations in Central America by implementing an integrated regional policy in Africa. Since the early 1990s, the first trip made by the PRC's minister of foreign affairs each year has been to an African country, symbolizing the importance of China-Africa relations. This was followed by the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) in 2000, China's first attempt at a collective African dialogue. In 2007 the PRC established the China-Africa Development Fund (CAD), administered through the China Development Bank and under the direct jurisdiction of the State Council. Within one year, the CAD granted over US$90 million to projects in Africa and expected to invest an additional US$5 billion in the short term.4 5 The PRC has also offered various assistance packages to African countries in return for recognition, and leaders in Beijing are increasingly confident that African holdouts will eventually come their way.46 In 2004 China offered Angola an aid package nearly matching an assistance package from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) but with no constraints and followed this with a US$9 billion loan in 2006. Similarly a 2008 agreement provided US$9 billion to the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) for far-reaching investment in exchange for millions of tons of copper and cobalt. This "Chinese Marshall Plan" is potentially reconfiguring the diplomatic battlefront in Africa by fostering both long-term mutually beneficial programs and raising the potential costs of switching recognition. 47 While both the PRC and ROC maintain ideological reasons for extending recognition in what Hsieh refers to as "competing nationalisms," absent a Cold War framework few other countries share these concerns.48

45China Development

Bank. 2009. http://www.cdb.com.cn/english/Column.asp? ColumnId = 176 (acc essed March 3, 2009). 46T. Y. Wang, "Cross-Strait Re lations After the 2000 Election in Taiwan: Changing Tactics in a New Reality," Asian Survey 41, no. 5 (2001): 732. 47Wenran Jiang, "A Chinese 'M arshall Plan' or Business?" Asiatimes.com (accessed March 10, 2009). 48John Hsieh, "The Prospect of Cross-Relations: A Game-Theoretic Analysis," EAI Working Paper, no. 94 (2002): 4.

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If Cold War ideological frameworks have lost their saliency, economic conditions may provide greater insight. Countries with comparatively weak economies arguably would be more willing to recognize the ROC in exchange for aid packages. Microstates in particular constantly struggle to remain viable in a global economy and have little to bargain for international assistance, save their UN vote and ability to confer diplomatic recognition. Those states with few exports logically should be the most willing to recognize the ROC as the appeal of access to China's market should be weaker. A cursory review of the ROC's diplomatic allies supports this. According to the 2005 CIA Factbook, the Chinese market is only a significant factor to two of the ROC's current diplomatic allies, Burkina Faso and the Solomon Islands, with 39.8 percent and 41.6 percent of their respective exports going to the mainland, while China is the destination of only a little over 4 percent of the exports of both Paraguay and the Marshall Islands.4 9 Conversely, Taiwan's exports to and imports from its diplomatic allies are minimal. Current allies only accounted for approximately .004 percent of both exports and imports from 1989 to mid-2009 and less than .003 percent of exports in 2008.5 0 Non-economic factors have also been suggested. A sense of democratic solidarity could lead to higher levels of recognition. Taiwan may be viewed as a political model to follow, cultivating an image as an "exporter of democracy."51 Accordingly, among Taiwan's allies at any given time, democracies may be more likely to remain with Taiwan. 52 However, corrupt authoritarian governments also may view recognition as an effective means to strengthen their position, especially if recognition is combined

49This

does not include exports to Hong Kong. CIA Factbook, 2005. of Foreign Trade, Republic of China, http://cus93.trade.gov.tw/bftweb/english/ FSCE (a ccesse d September 7, 2009). 51For example, in 2005 Taiwan founded the Democratic Pacific Union (DPU) to foster democratic values as well as e conomic interactions. See Annette Hsiu-lien Lu ( §f ¨q½¬ ), "Address to the Opening Ceremony of the Democratic Pacific Assembly Preparatory Meeting (Taipei)," December 14, 2002. http://www.president.gov.tw. 52Elizabeth Freund Larus, "Soft Power versus Hard Cash: Retaining Democratic Allies," in Taiwan and the Inte rnational Community, ed. Steve Tsang (Oxford: Peter Lang, 2008), 153-88.
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with economic assistance. A brief review of recognizing countries suggests that size may be a factor as many are island microstates. In correspondence with the author, diplomatic missions to Taiwan also refer to their countries' commonalities as small nations.53 One would also assume that states comparatively distant geographically from the PRC would be more insulated from Beijing's push for recognition. To analyze the factors potentially influencing diplomatic recognition of the ROC, I employ a Probit model54 with a dichotomous dependent variable (1=recognition of the ROC) using data from 1960-2007. 55 To capture level of democracy, I use Polity Scores.56 Unfortunately Polity does not include any country with a population of less than five hundred thousand, which, if smaller countries are more likely to recognize the ROC, may bias the statistical results.5 7 A second measure is also tested to capture the potential dyadic effects associated with democracy, as countries with similar levels of democracy to Taiwan may be more likely to extend recognition. This is measured as the absolute difference between the Polity scores of Taiwan and the other country. In addition I include one economic variable, exports as a percentage of GDP, available from the World Bank. 58 Furthermore, I include three control variables: the size of country in square kilo-

53In

personal correspondence with diplomatic representatives from several of Taiwan's island allies, geographic al similaritie s were consistently referenced. 54A probit model is a nonline ar maximum likelihood estima tion regression model applicable when the outc ome of inte rest is not a continuous varia ble. While graphing predicted probabilities may provide additional insight beyond the regression output alone, for the sake of brevity these have been excluded. 55Dates of recognition were supplied by the ROC's Ministry of Foreign Affairs and checked against secondary sources. Because economic data is only available for most countries from 1960 to the present, I am unable to model the entire pe riod of interest. The data set includes all countries exc ept the Holy See (Vatican City). 56The Polity IV Project produces an authoritarian-democracy score which ranges from -10 (most authoritarian) to 10 (most democratic). Scores are available from 1800 to the present. 57Using Freedom House scores would relieve this problem, but they are only ava ilable for the past thirty years a nd only consistently measure d in the same manner since 1984. 58World Bank website, "WDI, GDF & ADI Online Databases," http://we b.worldbank.org/ WBSIT E/E XTE RNAL/DATASTATI STI CS/0 ,, co nten tM DK:2039 898 6~me nuPK: 64133163~pagePK:64133150~piPK:64133175~theSitePK:239419,00.html (Date accessed: March 5, 2009).

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Table 2 Probit Regression of Diplomatic Recognition
(Dependent variable: 1 = recognition of Taiwan) Model 1 Coef. Polity Scores Area (sq. km) Cold War Distance from Beijing Exports (GDP) Constant /lnsig2u sigma_u Rho N ***p