Bioterrorism Countermeasures:
Utilizing Intelligence Agencies over Biological Research

ABSTRACT: The 21st century has seen a revolutionary biotechnology force, one that has led to developments in healthcare and other industries around the United States. Coupled with the growing development of biotechnology, however, is a force hoping to harness its power to create biological weapons. Presently, there are several nations pursuing biological weapons programs, making it easier for terrorist groups to gain access and attain advanced weaponry. Recently, terrorists have demonstrated their ability to execute acts of bio-terror without any moral repugnance or regret. Though these weapons have been taboo in past centuries, known for their sneakiness and deception, the use of biological weapons and the incidence of biological attack in the present century has –relatively speaking– dramatically increased. It is for this reason that congress and the federal government must intervene to prevent future bio-attack. The best method to stall further biological development within terrorist groups is by infiltration and detection via the Intelligence Community (IC). Unfortunately, we have diverted all our resources towards bio-terrorism research, without realizing that it is the further development and accessibility of biological weapons information that has promoted the spread of deadly knowledge within the terrorist community. Instead of trying to develop research plans for specific pathogenic agents, we must try and directly detect the progress of bio-weapon development in other nations through secretive intelligence networking. While some may question the ability of the IC to forestall future bio-attack due to past failures, congress must communicate to the public the fact that the IC is our best bet at direct and early detection to protect American national security.

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Despite man’s repugnance for biological warfare, acts ranging from contaminating an enemies water supply to sending smallpox-infested blankets as gifts have spanned the history books, leading to the slightly more sophisticated acts of bio-terror reported today. It was the 20th century that witnessed the climax of bio-warfare, as the Japanese army launched a program that rained pathogens on China, killing thousands of prisoners (Drexler 2001). With increased biological development came more preparative strategies for dealing with potential bio-attack; for example, the U.S. military staged several hundred open-air experiments over densely populated areas to learn how bacteria would drift and decay in the environment (Drexler 2001). Eventually, in the year 1969, President Richard Nixon ordered the unilateral dismantling of the American bio-weapons program in order to encourage other nations to do likewise. Three years later, this act led to the signing of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) by both the United States and the Soviet Union, under the agreement that signatory nations “[would] not develop, produce, stockpile, or otherwise acquire biological weapons” (Drexler 2001). These developments reflected a universal feeling of moral repugnance towards the use of biological weapons, which in fact echoed the earlier 1925 Geneva Protocol, describing bio-warfare as “justly condemned by the general opinion of the civilized world.” Despite past efforts to contain the manufacture and distribution of biological weapons, however, there are currently over 10 nations that are reportedly in possession of such weaponry, each equipped with its own biological weapons program (Garrett 2001). Unfortunately, there is also a direct relationship between the growing number of nations developing biological weapons and the increasing number of biological warfare threats made on the United States within the past two decades (Cole 1998). In the present 21st century, we have seen several examples of Chemical and Biological (CB) terrorism: the 1984 large-scale incident of releasing salmonella bacteria to Oregon restaurants by the Rajneesh cult, the 1995 sarin nerve gas attack in the Tokyo subway by the cult Aum Shinrikyo, and finally the infamous 2001 anthrax scare (Cole 1998). Each attack has convinced professional societies to begin incorporating discussions of bio-terrorism in national meetings since terrorist groups have demonstrated their capability for future bio-attacks. It is this unfortunate truth that has led to the need for more biological research and transnational intelligence networks, both with the aim of preparing and preventing future biological attack.

POLICY ENVIRONMENT: BIOLOGICAL RESEARCH DEVELOPMENT VERSUS INTELLIGENCE NETWORKING
In the year 2000, investors poured an estimated $33 billion into biotech companies (Hsu 2004). The growing demand for biological research materialized in President Bush’s 2004 proposed legislation, entitled Bioshield, which led to subsequent increases in funding to the National Institute of Health (NIH), Department of Defense (DOD), U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), and Department of Energy (DOE) -all sectors saw a >2-fold increase in funding (“Bush Administration Seeks $2.9 Billion for Counter-Terrorism R&D in FY 2003” 2002). The purpose of project Bioshield was to allocate $5.6 billion towards the stockpiling of drugs, vaccines, and devices that would combat biological threats, while redirecting funding from the NIH towards bio-terrorism research and development (Hsu 2004). According to Frank Rapoport, an attorney who worked closely with the drafting of Bioshield, this project allowed pharmaceutical companies to bid for contracts from the government and develop eight-year plans which would deal with the development of modern drugs or vaccines against various pathogenic agents –anthrax, smallpox, etc (Hsu 2004). Other companies piggybacked on the emphasis of drug development to counter bio-terrorism, and soon biotechnology research skyrocketed into its present-day status, outperforming both the broader markets and the high technology sector (Feldbaum 2002). Hand in hand with an increase in biotechnology research was the increase in intelligence spending, leading to further funding and improvement of the intelligence sector. While it is harder to analyze the classified spending and networking of the government’s intelligence agency, it is clear that the 9/11 terrorist attack resulted in a national effort to prevent a reoccurrence; intelligence agencies began to focus on former bio-attack threats as probable cause for future danger. In particular, the terrorist group al-Qaeda responsible for the 9/11 attack was thought to have tried to obtain and develop biological weapons, declaring that “possession of such weaponry was a religious duty” (Stein et al. 2004). In order to counter bio-terror threats from various terrorist groups, a transnational effort would be required to seek out and identify potential bio-attacks. Thus, the first step in protecting the nation would be delivered by the information provided by government intelligence. As a result of the importance placed on intelligence to counter bio-terror -relative to traditional military concerns- the threat of transnational bio-terrorism elevated into a high priority intelligence mission (Mardis 2002).

ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF BIO-TERRORISM RELATED RESEARCH
There are several advantages of biological research that have led people like Health and Human Services (HHS) Secretary Tommy G. Thompson to call it a “vital element of bio-terrorism defense” (Perdue 2002). First, there is the advantage that emerging and re-emerging infectious diseases currently being studied are as equally unpredictable as bio-terrorism released pathogens; both require means for identification as unknown biological threats. The fact that scientists are already classifying and studying infectious diseases that have similar trademarks as biological pathogens means that their current expertise can be utilized in helping counter bio-terrorism. Therefore, in the event of a bio-attack, infectious disease research might allow one to identify the unknown pathogenic agent, and allow for the preparation and control of accompanying symptoms. A second advantage voiced by bio-terrorism research advocates is that an influx of resources towards CB research not only “renew[s] energy” into infectious disease research, but simultaneously stimulates other areas of science via the increased funding; for example, studies of the body’s protective immune system might lead to additional advances in many non-infectious diseases such as autoimmune diseases and cancer (Perdue 2002). The third and most voiced advantage is that scientists studying various pathogenic agents including anthrax, smallpox and plague, can eventually develop research plans describing how to identify and treat such diseases if distributed in a large-scale scenario (Perdue 2002). Knowing the nature of the identified pathogen could greatly reduce widespread public panic, and it could help us keep the pathogenic agent under control. Overall, the advantages to bio-terrorism related research are that scientists can redirect their focus to specific pathogens in order to come up with detailed research plans that can be used in the event of future bio-attack. However, the study of specific biological agents and the redirection of focus to bio-terror related research is not always in America’s best interests. As aforementioned, infectious disease research is focused on a group of specific biological agents. Unfortunately, out of the selected pathogenic agents, there are dozens more candidate organisms that could be considered appropriate for use as weapons (Cole 1996). Before 1985, biological-weapons makers from all around the world had the same list of pathogens and toxins that could be delivered by missiles or large-scale aerosol systems to kill thousands of adversaries (Garrett 2001). Each nation knew the list, and which vaccines and antidotes to stockpile accordingly (Garrett 2001). Consequently, the 21st century –particularly the last decade- has seen tremendous growth in biological development that has led to the manufacture of more complex and varied biological pathogens. The number of people working with biotechnology is growing on a global scale, and it is therefore likely that expansion of the field will continue overseas (Mardis 2002). Through expansion, the availability of information and knowledge on developing biological agents will increase. The growing interest in biotechnology has also, unfortunately, led to an offensive biological weapons effort, one that is developing the ability to produce weapons that “complicate identification, resist treatment, and increase virulence” (Mardis 2002). Altogether, emphasis on biotechnological advancement has allowed terrorists to not only acquire biological weapons, but to also expand upon the list of possible biological agents. With the expansion of biotechnology knowledge and the ability to make a variety of pathogenic agents, there is also the presumption that research efforts to plan for specific bio-agents will be ineffective. To reiterate my point, while the infectious disease research is preparing research plans for specific pathogenic agents, it is not planning for a microbe that is both rare and unidentifiable. If the outbreak were recognized, it would be simple for an epidemiologist to identify the cause and begin to treat symptoms, quarantine, etc. However, if the microbes were rare, like those that cause Ebola or plague, researchers might be unable to diagnose the problem even with their mapped-out research plans. The researchers would then start from scratch to try and identify/contain the disease, which could take a long time and cost civilian lives in the meantime. The 1995 Ebola outbreak in Zaire is a good example of what happened when research scientists were faced with an unidentifiable disease: a research team worked around the clock trying to identify the presence of the lethal virus in 30,000 tissue, blood, plant, insect, and animal samples -time and lives were lost in the process (Garrett 2001). Some could argue that the research inefficiency was due to the understaffed lab, however, the special pathogens laboratory at our Center for Disease Control is facing the same issue –there are only 12 registered specialized scientists. This leads us to question whether or not pouring money into biological research is the best option, seeing that the threat of being confronted by a newly developed pathogenic agent is more than likely, making our research plans in effect useless.

THE PROBLEM WITH REDIRECTING FUNDS TO BIO-TERRORISM RESEARCH
As mentioned in both the previous and Policy Environment sections, there has been a great increase in funding and focus in several bio-terrorism related research sectors. Researchers explain that the government’s “renewed focus” on CB terrorism is enabling the research field to expand upon ongoing projects and develop new initiatives to prepare for bio-attack (Perdue 2002), but what researchers are ignoring is that the one-sided focus on national bio-defense research has actually done more harm than good. First, massive buildups of the state’s bio-defense programs have increased the likelihood of unintended transfers of expertise and/or material from high-security laboratories. Second, the expertise and funding that is being provided for national security purposes is taking away from research of natural diseases and their respective vaccines in the health sector (Wenger et al. 2007). Third, the emphasis placed on bio-terrorism research came hand in hand with the restricted use of more than 60 substances to our nation’s researchers. Thus, by emphasizing our focus towards bio-terror related research, research in other areas of science has become limited and more difficult to pursue.

RARITY OF BIOLOGICAL ADVANCMENTS MADE TO COUNTER BIO-TERRORISM
The government -along with advocates for bio-terrorism research- has a very convincing outline of its future goals and accomplishments in the bio-terror sector. Some of these goals include increasing basic research to aid scientists in aggregating information on the biology and disease-causing mechanisms of potential bio-terror pathogens; some of the information collected might go to the development of new drugs and vaccines to combat the bio-terrorism-caused diseases (“Research on Medical Tools to Combat Bioterrorism” 2008). There will also be increased research studying the basic components of the human immune system, so that scientists will be able to develop safe and potent vaccines that boost overall immunity to a range of diverse pathogens. New Ebola and anthrax vaccines will also be developed so that the government can stockpile them in preparation for an outbreak (“Research on Medical Tools to Combat Bioterrorism” 2008). Research will also be used to study a microbe’s biology and genetic makeup in order to develop compounds that specifically destroy the organism and its’ associated toxins; information on a pathogen’s sensitivity to available drugs will help doctors quickly treat anyone who has been infected. The truth is that biological research has made some accomplishments. One of the first drugs to help treat smallpox was submitted to the FDA for approval, and two other studies suggest promising leads to develop new anthrax drugs. The intricate physiology of the bacteria causing both anthrax and plague is also better understood because of extensive bio-terrorism research (“Research on Medical Tools to Combat Bioterrorism” 2008). The only counter-argument is that these advancements have been made far and few, and it is reasonable to question whether or not the huge increase in funding is proportional to these rare advancements. Compared to the rare cases of biological advancements made to counter bio-terrorism, the series of unsuccessful past investments in biological research are far more widespread. Congress has previously sought technological solutions, allocating money to the Department of Defense (DOD) to manufacture devices that could uncover bugs and sanitize contaminated areas. The money went into the development of the Navy’s TagMan, which was a sophisticated gene scanner that could determine whether a liquid sample contained known pathogenic agents. The system, however, had tremendous limitations that made it a poor investment. First, it wasn’t portable –it weighed a hefty 300 pounds. Also, it couldn’t detect pathogens that were of high biohazard levels –precisely the types of microbes a terrorist group would use in a large-scale bio-attack. The most significant limiting factor, however, was the fact that the device could not analyze air samples –it was limited to scanning solid material. In 1998, Congress gave the DOD’s Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) 2 billion dollars to fund what some accused as off-the-wall science projects that were so bizarre that civilian funding sources wouldn’t consider them. 61.6 million of the project funding went to bio-terror defense efforts; the government was looking for bio-terror detecting advices that were fast, cheap, safe, portable, and could detect pathogens in the air. Similar to the goals projected by current research groups, these researchers were focusing on genetic attributes of bacteria and viruses alike. The goal of one project was to grow human nerve cells on microscopic chips that would change color/light up if the neurotoxin botulinum were detected (Garrett 2001). Other laboratories tried to develop probes by lining chips with thousands of pieces of bacterial DNA; the goal of the Argonne National Laboratory in Chicago was to build a bacteria detector -as described- that was small and portable. However, the research director of the project Eli Huberman said that the device was “years away from mass production or for widespread use” (Garrett 2001). Also, the group at Argonne didn’t envision the device sampling the air for viruses; no one in DARPA could imagine how that could be done. As you can see, most devices derived from biological research were potentially great ideas for countering bio-terrorism, but collectively have been ineffective for use in the real world.

INTELLIGENCE IS THE BEST WAY TO COUNTER FUTURE BIO-ATTACK
Almost all bio-defense analysts agree that intelligence is the first line of defense against an impending bio-attack. Other leading studies reinforce this notion, and point to improved intelligence as the key foundation for any effective counter bio-terrorism strategy. While there are reports of drags on effectiveness within the Intelligence Community (IC), it is said that when efficacy is improved, the IC’s efforts will make tasks of conducting bio-terrorism less expensive and cumbersome. It is also said that it will play a leading role in preventing future bio-terrorist attacks, though there is no doubt that there will be failures in order to have successful strikes. The IC understands that no matter how well-equipped it is, it will never be able to clear all risk from the American people. However, real measures of success will be the limitation of threats, and the ability to provide the people with an “information advantage” in treatment and containment missions should an attack succeed. In Robert Jay Lifton’s book Indeffensible Weapons, he states that: “there appears to be an extraordinary impact made upon people simply by new information… new information makes contact with amorphous fears…the menace one has known, but kept hidden comes in the open. And there is a beginning sense that one might, just possibly, be able to do something about it.” (Mardis 2002)
Unlike biological research that has developed few devices to counter bio-terrorism in the real world, the IC has had a long history of success in countering terrorist-related acts. With an emphasis on intelligence as the main countermeasure in fighting bio-terrorism, the IC will be able to uncover the threat with new information, and allow the resources of the United States government to do something about it.

MORE PROS OF INTELLIGENCE TO COUNTER BIO-TERRORISM
One of the prime ways to counter the threat of bio-terrorism will be to incorporate efforts that prevent the proliferation of biological weapons. The IC would prevent the spread of bio-terror weaponry by first detecting covert weapons programs (Mardis 2002). By infiltrating these biological weapons programs, the IC would report back to our nation new pathogenic agents in development and would determine the likelihood of their use in an attack. Unlike using technical intelligence (like remote sensing or environment sampling), human intelligence would also be able to distinguish the proper use of biotechnology from use with bad intent (Mardis 2002). Once the IC reports the misuse of biotechnology, the government could then intervene and stall further research developments led by likely terrorist groups (Mardis 2002). In this way, the IC could help reduce the spread of biological knowledge that may aid terrorists, though it would also face the challenge to avoid hindering the legitimate exchange of scientific information between countries (Mardis 2002). In essence, detection by IC infiltration could be a more direct and quicker method of identifying pathogenic agents than trying to identify rare, microbial agents through biological research.

IS THE IC CAPABLE OF HANDLING FUTURE BIO-ATTACK THREATS?
There is no doubt that the shadow of failures and embarrassments trailing behind the IC have led some to question its capability of preventing future bio-attack. Regrettably, these failures have been well publicized and are fresh in the minds of the American public (Mardis 2002). Some examples of these unfortunate failures include the Ames, Hansen, and Montes spy scandals, the surprise Indian nuclear test in 1998, and the failure to prevent terrorist attacks on US forces in Saudi Arabia, the US embassies in Africa, and the USS Cole in Yemen. The most embarrassing and horrifying recent attack on America, however, would have to be the attacks of 9/11 (Maridis 2002). For these attacks, the intelligence agency has been severely doubted and misrepresented in the American press and media. Despite these failures, it is well known that the IC was a key weapon in America’s victory against the Soviet Union during the Cold War. It was the IC that kept constant surveillance of Russian military forces, and continuously reported their capabilities (Mardis 2002). Once America had its hands on its enemies’ weaknesses, it was able to exploit Russia’s forces by building superior tanks, aircrafts, and ships; this was all due in part to the IC. Also, US precision combat strikes in Iraq, Kosovo, and Afghanistan would not be possible without the help of intelligence. Diverging from Russia, the IC also had an affect on preventing terrorist plots around the world. It prevented terrorist forces from attacking New York City tunnels in 1993, US jumpo airliners operating in Asia in 1995, millennium celebrations on the West Coast, and US forces in the Middle East in the summer of 2001 (Maridis 2002). Though these events aren’t technically bio-related attacks, using the intelligence agency to deal with traditional forms of terrorism would almost overlap its role of preventing CB terrorism situations. The foundation of the intelligence agency has never truly been questioned. The reason for this is that accompanying the exposed failures of the IC are the under-exposed (and mostly untold) success stories (Maridis 2002). Richard Betts in his Foreign Affairs article “Fixing Intelligence” illustrates the failures of the IC with an analogy to a major league baseball’s best hitter. The unfortunate truth is that the IC will always have its big failures. The terrorist groups that the IC must uncover and track are living, conniving strategists that are always on the move. Often the IC catch them before they can strike, but it is inevitable that once in a while they will manage to get through. In this matter, counter-terrorism is a competitive ball game in which even a great hitter can be taken out by a minor-league pitcher. However, in the real world of bio-terrorism, a strikeout is ultimately death, and a batting average less than 1 doesn’t play out well in the eyes of the American public. The lesson here is that despite the failures associated with intelligence, it is the untold success stories that demonstrate the IC’s capability at forestalling future attack.

RECOMMENDATIONS
The problem with picking one policy over another, biological research or human intelligence, is that both are necessary in bio-terrorism prevention. There is no doubt that the successes of biological research have aided the country in preparing for the introduction of a biological weapon. However, the impacts of biological research have also led to failures in our nation; redirecting funds to bio-terrorism research alone has hurt other areas of science and arguably supported far-reaching science projects that have had limited impact on our national security. Biological research has also come up short with respect to considering the possibility of the introduction of rare, microbial agents to the United States. Intelligence, on the other hand, has had a long history of supporting national defense. Though it has its share of failures, its success stories have given the government continuous reason to supports its efforts. The fact of the matter is that through early detection of biological weapons via Intelligence, one can identify a pathogenic agent without the waiting period that accompanies biological research. Since we are looking at a fast and effective way of countering bio-terrorism, we would be foolish to ignore the IC and its capability at forestalling future bio-attack. Some might say that infiltration via intelligence efforts is a sneaky way at defending our nation, but others might argue that it is this devious method that is most capable at handling an equally sneaky and deceptive bio-terrorist force. While maintaining some aspects of biological research and pouring funding into intelligence resources, we will finally have our best bet at stalling future bio-terrorist activities and preparing for the growing threats of bio-terrorism.

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