THE UNIVERSITY OF DODOMA
SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES

DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION

MBA-EXECUTIVE PROGRAMME
2009/2010

RESEARCH PROPOSAL
By
KIBIKI YUSTIN, L.M

TITLE: MANAGEMENT OF CAPITATION GRANTS IN PRIMARY SCHOOLS OF TANZANIA: A CASE OF KIGOMA DISTRICT COUNCIL

PROPOSED SUPERVISOR: DR MBOGORO DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS –UDOM 1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 Background to the Study Problem
Sound Economic Governance is essential for the achievement of the desired reduction in poverty levels and improvements in economic growth in Tanzania. Good Public Financial Management (PFM) is important for efficient, effective and equitable utilization of scarce national resources (REF). Whilst the extent to which policy makers are held accountable to their constituents is an excellent indicator of good governance. Accountability and transparency go hand in hand in developing open and participatory decision-making processes.
In 2005, the government of Tanzania reviewed the financial management practices and processes at the central government level. In 2006, the focus has shifted to local government, which now accounts for an increasing proportion of expenditures and is primarily responsible for service delivery in sectors such as primary education and primary health (URT, 2004). This kind of study is therefore wanting to provide a snapshot of how the resource allocation, resource management and control, resource utilization and accountability processes take place in primary schools of Tanzania and to make recommendations for improving the local Public Expenditure management (PEM) framework, institutional performance and capacity building(URT,2010)
In February 2004, Cabinet decided to move towards a formula-based system of sectoral block grants, where the level of grants that each local government authority receives for the various sectors are based on a number of transparent and objective client-focused financial norms. In accordance with the Cabinet decision, formula-based grants were introduced for primary education and local health services as part of the 2004/05 budget year (URT, 2004) . Similar formula based grant schemes for water, agriculture and roads were introduced in the FY 2005/6 budget year.
The Local Government compensation grant was introduced in 2003 to compensate for the abolition of development levy and other nuisance taxes. This grant has been renamed the General Purpose Grant (GPG), and in 2005/06 it was allocated according to a formula that reflects the size of the population (70%), land area (10%) and poverty count (20%).( URT,2004). Proposals have been developed to combine the current GPG with the Local Administration Grant into a single, unconditional, equalizing, formula-based General-Purpose Grant scheme in 2006/7. The introduction of a formula based block grant is expected to take several years to implement in its entirety due to the fact that no council is supposed to be worse off because of its introduction and the varying levels of service provision already in place.

Other grants and transfers, partly or completely funded by Development Partners include the Health Basket Fund (HBF), the Primary Education Development Plan (PEDP) which is further subdivided into a Capitation grant and a development grant, the Local Government Capital Development Grant (LGCDG). There are also a multitude of other donor funded projects including the Participatory Agricultural Development and Empowerment Project (PADEP) and the Rural Water Supply and Sanitation Project (RWSSP). Further discussion of the various forms of funding is provided in section.
The abolition of school fees especially at the basic education level has been adopted by many countries as one of the key policy interventions for influencing education outcomes. In 2004, Ghana adopted a school fees abolition policy, the Capitation Grant (CG), to spur the attainment of universal access to the basic education goal under the Ghana Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy (GPRS II) and meet its Millennium Development Goal (MDG) targets (2 and 3). (REF). Since the introduction of the CG in Ghana, many studies have been conducted by government, development partners, civil society and other stakeholders in education. These studies have however focused largely on the effects, impact and outcomes of the policy on school enrolment, completion rates and quality outcomes. Not much research has been done to track the disbursement, management and use of the CG, this situation is the same for the case of Tanzania.( REF). The CG would only be successful in ensuring universal basic education if resources allocated to the grant reach beneficiary schools and at the same time used for its intended purpose.

Education has been regarded in all societies and throughout human history both as an end in itself and as a means for the individual and society to grow. It is not only “the key to sustainable development,” but also “a fundamental human right (Bruns et al, 2003; World Bank, 2003). As a result, various efforts have been made towards achieving Education for All (EFA). However, progress has not been impressive, particularly in Africa where most of the world’s out-of school children live.

Insufficient [public] funding has been identified as one of the most prevalent obstacles for this situation and there is rich and growing literature on the cost and financing of education. Consequently, the abolition of school fees especially at the basic education level has been adopted by many countries as one of the key policy interventions for influencing education outcomes (USAID, 2007).

Determined to get more children into school therefore, the Government of Ghana re-launched the policy of free Compulsory Universal Basic Education (FCUBE) in 1995 supported by the World Bank Primary School Development Project (PSDP). Parents were expected to bear limited educational expenses. More importantly, no child was to be turned away from school for non-payment of fees. But the initiative did not work well as expected. A persistent 40% of children between 6 and 11 years of age in Ghana remained out of school as of 2003 (UNICEF, 2007).

In addressing the challenges to universal basic education, the Governments rolled out two pilot primary education improvement policy initiatives - the Capitation Grant Scheme (CG) and the School Feeding Program (SFP) in the 2004/05 academic year. These initiatives aimed at helping poor parents meet the cost of primary education and improve the nutrition of children, especially poor children (African Education Watch, 2008).

The implementation of the CG or School Fees Abolition Initiative (SFAI) in Ghana, like in other Sub-Saharan African countries is however not without challenges. Corruption, leakages, poor record keeping, misappropriation of resources among others have been identified as major bottle-necks (World Bank 2009; GII/AEW, 2008; MoESS, 2008; GES 2008; GNECC, 2007).

When the government of Tanzania re-introduced free primary education in 2002 with the Primary Education Development Program (PEDP), it came with a particularly important innovation: the capitation grant. Primary aims of the grant were to replace revenue lost to schools because of the abolition of fees and to improve the quality of education by making real resources available at the school level. (UWAZI, 2010)

In particular, the capitation grant was meant to finance the purchase of textbooks and other teaching and learning materials, as well as to fund repairs, administration materials, and examination expenses. The capitation grant is a dominant feature of the PEDP program, and many resources have been allocated to it: more than 80 billion shillings in 2009/2010 alone. This note considers the practice of the capitation grant in detail. It finds that:
• The original capitation grant policy of allocating $ 10 per pupil has never been followed.
• Even if followed, the capitation grants are too small to cover the cost of learning Materials.
• Actual capitation grant disbursements are less than what is allocated in the budget.
• Capitation grant disbursements are so unpredictable that proper planning is not possible.
As a consequence, we argue that the capitation grant needs revision: In terms of policy, more money should be allocated; in terms of practice, the budget allocation should be disbursed in full and in a timely manner; and in terms of transparency, everyone – including teachers, parents and students – should be aware about how much money will be sent when and for what purpose.
By replacing revenue lost by schools due to the abolition of school fees and contributions, the introduction of the capitation grant allowed children from all wealth backgrounds to go to school. This reduced social exclusion as children from poor households could now afford to attend school. Net enrolment rates rose sharply from less than 60 percent of eligible school age children in the year 2000 to more than 95 percent since 2006. (MOEVT, 2010). PEDP recorded other successes as well: 36,641 classrooms were constructed between 2002 and 2006; and between 2001 and 2009, teaching staff increased by 45,555. Even though the number of students increased dramatically, the availability of text books improved too. In 2007, the textbook to pupil ratio was reportedly 1:3 compared to 1:20 in 2000 (Sitta, 2007). However, the basis on which this claim is made is unclear, since no reliable studies are offered as evidence.

The PEDP I (2002-2006) policy that accommodated much of this success stated that the capitation grant to each school should be equivalent, in Tanzanian shillings, to 10 US dollars per enrolled pupil. Under the PEDP II (2007-2011), the government revised the US dollar measure1 downwards to make the grant Tshs 10,000, which was equivalent to less than 7 US Dollars mid-2010. Such grant was meant to increase capacity in the administration of the grant, explaining how much of each shilling disbursed to the school should be used for facility repair, purchase of learning materials, stationery, and also to support administrative expenses (such as that of exams).

Despite these successes, it is not clear how the capitation grant has contributed to improving quality of education. One disappointment is that a good number of pupils remain unable to perform in the Primary School Leaving Exams (PSLE). In 2009, only fifty percent of the pupils who sat for the PSLE qualified to proceed into secondary school (UWAZI, 2010). Moreover, statistics for the regions show a considerable variation in performance. Some regions are good performers (relatively speaking) with more than 70 percent of pupils passing, while others, such as Shinyanga with just over 30 percent passing, do dismally( Ibid).

The large number of children completing primary school without sufficient qualifications to proceed into higher levels of education raises questions as to whether the PEDP hasn’t created new forms of inequity and social exclusion. It also raises questions about the role of the capitation grant in improving education quality.

However, as the capitation grant policy was never executed the way it was envisaged, the failure of the school system to improve quality should not be considered as a failure of the capitation grant. Without proper implementation, the grant could not be expected to work.

This study therefore tracks possible leakages and inefficiencies in the disbursement and usage of the CG in thirty (100) public basic schools in Tanzania In particular, the study provides empirical evidence on the leakage (if any) of financial resources allocated to the CG by tracking disbursed resources from the PEDP through to the District Education Units and finally, at the service delivery points (schools). More importantly, the study examined the usage of the grant at the beneficiary schools and assessed the robustness of the transparency and Accountability measures for the appropriate and efficient usage of the funds.

1.2 Statement of the Problem
The role of education as a tool for economic growth has been recognized worldwide. Many governments have been coming up with a number of strategies on how to improve the provision of quality education with more emphasis on primary education. For instance in Ghana , the Capitation grant was initiated in primary schools to finance the purchase of textbooks and other teaching and learning materials, as well as to fund repairs, administration materials, and examination expenses.( Ampratwum and Armah-attoh, 2010 ). In addition, apart form such kind of initiatives, but the capitation grant that has been introduced in many parts of the world including Tanzania has been associated with a number of achievements including higher enrolment rates and helped reduce an acute shortage of teaching and learning materials in schools ( UWAZI,2010; URT, 2004).

However, the capitation grants in many parts of the world including Tanzania are associated with the following challenges such that the capitation grant policy does not reflect conditions on the ground, in that the stated amount in the policy falls far short of what is needed to even provide a very basic set of learning materials. In addition, it is found that the way the grant is implemented leaves much to be desired: budget allocations are lower than stipulated by policy, budget allocations for districts do not follow the official criteria, the full budgeted amount is not released, and the full amounts released do not get to schools, Disbursements come in small installments and oversight is weak throughout the system and Capitation grant disbursements are so unpredictable that proper planning is not possible ( UWAZI,2010).

Therefore, a lot of studies have been reporting on the way the capitation grants in primary schools have been implemented, and specifically on the leakages as well as the benefits associated with, but there is little literature to support the idea on how the community members are really involved in the planning process of capitation grants. This is the area of departure that this study wants to add knowledge in terms of improvement the management of capitation grants at school level.

and implemented. Education sector policy makers need to examine enrolment periods of basic schools to establish cutoff points to aid early submission of school and district enrolment records to the GES and the Ministry of Finance for release of the CG funds.
Therefore, this study will add knowledge on how the public resources should be managed at public schools, the policy required to overcome such kind of limitations which are not limited to the amount that currently the
1.3 Objectives of the Study 1.3.1 General Objective
To investigate the mechanisms used to manage capitation grants in primary schools for improving public resources management. 1.3.2. Specific Objectives a. To examine the contribution of capitation funds to primary school performance

b. To assess the extent of community participation in Capitation grant management

c. To determine the challenges facing the management of capitation grants

d. To analyze approaches used by the schools to manage capitation grant

e. To propose measures to improve the management of capitation grant

1.4 Research Questions
The study intends to answer the following questions a. What is the contribution of capitation funds to primary school performance?

b. What is the extent of community participation in Capitation grant management?

c. What are the challenges facing the management of capitation grants?

d. What are the approaches used by the schools to manage capitation grant?

e. What should the measures to improve the management of capitation grant?

1.5 Research Hypothesis

In order to study whether there is a relationship between the amounts of CG provided with respect to school performance, the Pearson Chi Square model will be used at 5% level of significance. This will give the value that will be compared with the tabulated value based on the p value from the analysis. The decision rule will therefore base on the statistical inferences.

Ha: There is no significant relationship between the amount of Capitation grant school and the school performance.

Variables

Performance (good, bad) and amount of capitation grant

Ha: There is a significant relationship between the amount of Capitation grants and the school performance.

Variables

Performance (good, bad) and amount of capitation grant

1.5 Significance of the Study
The role of Education Policies as well as the programmes such as Primary Education Development Programme is well known. This study among others wants to contribute to the improvement of the existing policies and programmes on how to ensure efficient mobilisation of resources, allocation of resources as well as utilisation of resources while taking the community participation at a pivotal point so as to improve the quality of education.
Therefore, this study will provide Policy measures that will gradually align education policy outcomes from enrolment explosion as a result of CG and other supportive programs to quality outcomes must be formulated government issues per child being small and is in terms of nominal value, oversight and transparency, regarding capitation grant allocations, disbursements, and spending being overlooked.

2. LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1 Theoretical Review.

2.1.1 A Principal-Agent Theory Approach to Public Expenditure Management Systems

(a) Overview
A well-functioning public expenditure management (PEM) system is considered a critical pillar of government efficiency by most practitioners, who place it at par with a low-distortion tax system and an efficient tax administration. Thus this theory among others will be used to study the Public Expenditure Management (PEM) systems in developing countries using an analytical framework based on principal-agent theory (Leruth and Paul, 2007).
On the empirical side, papers have generally focused on the efficiency of public expenditure in key sectors (health and education) and only a few attempts have been made to quantify the welfare losses associated with a weak PEM system taking into account the role of community.. They all point to rather high economic costs. The importance of a good PEM system has also come to the forefront of the debate in the context of the debt initiative for Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPCs), which provides substantial debt relief from the international community while requiring eligible countries to pursue good economic policies and to make their budget more “pro-poor,” using the HIPC relief received for spending on priority areas of a country’s poverty reduction strategy (PRS). The difficulty in tracking public expenditure in order to monitor the implementation of the initiative has clearly appeared during the systematic assessment of the capacity of some 26 HIPCs by the IMF and World Bank
The study by Leruth and Paul, (2007) took the example of the relationship between a Ministry of Finance (MoF), acting as the principal, who delegates the production of public output to a representative line ministry (LM), acting as the agent. We show that the model could also apply to other relationships within a PEM framework. We interpret the pair “expenditure program – budget appropriation” as the two components of a contract between the MoF and the LM. We also interpret corruption and misspending as resulting from the existence of an informational rent captured by the LM at the expense of the principal. (Ibid)
This simple model can be applied to various PEM systems, and allows for comparisons between institutional settings. To illustrate this, we analyze the benefits derived from the use by the MoF of two control instruments, ex post audits and ex ante controls, and assess their value in terms of their ability to deter cheating. We derive a set of possible “control regimes” which can be used by the MoF. The choice of regime is determined by the agency costs incurred by the MoF, and this depends on a number of country-specific parameters. We also discuss cases where constraints limit the ability of the MoF to implement the optimal contracts as derived from the theoretical framework. In particular, if the ability to impose penalties on the LM is limited (say for social reasons), as is often the case in poorer countries, the MoF will not be able to deter cheating through ex post audits. However, although we moslty illustrate the use of the model using developing countries, we also argue that it is relevant to developed economies.
(b) Interpretation Of PEM Under The Principal-Agent Theory
The Contract
We base our analysis on standard principal-agent models involving supervision (Kofman and Lawarrée, 1993, 1996; Khalil and Lawarrée, 2003). We essentially focus on the control of LMs or assimilated bodies by the MoF, which is supposed to represent the public interest. LMs can be seen as agents of the MoF (the principal) because they are required to produce a certain level of public output—including the quality of this output—in exchange for their budget appropriation. The pair “expenditure program – budget appropriation” can be interpreted as the two components of the contract between the MoF and the LMs.10 The objective of the MoF is to induce the LMs into implementing their expenditure programs, while the LMs pursue their own objectives. That relationship entails both hidden actions (e.g., the productive “effort” of the civil servants, possible perquisite consumption, or corruption) and hidden information (e.g., the exogenous productivity of that particular sector of the economy), with the agents having the informational advantage over the principal. Hidden information could also refer to poor program design, which would lead to inefficiency and would be difficult to dissociate from the inefficiency originating from a weak PEM system.11 As already indicated, a number of government operations can be assimilated to principal agent relationships. For example, one could consider that the minister (who is the head of the ministry, but also a political appointee) heading the LM is a principal whose objective is to make sure that his agents (the civil servants) implement what he has promised to do. One could also consider that the parliament is the principal, whose objective is to make sure that the government (the executive) implements the government’s program. Yet another example would be to model the central government as the principal, while the sub national governments are the agents. A paper by Ahmad, Tandberg and Zhang (2002) looks at this issue, using a principal-agent framework to analyze incentive structures that best compel local governments to truthfully reveal their ability to implement national programs. The paper focuses on the optimal contract between both levels of governments. It also insists on the need to have a multiperiod game in order to make punishments credible. An important element of any principal-agent model is to specify an observable that will be the main element of the contract. When the agent is the LM, measuring performance should ideally be based on a mix of indicators including output, outcome, and impact. Such information is usually difficult to obtain, and although simply measuring inputs is clearly not possible.

(c)Agency Problems
The agency problem arises from the diverging interests of the MoF and the LM, and the latter’s informational advantage, both on its own actions and on the current state of nature. As standard in the principal-agent literature, the agent’s effort is a necessary component of the production function—but entails some disutility. The agent may take unfair advantage of its superior information: if external conditions are favorable, the LM could exert little effort and produce a low output, while claiming that this low output is due to unfavorable external conditions. The MoF is not in a position to disentangle the two factors unless it uses some form of audit or supervision. There is thus a risk that the LM captures some rent at the expense of the MoF.15 In the principal-agent literature, this cheating rent generally stems from lowering the level of effort vis-à-vis the compensation received. Rents, and possible reductions in public output, compared to what is economically efficient, constitute the agency costs.
In this paper, we broaden the interpretation of corruption (generally referred to as the abuse of public office for private benefits) to include misgovernance stemming from the abuse of some information asymmetry. We consider the LM’s effort in terms of a combination of factors that can be good and bad, including, on the one (good) hand, an efficient and equitable allocation of resources, fiscal transparency measures, and quality of services provided; and, on the other (bad) hand, corruption, consumption of perquisites, mismanagement, and nepotism in the choice of staff or suppliers. This allows us to interpret the cheating rent, not only in terms of reduced disutility from “productive” effort, but also as corruption or misgovernance. For example, if the state of nature is high (say, favorable weather conditions), the LM could allocate some resources to unproductive areas or divert monies, if it thinks that the MOF could be led to believe that the state of nature was low. In such cases, rent capture takes place and is possible because of the information asymmetry between the principal and its agent.

This interpretation enables us to link our approach with the empirical literature on corruption.
Indeed, the latter identifies various factors contributing to corruption, including the overall level of potential benefits from corrupt behavior, the cost of bribery (including penalties and sanctions), and the bargaining power and extent of discretionary powers of the various actors (Chand and Moene, 1999). Moreover, while cheating (exerting a lower effort) is probably costless for the agent, we argue in this paper that cheating, in the sense of being corrupt, may entail some costs to be concealed. This enables us to make the link with the literature on collusion in organizations (e.g., Tirole, 1986), and in Section V, we interpret ex ante controls by the MoF as increasing the cost of cheating for the agent.

As already stated, the MoF has a number of instruments and strategies at its disposal to limit agency problems. First, it can use incentive schemes, designed solely on observable information, and promise to grant the LM a transfer equivalent to the sum of a suitable compensation for the LM’s effort and an informational rent (which depends on incentive compatibility constraints) in case of high productivity.16 If such a contract exists, it prevents the LM from exerting little effort—but at the expense (for the MoF) of a loss equivalent to the Hereafter we use the term “informational rent” when referring to the supplementary premium that the LM is deliberately granted as an incentive to exert high effort. We use the term “cheating rent” to refer to the amount illegally diverted, notably through corruption.
(d) Timing
The MoF and the LMs act in a continued relationship framework, because a new budget is prepared every year. However, we consider that the external productivity occurrences are independent, so that the MoF cannot infer the state of nature—and thus the LM’s effort—from what happened in previous years. This allows us to simplify the problem and limit ourselves to the study of the optimal static contract. Nevertheless, the actual repetition of the game allows the MoF to make credible commitments.
We assume that the timing of the PEM process is as follows:
(1) After negotiations (not modeled here—but note that the contract guarantees the LM its reservation utility), the LM accepts the contract proposed by the MoF; the contract is a menu of {output and implicit effort/budgetary allocation} pairs, dependent on the external productivity occurrence.
(2) Nature chooses the level of the external productivity parameter, and only the LM observes it.
(3) The LM chooses its level of effort and starts producing the output; in the meantime, the MoF can exert ex ante controls.
(4) The transfer is paid through warrants (if the LM plans to reach a high level of output, it can justify it and call for additional credits).
(5) The MoF collects the output, which is publicly observable at the end of the budgetary year.
Incentive schemes may be used in public companies (see, for instance, the regulation theory following Laffont and Tirole, (1993) and also, to some extent, in customs administrations (on the theoretical side, see, for instance, Besley and McLaren,( 1993). A model close to ours, which combines adverse selection and moral hazard, predicts that monitoring the Agent’s action is strictly preferable to auditing private information (Kessler, 2000). As we shall see, the effort level required from the LM should be optimal with respect to the contracted output. It is thus implicitly defined. This problem is a case of “false moral hazard” where the observation of the variable does not allow to perfectly disentangling the agent’s “type” and effort level (Laffont and Martimort, 2002). The MoF can order an audit if it suspects that cheating took place (or simply because it has committed to make these audits for long-term credibility purposes). The LM (or its program manager) is imposed a penalty if caught cheating.

2.2 Empirical Review
2.2.1 Contribution of Capitation Grant
When the government re-introduced free primary education in 2002 with the Primary Education Development Program (PEDP), it came with a particularly important innovation: the capitation grant. Primary aims of the grant were to replace revenue lost to schools because of the abolition of fees and to improve the quality of education by making real resources available at the school level. In particular, the capitation grant was meant to finance the purchase of textbooks and other teaching and learning materials, as well as to fund repairs, administration materials, and examination expenses. The capitation grant is a dominant feature of the PEDP program, and many resources have been allocated to it: more than 80 billion shillings in 2009/2010 alone. This note considers the practice of the capitation grant in detail. It finds that: the original capitation grant policy of allocating $ 10 per pupil has never been Followed; Even if followed, the capitation grants are too small to cover the cost of learning ;Materials. Actual capitation grant disbursements are less than what is allocated in the budget; Capitation grant disbursements are so unpredictable that proper planning is not possible. (UWAZI, 2007).

By replacing revenue lost by schools due to the abolition of school fees and contributions, the introduction of the capitation grant allowed children from all wealth backgrounds to go to school. This reduced social exclusion as children from poor households could now afford to attend school. Net enrolment rates rose sharply from less than 60 percent of eligible school age children in the year 2000 to more than 95 percent since 2006 (Figure 1). PEDP recorded other successes as well: 36,641 classrooms were constructed between 2002 and 2006; and between 2001 and 2009, teaching staff increased by 45,555. Even though the number of students increased dramatically, the availability of text books improved too. In 2007, the textbook to pupil ratio was reportedly 1:3 compared to 1:20 in 2000 (Sitta, 2007). However, the basis on which this claim is made is unclear, since no reliable studies are offered as evidence.

The PEDP I (2002-2006) policy that accommodated much of this success stated that the capitation grant to each school should be equivalent, in Tanzanian shillings, to 10 US dollars per enrolled pupil. Under the PEDP II (2007-2011), the government revised the US dollar measure1 downwards to make the grant Tshs 10,000, which was equivalent to less than 7 US Dollars in mid-2010. Figure 2 shows the schedule of administration of the grant, explaining how much of each shilling disbursed to the school should be used for facility repair, purchase of learning materials, stationery, and also to support administrative expenses (such as that of exams). (URT 2005, 2007, 2009).

Despite these successes, it is not clear how the capitation grant has contributed to improving quality of education. One disappointment is that a good number of pupils remain unable to perform in the Primary School Leaving Exams (PSLE). In 2009, only fifty percent of the pupils who sat for the PSLE qualified to proceed into secondary school. Moreover, statistics for the regions show a considerable variation in performance. Some regions are good performers (relatively speaking) with more than 70 percent of pupils passing, while others, such as Shinyanga with just over 30 percent passing, do dismally.( URT, 2004).
The large number of children completing primary school without sufficient qualifications to proceed into higher levels of education raises questions as to whether the PEDP hasn’t created new forms of inequity and social exclusion. It also raises questions about the role of the capitation grant in improving education quality. However, as the capitation grant policy was never executed the way it was envisaged, the failure of the school system to improve quality should not be considered a failure of the capitation grant. Without proper implementation, the grant could not be expected to work (URT, 2010).

2.2.2 The Challenges Facing CGs
Data about capitation grant disbursements per district council and at school level are surprisingly inaccessible. Since capitation grants are public money intended to improve the quality of learning, it is in the interest of citizens that such information be more readily available. The Government would equally benefit from access to such data as monitoring is essential for appropriate planning. There is, therefore, an urgent need for a systematic approach to monitoring and reporting the amounts in capitation grants disbursed from central government to councils and from the councils to schools. ( UWAZI,2010).

While this information is not yet available, this brief relies on information from Public Expenditure Tracking Surveys of the sector, the budget books, and interviews we conducted with teachers. The following observations stand out as challenges facing CGs
(a)The value of CGs declines annually It is argued that since 2002 the value of the capitation grant declined by over 35% (UWAZI, 2010). During the first phase of free universal education under PEDP I (2002-2006), the capitation grant policy stated it to be 10 US dollars per pupil per year. This policy was revised to 10,000 TZ shillings in PEDP II (2007-2011).

Between 2001 and 2009 the cost of living in Tanzania increased substantially. Tshs 593 in 2002 bought the same amount of goods as Tshs 1,000 in 2009 (NBS 2009). Initially (between 2002 and 2006), the capitation grant was protected against this erosion of the value of the shilling as it was expressed in US dollars. But when the policy was revised under PEDP II, the real value of the capitation grant dropped sharply. In 2002, the $ 10 grant was worth the equivalent of Tshs 9,666. In 2009, the Tshs 10,000 grant was worth only Tshs 6,078 (expressed in 2002 shillings), a 37 percent decline in value (URT, 2010).

By keeping the capitation grant policy nominally unchanged, the government has allowed the value of the grant to dwindle in a manner that raises questions about the Government’s commitment to allocate resources to the community level. Such a trend is disappointing considering that the education sector budget has grown considerably in recent years. But even without adjusting for inflation, the actual amount of money reaching schools for capitation grants is clearly much less today compared to what it was between 2002 and 2003. According to the Education Public Expenditure Tracking Survey of 2004, in the period 2002-2003 schools received on average 5,400 shillings per capita. In 2007/08 however, the money actually reaching the schools had declined to 4,189 shillings per pupil (URT, 2010). This may be of particular interest to both teachers and citizens, who have an interest in ensuring that adequate resources for achieving quality at the school level are made available.

(b) The capitation grant is insufficient to buy a minimum set of books
There are key question in relation to CGs, such that the total amount has declined, but how much is it now worth? Is the amount adequate to meet basic needs? Picture what can be bought with it. It is shown that 40% of the capitation grant or Tshs 4,000 is meant for text books and teacher guides covering the full range of subjects, including English, Mathematics, Kiswahili, Geography, Civics, Vocational Skills, etc. Going by the price list of approved textbooks for instruction in primary schools established by one company (Ben and Company Limited) for 2008- 2009, this money allows a school to buy, at most, one text book per pupil, as prices range between 3,500 shillings and 5,000 shillings. There are also books that are more expensive.

If children study six subjects, six books are required at a minimum, costing Tshs 38,900. Assuming that text books last for three years (this is an optimistic estimate for books that are used intensively), an allocation of Tshs 13,000 per annum would be needed for text books alone. So even if the Tshs 10,000 per pupil capitation grant were disbursed in full, which isn’t the case, Tshs 4,000 would still be grossly insufficient to purchase a minimum set of text books (UWAZI, 2010).

3.3 The amount allocated in the budget is less than that approved by PEDP policy.
The amount allocated in the budget for capitation grants has systematically been lower than the amount stated in the PEDP policy adopted by Cabinet. In 2007/08, for example, the shortfall in the capitation grant allocation was Tshs 4,481 as Government allocated 5,519 shillings per pupil compared to the amount of 10,000 shillings per pupil stated in the policy. (UWAZI,2010).

(d) Some improvement is taking place.
The allocations for capitation (in the budget, not necessarily what schools received) improved considerably in 2009/10. In 2008/09 the allocation was roughly Tshs 6,851 per pupil, or a shortfall of Tshs 3,149 relative to the policy. In 2009/10 the amount allocated was about Tshs 9,627, implying a shortfall of 373 shillings relative to what the policy states.

While this figure marks a significant improvement over the past, at district level there remain cases where allocations deviate significantly from the mean. It also shows capitation grant allocation in 2009/10 for all district councils. It demonstrates how the allocation for most district councils is about Tshs 10,000 per pupil. However, there are councils that have been allocated amounts that are either significantly higher or lower than the average allocation in budget. Iringa councils appear in the lowest rung, among the bottom ten recipients, while Mafia (in Pwani) and Sikonge (in Tabora) are on the high end (UWAZI, 2010).

(e) Variations in allocation do not reflect regional inequities.
With regard to the allocation of capitation grant per pupil, we examined the data to see whether well off regions consistently received higher allocations than poor regions. Regional economic profiles differ significantly in the country. Information from the National Bureau of Statistics on regional economic profiles ranks Dar es Salaam at the top and Singida at the bottom, when the per capita income of the regions in 2008 is considered.

By showing the information on allocations per region in 2008/09 and 2009/10, we can see that a systematic pattern is lacking. Sometimes economically disadvantaged regions receive lower amounts of capitation grant per capita than relatively economically well-off regions. But there are also instances where low income regions have more resources allocated to them than economically well to do regions. According to NBS statistics on per capita income in 2008, Singida and Dodoma are low income regions. In 2008/09, the two regions were also among the lowest five recipients of capitation grant per pupil, which included Dar es Salaam and Kilimanjaro (typical high income regions) and Morogoro (a middle per capita income region). One cannot, therefore, confidently argue that economically strong regions are favored in terms of the allocation of the capitation grant. ( UWAZI,2010).

(f) Not all money that is budgeted is received at the schools.
For the capitation grant to have an impact, the money needs to reach the schools. Public Expenditure Tracking Surveys (PETS) provide a good tool for assessing whether money allocated to capitation grants actually gets to schools. Recently, in collaboration with its donors, the Ministry of Education and Vocational Training commissioned a trackingof public expenditure for the fiscal year 2007/08. This survey reveals that, in addition to allocations falling short of the policy, not all money that is allocated actually flows to the schools. A region, district council, or school may receive more or less than its budget allocation; usually they receive less.
For instance, in 2007/8 the amount in capitation grants reaching the schools averaged 4,189 shillings per pupil, while the district councils reported making disbursements averaging 4,570 shillings per pupil (MoEVT 2010). Yet, when one compares this to budget allocation, one finds that 5,519 shillings per student had been allocated (Figure 8). The PETS notes further variations across district councils and schools, and that amounts disbursed ranged from a minimum of 1,260 shillings to 19,236 shillings per pupil.( UWAZI,2010).

(g) The timing of capitation grant disbursements is unclear.
For planning purposes, capitation grants need to be predictable: the amount needs to be reliable and the disbursements need to arrive on time. Money arriving at the school at the end of the school year can no longer be used to benefit students. Unfortunately, late disbursement of capitation grants, and the capitation grant arriving in small amounts rather than in meaningful amounts, appears to be the rule rather than the exception. (UWAZI, 2010).

Head teachers do not know in advance when or how much the school would receive in capitation grants. This situation means that, even if they receive less than what their schools are entitled to get, they will not know. They are therefore not in a position to follow up on what the policy says that they are entitled to receive.

(h) Oversight is weak—money alone will not solve the problem.
Without adequate oversight there are few assurances that resources are used as intended. The discrepancies between the policy and budget allocations, between allocation and disbursements, suggest that money can easily end up being misused. This conclusion is corroborated by what the Poverty and Human Development Report (PHDR) (2009) says about the malfunctioning of the textbook procurement system. The report notes serious concerns raised by the Education Sector Review 2008 about the high number of books left un-purchased or in storage, while children need books to read. It also notes problems arising from increasing pirating and poor quality copies of approved books being used in schools. Oversight is needed in all of the four aspects that are key to the success of the capitation grant:

2.2.3 Participation of Community in managing CGs
a) Overview
Participatory budgeting is usually characterized by several basic design features: identification of spending priorities by community members, election of budget delegates to represent different communities, facilitation and technical assistance by public employees, local and higher level assemblies to deliberate and vote on spending priorities, and the implementation of local direct-impact community projects.

Various studies have suggested that participatory budgeting results in more equitable public spending, higher quality of life, increased satisfaction of basic needs, greater government transparency and accountability, increased levels of public participation (especially by marginalized or poorer residents), and democratic and citizenship learning.

2 b) Why the public is interested with the CGs?

The national budget is the most important economic policy instrument for government. It reflects the government’s social and economic policy priorities. No policy or plan can be implemented without funding, and thus the budget is the key to implementation of any government policy. A well-balanced budget reflects stability of a government to both collect funds and disperse them effectively. A functioning budget system is vital for formulation of sustainable fiscal policies and facilitates economic growth. Additionally, budgets are not just a tool for upper level government; they affect all the citizens of a country. Indeed, the budget tends to have the most impact on the poorest of the poor, for when a health care program is properly funded is helps the poor access health care, but when budgets are cut it is the poor who have the fewest alternative options. The poor rely on a budget that meets their needs. Budget allocations and performance affect the livelihoods on all Tanzanians by affecting the social services on which all rely, such as health, education, and the justice system ( Hakikazi Catalyst, 2004).
Participatory budgeting involves citizens directly in making decisions about budget issues, either on a small scale at the service or neighborhood level or on a more strategic level at a city or state level.

In practice, the power delegated to the citizens in the decision processes varies, from providing decision-makers with information about citizen preferences to processes that place parts of the budget under direct citizen control. In general the amount of power devolved has tended to be larger in Latin America where participatory budgeting was developed compared to in Europe and North America.

The scale of citizen participation has ranged from single neighborhoods to an entire state (with populations of millions). Discussions are often limited to new investment rather than discussing spending as a whole. It can be run as a one off process, but long-term benefits tend such as social capital and ownership, require a reoccurring, cyclical process.

The 'classic' participatory budgeting model as developed in Brazil makes use of area meetings where all citizens can attend and determine the spending of local budgets (set based on population and poverty levels). Citizens also elect representatives to attend larger city wide meetings where more wide ranging priorities are determined.

Peer grant giving has also been carried out under the banner of participatory budgeting. This allows a group of citizens the power to assign grants for community projects and other spending.

3 (c)Suitable Participants in participatory budgeting

Participatory budgeting can be done with both direct participation of citizens or through directly elected citizen representatives. The larger, city wide processes often combine the two with direct participation at neighborhood level where representatives are elected for city wide forums. The total number of participants in all meetings in city wide processes can be tens of thousands. In the UK the numbers have tended to be more modest, in the hundreds at most.

In most processes meetings are open to all, creating the risk of certain groups dominating the proceedings. However, research into participatory budgeting in Porto Alegre shows that the poorest neighborhoods have actually been the more active participants. This can probably be linked to the fact that poorer neighborhoods feel a more pressing need for improved services.

4 (d)Cost involved in participatory budgeting

Participatory budgeting is often undertaken to increase efficiency in the budget and thus save money. The process of citizen involvement in budgets in itself is however costly.
Setting up a city wide infrastructure of forums and meetings requires a large investment of money and staff time (potentially running into millions of pounds). Processes run at the local level around a particular service or neighborhood can be cheaper but still require substantial commitment to work.

5 (e) Time Requirements in participatory budgeting

It is possible to run a participatory budgeting exercise as a one day one off event. However the main benefits of participatory budgeting in terms of increased trust and citizen empowerment only develop over time. Ideally participatory budgeting should form a continuous part of the budget cycle, ensuring that citizens feel assured that their efforts will not be wasted.

6 (f)When to use Participatory Budgeting

Participatory Budgeting is useful when the government or the council: want to get citizens directly involved in determining how to spend public money, want citizen input into spending priorities , want to increase your understanding of local needs and want to increase the public's awareness of the trade offs involved in the budget.
Participatory budgeting can deliver increased transparency and re-establish the legitimacy of government budget decisions. It has also been shown to build the skills and awareness of participants through the process of deliberation.

By being exposed to the trade offs surrounding financial decisions participants can acquire a deeper understanding of the work of government. The fact that Participatory budgeting often involves control over actual resources can be a catalyst for civic mobilization, especially in poorerareas.

In Porto Alegre, Brazil (the city with the longest running participatory budgeting process) there has been a significant reallocation of resources towards spending in poorer areas as well as increased efficiency and reduced corruption as a result of participatory budgeting. Those councilors involved in Participatory Budgeting tend to be trusted by participants providing legitimacy and a real sense that democratic elections locally are worth voting in, that they do make a difference.

7 (g)Establishing Purposes for Public Participation Efforts

Articulating the purpose for conducting a public participation process is critical because the purpose becomes the foundation for deciding who to involve, how to select them, what activities they will be involved in, what information will be collected, and how the government will use the information. Consequently, determining the purpose should be the first step in designing a participation effort. Governments should not initiate public participation processes without establishing a tangible purpose or objectives, nor is it sufficient to create a public participation process simply because it is a best practice or because other governments have done so.

Purposes may include one or more of the following, and, in addition, individual governments may identify other purposes for involving the public: • To improve performance by better understanding what the public wants and expects from its government; • To adjust services and service levels more closely to citizens’ preferences; • To establish performance measures that incorporate the public’s perspective; • To differentiate among the expectations of a jurisdiction’s various demographic groups in policy and service design; • To understand public priorities in planning, budgeting, and managing services. (Public priorities are particularly important in making budget decisions when revenues are not sufficient to continue to provide all services at their current levels); • To establish long term strategies to provide for a fiscally sustainable future for the jurisdiction; • To ensure that capital investment decisions, such as the location of infrastructure elements, are informed by public input; • To provide information to the public about a government’s services and results.

8 (h)Identifying the Public’s Perspective

Citizens are diverse. Not only do citizen viewpoints differ from those of government “insiders,” but from citizen to citizen. No single citizen or group of citizens is able to represent the views of all citizens. The best way to assure a broad perspective is to collect information in a variety of ways and from a variety of sources.

9 (i)Timing and Approaches to Public Participation

Timing and approaches are related because approaches that work in one phase of planning, budgeting, and performance management may not be effective in other phases. For example, a community goal setting session would be very appropriate in assisting a government to establish priorities in developing a strategic plan or in the early stages of the budget process. General approaches and timing are listed below:

First , Identifying citizen preferences and satisfaction levels. Such efforts should occur before a decision has been made, or to test various ideas and approaches. Governments may solicit information for general purposes, such as strategic planning, or may solicit targeted information as input for specific projects, plans, or initiatives. Unless there is a compelling reason to target only certain segments, public involvement approaches should encourage all citizens to participate. In addition, governments should make involvement opportunities accessible to all citizens and hold meetings at various times to provide maximum participation.

Second, Local governments have used numerous mechanisms for eliciting public input. Common methods for soliciting information include the following: Surveys, either in person or via mail, phone, or Internet, Focus groups , Interviews , Comment (or point of service) cards , Public meetings, such as public hearings, “Town Hall” meetings, and community vision sessions and Interactive priority setting tools. In addition, Creating public or neighborhood advisory groups, committees, and informal task forces. These are often ongoing and can be used both to seek information during planning and information gathering and can in connection with subsequent phases, including consideration of alternatives, decision making, implementation, evaluation, and reporting. It is important to identify specific groups that will be affected the most by the decisions made. Providing information to the public. This approach is appropriate at all stages and may include Newsletters, Public notices in community media Public hearings , Public reports, such as Budgets-in-Brief, Popular Annual Financial Reports, or performance reports , Web sites , Individual or group emails, phone calls, and in-person contact. Using technology, such as Constituent Relationship Management (CRM) systems. CRM may be used to manage service relationships as well as to identify public preferences and priorities.

2.2.5. Approaches to address the CG challenges
There are a number of strategies that have been suggested by different authora in relation to the process of address the poor managing of CGs in primary school. Such strategies include

Bank Account
The district education office should open a special account to lodge funds for the capitation grants. The signatories to this account are the DDE and the District Accountant. To ensure smooth implementation of the school programs, separate bank accounts should also be opened by the district for each school. The signatories to the school account are the head teacher and the assistant. A projected estimate of enrollment levels in each school is made at the beginning of each academic year [based on the GER (Gross Enrolment Ratio) for the district].

This estimate is the basis for the transfer of 50 percent of funds to the school at the beginning of the first term. Subsequent transfers for the first term are dependent on the submission of adequate returns on the actual enrollment for the school in the course of the term. For the second and third terms, based on the enrollment levels as established in the first term, funds are transferred to schools at the beginning of term. Efforts should, however, be made to confirm that these enrollment figures have not changed because of attrition.

The executor of an activity within the SPIP applies to the head teacher for funds with a Request Form. Acash equivalent to that activity is withdrawn from the bank, an Advance Form is completed, and cash is given to the executor to be used for the purpose indicated on the request form. After the completion of the activity, the executor submits the relevant documentation (receipts, honor certificates, and activity report) to the head teacher and completes an Accounting for Advances Form to end the process. At the school level, requests for funds are to be endorsed by both the SMC chairman and the head teacher. These persons are jointly responsible for the use of funds to attain targets set out in the plans.

Record Keeping
The school is to maintain financial records, which document all capitation grants disbursed and received, along with all appropriate receipts and documentation.
These records are to be made available for the review of the SMC, the district education office, and the internal audit office. Report Process
Monthly and quarterly reports describing activities (both completed and underway) during the period, together with a statement of expenditures for these activities, are to be sent to the district education office by the head teacher and the SMC chairman. The district education office is also to report on a quarterly basis to the director general on capitation grant operations.
The school is to maintain financial records, which document all capitation grants disbursed and received, along with all appropriate receipts and documentation. These records are to be made available for the review of the SMC, the district education office, and the internal audit office. Monthly and quarterly reports describing activities (both completed and underway) during the period, together with a statement of expenditures for these activities, are to be sent to the district education office by the head teacher and the SMC chairman.
The district education office is also to report on a quarterly basis to the director general on capitation grant operations. The circuit supervisor is to visit each school twice per term and report to the district education office on the following: abolition of all levies in the school, implemen-tation status of the SPIP, and submission of all reports on a timely basis. The DDE as well as the district teacher support team and district head teacher adviser are to pay regular visits to each school to review progress on implementation of activities. Progress reports are to be submitted by the head teacher through the SMC to the DDE. The regional monitoring teams are to monitor and report on the disbursement and use of funds at the districts and schools on a term-by-term basis. Monitoring Mechanism
The circuit supervisor is to visit each school twice per term and report to the district education office on the following: abolition of all levies in the school, implemen-tation status of the SPIP, and submission of all reports on a timely basis. The DDE as well as the district teacher support team and district head teacher adviser are to pay regular visits to each school to review progress on implementation of activities. Progress reports are to be submitted by the head teacher through the SMC to the DED The regional monitoring teams are to monitor and report on the disbursement and use of funds at the districts and schools on a term-by-term basis.
Audit Process
The internal auditors will monitor the school accounts and will conduct at least one audit of the use of the capitation grants, half yearly. They will submit copies of their report to the SMC, the DDE, and the regional officer of education.

2.5 Research Gap

This study focuses on analyzing the management mechanisms of the Capitation Grant in primary schools. Most studies have focused on the leakages of funds committed as well as the sources of delay for funding. This study starts from that point and hence wants to study the relationship between allocation, equity and improved quality outcomes in the education sector. There is a doubt that the fixed amount CG per pupil per year does not suffice the needs and thus there is evidence that little is known as how the Equity and need factor are taken into consideration. In addition, there is evidence that community participation in public sector management has not been taken much assessment and thus posing a doubt on the participatory public expenditure management. As it is now, it might in the long run widen the social inequality gap because schools with larger population will have more and will be able to meet basic essentials than smaller schools.
2.6 The Conceptual Framework
The Public expenditure management requires collaborative efforts. This is evident from aspect of ensuring resources are well mobilised, allocated and utilised. This study wants to investigate the mechanism that is involved in the process of managing public resources through the use of Principal Agent Problem Theory.
Firstly, it is presumed that if community members are involved in all the processes of budgeting, then the CGs will be of useful to the schools. This is possible if the school management committee are formed and well informed about the school funds.
Secondly, the school is to maintain financial records, which document all capitation grants disbursed and received, along with all appropriate receipts and documentation. These records are to be made available for the review of the SMC, the district education office, and the internal audit office.
Thirdly, Monthly and quarterly reports describing activities (both completed and underway) during the period, together with a statement of expenditures for these activities, are to be sent to the district education office by the head teacher and the SMC chairman. The district education office is also to report on a quarterly basis to the director general on capitation grant operations
Fourthly, the circuit supervisor is to visit each school twice per term and report to the district education office on the following: abolition of all levies in the school, implementation status of the SPIP, and submission of all reports on a timely basis. The DED as well as the district support team are to pay regular visits to each school to review progress on implementation of activities. Progress reports are to be submitted by the head teacher through the SMC to the DDE. The regional monitoring teams are to monitor and report on the disbursement and use of funds at the districts and schools on a term-by-term basis.
Fifthly, the internal auditors will monitor the school accounts and will conduct at least one audit of the use of the capitation grants, half yearly. They will submit copies of their report to the SMC, the DED, NAO and PMO- RALG.
Lastly, capacity building should be provided to the management of the schools as well as the SMC so as to be able to predict the needs for the schools and evaluate the use of such resources. (See figure 1 below).

Figure 1. The conceptual Framework on Management of CGs
3.0 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

3.1 Study Area

This study will be conducted in Kigoma district council, at Kigoma region, focusing on Local public primary schools where the respondents will be the teachers, community and management. This is due to the reason that contribution of the schools to the economy of the country is significant, and yet the mechanism and impact of CGs are not well documented. This situation causes primary schools fail to have efficient use of CGs (KDC, 2010).
Kigoma DC has a total of 219 primary schools, all of them being public schools and none are private schools. The KDC has a total of 114,449 pupils in public schools, where 56,919 are male and 57,530 are females. The district has a total of 1981teachers, where 1273 are males and 708 are females.

The amounts of Grants received by the district for six years are as shown in the table below.
|Year |Target Amount of CG |Actual |
|2004/2005 |274,827,700 |274,827,700 |
|2005/2006 |527,469,600 |527,469,600 |
|2006/2007 |631,033,900 |631,033,900 |
|2007/2008 |153,433,000 |153,433,000 |
|2008/2009 |758,461,000 |758,461,000 |
|2009/2010 |1,132,379,000 |1,132,379,000 |

Source: KDC, 2010

Kigoma district is among of the four districts of Kigoma region located in western part of Tanzania. The district is found on the southern part of Kigoma region and has a total area of 19,574 km2 extending between latitude 4.25° and 6.30° south and between longitude 29.45° and 31.30° east. Among the tribes found in Kigoma District Council, Waha is the dominant tribe in the area. Others are Goma, Rundi, Bwari, Manyema, Bemba, Holoholo, Vinza, Nyakaramba, Hangaza, Tongwe and Jiji peopole. According to the 2002 National Population Census, the population of the district is about 490,271 people of whom 244,733 are males and 245,538 are females. But recently, the projected population is about 649,518 people, where 324,226 are males and 325,292 are females. This is due to the fact that population growth rate is estimated to be 4.1% per annum.
People depend on livestock keeping, agriculture and fishing. The main cash crops are palm oil, tobacco, coffee, cotton and groundnuts while the food crops include maize, rice, bananas, and cassava. Livestock keeping involves cattle, goats, sheep and poultry. Lake Tanganyika, Mumbara and Nyamagoma dams provide high potential areas for fishing (Kigoma social-economic profile 2008).

3.2 Research Design

This study will employ a cross sectional design that involves an investigation about the impact and extent of under financing once in a time and hence applying a case study that will be adopted to have an in depth examination of how the problem of management of CGs is in Kigoma District (Kothari, 2004). In addition, this is both a quantitative and qualitative research. It is quantitative since it will involve testing hypothesis through the use of chi square model and it is qualitative since it involves analysing the problem based on opinions made by respondents that are non numeric and hence require subjective judgement. (Kothari, 2004).

3.3 Sample Size and Sampling Techniques

3.3.1 Sampling Frame

The sampling frame will be among the public schools in Kigoma District Council. The sampling frame will thus include the head teachers, teachers, WEO, DED, DEO, VEO, SMCs and pupils.

3.3.2Sampling Techniques /Procedures

The purposive sampling technique will be used to get representative from the management as they are few departments. Thereafter, in each department or unit the employees will be selected purposively to provide data of aspects of CGs management.
On the case of the community members, the divisions will be selected by purposive sampling on the bases of having many schools. Thus 4 divisions be selected. Then 4 wards from each division will be selected randomly to get a good representation of the population. In each ward, 4 schools will be selected also randomly to get a good presentation of the respondent. In each school, 4 teachers will be randomly selected to give view on the progress of the CGs. Therefore a total of (4x4x4= 64) teachers will be sampled randomly to respond to the study questions.
On the other side a total of 16 head teachers will be selected purposively based on the mechanism of sampling the teachers. So each school that is sampled randomly will provide the head teacher. The each school sampled randomly will give 2 pupils from standard six based on gender and selected randomly. Thus there will be a total of 32 pupils interviewed on CGs management. Also a total of 2 members of the SMC will be selected purposively (chairperson and secretary) to give views on the management of CGS. Thus they are going to form a total of 16 respondents. At village level, one VEO will be picked purposively based on the schools picked randomly, to give data on how the CGs is managed. Thus a total of 144 respondents will be from the community level.
At Ward and District Levels, 1 WEC per ward (4 wards), 1DED, Planning officer(1), DT(1) and 1DEO will be purposively selected as they are few to give data on the way the CGs have been managed in schools. Thus a total of 8 respondents will be selected here. 3.3.3 Sample Size
This study will employ a total of 152 respondents. The 144 sample from the village level while will 8 will be from the ward and district officials... This will help the researcher to obtain more data and information about the way the CG is managed.
3.4 Data Collection Techniques and Tools
The methods to be employed for data collection in this study will be interview, focused group discussion and documentary review whereby both primary data and secondary data will be collected.
3.4.1 The Primary Data Sources
a) Interviews
This is a face to face conversation between interviewer and interviewee, which will aim at gathering data from the sample size. The method will be adopted because it enables the researcher to understand the respondent inner filling about the problem of managing CG. The method will be applied to community and officials. This method will use Questionnaire to collect data from the sample Size. The method is also free from biasness of the researcher, less expensive and does not exert pressure on the respondents hence be more comfortable (Kothari, 2001:124) Questionnaires will be distributed to all sampled respondents. The aim of questionnaire will be to collect general and specific information regarding the management of CG in LGA. b) Focused Group Discussion
This entails discussing issues pertaining to the extent and impact of under financing. Here, the method will involve 5 staff from management as per section3.3.2 above so as to get each segment of staff playing part in the discussion.
3.4.2 Secondary Data Source
Secondary data sources will include documentary review whereby various files, reports, speeches and various acts will be surveyed, also the collection of data will base on other documents such as journals and other relevant materials related to the way the CG is managed. Such data include challenges facing the implementation of CGs, amount of CGs, documents related to CG. In order to do documentary review the checklist will be designed.

3.5 Data Processing, Analysis and Presentation

Before the data are analyzed, they will be processed so as to edit and code them to be able to enter into the software. The analysis then will follow where the SPSS package will be used. The results of the analysis will be presented in the forms of cross tabulation, tables, charts and figures.

3.6 Validity and Reliability of Instrument

3.6.1 Validity and Reliability

3.6.1. Validity

This will be conducted on collection tools to accommodate comments from supervisor, administration of tools by the researcher and pre-testing of the tools particularly questionnaires before the actual data collection, translating the tools into Swahili, to ensure easy administration and confidence for local leaders’ participation (Veal, 1997; Kothari, 2004).

3.6.2. Reliability

Tools for data collection will be subjected to pre- testing to ascertain the consistency of the results. Such that reliability is the extent to which research findings would be the same if the research were to be repeated at a later date or with a different sample of subject (Veal, 1997). 3.7. Estimate Budget
The total budget for the assignment is TZS 2,270,000/= as summarized below (Table 1). The budget covers all costs.

Table 1: Budget
|S/N0 |Item Description |Details |Amount (TZS) |
|1 |Direct Cost | | |
|1.1 |Average return ticket for researcher(KGM & UDOM |60,000 x 4 | 240,000/= |
|1.2 |Boarding expenses for researcher |25,000 x 28 | 700,000/= |
|1.3 |Stationary and communication |Lump sum | 350,000/= |
|1.4 |Photocopying costs |Lump sum | 200,000/= |
|1.5 |Data analysis |Lump sum | 300,000/= |
|1.6 |Secretarial costs |Lump sum | 180,000/= |
|2.0 |Supervision costs |Lump sum | 300,000/= |
| |Total Cost |2,270,000 |

8. Time Frame
|SN |Activity |Milestone Per Month |
| | |Sept-Dec |Jan -march |April –June |
|1 |Proposal Design and Modeling | | | |
|2 |Tools Designing and Pilot Study | | | |
|3 |Data Collection | | | |
|4 |Data Analysis | | | |
|5 |Report Writing and Compiling | | | |
|6 |Report Presentation | | | |

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-----------------------
Dependent Variable

Independent Variable

❖ Audit ❖ Reporting ❖ Training ❖ Monitoring / visits ❖ Community participation

❖
CGs management