Caribbean Human Development Report 2012
Human Development and the Shift to Better Citizen Security

Caribbean Human Development Report 2012 Human Development and the Shift to Better Citizen Security Copyright © 2012 by the United Nations Development Programme 1 UN Plaza, New York, NY 10017, USA All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise without prior permission. ISBN: 9789962688082 Website: http://www.regionalcentrelac-undp.org/en/hdr-caribbean Editors: Robert Zimmermann, Carol Lawes and Nanette Svenson Cover design: Timothy Bootan and Juan Manuel Salazar Design and Layout: Miguel Nova y Vínculos Gráficos Printed in Panama by Inversiones Gumo, S.A. For a list of any errors or omissions found subsequent to printing please visit our website. No consultation has been carried out in Guyana. The data on Guyana have been obtained through public sources and the UNDP Citizen Security Survey 2010.

Caribbean Human Development Report 2012
Helen Clark Administrator United Nations Development Programme Rebeca Grynspan Associate Administrator United Nations Development Programme Heraldo Muñoz Assistant Administrator and Director of the Regional Bureau for LAC United Nations Development Programme Freddy Justiniano Director a.i. Regional Centre for LAC United Nations Development Programme Niky Fabiancic Deputy Director Regional Bureau for LAC United Nations Development Programme Leida Mercado Human Development Advisor Coordinator Caribbean HDR Regional Centre for LAC United Nations Development Programme

Anthony Harriott Lead Author Caribbean HDR Executive Board Marcia De Castro UNDP Resident Representative Trinidad and Tobago and Suriname Thomas Gittens UNDP Country Director Suriname Michelle Gyles-McDonnough UNDP Resident Representative Barbados and OECS Arun Kashyap UNDP Resident Representative Jamaica Khadja Musa UNDP Resident Representative Guyana Luis Felipe Lopez Calva Former Chief Economist and Practice Leader Poverty, MDGs and Human Development Regional Bureau for LAC Alvaro Pinto Former Practice Leader Democratic Governance Regional Bureau for LAC Pablo Ruiz Practice Leader Crisis Prevention and Recovery Regional Centre for LAC

Consultants Richard Bennett Consultant on Police Terri-Ann Gilbert-Roberts Consultant on Youth Violence and Youth Resilience Marlyn Jones Consultant on State Policies and Policy Orientation of the Populations Charles Katz Consultant on Street Gangs and Organized Crime Edward Maguire Consultant on Criminal Justice Systems

National Consultants April Bernard Barbados Anthony George Saint Lucia Mellissa Ifill Guyana Marlyn Jones Jamaica Janielle Matthews Antigua and Barbuda Jack Menke Suriname Survey and Statistics University of West Indies Mark Kirton Marlon Anatol Roy Russell Quality Control Consultant Helena Rovner Randy Seepersad Trinidad and Tobago

Peer Reviewers Edward Greene Peer Reviewer on Human Development Gabriel Kessler Peer Reviewer on Youth Patricia Mohammed Peer Reviewer on Gender Trevor Munroe Peer Reviewer on Policy

Foreword

The increase in violence and crime in Latin America and the Caribbean is an undeniable fact that erodes the very foundation of the democratic processes in the region and imposes high social, economic and cultural costs. Our region is home to 8.5 percent of the world’s population, yet it concentrates some 27 percent of the world’s homicides. Violence and crime are therefore perceived by a majority of Latin American and Caribbean citizens as a top pressing challenge. The resulting alarm has often led to short-sighted, mano dura (iron fist) policies, which have proven ineffective and, at times, detrimental to the rule of law. The situation varies much among and within countries. Broadly speaking, there are high- and low-crime countries in the region, and differences exist even within each of the sub-regions (i.e., South America, Central America, and the Caribbean). However perceived insecurity and citizens´ concern are independent of actual crime rates, so that mano dura policies are not exclusive of high-crime countries. In this context, we are confronted by a paradox: Why is it that, despite the democratization process experienced in the region in the last 20 years, citizen security levels, as well as the justice and security institutions in the region, are in crisis? Why is it that, despite the structural and institutional reforms promoted by countries in the region in order to construct governance mechanisms which are more transparent, horizontal and democratic, the justice and security institutions are overwhelmed and confidence in them is shattered? To begin to resolve this paradox and deal effectively with crime and violence, we need accurate assessments that provide evidence for action. To this end, the United Nations Development Programme, in association with governments, civil societies and international agencies, is leading numerous initiatives aimed at improving citizen security in Latin America and the Caribbean. This report is a one of these efforts. Drafted by a team of outstanding scholars building upon previous research and practical experience, this report also reflects findings from the analysis of extensive new survey data and sustained consultations involving over 450 experts, practitioners and stakeholders in seven Dutch- and English-speaking Caribbean countries. Of primary concern with citizen security is the issue of public confidence in state capacity to protect citizens and ensure justice. If citizens lack confidence in the police, the judiciary and other public authorities, no amount of repression will restore security. The success of any law enforcement system depends on the willingness of the people to participate and contribute. For the state to enjoy the trust and commitment of the people, it must strive to eradicate exclusion, improve transparency and create opportunities that encourage a sense of belonging for all. A key message of the report is that Caribbean countries need to focus on a model of security based on the human development approach, whereby citizen security is paramount, rather than on the traditional state security model, whereby the protection of the state is the chief aim. Indeed, the contrast between prevention on the one hand and repression and coercion
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on the other is ill conceived. Social inclusion to help prevent crime and violence and efficient and effective law enforcement are by no means incompatible or mutually exclusive. In a truly democratic society, broad based social inclusion and swift criminal justice–or “prevention” and “coercion”—serve to reinforce and complement each other. This is one of the most important lessons to be taken from this report – and not only for the Caribbean but for all of Latin America as well. An issue of common interest to Latin America and the Caribbean is security. Organized transnational crime, mainly that which involves drug trafficking, looms large in the security crisis currently affecting an increasing number of countries in both sub-regions. Although this report concentrates on implications for the domestic dimensions of the problem in the Caribbean, especially among youth, it is also important to note that the Caribbean is a critical transit route between drug producers and large-scale consumers. As a result of this geographical positioning, it is necessary for the Caribbean to strengthen cooperation with its Latin American neighbours and project a larger voice in the global dialogue on existing policies and possible alternatives. An improved worldwide policy addressing the problem of addictive drugs could contribute considerably to reducing levels of violence and social disruption in the Caribbean. This belief is substantiated by an encouraging finding presented in the report: despite exceptionally high homicide rates, the overall incidence of crime in the Caribbean as measured by the victimization survey data “compares favourably at the lower end with countries such as Japan,” referring to nations that participated in the 2004-2005 International Crime Victimization Survey This suggests that the spiral of violence generally associated with drug trafficking exists within the context of an otherwise durable social fabric that makes for lesser ordinary “street” crime. This is but one of the constructive insights readers of the Caribbean Human Development Report 2012 will find. With its fresh prospective, solid data and rigorous analysis, this publication offers people from the Caribbean, along with those from Latin America and every other region, many valuable lessons to apply in the ongoing effort of confronting crime and fostering human development.

Heraldo Muñoz Assistant Secretary-General of the United Nations, Assistant Administrator of the United Nations Development Programme and Regional Director for Latin America and the Caribbean

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Acknowledgements

This groundbreaking report, the first regional Caribbean Human Development Report, represents an incredible collaboration across sectors of UNDP and non-UNDP experts, practitioners, academics and policy-makers whose combined insight and dedication have made this publication possible. Thus, the list of credits and thanks extends far beyond these pages, but first and foremost goes to the UNDP Country Offices in the Caribbean and the UNDP Regional Bureau for Latin America and the Caribbean for both financial and technical support of this process since its inception. Likewise, the UNDP Bureau for Development Policy contributed funding and expertise, and the Human Development Report Office provided critical guidance and commentary. A special appreciation is also in order for the UNDP Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery for its extensive and invaluable expert participation along with its financial backing. Several teams and individuals were essential to the success of this production as well. Among them are the technical committee that included Trevor Benn, Sandra Baptiste Caruth, Akiko Fuji, Pablo Gago, Sonia Gill, Stein Hansen, Daniel Luz, Chisa Mikami, Paula Mohamed, Edo Stork, and Alana Wheeler; the communications team comprised of Pablo Basz, Maria Blanco Lora, Janine Chase, Franciois Coutu, Luke Paddington and Laura Raccio; the internal and external readers Carmen de la Cruz, Alfredo Gonzalez, George Ronald, Natasha Leite, Jairo Matallana, Gerardo Noto, Stefano Pettinato, Maria Tallarico, Hernando Gómez, Mitchell Seligson and Oscar Yunowsky; the research and finance component with Danielle Brown, Estefania Grijalva, Norma Peña, Querube Mora, Raj Ramnath and Cheryle Tewarie. A special appreciation is also due to Minh Pham (Former UNDP Resident Representative Jamaica), Paula Hidalgo, and Pedro Moreno who provided valuable inputs at onset of the preparation process. The statistical team from the University of the West Indies was indispensible for the design and implementation of the UNDP Citizen Security Survey 2010. Another important institutional contributor was the Vanderbilt University Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) that facilitated access to Caribbean LAPOP survey data and commented instructively on methodology and results. With the support of UNDP Country Offices and the UNDP Democratic Dialogue Regional Project, a widespread series of consultations was conducted that involved over 450 government officials, policy-makers, opposition members, academic researchers, civil society representatives, and national and international development practitioners. A special effort was also made during these consultations to include representatives of typically underrepresented groups such as youth, women, Maroon communities and other populations facing potential discrimination. All of the participants in these consultations provided vital qualitative data as well as insightful references that were important for consolidating the findings and recommendations of the report. We thank those who acted as chairs and repertoires of the working groups, Mobola Aguda-F, Charles Clayton, Beverly Chase, Gianluca Giuman, Itziar Gonzalez, Lebrechtta Oye Hesse-Bayne, Meriam Hubard, Gaston Ian, Anna West, Rosemary Lall, Ruben Martoredjo Carol Narcisse, Rachida Norden, Howie Prince, Philip Thomas, Joan Seymour and Stacey Syne. We specially wish to acknowledge the contributions provided by the following government and non government representatives during the entire preparation process:
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Barbados: Carson Browne, Permanent Secretary Economic Affairs and Team on the Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs; George Belle, Dean, F.S.S and Corin Bailey, Research Fellow, University of the West Indies; Rodney Grant, CEO, Wildey Great House; Victor Roach, President National Committee for the Prevention of Alcohol; Cheryl Willoughby, Director, National Task Force on Crime Prevention. Jamaica: Dwight Nelson, Former Minister of National Security; Aubyn Bartlett, Minister of State, Ministry of National Security; Delroy Chuck, Former Minister for Justice; Peter Phillips, Minister of Finance, Planning and Public Services; Senator Oswald Gaskell Harding; Robert Rainford, Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Justice; Vivian Brown, Chief Technical Director, Ministry of National Security; Richard Lumsden, Planning Institute of Jamaica; Dianne McIntosh, Permanent Secretary, Ministry of National Security; Gladstone Hutchinson, Director General, PIOJ. Saint Lucia: Issac Anthony, Permanent Secretary, John Calixte, Deputy Permanent Secretary and Team on the Ministry of Finance, Economic Affairs and National Development; Mary Wilfred, Programme Officer UNDP-Government of Saint Lucia; Agnes Henry, Assistant Commissioner of Police and Dorian O’Brian, Police Inspector, Royal Saint Lucia Police Force; Hilary Herman, Director, Bordelais Correctional Facility. Suriname: Jennifer Geerlings-Simons, Speaker of the Parliament; Martin Misiedjan, Minister of Justice and Police; Paul Abena, Minister of Youth and Sport Affairs; Robby Ramlakhan, Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Ewald Refos, National Champion; Krishna Mathoera, Commissioner of Police; Saskia Wip, Secretary and Raynel Fraser, Member, Suriname National Youth Parliament; Abigail Misdjan, CARICOM Ambassador for Suriname, Ratanlal Kalka, Advisor, Suriname Business Development Center; Lilian Ferrier, Chair, National Commission for Child Rights. Trinidad and Tobago: Timothy Hamel-Smith, President of the Senate; Bhoendradath Tewarie, Minister of Planning and the Economy; John Sandy, Minister of National Security; Jennifer Boucaud-Blake, Permanent Secretary, Ministry of National Security; Nizam Baksh, Minister of Community Development; Arlene Mc Comie, Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Local Government; Senator Surujrattan Rambachan, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Communications; Gary Griffith, Security Adviser to the Prime Minister; Roy Augustus, Adviser to the Minister of National Security; Margaret Farray, Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Community Development; Margaret Parillon, Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Communications; Claire Exeter-De Bourg, Senior International Relations Officer, Multi Lateral Division, MFAC; Petronella Sylvester, Asst. Director, Legal Affairs Unit, Ministry of Justice; Stephen Williams, Deputy Commissioner of Police; Gillian Gellizeau-Gardner, National Security Council Secretariat; Mc Donald Jacob, Deputy Commissioner Police ASP, Crime and problem Analysis Unit (CAPA); Esther Best, Director, National Drug Council; Dave Clement and Sean O’Brien, Central Statistical Office (CSO); Wayne Chance, Vision on a Mission (VOM); Jessie-May Ventour, CNMG Television and Radio Producer and Journalist; Anselm Richards, Tobago CSP; Dana Seetahal, President of the T&T Law Association; National Champions: Rhoda Reddock, Don La Foucade, Noble Khan, Winston Cooper, Folade Mutota, Richard Ramoutar, Renee Cummings, Robert Torry, and Ira Mathur. Regional organizations: Beverly Reynolds, Programme Manager Sustainable Development, CARICOM Secretariat; Len Ishmael, Director General and Team on the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States Secretariat; Regional Security System representatives: Grantley Watson, Coordinator; Leonard Cabral and Franklyn Daley, Antigua and Barbuda; Yvonne Alexander, Dominica; Franklyn Belgrove and Margaret Astona Browne, Saint Kitts; Jonathan Nicholls, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines; Brian Parkes, Grenada; Rhea Reid, Central Liaison Office.

A more detailed presentation of the background research, which was commissioned across a broad range of topics and the complete list of participants attending the consultations, are available online in the Caribbean HDR website http://www.regionalcentrelac-undp.org/en/ hdr-caribbean. Finally, we, the regional Caribbean HDR Team, would like to sincerely thank all of those who were involved directly or indirectly in the research and compilation of this report. We particularly want to express our gratitude to the survey respondents whose number reached more than 11,000 and who generously supplied the responses that serve as the basis for the preparation of this report. The new regional insights provided in this publication are a reflection of the collective investigative effort, while any errors of commission or omission are the sole responsibility of the Report Team. We are all proud to have been instrumental in this pioneering endeavor and hope it will pave the way for many Caribbean Human Development Reports to follow.
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Contents

Overview

1

Chapter 1 Crime Trends since Independence and the Impact on Vulnerable Groups 13 Introduction The Caribbean Context Human Development in the Caribbean Community Trends in the Three Basic Dimensions of Human Development The Inequality-Adjusted HDI The Gender Inequality Index Crime Trends since Independence Crime Victimization Determinants of Victimization Domestic Violence and the Victimization of Women Trafficking in Persons Identification of Groups Vulnerable to Victimization Fear of Crime Perceptions of Security and Insecurity Women’s Fear of Crime Conclusion Chapter 2 Youth Violence: Reducing Risk and Enhancing Resilience Introduction Youth Violence and Caribbean Human Development Youth Involvement in Violent Crime The Impact of Youth Violence on Caribbean Human Development Risk and Vulnerability: Explaining the Patterns of Youth Violence Societal Risks Community and Interpersonal Risks Individual Risks Reducing Risk and Enhancing Resilience Reducing Risk and Vulnerability Enhancing Youth Resilience Factors Supporting Risk Reduction and Resilience-Building Conclusion Chapter 3 Reducing the Contribution of Street Gangs and Organized Crime to Violence Introduction Scope and Nature of the Problem Prevalence of the Problem The Sex and Age Composition of Caribbean Street Gangs The Organizational Characteristics of Street Gangs 15 15 16 17 17 17 20 27 27 29 31 33 36 36 39 41 43 45 45 46 49 50 52 54 56 57 57 58 59 63 65 67 68 68 71 72
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The Consequences of Street Gangs and Organized Crime The Causes of Street Gangs and Organized Crime Community-Level Explanations Individual-Level Explanations Responding to Street Gangs and Organized Crime Suppression The Consequences and Limitations of Suppression The Need for Intervention and Prevention Conclusion Chapter 4 The Police: Transitioning to Citizen Security Introduction Policing under Colonial Rule: State-Oriented Security Modern-Day Policing: The Citizen Security Approach The Police in the Caribbean The Capability Challenges The Integrity Imperative The Rights-Respecting Imperative Accountability Changing the Relationship with Citizens: Community-Based Police Developing Capacity: Advancing Police Training and Education Regional Cooperation Perceptions on the Police in the Caribbean Region Perceived Police Legitimacy Perceived Police Competence and Performance Willingness of Citizens to Participate and Cooperate with the Police Conclusion Chapter 5 Criminal Justice Systems Introduction Criminal Justice Systems Legal Systems Prosecution and Defence Correctional Systems Statistical Infrastructure Indicators of the Effectiveness of Criminal Justice Systems Case Processing Delays and Backlogs Low Conviction Rates Prison Overcrowding Insufficient Alternatives to Incarceration Opinions on the Effectiveness of Justice Systems Confidence in the Justice Systems Mechanisms to Prevent and Control Crime Accountability Regulating Police Misconduct Regulating Official Corruption Regional Links CARICOM The Caribbean Court of Justice and the Eastern Caribbean Supreme Court Regional Bodies Focused on Police, Prosecution, and Corrections Additional Regional Efforts Conclusion
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73 79 79 82 83 84 85 87 88 91 93 93 94 95 95 96 96 97 97 99 100 101 103 105 108 114 115 117 117 117 119 119 122 122 123 124 125 126 129 130 131 133 133 135 136 136 137 137 138 138

Chapter 6 State Policies and the Policy Orientation of Populations Introduction The Policy Environment Crime and Insecurity in the Caribbean: The Policy Factor The Evolution of Policy, Deterring Social Violence, and the War on Narco-Trafficking The Shift in Policy Reflected in Budgetary Allocations Explaining the Policy Shift The Policy Orientation of the Population The Policy Environment Public Attitudes towards Crime and Punishment The Salience of Crime in Public Opinion Measure of Punitiveness Social Tolerance and Ideals of Justice Public Opinion on Mechanisms for Preventing and Controlling Crime Balancing Crime Prevention and Crime Control The Implications of Policy Responses State Capacity and Citizen Security Institutional Capacity Building the Human Capacity for Development Youth Unemployment and Social Prevention Conclusion Chapter 7 Conclusions and Recommendations Introduction Conclusions Existing Efforts The Demand for Change Directions for Future Efforts Recommendations Reducing Victimization Reducing Risk and Building Youth Resilience Reducing Gang Violence Transforming the Police Reforming the Justice System Building the Capacity for Evidence-Based Policy Notes References Technical Notes

141 143 144 144 145 146 148 152 152 153 153 154 155 157 159 160 163 163 164 167 170 171 173 173 173 174 175 175 176 178 181 182 184 185 187 201 225

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List of Boxes, Charts, Figures and Tables Boxes Box 2.1 A Promising Family Programme: Parental Education, Suriname Box 2.2 A Promising Peer Programme: Peace Ambassadors, Barbados Box 2.3 A Promising State-Community Programme: The Peace Management Initiative, Jamaica Box 3.1 Why Do Caribbean Youth Join Street Gangs? Box 3.2 Do Gangs Have an Impact on the Number of Homicides in Communities? Box 3.3 Deportees, Street Gangs, and Organized Crime in the Caribbean Box 3.4 When Responding to Gangs Makes the Problem Worse Box 3.5 On the Horizon: Caribbean Anti-Gang Legislation Box 4.1 The Example of the Royal Grenada Police Force Box 4.2 Rio de Janeiro: Community Policing in a Context of High Crime Rates Box 4.3 Problem-Solving Partnerships in Suriname Box 4.4 The Co-Production of Security in Nicaragua Box 4.5 Caribbean Regional Police Training Centres Box 6.1 The Citizen Security Programme, Trinidad and Tobago Box 6.2 The Control of Firearms Trafficking in Central America and Neighbouring Countries Box 6.3 Manifesto of the Democratic Labour Party, Barbados, 2008 Box 6.4 Inner City Basic Services for the Poor, Jamaica Box 6.5 Special Youth Employment and Training Project, Jamaica Box 6.6 Anti-Corruption: The National Integrity Action Forum, Jamaica Box 7.1 Strengthening the Capacity to Combat Illicit Trafficking in Firearms in the Caribbean Box 7.2 Citizenship Culture in Bogotá Box 7.3 The Juvenile Violence Prevention Unit of the National Police of Nicaragua Box 7.4 The Juvenile Liaison Scheme, Barbados Charts Chart 1.1 Chart 1.2 Chart 1.3 Chart 1.4 Chart 1.5 Human Development Index, Caribbean-7, 2011 Trends in HDI and HDI Components, Caribbean-7, 1980–2011 Sense of Security in the Caribbean-7, 2010 Homicide Rates Per 100,000 Population, Caribbean-7,1990–2010 Firearm-Related Offences Per 100,000 Population, Selected Caribbean Countries, 1990 - 2010 Chart 1.6 Robbery Rates Per 100,000 Population, Caribbean-7, 1990–2010 Chart 1.7 Burglary and Break-in Rates Per 100,000 Population, Selected Caribbean-7 Countries, 1990 - 2010 Chart 1.8 Rates of Rape Per 100,000 Population, Selected Caribbean-7 Countries, 1993–2010 Chart 1.9 Self-Reported Criminal Victimization, Caribbean-7, 2010 Chart 1.10 Self-Reported Victimization, by Demographic Group, Caribbean-7, 2010 Chart 1.11 Gender Differences in Victimization Rates for Specific Types of Crime, 2010 Chart 1.12 Self-Reported Victims of Domestic Violence, Caribbean-7, 2010 Chart 1.13 Self-Reported Victims of Domestic Violence, by
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59 60 60 71 73 82 83 88 95 98 99 99 101 147 151 161 166 168 169 177 179 182 183

17 18 19 21 22 23 24 26 27 28 28 29

Type and Gender, Caribbean-7, 2010 30 Chart 1.14 Fear of Burglary and Robbery, Caribbean-7, 2010 37 Chart 1.15 Weapon-Related Self-Protective Behaviour, Caribbean-7, 2010 38 Chart 1.16 Gender Differences in the Fear of Crime Victimization, by Type of Crime, Caribbean-7, 2010 39 Chart 1.17 Fear of Sexual Assault and Partner Assault, Caribbean-7, 2010 40 Chart 2.1 The Main Problem in the Country in the View of All Respondents, Caribbean-7, 2010 52 Chart 3.1 Perceptions of the Street Gang Problem, Caribbean-7, 2010 68 Chart 3.2 The First Appearance of the Gang Problem in Neighbourhoods, Caribbean-7, 2010 69 Chart 3.3 Neighbourhood Experiences of Gang Violence, Caribbean-7, 2010 74 Chart 3.4 Respondents Who Believe Gangs Make Neighbourhoods Safer, Caribbean-7, 2010 76 Chart 3.5 Perceived Confidence in the Ability of the Police to Control Gang Violence, Caribbean-7, 2010 85 Chart 4.1 Incidence of Key Topics in Police Training Curricula 100 Chart 4.2 The Role of Perceptions of the Police in Achieving Citizen Security 102 Chart 4.3 People Who Believe Police Treat Citizens with Courtesy, Equality, Fairness and Respect, Caribbean-7, 2010 103 Chart 4.4 People Who Believe Police Respect Their Rights and the Rights of All Citizens, Caribbean-7, 2010 104 Chart 4.5 Victims of Domestic Violence Who Believe Police Treated Them with Respect, Caribbean-7, 2010 105 Chart 4.6 Perceived Confidence in the Police to Control Crime, Caribbean-7, 2010 106 Chart 4.7 Perceived Performance of the Police in Controlling Robbery and Burglary, Caribbean-7, 2010 107 Chart 4.8 Perceived Performance of the Police in Controlling Domestic Violence, Caribbean-7, 2010 107 Chart 4.9 Reporting Crimes to the Police, Caribbean-7, 2010 108 Chart 4.10 Satisfaction with Police after Violent Crime Reports, by Gender, Caribbean-7, 2010 109 Chart 4.11 Satisfaction with Police after Property Crime Reports, by Gender, Caribbean-7, 2010 110 Chart 4.12 Respondents Who Believe the Police Are Competent and Deserve Support, Caribbean-7, 2010 111 Chart 4.13 Respondents Who Believe the Police Need More Personnel and More Resources, Caribbean-7, 2010 112 Chart 4.14 Respondents Willing to Work with Others to Reduce Violent Crime, Caribbean-7, 2010 113 Chart 4.15 Respondents Willing to Work with Others to Reduce Crime, by Age, Caribbean-7, 2010 113 Chart 4.16 Respondents Willing to Work with Others to Reduce Crime, by Gender, Caribbean-7, 2010 114 Chart 4.17 Respondents Willing to Work with Others to Reduce Crime, by Socio-economic Status, Caribbean-7, 2010 114 Chart 5.1 Respondents Who Rate the Capacity of the Criminal Justice System as Sufficient, Caribbean-7, 2010 129 Chart 5.2 Perception of the Hopelessness of Crime Control, Caribbean-7, 2010 130 Chart 6.1 Estimates of Government Expenditure on Security, Caribbean-7 148 Chart 6.2 Problems of Insecurity, by Dimension, First Mention
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Chart 6.3 Chart 6.4 Chart 6.5 Chart 6.6

(Top of Mind), Caribbean-7, 2010 Crime as One of the Three Most Serious Problems, Caribbean-7, 2010 Respondents Who Agree the Military Should Control Crime, Caribbean-7, 2010 Citizen Support for Institution Building in Crime Control, Caribbean-7, 2010 Support for Social Interventions as a Means of Crime Control, Caribbean-7, 2010 Tables

154 154 157 159 160

Table 2.1 Youth Population, by Country, Caribbean-7, 2004 Table 2.2 Youth Self-Reported Criminal Accusations and Arrests, Caribbean-7, 2010 Table 2.3 Youth Victimization, Caribbean-7, 1990–2010 Table 2.4 The Annual Cost of Youth Crime in Four Caribbean Countries Table 2.5 Risk Antecedents and Risk Markers of Youth Violence in the Caribbean Region Table 2.6 The Main Problem in the Country in the View of Youth, Caribbean-7, 2010 Table 2.7 How Should One Resist Violence in Communities? The Point of View of Youth Table 2.8 Analysis of the Context of Youth Violence in the Caribbean Table 3.1 Official Police Estimates of the Population of Street Gangs, Caribbean-7 Table 3.2 Victimization and Neighbourhood Gang Presence, Caribbean-7, 2010 Table 3.3 Perceptions of Corruption, Caribbean-7, 2010 Table 3.4 Mean Levels of Informal Social Control and Community Cohesion with and without Gangs, Caribbean-7, 2010 Table 3.5 Mean Levels of Social Cohesion in Communities with and without Gangs, Caribbean-7, 2010 Table 3.6 Confidence of Neighbourhood Residents in the Police, Caribbean-7, 2010 Table 3.7 Residents Who do Nothing about Crime Because Criminals are too Powerful, Caribbean-7, 2010 Table 4.1 Police Strength and Density, Caribbean-7, 2011 Table 4.2 Police Accountability Systems, Caribbean-7, 2007 Table 5.1 A Statistical Profile of Prison Systems, Caribbean-7 Table 5.2 Police Accountability Systems, Caribbean-7 Table 5.3 Corruption Perceptions Index, Rankings, Caribbean-7, 2009–2011 Table 6.1 The Distribution of Government Budgetary Expenditures on Security Table 6.2 Youth Labour Force Participation Rates, by Gender, Latin America and the Caribbean, 2000–2015: History, Estimates and Projections

46 47 49 50 51 53 58 63 70 75 78 80 81 86 87 95 97 120 134 135 149 167

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Overview

Human Development and the Shift to Better Citizen Security

“The advantage of economic growth is not that wealth increases happiness, but that it increases the range of human choice.”1 These words were written in 1955 by Arthur Lewis, a Caribbean scholar and Nobel laureate in economics who made an important contribution to the development debate and development policy in the Caribbean and elsewhere. It is a profoundly people-centred approach to economic growth that prefigured the later debates on human development. If people are generally regarded as the centre of the development process in that their freedom of choice, standard of living and general welfare are the purpose of development and their participation, creativity and power in society, the economy and polity are the primary drivers of these outcomes, then these truths are important in Caribbean countries, which are generally characterized by small size and limited natural resources.2 This meaning of human development, which emphasizes freedoms and human choice, is found in the work of the Indian development economist Amartya Sen. Human development means the enlargement of people’s freedom to lead lives they value. This revolves around expanding choices and capabilities. The history and developmental aspirations of the Caribbean are truly connected with this approach. Caribbean people now have a vastly wider range of choices than they had in the colonial era when Arthur Lewis wrote the words quoted above. There have been significant advances in human development especially in health care and education. Since the 1960s, there have been marked increases in life expectancy across most of the countries of the Caribbean and a similarly marked decline in infant mortality. There has been a virtual revolution in access to education. Secondary education is nearly universal, and there is much greater

access to tertiary education. There have been tremendous advances in reducing the levels of poverty and improving the standard of living of the majority. These advances are reflected in the Human Development Index (HDI) scores and rankings for these countries. There have also been advances in political development and democratic governance. Car-ibbean countries are, with some exceptions, stable democracies with high levels of political participation and low and declining levels of political violence, which is, in the main, associated with electoral cycles. Democratic stability is evidenced by the repeated uneventful changes in the political administrations in the countries of the region since independence (with interruptions in Grenada and Suriname).3 This stability in the electoral system has been accompanied by the progressive consolidation of the rule of law. The reduction of undue and unlawful political influences on law enforcement and the protection of the independence of the courts have been major achievements in political development since the end of the colonial era. Despite these advances, several countries in the region are beset by high rates of violent crime and troubling levels of non-criminalized forms of social violence that are typically directed at the members of vulnerable groups that historically have been disfavoured and discriminated against.4 If the purpose of development is to widen human choice, the elevated rates of violent crime in the Caribbean may be taken as evidence of problematic development paths that leave far too many behind because of rather limited choices and limited life chances. Much of the crime that is evident in the region is, after all, the outcome of a limited range of human choice, that is, the inequalities of opportunity that restrict these choices among large sections of the populations of the region.
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Within the region, crime may thus rightly be regarded as a problem that is profoundly developmental. Consistent with this understanding of the relationship between crime and development, Amartya Sen, in the introduction to the global Human Development Report of 2010, The Real Wealth of Nations: Pathways to Human Development, makes the point that, while much has been accomplished on a global scale since the first Human Development Report in 1990, “the human development approach is motivationally committed to concentrating on what remains undone—what demands most attention in the contemporary world— from poverty and deprivation to inequality and insecurity.”5 Insecurity is one of the issues that demand greater attention in the human development process. Insecurity restricts the capacity of people to exercise their freedom of choice and their autonomy. It reinforces inequalities because it mainly affects vulnerable people. It has a negative impact on economic growth. If insecurity is related to elevated rates of violent crime, as it is in the case of the Caribbean, it reflects the limited range of choices open to significant sections of society and the inequalities of opportunity that prevail. Given the strong relationship among crime, insecurity and human development in this region of highly vulnerable small and island micro-states and the importance of this issue to the people of the region, it is most appropriate that the problems of crime and insecurity should demand the attention of the first Human Development Report on the Caribbean. A Time for Action, the report of the West Indian Commission (1993), was an attempt to address the challenges of Caribbean development in a comprehensive way. Written in 1993, the report only briefly discussed the problem of insecurity, through a focus on illegal drugs. The decade of the 1990s was, however, a period in which the issue of insecurity became more problematic in the region. Subsequent regional reports, including the reports of the Task Force on Crime and Security of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM 2002) and of the United Nations Of2
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fice on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and World Bank (2007), have made invaluable contributions to the better understanding of the problem, improving policy-making and potentially enhancing the effectiveness of planning and programming in crime prevention and control at the national and regional levels. This HDR attempts to build on these efforts and to promote an explicitly developmental approach to the security of people. This HDR does not aim to replicate or to improve on these efforts, but, rather, to extend them. There are unavoidable overlaps between the HDR and these earlier reports, but this HDR reflects a deliberate attempt to minimize these overlaps. Therefore, this HDR does not attempt to explore every aspect of the security situation in the region. Thus, for example, the discussion of drug use and drug-trafficking is somewhat limited, and, related to this, the discussion of the transnational activity of organized crime networks is also limited. Indeed, the discussion of organized crime is largely restricted to national dimensions and activities and, particularly, the violence that is generated. This approach calls greater attention to the internal roots of the problem and does so without minimizing the importance of international cooperation in tackling transnational organized crime networks and drug-trafficking. Similarly, while the UNODC and World Bank report (2007) focuses on organized crime, the HDR places greater emphasis on street gangs and their role in generating violence. Consistent with the intent to avoid retracing the paths followed by earlier reports, the important issues of white-collar and corporate crime, as well as deportee or involuntarily returned migrants, are also excluded.6 The focus on violence and the responses or incapacity to respond effectively to violence is a central concern of the report.

The Caribbean
This is the first HDR on the Caribbean region. The Caribbean is diverse. It consists of several subgroupings that may be categorized in different ways. It may be subdivided by

geographical features into the mainland Caribbean and the insula (island) Caribbean and by linguistic groups into the Dutchspeaking, English-speaking, Francophone, and Hispanic Caribbean. The Caribbean is largely made up of societies that are young in historical terms. Except for Haiti, the Dominican Republic and Cuba, which became independent in 1804, 1821 and 1902, respectively, Caribbean societies have only emerged as independent nations in the last 50 years, and some still remain dependencies of European powers.7 In the case of the English-speaking Caribbean countries that attained their independence between 1962 and 1983, the sense of national identity that emerged during the latter part of the colonial era has not yet become consolidated into a source of social cohesion. These countries are also characterized by considerable variation in their basic demographic features, levels of development and state capacities. Caribbean populations are young, and, in several countries, most persons now live in urban areas. In the seven countries selected as the research sites for this report (the Caribbean-7), the proportion of persons below the age of 25 years ranges from a high of 54 percent in Guyana to a low of 36 percent in Barbados, with the corresponding population proportion for this group of countries is 46 percent.8 The populations of the region are diverse. Cultural differences are expressed in the wide range of languages and religions. Christianity is the dominant religion, but there are significant proportions of Hindus and Muslims in Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, and Guyana. In Trinidad and Tobago, 23 percent of the population are Hindus, and 6 percent are Muslims, and, in Guyana, the corresponding proportions are 28 and 7 percent. Racial, colour and ethnic diversity are variously configured within the region. For example, in Guyana and Trinidad and Tobago, no racial group enjoys majority status. The major racial groups are persons of East Indian origin, at 44 and 40 percent, respectively, and persons of African origin, at 30 and 38 percent, respectively. Other societies such as Jamaica and Antigua are of predominantly

African descent. Barbados has a numerically significant—at 3 percent—and economically powerful white racial minority. There are other minority groups, including Amerindians, who constitute 9 and 2 percent of the population in Guyana and Suriname, respectively.9 People of Chinese origin are also present and have made invaluable contributions to the development of the countries of the region. Differences in levels of development are captured in the distinction between those states that are classified as more developed countries (MDCs) and those that are classified as less developed countries (LDCs).10 This distinction is being erased by the higher growth rates and HDI scores of the LDCs and former LDCs. The MDCs are typically small states, while the LDCs are typically micro-states. The size of the populations of the micro-states falls within a range of less than 40,000 in Saint Kitts and Nevis to almost 173,000 in Saint Lucia. These states have limited capacities. Among them, regionalism is thus treated as a problem-solving device. Historically, the countries of the region have been producers of primary products for export. This pattern left legacies of inequality that have since been eroded by changes in economies, greater access to education and high rates of social mobility. But, in some Caribbean cities, particularly those in the larger territories, there are substantial populations of excluded poor. In contexts of rapid social change and socially dislocating modernizing processes, high levels of inequality and the multiple deprivations that are associated with social exclusion tend to be strongly correlated with criminal violence. The countries of the region have tried to increase their viability and reduce their vulnerabilities via regional integration. The Caribbean Community (CARICOM), the Caribbean Forum (CARIFORUM), and the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) are expressions of these efforts. CARICOM has a membership of 15 states. CARIFORUM is simply CARICOM, plus the Dominican Republic. It was expected to be a bridge to the Dutch-, French-, and Spanish-speaking countries of the Caribbean.
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OECS is a subset of more closely integrated CARICOM states. Earlier attempts at political integration were not successful, and the West Indies Federation, which was the architecture for political integration, collapsed in 1961 before the first set of Caribbean countries became independent. The movement for Caribbean integration now focuses on functional cooperation, economic integration, the coordination of foreign policy, and, most recently, regional security cooperation and rationalization. These are the four pillars of the integration movement. CARICOM has a fairly elaborate structure. At the apex of this structure is the Conference of Heads of Government. The regional security establishment includes the Council of National Security and Law Enforcement (CONSLE). At the level of the civil service, there are several committees consisting of heads of law enforcement and military, customs and migration officials and other representatives of security and law enforcement agencies. The operational arm of the security establishment is the Implementation Agency for Crime and Security (IMPACS), which, as its name suggests, coordinates the implementation of regional security policies. IMPACS was established after the completion of the work of the CARICOM Task Force on Crime and Security, which identified a number of priorities and made several recommendations to the Conference of Heads of Government, most of which remain relevant.11

The Selection of Countries
The scope of this report is limited to the Dutchspeaking and English-speaking countries. The selection of these two subregions is based on the understanding that insecurity has become a serious problem in these two groupings, but particularly in the English-speaking Caribbean. In addition, systematic work aimed at a better understanding of the issues on a truly regional scale has been somewhat limited. Moreover, there has not been a regional HDR for these groups of countries previously, and there have been only a few HDRs on the individual countries within these two subgroupings.12
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Seven countries within these two groups have been selected as the research sites for this report (the Caribbean-7). These countries are Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Guyana, Jamaica, Saint Lucia, Suriname, and Trinidad and Tobago. The report clearly focuses on the English-speaking group. These seven countries have been selected in a manner that accounts for geographical spread, population size, and the variations in the degree and character of the problem of insecurity. They have been selected with variation in mind. They represent the geographical dispersion of the group in that they include countries in the northern Caribbean (Jamaica), the south Caribbean (Trinidad and Tobago) and the east Caribbean (Saint Lucia). There are island territories (Barbados) and mainland territories (Guyana). There is variation in the size, including microstates (Saint Lucia and Antigua and Barbuda) and small states (Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago). And there is variation in the levels of development through the representation of LDCs and MDCs. The selected countries also represent the differences and range of variation in the level, structure and intensity of the crime and insecurity problems in the region. Barbados, for example, shows a high level of property crimes, but a relatively low level of violent crimes. Jamaica is the opposite. Among the English-speaking countries, the countries selected approximate a maximum variation sample. Suriname represents the Dutch-speaking territories. It is the only unambiguously independent Dutch-speaking territory. In this sense, it is self-selecting. We emphasize variation to capture the range of problems and experiences and thereby enrich the analysis and the proposed solutions to the problems. This approach, we hope, will make the report relevant and useful for all. As a regional HDR, the report and the process associated with it present an opportunity for the people of the region to learn more about each other and to learn from each other. Learning more about each other is imperative given the CARICOM and CARIFORUM integration frameworks and the impact of the forces of globalization. There is increasingly intensive contact among the

peoples of the region. Because of increased integration, there is more interdependence, shared vulnerabilities and greater risks and opportunities. Learning about each other smashes ster-eotypes and reduces fear and the treatment of neighbouring citizens as threats. Learning from each other involves making accessible the positive and negative experiences of the different countries of the region, thereby enhancing collective learning from this larger pool of experience. Given the dynamism and complexity of the crime and security problems and the importance of finding solutions to these problems for the people of the region, this ought to be a focal point for shared learning. Thus, in this report, promising practices are drawn from several countries. This approach is extended beyond the region to draw on some of the experiences of Central America and other parts of the hemisphere.

Crime and Development in the Caribbean
The negative impact of crime on development in its various aspects is well documented. Crime, particularly violent crime, tends to have a negative impact on vulnerable economies such as those of the Caribbean. It erodes confidence in the future development of countries, reduces the competitiveness of existing industries and services by, for example, imposing burdensome security costs, and may negatively alter the investment climate. Capital may take flight.13 Crime may generate insecurities among the general population that lead to loss of human capital via migration, that is, the loss of skilled and educated citizens. People may take flight. The quality of education and health care suffer because of the diversion of scarce resources to the control of crime. Crime destroys social capital and thereby retards the development process.14 This negative effect of crime on development represents an argument for more effective crime prevention and control and improved citizen security as a condition for development.15 In the context of the Caribbean, effective crime prevention and control

may be a condition for development, but development is also a condition for lower rates of violent crime and more secure societies. It is well known that growth is not equated with development. But the relationship between crime and growth may serve to illuminate the relationship of growth to development. The joint report of UNODC and the World Bank, Crime, Violence and Development: Trends, Costs, and Policy Options in the Caribbean, presents evidence in support of the claim that, on average, increased economic growth is associated with reduced crime rates.16 Economic growth increases opportunities. It may, however, also intensify inequalities and exclusionary trends, and, in the rapidly changing societies of the Caribbean region, it may also trigger unrealistic expectations and have strong mobilizing effects even among the excluded. Exclusionary and jobless growth and, especially, high rates of youth unemployment, coupled with unrealistic expectations and high levels of inequality, tend to result in high rates of crime, including violent crime. Particular countries may thus deviate from the general pattern or average effect of the impact of growth rates on crime rates or crime patterns. The relationship is policy and context sensitive. High rates of violent crime and gender violence may be regarded as the outcome of a wrong approach to development that marginalizes large sections of the population. Where crime, particularly violent crime, has become a major social problem, it has had feedback effects that retard the development process in the economic, social and even political dimensions. The effects of crime on some of the economies of the region have been documented. As suggested above, the effects extend beyond the economy. In the more socially fragmented societies of the region, the victimization of members of one group by members of another group may have the effect of deepening race, class and gender divisions. For example, if crime becomes racially motivated or otherwise associated with race, this may trigger race mobilization, which intensifies political conC ARIBBEAN H UMAN DE VELOPMENT R E P O R T 2 0 1 2

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flicts, thereby generating even greater insecurity. In such situations, it becomes exceedingly difficult to achieve consensus policies for crime prevention and control that would permit greater community-level cooperation and avoid cross-pressures on law enforcement and other state agencies that tend to make these agencies ineffective in policy implementation. Crime control and prevention policies thus become the policies of particular political administrations rather than truly national policies. High levels of violent crime may have other negative political effects. These effects may include the amplification of already existing authoritarian tendencies among citizens that take the form of demands for greater punitiveness, support for laws that reduce the rights of citizens and give greater power to the police, and, more recently, significant support for military regimes as a means of managing more effectively the problems of insecurity.17 These tendencies influence national policies, and it is the poor and the most vulnerable whose freedoms are most affected by crime and whose rights are most restricted by crime control measures. At the national level, if crime is responded to or fought in ways that reduce fundamental rights, then political development may be arrested and notions of citizenship may become problematic. Security policies that unnecessarily restrict the rights and freedoms of people tend to restrict political development. At the regional level, there is a reproduction of this problem if citizens of the countries of the region who seek opportunities elsewhere or who, in various ways, conduct business or simply wish to travel within the region are subjected to indignities and disrespectful treatment by border control agents. These activities find their justification in narratives that seek to tie links among freedom of movement, the migration of poverty and a crime contagion. If crime and violent behaviour are externalized in this way, then unwarranted restriction on movement within the region is the likely outcome. Yet, given the small size of the countries and the corresponding limited pools of human capital in any one country,
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free movement is vital to the integration process and to development in the region. The approach to crime control that regards it as a trade-off with freedom and rights is but an expression of a broader attitude towards the place of the ordinary citizen in the larger development process. Freedoms and rights may be seen as threatening to the development process, which, it is felt, requires a disciplined focus on economic growth and capital accumulation. As in matters of crime control and security, where freedom may be seen as an obstacle rather than as foundational to the security of citizens, so too in matters of economic development: freedom may be seen as an obstacle to development (at least in its early stages) rather than as constitutive of development.18 Given the effects described above, the concern regarding the development strategies of some countries of the region, particularly in the 1960s to 1980s, was that these strategies were exclusionary and thus underestimated the importance, in the development process, of social integration and human creativity. The pattern of concentration of violent crimes in the communities of the urban poor that is described in this report is evidence of the association of crime with exclusionary processes that have long histories and that have found much contemporary reinforcement. In troubled countries, a vicious cycle has been set in motion, thereby making crime control and prevention more difficult. This vicious cycle of unbalanced development that generates high levels of crime and insecurity that, in turn, impede development may be avoided. Where this vicious cycle exists, it may be transformed into a virtuous circle. Balanced development reduces and prevents the emergence of crime as a major social problem. Sound crime reduction and prevention facilitate the achievement of development goals. In the words of Helen Clark, the Administrator of the UNDP, “If we fail to reduce [the] levels of armed violence in affected countries, our collective commitment to MDG targets is not only under threat; but indeed progress is likely to be reversed.”19

There is considerable variation in the population size, land area and natural resources of the countries of the Caribbean, but they are, in the main, small island developing states (SIDSs). They rely on state institutions to respond to the security challenges they face. These countries, however, cannot afford to spend large proportions of their budgets to strengthen law enforcement machinery. They must invest in the prevention of crime, in the capabilities of their people and in the creation of opportunities. The degree, intensity and character of the problems of crime and insecurity vary from country to country. The capacities of the state institutions that are charged with the responsibility to protect the populations they serve and to ensure justice are also quite different within the region. Regardless of these differences, however, crime and insecurity have become more generalized Caribbean problems. Crime, violence and insecurity demand our attention. The problem is acute and in need of urgent action. A sense of urgency usually inspires policies that are intended to yield short-term results and therefore are usually restricted to more punitive measures, more robust law enforcement action, and assigning more power to the police, typically without the commensurate systems of accountability. The challenge behind this report is to discover ways to address crime as a fundamental development issue without ignoring the pressing shortterm aspects of crime. The challenge is to meet the requirements of urgency, effectiveness and justice without neglecting the root socio-economic causes of the problem. It may reasonably be claimed that HDRs have helped shift the debate on development and that this shift has had some impact on public policy and, consequently, on the conditions of the lives of people in the region. A similar shift in thinking is needed in security and crime control policy-making. Shifts in ways of thinking and acting on this scale are usually the outcome of slow processes that may take place in many different sites of innovation in crime reduction and prevention both within the state and non-state sectors and at

the national and regional levels. Such shifts in thinking are most likely to first occur and take effect as policy if there is an inclusive and deliberative approach to policy-making based on an active citizenry and open and accountable government and if the welfare and rights of the citizen are at the centre of security considerations and the citizen is regarded as a critical actor in the co-production of security. This report hopes to make a contribution to this process of change and innovation, not least by documenting and highlighting some of the good practices that may be observed in the region.

Citizen Security: a Shift in Ideas
We believe that the required shift in thinking is reflected in the idea of citizen security. Citizen security may be regarded as a dimension of human security. The more overarching construct, human security, “is based on a fundamental understanding that Governments retain the primary role for ensuring the survival, livelihood and dignity of their citizens.”20 Human security articulates a core set of concerns, including safety for people from both violent and non-violent threats and safety from both state and non-state actors. It refers to “one of the means or conditions for human development, which in turn is defined as the process that opens up an individual’s options . . . [which] range from enjoying a long and healthy life, access to the knowledge and resources needed to achieve a decent standard of living, to enjoyment of political, economic and social freedoms.”21 In this construct, citizen security is strictly a dimension of human security because it is conceived as the social situation in which all persons are free to enjoy their fundamental rights and in which public institutions have sufficient capacity, against a backdrop of the rule of law, to guarantee the exercise of those rights and respond efficiently when those rights are violated. 22 Thus, the citizenry is the principal focus of the state’s protection. It is a necessary, but not sufficient condition of human development. Therefore, institutional interventions to prevent and control violence and crime (citizen
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security policies) can be regarded as an indirect, but, nonetheless, significant opportunity, first, to buttress sustainable economic development and, second, to strengthen democratic governance and the observance of human rights.23 The concept of ‘citizen security’ is associated with security against the threat of crime or violence and is used to refer to the paramount security of individuals and social groups. It does not stand in opposition to the preservation of the territorial integrity of the state. Citizen security includes institutional and social actions to protect and guarantee effective liberties and the rights of people through the control and prevention of crime and disorder. In addition, the “concept of citizen security involves those rights to which all members of a society are entitled, so that they are able to live their daily lives with as little threat as possible to their personal security, their civic rights and their right to the use and enjoyment of their property.”24 This conceptualization entails the idea that the state has an obligation to protect the citizen and to do so in ways that respect rights. These ideas have universal appeal and are particularly relevant in the Caribbean. Elements essential to increasing citizen security in the Caribbean context therefore include the reform of state institutions to make them more effective and ensure they respect rights, the creation of avenues for citizen participation and the development of programmes geared towards decreasing poverty and inequality, including gender and race or ethnic inequality, thereby increasing social integration. The idea of citizen security also places responsibilities on the citizens. They are expected to participate actively in the co-production of their security in partnership with state agencies. This means citizens must actively engage in problem-solving in their communities and in demanding greater accountability among state agencies, including the police and courts. It means taking greater responsibility for their own security and their own behaviour, respecting the rights and integrity
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of others and acknowledging their responsibility towards their fellow citizens. Security and human progress entail a commitment to good citizenship. The capacity of responsible state institutions, however, remains central to the effective protection of the citizen. Institutions Strong and legitimate institutions and inclusive systems of governance are crucial to providing citizen security and justice so as to break cycles of violence.25 In the Caribbean, the law enforcement and justice systems tend to be weak and have a limited capacity to provide the effective protection of citizens. Thus, while building the capacity of state institutions, it is necessary to transform the relationship between these institutions and the people so that, in the case of the provision of security services and the administration of justice, this is done with the people, not only for the people. This is the option of transitioning to citizen security, that is, a profoundly democratic approach to security. This approach is even more important for the enduring stability of weak and vulnerable states such as those in the region. In this context, the term citizen security is not used to carry the idea of pushing back or pushing out the state. Rather, it involves democratizing the state so that it better serves and protects the people. In its most developed expression, it entails the co-production of security by state and citizen. As a co-producer of security, the citizen has a duty to respect the rights, physical integrity and dignity of others. Traditional approaches to security in situations where the capacity of the state to protect and ensure adequate access to justice is doubtful may lead to external dependency and a renunciation of democratic processes and practices. Just as there can be jobless, voiceless and rootless growth, there can be voiceless security, that is, a paternalistic state security system whereby the state is not accountable to its citizens and, worse, whereby authoritarian tendencies are strengthened in the state security establishment, the political administration and among sections of the population. There can also be a rights-less security whereby populations are told that they must constantly give up their rights as a trade-off for the more effec-

The time to act is now. The trajectory of violence can be interrupted, and insecurity can be diminished. This has been achieved elsewhere and can be achieved in the countries of the region.

tive provision of security by the state. Through these old patterns, security is set in opposition to any notion of political development that is grounded in democratic principles of voice, participation and accountability. Social Prevention A transition to citizen security means not only institutional reform, but also a focus on the reduction of social risks, that is, social crime prevention. This assures a stable and sustained security that does not rest primarily on police action and the imposition of discipline by the state and therefore does not constantly seek to trade away the rights and freedoms of security among citizens. Social crime prevention means ending marginalization and more effectively integrating excluded sections of the population. The improved social integration of society increases the potential for greater resilience and better state-society relations, which may result in greater voluntary compliance with the law. This focus on social crime prevention means paying attention to the social conditions that are most associated with crime and creating greater opportunities and choices for people, which does not necessarily mean one must design expensive intervention programmes in skills training and job creation. The root causes of violent crimes, especially youth crimes and delinquency, include less tangible factors that account for the alienation and sense of exclusion among these population groups. Paying attention to the root causes therefore also means treating people with respect, positively protecting their rights, and promoting common integrative identities that bridge race, colour, ethnicity, class, gender and other social divides, thereby promoting a common sense of belonging and a common national and regional purpose. The survey which was conducted as a part of this project—the UNDP Citizen Security Survey 2010—found majority support for this approach in every country. The adoption of programmes of social crime prevention is, therefore, not a politically risky policy. In summary, citizen security ought to have social prevention, citizen rights, and state institutional reform dimensions. Citizen secu-

rity is most effective if states are responsive and accountable and are willing to integrate crime prevention into larger development planning and if citizens are aware of their civic duties and rights and are engaged in the coproduction of their own security.

The Messages of the Report
The central message of this report is simple enough: the Caribbean countries need to complete the shift from an approach to security that is centrally concerned with regime protection to the full adoption of a citizen security approach that is consistently pursued in the context of human development. Caribbean countries have a long history of inequality and discrimination. The inequality includes inequalities of social power that find expression in the unbalanced distribution of state protection and the inequitable treatment of rights and freedoms. This historical pattern still affects the distribution of the protective resources of the state and the way in which the rights of different groups, including the most vulnerable, are treated. Citizen security is centred on profoundly changing this relationship between the state and the citizenry by making institutions more responsive and accountable to the people they serve. Such a fundamental change entails greater social integration, which may be brought about by seeking to resolve the problems of social exclusion and marginalization among large sections of the populations—including state security practices that do not respect rights and unnecessarily stigmatize and criminalize—and by a greater emphasis on human development. These ideas may be simple, but they are hugely significant in the everyday lives of the people of the region. The main messages of this report are as follows: • First, with the right mix of policies, high levels of violence can be successfully turned around. There are many useful and instructive cases of countries that have been able to make considerable improvements in their security situations, while reducing the levels of violence and insecurity. Some of these experiences are included in the variC ARIBBEAN H UMAN DE VELOPMENT R E P O R T 2 0 1 2

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ous chapters of this report. There are also valuable and instructive Caribbean experiences at the country and community levels. Barbados, for example, has avoided high levels of criminal and political violence. Targeted prevention programmes, especially those that are directed at youth, the greater responsiveness and accountability of state agencies, national unity, and high levels of citizen participation all contribute to effective outcomes. The practices and lessons of some of these experiences may be helpful for other countries and are discussed in the report. • Second, gender-based violence (GBV) can be controlled and prevented by interventions that interrupt the cycle of violence. Some forms of GBV, particularly domestic violence, tend to show histories and patterns of abusive behaviour that may be disrupted in their early stages before they degenerate into life-threatening and life-taking physical violence. This requires investments aimed at developing the capabilities of the responsible institutions of the state. • Third, social cohesion is generally greater in communities that have no street gangs and less in communities that have street gangs. Street gangs are major contributors to the high rates of violence. This message should instruct policy. Social cohesion is promoted by socially integrative policies that give people, particularly young people, a sense of being valued and belonging to the community and the country regardless of ethnicity, gender, class, or other differences. • Fourth, security efforts are more effective if the rights of the people are respected and the people are involved as active agents and coproducers of their own security. If they are to be effective, the policy-making and policyimplementation processes and the state institutions that are responsible for public safety and the security of citizens must have the confidence of the people. Confidence rests on respect for rights and adherence to the principles of good governance, including accountability, transparency and participation. Processes that are open and participatory and institutions that are fair
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•

•

•

•

and responsive are likely to be more effective. Fifth, there is considerable popular support for social crime prevention. Caribbean populations, including in the most crime-affected countries, tend to have a strong sense of social justice that informs their thinking about crime prevention and crime reduction policies. Public policies that are oriented towards social justice are therefore likely to be consensus policies. Considerable evidence in support of this conclusion is presented in this report. Sixth, empowering young people by investing in their development should be a priority. Most Caribbean countries have young populations. There are large populations of youth at risk, some of whom may drift into self-destructive anti-social behaviour. It follows that investments in youth and, more specifically, investments in youth at risk or detached youth are likely to yield significant returns in terms of reductions in violence and crime and greater citizen security. Because violent crime is a drag on development, investments in the prevention of youth violence may, in turn, yield good results in human development. Seventh, opportunities matter. This is why the importance of social crime prevention is underscored, but a sense of belonging, participating in political and community life, being respected by others, and having one’s rights respected matter equally; in the case of young people, they may matter even more. Improving security therefore does not involve only the design and implementation of costly programmes. It requires adequate regard for the intangibles associated with how people are treated and with greater social integration and cohesion. Eighth, crime and insecurity are costly to longterm development. Successfully meeting the security challenges of the moment requires the consistent adoption of a citizen security approach. The time to act is now. The trajectory of violence can be interrupted, and insecurity can be diminished. This has been achieved elsewhere and can be achieved in the countries of the region.

The Process of Producing the Report
The HDR Process The process of producing the report may be divided into two basic stages. During the first stage, monographs on the situation in the Caribbean-7 countries selected for participation in the HDR process were prepared, albeit with considerable limitations in the availability of comparable data. During the second stage, an analysis of the regional situation was conducted, and the regional HDR was produced. The national processes and the seven national monographs fed into the second stage of the process. Methodological Issues Evidence-based policy and programme design requires rigorous analysis of the problems to be addressed. This HDR relies heavily on primary data gathered through the UNDP Citizen Security Survey 2010.26 Extensive use is also made of secondary sources, including official statistics on reported crimes, although this was limited by the absence of comparable data on all countries. For example, data on the caseloads of courts, the caseloads of police investigators and other indicators of the capacities and capabilities of institutions of the criminal justice systems of the countries of the region are not uniformly available across all countries. The UNDP Citizen Security Survey 2010 was administered in the Caribbean-7, which are named in the section on Selection of Countries. Some 11,155 resident citizens of the Caribbean-7 were randomly selected and interviewed. The target population of the survey was households with at least one person older than 18 years of age and residing permanently in the household. The sample for the survey was designed to reflect the key demographic characteristics of the adult population of the participating countries based on the results of the most recent population censuses. For each country, the sample was self-weighted by regional and gender distribution and configured to be representative of the target population. A multi-stage, stratified area probability sample

was developed. The objective of this sample design was to attain the highest level of representativeness and distribution among the selected sampling units and, in turn, the respondents of the survey.27 The report also relies on secondary data taken from official sources in the Caribbean-7. It is well known that reported crime rates do not usually approximate true crime rates. The proximity of the reported crime rate to the true crime rate usually varies with the seriousness of the type of crime. Thus, for example, in most jurisdictions, the reported homicide rate may be assumed to approximate closely the true homicide rate. For those types of crimes on which the reported rates are high across jurisdictions, valid comparisons within and across countries may be made. At the other end of the spectrum, the proportions of property crimes that are reported will tend to be much lower and will tend to vary considerably across jurisdictions. This makes crossnational comparisons somewhat problematic. However, if within any given country, the proportion of each crime that is reported is stable over time, then trend analyses may be meaningful. Some of the factors that may affect changes in the proportion of crimes that are reported to police services include the level of confidence in the police and other institutions of the justice system and patterns of insurance coverage. Under normal conditions, these factors tend to change rather slowly. Trends may thus be compared and contrasted across countries even though the official statistics may not represent true crime rates and the proportion of reported crimes may differ across countries. Another obstacle to comparative analyses of official crime statistics is the differences in legal definitions of various crimes. These definitional differences may be found in the Caribbean. This problem has been minimized by selecting for comparative analysis only those crimes that are legally defined in similar fashion across the Caribbean-7 jurisdictions, such as murder and homicide, and those crimes that are amenable to reconstituted operational definitions, such as burglary. Where
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particular categories of crimes have been reconstituted to make them comparable, these changes are noted in the text. Consultations: Participation Matters The process of producing the report has involved extensive and intensive consultations with experts, practitioners and a variety of institutional actors and interested parties across the region. There were three iterations of national consultations in Barbados, Jamaica, Suriname, and Trinidad and Tobago and fewer, but similarly targeted consultations during bilateral meetings in Antigua and Barbuda and in Saint Lucia. Some 194 persons, including government officials and representatives of civil society, experts and practitioners, actively participated in this process. Five regional consultations were also held in Paramaribo, Suriname; Port of Spain, Trinidad and Tobago; Bridgetown, Barbados; Castries, Saint Lucia; and Kingstown, Jamaica between 1 and 20 September, 2011 and involving 256 persons, including members of regional organizations such as the Regional Security System and CARICOM. The consultations were developed using the democratic dialogue methodology, and they provided the opportunity to

cross-check and flesh out the findings derived from the data generated during the survey according to the experiences of the participants in the consultative process. Participation is an important principle. It ensures good recommendations that are grounded in the evidence generated by the research process, as well as the experience of practitioners. Good recommendations are not simply bright new ideas. They are ideas that are effective in the particular national environment and that sufficiently animate people and motivate them to invest their time and energy in implementation. The best results are achieved if rigorous research is combined with efforts to tap into the experiences of practitioners and stakeholders. This requires the active participation of practitioners and stakeholders. The commitment to participation is grounded in confidence in the knowledge that people may contribute and the belief that people’s actions make a difference in determining outcomes. For this HDR, the participatory process is expected to be ongoing and may be even more fruitful after the report has been published. The process initiated by the report will, hopefully, be more important than the report itself.

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CHAPTER

Crime Trends since Independence and the Impact on Vulnerable Groups

Proactive, pre-emptive policies need to target at-risk groups, eradicating violence before it starts It’s not culture; it’s crime: no form of gender-based violence should be tolerated Rejection by the mainstream breeds mischief on the margins

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CHAPTER

Crime Trends since Independence and the Impact on Vulnerable Groups 1
Crime Trends since Independence and the Impact on Vulnerable Groups
15

Introduction
This chapter examines crime trends since independence and locates these trends in the context of the development challenges faced by Caribbean countries during this period. It identifies aspects of citizen insecurity in the region and shows how feelings of insecurity have shaped public attitudes about the effectiveness of Caribbean governments in fighting crime. The chapter first reviews and describes important developments in crime in the region since independence. It then discusses the victimization reported by the participants in the UNDP Citizen Security Survey 2010 for this Caribbean Human Development Report (HDR), followed by an examination of the fears about crime or the anxieties related to the perceived risk of victimization that these people experience and the protective steps they have taken. At several points, the discussion focuses on the experiences and concerns of vulnerable groups.

The Caribbean Context
Although the achievement of national independence is supposed to signal a promising moment in the path towards development, the optimism with which countries in the region engaged in their independence was soon challenged by economic, political and social factors that had foundations in the colonial past. The legacy of deep social problems, such as high levels of income inequality and inequality of opportunity, including gender inequality, high rates of unemployment, high rates of rural and urban poverty, and communities with histories of social exclusion, has continued to exert an influence until today. Post-independence governments

must bear some of the responsibility for these disappointing results. Better management of the transition from independence might have produced more positive outcomes among populations. For instance, governmental policy for economic development was based on direct foreign investment in key sectors of the region’s economies. When strains emerged soon after independence, evident in the resentment felt about foreign ownership, enclave economic growth, limited economic diversification, high unemployment and rising social discontent, these were not adequately addressed in creative and positive ways. Indeed, the current economic and social predicament facing the region demands innovative leadership and sound long-term development strategies. Thus, the region’s development and, by extension, the peoples’ quality of life have been affected by a range of negative factors. Economically, except for Guyana’s agricultural sector and Trinidad and Tobago’s extractive sector, the light industries and services that once sustained the region have struggled. The region now relies heavily on travel and tourism for economic wealth and job creation. The World Travel and Tourism Council ranks the Caribbean region first (among 12 regions) in the relative contribution of tourism to the regional economy and the most tourist-dependent area in the world. Tourism accounts for 25 percent of the foreign exchange earnings, 20 percent of all jobs, and between 25 and 35 percent of the total economy of the Caribbean.1 The region’s heavy dependence on tourism creates vulnerabilities, such as the emergence of sex tourism, which exploits young women and children. Tourism is highly vulnerable to developments in source countries such as tax regimes and changes in the business cycle in these countries, as well
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as the effects of climate change, including the loss of shore-line and more extreme weather conditions. It is also vulnerable to the effects of high rates of violence. Persistently high rates of violence in a single country or group of countries have the potential to damage the reputations of all the countries of a region. This is truly a regional issue and a regional vulnerability. Politically, the region underwent dramatic changes in response to powerful shifts in global and local values that began in the 1960s with the Black Power Movement and continued into the 1970s with other social movements that were inspired by grass-roots advocacy for social justice and social change. The outcome was a shift to the left by some states, such as Guyana, which adopted cooperative socialism under Forbes Burnham, and Jamaica, which turned to democratic socialism under Michael Manley. During the 1970s, the ideas associated with these social movements became, for a time, part of the political mainstream and profoundly influenced the development policies of governments in the region. In one of the outcomes, social sensibilities and public attitudes towards restraining moral values underwent dramatic changes beginning in the early 1970s. As the growing population of young people became more assertive, claims for individual empowerment and more open opportunity structures, especially wider access to education, created greater pressure for social reform. This is reflected in the comparatively better performance of the countries of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) on international indicators such as the Human Development Index (HDI) and their ranking as middle-income countries.2 Human Development in the Caribbean Community Human development measures rely on the HDI, which is a summary measure for assessing long-term progress in three basic dimensions of human development: a long and healthy life, access to knowledge and a decent standard of living. The HDI has been

estimated since 1990 for most countries in the world. However, a complete 1990–2011 HDI series has been calculated for only three countries among the Dutch-speaking and English-speaking countries in the Caribbean, while, for many others, especially small island developing states (SIDSs), the HDI was estimated for the first time only in 2010–2011.3 This represents a challenge in looking at HDI trends in the region. The HDIs for the seven Caribbean countries selected as the research sites for this report (the Caribbean-7) are presented in chart 1.1. The HDI for Barbados for 2011 is 0.793, positioning the country in the very high human development category and a rank of 47 among 187 countries and territories. For the rest of the countries, with the exception of Suriname and Guyana, the HDI ranges between 0.764 and 0.723, positioning these in the high human development category. Suriname and Guyana, with HDIs of 0.680 and 0.633, respectively, are in the medium human development category. Among the Caribbean-7, only Barbados, Antigua and Barbuda, and Trinidad and Tobago have HDIs higher than the HDI for the Latin America and Caribbean (LAC) region (0.731). To reflect more closely the specific characteristics of the Dutch-speaking and Englishspeaking countries, we have estimated a 2011 aggregated HDI that covers all CARICOM countries for which data are available.4 This represents the first attempt to estimate such an HDI. The 2011 CARICOM estimated HDI is 0.564, which is considerably lower than the 2011 LAC HDI. Since the HDI is a population-weighted index, the low value of the CARICOM HDI may be explained by the impact of Haiti, given the proportion of the CARICOM population accounted for by Haiti (nearly 60 percent) in 2011. If the CARICOM HDI is estimated without including Haiti, the value shifts upwards (0.724), which better approximates the reality of the Dutchspeaking and English-speaking countries and is closer to the LAC HDI (0.731).

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Chart 1.1
0.800 0.750 0.700 0.650 0.600 0.550 0.500 0.450 0.400 Barbados (47) 0.793

Human Development Index, Caribbean-7, 2011

1
0.731 LAC HDI Crime Trends since Independence and the Impact on Vulnerable Groups
17

0.764

0.760 0.727 0.723 0.680 0.633

0.564 CARICOM HDI

Antigua & Trinidad & Barbuda Tobago (60) (62)

Jamaica Saint Lucia Suriname (79) (82) (104)

Guyana (117)

Source: Calculations of the UNDP Regional Centre for Latin America and the Caribbean based on International Human Development Indicators (database), UNDP, New York, http://hdrstats.undp.org/en/tables/.

Trends in the Three Basic Dimensions of Human Development Trends in the HDI and in the three basic dimensions of the HDI for the Caribbean-7 are presented in chart 1.2. All the countries show positive average growth rates in the three HDI components. Between 1980 and 2011, the increase in life expectancy ranged from 10.4 years in Guyana to 2.6 years in Jamaica. Barbados has the longest life expectancy, at 76.8 years, and Guyana has the shortest, at 69.9 years, followed by Suriname, at 70.6 years. In education, the mean years of schooling in 2011 varied from 7.2 years in Suriname to 9.3 and 9.6 years in Barbados and Jamaica, respectively. The increase in gross national income since 1980 shows positive trends in all seven countries. The Inequality-Adjusted HDI The HDI is an average measure of basic human development achievements. As an average, it masks inequality in the distribution of human development across a population at the country level. The 2010 global HDR

introduced the inequality-adjusted HDI (IHDI), which takes inequality into account across all three dimensions of the HDI by discounting the average value in each dimension according to the relevant level of inequality in a country.5 The human development potential forgone because of inequality is indicated by the difference between the HDI and the IHDI, which can be expressed as a percentage. Due to a lack of relevant data, the IHDI has only been calculated for Trinidad and Tobago (0.644 and an overall loss of 15.3 percent), Jamaica (0.610 and an overall loss of 16.2 percent), Suriname (0.518 and an overall loss of 23.8 percent), and Guyana (0.492 and an overall loss of 22.3 percent). In general, the overall loss among these countries is lower than the overall loss among LAC countries (26 percent). The Gender Inequality Index The Gender Inequality Index (GII) reflects women’s disadvantage in three dimensions— reproductive health, empowerment and economic activity—for as many countries as data
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Crime Trends since Independence and the Impact on Vulnerable Groups

Chart 1.2

Trends in HDI and HDI Components, Caribbean-7, 1980–2011
Education Index 1.00 1.00 Health Index 1.00 Income Index

1.00

Human Development Index (HDI) value

0.80

0.80

0.80

0.80

0.60

0.60

0.60

0.60

0.40

0.40

0.40

0.40

0.20

0.20

0.20

0.20

0.00

1980 1990 2000 2011 Antigua & Barbuda (60)

0.00

1980 1990 2000 2011 Guyana (117)

0.00 Jamaica (79)

1980 1990 2000 2011 Saint Lucia (82)

0.00

1980 1990 2000 2011 Trinidad & Tobago (62)

Barbados (47)

Suriname (104)

Source: Calculations of the UNDP Regional Centre for Latin America and the Caribbean based on International Human Development Indicators (database), UNDP, New York, http://hdrstats.undp.org/en/tables/.

of reasonable quality allow.6 The GII shows the loss in human development caused by inequality between the respective achievements of men and women in the three GII dimensions. The 2011 score on the GII has been estimated for Trinidad and Tobago (0.331), Barbados (0.364), Jamaica (0.450), and Guyana (0.551). The scores reflect a percentage loss in achievement across the three dimensions that arises because of gender inequality of 33.1, 36.4, 45.0 and 55.1 percent, respectively. Trinidad and Tobago, as well as Barbados, experienced the least loss, while Guyana experienced the greatest loss. In the case of Jamaica and Guyana, the loss is higher than the LAC average (44.5 percent). Advances in social policy that are represented in the HDI measurements noted above may be compromised by poor economic performance and high debt burden. With
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some exceptions, countries in the region currently have high debt ratios, high unemployment rates and significant poverty rates. Girvan (2011, citing CARICOM 2010a) reports that national poverty rates are 14.5 percent in Jamaica, 15.9 percent in Nevis, 16.7 percent in Trinidad and Tobago, 18.4 percent in Antigua and Barbuda, 27.0 percent in Saint Kitts, 28.8 percent in Saint Lucia and 37.7 percent in Grenada.7 The majority of the region’s poor live in rural areas.8 UNDP (2004) finds that there is considerable variation and unevenness in the poverty profile of countries in the region, as well as significant disparities in wealth distribution. Women have made important advances in education, labour force participation, political participation and equality before the law, but gender inequalities persist.9 The economic sectors that have traditionally provided employ-

ment and contributed to the livelihoods of poor women and their families, such as agriculture and light industries, have experienced significant decline. In addition, the global financial crisis has deepened the economic crisis in the Caribbean and undercut the well-being of women in the region. These economic factors, together with other outcomes of gender inequality, such as the gender employment gap, the gender pay gap, occupational segregation, and the burden of unpaid work, are contributing to the marginality of Caribbean women. Indeed, the significant rate of poverty among women, coupled with their dependent status within countries and in the region, has had long-term negative effects, not the least of which is the intergenerational transmission of poverty and inequality.10 The current high level of violent crime in the Caribbean region is a result of some of these convergences. Increasing rates of violent crime and the public’s deepened sense of insecurity have led governments in the region to undertake remedial measures. The crisis has also encouraged collaboration with international and regional agencies and institutions. Indeed, the involvement of these agencies has contributed to a noticeable increase in scholarship on the region’s crime problems. The scholarship has introduced a needed comparative framework that goes beyond the earlier concern about high crime rates in specific countries to focus on the whole region and argue that anti-crime efforts require a response that is regionwide. CARICOM agreed in 2001 to establish the Regional Task Force on Crime and Security (RTFCS) to identify the major causes of crime in the Caribbean and to recommend approaches to deal with the interrelated problems of crime. The task force report identified the main security threats in the region and highlighted the threats from illegal drugs, from the increasing involvement of youth in crime and from the increased access to and use of illegal firearms as major sources of insecurity in the region.11 The threats and challenges identified in the RTFCS report overlap with those identified by Harriott (2002), Deosaran (2007a) and UNODC and the World Bank (2007).

As the discussion above illustrates, the growth of violent crime in the Caribbean region is one manifestation of declines on many national and regional fronts. Here, as elsewhere in the world, crime is contextualized in an environment of high debt, high rates of poverty and high unemployment, especially youth unemployment. These occur in an environment of changes in crime patterns, changes in public attitudes, and weakening institutions. It is important to understand the outcome of all these factors and changes on the personal sense of security from crime among the respondents to the Crime Security Survey 2010 (chart 1.3). Regionwide, 46 percent of the respondents said that, overall, they felt secure or very secure living in their countries; looked at the other way, more than half felt insecure because of crime or uncertain about crime and security. The sense of security was strongest in Barbados (79 percent) and weakest in Trinidad and Tobago (25 percent).

1
Crime Trends since Independence and the Impact on Vulnerable Groups 57.6 45.5 24.7 Trinidad & Tobago Suriname Caribbean-7
19

Chart 1.3
90 80 70 60 Percent 50 40 30 20 10 0 45.9

Sense of Security in the Caribbean-7, 2010

78.7

42.7 35.7 37.7

Guyana

Jamaica

Source: UNDP Citizen Security Survey 2010. Note: Base: all respondents (N = 11,155). Question: “How secure or insecure do you consider (living in) your country to be?” The chart shows the share of respondents who answered “Secure” or “Very secure”.

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Saint Lucia

Antigua & Barbuda

Barbados

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Crime Trends since Independence and the Impact on Vulnerable Groups

Crime Trends Since Independence
The region consists of small, open societies that have been subjected to globalization and fairly rapid modernization. These forces have also fostered social instability and rising rates of violent crime. As the literature on modernization and development confirms, modernization has contradictory effects. On the one hand, it enhances economic growth and living standards. On the other, it fosters social mobility that may widen the gulf between rich and poor, thereby heightening the sense of relative deprivation among marginalized groups. Indeed, a deep sense of relative deprivation may well have an impact on the crime rate precisely because it fosters, among marginalized groups, outrage and the search for remedies to injustice by any means.12 The increase in criminal violence across the region threatens the post-independence development trajectory of most nations and will have consequences in the attainment of or the poor performance in global indicators such as the Millennium Development Goals, as well as in national development plans. The changes in post-independence environments have coincided to impact the region’s security landscape. This includes the economic consequences of structural adjustment programmes in several countries. In addition, the region has been affected by the violence associated with and emerging from political competition, growth in the drug trade and, more recently, gang-related violence. High levels of violence represent a break from the colonial pattern of criminal offending, which was characterized by high rates of property crime and low rates of violent crime. Jamaica was the first country to break with this pattern and consistently exhibit high rates of violent crime. In a discussion of crime trends in Jamaica, Harriott (1996), identifies three discernable stages in the development of criminality in independent Jamaica. The first was a continuity with the colonial era in terms of the structure of crime, that is, a continuation of a pattern that was dominated by property crime rather than violent crime. The second stage was associated with a clear turn towards violence (largely due to the growth in drug-traf-

ficking and high-intensity political violence). The third and current stage is associated with the activities of transnational organized crime and gang conflicts. The third stage also evidences an increase in violent crimes such as homicide, more firearm-related offences and violence against women. This is not the inevitable trajectory of other Caribbean countries. Indeed, several other Caribbean countries have not followed this path, but they have been variously affected by the drug trade and gang violence, and, in several countries, there was a clearly discernable turn towards higher rates of homicide and other categories of violent crime during the first decade of the 2000s. During the consultations that were part of the process of producing this report, participants repeatedly expressed concern regarding the elevated levels of violence in their countries and in the region. In some Caribbean countries, aggregate crime rates are falling. Prior to 1990, with some exceptions, the Caribbean was characterized by low rates of violent crime, and the ratio of property crimes to violent crimes approximated the rates in developed countries. For more than a decade, violent crimes have been on a downward trend in most parts of the world. Harrendorf, Heiskanen, and Malby (2010) report that, in countries where trend data are available, the majority show decreasing or stable homicide rates. In the Caribbean, however, the trend in violent crime has been moving in the opposite direction; it has been increasing. Despite the rising rates of violent crime, there are variations in the structure of crime and the complexity of crime problems across the Caribbean countries. In some countries, property crime rates continue to outstrip violent crime rates. A review of the current structure of crime throughout the region shows countries such as Barbados, Saint Lucia, and Antigua and Barbuda with low violent crime rates, but high rates of property crime.13 Property crimes such as burglaries are often associated with inequalities, especially relative poverty. Homicides: Homicide is one of the most reliably and consistently recorded crimes.14

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Chart 1.4
70 60 50 40 Rate 30 20 10 0 1990

Homicide Rates Per 100,000 Population, Caribbean-7, 1990–2010

1
Crime Trends since Independence and the Impact on Vulnerable Groups
21

1992

1994

1996

1998 Barbados Suriname

2000

2002

2004

2006

2008 Jamaica

2010

Antigua & Barbuda Saint Lucia

Guyana Trinidad & Tobago

Sources: Royal Antigua and Barbuda Police Force; Royal Barbados Police Force; Guyana Police Force; Jamaica Constabulary Force, Statistics Division; Royal Saint Lucia Police Force, Crime and Problem Analysis Branch; Trinidad and Tobago Police Service.

The patterns exhibited in the associated crime rates may therefore be discussed with considerable confidence. During the pre-independence period, Caribbean homicide rates were comparable with and, in some instances, lower than the rates in other developing countries. After independence and prior to the 1990s, homicide rates within the region were below the global average.15 By 1990, however, Latin America and the Caribbean had an average homicide rate of 22.9 per 100,000 citizens, and the region was ranked first in the homicide rate among regions of the world.16 As depicted in chart 1.4, there has been considerable variation in the homicide rates across time in the countries of the Caribbean-7 on which trend data are available. Jamaica has had particularly high per capita homicide rates and is ranked among the most violent countries worldwide. The homicide

rates were relatively low and stable in the other five across the 1990–2000 period. Since then, the homicide rate has risen substantially in Trinidad and Tobago and fluctuated, but trended mostly upward in Antigua and Barbuda, Guyana, and Saint Lucia. Barbados has experienced some fluctuation, but tended to have a low and stable rate across the 20-year period of 1990–2010. Some of the conditions that influence homicide rates across the Caribbean region include, but are not limited to crime clearance rates, levels of development, low rates of economic growth, and the proportion of young men in the population.17 Drug-trafficking (in some concrete contexts) and weapons availability are also associated with high homicide rates. The RTFCS report identifies increased access to firearms and the greater involvement of
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youth in crimes as conditions influencing the commission of crimes in the region. Increased insecurity can be related to gun ownership. On the one hand, it can lead to a rise in the number of legal registration applications for firearms. On the other hand, insecurity also arises from the spread of legal and illegal firearms, a condition that is now manifest in the rise in firearm-related offences. Firearm-related offences: Across the Caribbean, deaths and injuries because of gun violence have been exacerbated by the ready availability and misuse of firearms. The impact is being witnessed predominantly in nations such as Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, and Trinidad and Tobago, but, regionwide, firearms are being used more often in the commission of crimes. Chart 1.5 shows the rate of firearm-related offences in Barbados, Jamaica, and Trinidad and Tobago, the only nations on which data are available. The rates have consistently been highest in Jamaica. However, even in jurisdictions with low rates of violence, such Chart 1.5

as Barbados, there has been a rise in firearmrelated offences. Between 1975 and 2010, the use of firearms increased in Barbados, and, despite a decline in firearm-related offence rates between 2000 and 2009, the rates have remained above the levels of the 1990s. Since 1997, Trinidad and Tobago has seen a steady increase, which peaked in 2005 at 66 offences per 100,000 population. All three jurisdictions showed a reduction in rates in the last three years of the data period, but the rates in all remain significantly above the 1990 rates. The LAC region is disproportionately affected by small arms violence. This type of violence accounted for 42 percent of all firearmrelated deaths worldwide. The Caribbean is, however, not a major producer, exporter, or consumer of legal firearms. Indeed, between 2004 and 2006, only 3 percent of global arms trade transfers involved the Caribbean.18 Gun violence is related to the ease of access to US markets for firearms and to narcotics trafficking, as well as governmental inability to secure the borders, which are issues intricately

Firearm-Related Offences Per 100,000 Population, Selected Caribbean Countries, 1990–2010

80 70 60 50 Rate 40 30 20 10 0 1990 1992 1994 Barbados 1996 1998 2000 Jamaica 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010

Trinidad & Tobago

Sources: Royal Antigua and Barbuda Police Force; Royal Barbados Police Force; Jamaica Constabulary Force, Statistics Division; Trinidad and Tobago Police Service.

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related to organized crime activities and the incapacity of states.19 The ready availability of small arms and light weapons in the Caribbean region impedes security, democratic processes and economic development. Several initiatives under way regionwide aimed at reducing gun use and availability may offer significant opportunities for stemming the tide of gun-related crime.20 Robberies: Data of the UNDP Citizen Security Survey 2010 indicate that robberies, burglaries and break-ins are the crimes that induce the most fear among Caribbean residents. Robbery, defined as the theft of property by relying on force or the fear of force, is traditionally classified as a violent crime. Robbery rates in the Caribbean-7 for the period 1990–2010 are shown in chart 1.6. They evidence an upward trend. While rates have been relatively stable in Barbados and have declined in Jamaica and Guyana, the overall rates have increased.21 Trinidad and Tobago currently shows the highest rates of robber-

ies, and, while Saint Lucia shows a gradual increase, Antigua and Barbuda has shown the most dramatic increase. The rates in Suriname, which has lower rates of violent crime than other Caribbean countries, posted an increase from 107 to 386 per 100,000 people between 2004 and 2006 and have declined since then, though they have remained above 300. Similar to homicide rates, robbery rates in the Caribbean are higher in countries showing low economic growth.22 The exception is Jamaica, which has had low economic growth, but also records low robbery rates. Francis et al. (2009) indicate that businesses in Jamaica have experienced high rates of violent crimes, including robberies, but police records do not distinguish between commercial and individual victims. Burglaries and break-ins are the unlawful entering of a home or other building.23 Both are discussed herein in the context of acquisitive crimes.24 Within the Caribbean region, citizens are most likely to be victimized by

1
Crime Trends since Independence and the Impact on Vulnerable Groups 2008 Jamaica 2010
23

Chart 1.6
600 500 400 Rate 300 200 100 0 1990

Robbery Rates Per 100,000 Population, Caribbean-7, 1990–2010

1992

1994

1996

1998

2000

2002

2004 Guyana

2006

Antigua & Barbuda Saint Lucia

Barbados Suriname

Trinidad & Tobago

Sources: Royal Antigua and Barbuda Police Force; Royal Barbados Police Force; Guyana Police Force; Jamaica Constabulary Force, Statistics Division; Royal Saint Lucia Police Force, Crime and Problem Analysis Branch; Trinidad and Tobago Police Service.

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Chart 1.7

Burglary and Break-in Rates Per 100,000 Population, Selected Caribbean-7 Countries, 1990–2010

4500 4000 3500 3000 Rate 2500 2000 1500 500 0 1990 1992 1994 1996 Barbados 1998 2000 Jamaica 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 Saint Lucia Antigua & Barbuda Trinidad & Tobago

Sources: Royal Antigua and Barbuda Police Force; Royal Barbados Police Force; Jamaica Constabulary Force, Statistics Division; Royal Saint Lucia Police Force, Crime and Problem Analysis Branch; Trinidad and Tobago Police Service.

burglaries and robberies, crimes that involve high social, economic and personal costs among victims. As chart 1.7 shows, there has been a long downward trend in burglaries. While Trinidad and Tobago saw low and stable burglary rates, Barbados and Saint Lucia saw somewhat higher, but stable rates over 1990–2010. The burglary rate in Jamaica fell significantly from a higher level, and the rate in Antigua and Barbuda mirrored this behaviour, but from an even higher initial rate. The low recent rates for Jamaica may be attributed to underreporting. Economists and criminologists have long discussed the impact of economic conditions on crime. Development affects crime, but crimes of violence and theft are affected differentially. Specifically, as development increases, violent crimes decrease, while crimes of theft increase across all socio-economic
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groups. This is a general trend that does not apply to every country. Prenzler and Townsley (1996) have reviewed the literature and suggest that affluent homes often attract skilled professional burglars, while homes and businesses in poorer areas are vulnerable to burglaries committed by individuals who live nearby. Demographically, households in lower socio-economic areas are the most vulnerable, but burglary rates are also high in communities that lack social cohesion. The number of people in a household, marital status, housing type, and time of day also impact the likelihood of a burglary.25 Another set of insecurity-generating crimes worth examining is gender-based violence. Across the Caribbean, three specific practices have become a significant concern primarily regarding women and the girl-child, although data generated by the Citizen Secu-

Gender-based violence also serves— by intention or effect—to perpetuate men’s power and control. It is sustained by a culture of silence and denial of the seriousness of the consequences of abuse. In addition to the harm they exact on the individual level, these consequences also exact a social toll and place a heavy and unnecessary burden on health services. — ‘Gender Equality: Ending Widespread Violence against Women’, United Nations Population Fund, New York, http://unfpa.org/gender/violence.htm

public awareness and spurred demands for redress. Combating gender-based violence is of considerable importance if the Millennium Development Goals are to be achieved. Violence against women, as defined by the United Nations in Article 1 of the Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women and reiterated in subsequent documents, refers to “any act of gender-based violence that results in, or is likely to result in, physical, sexual or psychological harm or suffering to women, including threats of such acts, coercion or arbitrary deprivation of liberty, whether occurring in public or in private life.”26 The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women expanded the enunciation of the rights of women to include protection against discrimination in the family, community, employment, and political life.27

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Crime Trends since Independence and the Impact on Vulnerable Groups

rity Survey 2010 suggest that smaller shares of men also fear becoming the victims of these practices. These are sexual violence, domestic violence and trafficking in persons. An increase in the incidence and brutality of some of these crimes across the region has raised

Not every violent act that a woman may experience encompasses gender-based violence.28 Instead, the term ‘gender-based’ acknowledges that this sort of violence against women is directly related to and shaped by gender roles in society. Specifically, this is a “manifestation of the historically unequal power relations between men and women, which have led to domination over and discrimination against women by men and to the prevention of women’s full advancement.”29 Gender-based violence has been reinforced by and in social, cultural, economic and historical values, beliefs, norms and institutions. Different forms of gender-based violence may be experienced at different phases of the life cycle. Thus, the protection of women’s rights within the region is predicated on the existence of legal, cultural and social frameworks to empower and protect women. Across the region, there have been significant improvements in access to justice for women who are victims of gender-based violence. However, challenges remain. Thus, this report supports the continuation of regional programmes such as police training, the strengthening of service delivery through family courts, increased access to legal aid, and capacity-building to support legislation.30 The effects of rape are particularly devastating and life-changing. Rape is non-consensual sexual intercourse with a female.31 In some jurisdictions, police statistics on rape are often aggregated with statistics on other sexual offences, making it difficult to discern national trends in the crime.32 Nonetheless, in the five countries of the Caribbean-7 in which police statistics can be disaggregated, the rates were low and stable in four in 1993–2010: Barbados, Jamaica, Saint Lucia, and Trinidad and Tobago (chart 1.8). The rates in Antigua and Barbuda were the highest among the five and doubled between 2006 and 2009, before declining to a low level. De Albuquerque and McElroy (1999) also note this puzzling difference in rape rates between larger and smaller jurisdictions; they attribute it to the fact that, in small countries, minor increases in occurrence produce dramatic increases in per capita rates. In Antigua and Barbuda, the rate of

1

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Chart 1.8

Rates of Rape Per 100,000 Population, Selected Caribbean-7 Countries, 1993–2010

120

100 80 Rate

60

40

20

0 1993 Antigua & Barbuda 1995 1997 Barbados 1999 2001 Jamaica 2003 2005 Saint Lucia 2007 2009 Trinidad & Tobago

Sources: Royal Antigua and Barbuda Police Force; Royal Barbados Police Force; Jamaica Constabulary Force, Statistics Division; Royal Saint Lucia Police Force, Crime and Problem Analysis Branch; Trinidad and Tobago Police Service.

rapes and indecent assaults accounted for as much as 20 percent of the country’s violent crime rate. 33 Rape is one of the most underreported crimes worldwide. The underreporting transcends age, race, class and geography. According to worldwide estimates, 60 percent of all sexual crimes go unreported, and one in three women will be raped, beaten, forced into sex, or otherwise assaulted in her lifetime.34 In countries such as Guyana, Jamaica, and Trinidad and Tobago, the risk of sexual victimization increases in specific geographical areas and among specific subpopulations.35 Across the Caribbean, rape rates are relatively high, and clearance rates on cases are low; so, by extension, conviction rates are also low.36 For example, during the period 1970 to 2009, the average clearance rate for cases of rape and carnal abuse in Jamaica was 48 percent. It declined from 62 percent in 1970, was lowest, at 35 percent, in 1995, and then rose to 50 percent in 2009.
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UNODC and World Bank (2007), drawing on United Nations crime trend data for various years, state that 3 of the top 10 recorded rape rates occur in the Caribbean. Among Caribbean countries on which there are available and comparable data, each showed a rape rate that was higher than the unweighted average of the full set of 102 countries in the study. A comparison shows significant differences in incidence rates across rape statistics as measured by reports to police, hospital records and surveys. In general, the number of self-reported rapes in victimization surveys is approximately 25 percent greater than the number known by or reported to the police.37 It is even more difficult to estimate rates for some of the other sexual offences. Regionwide, violence against women is disproportionately borne by youth and significantly impacts the girl-child. Amnesty International (2008) finds that, in 2004, seventy percent of all reported sexual assaults in Jamaica were committed against girls rather than women. LAC is the region with the highest

Crime Victimization
Crime and violence have created a disequilibrium that now threatens human development, national prosperity and regional stability. Insecurities emerge from many sources, such as crime and natural disasters, and it is evident that the consequences of such events are not borne equally by all members of society. The Citizen Security Survey 2010 included questions about crime victimization to assess the characteristics of individuals more likely and less likely to have been victimized in 2009, the one-year recall period used in most of the survey questions. Determinants of Victimization The risk factors associated with victimization are multifaceted and vary based on the offence, the offender type, the victim and the context within which the victimization occurs. Responses to the Citizen Security Survey 2010 show that national context is important. The share of respondents who reported that they had been victims of a crime in 2009, as recalled in the 2010 survey, ranged from a high of 11 percent in Antigua and Barbuda, Saint Lucia, and Barbados to a low of 6 percent in Jamaica; the average for the Caribbean-7 was 9 percent (chart 1.9). The demographic characteristics of the re-

Chart 1.9

Self-Reported Criminal Victimization, Caribbean-7, 2010

12 10 8 Percent 6 4 2 0

11.2

10.8

10.9 9.7 7.8 5.6 10.2 9.3

Saint Lucia

Antigua & Barbuda

Suriname

Jamaica

Trinidad & Tobago

Barbados

Guyana

Source: UNDP Citizen Security Survey 2010. Note: Base: all respondents (N = 11,155). Question: “In the last year, were you the victim of a crime?” The chart shows the share of respondents who answered “yes”.

Caribbean-7

C ARIBBEAN H UMAN DE VELOPMENT R E P O R T 2 0 1 2

27

Crime Trends since Independence and the Impact on Vulnerable Groups

proportion of adolescent females who claim to have had their sexual debut before age 15, at 22 percent; there are no equivalent figures for young men in the region.38 The Caribbean region has the earliest onset of sexual initiation in the world.39 The World Bank (2003) cites a study on nine countries conducted by the Pan American Health Organization that found the mean age of first intercourse was 10 years or younger, and almost two-thirds of respondents reported sexual initiation before the age of 13. Early sexual debut and sexual violence impact adolescent pregnancy and expose the girl-child to HIV/AIDS through forced sexual intercourse with infected partners, increased sexual risk-taking such as multiple partners or engaging in transactional sex, and a lack of control or negotiation skills to use condoms and seek preventive health care services.40

spondents are important for understanding the risk of victimization. As chart 1.10 shows, three groups were significantly more likely to report that they had been victimized in 2009: men, people 18 to 34 years of age, and people unemployed or seasonally employed. A similar pattern emerges if the distinction is drawn between victims of violent crimes and victims of property crimes. The predictors of violent crime victimization include gender (see chart 1.11), age (18–30 years), class self-placement (lower), education (low) and employment status (unemployed or seasonally employed). Income and race are not significant predictors.41 For property crimes, respondents whose income self-placement was high reported higher levels of property crime victimization (12.8 percent) compared with respondents who placed themselves lower (10.8 percent). Age was also a significant predictor, as was educational attainment (lower levels).

1

1
Crime Trends since Independence and the Impact on Vulnerable Groups

Chart 1.10

Self-Reported Victimization, by Demographic Group, Caribbean-7, 2010

Females Males 18 to 34 Years of Age 35 Years of Age & Over Employed Unemployed/ Seasonally Employed 0 2 4 6 8 Percent

9.3 12.0 12.2 9.3 10.4 12.5 10 12 14

Source: UNDP Citizen Security Survey 2010. Note: Base: all respondents (N = 11,155). Question: “In the last year, were you the victim of a crime?” The chart shows the share of respondents who answered “Yes”.

Chart 1.11

Gender Differences in Victimization Rates for Specific Types of Crime, 2010

Robbery with other types of weapons Domestic violence involving a partner Robbery at gunpoint Assault with a weapon Sexual assault and/or rape Family violence Female 0.4 1.4 1.4 1.6 1.0 2.2

2.4 3.3 2.3

3.4 3.8 1.5

Male

Source: UNDP Citizen Security Survey 2010. Note: Base: all respondents (N = 11,155). Question: “Within the last 10 years, have you been a victim of any of the following crimes/behaviour?” The chart shows the share of respondents who answered that they had been victims, for each type of crime. Differences are statistically significant at p