Case study of terrorist group “Egyptian Islamic Al-Jihad”

Name

Course

Instructor

Paper due date

Abstract

The Egyptian Islamic Jihad, commonly abbreviated as EIJ is an Islamic terror group seeking to overthrow the Egyptian government and install an Islamic state. More recently, the EIJ has broadened its goals to debilitating and attacking the capabilities and interests of U.S and Israel, in Egypt and in other countries. EIJ is led by Ayman al-Zawahiri since 1991, and the group has carried out numerous terror attacks through its militant cells. EIJ’s most prominent attack is the assassination of former Egyptian President Anwar al-Sadat in 1981. EIJ is considered a foreign terrorist group by the U.N. In the late nineties, EIJ had largely been eradicated from Egypt, but in 2001, the group merged with al-Qaeda, and it is now known as Qaeda al-Jihad. The command structure of al-Qaeda Jihad is centered on nine leadership seats. EIJ’s former leader al-Zawahiri is an acting commander of al-Qaeda. The group has been behind some of the most horrific terror attacks of the last two decades; the group has engineered many bombings and assassinations, which have killed many, most of them innocent people. The EIJ, in its turbulent wake leaves behind a legacy of wrath, pain and bloodshed.

Main Body

The Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ) is also known as al-Gihad al-Islamic and Tanzim al-Jihad. Mhuammad Abd al-Salam Farraj founded EIJ in 1979 in Cairo, Egypt. Other notable leaders are al-Zawahiri, Col. Abbud el-Latif al Zumor and Khalid al-Islambouli. While all of EIJ’s armed operations have occurred in Egypt, EIJ is known to have maintained cells or placed operatives in Pakistan, Afghanistan, Yemen, Sudan, Saudi Arabia, and throughout western Europe (Orr, 2003). Most of EIJ’s present leaders are believe to be located in Pakistan among and alongside the Maklis al-Shura of al-Qaeda.

Egypt has fought a lengthy and bloody war with radical Islam. From the era of the Egyptian monarchy to the current government, different Islamic groups, particularly the EIJ has constantly attempted to wrest control of the country from the secular nationalist and its allies. Nevertheless, throughout the 1950s and 1960s, political Islam was exposed to a relentless intellectual and ideological assault by an exceptional Egyptian blend of Arab socialism and nationalism, led by charismatic Nasser. But, in the humiliation of the 1967 war as well as the succession of Anwar Sadat to presidency in 1970 revived radical Islam. DeLong (2004) states that it is widely believed that the rise of political Islam was approved tacitly by Sadat who hoped to use radical Islam as a counterweight both against the more radical manifestations of communism and Nasserism. The time between Islamists and Sadat was short lived, particularly following the implementation of Sadat’s liberal economic policies and signing of the Camp David peace treaty with Israel in 1979 (Orr, 2003). In reality, the peace treaty with Israel as well as Sadat’s enmity towards the Iranian Islamic revolution incensed EIJ and other Islamists to point that they plotted his assassination. During the 1980s and 1990s, the Islamic movement in Egypt was mainly led by the EIJ and al-Jama’a al-Islamiyaa. Zawahiri’s main goal was to topple the Egyptian government, even though he did not pay much attention to the Israeli Arab conflict. For Zawahiri and the EIJ, fighting the close enemy, that is, the Egyptian regime was more significant than fighting the far enemy that is, Israel and the West.

EIJ’s Ideology

The manifesto of EIJ was provided by the founder Mohammed Abd al-Salam Farraj where he states that “…Jihad for God’s cause has been neglected by the ulema of this age…” (Orr, 2003). While the conventional Islamic interpretation of Jihad is mainly one of personal struggle for moral rectitude, Farraj considers this as an obfuscation of the truth. Farraj portrays violent jihad as the sixth pillar of Islam, an individual duty, which necessitates a drop of sweat from every Muslim (Zayyar & Abu, 2004). EIJ’s main goal was to establish an Islamic state in Egypt through a revolution brought by righteous group of believers. Farraj believed that jihad is not a popular struggle, because Islam does not attract the support of the majority. The ultimate goals were the re-establishment of the Muslim caliphate (Zayyar & Abu, 2004). Most of the ideas considered by Farraj were heavily borrowed from prominent Eqyptian Muslim Brother Sayyid Qutv and medieval Hanbalic Ibn Taymiyya. Taymiyaa witnessed the demise of the Abbasid dynasty in the 13th century after the Mongol invasion and he attributed the decline of Muslim military might to the perceived deviation of the society from ‘authentic’ Islam. In Taymiyya’s view, political and social ills could only be tackled through the purification of Islam (Zayyar & Abu, 2004). His main contribution to EIJ’s ideology came with the issuing of a fatwa, which set a precedent for the practice of excommunication or takfir. A radical and prominent member of the Muslim Brotherhood, Sayyid Qutb was executed by Egyptian authorities in 1966 and this paved the way for EIJ and contemporary day jihadist movement as a whole.

Imre et al (2008) states that Qutb’s ideology marked a radical break with the incrementalist approach of Egyptian Islamists who wanted to establish an Islamic state through participation in the political system and through da’wa. Qutb characterized contemporary Egyptian society as pre-Islamic Arabia, a time of unbelief and ignorance. He argued that while Egyptians were mostly Muslim, the fact that the country’s leaders ruled by heretical secular laws and not by Shari ‘a law rendered them apostates (Imre et al, 2008). Thus, armed struggle was necessary in order to bring down the government, and anyone who refused to participate in jihad was considered apostates. Just like Qutb, Farraj believed that the extermination of Egypt’s leaders was the first priority and while acknowledging the apparent malevolence of the infidel West, he affirmed that to fight an enemy who is near is more significant than to fight an enemy who is far (Orr, 2003).

EIJ’s structure and current status

The EIJ emerged as a coalition of Sunni Islamic radical groups, which split from the Muslim Brotherhood, an Egyptian Islamic political movement in late 1970s. After the assassination of President Anwar Sadat in 1981 by the EIJ, actions by the Egyptian authorities constrained the group’s capability within Egypt. In the 1990s, the domestic EIJ faction continued to attack targets in Egypt. In the meantime, senior EIJ leader al-Zawahiri, and the global faction of EIJ formed links with al Qaeda and affiliated terrorist groups. in 1998, EIJ joined al Qaeda and other terrorist organizations in issuing a declaration under the banner of the World Islamic Front (Gebara, 2005) announcing a jihad against ‘crusaders’ and ‘Jews’ and stating that the United States and its allies should be expelled from the Middle East.

The EIJ operates as two factions: the domestic and international. The domestic faction is mainly inactive because of successful, sustained action by the Egyptian government. The international faction is led by al-Qaeda’s deputy al Zawahiri and it is subsumed largely within al-Qaeda and has the same goals as al-Qaeda. However, there is no evidence showing that this has led to the creation of two separate organizations. The objectives of the EIJ are: to overthrow the Egyptian government and establish an Islamic state. More specifically, the international faction has adopted the international jihadist objectives of the al-Qaeda. EIJ’s spiritual leader is Omar Abdul Rahman, an Egyptian cleric presently incarceration in the United States for his role in the World Trade center bombing. The leader of EIJ’s domestic faction is Abbud al-Zumar who is presently in prison in Egypt. Current estimates of the size of the EIJ membership vary (Orr, 2003) as it is estimated to have a core membership of hundreds, with various thousand supporters.

EIJ was established in 1979 and it first functioned as a loose confederation of cells. In 1980, Majlis al-Shura that is, the consultative council was appointed as the key decision making body with Farraj as its amir (Gebara, 2005). Three sub-committees were implemented below the Majlis: Lajna al-Da’wa (propaganda), Lajna al-‘Ida (preparation) and the Lajna al-Iqtissad (economics). The responsibilities of recruitment were distributed among the members of EIJ according to their geographical location. The most outstanding mechanisms for recruitment into EIJ were apparently friendship and kinship ties. Additionally, while EIJ upheld a non selective open door policy towards new members, sensitive information was given only to members who had undergone extensive testing and observation. In total, six or five cells operated in Cairo, with the Upper Egyptian members maintaining secret groups along al-Jama’a al Islamiyya’s pre-existing network (Zayyar & Abu, 2004).

EIJ’s engagement in terrorist activities

EIJ’s Zawahiri is widely considered to be the main theoretician and strategist of al-Qaeda. He is also believed to have contributed to the planning of most of the mega terrorist attacks attributed to al-Qaeda since 1998. According to DeLong (2004) there are several reasons why Zawahiri decided to merge EIJ with al-Qaeda. First, Mubarak’s regime was successful in dismantling the organization of EIJ inside Egypt. Many EIJ were killed in shootouts with Egyptian security forces and many were detained. Additionally, on the wider global front, EIJ received a major blow when Albania agreed to extradite to Egypt twelve EIJ members in 1998 in the case referred to as ‘the Returnees from Albania’. In 1998, a senior member of EIJ, Mabruk was arrested in Azerbaijan and his laptop contained important information on EIJ’s members in Europe. Two key figures of EIJ’s Europe cell were sentenced to death in 2000. Additionally, there were reports that that Zawahiri’s brother, Mohammed, who is considered to be the former military commander of EIJ was one of the returnees who is presently held in an Egyptian prison. The capturing of Mohammed and other significant members in Egypt and Europe had a devastating effect on the organizational coherence and morale of the EIJ.

Furthermore, Zawahiri was isolated in Egypt following the public declaration by the leaders of Islamic movements against violence (Zayyar & Abu, 2004). In fact, Zawahiri publicly dismissed the declaration and encouraged the EIJ to continue fighting the Egyptian regime. He even took the unprecedented step of criticizing the leaders of Islamic groups in Egypt and accused them of working with the Egyptian regime against the greater Islamic cause (Imre et al, 2008). Subsequently, Zawahiri started to search for a secure and new base for EIJ. As a result, EIJ operatives decided to establish communications and operational bases in Caucasus, particularly Chechnya. In 1996, Russia arrested Zawahiri and his lieutenants for illegally entering the country and possessing false documentation. However, the Russians did not discover Zawahiri’s real identity. Also, Zawahiri was forced into Osama bin Laden’s hands because he needed assistance and funds to keep EIJ active. In this regard, the decline of the militant Islamic movement in Egypt ironically boosted the strength of the wider global movement coalescing around bin Laden.

Consistent with its main objectives, the EIJ primarily conducted armed attacks against Egyptian facilities and high level Egyptian government personnel. As the group’s goals become intertwined with those of the al-Qaeda, the EIJ became frustrated in its efforts to overthrow the Egyptian government. As a result, the EIJ concentrates on attacks against Egyptian targets outside United States and Egypt’s interests. According to Gebara (2005) the Egyptian police and security services have been effective in reducing the operational ability of the EIJ in Egypt and attacks which can be attributed reliably to the group have declined. Nonetheless, in spite of the merger between al-Qaeda and EIJ, there is no indication that the group has retreated from its goals or has stopped being involved in terrorist activities. In 2005, the United States Government identified several Egyptian nationals as EIJ members who had provided material support and training to al-Qaeda. In March 2006, a statement attributed to EIJ’s spiritual leader, Omar Rahman expressed the anti-Egypt sentiment of the EIJ and called for jihad in seeking Rahman’s release from United States custody. Zawahiri remains a significant leader and symbol of international jihad and is still considered to the leader of the international EIJ faction. In 2006, al-Zawahiri issued a statement calling on Muslims to target the interests of all nations who participated in the assault against Muslims in countries including Iraq and Afghanistan, a reference taken to include Australia (Zayyar & Abu, 2004). Based on this, it is reasonable to establish that the EIJ, including its members’ active in the al-Qaeda network continue to have the intent and ability to conduct further terror attacks. According to Orr (2003) it is evaluated that the EIJ is active globally and it is likely that this group will undertake groups when and if the opportunity arises. EIJ’s close connection with al Qaeda means that it could draw on important resources for future activities.

Evaluation of the effectiveness of counter-terrorism efforts against the EIJ

Primary to evaluating the efficiency of counter terrorism is questioning whether or not radical Islam has been understood fully by counter terrorist organizations. The war on terrorist groups such as EIJ wishes to tackle the terrorism problem, which is propagated in the name of Islam, and as a result, has the delicate task of confronting this kind of terrorism without alienating the broader Muslim community. The fight between counter terrorist policies and terrorism is eventually dependent on support and winning the minds and hearts of the people as Gebara (2005) points out. Counter terrorism policies tread a very thin line where they try to destroy the problem posed by EIJ and similar terror groups, yet there is also a risk of simultaneously increasing the terrorist problem. Particularly, the war on EIJ and al-Qaeda is at risk of being perceived to be a war against Islam, and therefore creating enmity between the conventionally Christian West and Islamic east.

The goal of eliminating terrorism and its ideology with the effort to spread liberal values to nations such as Afghanistan and Iraq continues to be undermined with cases such as the abuse of terror suspects, detention of terror suspects in Guantanamo bay, mishandling of Islamic Holy Scripture by interrogators and the use of extraordinary rendition as Delong (2004) points out. These cases have been damaging to the countries attempting to win the terrorist battle. Additionally, this type of negative press works against the efficiency of counter terrorism policies.

Egypt’s objective is to roll back EIJ’s network to a point where it will no longer pose a threat to Egypt and other countries. To significantly reduce the threat of EIJ, the Egyptian government considered every aspect of EIJ’s infrastructure, and consequently, tried to weaken it. As a result, EIJ domestic faction in Egypt has been weakened, however, its international faction, particularly its connection with al-Qaeda is still strong. The U.S seeks to weaken al-Qaeda in the next few years though a coordinated and steady program employing all means. To implement this strategy, the U.S has used intelligence collection, diplomacy, law enforcement, covert action, force protection, foreign assistance and diplomatic security in a coordinated campaign against EIJ and al-Qaeda. For instance, the U.S placed significant diplomatic pressure on Sudan, to request bin Laden and Zawahiri to move from Sudan. In addition to disrupting cells, Egypt and the U.S have found and brought to trial EIJ’s operatives, in Pakistan, Egypt, Jordan, Germany and the U.K. Additionally, the U.S has enhanced the abilities of various countries in collecting intelligence on al-Qaeda and disrupting their operations. Counter terrorism training have been provided to several countries’ security forces and as a result of these partnerships, coincident disruptions of various EIJ and al-Qaeda’s cells were conducted to prevent potential terror attacks as Gebara (2005) points out.

The programs initiated by the Egyptian regime and United States in the war against terror lay the basis for attaining the strategic goal of rendering EIJ and its al-Qaeda connection as a non serious threat to the world. To implement the general global strategy against terrorism whilst undermining the capacity of EIJ and al-Qaeda to utilize countries such as Afghanistan, the U.S has a program, which focuses on eliminating terrorist groups and disrupting the mujahidin support infrastructure which connects Afghanistan to the global network and changing the operational environment inside Afghanistan.

The war on terror has led many to examine variations and different interpretations of Islam. The concept of radical Islam has briefly been afro mentioned and the findings would establish that it is a minority ideology and one, which is not necessarily inherent in Islamic governments. In the question of reaction to EIJ and al-Qaeda, it seems counter terrorism policies have not done much. On a positive note, Egypt has managed to weaken EIJ’s domestic faction, however, EIJ’s international faction is very strong, especially with its connection to al-Qaeda. Globally, the U.S has made less progress to limit home grown radicalism through community building projects (Zayyar & Abu, 2004) while other countries such as the U/.K has pursued community based initiatives to help in the fight against terror groups such as EIJ and al-Qaeda. Even though some projects in the fight against terrorism have been widely criticized, it is a kind of counter terrorism that has been evidenced to have had success (Orr, 2003). Additionally, the war on terror has became an educational journey as to how individuals of different faiths understand each other; there has been the need for the Islamic east and Christian west to garner a better understanding of each other and build bridges towards peace.

Conclusion

The Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ) is an Islamic terror group seeking to overthrow the Egyptian government and install an Islamic state. The EIJ has broadened its objectives to debilitate and attack the interests of U.S and Israel, in Egypt and in other countries. EIJ is led by Ayman al-Zawahiri since 1991, and the group has carried out numerous terror attacks through its militant cells. EIJ’s most prominent attack is the assassination of former Egyptian President Anwar al-Sadat in 1981. EIJ is considered a foreign terrorist group by the U.N. In the late nineties, EIJ had largely been eradicated from Egypt, but in 2001, the group merged with al-Qaeda, and it is now known as Qaeda al-Jihad. EIJ’s members are still active and are directly/indirectly engaged in planning, preparing, helping or fostering the doing of terror attacks. However, Zawahiri was isolated in Egypt following the public declaration by the leaders of Islamic movements against violence and this somewhat weakened EIJ’s domestic faction in Egypt. The Egyptian government has been successful in dealing with EIJ, and this has significantly contributed to EIJ weakening in Egypt.With respect to policies combating EIJ and al-Qaeda, numerous lessons have been learnt along the way and continue to be learnt and integrated into counter-terrorism policies in Egypt and other countries in the world. It is evident that hard power is necessary in carrying out the goals of the war on terror on groups such as EIJ, but as much as hard power is fundamental so is the need to prevent further war and terror. It is thus important to use soft power approaches where possible as it is crucial for tackling any underlying regional issues and grievances that are normally disregarded. If the global community used the just and proper measures available to them, to tackle disputes involving Islamic nations, then it is plausible to consider that the level of terrorist threat posed by EIJ and al-Qaeda would decrease substantially.

References

DeLong-Bas, N. J. (2004). Wahhabi Islam: From revival and reform to global Jihad. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Gebara, K. (2005). “The End of Egyptian Islamic Jihad” Terrorism Monitor Volume vol. 3, no. 3

Imre, R., Mooney, T. B., & Clarke, B. (2008). Responding to terrorism: Political, philosophical and legal perspective. Aldershot: Ashgate.

Orr, T. (2003). Egyptian Islamic Jihad. New York, NY: Rosen Pub. Group.

Zayyāt, M., & Abu-Rabiʻ, I. M. (2004). The road to al-Qaeda: The story of Bin Lāden's right-hand man. London: Pluto Press.