Chiang Kai-Shek lost control of China to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in 1949 following two and a half decades of mistakes and fundamental errors in ruling the struggling and fractured republic. Under his leadership, corruption was allowed to flourish in the nationalist party, failed military campaigns were commonplace, national unity was never created, and the obsession with personal wealth and gain was the rule among large numbers of the higher ranking members of the nationalist party, all of which lead to a complete breakdown of support for the nationalist party from the Chinese people. Chiang never had a “relationship with the common people.”1 From the time he came to power in 1925, he appeared never to understand his people. His obsession with purging the Kuomintang (KMT) of all Communists, his push for a New Life Movement2, making the claim, “first internal pacification, then external resistance”*3, and his use of foreign relationships and criminal organizations to gain superiority and exterminate the communists each played a role in confirming Chiang’s failure. In the fight against the Japanese in World War II, Chiang’s single-minded focus on the Chinese Communists allowed Japan to gain a strong grip in China and occupy parts of the country. It eventually required the help of the United States to defeat and oust the Japanese. Chiang’s repeated military failures against the Japanese caused him to lose support within his own elite KMT group. In an effort to reestablish power, he attacked the Communists, which led to a deterioration of support amongst the Chinese people. It made him appear aggressive and hypocritical to the massive peasant population as he attacked the one Chinese group who was actually intent on helping the poor agrarian workers. By 1945, the Communists were strong enough to defeat Chiang Kai-Shek due to his repeated tactical errors in military, political and social policies. To understand how Chiang Kai-shek failed China, the events that led him to lose control of the Mainland must be considered. In 1949 Mao Zedong and the CCP easily defeated what remained of his Nationalist Party. The prospect of civil war between the two groups had existed since the great purges against the communists in 1927. In 1947, with World War II ended, the Nationalists resumed their eradication of the CCP. They launched an attack on the Northern regions of China and even though they enjoyed “absolute superiority….being] ten times richer than the Communist army in military-suppl[ies]”4, they still lost. Reviewing these blunders, Tao Xisheng a member of the Chinese Reform Commission of 1950 said, the Nationalist lost because “The party emphasized form rather than substance.”5 Chiang himself stated, the use of “officers who did not use their brain,” who were “unwilling to study” and, “who embezzled supplies intended for their troops” contributed to the loss.”6 Furthermore, Chiang admitted that their acts of corruption were because “their revolutionary spirit [had] almost completely dissipated.”7 The party went into the Civil War during a period of terrible inflation, and without public support. These factors were detrimental to the success of the party and could have been prevented.8 Chiang Kai–Shek was born October 31st, 1887 in Xikou, China. He was the son of a wealthy salt merchant family. “Salt was a government monopoly, and the merchants who handled it enjoyed a certain standing.”9 That made the “Chiangs the leading family in the village.”10 Growing up Chiang took on a role of dominance as a schoolboy, when his classmates would play “games of soldiers, he preferred to be commander.”11 Chiang always “liked to be at the head of the children,”12 an obvious trait considering what he went on to be in life. In 1907 Chiang attended the Shikan Gakko Military Academy in Tokyo, Japan where he met a group of Chinese revolutionaries. He became close with them and joined their republican movement. In the fall of 1911 Chiang returned from Japan to fight in the Wuhan Uprising and the Xinhai Revolution. By 1918 he became a prominent member of the Nationalist Party or the Kuomintang (KMT) by befriending the leader Sun Yat-sen. Chiang then served under Sun Yat-sen, traveling to the Soviet Union on Sun’s behalf to study military tactics. In 1923 Chiang was appointed by Sun as head of the Whampoa Military Academy. Sun’s death in 1925 triggered a power struggle amongst the KMT and the Communist Party, which had been united from 1912-1925. Chiang was able to succeed Sun with the help of the Whampoa Academy Forces and the support of the chief Soviet in China, Galen. The transition was volatile as Chiang faced threats to his power from factions of the Communist Party, and from Japanese and Chinese warlords. The lapses of Chiang Kai-Shek that caused the defeat of the KMT began in 1926 with the launching of Chiang’s Northern Expedition. He declared at the start of the expedition that, “To protect the welfare of the people we must overthrow all warlords and wipe out reactionary power so that we may implement the Three People’s Principles and complete the when Nationalist Revolution.”13 For almost a year the expedition succeeded in its goal of overthrowing the warlords. However, in April 1927 its success started to falter when Chiang, who felt that the communist within the KMT were beginning to pose a threat, tried to expel the communists from the party and from the Republic of China (ROC). He marched into Shanghai, and with the help of Shanghai 's secret societies (organized crime groups) attacked the CCP members in Shanghai. Thousands of CCP members were executed or went missing, others were arrested and imprisoned, and the purge of the CCP had begun. Chiang had just killed his and China’s “most politically energetic and creative individuals.”14 This was hugely unpopular with a large portion of the vast underclass of people who were big supporters of the communists in the Nationalist party. At this point widespread corruption grew within the government as KMT Party officials began firing the lower level party members and filling their slots with their own “friends, family members, or other inadequately trained individuals.”15 It’s clear that the original political ideology of the KMT had been forgotten and spoiled by the party members who “disregard party organization and policy, and act instead largely on the basis of personal connections.”16 Chiang didn’t have firm control over his government, and the corruption spread like a cancerous disease throughout the government. By 1947 when the civil war broke out the massive corruption has seriously undermined the Nationalist Party than the Communists that have protected themselves from corruption and maintained and organized executive power all along. Chiang was obsessed with the destruction of the CCP. This led him to ignore governing or leading his country and resulted in the increasing loss of support from fellow party members and the general public. When Japan invaded China and captured Manchuria in 1931 and Beijing in 1935, the people asked Chiang to stop the purge of the communists but Chiang continued on. His answer to the public’s plea, “first internal pacification, then external resistance.”17 This was widely unpopular with the Chinese people, and only worsened internal problems, and for the first time angered a lot of KMT party officials.18 War against a foreign enemy generally united a nation’s people but by opting not to go to war with Japan, Chiang killed the Chinese “revolutionary spirit.”19 This meant he failed to promote any form of national unity, and consequently lowered the morale of the party and the people. Low morale was one of the effects that led to the nationalist’s defeat in 1949. Also, while Chiang was losing support because he was appeasing the Japanese, the CCP took a fervent anti-Japanese stance and gained the support that the KMT lost. All of which was significant, considering that the Nationalists went into civil war lacking support from the public. Chiang Kai-Shek’s inability to focus on important matters or to understand and listen to his people caused problems for him. In the case of the Japanese invasion, which occurred in 1931, Chiang chose not to focus on the Japanese in a timely manner and delayed taking decisive action until 1936. This mistake occurred because Chiang thought he was smarter than everyone else which led to errors in military strategy that allowed the Japanese to secure a strong foothold in China. By the time he decided to confront the Japanese they were much stronger than when they first invaded in 1931. Chiang’s military decision to defeat the communists then fight the Japanese was the source of his failure. By the time Chiang decided to confront the Japanese, morale in the Nationalists forces was all but extinguished and the corruption in the military and government was overwhelming. Chiang’s passive approach to the Japanese aggravated the members of the Nationalist Party. Taking action, they kidnapped Chiang at a military encampment in Xian in 1936. They refused to release him until he agreed to their proposal of a “United Front” to fight the Japanese.20 Chiang reluctantly agreed, and In July of 1937, war against Japan was declared. In August, Chiang Kai-shek sent half a million of his best troops to defend Shanghai, while he sent the rest of his forces to fight the Japanese. Chiang’s decision to divert forces directly from fighting with Japan in order to protect Shanghai from a possible communist invasion outraged the Whampoa Academy Officers21. Chiang lost their support and his political base. His decision to weaken his forces on the Japanese front allowed the Japanese to push Chiang and the KMT out of their capital, Nanjing, and inland to Chongqing, which was “ devoid of economic and industrial resources.”22 Being in a city that was so depleted led to “wartime shortages that in turn caused increased inflation and corruption with ever decreasing spirits”23. From then on the United Front was able to hold off the Japanese from further encroachments, but unable to push the Japanese back. China couldn’t defeat the Japanese without allying itself with the United States (US). Conversely, the US could not rid China of the Japanese without the help of the Nationalist forces. Aligning with President Roosevelt, Chiang was able to get the US to provide his KMT forces with ammunition and weapons.23These resources were intended to fight the Japanese except Chiang chose to stockpile the weapons for future use against the Communists. Chiang’s abuse of his relationship with the US and the mindset that he could use a superior country to service his own personal agenda made a lot of people, including the Americans, angry with him. In 1945 when the war ended, Chiang was blamed for the large number of KMT casualties. People in his party directly attributed this to the late entry into the war and the failure to properly utilize the weapons provided by the US against the Japanese. His support base was eroding but despite these circumstances and the enormous losses in the KMT forces, Chiang chose to resume his purge of the Communists. Amongst the people, “the War had severely weakened the Nationalists both in terms of resources and popularity.”25 Given all of these negative conditions, Chiang believed he could prevail against the Communists. With his government and forces exhausted, he was forced to turn to the US and Japanese to help reclaim former Nationalist areas now under control of the Communists. His usage of the enemy and foreign nationals to reclaim parts of China was deeply unpopular. Under the Nationalists the country was quickly “deteriorating with corruption and inflation.”26 In a desperate attempt to prevent the collapse of his Nationalist party, he formed an alliance with the wealthy Chinese landlords who controlled large swaths of the country. This resulted in the almost total “alienation of the peasant population”7 against the Nationalists and led to a massive switch by the people to support the CCP who were energetic, organized and promoted land reform, which was a popular measure. Chiang lost support from “the group representing 90%”of the population.28 His government was in shambles, his military was on its last legs and his support from the people was nonexistent. The CCP had become more powerful than Chiang Kai-shek and the KMT. His “international recognition”29 had become meaningless. In 1947 with his prospects dwindling, Chiang passed a constitution trying to promote a “democratic constitutional government”30 He hoped he could forge an alliance with the Communists and retain his role as leader but it was too late. The CCP and their following didn’t want to hear it and refused the legitimacy. Civil war erupted between the two and devoid of energy and morale the Nationalists couldn’t successfully combat the rising tide of the Communists. In December 1949 the CCP forces invaded Chengdu, the last KMT controlled city in China, and Chiang and his family were forced to flee to Taiwan. They never set foot on Mainland China again. Chiang’s obsession with purging the communists from the KMT was his downfall. It distracted him from tackling China’s myriad of domestic issues and enabled the Japanese occupation. If Chiang hadn’t pursued the CCP with such vehemence and single mindedness he “would have maintained support from the large peasant portion of the population.”31 With his government rife with corruption and nepotism, where decisions were “decided largely on the basis of an individual’s whim or personal favortisim”32, the Communists were able to attract the intelligent and uncorrupt officials to their cause. The Nationalist’s problems were further compounded by the generals’ selfish pursuits on and off the battlefield. The lack of military success directly correlated to a lack of national unity. Without a unifying spirit or strong ideological base, the Nationalists were ineffectual and China remained divided. Chiang spent years “ignoring the demands of the masses.”33 This opened the door for the Communists to promote their liberal agenda in support of the vast underclass, which comprised 90% of the nation.

Notes:

1.Eastman, Lloyd E. "Who Lost China? Chiang Kai-Shek Testifies." The China Quarterly (1981): 658-668. JSTOR. 13 Nov. 2006. Pg.665

2.Fenby, Jonathan. Chiang Kai Shek: China's Generalissimo and the Nation He Lost. New York: Carroll & Graf, 2004. Pg.120

3.The Strategy of Chiang Kai-Shek Author(s): Walter H. Mallory
Reviewed work(s): Source: Foreign Affairs, Vol. 17, No. 4 (Jul., 1939), pg 125

4.Fenby, 18

5.Fenby, 18

6.Fenby, 19

7.Fenby, 19

8.Eastman, 658

9.Eastman, 665

10.Eastman, 659

11.Eastman, 658

12.Lieberthal, Kenneth. Governing China. New York: WW Norton & Co, 1995. pg 34

13.Fenby, 115-116

14.Coble, Parks M. “Chiang Kai-Shek and the Anti-Japanese Movement in China.” The Journal of Asian Studies (1985): 293-310. JSTOR. 7 Nov 2006. pg 295

15.Fenby, 135

16.Eastman, 665

17.Mallory, 125

18.Lieberthal, 30

19. Doenecke, Justus D. "Chiang Kai-shek and the Struggle Between the Nationalist and Communist." The History of Nations. China ed. New Haven: Greenhaven, 2003.pg 116

20. “Japanese Military Campaigns in China, July 7, 1937 – August, 1945.” Discovering World History Online Edition. Gale, 2003. Student Resource Center. Thomson Gale. 7 Nov. 2006 pg unknown

21.Fenby, 25

22.Discovering World History Online Edition, pg unknown

23.Lieberthal, 36

24.Mallory, 710

25. Mallory, 711

26.Fenby 416

27.Fenby 416

28.Fenby 422

29. Fairbank, John K., and Merle Goldman. China: a New History. Cambridge: Belknap P of Havard UP, 1998. 185

30.Lieberthal, 42

31.Fenby 474

32.Eastman, 662

Bibliography:

Chiang Kai-shek's March Twentieth Coup d'Etat of 1926 Author(s): Tien-Wei Wu
Reviewed work(s): Source: The Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. 27, No. 3 (May, 1968), pp. 585-602

Coble, Parks M. “Chiang Kai-Shek and the Anti-Japanese Movement in China.” The Journal of Asian Studies (1985): 293-310. JSTOR. 7 Nov 2006.

Crozier, Brian. The Man Who Lost China. New York: Scribner, 1976

Doenecke, Justus D. "Chiang Kai-shek and the Struggle Between the Nationalist and Communist." The History of Nations. China ed. New Haven: Greenhaven, 2003. 109-20

Eastman, Lloyd E. "Who Lost China? Chiang Kai-Shek Testifies." The China Quarterly (1981): 658-668. JSTOR. 13 Nov. 2006.

Fairbank, John K., and Merle Goldman. China: a New History. Cambridge: Belknap P of Havard UP, 1998.

Fenby, Jonathan. Chiang Kai Shek: China's Generalissimo and the Nation He Lost. New York: Carroll & Graf, 2004.

“Japanese Military Campaigns in China, July 7, 1937 – August, 1945.” Discovering World History Online Edition. Gale, 2003. Student Resource Center. Thomson Gale. 7 Nov. 2006

Lieberthal, Kenneth. Governing China. New York: WW Norton & Co, 1995.

The Collected Wartime Messages of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, 1937-1945 by Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek; The Chinese Ministry of Information
Review by: Knight Biggerstaff
Pacific Historical Review , Vol. 16, No. 4 (Nov., 1947), pp. 466-467

The Collected Wartime Messages of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. by Chinese Ministry of Information Review by: Earl Swisher The Far Eastern Quarterly, Vol. 6, No. 2 (Feb., 1947), pp. 184-186

The Strategy of Chiang Kai-Shek Author(s): Walter H. Mallory
Reviewed work(s): Source: Foreign Affairs, Vol. 17, No. 4 (Jul., 1939), pp. 699-711 and 120-147