Executive Summary Prior versions of the case have been used to teach various subjects, including industry analysis, competitive dynamics, and vertical integration. While this case tries to incorporate some of the essential elements about the history of competitive dynamics and the historical patterns of vertical integration the primary teaching purpose of this case is to discuss the economics of the U.S. soft drink industry. Concentrate producers (CPs) sold syrup and concentrate to franchised of company owned bottlers, and made gross margins of 83% and a pretax profit margin of 30%. The best-know CPs were Coke and Pepsi. Historically, Coke and Pepsi were also major bottlers, but in the mid-to late 1990s, both had divested their bottling operations while maintaining significant equity ownership and indirect control of bottling networks. CPs invested heavily in advertising and marketing. One of the key issues for students to understand is why most of the profits in this industry are earned upstream in the concentrate business.
The bottling business was much less profitable than concentrate, particularly in the mid- 1990s. Bottling profits improved somewhat in recent years, in part because the concentrate manufacturers could no longer squeeze the bottlers without disrupting their own distribution. Bottlers invested in bottling and caning lines, trucks, and warehouses and earned gross margins 40% and pretax profit of 9%. Coke and Pepsi bottlers delivered their products directly to the store which was part of their strategy for differentiation over private label. Private label offered warehouse-delivered product. Historically, bottling had been a very good business: Franchised bottling contracts were very generous to the bottler. Coke and Pepsi had given bottles franchises in perpetuity, allowed bottlers the final say on pricing and gave bottlers significant influence