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| Name: | <please leave blank> | | | Matriculation No: | 44081 | | | Title: | South China Sea: Recipe for War Between China and ASEAN? | | | Course and Code: | ADSP | | | Lecturer/Tutor: | A/P Bernard Loo | | | Submission Date: | 8 Apr 13 | |

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COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE 44th COMMAND AND STAFF COURSE

<< ADSP Assignment – South China Sea:Recipe for War Between China and ASEAN? >> |

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SOUTH CHINA SEA: RECIPE FOR WAR BETWEEN CHINA AND ASEAN?

INTRODUCTION

In the aftermath of the post-Cold War era, China has become both an economic power house as well as a strong military force which has attracted the attention of nation states and global defense analysts. To keen observers, this exponential growth has emboldened China in realizing their core interests and establishing their influence in the region. Of significance, Beijing’s territorial assertion over the much disputed South China Sea has created tension and in some instances, resulted in military confrontations with ASEAN coastal states. Are these undesirable behaviors destabilizing the regional security? If these issues are to escalate any further, will they engender war amongst the claimant states? This essay will attempt to address these questions. It will examine the South China Sea context and analyze the various security issues, before proffering the way forward for these heavily contested waters.

EXAMINING THE SOUTH CHINA SEA NARRATIVE

Tensions and security issues in South China Sea are underpinned by the geostrategic interests of this region and the characteristics of its disputes. The following sections will cover these areas and in addition, highlight key military conflicts that took place as a result of these competing considerations.

Geostrategic Interests

South China Sea is located strategically in terms of its influence along one of the busiest sea lanes in the world, facilitating the sea line of communications between Europe and Asia. Nearly half of the world shipping depends on these waterways and their traffic is several times more as compared to both the Suez and Panama Canals. More importantly, South China Sea is rich in mineral and energy resources as well as contributing to 8% of world’s fishing catch (UCLMUN, 2012). These are crucial ingredients to sustain thriving and developing economies in the region.

With unclear jurisdiction and sovereign boundaries governing the South China Sea currently, it comes as no surprise that the presence of its natural resources creates a rivalry amongst ASEAN coastal states, and especially China, to secure them and a fervent claim on the territorial rights to the Paracel and Spratly Islands that are situated at the heart of its waters.

Nature of South China Sea Disputes

The issues on South China Sea disputes are inherently complex and are compounded by conflicting interpretations from the claimant states. In attempting to dissect this conundrum, Dutton (2011) propounds a framework to explain the three facets to the disputes – territorial sovereignty, jurisdiction over sea zones, and control over military activities. The argument on territorial sovereignty premises on the notion of complete state authority over part of, or all of the islands in the South China Sea, in particular the Paracel and Spratly Islands. Common to both, China is the only state that has made sovereignty claims over both clusters of islands. It is noted that since 1949, the Zhou Enlai government has published maps with nine dashes forming a U-shape line in the South China Sea demarcating its maritime boundaries (Nguyen, 2012). In late 2012, China even published maps with the U-shape line in its new passports (Anderlini & Bland, 2012). Separately, Dillon (2011) posits that Beijing’s territorial assertion in the South China Sea stems from the historical tributary system with its vassal kingdoms that span from Japan and Korea in the Northeast Asia, Turkistan and Tibet in the West, to Vietnam in the South. Yet another perspective highlights China’s territorial claim is based on its maritime security interests in the South China Sea, which inevitably is substantiated by the U-shaped line and is part of its maritime “strategic stability belt” (China Review News, 2010). Regardless, these claims are never acknowledged and accepted by international laws. Consequently, this created differing views on the exercising of territorial rights in these waters. Notably, China has been wrestling with Vietnam over the control to the Paracel Islands since post-Vietnam War. At the same time, these two countries, together with other ASEAN coastal states such as the Philippines, Malaysia, and Brunei are also involved in the territorial disputes over the Spratly Islands.

The second category of dispute as explained by Dutton (2011) centers on establishing jurisdictional boundaries across various Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) and continental shelf zones. As defined by UNCLOS Article 76 and UNCLOS Part V, both of these sea zones give coastal states varying degrees of authority over maritime living and non-living objects. With China and several ASEAN coastal states sharing the South China Sea common, it is already a challenge to delimit these zones effectively and restrictively when these countries have different interpretations of the UNCLOS. Coupled by the territorial claims on the Paracel and Spratly Islands as well as Beijing’s U-shaped line, the demarcation of these zones extending from these islands becomes even more convoluted. This impasse has already created numerous flashpoints for conflicts as it creates issues for any oil and fishing vessels operating in the South China Sea. Naturally, the same coastal states disputing over territorial sovereignty are also fighting over the jurisdictional control of these waters, with the addition of Indonesia.

In the third category of dispute, Dutton (2011) notes that it concerns the control over freedom of navigation by military vessels in the South China Sea in relation to the international laws and the jurisdictional rights exercised by the coastal states. Specifically, this affects only China and the United States (U.S.) as the former asserts its legal claim over the disputed waters and the latter stands firm in wielding its freedom of action in the international high-seas within the South China waters. This has led to confrontations between the vessels of both countries between 2001 and 2009 and eventually escalated with the occurrence of the USNS Impeccable (Pedrozo, 2009) and USS Chung Hoon (Tyson, 2009) incidents.

Military Conflicts

The South China Sea disputes are far from reaching any international or at least regional consensus. Locked in this sovereignty stalemate, coastal states have resorted to military actions to further cement their influence and self-professed jurisdiction over these waters. Between China and Vietnam, their first major conflict over territorial sovereignty in the South China Sea occurred in 1974 when both countries competed for the state authority over the Paracel Islands. The aftermath of this naval battle saw 53 Vietnamese and 18 Chinese military personnel dead (AFP, 2012). A repeat of a similar conflict in 1988, this time over Johnson Reef in the Spratly Islands, resulted in an additional 70 Vietnamese military death (Tharoor, 2010). Furthermore, Vietnam has in 2011 alleged Beijing of sabotaging a Vietnamese oil exploration vessel. More pronouncedly, tension escalated in the same year when China conducted a live firing military exercise near the disputed Spratly Islands and was perceived as a warning to Vietnam (Demick, 2011).

In another part of the South China Sea, China nearly got embroiled in an armed conflict with the Philippines government in 1995. It was over the jurisdictional rights to the Mischief Reef in the Spratly Islands when several Filipino fishermen were detained by the Chinese navy (Dzurek, 1995). In response, the Philippines conducted aerial reconnaissance over the disputed waters and discovered active Chinese military installations on the Mischief Reef. Tension flared as both countries were push to the brink of a military confrontation. The Philippines government eventually adopted a diplomatic approach to resolve this situation by mustering the political unity of ASEAN to condemn Beijing’s actions. More recently in April 2012, a standoff between a Philippines warship and two Chinese surveillance ships near Scarborough Shoal over territorial rights in the area revitalized the countries’ confrontation (The Guardian, 2012). With dispute over sovereignty rights between the two coastal states persisting till date, it is unlikely their military antagonism will cease in the near future.

Military demonstrations did not preclude those from the regional coastal states. There have been several high profile incidents involving both the U.S. and China over the last decade when the latter asserted its control over the former’s military movement in the international waters of the South China Sea. In April 2001, a U.S. Navy reconnaissance airplane was forced to make an emergency landing in Hainan Island after it collided with a Chinese combat aircraft sent to intercept it (CNN, 2001). Apart from the encounters mentioned earlier between the Chinese vessels and USNS Impeccable and USS Chung Hoon, another significant event took place in June 2009 when the sonar array of USS John McCain knocked into a Chinese submarine off the Subic Bay (Starr, 2009). These incidents, coupled by the periodic large scale live-firing military exercises conducted by China near their waters and in the South China Sea, could impair the intricate relationship between Washington and Beijing and spark further tension.

ANALYSING THE SECURITY SITUATION Learning from the past lessons of the Paracel and Spratly Islands disputes – in particular how China ousted Vietnam and the Philippines through military coercion to assert its territorial claims - ASEAN coastal states are expected to reinforce their military, especially their naval capabilities, to preserve their maritime security interests in the South China Sea. Fuelled by burgeoning economies in a fast developing Asia, these countries will have more resources at their disposal to build up their military power. Such an endeavor, if unchecked, could progressively lead to a regional arms competition, a possible prelude to a South China Sea war.

Gearing Up Military Capabilities

A study by Bitzinger (2010) on recent Southeast Asian defense acquisition examines the arming of regional militaries in detail. Vietnam is observed to have increased its defense expenditure and procurement to bolster its maritime capabilities. The Vietnamese navy now boosts new frigates, naval aircrafts, as well as coastal defense missiles and will have modern corvettes from the Netherlands in the coming years. Additionally, Vietnam has already purchased new Kilo-class submarines and will become a major submarine power house in the region after they take delivery of these naval assets by 2016. Vietnam’s strong desire to establish a credible submarine force can be a game changer in terms of its strategic impact to the maritime landscape in the South China Sea. If Beijing continues to impose its authority militarily in the Spratly Islands, a decisive sub-surface offensive retaliation by Vietnam in the near future is definitely within its capability. The Philippines, on the other hand, pale in comparison. Although the U.S. has rendered much financial assistance between 2001 to 2010, the Philippines government fails to increase its defense spending to improve military capabilities. This is largely due to the need to focus on managing its domestic issues and internal insurgencies. As a result of this underfunding, the Philippines Armed Forces are not able to modernize themselves adequately and are likely to borrow U.S. military presence to counter Chinese influence in the region.

Notwithstanding Vietnam and the Philippines who have experienced military confrontations with China in the South China Sea, other ASEAN coastal states like Malaysia, Indonesia, and even Singapore, who do not have similar encounters but have a vested interest in the regional maritime security, are seemingly gearing up their military. Over two five-year periods of 2000–2004 and 2005-2009, these three countries have increased their defense expenditure by many folds – Malaysia by 722 percent, Indonesia by 84 percent, and Singapore by 146 percent (Weitz, 2010). Among these procurements, Malaysia has bought Su-30s from Russia, main battle tanks from Poland, and Franco-Spanish Scorpene-class submarines; Indonesia has equipped themselves with additional armoured personnel carriers, new Sigma-class corvettes from the Netherlands, and installed new anti-ship cruise missiles; and the Singapore Armed Forces are already equipped with F-15 fighters from the U.S., German-made main battle tanks, locally produced armoured personnel carriers, Formidable-class frigates armed with advanced missile systems, and two different classes of submarines (Bitzinger, 2010).

Perhaps the catalyst to this military acquisition endeavor in Southeast Asia is due to China’s massive military buildup, which thrives on its expanding economy. For the past twenty years, Beijing’s declared defense budget has been experiencing double-digit growth. Just recently in March 2013, it was reported that China has purchased four Lada-class submarines and 24 Su-30s from Russia (AFP, 2013). This is in addition to its first aircraft carrier which was commissioned last year and its ambition to build indigenous stealth combat aircrafts. Accordingly, Beijing just announced its defense budget for 2013 to be over $110 billion dollars. No other country in the Asia Pacific region is more aggressive in developing their military as one demonstrated by China.

Arms Race?

Gray (1971), one of the pioneer strategic thinkers who studied the dynamics of arms acquisition, defines the conditions of arms race as: (1) presence of at least two parties who are aware of their animosity and mutual adversarial engagement, (2) a deliberate attempt by both parties in developing their military to counter each other, (3) overt competition by both parties to arm their military quantitatively and qualitatively, and (4) each party must acquire their military capabilities at a comparatively fast pace. An arms race takes place when all of these four factors co-exist at the same time. Putting into context, recent military development in ASEAN does not fully meet the tenets expounded by this definition. Instead, as argued by Bitzinger (2010), the region is likely experiencing an arms dynamic. It is characterized by the aspiration of nation states to transform their military capabilities and concept of operation through the procurement of advanced weaponry as well as their attempt to maintain military equilibrium.

Judging from their defense procurements, ASEAN coastal states that have a stake in the South China Sea are indeed leveling up their military prowess instead of mere force modernization. Presently, their combined figures stand at approximately 680 combat aircrafts, eight submarines, and 412 combat vessels as compared to the People’s Liberation Army which has over 2,000 combat aircrafts, 60 submarines, and 250 combat vessels (Dillon, 2011). With ASEAN coastal states progressively arming themselves with capable combat platforms that can shoot farther and with more precision; sensor technologies that are more accessible and pervasive; and networking systems that are becoming more ubiquitous and support decentralized operations, these force multipliers can offset quantity with quality and rebalance the military status quo.

Nevertheless, these numbers do provide a strong deterrence against a hawkish China and if ASEAN are to commit to a cooperative defense treaty akin to NATO, this coalition effort will be a force to be reckoned with. Notwithstanding this empirical development, the motivations of various coastal states in the South China Sea underpinning an arms dynamics in the region must be studied. A critical area will be China’s attitude and behavior in asserting their influence over the maritime security in the region.

Beijing’s Rhetoric

At the 2011 Shangri-La Dialogue plenary session, General Liang Guanglie, Minister of National Defense of China, gave a telling speech on China’s aspiration and desire for a peaceful and prosperous Asia Pacific, build on shared understanding and awareness in common interest areas such as economic development and security cooperation. Specifically for the latter, he proposed four key principles to the Asia Pacific nation states (Liang, 2011). First, states need to respect and be fair, while accommodating to one another’s “core interests and major concerns”. Second, states need to build endearing trust to understand one another’s “strategic intentions”. Third, common interests and concerns are the responsibilities of all states and there should not be any alliance between states that “target a third party”. Finally, states should cooperate with one another as well as with external stakeholders beyond the region by being open and inclusive. This declaration of intent by Beijing seems to suggest that it is determined to leverage diplomacy as the strategic instrument to fulfill its national imperatives, inclusive of exercising sovereign claims in the South China Sea.

Perhaps more poignant to note was General Liang’s articulation on China’s strategic plans that buttress these principles. He stated that Beijing will maintain the position to develop (1) itself and with other states in a peaceful and “win-win” manner, (2) a defense policy that is “defensive in nature” and one which will not seek antagonistic dominance or “military expansion”, and (3) a foreign policy that treats all Asian states as friends, build on good and cordial relationship. However, this rhetoric by the Chinese Defense Minister is seemingly ambiguous. On one hand, China professes to resolve issues through a peaceful process but on the other, it displayed military aggression over the South China Sea territorial disputes. Global Times (2011) even boldly posits that if the disputant countries do not adjust their negotiation approach with Beijing, they will have to “prepare for the sounds of cannons”. Moreover, the uncertainty is further exacerbated when China expands its military at a threatening pace that outstrips any states in the Asia Pacific. It may still be too early to believe these propositions without having a sense of apprehension.

ASEAN’s Perspectives

ASEAN has a long standing history of developing cooperation out of conflict. Beginning with the communist insurgencies in the 1960s, to Vietnam’s incursion into Cambodia in the 1980s, and up till the end of Cold War, the association has facilitated peaceful negotiations and grew from the founding five member states to the current 10. It was developing well as the cornerstone to Southeast Asian diplomacy. In fact, pertaining to the sovereignty disputes in the South China Sea, ASEAN even managed to broker a deal with China as witnessed by the 2002 ASEAN-China Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea. It seemed ASEAN was speaking with one voice then and solidified itself as a worthy counter-balance to Beijing’s territorial assertion.

Ten years on, the situation has changed drastically. In the association’s 45-year history, it was unsuccessful, for the first time, in issuing a joint communiqué during the 2012 ASEAN Summit. Both Vietnam and the Philippines rejected to the non-inclusion of South China Sea discussion on the Scarborough Shoal and jurisdictional rights over the EEZs in the draft communiqué. It is perceived that China is responsible in influencing Cambodia, who chaired the meeting, to deliberately leave out this agenda (Bower, 2012). Additionally, Myanmar, Cambodia, Laos, and Thailand are ASEAN member states who have no stake in the South China Sea disputes but enjoyed beneficial bilateral ties with Beijing. These countries’ willingness to stand up for their ASEAN counterparts in countering China’s territorial claims is undoubtedly questionable. Presently, ASEAN remains divided internally over this matter and it calls for a collective and united effort if the association harbours any hopes of pulling its weight on China diplomatically.

Furthermore, ASEAN’s expectation on relying the U.S. to keep check of Beijing needs to be calibrated. As seen from the past, the U.S. did not act militarily when it comes to the territorial disputes in the South China Sea. Even when China displayed aggression against the Philippines, a close ally of the U.S., the latter did not express its stand (Dillion, 2011). Although U.S. presence in the region is regarded by ASEAN as a valuable counter-weight to China’s demonstrative military actions, it is unlikely Washington will interfere unless its interests are comprised in the process. On this regard, ASEAN will probably gain more instead from U.S. participation in regional security dialogues and defense diplomacy .

WAY AHEAD

The security situation in the region is far from settled and runs the risk of escalated tension. Although the concerned coastal states have leveraged diplomacy to negotiate territorial disputes, history has shown that military intervention can still occur, as witnessed by the conflicts between China, Vietnam, and the Philippines. More importantly, with Vietnam proactively seeking regional naval dominance, military confrontations with China over the disputed waters can possibly spiral into a full-blown war if they are to miscalculate one another’s actions.

However, this circumstance is not beyond rectification. As suggested by Teo (2009), existing regional security architecture, such as the ASEAN Regional Forum, ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Meeting-Plus, and the Shangri-La Dialogues, continues to create the diplomatic space for multilateral and open dialogue amongst the participant states, especially China. On top of bilateral engagements, ASEAN should actively bring China as well as the other extra regional states such as the U.S., Japan, and South Korea into a shared conversation. This will engender mutual trust and socialize norms, in particular those concerning the South China Sea disputes. Of significance, it is paramount for ASEAN and Beijing to reaffirm the 2002 agreement and “focus on issues such as the prevention of incidents at sea, crisis management, confidence-building measures and encouraging joint development” (Desker, 2012). This will help to assuage friction and perhaps contribute to China’s hope that “the prevailing human aspiration is peace, not war; dialogue, not confrontation; understanding, not estrangement” (Liang, 2011).

CONCLUSION

Based on the above analysis, war is not imminent in the South China Sea, at least in the foreseeable future. Nevertheless, a review of its narrative has uncovered fault-lines predicated on its geostrategic interests and the difficult issues that cloud its territorial disputes. They will remain as a trigger for coastal states rivalry and conflicts. Military actions taken as a result of these contested waters have thus far been controlled and measured. Substantial military buildup, seen as the assurance for sovereign security and the leverage for territorial claims, will continue to be the tool for ASEAN coastal states and China to consolidate and exercise their authority. Despite this regional arms dynamics not creating overt hostility, it is not insurance for miscalculation which can potentially spark off war in Southeast Asia, particularly between China and Vietnam. In the diplomacy realm, although ASEAN has established itself as a platform for multilateral dialogue and cooperation, there are still challenges internally in partnering Beijing to establish a code of conduct in the South China Sea. Participation of extra regional states and their presence, especially the U.S., can contribute to the overall balance to China’s growing influence and territorial assertions. Moving ahead, mutual trust, confidence-building, and patience will be key to sustain peace and stability as Beijing and the ASEAN coastal states continue to navigate through the South China Sea disputes.

References

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