Communication
During and After
Hurricane Andrew

The largest natural disaster ever recorded in the history of the United States was hurricane Andrew, which struck South Dade County, Florida, as midnight turned the clock into August 24, 1992. Contrary to what the American news media broadcast across the United States and throughout Europe, the first outer wall of the hurricane unexpectedly slammed into South Dade, packing 214+ mph winds which quickly escalated to 350+ mph. Most of the 414,151 residents living in the danger zone were asleep when the outer wall struck. Thousands of them lost their lives, for no one in South Dade had been evacuated or even advised to evacuate. (Frankovich, 2001) Hurricane Andrew was a powerful category 4 hurricane, which made landfall in Dade County, Florida on August 24, 1992. The hurricane was later upgraded to a category 5 due to the storms extremely strong and damaging winds. When the storm made landfall it reportedly had sustained winds of 145 mph and wind gusts of 175 mph. In Dade County alone, the storm left 15 dead and approximately 250,000 residents homeless. According to (Rappaport, 1992) an additional 25 lives were lost due the after effects of the storm.
No one knew exactly how big the storm would be and how much it would impact the southern part of Florida. Damage caused by the storm was estimated at $25 billion dollars. In Dade County alone, some 25,000 homes were destroyed and over 101,000 were damaged. In Homestead, Florida nearly all of the mobile homes were lost (1167 out of 1176). Even though the monetary damage caused by the storm was astronomical, in reality, casualties were very low. According to (Rappaport, 1992), over a million people were evacuated from southern Florida prior to the storm hitting land. This can be related to the fact that track forecast by the National Hurricane Center had an error margin that was 30 percent smaller than of the prior ten year average (Rappaport, 1992).
According to (Frankovich, 2001) the media had advised that south Dade County would only receive 50 mile per hour winds. Therefore, south Dade was never evacuated. The death toll was reported to be much higher than that of the estimates released after the storm. According to (Frankovich, 2001) the military constructed incinerates and disposed of the bodies in mass grave sites. It was estimated by a military official that the Army National Guard confiscated over 5200 bodies and the Coast Guard recovered over another 1500 bodies out of lakes and surrounding waters.
In the immediate aftermath of Hurricane Andrew, communications with the affected areas were severed, roadways were blocked by debris, neighborhoods were unrecognizable, and street signs had been blown away. These conditions hampered initial relief efforts, especially because many local officials had lost their homes or were inaccessible, and outside staff unfamiliar with the area was called in to respond. No accurate information on the acute medical needs of the population was available. The rapid needs assessment surveys were conducted as soon as heavily damaged areas could be traversed. (Center for Diease Control, 1992)
Although diverse and redundant communications equipment existed at Turkey Point Nuclear Power Plant, offsite communications were lost during the storm because of a common vulnerability to wind damage. Normal telephone service failed because the storm blew down the lines near the station. The dedicated commercial telephone lines servicing the control room, technical support center, and emergency operations facility, used to give initial notification and status to the State in an emergency, also failed. The Federal Telecommunications System (FTS)-2000 lines used for the Emergency Notification System failed, cutting off normal communications with the NRC Operations Center. The cellular telephone systems also did not function because the storm damaged the onsite antennas and the offsite repeating stations. Except for one hand-held radio on the company FM radio system, the plant radio systems did not function during and immediately following the storm. Overall, all offsite communications were lost for about 4 hours during the storm, and reliable communications were not restored for about 24 hours following the storm. A temporary satellite communications system provided by the NRC aided recovery efforts considerably and would have been more beneficial if it had been on site before the storm. (United States Nuclear Reglatory Commision, 1993)
Another incident ignored by the media, involved the Turkey Point Nuclear Power Plant in Dade County. A 400 foot smoke stack was found to have a 200 foot crack in it. According to FPL the smoke stack was demolished. However, reports indicate that large doses of radiation were released because of the plant not properly cooling. (Frankovich, 2001) noted that in his group of twelve, they all broke out with sores, became nauseous, and had dry heaves for months after Andrew. The onset of the effects was within 24 hours after the storm impacted the area.
On August 28, 1992, The Miami Herald released the article, “We Need Help”. The article explained that because of the inaction of the United States the relief effort was collapsing. The article claimed that Dade County was on its own and that its people were in dire need of food and water. Without these, the casualties would continue to rise.
On August 29, 1992, it was reported that the Red Cross had problems. People were calling and pledging aid, however, the persons taking the calls only wrote the messages out and passed them on to someone else. Because of this, many supplies and donations were lost. Many callers were put on hold and others could not even get through.
According to (Frankovich, 2001) medical attention was sparse as well. Injured and ill people were unable to seek any medical aid. Instead, there were being told to write the name and contact number of their next of kin and pin it on their clothes so when their bodies were found, they could be contacted.
Help for the victims of the storm came from everywhere. It wasn’t until after the storm, local agencies realized that they had been unprepared for the devastation or the coordination of hundreds of volunteers. The Florida Fire Chiefs Association started to design a plan that would allow for local agencies to request for mutual aid during a major incident and provide a coordinated and tractable system to manage and deploy those resources (Gordon, 2005)
To design the system, the Florida Fire Chiefs turned to the Division of Forestry’s Incident Command System and the Florida Statewide Emergency Response Plan (Gordon, 2005). With the development of the system, the incident commander can make a request for assistance and resources through a central clearinghouse, deploy them, and then demobilize them just as quickly.
Everyone was looking to the storm as it was approaching and everyone who has ever lived through a hurricane in Florida knew the basics of how to prepare, but no one was ready for what occurred after the storm. Afterwards there was massive destruction throughout southern Florida. Homes were brought to rubble, business ruined, power plants heavily damaged, water supplies lost as well as just total chaos. Most who attempted to ride the storm out had supplies for a few days as well as those who evacuated only took a few days supplies. They were not prepared for the year’s worth of rebuilding they were now facing. Many cried for help in any form they could get it. Some never bothered to return since they now no longer had a home or a job to go back to.
It was now up to crisis intervention to come up with a plan not only to rebuild these cities but to rebuild these people’s homes and businesses. Command centers had to be put up and organized, plans had to be put in place so there could be a way to work toward everyone getting the help they need and all basic needs being met until water and electric could be restored. Who was going to do this and who were going to come and help?
Soon after Andrew had passed, the Florida Fire Chiefs' Association started to design a plan that would allow local agencies to request mutual aid during a major incident and to provide a coordinated and tractable system for deploying those resources in an orderly and manageable fashion. This may sound simple, but when you take into account the multitude of emergency service providers throughout Florida, the geographic obstacles of the Panhandle State, and the ability to get federal reimbursement in a timely manner, suddenly the picture gets very fuzzy.
To design their system, Florida's fire chiefs turned to the experts at managing large numbers of resources and specialty teams during emergency situations. The Division of Forestry's incident command system, the Florida Statewide Emergency Response Plan, identifies 17 separate functions that can provide needed resources during a major incident. Each emergency support function acts as an independent agency, coordinating and procuring requested services under its purview. Collectively, the ESFs are accountable to the incident commander. (Gordon, 2005).
The Chief’s and the Florida Statewide Emergency Response plan needed to organize who all needed to come and in what order, how they would get them to South Florida as well as where they would be housing them during their cleanup process. This was no easy tasks as well as what do you do first? The National Guard along with the Coast Guard, the Army, FEMA (the Federal Emergency Management Agency), Metro Dade Police, state police and local police removed dead bodies and body parts as quickly as possible during those first ten days of the aftermath. Horrified survivors watched as both uniformed and civilian- clothed men searched the rubble and filled body bags, which they then stacked in military vehicles or huge refrigerator trucks normally used to transport food, only to drive off and leave the stranded injured to fend for themselves. (Frankovich, 2001) There were those that did not understand the need and system for those agencies doing this, to keep from spreading disease and to quickly help secure the bodies for the family members to claim and have closure.
A system had to be put in place so once you had the bodies located and removed the heavy trucks from across the United States could be brought in to help remove those buildings that were damaged and destroyed so the cities could start rebuilding. As well as when the roadways were cleared power companies from all over could come and help restore power so food could be stored more plentiful for those returning and those helping with the cleanup process. (Department of Homeland Security, 2006)
Hurricane Andrew did many things when it hit South Florida in 1992. Many emergency procedures were not really in place for just such incidents as well as many agencies did not have a mutual agreement in case of these types of natural disasters. Florida with it sitting in such a position to be hit by many disasters needed to make sure if these types of events occur again they were more prepared and ready to respond in whatever area it is in need.
To maintain a state of readiness, Crisis Leadership Now defined three levels of activations in response to an incident:
Level One, Minor Incident:
This would typically be a local event with limited impact that does not affect the overall functioning capacity of your company. Examples would be a contained, nontoxic hazardous material incident or a limited power outage that is expected to last less than one day. Local on-site or first responders typically will manage the situation without the intervention of your teams or any meaningful press coverage. (Barton, 2008)
Level Two Emergency: An emergency is an incident, potential or actual, which seriously disrupts the overall operations of your enterprise. Examples would a power outage that could compromise your operations for a day longer. In a level 2 crisis, your incident commander should be notified, and such a crisis usually requires the activation of your hotlines, crisis communications plan, and BCP. (Barton, 2008)
Level Three, Disaster:
A level 3 incident seriously impairs or threatens your functionality as an enterprise. Examples might include a plane crash in which several or your executives are on board or a massive product recall that certainly will get the attention of consumers, as well as the news media and regulators. The event would likely disable business operations for at least two days. (Barton, 2008)
Florida's geography and large land mass would make statewide management of equipment and personnel virtually impossible. The SERC committee followed the Division of Emergency Management's plan and divided the state into seven geographic regions. The committee appoints a director, from each region, who is responsible for keeping records of equipment and personnel availability as well as which units could be deployed quickly.
Region Seven, the largest of the regions, extends from Martin County and the Port St. Lucie area at its northern border to Monroe County and Key West in the south. Due to its shape and dense population, the region is further classified as Regions Seven North and Seven South.
Due to the diversity in terminology and the wide variety of definitions within each of the ESFs, commonality of resources and like terminology had to be created. The plan allows for resources to be mobilized as a single entity, or in large groups.
Incident Command System organization consisting of five major functions: Command, Operations, Planning, Logistics, and Finance and Administration. A sixth function, Intelligence, is sometimes added to an ICS organization and establishes a process for gathering, sharing, and managing incident related information and intelligence. Responsibilities in each functional area include: (Paniati, 2006) * Command—provide on-scene management and control authority * Operations—direct incident tactical operations * Planning—prepare Incident Action Plan and maintain situation and resources status * Logistics—provide services and support to the incident * Finance and Administration—track incident costs and account for reimbursements * Intelligence—provide analysis and sharing of information and intelligence during the incident * (Paniati, 2006)
A tracking system was designed in an attempt to avoid the freelancing fiascos that occurred during Andrew, maintain accountability and provide for efficient and timely reimbursement from FEMA.
When an incident commander makes a request for resources, the request is entered into Tracker and assigned a tasking number. Once a number is assigned, the request is assigned to the appropriate ESF and filled as required. When a unit is deployed, the team leader is provided with the tasking number. Coded within the number is a description of the event and the specific assignment that has been given. Units or teams responding to an affected area without an assigned tasking number will not be granted access and will not be eligible for reimbursement. (Gordon, 2005)
Hurricane Andrew was a disaster filled with reminders about the role of communications. Employees needed to know where to get help, food, temporary housing and cash and then where and when to report to work. From bank customers who wanted to withdraw cash to families who needed milk for infants and from reporters clamoring for news to public agencies wanting to be updated, there was a nonstop demand for information. (Keslar, 2011)
With 1700 miles of power lines down, Florida Power & Light issued media advisories with safety tips for the public and held daily news conferences about the recovery process. IBM and other South Florida employers issued news wire releases asking employees to call their company 800 number to confirm that they were okay and to get the help needed for themselves and their families. IBM’s communications support involved writing news releases, making available backgrounders, fact sheets and video, answering media questions and conducting interviews. It also included working with public agencies in the affected areas and gathering information about IBM’s relief efforts. (Keslar, 2011)
One thing none of us want to find ourselves in the middle of is a natural disaster, but when it comes to Mother Nature, at some point we all find yours selves right in the middle. Due to Hurricane Andrew being larger than anyone expected, it opened the eyes of many Americans to maintaining a readiness plan for a natural disaster. This plan should show the best course of action to quickly restore the areas hit. Hurricane Andrew established the needs and technology to have advance equipment to help accurately predict storms. This technology would also predict where the storms will hit, how severe the storm will be, and how fast the storms are traveling. Crisis Incident Commands have become a staple because of Hurricane Andrew and has help to ensure these types of storms do not create too much havoc.
Did we learn our lesson during Hurricane Andrew? No. In general terms, the challenges to our collective response to Hurricane Katrina are not difficult to identify. Hurricane Katrina, its 115-130 mph winds, and the accompanying storm surge it created as high as 27 feet along a stretch of the Northern Gulf Coast from Mobile, Alabama, to New Orleans, impacted nearly 93,000 square miles of our Nation, roughly an area the size of Great Britain. The disaster was not isolated to one town or city, or even one State. Individual local and State plans, as well as relatively new plans created by the Federal government since Hurricane Andrew, failed to adequately account for widespread or simultaneous catastrophes. (Department of Homeland Security, 2006)
Bibliography

Barton, L. (2008). Crisis Leadership Now. New York: McGraw-Hill.
Center for Diease Control. (1992, September 18). Rapid Health Needs Assessment Following Hurricane Andrew. Retrieved September 9, 2011, from Center for Diease Control: http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/00017631.htm
Department of Homeland Security. (2006, Febuary 23). The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina. Retrieved September 10, 2011, from Department of Homeland Security: http://library.stmarytx.edu/acadlib/edocs/katrinawh.pdf
Frankovich, K. (2001). Deadly Silence, The Hurricane Andrew Cover-up. Nexus Magazine Volume 8, Number 3.
Gordon, J. (2005, March 1). Andew's Legacy. Retrieved June 10, 2011, from Prepardness: www.firechief.com
Keslar, C. A. (2011). How To Avoid A Second Disaster- In Communication. Retrieved September 10, 2011, from Disaster Recovery Journal: http://www.drj.com/article-archives/communications/how-to-avoid-a-second-disaster-in-communications.html
Paniati, J. (2006, Feburary). Incident Command System. Retrieved September 24, 2011, from United States Department of Transportation: http://ops.fhwa.dot.gov/publications/ics_guide/ics_guide.pdf
Rappaport, E. (1992, August). TPC NHC Hurricane Andrew. Retrieved June 12, 2011, from www.nhc.noaa.gov
United States Nuclear Reglatory Commision. (1993, July 20). EFFECT OF HURRICANE ANDREW ON TURKEY POINT NUCLEAR POWER PLANT. Retrieved September 9, 2011, from United States Nuclear Reglatory Commision: http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/gen-comm/info-notices/1993/in93053.html