What is the most effective strategy for defeating the insurgents in Afghanistan?
The insurgents in Afghanistan cannot be defeated. “After eight years of fighting, two things seem clear: First, the insurgency does not have the capability to defeat U.S. forces or depose Afghanistan’s central government; and, second, U.S. forces do not have the ability to completely eliminate the insurgency.” Thus, the question is no longer how to militarily defeat those we find repellant, but rather how to politically engage nationalist insurgents in a way that ultimately prevents the propagation of future international terrorists. This policy paper addresses the virtual stalemate between insurgents and counterinsurgents and prescribes political compromise as an alternative to the failed counterinsurgent strategies in Afghanistan. The inability of ‘Deterrence strategy’ or ‘Hearts and Minds strategy’ to produce results underscores the impotence of COIN. I argue against the question: the insurgents cannot be defeated; to achieve our stated objective, we must bring the insurgents to the political bargaining table and jointly combat the terrorists that hinder the legitimacy of their national cause. This paper seeks to advance this policy as the most resourceful and self-sufficient solution to producing stability in Afghanistan.
Total victory for either side is impossible: the insurgency does not have the capability to defeat U.S. forces or depose Afghanistan’s central government; and furthermore, U.S. forces have failed to eradicate the insurgency. Given recent government estimates and testimonies of strategists such as National Security Advisor Jim Jones, “Afghanistan is not in imminent danger of falling”: the Taliban is overthrown, Al Qaeda is in retreat, with many killed or fled to Pakistan, and fewer than 100 active fighters remain within its borders. At the same time, however, several campaigns, billions of dollars and 100,000 troops later, the fight continues against an underground and organic weaker nationalist insurgency. The fact is, therefore, that no amount of troops or COIN strategy will achieve stability in Afghanistan.
To test this, reality can be compared to theory. Deterrence strategy provides for the use of violence to make an example of defiant communities and deter further public support for insurgents. In theory, counterinsurgents are likely to prevail, encouraging the population to bandwagon with the likely winner. In reality however, the Taliban enjoyed support by largely sympathetic Pashtun populations even after successful eviction while the provincial central government of the United States is fragile and struggles to exercise even limited control outside Kabul. Likewise, General Mchrystal’s Hearts & Minds approach displayed similar impotence. His imprecise strategy lacked the lacked the ability to articulate the requisite provisions for bolstering government legitimacy and administrative capacity, which eventually failed to produce long-term population security. Furthermore, practice reveals that Hearts & Minds produces costs that cannot be sustained. General Petraeus’s own "Counterinsurgency Field Manual" calls for twenty counterinsurgents per 1000 residents as considered the minimum troop density required for effective counterinsurgency operations. Afghanistan, with a population estimated at 28.4 million, would require 568,000 troops under that model. The idea that adding 40,000 troops to the roughly 100,000 American and NATO troops there will produce a military victory over the insurgency is to overlook nearly a decade’s worth of failed military investment. Galula was correct: military action must be secondary to political action.
Insurgency is war for the people. To fight a nationalist insurgency is to commit to an endless military campaign short only of mass killings and blatant imperialism. The struggle in Afghanistan has been at a political/military impasse from which compromise and power-sharing are the only ways out. In order to attain stability we must adopt a policy of political resourcefulness. In “ungovernable” areas Taliban wields substantial governing authority in at least a third of Afghanistan’s districts: keeping order, providing services, mediating disputes, etc. In areas where no support exists, Nationalist insurgents, not groups of international terrorists, have earned the right to participate in government given the largely supportive Pashtun population. Through participation in government, their actions can be evaluated by the people and observed by the global community. Whether this entails greater opportunities for engagement or formalization of political powers for certain demographics—as there is in Iraq—should be up for debate and negotiation, but political process must be the focus, rather than pure military goals. It is in promising a position at the political bargaining table that insurgents lay down their weapons and legitimize their cause, as evidenced by the IRA’s movement into mainstream politics. If we embrace it, compromise with national insurgents could simultaneously weed out terrorists, protect Afghan non-combatants, and provide the United States with a tempting self-sustaining and diplomatic exit strategy.