...tation Compensation Policy Bd Telecommunication Rukana.Ppt Course No: EHRM-521 Course Title: Compensation Management Prepared for Abu Sayef Md. Muntaquimul Bari Chowdhuri Lecturer, Department of Management Studies Faculty of Business Studies Jahagirnagor University Prepared By: Md. Abu Rukana (Std. ID: 2011 3 122 ) Md. Hemayetul Islam (Std. ID: 2011 3 022) Mohammad Khalilur Rahman(Std. ID: 20122394) Ziasmin Akter (Std. ID: 20113286) Content…….. 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. Synopsis of mobile operator in BD Robi Banglalink Citycell Findings Recommendation Q/A Mobile Phone Subscribers in Bangladesh Operators Grameen Phone Ltd. (GP) Active Subscribers(Million) 39.293 Orascom Telecom Bangladesh Limited (Banglalink) 25.490 Robi Axiata Limited (Robi) Airtel Bangladesh Limited (Airtel) Pacific Bangladesh Telecom Limited (Citycell) Teletalk Bangladesh Ltd. (Teletalk) Total 19.211 6.734 1.699 1.358 93.788 Source: BRTA Website Company Overview ROBI… Axiata (Bangladesh) Limited is a dynamic and leading countrywide GSM communication solution provider It is a joint venture company between Axiata Group Berhad, Malaysia and NTT DOCOMO INC, Japan. Company Overview ROBI Cont. On 28th March, 2010 the company started its new journey with the brand name Robi. It has the widest International Roaming coverage in Bangladesh connecting 553 operators across 207 countries. Compensation plan of ROBI Salary & Benefit Monthly salary is transferred...
Words: 484 - Pages: 2
... | 1.1 | Bank CEO incentives | 2 | | 1.2 | Credit Crisis | 2 | | | | | 2.0 | Bank CEO incentives were the major factor in credit crisis | 2-5 | 3.0 | Conclusion | 6 | | | | 4.0 | References | 7 | 1.0 Introduction Bank CEO and the credit crisis was it related to each other? There is a statement which is ‘Bank CEO’s incentives were a major factor in credit crisis.’ First of I would like to explain a few terms in the topic. A CEO stand for Chief Executive Officer meanwhile, incentives here doesn’t only mean money or material incentives. It also includes motivation either positively or negatively towards the CEO. Therefore, the statement says that the lack or abundance of incentives to the CEO is the major factor for the past credit crisis. CEO incentives were not the major cause for the credit crisis based on my research from the journals and articles. I totally oppose these because I have gathered valuable evidences from journal and articles that I have read online. 1.1 Bank CEO Incentives There are several titles for the position Chief Executive Officer (CEO) such as Managing Director, Executive and President. The responsibility of CEO is different from one another according to their size, scope of work and an organization. CEO plays an important role by making a decision, hiring of staff. Besides that, CEO will have communication deal with board of directors and corporate operation of high strategy in large company. CEO incentives are...
Words: 1783 - Pages: 8
...HOW TOTAL WEALTH OF THE CEO AFFECTS THE RISK POLICY OF FIRM OLD DOMINION UNIVERSITY FIN 863 FINAL PROJECT BY SONIK MANDAL CHARLIE SWARTZ INTRODUCTION Agency theory states that the goals of the owners and the managers of a firm diverge in a way that the managers take less risk since their ownership of the company is much less compared to the owners of the firm who have a much bigger stake in the company. Thus managers being risk averse, they forego profitable ventures if they anticipate them to be risky (Guay, 1999, Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Making the salary structure more convex by introducing more option-based compensation and stock awards is one way owners try to align the goals of the managers with the owners. But managerial wealth attached to the firm is only a fraction of their total personal wealth in the portfolio. Other components of manager’s total wealth could be stocks owned in other companies, real estate portfolio, and other debt related securities. A lot of research has been done in the past explaining how managerial compensation structure (options, stock awards etc.) affect his risk taking abilities (Knopf et al. 2002, Rogers, 2002, etc.). But not much research has been done showing how manager’s outside wealth affects his risk taking in the firm. As far as we know, the only paper that has looked at this relationship is by Elsila et al. 2013 but that paper only looked at the Swedish listed firms...
Words: 1609 - Pages: 7
...literature review Prepared by: Zainab Ashfaq (4525819) Unit Code: BGP8022 CEO DUALITY-THE COMBINATION OF CHAIRMAN AND CEO ROLES A literature review of different theories and empirical research about CEO Duality. INTRODUCTION Recent financial scandals like Enron, Mobily and WorldCom arise a demand for a better monitoring and controlling structure within the organizations. Conflict of interest between the shareholders and the managers is an on going debate in the literature of corporate governance. In this situation, the board of directors is supposed to be a critical mechanism in supervising the actions of management. Researchers of corporate governance field are well motivated to study about the numerous features of the board of directors based on different theoretical backgrounds. Agency theory and the stewardship theory has been widely used as a theoretical framework by many of these studies. Concerning the board of directors, a developing area of research is whether the CEO and board Chairman roles are split or not to be split (Dey, Ellen and Liu 2011). Agency theory proponent claims that in the best interests of shareholders it is necessary to have a separate Chairman of board and CEO (Nicholson and Kiel 2007). On the contrary, stewardship theory supporters believe in the concept of CEO duality in which the role of CEO and board chair is performed by one person (Abels and Martel 2013). The need for monitoring arises because of...
Words: 4334 - Pages: 18
...Journal of Banking & Finance 27 (2003) 103–131 www.elsevier.com/locate/econbase The impact of the manager–shareholder conflict on acquiring bank returns Marcia Millon Cornett a,*, Gayane Hovakimian b, Darius Palia c, Hassan Tehranian d,* a Department of Finance, College of Business, Southern Illinois University, Carbondale, IL 62901, USA b Graduate School of Business, Fordham University, New York, NY 10023, USA c Columbia Business School, Columbia University, New York, NY 10027, USA d Carroll School of Management, Boston College, Chestnut Hill, MA 02167, USA Received 22 May 2000; accepted 16 May 2001 Abstract This paper examines whether shareholder value-maximizing corporate governance mechanisms assist in reducing the managerial incentive to enter value-destroying bank acquisitions. We find that diversifying bank acquisitions earn significantly negative announcement period abnormal returns (AR) for bidder banks whereas focusing acquisitions earn zero AR. We then find that corporate governance variables (such as CEO share and option ownership and a smaller board size) in the bidding bank are less effective in diversifying acquisitions than in focusing acquisitions. These results are robust to the inclusion of the usual control variables. Ó 2002 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved. JEL classification: G21; G34 Keywords: Banks; Bank acquisitions; Corporate governance 1. Introduction Several empirical studies have documented a negative relation between firm performance...
Words: 14440 - Pages: 58
........................................................... 6 5. Reference list...................................................................................................................... 8 Tables Table 1: Cash-flows................................................................................................................ 6 Table 2: Discounted cash-flows ............................................................................................. 6 Table 3: Banks strengths in comparison................................................................................. 7 1. Evaluate the rationale for the merger After a period of record number of bank failures during the 1980s, the Banking Industry entered a period of record profits in the 1990s. Also the industry saw a large number of bank mergers that pointed out a new trend, leading to more concentrated and bigger banks holding a majority of total banks assets. Following this trend a Chemical/Chase merger became attractive. By accomplishing this merger Chase Manhattan would grow to the largest bank of the USA and the fourth largest in the world, which would sum up to total assets of $297.3 billions, a market capitalization of $22.9 billions and shareholder equity of $7.3 billion. A clear rationale for merging was the elimination of overlapping business activities, which would lead to massive cost savings of $1.5 billions per annum. This would be achieved through a reduction...
Words: 2581 - Pages: 11
...School Master thesis within Business Administration Title: CEO remuneration in listed European insurance companies – Trends and justifications over the years 2005-2009 Authors: Sara Palmén, Avare Suleyman Tutor: Dr. Petra Inwinkl Examiners: Dr. Petra Inwinkl, Prof. Gary Cunningham Date: Spring 2010 (uploaded 2010.06.03) Key words: CEO, chief executive officer, remuneration, fixed pay, variable pay, short-term, long-term, benefit, Europe, insurance, incentive, attraction, retention, agency theory, financial crisis, trend, justification. Abstract In the ever so increasingly competitive business climate of the 21st century, human resources are vital for corporate success. Employees need proper incentives to perform in goal-oriented manners. Incentive systems, especially Chief Executive Officer [CEO] remunerations, have been a popular topic since the 1990s, and this tendency has increased both during the 2002-2003 corporate scandal era, as well as the financial crisis which sparked in 2007. The recent tendency appears to lean towards companies cutting their executive bonuses as well as criticism and suspiciousness towards large bonus payments. While remuneration policies within the banking industry have been thoroughly debated and researched, another financial industry that is left largely untouched are the insurance companies. The focus of this research is therefore CEO remuneration in European insurance...
Words: 23597 - Pages: 95
...Journal of Economic Perspectives—Volume 17, Number 3—Summer 2003—Pages 71–92 Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem Lucian Arye Bebchuk and Jesse M. Fried E xecutive compensation has long attracted a great deal of attention from financial economists. Indeed, the increase in academic papers on the subject of CEO compensation during the 1990s seems to have outpaced even the remarkable increase in CEO pay itself during this period (Murphy, 1999). Much research has focused on how executive compensation schemes can help alleviate the agency problem in publicly traded companies. To understand adequately the landscape of executive compensation, however, one must recognize that the design of compensation arrangements is also partly a product of this same agency problem. Alternative Approaches to Executive Compensation Our focus in this paper is on publicly traded companies without a controlling shareholder. When ownership and management are separated in this way, managers might have substantial power. This recognition goes back, of course, to Berle and Means (1932, p. 139) who observed that top corporate executives, “while in office, have almost complete discretion in management.” Since Jensen and Meckling (1976), the problem of managerial power and discretion has been analyzed in modern finance as an “agency problem.” Managers may use their discretion to benefit themselves personally in a variety y Lucian Arye Bebchuk is the William J. Friedman Professor...
Words: 17317 - Pages: 70
...CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: A SURVEY OF THE LITERATURE November, 2003 Jorge Farinha* Keywords: agency theory, corporate governance, ownership structure JEL Classification: G300 *CETE-Centro de Estudos de Economia Industrial, do Trabalho e da Empresa, Faculdade de Economia, Universidade do Porto, Portugal. Correspondence to: Jorge Farinha, Faculdade de Economia da Universidade do Porto, Rua Roberto Frias, 4200 Porto, Portugal. Tel. (351)-22-5571100, Fax (351)-22-5505050. E-mail: jfarinha@fep.up.pt. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: A SURVEY OF THE LITERATURE ABSTRACT This paper reviews the theoretical and empirical literature on the nature and consequences of the corporate governance problem, providing some guidance on the major points of consensus and dissent among researchers on this issue. Also analysed is the effectiveness of a set of external and internal disciplining mechanisms in providing a solution for the corporate governance problem. Apart from this, particular emphases are given to the special conflicts arising from the relationship between managers and shareholders in companies with large ownership diffusion, the issue of managerial entrenchment and the link between firm value and corporate governance. Keywords: agency theory, corporate governance, ownership structure JEL Classification: G300 1 1 Introduction Recent financial scandals associated to accounting and other frauds allegedly blamed to top company managers (e.g. Enron, Worldcom, Adelphia) have...
Words: 19465 - Pages: 78
...furthermore, shocking investors’ confidence. Consequently, corporate governance mechanism has been a crucial issue discussed again. Sarbanes-Oxley Act was enacted in 2002 to enhance corporate government mechanism which is viewed as the priority of financial revolution, in the expectation that governance mechanism may be reinforced, public confidence retrieved, accuracy and reliability of financial information assured. In Bangladesh a massive stock market meltdown hit the market in the middle of 2010. The DGEN Index was cut by two third and a lot of investor lost all of their money. Then very recently major financial institutions like Sonali Bank, Basic Bank etc. were caught in financial scam which again shook the confidence of the market to such industries. These events renewed and reinforced people’s interest in study of corporate governance and how it could have prevented such mishaps. Corporate governance describes the structure of rights and responsibilities among the parties that have a stake in a firm. System of corporate governance could be defined as a set of processes and structures used to direct a corporation's business. Once implemented, an effective corporate governance system can help to ensure an appropriate division of power among shareholders, the board of directors, and management. It is not just corporate management; it is something much broader which include a fair, efficient and transparent administration to meet certain well-defined objectives. When it is practiced...
Words: 9456 - Pages: 38
...The impact of performance-based compensation on misreporting Natasha Burns and Simi Kedia * * Burns is at University of Georgia, Terry College of Business, Athens, GA. 30602, e-mail: nburns@uga.edu. Kedia is at Harvard University, Harvard Business School, Boston, MA 02163, e-mail: skedia@hbs.edu. This paper combines the results of two earlier papers: “Does performance-based compensation explain restatements” by Natasha Burns and “Do Executive Stock Options Generate Incentives for Earnings Management? Evidence from Accounting Restatements” by Simi Kedia. We thank Jean Helwege, Andrew Karolyi, and René Stulz for their comments and advice. We also thank Jim Hsieh, Kose John, Steven Kaplan, Kevin Murphy, Prabhala, Jeremy Stein, Christof Stahel, Ralph Walking, Karen Wruck, David Yermack, participants at the 2003 NBER Universities Research Conference of Corporate Governance, the 2004 AFA Meetings in San Diego, seminars at Arizona State University, Baruch College, Indiana University, Ohio State University, Penn State University, Rice University, Rutgers University, Southern Methodist University, University of Georgetown, University of Houston, University of Illinois, and University of Pittsburgh for helpful comments. All errors are the responsibility of the authors. The Impact of performance-based compensation on misreporting Abstract This paper examines the effect of CEO compensation contracts on misreporting. We find that the sensitivity of the CEO’s option portfolio...
Words: 14024 - Pages: 57
...FORDHAM UNIVERSITY SCHOOLS OF BUSINESS CEO-Director Connections and Corporate Fraud N.K. Chidambaran Simi Kedia Nagpurnanand R. Prabhala Working Paper 2010-009 Copyright © 2010 by N.K. Chidambaran, Simi Kedia, and Nagpurnanand R. Prabhala Working papers are in draft form. This working paper is distributed for purposes of comment and discussion only. It may not be reproduced without permission of the copyright holders. Copies of working papers are available from the authors. Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1681472 CEO-Director Connections and Corporate Fraud∗ N. K. Chidambaran Simi Kedia Nagpurnanand R. Prabhala This Version: September 2010 JEL Classification: G30, G32, G34, G38 Chidambaran is at Fordham University (chidambaran@fordham.edu), Kedia is at Rutgers University (kedia@busness.rutgers.edu), and Prabhala is at the University of Maryland (prabhala@umd.edu). We thank Jonathan Karpoff and Jerry Martin for graciously sharing their data on frauds with us. We thank Benjamin Cole, Eli Fich, Shane Johnson, Lalitha Naveen, Howard Tuckman, Antoinette Schoar, Vijaya Venkatramani, Adam Yore, and seminar participants at Fordham University, London Business School, and 2010 Summer Research Conference at ISB for their comments. All errors remain ours. Chidambaran acknowledges support from a Fordham University Faculty Research Grant, Kedia acknowledges support from the Whitcomb Center, and Prabhala acknowledges support from the Center...
Words: 17245 - Pages: 69
...Wilfrid Laurier University Scholars Commons @ Laurier Theses and Dissertations (Comprehensive) 2010 Three Essays in Corporate Governance Vishaal Rabindranauth Anand Baulkaran Wilfrid Laurier University Follow this and additional works at: http://scholars.wlu.ca/etd Part of the Management Sciences and Quantitative Methods Commons Recommended Citation Baulkaran, Vishaal Rabindranauth Anand, "Three Essays in Corporate Governance" (2010). Theses and Dissertations (Comprehensive). Paper 1121. This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by Scholars Commons @ Laurier. It has been accepted for inclusion in Theses and Dissertations (Comprehensive) by an authorized administrator of Scholars Commons @ Laurier. For more information, please contact scholarscommons@wlu.ca. 1*1 Library and Archives Canada Bibliotheque et Archives Canada Published Heritage Branch Direction du Patrimoine de I'edition 395 Wellington Street Ottawa ON K1A 0N4 Canada 395, rue Wellington Ottawa ON K1A 0N4 Canada Your file Votre reference ISBN: 978-0-494-75409-2 Our file Notre reference ISBN: 978-0-494-75409-2 NOTICE: AVIS: The author has granted a nonexclusive license allowing Library and Archives Canada to reproduce, publish, archive, preserve, conserve, communicate to the public by telecommunication or on the Internet, loan, distribute and sell theses worldwide, for commercial or noncommercial purposes, in microform, paper...
Words: 16083 - Pages: 65
...Proceedings of the 2nd International Conference on Corporate Governance Garrow A New Hypothesis on the Determinants of Acquisitions Nigel Garrow Introduction Merger and acquisition (M&A) activity is a significant factor in business in most advanced economies. According to Thomson Reuters, the value of M&A deals completed globally during the 12 months to November 2009 was US$1.8 trillion. However, the acquirers’ shareholders often lose value. Much of the literature on M&A is centred on the UK and US markets, with only a modest level of research within Australia This paper suggests a new proposition to explain why M&A activity may be value destroying for the acquirers: Success or failure for the acquiring firm’s shareholders in M&A is a function of the combined tenure, personal motivation, and recent performance of the Chairman and Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of the acquiring firm. This examination of the combined effectiveness of the Chairman and CEO is not something that appears to have been undertaken before. The paper will present the constituent hypotheses of the main proposition, followed by a literature review, a presentation of findings from a pilot study, conclusions and next steps. Four constituent hypotheses, each of which refers to the performance of the Chairman and CEO, arise out of the pilot study: Hypothesis 1. The length of time that the Chairman and CEO of the acquiring firm have been together in their respective positions at the time of the acquisition will...
Words: 5864 - Pages: 24
...Journal of Banking & Finance 27 (2003) 1297–1321 www.elsevier.com/locate/econbase Corporate governance, dividend payout policy, and the interrelation between dividends, R&D, and capital investment Klaus Gugler * Department of Economics, University of Vienna, WP No. 9803, Br€nnerstrasse 72, 1210 Vienna, Austria u Received 12 October 2000; accepted 5 November 2001 Abstract This paper investigates the relationship between dividends and the ownership and control structure of the firm. For a panel of Austrian firms over the 1991/99 period, we find that statecontrolled firms engage in dividend smoothing, while family-controlled firms do not. The latter choose significantly lower target payout levels. Consistently, state-controlled firms are most reluctant and family-controlled firms are least reluctant to cut dividends when cuts are warranted. The dividend behavior of bank- and foreign-controlled firms lies in between stateand family-controlled firms. This is consistent with the expected ‘‘ranking’’ of information asymmetries and managerial agency costs. The above results hold for firms with good investment opportunities. We find that firms with low growth opportunities optimally disgorge cash irrespective of who controls the firm. Ó 2002 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved. JEL classification: G3; L2; D9 Keywords: Corporate governance; Dividend policy; Simultaneous equations 1. Introduction In March 1999, Richard Schenz, the CEO of OMV AG, the largest Austrian corporation, announced...
Words: 13500 - Pages: 54
