Chapter 1
THE PROBLEM AND ITS Background
Introduction
The September 11, 2001 terrorist attack of the World Trade Center in New York City, USA directly caused the death of more than three thousand innocent civilians when two hijacked jetliners deliberately slammed against the twin towers that used to be a testament to the United States’ economic clout. On the same day, two other hijacked airliners were flown to other targets, one of which was the Pentagon, the seat of America’s military might, while the fourth aircraft crashed in a Pennsylvania field, believed to have been due to its passengers fighting back to regain control. While these incidents are certainly not the latest terrorist attacks against civil aviation, these attacks are significant in the sense that its aftermath truly changed the course of history of many nations and radically changed the lifestyles of many peoples.
The earliest recorded terrorist act was on September 9, 1949, when a bomb was placed and exploded in a Quebec Airways flight in Canada. Since that first recorded aviation security breach, security experts had been trying to be one step ahead of the terror groups in hardening aircraft and airport targets against all forms of terrorist attacks. However, on July 22, 1968, three gunmen from the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), hijacked a passenger airliner of the Israeli airline El Al, on a flight from Rome to Tel-Aviv, and demanded the release of their comrades-in-arms who were imprisoned in Israel. While this may not be the first case of civilian aircraft seizure during that year, this operation was qualitatively different in its content and ultimate aim. It was the first time that an aircraft had been hijacked not out of criminal motivation or for personal reasons, but with the specific goal of politically pressuring an opponent and using the incident as a propaganda message to bring a political cause to the world’s notice.
Since the first recorded aviation security breach, security experts had been trying hard to harden aircraft and airport targets against all forms of terrorists acts. However, it took the World Trade Center terror act to make nation-states re-assess the threat situation against aviation security. Past incidents of attacks by disgruntled groups as well as by organized terror groups against airports and the rest of the airline industry has proven that Philippine civil aviation is not immune to terrorist acts, the most recent being the bombing of the International Cargo terminal of the NAIA, where the explosion resulted to scores wounded and damage to property.
The Arab Convention for the Suppression of Terrorism was adopted by the Council of Arab Ministers of the Interior and the Council of Arab Ministers of Justice in Cairo, Egypt in 1998. Terrorism was defined in the convention as:
Any act or threat of violence, whatever its motives or purposes, that occurs in the advancement of an individual or collective criminal agenda and seeking to sow panic among people, causing fear by harming them, or placing their lives, liberty or security in danger, or seeking to cause damage to the environment or to public or private installations or property or to occupying or seizing them, or seeking to jeopardize a national resources. However, The United States Federal Bureau Investigation defines terrorism as the unlawful use of force or violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a Government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives.
According to Singgian, “Of the various translational phenomena impinging on the international society during the last quarter of this century, most especially since the end of the Cold War, the resurgence of terrorist activities is emerging as one of the most dynamic and is becoming a cause of global concern. The persistence of unresolved conflicts and the rise of extremism have provided new spawning grounds for terrorism.” These “unresolved conflicts” may well reflect on the current situation in the country, where various interests and ideologies have clashed with each other for supremacy.
Given such a historical development, it is not surprising that airports have become an attractive and even a vital target of terrorist groups for the staging of violent acts in expressing political statements. It is also for these reasons that access control and limitation became a fundamental requirement in all areas of the world that serves international civil aviation and in particular, in the Ninoy Aquino International Airport or NAIA.
An airport such as the NAIA will have two generally sanitized areas; the landslde and the airside. The landside is that area of an airport and buildings to which the non-traveling public has free access. This includes the cargo areas, airline offices, as well as the passenger terminals, where passengers and well-wishers, as well as the general public are allowed to co-mingle.
At the moment the more familiar building to many is the International Passenger Terminal or the IPT. The International Passenger Terminal is a Y-shaped, two tiered, two-satellite structure where the passengers are processed either for the arrival or departure. It has a total floor area of 85,000 square meters. As an international airport, the IPT is the terminal for all airlines doing business in the Philippines except Philippine Airlines, which is being serviced solely by the NAIA Centennial Terminal or simply NAIA Terminal 2. The NAIA Centennial Terminal II however, was built to accommodate passengers of the Philippine Airlines but the MIAA management has plans to limit its operations for Philippine Domestic flights only, once the NAIA Terminal III become operational. It was completed under former President Fidel V. Ramos in 1999, whose term also saw the start of the construction phase of the scandal-ridden NAIA Terminal III, now being used by a lone local airline, Cebu Pacific Airlines.
Whichever building are used for international civil aviation, an airport passenger terminal will have a designated sanitized area in the landside, where only passengers, security personnel, airline and airport employees are allowed in. The airside however, is the aircraft movement area of an airport, including adjacent terrain, buildings, and/or portions thereof, access to which is tightly controlled. The airside includes that portion of the passenger terminal where passengers, security personnel and selected number of airport workers are the only persons allowed. Within the airside lies the Aircraft Movement Areas, which consist of a sizeable portion of the entire aerodrome complex. Both landslide and airside comprises an area that measures about 631 hectares. Within this area is the international runway, designated as RW 06-24. It is a concrete runway overlaid with two inches of industrial grade asphalt. It is 3,737 meters in length and 60 meters wide, including the shoulders. A taxiway, which runs to the north, is designated as taxiway 13-31; this leads towards the General Aviation Area, and also encompasses the NAIA Centennial Terminal II apron. Surrounding the runways and its adjacent facilities are perimeter walls, which stand from 1.83 meters high up to 2.83 meters in some areas. Surmounted on top of these walls are four layers of barbed wire a foot high and oriented towards the landslide, or towards possible intruders. These walls are made up of either hollow blocks or cyclone wire mesh. Dotted along the perimeter walls are the various access gates that lead to the heart of the airport. These gates, numbering to eighteen access points separate the airside from the landslide, and were intended to be heavily guarded and secured checkpoints. Within these access gates, the Airport Police Department, with the police powers granted by law, implements the ICAO prescribed security methods and procedures called AMA Rules and Regulations to sanitize everything inside the Aircraft Movement Areas.
Through the years, commercial and residential areas sprouted in and around the perimeter walls and fence of the aerodrome, some of which became directly or indirectly livelihood-dependent on the airport. These populated areas are a constant concern to aviation security primarily due to its proximity to airport areas responsibility, the economic condition of some of the residents and the inherent culture of marginalized urban Filipino. It is for these reasons that the Airport Police Department had invested considerable effort in the control of past encroachment of the airport from intruders coming from these residential areas. According to the Annex 17, item 4.4.1, Security Manual of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), “Each Contracting State shall establish procedures and identification systems to prevent unauthorized access by persons or vehicles to: a) the airside of the airport serving international civil aviation;

b) other areas important to the security of the airport. Furthermore, Annex 17.4.4.2 added; “Each Contracting State shall establish measures to ensure that adequate supervision over the movement of persons to and from the aircraft, and to prevent unauthorized access to aircraft.”
Within each of the eighteen checkpoints inside the Aircraft Movement Areas, assigned APD personnel are directed to rigidly inspect each person and vehicle passing through his post and to effect apprehension of any violation of access regulations. This includes the visual inspection of the vehicle for purposes of intercepting weapons or explosives that might be smuggled to an aircraft.
The vehicles to be inspected include those that service the aircraft, like catering and fuel trucks, airline maintenance vehicles, as well as those that ferry the aircraft crew, like pilots and attendants. This standard operating procedure is in accord with ICAO Annex 17.4.7.3 that states, “It is recognized that passengers no longer can be considered the primary problem in terms of the introduction of weapons and explosives into the aircraft. Weapons and devices are being introduced through the ramp, and through other ways which must be controlled.”
With this in mind, the role of the APD in securing the airside becomes more critical, creating a psychological challenge for each personnel to overcome the inherent problems attendant to the enforcement of this international standard. This responsibility becomes even graver in light of the usual political conditions prevalent in the country, where those in high official positions who are supposed to be the implementers and supporters of aviation security efforts instead tended to act like royalty whenever they are within the airport confines. There had been reports of resentment by these officials towards APD personnel who try to conduct these security standards as they passed a checkpoint. It is at this point that these officers are expected to make the right decisions. According to Russell, “the one thing that police officers deal with, not just during duty hours, but during the entire waking day, is human behavior.” Police officers must make decisions in a minimum of time, a few minutes or seconds, that might baffle the academic behaviourist, a decision whose ultimate resolution may involve months or even years of debate and legal consideration. However, according to Crank, “outside of a prison environment, it is difficult to imagine an organization like the police, that seeks more stringent control over its charges, or one that has such limited success”. The political and economic situation of the country has made it imperative for aviation security to become an item of national interest. It is therefore only logical to make an assessment whether there are concerns in effectiveness, in security screening procedures conducted by the people responsible for securing the airport are recognized and properly addressed.

Statement of the Problem This study aims to determine the effectiveness of the Aircraft Movement Areas security screening procedures conducted by the Airport Police Department personnel as perceived by both APD members and non-APD airport employees.
Towards this objective, the following questions were addressed: 1. How may the demographic profile of the respondents be described according to:
1.1 Sex
1.2 Age
1.3 Civil status
1.4 Educational Attainment
1.5 Position
1.6 Years in service 2. How effective are the security screening procedures and Airport Police personnel at the Aircraft Movement Areas in terms of screening the following; 2.1. Personnel and vehicular Requirements 2.2. Vehicle Search for weapons and Explosives 3. How adequate are the operational and the non-operational facilities for the conduct of security screening procedures at the AMA in terms of: 3.1 Guardhouses and Checkpoints 3.2 Manpower and Logistic Support 4. What are the perceived problems of the members of the APD in relations to the implementation of Aircraft Movement Areas Rules and Regulations with regards to: 4.1 Airport Employees/Visitors 4.2 Security rules and Regulations 4.3 Standard Operating Procedures 5. What are the perceived effects experienced from the problems encountered of the members of the APD in relations to the implementation of Aircraft Movement security rules and regulations? 6. Is there a significant relationship between the effectiveness of the security screening procedures and Airport Police personnel at the Aircraft Movement Areas and the perceived effects experienced from the problems encountered in relations to the implementation of Aircraft Movement security rules and regulations? 7. What implications may be drawn from the findings of the study?
Theoretical Framework
In a perfect world, civil aviation will be secured from terrorist threats and actions. No one wants to be on board a hijacked aircraft except terrorist, who were there in the first place to impose a political statement on those who will care to listen. But our world is far from perfect, which is why our government is investigating a lot of resources in making sure that each aircraft that left the airport has been thoroughly screened and secured.
However, there is a continuing threat to civil aviation that needs to be addressed in a dynamic and pro-active way. According to Singguian, despite the obvious redundancy in the security arrangement, there is still a perceived need for a better and more stringent security procedures in all of the country’s airports. He further stated that despite the presence of security personnel and state of the art equipment and devises at the airport, it does not seem to be sufficient in deterring terrorist in pursuing their plans such as bombings and hijacking, for instance.
Attacks on civil aviation are considered as low- probability yet high- consequence Incident, due to its inherent position as an attractive and symbolic target. Any airport Incident is immediately reported by media as a sensational event and a newsworthy item of a note. According to Morada, the advent of high level technology, especially in telecommunication, has made it possible for any aviation related incident to become immediately known to the world, thus offering a stage for terrorists groups to do their act of promoting their political agenda across a wider audience and in less time possible.
The current political, social and cultural conditions in the country do not offer any solace for aviation security personnel such as the Airport Police line officers. Each APD line officer is deemed to be fully aware of the responsibility and the kind of effort that is expected of him in the maintenance of aviation security at the NAIA. Past experience has taught each APD line officer that any failure on his part to make the correct on the spot decisions could ultimately lead to disciplinary actions, termination from his work or worse, a breakdown in the entire aviation security system. In this regard, APD officers are given pre-posting briefings before being dispatched to their respective AMA posts. These briefings not only take the form of new instructions from higher authorities but also the manner by which they could carry out these instructions. The rationale is that aviation security is a state function that must not be left alone in the hands of the private entities such as airline security, but should be made a coordinated effort of all concerned. As Merari stated, airline companies do not have, nor can they obtain the capabilities, which are essential for effective coping with sophisticated terrorist groups or state terrorism.
As a government entity, airport police personnel have a vital role in this coordinated effort. This role can only be performed well if the practitioners have a high degree of flexibility and innovativeness. This study therefore is based on the concept that law enforcement bodies eventually overcome the limitations inherent in their environment. The theory is that although there are inherent problems in the enforcement and preservation of civil aviation security, proper training and motivation can help achieve a high degree of performance without substantial effect in the performance on the part of security personnel. In his book, The Final Warning, Robert Kupperman stated that,”conventional police techniques must be augmented innovative measures to allow security officers to allow security officers to cope with the evolving nature and requirements of aviation security, however, these should be based on a design of security techniques and procedures for the employment of specialized skills to increase the environmental competence of the organization members and diminish the crisis that adversely affect the environment” The operative word is specialized skills, which are a set of knowledge acquired through constant training and applications, and with which the airport police officer is expected to have had prior to his assignment in the Aircraft Movement Areas.
These specialized skills are what enables police officers anywhere to perform their jobs and render sudden but practical decisions in operational situations, and yet still enables to him to remain unaffected by the inherent problems of his profession. Yet in order to fully attain understanding of the situation, it is necessary that these perceived problems be identified and addressed. Full compliance from the implementers to perform what is on paper is easy to expect when the demands is made face to face, but if the police officer is on his own in his post, it is he who will be making decisions, some of which may well affect the over- all safety of the aerodome. These decisions will certainly be affected by many factors,among them the workplace conditions, different attitudes, legal questions, the inherent Filipino culture, etc. The psychological profile of police officers anywhere in the world must be taken into account.
According to Russell ,police officers must make decisions in a minimum of time, a few minutes or seconds, that might baffle the academic behaviourist, a decision whose ultimate resolution may involve months or even years of debate and legal consideration. However, according to Crank, “outside of a prison environment, it is difficult to imagine an organization like the police, that seeks more stringent control over its charges, or one that has such limited success”.
The Airport Police Department (APD) is mandated by law to, among others, “safeguard the security of aircraft, passengers, cargoes, equipment, structures, facilities, personnel, funds, and documents at the airport in accordance with the standards, measures, rules, regulations and procedure established in the MIAA Airport Security Program.” In the case of the Aircraft Movement Areas, the APD division tasked to secure the airside is the Aircraft Movement Areas Police Division or AMAPD, whose personnel are those who are posted in each checkpoint within the AMA. The checkpoints are so place because they block the way to the critical ramp areas of the airport. Within these checkpoints, AMAPD personnel conduct the standard operating procedures as embodied in MIAA Memorandum Circular No. 22, along with other applicable memorandum circulars. The exercise of these procedures begin when a person or vehicle approach an APD post or not. The persons identification cards are examined for their validity by matching first, the picture of the ID against the holder’s and second by looking for the expiry date of the ID. If the subjects pass this scrutiny, they are then required to open up their belongings like bags or attaché case for inspection. If the subjects are on board a vehicle, they are required to open the trunk and hood, to inspect against weapons and explosives. An under chassis mirror is then utilized to look for weapons and explosives that might be hidden underneath the vehicle. If the officer has a partner, this is done simultaneously. Only when the subjects pass each scrutiny will they be able to pass the post. Any discrepancy or deviation from these rules, an immediate apprehension is effected by the airport police officer. These procedures have been adopted by the Airport Police Department in compliance with the ICAO recommended standards and recommendations. They were designed to prevent to prevent the smuggling of weapons and explosives to the ramp areas, as well as to deny opportunity to unauthorized intruders from gaining access to the restricted areas. But past events revealed that are also effective in the interception of smuggled goods like illegal drugs and high value commodities such as jewelries and electronics.
With the magnitude of responsibility by which airport police officers must bear in order to fully attain their objectives, it is necessary for them to fully implement AMA rules and regulations to the exact end by which they were intended. Full implementation must take cognizance of the effectiveness of such measures. The task of fulfilling their mandated duties and the manner by which they must implement the rules must be borne on their shoulders with the hope that the lilmitation and problems inherent to their chose profession as well as the what Kupperman stated as environmental conditions surrounding them will not in any way affect their performance.
Conceptual Framework The rank and file members of the Airport Police Department come from different strata of society. Therefore it is assumed that each airport police officer has a different perception of the effectiveness of the AMA security screening procedures that is implemented and the attendant problems that are encountered day to day and whether these problems affect them in anyway. In this study, it is intended to recognize the general outlook of both APD personnel towards AMA rules and regulations implementation on non- APD airport employees and airport visitors and the airport employees as well. Even with this specific type of objective, different groupings may be identified. For example, the perceptions of problems by more senior airport police corporals may differ from that of the younger officers. For instance, the younger officers may be more enthusiastic about their work due to their youthful zeal, while the older and more senior respondents may be deem themselves to be more familiar with their work as well as looking forward to their retirement, therefore less enthusiastic about active AMA implementation, or those with commendable academic backgrounds may have a more profound view of the problems and effects than those who have less than adequate schooling. It is hoped that through the responses of the respondents of this study, the effectiveness of the implementation of the security screening procedures as well as the various perception of Airport Police personnel regarding the problems inherent to the implementation of Aircraft Movement Areas Rules and Regulations will be determined.
Paradigm of the Study Figure 1 shows the paradigm used in this study utilizing the systems approach model using input-process-output. The input stage covers the demographic profile of the respondents be described according to gender, age, civil status, educational attainment, position and years in service. It also treats the respondents’ assessment on the effectiveness of the security screening procedures and Airport Police personnel at the Aircraft Movement Areas in terms of screening as to personnel and vehicular requirements and vehicle search for weapons and explosives. Moreover, it also considers the adequacy of the operational and the non-operational facilities for the conduct of security screening procedures at the AMA in terms of guardhouses and checkpoints and manpower and logistic support.

INPUT
Profile of the Respondents Sex, Age, Civil status, Educational Attainment Position, Years in service

Effectiveness of the security screening procedures and Airport Police personnel at the Aircraft Movement Areas in terms of: 1. Personnel and vehicular Requirements 2. Vehicle Search for weapons and Explosives Adequacy of the operational and the non-operational facilities for the conduct of security screening procedures in terms of: 1. Guardhouses and Checkpoints 2. Manpower and Logistic Support

Perceived Problems in relations to the implementation of Aircraft Movement Areas Rules and Regulations with regards to: 1. Airport Employees/Visitors 2. Security rules and Regulations 3. Standard Operating Procedures

Perceived effects experienced from the problems encountered from the problems encountered of the members of the APD in relations to the implementation of Aircraft Movement security rules and regulations

INPUT
Profile of the Respondents Sex, Age, Civil status, Educational Attainment Position, Years in service

Effectiveness of the security screening procedures and Airport Police personnel at the Aircraft Movement Areas in terms of: 1. Personnel and vehicular Requirements 2. Vehicle Search for weapons and Explosives Adequacy of the operational and the non-operational facilities for the conduct of security screening procedures in terms of: 1. Guardhouses and Checkpoints 2. Manpower and Logistic Support

Perceived Problems in relations to the implementation of Aircraft Movement Areas Rules and Regulations with regards to: 1. Airport Employees/Visitors 2. Security rules and Regulations 3. Standard Operating Procedures

Perceived effects experienced from the problems encountered from the problems encountered of the members of the APD in relations to the implementation of Aircraft Movement security rules and regulations

PROCESS

Assessment of the data through the following: * Questionnaire * Interview * Observation * And others

Significant Relationship between the Problems Encountered and Effects Experienced by the Respondents in the implementation of Aircraft Movement Areas Security Rules and Regulations

PROCESS

Assessment of the data through the following: * Questionnaire * Interview * Observation * And others

Significant Relationship between the Problems Encountered and Effects Experienced by the Respondents in the implementation of Aircraft Movement Areas Security Rules and Regulations

OUTPUT

Implications that may be drawn from the Findings of the Study

OUTPUT

Implications that may be drawn from the Findings of the Study

Figure 1. Research Paradigm
The researcher also considers the perceived problems of the members of the APD in relations to the implementation of Aircraft Movement Areas Rules and Regulations with regards to airport employees/visitors, security rules and regulations and standard operating procedures and the perceived effects experienced from the problems encountered of the members of the APD in relations to the implementation of Aircraft Movement security rules and regulations.
The process, on the other hand, includes the assessment of the data through questionnaire, interview and observation. It also treats the testing of significant relationship between the problems encountered and the effects experienced by the respondents in the implementation of Aircraft Movement Security Rules and Regulations. The output is the implications that may be drawn from the findings of the study, which may be as follows;
1. The result of the study ma encourage the airport administration not to be discriminating in hiring new personnel and should hire more female security officers as long as they are qualified. 2. It may motivate the security personnel to do their duties and functions effectively in the Aircraft Movement Areas Security Screening Procedures with regards to Personnel and Vehicular Requirements and Vehicle Search for weapons and explosives. 3. For the airport administration, it may be moved to ensure and keep the Operational and the Non-operational Facilities in workable state for the Conduct of Security Screening Procedures at Aircraft Movement Areas particularly the guardhouses, checkpoints, manpower and logistic support. 4. Strategies may be developed to lessen the problems encountered by the respondents in the Implementation of AMA Rules and Regulations such as the conduct of pre-posting briefings, strict implementation of security rules and regulations to all, continuous review of security instructions, memoranda and intelligence resources. 5. Intervention programs may be formulated that would ensure that only proper procedures will be performed in the implementation of security rules and regulations.
Hypothesis
The hypothesis that was tested for rejection and acceptance using 0.05 level of significance was that: H(O): There is no significant relationship between the problems encountered and the effects experienced by the respondents in the implementation of Aircraft Movement Security Rules and Regulations.
Definition of Terms The following terms are defined below to assist the reader in perusing the paper: Aircraft Movement Areas refers to the movement area of the airport, adjacent terrain and buildings or portion thereof, access to which is controlled, also known as AMA Air Carrier is any person who undertakes, whether directly or indirectly, or by lease or any other arrangement to engage in air transportation. Airport Police is organic personnel of the Manila International Airport Authority mandated by law to exercise police powers in the preservation of aviation security within the NAIA aerodrome complex. Airport Security Program pertains to a document prepared by an airport operator that contains the procedures, description of the facilities, responsibilities, and actions to be used by the airport operator. Dangerous goods are articles or substances, which are capable of posing significant risk to health, safety or property when transported by air. Effectiveness of Vehicle Search for Weapons and Explosives pertains to activities by the security personnel assigned to conduct in screening vehicles for unauthorized weapons and explosives. Land side is the area of an airport and buildings to which the non-traveling public has access. Manila International Airport refers to the government agency invested with the power and police authority to administer and operate the NAIA, Manila Domestic Airport, General Aviation Area, NAIA Terminal II and III. Personnel and Vehicular Requirements refer to activities in ensuring the security and safety of the Aircraft Movement Areas in identifying authorized personnel from non-authorized personnel. Restricted Area are areas where access is controlled or an area intended for authorized persons, or as designated by the airport authority.
Significance of the Study This study is deemed significant to the following:
Policy makers and government officials concerned may enlighten with the safety and security of the airport and the aviation industry and could provide them with baseline information on how to deal best with its inherent problems.
Private Security Agencies may be provided with data for the development of other airports within the country.
Aviation security management may be provided information faced with similar problems so that will not become the problem but an important contribution to the growth and development of the state.
Frequent travelers using the facilities and conveniences of modern civil aviation, the researcher, through this study, may also be able to provide solutions to existing issues that will satisfy civil aviation security concerns that this researcher has, as well as for future researchers of this particular field of study.
Future Researchers may find this study useful that may provide inputs to existing bodies of knowledge on aviation security management, which will be useful to other researchers of this particular discipline.

Scope and Delimitation of the Study
The study is limited to determining the effectiveness of the implementation of the AMA security screening procedures as well as the perceptions of Airport Police personnel as to the problems of implementing of AMA rules and regulations. It is not a comprehensive study that covers the full activities of the Airport Police Department, such as terminal security, traffic management, intelligence gathering activities, etc.
It does not venture to deal with the technical aspects of aviation security, but rather it aims only to determine the effectiveness of the implementation of AMA security screening procedures and what the Airport Police Department personnel perceive as AMA problems, their perception of its effects, and its causes. Further, the study is limited to the personnel of the Airport Police Department as well as to bona fide non-APD airport employees. These personnel come from various age groupings, gender, and academic background. It is also thought that a random sampling from the AMA Police Division of the Department would provide results indicative of the answers to the questions posed by this paper.

Chapter 2 REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE
This chapter is dedicated on the review of related literature and studies both local and foreign which have been found relevant to the present study. These are presented to strengthen the background and enrich the content of this study.
Related Foreign Literature
In the preparation for this study, the researcher made use of several sources for possible reference. These included manuals published by the United States Federal Aviation Administration, procedures manual from the air Transport Association of America, pertinent memorandum circulars issued by the Manila International Airport Authority, as well dissertations, books and papers prepared for conferences. The following is a discussion of some of the papers and reports selected from among many. Annex 17 Security Manual is an annex to the Convention of International Civil Aviation Organization first published in 1971, detailing International Standards and Recommended Practices in airport security implementation directed towards the prevention of unlawful interference. The manual prescribes the standards in the use of human resource and physical barriers for airport access control. This manual was conceptualized by contracting states of the Convention of International Civil Aviation to ensure that a minimum standard in international civil aviation security in all airports. Annex 17 also prescribed that these measures must be embodied with an Airport Security Program to be written and adopted by all airports serving International civil aviation. The Checkpoint Operators Guide is a manual that details the standard operating procedures in aviation security implementation and is designed to provide technical and administrative guidance for passenger screening personnel as endorsed by the Air Transport Association of America. The principles of passenger screening had been, to a large extent, adopted and implemented within the Aircraft Movement Areas, simply because smuggling of arms and explosives by terrorists is no longer confined to passengers of an aircraft, but more and more had been found to be brought to an aircraft through the ramp areas. Physical body search as well as electronic detection is thus used in all areas that lead towards an aircraft. The guide also provides the actions that should be taken by the screeners should there be an interception of restricted material like firearms and explosives in any of the screening posts, or should an incident occur that could lead to an aviation related crisis. It is for this reason that the U.S. Transportation Security Administration published the Crisis Management Manual. This is a publication intended to provide guidance for airport authorities in developing a Crisis Management Plan. It is a compendium of ideas utilized by small, medium, and large airports around the world and addresses the various aspects of incident scene management that can be adapted to the practices and requirements of individual government and airports. Among the principles laid by the manual is that in management of any crisis, all entities within the airport like the airline operators, airport management, airport police and local law enforcement agencies must taken into account when planning for crisis contingencies. No airport in the world is that self sufficient as to ignore the capabilities of these entities. A crisis management plan is essential to an airport if and where there is breakdown of security and control.
In a lecture entitled “Attacks on Civil Aviation: Lessons and Trends” by Prof. Ariel Merari of the Tel Aviv University was conducted at the White House Commission-GWU Conference and evaluated the capability of nations-states as well as airline security units in thwarting attacks have by and large failed. This was based on his analysis of the number of attacks that had been thwarted by airport security personnel. He also attributed these failures to lack of foresight on the part of security authorities and the inherent limitations of Airline Company-based security system. He further concluded that efforts to secure to commercial aviation had been defensive. Instead he advocated that government must take all steps necessary to deter terrorists and their sponsoring states by all means at their disposal.
The development of preventive aviation security doctrine was amply documented in the Final Report of the Irish Aviation (2004), wherein the historical progression of hijacking events clearly showed that there were three phases wherein civil aviation was used for various political and private agenda, and that these agenda culminated in the September 11 attacks. The phases are as follows;
(1) Phase 1: 1948 to 1968- Flight from persecution or prosecution;
(2) Phase 2: 196 to 1994- The Political phase, and
(3) Phase 3: 1994 to date – The aircraft as a weapon of destruction. Phase 1: 1948 to 1968 – flight from persecution or prosecution. From 1948 to 1968, there emerged a trend when individuals wanted to flee certain states either to avoid persecution or prosecution. One early case involved three (3) crew members and twenty one (21) of the twenty six (26) passengers of a Ceskoslovenske Aeroline (CSA) on April 6, 1948 and succeeded in reaching the US Occupation Zone in Munich, Germany. Since then, there have been numerous attempts to use the aircraft as a means of escape by fleeing individuals or groups.
Phase 2: 1968 to 1994- The Political phase. The advent of this phase was marked by the exploitation of the aircraft as a tool for certain individuals or groups to force governments to act against their mandated duties or, at least, get them to the bargaining table to get what they wanted were politically motivated. The hijacking of Israel’s El Al Airlines by members of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) in 1968 saw the emergence of organized aircraft hijacking by groups espousing political agenda.
During the phase, the link between politics and terrorism against civil aviation was identified, as opposed to the apolitical nature of aviation terrorism during the first phase. It was also during this phase when the terrorist made full use of the vast media potential their hijacking or bombing could generate thus, exerting great pressure for governments to give in to their demands. The Irish Aviation Authority Report (2004) pointed out the regardless of the variants of their demands, the objectives of the terrorist’ attacks generally fall into the following categories:
1. Embarrass their opponents (governments and other terrorist organizations ;)
2. Damage the economy of the target State, and
3. Use it as a tool for extortion, either for the release of imprisoned colleagues and/or for money.
Three major of aviation terrorism highlighted the second phase: 1. The diverting of TWA flight 847 en route from Athens to Beirut by Lebanese terrorists in June 1985 that resulted in the death of one passenger during the two weeks it lasted while the other 155 passengers were released; 2. The bombing of an Air India flight when ground staff allowed a bag with no confirmed seat holder to be checked through to its final destination, also in 1985; and 3. The mid- air bomb explosion over Lockerbie, Scotland that brought down Pan Am flight 103 en route from London to New York on December 21, 1988, killing all 259 people on board plus another 11 people on the ground.
Phase 3: 1994 to date- The aircraft as a weapon of destruction. The third phase of the threat in aviation security was marked by the exploitation of the aircraft, ultimately, as a weapon of destruction. What makes this phase as the most dangerous era is the fact that whereas previously, the aircraft only served as a means to an end, to further certain causes or the terrorists getting what they demanded for, during this phase, the terrorist have made international aviation as a battle ground and the aircraft as a weapon.
Regardless of the motivation behind aviation terrorism and acts of unlawful interference to civil aviation, aviation security developed as a dedicated or specialized branch of security exclusive to airport complexes as a result of these.
Keating stated that organized aircraft hijacking peaked during the 1970s. The era was marked by the successive hijacking of four aircrafts – that of the Trans World Airlines (TWA), Swiss Air, British Overseas Airways Corporation (BOAC) and Pan American Worldwide Airways (Pan Am) which culminated in their simultaneous destruction before horrified television audiences world – wide on September 21, 1970. The passengers were freed first in exchange for the freeing of political detainees and members of terrorist groups.
Aviation security at the time was still in its infancy and metal detectors were not typically used to screen passengers. Although some of the hijackers’ luggage was searched, they reportedly concealed weapons in their persons. The successful hijacking followed the destruction of four empty aircraft in Jordan and Egypt airports awakened aviation security specialist to the vulnerabilities of adopted security measures during the time.
In his book called Terrorist Handbook for Operational responders, Bevelacqua stated that a terrorist’s principle aim is to use violence in order for a state to react in manner that would disrupt its normal way of life. Thus, if a state reacted to a terrorist act by restricting the civil rights of its constituents, the terrorist had already achieved its aim. The state is therefore required to “provide to an atmosphere wherein law enforcement must be seen as an effective terrorist countermeasure and yet allows civil liberties to flourish”. It is becomes necessary to establish the understanding of the motivation of a state’s law enforcer. Crank delves into the dual role of the police officer, first as an enforcer of the law, and second as a street level psychologist. The author pointed out that the police officer’s working day does not end after duty hours but his entire waking day is devoted to the understanding of human behavior. The author’s insight provides certain explanation on what the officer goes through whenever his authority as a law enforcer is challenged. This authority however, is being challenged in an increasing tempo, necessitating a thorough understanding of the problems of law enforcement agents in the performance of their duty.
In the campaign against terrorism, there are suggestions that conventional police techniques should be augmented with innovative measures, to allow officers to cope with the evolving nature and requirements of aviation security. However according to Kupperman9, these should be based on a design of security techniques and procedures employment of specialized skills to increase the environmental competence of organization members and diminish the crisis that adversely affects the environment.
The coping mechanism of law enforcement agents cannot be underestimated. Crank further stated that police organizations anywhere is unique in that they have their own sub-culture brought about by their individualism in the sense that police officers has their idea of how best to deal with sudden on-the-job actions. In the same token, police officers are subject to various devices designed to impress upon them their accountability to the organization. The United States’ Transportation Security Administration or TSA, integrates information from the intelligence community, policymakers, air carriers, and airports to determine the level of threat to civil aviation. When no specific threat has been identified, the security system operates at a basic level for detecting weapons and explosives on passengers or in their baggage. Low alert levels indicate that the TSA considers the probability of an attempted bombing or hijacking to be minimal. If specific hijacking or terrorist targets have been identified, the TSA declares a higher alert level and warns air carriers and airport authorities of the specific bomb or hijacking threats and of their potential locations. For higher alert levels, the security-screening process imposes additional procedures to increase the likelihood of detecting the terrorist. Rapidly changing situations may require significant modifications in screening procedures, with little or no advanced warning. These procedures involve more thorough screening, including additional baggage inspection, passenger questioning, and identification checks. The level of tolerance demonstrated by the traveling public for the inconvenience, lack of privacy, perceived health risks, and delays for passengers, greeters, and air crews will be proportional to their perception of the severity of the threat. More expensive screening equipment and more intrusive screening procedures will be acceptable at higher alert levels, but only if the threat is perceived to warrant their use and if the equipment or procedures are perceived to be effective in deterring the threat. The dilemma in passenger screening is how to provide an effective and suitable level of screening at a justifiable cost for all threat levels. The performance of a security system must be evaluated to determine both its effectiveness and suitability. Effectiveness is the capability to detect threat objects, and it is generally dependent on the capabilities of the system technology. Suitability is the capability of the system to operate with few undesirable characteristics (e.g., elevated radiation levels). Performance should be evaluated continually, and the process should be designed to provide feedback to allow air carriers and equipment manufacturers to improve the effectiveness and suitability of a system. Compliance with standards of security equipment set by the United States Transportation Security Administration (TSA) is considered the minimum acceptable level of performance. For example, when metal-detection portals are first installed in an airport or moved to a new location, they must be proven to perform at the minimum compliance level specified by the TSA. Screening systems are evaluated for both equipment and system compliance to ensure a minimum level of performance. Evaluation includes testing the ability of the system to detect, react to, and properly respond to a terrorist threat or action. For example, system compliance may be determined by using government red teams to test airport systems. Airport security procedures are continually enhanced and altered in countries and airports worldwide. These mostly impact passengers with regards to security check-in procedures and carry-on luggage: for example, the number of bags allowed per person, and restrictions on items that may be taken on board. Travellers are recommended to check with their airline for advice on security requirements (most airline websites have clear luggage guidelines) and look out for all notices at airports.
Related Local Literature
The Manila International Airport Authority published the first ever Airport Security Program 16 September 1995. This publication is a comprehensive manual that specifies not only the security procedures of the NAIA, but also enumerates, among others, the sources of regulations regarding aviation security. The program was developed to become the principal guide and reference of airport authorities in adhering to the international standards of the ICAO, and is implemented by the Airport Police Department and other law enforcement agencies
Memorandum Circular No 22, series of 1997 is also known as the Standard Operating Procedure Governing Entry of Vehicles/Pedestrians Into the General Aviation and Aircraft Movement Areas. It details the various requirements for airport tenants, employees and visitors to comply in order to adhere with the Airport security Program and the ICAO Security Manual. It is also one of the most important documents being implemented by the Airport Police Department due to its emphasis on access control and screening. This document is a prime example of preventive measure that shows how a state can deter eventuality of a terrorist act simply by establishing access security and control. A breakdown in security in such a high profile installation such as an airport may lead to a radical change in policy by the state; therefore it is necessary to be able to project a deterring stance in all aspects of aviation security.
Related Local Studies
In a study entitled “Doctrine on Airport Security”, Supt. Morada detailed the capability of the Special Operating Unit of the PNP-ASG, as well the required overhead costs in mounting an operation that would enable recovery of hijacked aircraft. The study also detailed number of police personnel required to mount a recovery operation and predicted casualties such an operation would entail, thereby validating the need for preventive security measures. Preventive aviation security was the focus of the study called “An Assessment of the Airport Security Program of the Philippines” by Maturan. This 1994 study assessed the need for upgrading the perimeter fence of the airport into international standards in order to deter the entry of intruders. It also cited the need for checkpoints to be established along the perimeter road in order to screen all persons and vehicles coming into the airport terminals. This paper became one of the bases for massive reconstruction of airport perimeter fencing and establishment of forward checkpoints began in 1995.
The traditional security measures that were previously in place in most aviation facilities around the world were proven to be inadequate as the 9/11 attacks demonstrated. Investigation into the events leading to the 9/11 attacks identified a major failure in intelligence which was tantamount to an open admission that intelligence and community support play an indispensable, if not the most important roles, in civil aviation security.
As early as December 7, 1944, the United Nations (UN) established the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) to ensure the steady development, safety and security of the international civil aviation industry, which was considered to be at its infancy stage. ICAO was officially organized on April 4, 1947 when it became a permanent body under the UN Charter. During the first ICAO convention held in Chicago, it came up with 18 Annexes, with Annex 17 containing Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPs) on aviation security that the UN contracting states need to comply with it and incorporate these into their National Legislation.
Historically, the Philippines’ civil aviation industry shares that trend with the rest of the world. Based on the data on hijacking incident in the country, there had been the first recorded hijacking incident, when two Filipino-Chinese students shot dead the captain and a flight steward of PAL flight RPC-86 which was en route to Aparri, Cagayan from Laoag in December 1952 (see Table 1). The hijackers demanded that they be flown to Mainland China, indicating a desire to flee the country, which is a characteristic of the first phase. It was never made clear, however, whether the criminals were fleeing persecution or prosecution. Taiwanese authorities intercepted the aircraft and thinking they were already in China, the hijackers surrendered and were imprisoned.
Two other hijacking incidents in the Philippines world fall under this phase. Six men successfully commandeered PAL flight PIC 1121 on March 30, 1971 after they demanded to be flown to Canton, also in China, and were never heard of again (See Table1). Then on April 7, 1970, with flight from prosecution as a motive for hijacking evidently clear, three disgruntled former military officers successfully reached Libya using a substitute DC 8-jet initially hijacking PAL BAC 111 RPC 1187 with scheduled flight via the Cagayan de Oro-Davao-Manila- route.
Although hijacking an aircraft as a primary means of escape has lessened, as late as the early part of 2003, there were still a number of reported hijacking cases in China involving individuals who attempted to leave the country and reach Taiwan. This could indicate that the phase is not yet obsolete hence it could still potentially be used, making it as very real and impending threat.
Considering that the Philippines is not just an ally of the USA but also a member of the UN, the implications of aviation security measures it enforce will not only have an impact on public safety within the country but also on the country’s relationship with international community.
In compliance with the Hague Convention of 1970, the Philippine Congress enacted Republic Act No. 6235 on June 19, 1971. Otherwise known as “An Act Prohibiting Certain Acts Inimical to Civil Aviation and for Other Purposes,” The act made it unlawful for any person to compel a change in the course of an aircraft of Philippine registry or seize or usurp control thereof, while it is in flight.
Essentially, the use of terrorism directed against civil aircraft was not new; using the aircraft to target an entire city was, according to the Irish Aviation Authority’s Final Report published in 2004. According to Bernal, this change in tactics for the terrorists was first attempted on December 24, 1994 when Algerian terrorists hijacked Air France flight 8969 en route to Paris from Algiers. The French government refused the flight landing rights due to the intelligence that the hijackers intended to blow the aircraft up over the city. That plan was thwarted when the plane was diverted to Marseilles and French police commandos stormed the aircraft and successfully rescued the passengers and crew.

Chapter 3
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY This chapter presents the discussion of research design, the locale and population, respondents of the study, the research instruments used - its construction and validation, the data gathering procedure and the statistical treatment of data.
Research Design The descriptive method was used in this study to explain the prevailing conditions during the time the study was conducted - in this study the respondents’ assessment on the effectiveness of the security screening procedures at the Aircraft Movement Areas in terms of personnel and vehicular requirements and vehicle search for weapons and explosives.
Calderon and Gonzales (2009) pointed out that the “descriptive method of research is a fact-finding study with adequate and accurate interpretation of the findings. It describes with emphasis what actually exist such as current conditions, practices, situations, or any phenomena.”
As told by Calmorin (2009) descriptive research is a process of gathering, analyzing, classifying and tabulating data about prevailing conditions, practices, beliefs, processes, trends, and cause-effect relationships and then making adequate interpretation of such data.
Furthermore, Medel (2007) said that the descriptive method is a process for learning pertinent or precise information about an existing situation or phenomena. The characteristics of a descriptive method include all those that support to present facts concerning the nature of status of anything, a group of people, a number of objects, and a set of phenomena one way wish to study.
Respondents of the Study This study includes 70 respondents employed at Airport Police Department. Since the study is about effectiveness of the AMA screening procedures, two groups are chosen as respondents, namely; the organic personnel of the Airport Police Department, who implements the screening procedures in the AMA and those who are being screened, which are non-APD personnel who are required by the nature of their work to enter the AMA.
Airport Police personnel, especially those who belong to the rank and file are deemed ideal because they are the ones who render duty at the various posts of the Aircraft Movement Areas. Airport Police personnel posted at the AMA come from different age groups, some in their early twenties while others are in their late forties and fifties. Most have ranks of Specials Police Officers (SPO) and Corporals. The respondents will definitely vary in their academic background. It is presumed that most will be college level or graduates, while others may even have earned a number of master’s units. A minimum of 50 respondents will be taken as sampling basis for the study.
Sampling Technique In selecting the respondents for the study, the office of the Aircraft Movement Areas Police Division (AMAPD) were requested to provide a list of APD personnel serving in or has served in the AMA and from among them, respondents were chosen at random. Once, the respondents were chosen, they were administered the interview with the use of questionnaires. With regards to non-APD personnel, letters of request were sent to various firms and companies operating inside the AMA to provide the researcher with lists of their employees. From the list, respondents for the survey were also chosen at random. Instruments Used The study was in survey form wherein questionnaires were distributed to the respondents. Each item per category were carefully constructed and represented in order to extract detailed and substantial information from the respondents. Instruments used in this study include:
1. Questionnaire was prepared by the researcher as the main data information-gathering tool required for this study in assessing the effectiveness of the security screening procedures at the Aircraft Movement Areas. The questionnaire used in this research was drafted and composed of the following parts: Part 1 covers the demographic profile of the respondents be described according to gender, age, civil status, educational attainment, position and years in service. Part 2 treats the respondents’ assessment on the effectiveness of the security screening procedures and Airport Police personnel at the Aircraft Movement Areas in terms of screening as to personnel and vehicular requirements and vehicle search for weapons and explosives. Part 3 considers the adequacy of the operational and the non-operational facilities for the conduct of security screening procedures at the AMA in terms of guardhouses and checkpoints and manpower and logistic support. Part 4 focuses the perceived problems of the members of the APD in relations to the implementation of Aircraft Movement Areas Rules and Regulations with regards to airport employees/visitors, security rules and regulations and standard operating procedures. Part 5 treats the perceived effects experienced from the problems encountered of the members of the APD in relations to the implementation of Aircraft Movement security rules and regulations. Validity of Questionnaire. The draft of the questionnaire was tried out to a group of 5 security personnel to determine its validity. After validation it was improved based on the comments and suggestions of the expert and the adviser.
Administration and Retrieval. The researcher asked permission to the airport administrator to administer the questionnaire. Upon receiving of the letter of approval, dissemination of the questionnaire to the identified airport security was done by the researcher. The questionnaire was personally administered to the respondents to achieve one hundred percent assurance of retrieval rate.
2. Unstructured interview was also conducted to the respondents to supplement the findings in this study which were not covered in the questionnaire.
3. Observation as one of the methods of collecting data was utilized since it is a very useful in collecting descriptive data. Observation was also done as an additional data-gathering tool to see the actual situation and behavior of the respondents during the entire conduct of the study.
Data Processing Procedure After the interviews were completed, the results were collated and cross-tabulated. Statistical analysis will follow. Percentage distribution of response to each relevant item were obtained and interpreted. Where appropriate, a comparison of the perceptions among the respondent groups will be made in the making of hypothesis testing.

Statistical Treatment of Data The study used the following statistical treatment. 1. Percentage was used to describe the profile of the respondents according to gender, age, civil status, educational attainment, position and years in service. In computing for the percentage, the researcher used the formula:
P (%) = F x 100 N
P (%) = F x 100 N

where: P - percentage F - frequency N - total number of respondents 2. Weighted Mean was used to describe the respondents’ assessment on the effectiveness of the security screening procedures and Airport Police personnel at the Aircraft Movement Areas in terms of screening as to personnel and vehicular requirements and vehicle search for weapons and explosives. It was also used to assess the adequacy of the operational and the non-operational facilities for the conduct of security screening procedures at the AMA in terms of guardhouses and checkpoints and manpower and logistic support, perceived problems and effects of the members of the APD in relations to the implementation of Aircraft Movement Areas Rules and Regulations with regards to airport employees/visitors, security rules and regulations and standard operating procedures. The weighted mean score was obtained using this formula: W x = f x ___ N

where: f x - sum of the product of the frequency N - number of respondents 3. Pearson Product Moment Correlation was used to measure the degree of relationship between the problems encountered and effects experienced by the respondents in the implementation of Aircraft Movement Security Rules and Regulations. Pagoso (2000) defined the Pearson’s r by using the formula; r = N (∑XY) - (∑X) ( ∑Y) √ [ N (∑X2) - (∑X) 2 ] [N (∑Y2) - (∑Y) 2 ] where: N - number of respondents
∑x - summation of first variable
∑y - summation of second variable
∑xy - summation of the product of first and second variable The computed Pearson’s r is given their corresponding verbal interpretation using the following intervals: Coefficient of Correlation, r | Verbal Interpretation | 0.00 to ± 0.20 | Negligible relationship | ± 0.21 to ± 0.40 | Low relationship | ± 0.41 to ± 0.70 | Moderate relationship | ± 0.71 to ± 1.00 | High relationship |

4. t-statistic was used to test the significance of Pearson r. Reyes (2001) defined t-statistic by the formula; n – 2 t = r 1 – r 2

where: t – computed t-value r – Pearson product moment correlation coefficient

n – number of paired observations
All statistical computations were guided with the use of the Statistical Software package SPSS version 12.

Chapter 4
PRESENTATION, ANALYSIS AND INTERPERTATION OF DATA

This chapter includes the presentation, analysis and interpretation of the data in terms of the questions formulated in this study.
Problem 1. Respondents Profile The following tables illustrate the demographic profile of the respondents according to gender, age, civil status, educational attainment, position and years in service. 1.1 Gender. Table 1 presents the profile of the respondents according to gender.

Table 1. Respondents Profile as to Gender

Gender | f | % | Male | 58 | 83 | Female | 12 | 17 | Total | 70 | 100 |

As shown, there are 58 or 83 percent of the respondents are males and 12 or 17 percent females. Data implies that securing the personnel of the Airport Police Department, who implements the screening procedures is still a male dominated occupation and not tailored for female workers.

1.2 Age. Table 2 depicts the profile of the respondents according to age.
Table 2. Respondents Profile as to Age

Age | f | % | 51 years old and above | 21 | 30 | 41 - 45 | 12 | 17 | 36 – 40 | 17 | 24 | 32 - 35 | 11 | 16 | 31 years old and below | 9 | 13 | Total | 70 | 100 | | Mean Age = 39 |

It can be seen from the table that there are 21 or 30 percent of the respondents who are aged 51 years old and above followed by 17 or 24 percent whose age falls within the 36 – 40 years old bracket. Furthermore, there are 12 or 17 percent who are aged 41 – 45 years old while 11 or 16 percent are aged 32 – 35 years old. Of the 70 respondents, 9 or 13 percent are aged 31 years old and below. Data implies that Airport Police personnel posted at the AMA come from different age groups, some in their early thirties while others are in their late forties and fifties.

1.3 Civil Status. Table 3 projects the profile of the respondents according to civil status.
Table 3. Respondents Profile as to Civil Status

Civil Status | f | % | Single | 10 | 14 | Married | 50 | 71 | Separated | 6 | 8 | Widow/Widower | 4 | 7 | Total | 70 | 100 | Data shows that there are 50 or 71 percent of the respondents are married followed by 10 or 14 percent who are single. Of the 70 respondents, 6 or 8 percent are separated while 4 or 7 percent are widow/widower. 1.4 Educational Attainment. Table 4 depicts the profile of the respondents according to educational attainment.
Table 4. Respondents Profile as to
Educational Attainment

Educational Attainment | f | % | High School graduate | 3 | 4 | College Level | 12 | 17 | College Graduate | 55 | 79 | Total | 70 | 100 |

Findings show that there are 55 or 79 percent of the respondents who are college graduates as compared to 12 or 17 percent who have reached the college level. Of the 70 respondents, 3 or 4percent are high school graduates. Data reveals that the respondents definitely vary in their academic background. It shows that most of the respondents are holders of college level or graduates, while others may even have earned a number of unots in the post graduate education.
1.5 Nature of Employment. Table 5 displays the profile of the respondents according to position.
Table 5. Respondents Profile as to
Nature of Employment

Nature of Employment | f | % | Airport Police Officer | 8 | 11 | Airport Police Sergeant | 7 | 10 | Airport Police Corporal | 46 | 66 | Airport Police Lieutenant | 9 | 13 | Total | 70 | 100 |

It can be deduced from the table that there are 46 or 66 percent are Airport Police Corporal followed by 9 or 13 percent as Airport Police Lieutenant. Of the 70 respondents, 8 or 11 percent are assigned as Airport Police Officer while 7 or 10 percent are Airport Police Sergeant. It was found out that the Airport Police personnel especially those who belong to the rank and file are deemed ideal because they are the ones who render duty at the various posts of the Aircraft Movement Areas. 1.6 Years in Service. Table 6 shows the profile of the respondents according to years in service.
Table 6. Respondents Profile as to
Years in Service

Years in Service | f | % | 30 years and above | 3 | 4 | 21 - 25 years | 24 | 35 | 16 - 20 years | 7 | 10 | 11 - 15 years | 13 | 18 | 6 - 10 years | 21 | 30 | 5 years and below | 2 | 2 | Total | 70 | 100 |

Data shows that there are 24 or 35 percent of the respondents who have worked for the company for 21 - 25 years followed by 21 or 30 percent of the respondents who stayed in the company for 6 - 10 years. Furthermore, there are 13 or 18 percent have worked for 11 - 15 years; 7 or 10 percent for 16 - 20 years and 3 or 4 percent have worked for 30 years and above. Of the 70 respondents, 2 or 2 percent have worked in the company for 5 years and below.

Problem 2. Effectiveness of Aircraft Movement Areas Security Screening Procedures The following tables illustrate the respondents’ assessment on the effectiveness of the security screening procedures at the Aircraft Movement Areas in terms of personnel and vehicular requirements and vehicle search for weapons and explosives. 2.1. Personnel and Vehicular Requirements. Table 7 displays the respondents’ assessment on the effectiveness of the security screening procedures at the Aircraft Movement Areas in terms of personnel and vehicular requirements. As shown the respondents are very effective in keeping off unauthorized drivers from entering the Aircraft Movement Area by getting the AMA Drivers’ Permit and in the issuance of AMA Drivers’ Permit can help in maintaining safety and security in the airside as seen from the mean score of 4.96 and 4.83, respectively.

Table 7
Respondents Assessment on the Effectiveness of Aircraft
Movement Areas Security Screening Procedures as to
Personnel and Vehicular Requirements

Personnel and Vehicular Requirements | Mean | Verbal Interpretation | Checking the MIAA Access ID in identifying authorized personnel from non-authorized personnel | 4.23 | Effective | Securing the MIAA Access ID document that it cannot be easily faked | 4.60 | Very Effective | Spotting a fake or fraudulent MIAA Access ID from a genuine one by the Airport security personnel | 4.08 | Effective | Issuance of the AMA Drivers’ Permit to all who wish to drive inside the Aircraft Movement Areas | 3.29 | Moderately Effective | Issuance of AMA Drivers’ Permit that can help in maintaining safety and security in the airside | 4.83 | Very Effective | Keeping off unauthorized drivers from entering the Aircraft Movement Area by getting the AMA Drivers’ Permit | 4.96 | Very Effective | Spotting unauthorized vehicles inside the Aircraft Movement Areas by having AMA Vehicle Sticker | 4.65 | Very Effective | Falsifying the AMA Vehicle Sticker is nearly impossible | 3.33 | Moderately Effective | Spotting a fraudulent AMA Vehicle Sticker by the Security personnel | 3.83 | Effective | Ensuring the use of beacon lights by authorized vehicles when moving inside the Aircraft Movement Areas. | 4.08 | Effective | Identifying an authorized vehicles from non-authorized ones through the use of beacon lights | 3.85 | Effective | Ensuring that beacon lights can minimize the vehicular accidents from within the aircraft movement areas | 4.46 | Effective | Over-all Mean | 4.18 | Effective | Legend: 4.50 – 5.00 5 Very Effective 3.50 – 4.49 4 Effective 2.50 – 3.49 3 Moderately Effective 1.50 – 2.49 2 Least Effective 1.00 – 1.49 1 Not Effective On the other hand, it was found out that the respondents lowest assessment was that they are moderately effective in saying that the AMA Vehicle Sticker is nearly impossible to falsify (wm=3.33) and in the issuance of the AMA Drivers’ Permit to all who wish to drive inside the Aircraft Movement Areas (wm=3.29). As a whole the respondents are effective in doing the security screening procedures at the Aircraft Movement Areas in terms of personnel and vehicular requirements. Results of the unstructured interview reveals that the respondents ensure the use of beacon lights by authorized vehicles when moving inside the Aircraft Movement Areas and spot a fraudulent AMA Vehicle Sticker by the Security personnel. Airports are continuously looking for ways to improve operations and better protect their passengers, employees and the general public from harm caused by acts of crime or accidents. In response to this call, the AMA keep in doing the issuance of AMA Drivers’ permit can help in maintaining safety and security in the airside and the AMA Drivers’ permit to keep off unauthorized drivers from entering the Aircraft Movement Area. In an interview with the respondents, they said that even visitors to restricted areas of the airport display a Visitor Identification Card (VIC) and be accompanied by a person holding and displaying a valid ID. 2.2. Vehicle Search for Weapons and Explosives. Table 8 depicts the respondents’ assessment on the effectiveness of the security screening procedures at the Aircraft Movement Areas in terms of vehicle search for weapons and explosives.

Table 8. Respondents Assessment on the Effectiveness of Aircraft Movement Areas Security Screening Procedures as to
Vehicle Search for weapons and Explosives

Vehicle Search for Weapons and Explosives | Mean | Verbal Interpretation | Training of the security personnel to screen vehicles for unauthorized weapons and explosives | 3.90 | Effective | Searching vehicles for unauthorized weapons and explosives by the security personnel | 3.88 | Effective | Performing the search procedures by security personnel on vehicles are systematic and correct | 4.46 | Effective | Adequate training in searching of any vehicles with unauthorized weapons and explosives by the security personnel | 3.85 | Effective | Conduct vehicular search for unauthorized weapons and explosives by the security personnel know what they are looking for | 3.81 | Effective | Restriction for someone to smuggle in weapons and explosives inside the aircraft movement areas | 2.35 | Least Effective | Security personnel assigned to conduct vehicle searches are consistent in the performance of their duties. | 3.44 | Moderately Effective | Intimidating airport security personnel when anybody wants to avoid vehicle searches | 2.10 | Least Effective | Vehicle search is crucial for the security of civil aviation | 3.83 | Effective | The vehicle search procedures of the Airport Police Department can easily detect impending terrorist attacks against the airport | 3.48 | Agree | Over-all Mean | 3.51 | Effective | Legend: 4.50 – 5.00 5 Very Effective 3.50 – 4.49 4 Effective 2.50 – 3.49 3 Moderately Effective 1.50 – 2.49 2 Least Effective 1.00 – 1.49 1 Not Effective

It was found out that the respondents are effective in performing the search procedures by security personnel on vehicles as they are systematic and correct (wm=4.46) and are effective in training of the security personnel to screen vehicles for unauthorized weapons and explosives (wm=3.90). Furthermore, the respondents are also effective in that security personnel are knowledgeable in searching vehicles for unauthorized weapons and explosives (wm=3.88). However, the respondents are least effective in the restriction for someone to smuggle in weapons and explosives inside the aircraft movement areas and intimidating airport security personnel when anybody wants to avoid vehicle searches as seen from the mean score of 2.35 and 2.10, respectively. As a whole, the respondents are effective in the security screening procedures at the Aircraft Movement Areas in terms of vehicle search for weapons and explosives as reflected from the over-all mean score of 3.51. In an interview with the respondents, they said that they conduct vehicular search for unauthorized weapons and explosives with their utmost efficiency. They believe how risky and dangerous if they will not be strict in the inspection procedures. Large numbers of people pass through airports everyday, this presents potential targets for terrorism and other forms of crime because of the number of people located in a particular location. In an interview with the respondents, they said that in keeping the airport secure, they are trying to formulate different techniques and methods in protecting passengers, airline crew and aircraft, all of which use the airports and thus should be kept secure from terrorism, accidental/malicious harm, crime and other threats to civil aviation so the security personnel must be fully trained to screen vehicles for unauthorized weapons and explosives and they have to do vehicle search which is crucial for the security of civil aviation. According to Kupperman (2009) ”conventional police techniques must be augmented with innovative measures to allow security officers to cope with the evolving nature and requirements of aviation security. However, these should be based on a design of security techniques and procedures for the employment of specialized skills.”
Problem 3. Respondents’ Assessment of the Operational and the Non-operational Facilities for the Conduct of Security Screening Procedures at Aircraft Movement Areas

The following tables illustrate the respondents’ assessment on the operational and the non-operational facilities for the conduct of security screening procedures at the AMA in terms of guardhouses and checkpoints and manpower and logistic support. 3.1 Guardhouses and Checkpoints. Table 9 presents the respondents’ assessment on the operational and the non-operational facilities for the conduct of security screening procedures at the AMA in terms of guardhouses and checkpoints. Data shows that the respondents agree that guardhouses are made out of concrete instead of wood and most AMA guardhouses do not have toilet facilities as seen from the mean score of 4.08 and 3.69, respectively.

Table 9. Respondents Assessment on the Facilities Used for the Conduct of Security Screening Procedures as to Guardhouses and Checkpoints

Guardhouses and Checkpoints | Mean | Verbal Interpretation | Most AMA guardhouses do not have toilet facilities | 3.69 | Agree | Most guardhouses do not have proper ventilation | 3.48 | Moderately Agree | Most guardhouses are not equipped to protect the security personnel from bad weather | 3.60 | Agree | Most guardhouses are too small | 3.33 | Moderately Agree | Most checkpoints have malfunctioning drop arms or gates | 2.94 | Moderately Agree | Most guardhouses do not have ample water supply | 2.63 | Moderately Agree | Most guardhouses have no electrical power supply | 3.38 | Moderately Agree | Guardhouses are made out of concrete instead of wood | 4.08 | Agree | The surrounding areas of most guardhouses are not properly lighted | 3.48 | Moderately Agree | There are too many checkpoints and access gates to man | 3.35 | Moderately Agree | Over-all Mean | 3.39 | Moderately Agree | Legend: 4.50 – 5.00 5 Strongly Agree 3.50 – 4.49 4 Agree 2.50 – 3.49 3 Moderately Agree 1.50 – 2.49 2 Disagree 1.00 – 1.49 1 Strongly Disagree

On the other hand, the respondents’ lowest assessment was that they moderately agree that most checkpoints have malfunctioning drop arms or gates (wm=2.94) and most guardhouses do not have ample water supply (wm=2.63). According to Bucu (2001), guardhouses and checkpoints need to be established along the perimeter road in order to screen all persons and vehicles coming into the airport terminals with amenities like toilet facilities and proper ventilation. He also reiterated that guardhouses and checkpoints need to be equipped with facilities to protect the security personnel from bad weather. 3.2 Manpower and Logistic Support. Table 10 describes the respondents’ assessment on the adequacy of the operational and the non-operational facilities for the conduct of security screening procedures at the AMA in terms of manpower and logistic support.
Table 10. Respondents Assessment on the Adequacy of Facilities for the Conduct of Security Screening Procedures as to Manpower and Logistic Support

Manpower and Logistic Support | Mean | Verbal Interpretation | There is enough manpower to man all AMA post and checkpoints | 3.48 | Moderately Agree | AMAPD has sufficient patrol vehicles to conduct regular perimeter patrol | 2.98 | Moderately Agree | The MIAA motor pool is doing a great job in maintaining AMAPD patrol vehicles | 2.42 | Disagree | AMAPD needs to have more patrol vehicles | 4.33 | Agree | All AMA checkpoints are equipped with two-way radios | 3.33 | Moderately Agree | There are enough radios in all AMAPD post. | 3.10 | Moderately Agree | The firepower of each airport police personnel in the AMA is sufficient | 2.65 | Moderately Agree | ALL AMAPD patrol vehicle are still roadworthy | 3.75 | Moderately Agree | MIAA engineering support to AMAPD checkpoints is prompt and adequate | 3.58 | Agree | AMAPD capabilities in civil aviation security needs new technological upgrading to conform with ICAO standards and recommended practices | 4.04 | Agree | Over-all Mean | 3.67 | Agree | Legend: 4.50 – 5.00 5 Strongly Agree 3.50 – 4.49 4 Agree 2.50 – 3.49 3 Moderately Agree 1.50 – 2.49 2 Disagree 1.00 – 1.49 1 Strongly Disagree

It was found out that the respondents agree that AMAPD needs to have more patrol vehicles (wm=4.33) and AMAPD capabilities in civil aviation security needs new technological upgrading to conform with ICAO standards and recommended practices (wm=4.04). However, the respondents moderately agree that the firepower of each airport police personnel in the AMA is sufficient (wm=2.65) and disagree that the MIAA motor pool is doing a great job in maintaining AMAPD patrol vehicles (wm=2.42). Data reveals that AMAPD needs to have more patrol vehicles and need to strengthen their capabilities in civil aviation security needs by introducing new technological upgrading to conform to ICAO standards and recommended practices (2009).
Problem 4. Problems Encountered in the Implementation of Aircraft Movement Areas Rules and Regulations

The following tables illustrate the perceived problems of the members of the APD in relations to the implementation of Aircraft Movement Areas Rules and Regulations with regards to airport employees/visitors, security rules and regulations and standard operating procedures. 4.1 Airport Employees/Visitors. Table 11 projects the perceived problems of the members of the APD in relations to the implementation of Aircraft Movement Areas Rules and Regulations with regards to airport employees/visitors.
Table 11. Problems Encountered in the Implementation of Aircraft Movement Areas Rules and Regulations as to Airport Employees/Visitors

Airport Employees/Visitors | Mean | Verbal Interpretation | Lack of briefing first of AMA rules and regulations prior to being allowed entry to restricted areas | 4.42 | Very Often | Insufficient control on airport visitors who intentionally violate AMA rules and regulations | 3.25 | Often | Insufficient control to airport employees and visitors violate AMA rules and regulations because they believe they can get away with it | 3.00 | Often | Lack of awareness by airport employees/ visitors on AMA rules and regulations | 3.73 | Very Often | Lack of awareness by the airport employees and visitors on their role in preserving civil aviation security | 4.13 | Very Often | Most airport employees obey AMA rules and regulations | 3.94 | Very Often | Low ranking airport employees are more prone to AMA security violations than high ranking airport employees | 2.85 | Often | Most airport employees are security risk | 1.96 | Sometimes | Lack of police visibility encourages violators to AMA related security violations | 3.33 | Often | Over-all Mean | 3.41 | Often | Legend: 4.50 – 5.00 5 Always 3.50 – 4.49 4 Very Often 2.50 – 3.49 3 Often 1.50 – 2.49 2 Sometimes 1.00 – 1.49 1 Never

Findings show that the respondents encountered very often lack of briefing first of AMA rules and regulations prior to being allowed entry to restricted areas and lack of awareness by the airport employees and visitors on their role in preserving civil aviation security as seen from the mean score of 4.42 and 4.13, respectively. The respondents, on the other hand, often encountered problem on low ranking airport employees are more prone to AMA security violations than high ranking airport employees as indicated from the mean of 2.85 and sometimes encountered that most airport employees are security risk based on the mean 1.96. Airport security attempts to prevent any threats or potentially dangerous situations from arising or entering the country. If airport security does succeed in this, then the chances of any dangerous situations, illegal items or threats entering into both aircraft, country or airport are greatly reduced. As pointed out by Danison (2009) airport security serves several purposes such as to protect the airport and country from any threatening events, to reassure the traveling public that they are safe and to protect the country and their people. 4.2 Security Rules and Regulations. Table 12 indicates the perceived problems of the members of the APD in relations to the implementation of Aircraft Movement Areas Rules and Regulations with regards to MIAA security rules and regulations. As shown, the respondents always encountered lack of implementation of MIAA security rules and regulations (wm=4.75) and poor training of security personnel to implement the AMA rules and regulations (wm=4.56). However, the respondents’ often encountered failure to discourage violators of AMA security penalties and stiff AMA security penalties as indicated from the mean score of 3.15 and 2.94, respectively. As a whole, the respondents very often encountered problems on the implementation of Aircraft Movement Areas Rules and Regulations with regards to security rules and regulations as seen from the over-all mean
Table 12. Problems Encountered in the Implementation of Aircraft Movement Areas Rules and Regulations as to MIAA Security Rules and Regulations

Security Rules and Regulations | Mean | Verbal Interpretation | Lack of implementation of security rules and regulations | 4.75 | Always | Poor training of security personnel to implement the AMA rules and regulations | 4.56 | Always | Conflicting AMA rules and regulations with other memorandum circulars | 3.08 | Often | AMA rules and regulations are applicable to all government officials and VIP's | 3.73 | Very Often | Lack of security of getting AMA requirements such as stickers and vehicle passes | 3.71 | Very Often | Subjective implementation/application of AMA rules and regulations to all airport users | 4.27 | Very Often | Stiff AMA security penalties | 2.94 | Often | Failure to discourage violators of AMA security penalties | 3.15 | Often | AMA security rules and regulations help to secure international civil aviation at the NAIA | 4.52 | Always | Lack of dissemination of AMA security rules and regulations to all personnel | 3.94 | Very Often | Over-all Mean | 3.87 | Very Often | Legend: 4.50 – 5.00 5 Always 3.50 – 4.49 4 Very Often 2.50 – 3.49 3 Often 1.50 – 2.49 2 Sometimes 1.00 – 1.49 1 Never

score of 3.87. Results of the interview reveals that the respondents often encountered conflicting AMA rules and regulations with other memorandum circulars and lack of security of getting AMA requirements such as stickers and vehicle passes. 4.3 Standard Operating Procedures. Table 13 portrays the perceived problems of the members of the APD in relations to the implementation of Aircraft Movement Areas Rules and Regulations with regards to standard operating procedures.
Table 13. Problems Encountered in the Implementation of Aircraft Movement Areas Rules and Regulations as to Standard Operating Procedures

Standard Operating Procedures | Mean | Verbal Interpretation | AMA Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) are critical in implementation of AMA security rules and regulations | 3.75 | Very Often | Failure to exercise AMA-SOP at all times | 4.69 | Always | Airport Police personnel should not waive the SOP if the airport visitor is a government official or a VIP | 4.06 | Very Often | Selective inspection of Airport Police personnel | 3.83 | Very Often | Lack of strict implementation of the AMA-SOP | 4.52 | Always | Even if the visitor is a familiar face, AMA-SOP can not be disregarded | 4.48 | Very Often | Generous airport visitors must be accorded VIP treatment | 2.13 | Sometimes | Embarrassing to exercise AMA-SOP on co-employees and friends | 2.38 | Sometimes | AMA-SOP are mandatory to implement | 3.94 | Always | Lack of continuous review of security instructions, memoranda and intelligence resources | 4.90 | Always | Over-all Mean | 3.97 | Very Often | Legend: 4.50 – 5.00 5 Always 3.50 – 4.49 4 Very Often 2.50 – 3.49 3 Often 1.50 – 2.49 2 Sometimes 1.00 – 1.49 1 Never

Data shows that the respondents always encountered lack of continuous review of security instructions, memoranda and intelligence resources and failure to exercise AMA-SOP at all times as seen from the mean score of 4.90 and 4.69, respectively. However, the respondents sometimes encountered problems on embarrassing to exercise AMA-SOP on co-employees and friends (wm=2.38) and generous airport visitors must be accorded VIP treatment (wm=2.13).
Problem 5. Effects Experienced from the Problems Encountered in the implementation of Aircraft Movement Security Rules and Regulations

Table 14 depicts the perceived effects experienced from the problems encountered of the members of the APD in relations to the implementation of Aircraft Movement security rules and regulations.

Table 14. Effects Experienced from the Problems Encountered in the implementation of Aircraft Movement Security Rules and Regulations

Effects Experienced | Mean | Verbal Interpretation | Feel exhausted after rendering duty at the Aircraft Movement Areas | 2.98 | Slight Effect | Feel nervous wherever I strictly implement AMA rules and regulations on VIP's and government officials | 2.27 | Least Effect | Makes health poor due to exposure to the sun or rainy weather | 3.48 | Slight Effect | Feel boredom while rendering duty at the AMA that affects my punctuality in reporting for work | 2.23 | Least Effect | Don't earn any extra money at the AMAPD, that is why I am poor | 2.15 | Least Effect | Being assigned to AMAPD requires extraordinary intelligence | 3.02 | Slight Effect | Get uneasy whenever I conduct inspection on VIP's and high government officials | 2.40 | Least Effect | Becomes familiar with AMA rules and regulations to avoid making mistakes during vehicle / personnel inspection | 4.00 | Moderate Effect | It is better to render duty at the aircraft movement areas than to be jobless | 3.94 | Moderate Effect | Implementation of AMA security rules and regulation requires a certain amount of flexibility | 3.57 | Moderate Effect | Over-all Mean | 3.01 | Slight Effect | Legend: 4.50 – 5.00 5 Great Effect 3.50 – 4.49 4 Moderate Effect 2.50 – 3.49 3 Slight Effect 1.50 – 2.49 2 Least Effect 1.00 – 1.49 1 No Effect

One of the positive moderate effects of encountering problems in the in relations to the implementation of Aircraft Movement security rules and regulations was that the respondents becomes familiar with AMA rules and regulations to avoid making mistakes during vehicle / personnel inspection (wm=4.00) and the respondents feel better to render duty at the aircraft movement areas than to be jobless (wm=3.57) especially nowadays that it is very hard to look for a job in the country. Furthermore, variables that have least effect on the respondents include getting uneasy in conducting inspections on VIP's and high government officials (wm=2.40); that they feel nervous wherever they conduct strict implementation of AMA rules and regulations on VIP's and government officials (wm=2.27); that they feel boredom while rendering duty at the AMA which affects ther punctuality in reporting for work (wm=2.23) and they do not earn any extra money at the AMAPD, that is why they are poor (wm=2.15). Data implies that whenever a person encountered a problem it will have an effect to his performance that may be positive or negative. In an interview with the respondents they said that due to the problems they encountered they feel bored while rendering duty at the AMA and that this affects their punctuality in reporting for work as well as feeling exhausted after rendering duty at the Aircraft Movement Areas. Furthermore, in an interview with Human Resource Director, the researcher found out that the rank and file members of the Airport Police Department come from different strata of society. Therefore it is assumed that each airport police officer has a different perception of the effectiveness of the AMA security screening procedures that is implemented and the attendant problems that are encountered day to day and whether these problems affect them in anyway.
Problem 6. Significant Relationship between the Problems Encountered and Effects Experienced by the Respondents in the implementation of Aircraft Movement Security Rules and Regulations

Table 15 present the significant relationship between the problems encountered and effects experienced by the respondents in the implementation of Aircraft Movement Security Rules and Regulations.
Table 15. Significant Relationship between the Problems Encountered and Effects Experienced by the Respondents in the implementation of Aircraft Movement Security Rules and Regulations

Variable | Pearson’s r | Correlation | t | Decision | Remarks | | | | Comp | Tab | | | Problems Encountered | 0.82 | High Correlation | 2.16 | 2.012 | Reject | Significant | Effects Experienced from the Problems Encountered | | | | | | |

As shown, there was a high correlation in the relationship between the problems encountered and effects experienced by the respondents in the implementation of Aircraft Movement Security Rules and Regulations as indicated by the Pearson’s r of 0.82. A high correlation signifies that the problems encountered have a great effect in the implementation of Aircraft Movement Security Rules and Regulations. Furthermore since the computed t-value of 2.16 is greater than the tabular t-value of 2.012, the hypothesis was rejected and concludes that there is significant relationship between the problems encountered and effects experienced by the respondents in the implementation of Aircraft Movement Security Rules and Regulations.
Problem 6. Implications that may be drawn from the Findings of the Study

The rules and regulations within the Aircraft Movement Areas of the NAIA, as embodied in Memorandum Circular No. 22, series of 1997, have been primarily conceived to rationalize all efforts of preventing the unauthorized access of vehicles and pedestrians within the airport’s restricted areas, with the overall objective of preserving civil aviation security. Strict and proper implementation of these rules and regulation is deemed as an essential element in thwarting attempts to infiltrate the aerodrome and commit terror acts such as air piracy or sabotage within the airport and the aircraft within. However, these rules are only as good as those who are implementing them. Therefore it becomes imperative that perceptions of problems of the implementers be recognized in order to address them and other misconceptions that may affect their performance. The Airport Police Department has been granted by law with all the police powers necessary for the attainment of the objectives of the MIAA. These powers are therefore applied whenever and wherever it is necessary to promote the interests of the state and the general public. Within the Aircraft Movement Areas, these powers are applied to the fullest whenever violations against aviation security are committed, but if unidentified problems are present, between the perceptions of the enforcer and the work at hand, the harmony intended for smooth implementation of the law is disrupted, which could result to poor performance or worse, to possible break down of discipline leading to, among others, breach aviation security. The civil aviation industry is a vital component of the national economy, and is considered a reliable gauge to the relative stability of the state. This study may therefore serve as starting point for future researchers who may opt to pursue such lines of investigation along the perceptions of aviation security personnel vis-á-vis the expectations of the riding public.

Chapter 5
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION This chapter presents the summary of the study which includes its findings, conclusions and recommendations. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS Based on the data gathered and presentation, the researcher came up with the following summary of findings: 1. Profile of the Respondents 1.1 Gender. There are 58 or 83 percent of the respondents are males and 12 or 17 percent females. 1.2 Age. There are 21 or 30 percent of the respondents who are aged 51 years old and above followed by 17 or 24 percent whose age falls within the 36 – 40 years old bracket. Furthermore, there are 12 or 17 percent who are aged 41 – 45 years old while 11 or 16 percent are aged 32 – 35 years old. Of the 70 respondents, 9 or 13 percent are aged 31 years old and below. 1.3 Civil Status. There are 50 or 71 percent of the respondents are married followed by 10 or 14 percent who are single. Of the 70 respondents, 6 or 8 percent are separated while 4 or 7 percent are widow/widower. 1.4 Educational Attainment. There are 55 or 79 percent of the respondents who are college graduates as compared to 12 or 17 percent who have reached the college level. Of the 70 respondents, 3 or 4percent are high school graduates. 1.5 Nature of Employment. There are 46 or 66 percent are Airport Police Corporal followed by 9 or 13 percent as Airport Police Lieutenant. Of the 70 respondents, 8 or 11 percent are assigned as Airport Police Officer while 7 or 10 percent are Airport Police Sergeant. 1.6 Years in Service. There are 24 or 35 percent of the respondents who have worked for the company for 21 - 25 years followed by 21 or 30 percent of the respondents who stayed in the company for 6 - 10 years. Furthermore, there are 13 or 18 percent have worked for 11 - 15 years; 7 or 10 percent for 16 - 20 years and 3 or 4 percent have worked for 30 years and above.
2. Effectiveness of Aircraft Movement Areas Security Screening Procedures 2.1. Personnel and Vehicular Requirements. The respondents are very effective in keeping off unauthorized drivers from entering the Aircraft Movement Area by getting the AMA Drivers’ Permit and in the issuance of AMA Drivers’ Permit can help in maintaining safety and security in the airside as seen from the mean score of 4.96 and 4.83, respectively. 2.2. Vehicle Search for weapons and Explosives. The respondents are effective in performing the search procedures by security personnel on vehicles as they are systematic and correct (wm=4.46) but least effective in intimidating airport security personnel when anybody wants to avoid vehicle searches as seen from the mean score of 2.10.
3. Respondents Assessment of the Operational and the Non-operational Facilities for the Conduct of Security Screening Procedures at Aircraft Movement Areas

3.1 Guardhouses and Checkpoints. The respondents agree that guardhouses are made out of concrete instead of wood and most AMA guardhouses do not have toilet facilities as seen from the mean score of 4.08 and 3.69, respectively but moderately agree that most guardhouses do not have ample water supply (wm=2.63). 3.2 Manpower and Logistic Support. The respondents agree that AMAPD needs to have more patrol vehicles (wm=4.33) but disagree that the MIAA motor pool is doing a great job in maintaining AMAPD patrol vehicles (wm=2.42).
4. Problems Encountered in the Implementation of Aircraft Movement Areas Rules and Regulations 4.1 Airport Employees/Visitors. The respondents encountered very often lack of briefing first of AMA rules and regulations prior to being allowed entry to restricted areas and lack of awareness by the airport employees and visitors on their role in preserving civil aviation security as seen from the mean score of 4.42 and 4.13, respectively but sometimes encountered that most airport employees are security risk based on the mean 1.96. 4.2 Security Rules and Regulations. The respondents always encountered lack of implementation of security rules and regulations (wm=4.75) and poor training of security personnel to implement the AMA rules and regulations (wm=4.56). 4.3 Standard Operating Procedures. The respondents always encountered lack of continuous review of security instructions, memoranda and intelligence resources and failure to exercise AMA-SOP at all times as seen from the mean score of 4.90 and 4.69, respectively but sometimes encountered problems on generous airport visitors must be accorded VIP treatment (wm=2.13).
5. Effects Experienced from the Problems Encountered in the implementation of Aircraft Movement Security Rules and Regulations

One of the positive moderate effects of encountering problems in the in relations to the implementation of Aircraft Movement security rules and regulations was that the respondents becomes familiar with AMA rules and regulations to avoid making mistakes during vehicle / personnel inspection (wm=4.00) and the respondents feel better to render duty at the aircraft movement areas than to be jobless (wm=3.57) especially nowadays that it is very hard to look for a job in the country. Furthermore, variables that have least effect on the respondents include getting uneasy whenever I conduct inspection on VIP's and high government officials (wm=2.40); feel nervous wherever I strictly implement AMA rules and regulations on VIP's and government officials (wm=2.27); feel boredom while rendering duty at the AMA that affects my punctuality in reporting for work (wm=2.23) and don't earn any extra money at the AMAPD, that is why I am poor (wm=2.15).
6. Significant Relationship between the Problems Encountered and Effects Experienced by the Respondents in the implementation of Aircraft Movement Security Rules and Regulations

There was a high correlation between the relationship between the problems encountered and effects experienced by the respondents in the implementation of Aircraft Movement Security Rules and Regulations as indicated by the Pearson’s r of 0.82. Furthermore since the computed t-value of 2.16 is greater than the tabular t-value of 2.012, the hypothesis was rejected.
7. Implications that may be drawn from the Findings of the Study

The Airport Police Department has been granted by law with all the police powers necessary for the attainment of the objectives of the MIAA. Strict and proper implementation of these rules and regulation is deemed as an essential element in thwarting attempts to infiltrate the aerodrome and commit terror acts such as air piracy or sabotage within the airport and the aircraft within. They should be able to perform their duties with utmost effectiveness and efficiency on the security screening procedures at the Aircraft Movement Areas in terms of personnel and vehicular requirements and vehicle search for weapons and explosives.

CONCLUSIONS: Based on the findings of the study, the following conclusions were drawn: 1. The respondents are mostly married males aged 51 years old and above, college graduates assigned as Airport Police Corporal followed by 9 or 13 percent as Airport Police Lieutenant who have worked for the company for 21 - 25 years. 2. The respondents are doing their wok effectively in the Aircraft Movement Areas Security Screening Procedures with regards to Personnel and Vehicular Requirements and Vehicle Search for weapons and Explosives. 3. The respondents assessed that the Operational and the Non-operational Facilities for the Conduct of Security Screening Procedures at Aircraft Movement Areas are in good working condition particularly the guardhouses and checkpoints and manpower and logistic support. 4. The respondents encountered lack of regular briefing of AMA rules and regulations, lack of implementation of security rules and regulations and lack of continuous review of security instructions, memoranda and intelligence resources in the Implementation of Aircraft Movement Areas Rules and Regulations. 5. The respondents becomes familiar with AMA rules and regulations to avoid making mistakes during vehicle / personnel inspection and feel better to render duty at the aircraft movement areas than to be jobless. 6. There was a high correlation between the relationship between the problems encountered and effects experienced by the respondents in the implementation of Aircraft Movement Security Rules and Regulations. 7. The Airport Police Department has been granted by law with all the police powers necessary for the attainment of the objectives of the MIAA. Strict and proper implementation of these rules and regulation is deemed as an essential element in thwarting attempts to infiltrate the aerodrome and commit terror acts such as air piracy or sabotage within the airport and the aircraft within.
RECOMMENDATIONS
The following are the recommendations forwarded by the researcher based from the conclusions of the study: 1. Encourage the airport administration not to be discriminating in hiring new personnel and should hire more female security officers as long as they are qualified. 2. Motivate the security personnel to do their duties and functions effectively in the Aircraft Movement Areas Security Screening Procedures with regards to Personnel and Vehicular Requirements and Vehicle Search for weapons and Explosives. 3. Request the airport administration to ensure and keep the Operational and the Non-operational Facilities in good working condition for the Conduct of Security Screening Procedures at Aircraft Movement Areas particulalry the guardhouses and checkpoints and manpower and logistic support. 4. Develop strategies to lessen the problems encountered by the respondents in the Implementation of Aircraft Movement Areas Rules and Regulations such as the conduct of briefing and strict implementation of security rules and regulations and continuous review of security instructions, memoranda and intelligence resources 5. Formulate intervention programs to perform proper procedures in implementation of security rules and regulations to avoid making mistakes. 6. Further research is hereby recommended on the same topic in other places to verify / amplify or negate the findings of this study.

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