“Instead of being on the defensive, I would be on the offensive”: General Sherman’s March through Georgia

1 The United States Civil War was the bloodiest and most trying conflict in American history.

Hundreds of thousands of American lives were lost on both sides of the war. General William Tecumseh Sherman’s march through Georgia to the sea was a brilliant strategic victory for the North that helped to end the war more quickly, all while preserving the lives of soldiers on both the North and South. All though his march was outside the general practice of warfare it is clear that the General’s movement through Georgia was the best course he could have taken given his circumstances. His capture of Atlanta and his subsequent march to follow is one of the most controversial issues of the war. At the time of the war it was commonplace for the military leaders to embed their troops in entrenchments that were nearly impossible to infiltrate. They would then rush their men towards each other in a bloody battle. General Sherman realized that attacking the entrenchments of the enemy was fruitless and killed too many soldiers. He went on a path of flanking maneuvers that helped get around these entrenched soldiers. He followed up this plan by attacking the economy of the South and breaking their resolve. The importance of his new plan can be seen on how his tactics of attacking the land and economy, instead of other human beings, and avoiding head-on confrontation actually saved lives for both the Union and Confederate armies. The march from Atlanta to Savannah has taken on a life of its own for historians today. The campaign’s impact has been over-emphasized by his contemporaries on both sides of the war creating a war hero or war tyrant depending on which side was describing his march. One of the reasons Sherman decided to avoid frontal confrontation with the Confederates was because on June 27, 1864 the opposing army dealt his army a major setback. General Sherman initially embraced the frontal assault that many of the Generals in the Civil War were using, but this turned out to be a bloody mistake for him just as it was for Lee and Grant as they faced off in

2

Virginia. This battle represented the most decisive loss for Sherman in a single battle and is known as the battle of Kennesaw Mountain. This attack on fortified positions already cost enormous losses to both the North and South. General Sherman’s attack was no exception. Sherman faced the Confederate General Johnston and both had an army of equal size; however Sherman’s loss was much greater. According to Sherman’s personal memoir, 7500 of his men were either killed, missing or wounded while Johnston lost only about 4000 men.1 Although the battle of the Kennesaw Mountain was a tactical victory for the Confederate forces, it proved more strategically significant to the Union because of its impact on Sherman and his future application of maneuver warfare. After both armies faced each other at close range for several days, Sherman decided that a new course of action was needed. On July 2, 1864, he began his flanking maneuvers to avoid battling the Confederate army, which helped to define Sherman’s approach to battle for the rest of the war.2 Along with many Civil War leaders, General Sherman was taught the tactics of warfare at West Point, which entailed attacking the opposing army with frontal assaults usually amounting to high death totals. After Kennesaw Mountain Sherman stepped outside the conventional wisdom of warfare and created a plan that he felt would quickly bring an end to the war. Sherman planned a series of flanking maneuvers. These movements allowed for his army to confuse and frustrate the Southern army while causing little casualties to both sides. His plan was to split the Southern army and push them to the north and west near the Tennessee border, allowing Sherman to capture Atlanta. His flanking maneuvers actually had him continually circling around Atlanta instead of marching right into it because of the continuous move to outflank his opponent.

1 William Sherman, From Atlanta to the Sea. Edited B. H Liddell Hart (London: The Folio Society, 1961), 64.

2

George Bailey, A Private Chapter of the War. (St. Louis: G. I. Jones and Company, 1880).

Sherman took Atlanta with very little frontal attack on the enemy’s entrenchments. His

3

choice to cut through the enemy’s rear so many times on his approach that it caught the Confederate army off guard enough that taking Atlanta was relatively easier than expected. After taking Atlanta, Sherman realized that turning and fighting would not only cost the lives of countless soldiers on either side, but could also keep him from protecting his supply chain. That would be another devastating calamity to his army that he wanted to avoid, and he was unsure what his next course of action should be. He finally came up with a plan to march east from Atlanta and have his soldiers live off the land, all while attacking the Southern economy. Sherman wrote a letter to Grant stating that he knew that occupying Georgia was useless, but to cripple its military value would be more beneficial to ending the war.3 Sherman decided to cut a swath through the fertile parts of the South and deal a pivotal blow to not only the Confederate war machine, because Atlanta was the second most industrious city to the south, but the spirit of the Southern population as well. His change from the frontal assaults that both Lee and Grant were using demonstrated his ability to learn from his losses in the Kennesaw Mountains. How he was able to accomplish his change of attack and how effective the march was is still hotly debated today. Sherman’s letters to both Lincoln and Grant give historians the opportunity to debate his intent and leadership. After Sherman captured Atlanta he wrote to Grant, “I can make this march, and make Georgia howl!”.4 This phrase becomes an important quote that historians use regularly when writing about General Sherman’s march through Georgia. Both the supporter of his march

3 William Sherman, From Atlanta to the Sea, 142.
4

William Sherman, Sherman’s Civil War: Selected Correspondence of William T. Sherman 18601865. Edited by Simpson and Berlin (North Carolina: The University of North Carolina Press. 1999), 731.

and the non-supporter alike use this quote as a starting point to describe his march to one extent or another.

4

The other important widely debated topic, is that of Sherman’s actual order to march toward the Atlantic coast from Atlanta. Both sides of the argument use General Sherman’s order to march as a sign of either his inhumanity or resourcefulness. On the surface his orders were clear. He directed his men that the foraging party was to live by a set of rules that would protect the civilian population while still providing for the armies’ needs as it trooped through the South. His direct orders stated that men can forage liberally however it was for a select group of people that made up the “foraging parties”. Sherman also stated that no one shall enter into other dwellings or trespass along the way. However, the outcome of the march helps historians determine that a lot of these orders were in fact not followed. Whether Sherman was aware that his men were deliberately disobeying orders (which seems to be the case) or not is something that historians also debate when it comes to Sherman’s brutality. The difficulty with understanding the damage of his order is that attacking the land also attacks the general population directly by stealing the food of women and children as well as potentially devastating the land for years to come. Sherman’s actions in the eyes of historians throughout the last one hundred and fifty years transform many times throughout the schools of thought.

5 “War is the remedy that our enemies have chosen, and I say let us give them all the want; not a word of argument not a sign of let up, no cave in till they are whipped”5 General Sherman as a War Hero Reviewing the writings and records of the soldiers and civilians of the time reflects the

difficulty of trying to establish Sherman’s motives. A lot of contemporaries of Sherman on both the North and South wrote about this march as it was happening. Military, political, and civilian accounts are all available from the march throughout Georgia. Samuel H.M Byers, a military serviceman who served with the federal government during the war, wrote an essay called “The March to the Sea” twenty years after the war.6 Byers discussed the importance of the march through Georgia. He stated that Sherman’s march, particularly through Georgia, was the most important event in the Civil War. He described the march to the sea as extremely important for the North and explained how it was a big part of the South surrendering. Quickly following the war, many of Byers’ counterparts were crediting General Grant for the march through Atlanta, but Byers takes the time to describe the march as something that Sherman himself designed and that he should be the General that receives full credit on the march through Georgia.7 Even forty years after the war, historians were describing the importance of the march and taking the time to give full accolades to Sherman and his leadership abilities. James Rhodes, a Pulitzer Prize historian from Ohio, in 1901

5 Ibid., 694.
6

Samuel H.M Byers. “The March to the Sea,” The North American Review 145 (1887): 235-245.

7

Henry Von Boyton, Sherman’s Historical raid: the Memoirs in the Light of the Record. A review Based Upon Compilations from the Files of the War Office. (Cincinnati: Wilstach, Baldwin and Co. 1875) 128 – 161. He devotes an entire chapter to explain how Grant planned the entire march. He concludes with “So the records not only show that General Grant planned the march to the sea, which was finally executed, but also, that general plan of operations for the closing year of the war was his conception.”

wrote “Sherman’s March to the Sea”.8 Rhodes described the difficulties Sherman was facing by staying in Atlanta. He noted that staying in Atlanta would have been challenging and many lives would have been lost if the soldiers were to turn and fight the opposing armies of General Hood. Rhodes explained that Sherman made the best choice that was presented to him. Rhodes does note that the “bummers”, official scavenging parties for Sherman’s army through Georgia and the Carolinas were destructive. However he cleared Sherman’s name by stating that his orders did not authorize such foraging and pillaging. The idea of total war, the systematic attack not just on the

6

other army but on the land and entire population trying to create a sense of collective responsibility for the defeated army, was not something that was considered at the time. These historians, and Sherman himself, viewed the march through Georgia as a Victorian style of warfare, which was similar to Sherman’s idea of attacking an area and exploiting the resources there. Sherman’s March, a book by Burke Davis who is a hall of fame journalist from North Carolina, and who later on in his life in the 1990’s was honored as a contributor to North Carolinian culture, is another example of Sherman being viewed as a great military strategist.9 Davis intended this book to be a non-biased account of the march by taking into consideration eyewitness accounts of the events that happened while in Georgia. The book is not written from his criticism of the march; nevertheless it does discuss the success of foragers in the campaign. Throughout the book, Davis gives credit to Sherman by giving praise to the military leader at the beginning of the book and stating how he was able to carve his name into “military immortality”.10 Davis can also be seen as a historian that fueled some of Sherman’s legend by mentioning events and ideas, like the

8 James Rhodes, “Sherman’s March to the Sea.” The American Historical Review 6 1901: 466-474.
9

Burke Davis, Sherman’s March. (New York: Random House. 1980). Ibid., 4.

10

“Sherman Sentinels” and the millions of dollars of destruction that was laid upon the South. Also he praised the march as an, “American military epic.”11 Although Davis tries to gives the appearance of Sherman from a neutral standpoint his verbiage shows differently; especially in regards to his ability to lead.

7

Lee Kennett is yet another historian who sees nothing wrong with Sherman’s march through Atlanta. Kennett is a historian from North Carolina as well who is best known for his time at the University of Georgia where he was honored for his work in military history. In The Story of Soldiers and Civilians during Sherman’s Campaign he discusses the march on a broader aspect than just the destruction.12 The book discusses the importance of the march to the re-election of President Abraham Lincoln. He also tries to debunk the notion of the amount of fire that was actually used during the war and treats the destruction that it wrought as almost a myth. He compiles his evidence by dissecting accounts from soldiers and civilians impacted by the march through Georgia. He disagrees with the method of foraging and notes that they took more than the share they needed but that in their opinions they did nothing more than what the other armies and generals were doing at the same time in the Civil War. Also in his writings he discusses the general feeling that many states had for Georgia. They felt that Georgia was too “apathetic” towards the Northern army and did little to stop any invasion.13 Kennett wanted to show that Sherman’s legacy had been grossly exaggerated over the years and that many of stories that were written about Sherman were in fact more myth than reality.

11 Ibid., 131.

12

Lee Kennett, Marching through Georgia: The Story of Soldiers and Civilians During Sherman’s Campaign. (New York: Harper Collins. 1995).

13

Ibid., 313.

Carl Sandburg’s extensive book on Abraham Lincoln called Abraham Lincoln: The War Years, a Pulitzer Prize winning series on the president, also highlights the importance of the march in regards to Lincoln, and though written about Lincoln, Sandburg emphasizes Sherman’s leadership as well.14

8

14 Carl Sandburg. Abraham Lincoln: The War Years. (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1939).

9 “If the North can march an army right through the South, it is proof positive that the North can prevail in this contest”15 Sherman as a Great Military Leader James McPherson, a historian who writes extensively on the Civil War and Pulitzer Prize

winner, has several books that examine Sherman and his march to the sea. In one of his earlier publications Ordeal by Fire, McPherson gives little attention to the march through Georgia.16 He dedicates a few pages to the event and brushes over them without much sway either way. McPherson followed up six years later in 1988 when he published his Pulitzer Prize winning book Battle Cry of Freedom.17 This is a single volume book that covers the scope of the Civil War. He dedicated a chapter to Sherman and his marches through Atlanta and Carolina. He described the victories that came with the marches including moral and economic benefits to the Northern war effort. McPherson highlights how little fighting went on during the march. He is not a full supporter of Sherman though he does contribute to the legend of Sherman by giving credence to the importance of the march and its overall significance to the war, and the re-election of President Lincoln. Richard Harwell’s book on General Sherman is called The Fiery Trail: A Union Officers Account of Sherman’s Last Campaigns.18 Richard Harwell founded and was the president of the “Civil War Round Table of Atlanta” as well as the prestigious Harwell book award is named after

15 John Sheldon Moody et al., The War of the Rebellion: A compilation of the official records of the Union and Confederate Armies. Series 1 volume 39 part III. (Washington: Official Government Printing Press, 1892). 660.

16

James McPherson, Ordeal by Fire. (Massachusetts: McGraw Hill, 1982). James McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom. (New York: Oxford, 1988).

17 18

Richard Harwell, Editor. The Fiery Trail: A Union Officers Account of Sherman’s Last Campaigns: (Tennessee: University of Tennessee, 1986).

him. The Fiery Trail is a compilation of diary entries and letters taken from an artillery officer in the Federal Army by the name of Major Thomas Osborn. The author feels he is being unbiased

10

because he is using a primary source to tell the tale. Major Osborn states that the land they walked through must have been at least 40 miles wide of soldiers. The army would take everything that could have been useful without any backlash from the leaders, and that Sherman himself knew what was going on throughout the march. He surmises that no one would be able to live on that land for at least two years after the army had cleared out. Hundreds of miles of railroad were torn up around him to keep the South from providing for their army, causing further damage to the economics of the South as well as the infrastructure. Men liberally went searching in homes and around the property for what they felt were treasures for their taking. Major Osborn expressed multiple times his interest in watching the men looking for treasures, and although he states that he never actively participated, he did not view these occurrences as something that was barbaric but rather something that was needed for the war effort. However the authors efforts are made clear in his introduction when he states, “Sherman had that sine qua non of great generals, the ability to inspire for himself the complete confidence of his men.”19 This set the tone for the rest of the book. Sherman took a lot criticism with regard to his ability to lead, as well as the tactics he used during the war. Initially a majority of the criticism from Sherman came from Southern historians. However, as the years progressed more and more historians take the time to attack Sherman. His reputation had change from a hard cruel General to one who was barbaric to the general population as well as a bad military leader who was too scared to openly fight his opponents.

19 Ibid., XXIX.

11 “Those who brought war into our country deserve all the curses and maledictions a people can pour out”:20 Sherman as a Bad Military Leader The Southern historians were not lacking in using the contemporary sources. In 1930 Tom

Gray, who grew up in Georgia and wrote this article while working for the University of Georgia, titled “The March to the Sea” in which he was critical of Sherman’s leadership ability.21 He explains that Sherman understood how unarmed Georgia was and that he made the choice to march in and attack unarmed civilians and their property. He explains that not once in the 300 miles he traveled did he experience anything that was slightly threatening to the General and his army. In 2008 Noah Trudeau wrote Southern Storm; Sherman’s March to the Sea, which also scrutinized Sherman’s order to march.22 Trudeau took diaries from varying civilians of Atlanta who describe the march from their own standpoint. The correspondence chosen all highlights the Northern actions as barbaric. He used civilian sources to highlight his point that the North did not separate their destructiveness between the solider and civilian. He is able to support his cause in showing the destructiveness by paralleling soldier’s diaries and letters of the time to confirm what the civilians were seeing and writing about. He often discredits Sherman’s leadership ability throughout the chapters and even considers the march, “…to all intents and purposes, a home invasion on a grand scale.”23 However it is evident throughout the reading, just like the Northern accounts and diaries, which much of Sherman’s march is tied up in myth and over exaggeration.

20 William Sherman, Memoirs of General William T Sherman. 126.

21 Tom 22 23

Gray, “The March to the Sea” The Georgia Historical Quarterly 14 (1930) 111-138.

Noah Trudeau, Southern Storm; Sherman’s March to the Sea. (New York: Harper. 2008). Ibid., 539.

12 For the next century and a half Sherman’s actions from a General’s standpoint were highly

scrutinized. In the twentieth century his actions proved difficult for different parties to determine if he was good or bad. In 1993 John F. Marszalek’s book Sherman: A Soldier’s Passion for Order, Sherman’s leadership ability is considered.24 The book explains that leading up to the march, Sherman was no more than an ordinary Northern military leader. However, when Marszalek’s argument came to the Georgia campaign he mentions that Sherman was a great General and that his march to Savannah saved thousands of lives in the process. He disregards the notion that he was scared to fight and that he made a better decision compared to other battles that were going on at the same time. His book is considered balanced by many historians because of the exhausting amount of sources he compiles into his extensive book except for when it comes to his own personal commentary. However his view on Sherman’s military leadership is not widely accepted and he especially agrees with Sherman and his choice to march into Georgia. Katharine Jones took a different approach when compiling her book, When Sherman Came. She sifted through different diaries and letters of women who lived in Georgia and Carolina that experienced firsthand on what Sherman did through the march. Unsurprisingly the content of the letters really attacks Sherman and his army. Different depictions of his bummers as they passed through the land take up much of the writing. Many of them talk about the fire and conduct of the men as they pass. However, it is of note that very few talk about the death of any members of the southern society as well as women being taken advantage of. Needless to say this was written to inform readers of the cruelty of Sherman’s actions.25

24 John Marszalek, Sherman: A Soldier’s Passion for Order. (Illinois: Southern Illinois University Press, 1993).

25

Katherine Jones, When Sherman Came: Southern Women and the “Great March”. (Indiana: Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1964).

13

“If the people raise a howl against my barbarity and cruelty, I will answer that war is war and not popularity seeking”26 General Sherman a Tyrant Some historians over the years have taken a more personal view of Sherman and not just his ability to effectively lead an army. Errol Clauss in 1969 wrote an essay titled “Sherman’s Failure at Atlanta” that describes the lack of ability Sherman had as a military leader.27 His writings rationalize that from a military standpoint, that the march across Georgia and his Atlanta campaign were complete military failures. Clauss criticized that Sherman was not able to hold Atlanta and he did not attack or destroy his opponent. He states that Sherman had four different chances to end the fight against the opposing army and chose to keep flanking instead. He explains that he should have dealt with Hood’s army instead of letting them evacuate north out of Georgia. He does, however, give credit to Sherman and his ability to have economic and political success for the North in regards to the Georgia campaign. Conversely, according to Clauss, that does not make him a good military general. Albert Castel, Professor of history at Western Michigan University, is another historian who makes Sherman’s ability to lead as poor at best. In “Sherman: Propaganda as History” Castel admits that Sherman was facing poor Southern leadership and enjoyed vast Northern resources, and that is what makes him look like a good general.28 Castel is known to call out different historians that have considered Sherman to be a brilliant leader. Castel agrees with many other historians who felt he was an unsuccessful leader because he refused to fight the Southern army head on, and felt

26 William Sherman, Memoirs of General William T Sherman. 111.

27

Errol MacGregor Clauss, “Sherman’s Failure at Atlanta” The Georgia Historical Quarterly 53 (1969). 321-329

28 Albert

Castel, “Sherman: Propaganda as History.” The Journal of Military History 67 (2003) 405

– 426.

14

that Sherman was a coward. Castel claims that Sherman, on several occasions, had the opportunity to crush the Southern army had he ordered his army to turn and fight instead of doing the series of flanking maneuvers that he used to capture Atlanta. Even though Sherman’s capture of Atlanta was extremely successful, in the sense that he captured it in a relatively short time with not many lives being lost, Castel still felt it was a failed mission. Castel also likes to state that Sherman was a man of terror more than a leader. Castel surmises this because of the attack on the land and the effect it had on the general population on the southern citizens. Castel states that the only reason Sherman is made to look like a good General is because he was facing poor Southern leadership and vast Northern resources. Castel also attacks Marszalek, who we saw earlier was a big advocate for Sherman’s leadership. Castel also argued that Sherman’s memoirs were fictional when compared to other Generals in his army at the time. In 1948 John B Walters wrote “General William T. Sherman and Total War” and was the first to coin his actions as “total war” which is now a phrase that is currently used when describing Sherman’s march to the sea, as well as many other wars.29 Walters is a native Georgian who received his degree from Vanderbilt University, also became a professor at Vanderbilt. Walters takes the discussion a step further when describing the viciousness of Sherman and highlights him as a brutal, cruel and vindictive man. Walters describes him as a violent and hateful man that wants to punish the South. Though his article is about how Sherman brutalized Georgia he actually spends very little time on the subject. The majority of the article is about how Sherman had a few isolated incidences in varying campaigns leading up to Atlanta and how that shaped him as a destructive man. Walters explains how he practiced total war leading up to Georgia by burning towns that resisted along his campaign east from Vicksburg. He uses the general orders of the

29 John Bennett Walters, “General William T. Sherman and Total War” The Journal of Southern History 14 (1948) 447-480.

15

United States Army and describes how Sherman does not even try to follow the general practices of the army. This article became a major point of discussion for both sides of the argument, and has faced major criticism over the last 60 years over whether the research he used is factual. Walter’s writing takes a harder stance against Sherman on a more personal level than many historians. Following Walters’s lead, Joseph T. Glatthaar’s, who is a writer of social history, used soldier’s accounts to describe the march to the sea.30 In his writing The March to the Sea and Beyond: Sherman’s Troops in the Savannah and Carolinas Campaigns he uses the term total war that he picked up from Walter’s article written a few decades earlier.31 Glatthaar, who teaches at the University of North Carolina, takes a unique angle in writing of the war by looking at accounts of soldiers and their views on property, civilians, slaves and fellow comrades. He describes that the soldiers were ok with foraging, but admitted that the method of doing so was brutal. Like their General, the soldiers show that “hard war” is needed in order to end the long ongoing conflict between the North and the South. Glatthaar also seemed to understand this for he stated, “…the Union armies not only had to defeat the Confederate armies in the field by also had to break the will of the Southern people…”.32 He also stated that they were shadowing the attitude of their commanding General and that Sherman knew and understood what was going on. He also talks about the soldiers who were caught up in their own mystique and quickly spread their own rumors of how destructive they were on the land. Glatthaar does point out that no matter how brutal many

30 Joseph Glatthaar is known to write his military history through the words of soldiers and civilians of the time. He specializes in the study of the Civil War and usually stays away from just a chronological account of the war. It appears that he wants the reader to understand what it was like to be a solider from the soldiers perspective.

31

Joseph Glatthaar, The March to the Sea and Beyond. (New York: New York University Press, 1985). Ibid., 135.

32

16

of the bummers were to the land they treated the Southern population with a lot more respect than generally described by total war supporters. Charles Royster is yet another historian that has written several essays and books who also used the total war concept that we got from Walters. Royster’s, The Destructiveness of War,33 understands that there is a lot of myth around Sherman and that he is not the barbarian that is often used to describe him and his march. He also uses Sherman’s words against him and recognizes that what was done by the army was much worse than what Sherman wanted and that the General fully knew what was going on during the march. Royster also believes that Sherman had a lot to do with the creation of the rhetoric of modern war that is seen in the twentieth century. However he states that Sherman’s contribution to modern war was more in rhetoric than that of practice. He does realize that it is hard to draw a complete conclusion that Sherman had direct influence on the World Wars and their concept of total war. He acknowledges that writing about Sherman is a challenging task because of all the mythology that surrounds him. Many modern writers also mention this fact that Sherman’s march has transformed into such an American myth that the southern writers are able to write what he did in a very negative way while the northern writers can make him out to be a great American war hero. Mark Neely, who has written extensively on the Civil War and has won the Pulitzer Prize, also tackles the ideas presented on Total War. In The Civil War and Limits of Destruction he systemically tries to disprove the ideas of “total war” that were used to describe General Sherman’s actions in Georgia.34 He notes that Sherman was a very active writer and speaker and that his actions were far less than what he would speak. However many historians, like Walters, spend a lot

33 Charles Royster, The Destructiveness of War: William Tecumseh Sherman, Stonewall Jackson, and the Americans. (New York: Vintage Books, 1991). 34 Mark Neely, The Civil War and the Limits of Destruction. (Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2007).

17

of time discussing his words and less time discussing his actions. This is a common argument that Neely has against Walters and his essay on total war. He criticizes the oft-used phrase of making the “South Howl” and how many historians and readers misappropriated the meaning for the discussion on Sherman. He also concluded that Sherman was no different than any other General in the Civil War including all the Northern and Southern leaders. He notes that they were all following the Victorian Style of war that was going on for centuries in Europe leading up to the American Civil War. In 2004 Neely follows up his discussion with his writing “Was the Civil War a Total War?”.35 He spends a good deal of time disagreeing with Walters’s research. He even goes on to explain that most of Europe did not find the march out of the ordinary and saw it as a significant upset to the South. Regardless of Walters’ views, it is clear that since the 1940’s his paper has been a great topic of discussion by historians.

35 Mark Neely, “Was the Civil War a Total War?” Civil War History number 50 (2004) 434-458.

“Should we fail, this “march” would be adjudged the wild adventure of a crazy fool”:36 Sherman as a Conflicted and Depressed Leader Sherman’s leadership ability as well as his contributions of total war although a topic that

18

many historians were writing about in his march, it was not the only thing that was discussed. Earl Miers 1951 wrote “The General Who Marched to Hell: William Tecumseh Sherman and his March to Fame and Infamy” Miers’ historical work was focused on trying to understand the mind of the General and his soldiers.37 Miers’ objective as noted in his introduction was to establish, “the moods and motivations…to see into the minds and evaluate the emotions of the General.”38 His intention was to use soldiers and civilians accounts and he wanted to see into the “mind” of these key figures in the Civil War. He does this by taking journals and diaries of Southerners who were impacted by the march. One of which was a 10-year-old girl who lived in Georgia. His writing is constantly filled with the attitudes of the soldiers and the moral torment that Sherman must have felt making these choices giving a pseudo psycho-historical view on Sherman. Miers’ book gives the impression of mixed emotions going back and forth between contempt and admiration for the General. He even brings to the front of his argument the theory that the suffering the South had to feel during the march shortened the bloodshed and helped end the conflict at a much faster pace. Michael Fellman also felt that Sherman was a conflicted General from the life Sherman lived up to that point. His father died at an early age and his mother could not provide for him. All of his business ventures failed throughout the United States and it appears that Sherman took this fear of failure with him throughout the war. His book titled Citizen Sherman: A life of William

36 William Sherman, Memoirs of General William T Sherman. 179.

37

Earl Miers, The General Who Marched to Hell. William Tecumseh and His March to Fame and Infamy. (New York: Dorset Press. 1951).

38

Ibid., xii.

19

Tecumseh Sherman tries to show the General’s personal life to the general reader.39 He does this by comparing and contrasting the different correspondence that Sherman had with his wife and other fellow soldiers. Again relying on Sherman’s writings, like many other historians, Fellman deduces that he is a brutal and racist man. He uses the letters to discuss how he felt that Sherman was crazy and emotional while dealing with bouts of rage. Fellman really tried to dive into the mind of Sherman. To come to this conclusion Fellman highlights Sherman’s failures and his mentally unstable showcase in the Georgia campaign. Jim Miles wrote To the Sea: A history and Tour Guide of Sherman’s March wrote an extensive book on the topic.40 Miles spends a large portion of his time feeding the myth of Sherman’s brutality. His factuality is skeptical at best with the numbers he uses to describe the march. He builds more against Sherman by titling all of his chapters after quotes that target Sherman as a villain. He uses the stories and journals of the elderly and women especially to highlight his view on the march. In between these two writers were Brooks Simpson and Jean Berlin who edited Sherman’s Civil War: Selected Correspondence of.41 Simpson and Berlin also chose to gather correspondence of Sherman, but rather than trying to demean him, they tried to show the reader that Sherman was a man with a family and emotions and that these are facts that are often left out of the war’s history. They use letters from family and friends in chronological form from the war years. They chose

39 Michael Fellman, Citizen Sherman: A life of William Tecumseh Sherman. (New York: NY, Random House, 1995).

40

Jim Miles, To the Sea: A History and Tour Guide of Sherman’s March. (Tennessee: Rutledge Hill Press, 1989).

41

William Sherman, Sherman’s Civil War: Selected Correspondence of William T. Sherman 18601865. Edited by Brooks Simpson and Jean Berlin. (North Carolina: The University of North Carolina Press. 1999).

writings that were more positive between family and friends and tend to leave out any correspondence between the leaders he faced on the other side of the line. Compared to the other

20

writings before this time, this author-duo appears to try and keep the march neutral. It is clear that they were trying to talk about more than just being a General but bringing a human element to Sherman. This was a theme that was gaining more interest among historians.

21 "left behind them a trail of terror and desolation, burned homes and towns, devastated fields and plundered storehouses, and a record for systematic torture, pillage, and vandalism unequaled in American history."42 Sherman’s March in Myth This style of history moved to the late 1990s when Stanley Hirshon wrote The White

Tecumseh.43 His writings were very different than that of Fellman for it appears that there was nothing barbaric or racist about Sherman. He attacks some of the other fellow historians who fell in line with Fellman’s way of thinking stating that there is a lot of gross exaggeration of Sherman’s march. He personally attacks Fellman’s theory that Sherman was crazy and was dealing with this his whole life. Hirshon does admit that Sherman wore many different hats and his attitude and decisions changed frequently. However, just like the other historians that fall into this school of thought, he did not know how to actually access him as a General. This does not seem to be as important to these historians as much as his general character. Though Miers and Hirshon wrote forty-six years apart from Simpson, Berlin and Fellman falling in the middle, all of them tried to introduce another thought of Sherman and his mindset. Though they separate on the outcome of Sherman, they all carry the same attitude in trying to understand Sherman as a person as well as a soldier. Most recently Edward Caudill and Paul Ashdown recognize the mythology that Sherman’s march created. In Sherman’s March in Myth and Memory these two authors look over how Sherman had been treated. By examining the treatment he received from the press, other historians, on stage, on screen and in literature they notice the transformation his life took. They take the time to look through these different medias to see how Sherman is portrayed to the population

42 John Bennett Walters, “General William T. Sherman and Total War” 478 – 479. 43

Stanley Hirshon, The White Tecumseh. (New York: John Wiley and Sons. 1997).

throughout the last one hundred and fifty years. They realize that this march was devastating but wanted to focus on how it was being portrayed to the population and in the media.44 Scrutinizing General Sherman’s leadership ability is a topic that historians seem to debate more the further we get from the actual war. The writers of his time appeared to give him a “free pass” because his actions were able to help end the war. Initially critics from all over the globe

22

weighed in on his decision because it was a progressive idea in that era of warfare.45 His decision to not turn and fight General Hood after he captured the city of Atlanta and to march through Georgia, which was mostly civilian occupied territory, is what is used as a catalyst to scrutinize his military leadership. Sherman’s actions and reputation also reflected many great qualities. His men loved him and would go anywhere he asked of them. This was partly because he was rather successful in taking the West and a large percentage of the deep southern resources away from the Confederates. A good portion of these men stayed with him all the way through Savannah, which is partly why they supported him so strongly.

44 Edward Caudill and Paul Ashdown. Sherman’s March in Myth and Memory. (New York: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers 2008).
45

Rutherford Hays, Life and Reminiscences of General W.M. T . Sherman by Distinguished Men of His Time. (Baltimore: R. H Woodward Company, 1891) 55.

“These fellows fight like Devils and Indians combined.”
46

23

Sherman’s Attack and Capture of Atlanta

There seemed to be two defining moments that helped him shift to a maneuvering tactic where he would continue to flank his opponent, a tactic that he used throughout the remainder of the war. Both were involved in the battle for Atlanta and happened within a month of each other. The first was the Battle of the Kennesaw Mountain that occurred on June 27, 1864. General Johnston had over 50 miles of fortified trenches that he held securely along this mountain ridge. This battle mirrored many of the other battles that were fought between Grant and Lee in Virginia throughout the majority of the war. Sherman foolishly launched several offensive maneuvers that ended with a large amount of casualties with little to no ground gained by the Union. He quickly realized that he was losing men at a fast pace and if he were to keep this up he would have little to fight with even if this method of attack was common for the time. He witnessed the losses that occurred and realized that he was needlessly throwing his men into the enemy guns. His ability to see this kept him from attaining the same nickname that Grant was getting around the same time. Grant was known to constantly throw his men at the pickets and win the war by sheer numbers. This caused his own men to refer to him as “the butcher” for the high death totals Grant was used to having and even some Congressmen were thinking he needed to be removed.47 While Sherman’s men called him “Uncle Bill” and trusted his decisions because they knew he had their best interests at heart. The men

46 47

William Sherman, Sherman’s Civil War: Selected Correspondence of, 671.

Charles Carleton Coffin, “Late Scenes in Richmond” The Atlantic Monthly, a Magazine of Literature, Art, and Politics. Volume XV, (1865) 748.

under him were openly proud to have him as their leader.48

24

Secondly, on July 22nd one of his Major Generals, James B McPherson, died in the Battle of Atlanta. McPherson’s death would mark one of the highest-ranking officials in the American Army to die in the field in the Civil War. Sherman and McPherson were together at Shiloh, Corinth, Oxford, Jackson, Vicksburg, Meridian and this Atlanta Campaign.49 Sherman began to rely heavily on him by the time they were invading Georgia, which he mentions often after McPherson’s death. McPherson asked for a leave earlier that year to get married to his fiancé Emily Hoffman. Sherman denied the request and looking back regretted it because McPherson was unable to get married. The official letter that Sherman sent of McPherson’s death to Ms. Hoffman also included a personal letter to her. In it he refers to his regret that his fellow General and friend died and that taking vengeance on a thousand Confederate soldiers would not do him justice.50 Sherman wrote to his wife and mentioned the grief of losing his close friend in battle and his wife asked him why he chose to be so near the battlefield. Sherman chastised his wife for suggesting that he was being foolish as a General and being close to the front however he felt that he would only ask his men to do something he would do.51 When leaving Atlanta he notes that he looked back and could see the hill around where McPherson died and paused to stare at it before pushing on towards Savannah.52 Staying in Atlanta was stressful for Sherman because he was always worried about his

48 James Padgett, “With Sherman Through Georgia and the Carolinas: Letters of a Federal Solider. Part I”. The Georgia Historical Quarterly volume 32, no. 4 (1948) 312.
49 50 51 52

William Sherman, Sherman’s Civil War: Selected Correspondence of, 682. lbid., 683. lbid., 672. William Sherman, From Atlanta to the Sea. Edited B. H Liddell Hart. 163.

supply line being disrupted by the opposing army. He was able to maintain a steady store of

25

supplies, which he felt was one of his top priories for his men to be successful. Lastly, he felt that being on the offensive and maneuvering around his opponents was more beneficial than trenching his army down and attacking each other’s fronts, something that both Grant and Lee never learned in the war.53 By avoiding this frontal assault technique he was able to save lives of countless soldiers instead of needlessly throwing them into charges against the Confederate guns. This will not leave him without fault as we see in the Kennesaw Mountain battle but his attitude of bringing the war to a close as quickly as possible was shown in his ability to learn from this defining battle that led up to his capture of Atlanta. Sherman’s mental state has been portrayed as unstable throughout the early part of his military career. This haunted him throughout the war and was a constant battle with the media. This did not take long for other military leaders in the Union army to try and capitalize off of this claim of insanity. Modern historians tend to think he was barbaric, which led to some of his choices in Georgia. Even the Federals felt that he was insane when he stated that 200,000 men were needed to win the war in the west. The press, which historically was hard on Sherman’s leadership, quickly changed their opinion on Sherman. After he captured Atlanta the New York Times stated that his capture “almost and impossible feat… we cannot deny to him the claim of a highly successful military leader.”54 The South held onto the idea that he was in fact crazy.55 However after this brief

53 Captain George Pepper, Personal Recollections of Sherman’s Campaigns in Georgia and the Carolinas. (Ohio: Hugh Dunne, 1866) 247 “Pepper mentions that Sherman pushed his men 12 to 15 miles per day and if they did not hit that mark he would push them further into the night. His objective was to stay a head of the enemy so they could never formalize a party to attack him and his men. Peppers sums up the march to be on the offensive by saying “this determined energy is one secret of General Sherman’s Success. He pushes onward – right onward”.
54

“GEORGIA.; ATLANTA. THE SITUATION. SERIOUS RAILROAD ACCIDENT. SHERMAN'S REAR.” New York Times September 23, 1864. Accessed august 1st, 2012

bout of depression it is noted in the correspondence with those around him that the depression episodes left and he was very adept to be a leader for the United States Army. He appeared to replace his self-laceration with pride in himself and his army. It was clear that he felt a heavy responsibility for his command and did not take the responsibility lightly.56

26

His brother, United States Senator John Sherman from Ohio, was in constant dialogue with General Sherman letting him know the politics that were going on in Washington DC. This was a benefit for General Sherman because he was able to stay current with what was going on in the capital from the direct perspective of his brother. This helped him understand the general feeling the government had towards him whether he agreed with them or not. On July 24, 1864 John Sherman wrote a letter to his brother General Sherman explaining the importance of Georgia and that his campaign was in favor of the Union cause.57 John mentions that he and other politicians in Washington felt the outcome of Atlanta could end the war quickly and he goes into length explaining the dangers to the Union if Sherman were to fail. He even compares his campaign to that of Grant's occurring at the same time in Virginia. It was noted how much more successful Sherman has been for the Union army and how people in Washington looked to him for inspiration.

http://www.nytimes.com/1864/09/23/news/georgia-atlanta-the-situation-serious-railroad-accidentsherman-s-rear.html?scp=8&sq=William Sherman and Atlanta&st=p&pagewanted=1
55

LP Brockett, Our Great Captains: Grant, Sherman, Thomas, Sheridan and Farragut. (New York: Charles B Richardson, 1866) 93. Michael Fellman, Citizen Sherman: A life of William Tecumseh Sherman. (New York: New York Random House, 1995). 118. Fellman Notes the turning point for Sherman’s mental state was at Shiloh and remained for the rest of war in regards to Sherman’s depression. James McPherson in Battle Cry of Freedom also states that after Shiloh “what he learned… helped to make him one of the premier generals.” (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988) 409.

56

57

William Sherman, The Sherman Letters: Correspondence Between General Sherman and Senator Sherman from 1837 – 1891, 237.

When Sherman requested the state of Georgia to surrender he sent a passionately written letter to

27

the Mayor. In his letter he explained that what he was doing was more of a sacrifice than the Mayor or others would ever feel. Sherman was seen as a strong patriot and to hold the Union together was his most important objective. To his soldiers it appeared that he was not out for personal gain as he was to end the war and restore the Union to what it once was.58 General Sherman was highly criticized for his actual attack on Atlanta. After spending time flanking General Hood’s army he finally pinned the Confederate army around Atlanta. He felt that it was Hood’s fault for his muskets and cannon balls that hit homes of the women and children who stayed in the city. He also noted that Hood also burned plenty of homes in Atlanta that were in his way while defending it from the Union siege. Sherman wrote a letter directly to Hood while surrounding Atlanta begging for him to send the women and children out of the city. He wanted to fight the Confederate army head on not kill innocent women and children that were under fire from his cannon. He closed his letter with stating, “whether it be more humane to fight with a town full of women, and their families… or to remove them in time to places of safety.”59 Sherman wanted to directly preserve the lives of the southern population; his march was a direct blow on the economy, not continued warfare with the population. The General felt not only responsibility to the country that he was serving, but responsibility to his men as well. Keeping the army well fed and maintained was of the upmost importance to Sherman. Logistics seemed to be in the forefront of his mind and it is clear that it served his army well throughout the march. His men were excited for the march and cared not on how or where

58 George Nichols, The Story of the Great March from the Diary of a Staff Officer. (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1865) 122.
59

William Sherman, Sherman’s Civil War: Selected Correspondence of, 706 – 707.

they were going. Sherman states about his men,

28

Nor did they measure the distance, or count the cost in life, or bother their brains about the great rivers to be crossed and the food required for man and beast, that had to be gathered by the way… this made me feel the full load of responsibility… success would be accepted as a measure of course… should we fail it would be adjudged the wild adventure of a crazy fool.60 After his army occupied Atlanta, the Confederate army did all it could to disrupt the rail lines into Atlanta so that supplies to Sherman’s army would be unreliable. This compelled Sherman to maintain a large force of men to protect the rail lines. General Sherman had serious anxiety which was reflected in his letters to Grant and Lincoln that protecting the rail lines of supply and staying on the defensive was not possible for long.61 As a great General he recognized that not only keeping his men alive was important but also making sure their quality of supplies was the best it could be. Seeing the production of the South and realizing that it would be in the time of harvest, he proposed to march through Georgia. Sherman’s rationalization was that the food supplies would eventually end up in the Lee’s army. He felt that if he could keep supplies from getting to Lee he would be helping out Grant’s campaign as well. He realized that he could take those resources to feed his own army while crippling the Confederate army at the same time. To this end Sherman felt that marching through Georgia and “smashing things to the sea” would help bring a quicker end to the war. William Sherman helped end the war quickly by being willing to leave conventional warfare that was used in the mid 19th century and attack the economy of the south by pillaging the land. General Sherman saw nothing of more importance than bringing the country back together and protecting the lives of millions of Americans. In his letter to the Mayor on September 12th, 1864 he

60 William Sherman, From Atlanta to the Sea. Edited B. H Liddell Hart, 163.
61

William Sherman, Sherman’s Civil War: Selected Correspondence of, 727.

29

defends his actions to Calhoun. He explains to the Mayor that to bring peace as fast as one can he needs to stop the rebel army by any means necessary and if that required a war on the land and people he would do it. He feels that one event leads to the other and that when it does it will end quickly.62 He feels that by looking to Mexico who was fighting over different views and considered them in “eternal war” and if America did not stop fighting within itself that it would end up just like them.63 While this was going on with the Mayor, Sherman was also writing to Hood who was constantly accusing Sherman of breaking the accepted rules of war. He even quotes what is considered to be an accepted practice directly to Hood and ends the conversation since he felt it was irrelevant. After invading and occupying Atlanta, Sherman had the army dismantle any buildings of production that the Confederate army could use.64 Daniel Oakley, Captain of the 2nd Massachusetts volunteers, mentions in his journal how they left Atlanta in flames. The objective was to render anything of military value useless; so once the Confederates reoccupied Atlanta everything was destroyed.65 Other buildings fell prey to the flames of the arsonists and nearly half the city was burned during the mayhem. However, it is stated that Sherman’s plan was to cause Atlanta to stop producing for the military machine. Nowhere does it reflect that he burned the city down to be barbaric or hateful. Sherman was only trying to end the war as quickly as possible and

62 lbid., 707.
63 64

Ibid., 708.

George Nichols, The Story of the Great March from the Diary of a Staff Officer. (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1865), 41. Mentions that machine shops that were used to cast cannons as well as warehouses that stored ammunition all for the destruction of the Union army were destroyed in the fire. He states, “the city, next to Richmond, has furnished more material for prosecuting the war than any other in the south exists no more.”

65

Robert Johnson and Clarence Bule, Battles and Leaders of the Civil War. (New York: The Century Co, 1884) 671.

30

he felt that it was the only way he could accomplish it. This does not account for the fact that many soldiers did maliciously burn the city and many felt that Sherman did not discipline these vandals, as he should have. Sherman was having a hard time with what he should do next after occupying Atlanta. He could turn and fight Hood’s army that he greatly outnumbered and have a bloody battle as many of the military figures thought he should have done initially. However, he felt that he could cripple the economy of the South while not facing too much opposition. After getting permission from both President Lincoln and General Grant he issued Special Field Order number 120.66 In this field order, article five addresses how the army of 60,000 would proceed through the enemy territory. He discusses the dissection of the corps commanders who he had entrusted the rules that pillaging should take place towards property. He granted the authority to destroy mills, cotton gins, houses and businesses.67 The degree of violence was supposed to be determined by the hostility of resistance including that of guerrillas or bushwhackers who were molesting the march. A Union officer in his journal stated how he was a part of the march through Georgia and he personally did not see any personal property burned. However he noted that the army burned every single public building they came across.68

66 William Sherman, From Atlanta to the Sea. Edited B. H Liddell Hart, 159.
67 68

Samuel HM Byers, “The March to the Sea.” The North American Review 145 (1887) 242.

Thaddeus Capron, “War Diary of Thaddeus H Capron, 1861 – 1865” Journal of the Illinois State Historical Society. Volume 12 No. 3 (1919) 337.

31

“My arrangements are now all complete, and the railroad cars are being sent to the rear. Last night we burned all the foundries, mills and shops of every kind in Rome, and to-morrow I leave Kingston with the rear guard for Atlanta which I propose to dispose of in a similar manner and to start on the projected grand raid”69 Sherman on his March A major point of discussion in regards to the march is targeted against Sherman in that critics feel he did not follow the Union army's guide on how to conduct the army in hostile territory. General Field order 100, also known, as the Lieber Code of 1863, is a major point that critics reference to attempt to show that Sherman completely disregarded general war practices of the Union used during the Civil War. President Abraham Lincoln as a reference for the Union forces established this code, also known as instructions for the government of armies of the United States in the field during the Civil War. Section II of this field order specifically talks about the protection of persons and property, especially women, the arts, and religion. It also states how the United States' army is supposed to behave while occupying an enemy nation. Item 34 takes into consideration that of public buildings in the given area of occupation. Any building establishing education of culture should be protected from the fate of other such property. Libraries, churches, public schools and universities, or museums of fine art fall into item number 34.70 It is well documented that the men in the army followed this rule very loosely and there is no denying that Sherman knew it was going on. One soldier wrote home to his wife that he personally burned enough cotton to buy the state of Indiana.71 However the primary sources of the Georgia civilians suggests that burning of personal houses was not as much as publicized and that

69 William Sherman, Sherman’s Civil War: Selected Correspondence of 757.
70

Francis Lieber, Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field. (Washington DC: Government Printing Press, 1861), page 34. Nova Mertens and Donald Carmony, “Jacob W Barmess Civil War letters” Indiana Magazine of History Volume 52. No. 2 (1956) 177.

71

the exaggerated accounts from the local newspapers tried to rally the population against

32

Sherman. The "bummers", or scavengers who were unauthorized, were rampant all throughout the march.72 The Union soldiers felt personally that this untouched part of the south was flowing with “milk and honey”.73 These foraging parties liberally worked their way through the countryside with much aid from the slave population that lived in the areas.74 There were countless accounts of men entering buildings and taking food and personal property. Livestock, horses, mules and wagons were also taken from most homes and the animals that they could not take or use were shot dead. Businesses were burned and homes were targeted if the army felt threatened by guerilla warfare. This practice was justified by Sherman in order to protect his soldiers and scare other civilians from attacking or impeding the army as it passed through. Conversely one of the most notable events of the march was the low causality count. This is significant because not only did he disrupt the Southern economy, but so many people lived to write about it. It was clear that he abhorred unneeded bloodshed from his past military failures leading up to the capture of Atlanta. Secondly, it is apparent that rape was not a serious issue during the march. It does not mean that these events did not occur, what it does state is that it was small enough that no one noted it. Which is unique since the amount of journals and diaries we have from both the soldiers and civilians is extensive when they recorded the march, which helps establish the death toll and rape to be very small.75 Prostitution was known to occur throughout the

72 Stephen Graham, “Marching Through Georgia: Following Sherman’s Footsteps to-day Part II”. Harpers Magazine colume140 (1920), 815.

73

FY Hedley, Marching through Georgia, (Chicago: Donohue, Henneberry and Company, 1884) 267.

74 75

Ibid., 270.

William Sherman, Memoirs of General William T Sherman, 221. Sherman states that roughly 1,800 of his 60,000 Union soldiers resulted in causalities occurred while on the march through

American Civil War for both the North and the South, which could be something of note that was not an exception for General Sherman’s army throughout his entire campaign.76

33

The Lieber code also addressed slavery. Article forty-three of the Lieber code asserted that men are naturally born free. It was important for the United States Army to protect the belief that men are born free and so it was necessary to free any slaves it would come in contact with during any invasion. It is very clear that the slaves were not viewed as property by the Lieber code and as such were able to be set free. It states that according to the law of postliminy no belligerent lien or claim of service can be had. In comparison with Sherman who intentionally or not has to deal with a recently large freed slave population as he ventured through the South had his own attempt to create a policy in regards to them. In items 7 and 8 Sherman addresses the possibility of slaves that they will encounter. He understood the trouble of feeding and providing for the potentially large population of freed slaves that would follow his army. He stated that only “Negroes who are ablebodied” are to be of service to the Army.77 He would allow them to become a part of the pioneer battalion to repair roads and bridges that the Confederates might destroy to impede the progress of the army. Sherman explains that he encounters several recently freed slaves and talks to them about the importance of not following the army and that the federal government will take care of it soon enough. This aligns with Sherman’s view on Slavery. Sherman was not fighting in the war to free slaves but to preserve the Union. So from the press and from Washington it appeared that he had

Georgia that lasted over a month. When compared to the fighting that took place in Virginia that same year like The Wilderness Campaign where no strategic victory occurred over a few days and tens of thousands of casualties occurred shows the significance of his military choice to move away from Hood instead of towards him.
76

Oscar Jackson, The Colonels Diary (1922) 183 http://archive.org/stream/colonelsdiaryjou00jack#page/116/mode/2up (accessed September 22, 2012). William Sherman, From Atlanta to the Sea. Edited B. H Liddell Hart, 160-161.

77

34

very little interest in helping the freed black population as he went through Georgia. Which is event with Sherman wanting the Federal government to take care of the slavery issue and to leave himself out of it.78 On the march, Sherman corresponded openly with many recently freed slaves. One of Sherman’s Majors, Henry Hitchcock, wrote about his encounter with slaves that were directed by their masters to arise early and head out to Florida. These slaves woke even earlier and took their horses to Sherman. Hitchcock noted how much faith the slave population had in Sherman.79 Hitchcock wrote home to his wife to explain the fierceness in Sherman and his dedication to the United States. When speaking with Hitchcock it is noted that Sherman said, “the simplest thing in the world you have undertaken to rebel against and destroy the Government-you must stop that and return.”80 This highlighted that Sherman was not about to get involved with any of the extra issues such as slavery as much as he was about ending the war. It is also important to consider the original opinion of his march in the eyes of governing bodies all around the world. The London Post upon hearing of the news described the march as a failure in the making and that his army should be utterly destroyed long before it reaches its destination. The London Times states that if he were to make it to Savannah it would go down as a new chapter in modern warfare. However the paper also felt that if he were to even make it to

78 William Sherman, Sherman’s Civil War Selected Correspondence of, 795-796. Sherman at one point lived and worked in the South before the war. So the idea of slavery wasn’t evil to him. He saw it just as another institution and he considered this drive for emancipation was just a radical “swing of the pendulum”. Which might seem barbaric to some but it goes hand in hand with the idea that Sherman’s ultimate goal was to end the war quickly and bring the Union back together.
79

Henry Hitchcock, Marching with Sherman: Passages from the Letters and Campaign Diaries of Henry Hitchcock, Major and Assistant Adjutant General of Volunteers, November 1864 – May 1865, ed. M.A. DeWolfe Howe, (Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1927. Reprinted in 1995 by the University of Nebraska Press) 70. Ibid., 36.

80

Savannah that the town was too well protected for Sherman to even take without a serious fight from the Confederate army. The Southern press was no exception to this notion either. It wrote

35

columns on how he was walking into the trap the Southern army set for him. As a historian it is easy to look back and realize that his march was set up for success. However, at the time it was innovative and unknown.81 The New York Times on November 9th 1864, the day Sherman announced his field orders, called the looming march... “One of the most extraordinary campaigns of the war... The rebels have nothing in Georgia that can oppose Sherman.”82 General Sherman and his army ravaged Georgia from Atlanta to Savannah then headed north burning and pillaging South Carolina. One of his major weapons was fire, which was used to destroy anything the Confederate army could use. Dealing this major blow to the South was accomplished by burning anything the Union Army could not use to keep it from reaching the Confederate army.83 Sherman’s path of destruction was well marked on the horizon showing nothing left of a building but the chimney; this received the nickname “Sherman’s Sentinels”. However, most of this destruction was aimed directly at business and production. Much of the personal homes were left alone from the all-consuming fire that the rest of Georgia was experiencing. If citizens or guerillas were to resist the army, then Sherman felt it necessary to burn the towns in that the area to help keep the citizens from impeding his march any

81 Captain David Conygham, Sherman’s March through the South: with Sketches and Incidents of the Campaign. (New York: Sheldon and Company, 1865) 240 – 241.
82

“EXTRAORDINARY NEWS.; Sherman's New and Grand Campaign. Great Military March Through Georgia. Stupendous Flank Movement upon Savannah and Charleston. The Railroad to Chattanooga Removed and Atlanta Burned. Atlanta as a Point of Advance upon the Atlantic. STRIKING FACTS AND DETAILS ADDITIONAL DETAILS” New York Times, November 10th, 1864, accessed August 21, 2012 http://www.nytimes.com/1864/11/10/news/extraordinary-shermans-new-grand-campaign-great-military-march-throughgeorgia.html?scp=2&sq=sherman+and+georgia+and+march&st=p

83

William Sherman, Selected Correspondence, 761.

further.

36

This was a fear that really happened with the Georgian citizens. In Covington Georgia, just outside of Atlanta, a citizen was disheartened by the loss of Atlanta and vowed to shoot the next Yankee he saw. This citizen shot, and killed, two Federal soldiers who asked him not to shoot and did not confront him as a hostile. The Georgian then opened fire into a platoon of cavalry where he wounded two more before they were able to capture him and execute him.84 Sherman was nervous of guerrillas. He had had past experience with guerilla warfare and was always on the lookout as he marched through the South. By the time he reached the capital of Georgia, Milledgeville, Sherman found newspapers that supported his fears. On November 18, 1864 Sherman found declarations from General Beauregard, Senator B.H Hill and six different members of congress addressing the Atlanta population. Each one promoted that the Southern members of society should destroy anything that would aid Sherman’s army. This included bridges, railroads and food supplies as well as to keep the attack by day and by night.85 William Sherman was known to show his emotions and often received much attention from the press, wanted or not, because he openly shared an uncensored opinion. His personality often left his opponents describing him as ‘crazy’ or ‘barbaric’.86 He openly did not care if people shared the same opinion as him since he felt he was not out looking for their opinion or their vote in regards to his military decisions. Sherman often mentioned how he felt that the news reporters were spies with the intention of picking up the camp rumors to make good stories and giving the enemy

84 Walter Clark, Under the Stars and Bars or, Memories of Four Years Service with Oglethorpe’s, of Augusta, Georgia. (Georgia: Chronicle Printing Press 1906) 149.
85 86

William Sherman, Memoirs of General William T Sherman. 945.

Hon Headley, Grant and Sherman; Their Campaigns and Generals. (New York: EB treat and Company, 1865) 144.

his movements.87 He also felt that they were in part to blame for the downfall of some of the Northern Generals that public interest wanted removed from their post.88 During his time near

37

Vicksburg he wrote his brother Senator Sherman extensively about his distrust and distaste for the Union Papers. “I am not willing to Stoop to the vile practice of keeping this class of Spies about me. They have done infinite mischief in this war and the enemy by suppressing them has a vast advantage over us. Every movement of ours is revealed before we can act. I suppose it is useless to attempt to prevent them but with our armies thronged with such spies I do not hope for success.”89 His anxiety felt towards the newspapers came to a boiling point when one the reporters from the New York Herald, Thomas Knox, reported some of the movements of his army without authorization. In the reports it was also clear that he said some unfavorable things towards General Sherman. This infuriated and frustrated the General to the point where he sent the report to court martial, the first and last time in American history. Both Grant and Lincoln knowing this was technically not legal still supported him and required that Sherman gave his consent to let Knox back into his army as a reporter. 90 Although this issue was resolved it was something that Sherman was always leery about for the remainder of the war.

87 William Sherman, The Sherman Letters: Correspondence of, 237.
88

Lee Randall, “The Newspaper Problem in its Bearing Upon Military Secrecy During the Civil War” The American Historical Review. Volume 23 no. 2 310. William Sherman. Sherman’s Civil War: Selected Correspondence of, 379. Sherman often referred to the press as spies throughout the war. He constantly felt like they were either giving away his next move or that they were personally attacking him. This is a battle he would fight long after the war.

89

90 Robins, Edward. William T Sherman. (Philadelphia: George W, Jacobs and Company. 1905).

118.

38 “I know the rebels are whipped to death, and I declare before God, as a man and a soldier, I will not strike a foe who stands unarmed and submissive before me, but would rather say – ‘Go and sin no more.” The Conclusion91 Sherman was brutal to the land of Georgia, which without a doubt affected the general

southern population and Confederate army. However if we look at the many accomplishments he had as a General we can see that he captured Atlanta, Milledgeville (Georgia’s capital at the time), Savannah and Charleston South Carolina (another capital) all on his march. These were all taken with very few lives lost for the Union as well as the Confederates. Atlanta was important to take because it was the second largest production site of the South second to Richmond only, and Savannah which was an important naval port that was now under Union control because of his march from Atlanta. He was well respected by his men, and they trusted his judgment wherever he chose to lead them.92 His superiors respected him and listened to his suggestions. This is not more evident than when Sherman proposed the march to Grant. Grant’s response highlights his trust in feelings towards Sherman and his military judgment, “If there is any way of getting at Hood’s army, I would prefer that, but I trust your judgment.” This is significant because Sherman was proposing something that really had not been done especially with that large of an army. Sherman’s army could have been used to support Grant directly or attack Hood.93 William Sherman was a man of many words throughout his entire career. Fortunately or not

91 Colonel S. M. Bowman and Lieutenant Colonel R. B Irwin. Sherman and His Campaigns: A Military Biography (New York: Geo. C. Bard & Avery, 1865) 488.
92

Robert Johnson and Clarence Bule, Battles and Leaders of the Civil War. (New York: The Century Co. 1884) 672.

93

Ulysses S Grant, The Complete Personal Memoirs of Ulysses S Grant. (New York: Empire Books, 2012) 484.

39

for him these records help his case in regards to his march. He was very detailed in his words and letters to others but rarely lived up to the destructiveness he commanded throughout his time as a General. On the same note he did not always live up to the positive issues he wrote about either. However, since he did speak passionately it provided people many opportunities to criticize and critique him. I have always learned that if you try to understand history by today’s standards you never will. The Civil War was a turning point in the history of warfare from Victorian warfare to modern warfare. Sherman’s method of attack and movement reminded contemporaries of Napoleon, and often refer to on both sides to Sherman’s army as being like Napoleon in Russia.9495 To judge Sherman’s tactics of warfare under today’s standards make it difficult to understand Sherman’s choices. This does not make his tactics any less brutal but what it does do is help clarify why Sherman did what he did as he marched through Georgia. A Confederate artilleryman of Savannah, Charles C. Jones, who was at the siege of Savannah when Sherman arrived, noted the departure of the Confederate army. He describes how brilliant the withdrawal was from Savannah and attests that Sherman did not know that it was happening. He also explains how they spiked the cannons and destroyed any ammunition and powder that was in the city. He goes into detail on how they used rice straw on the ground to deaden any sound of movement to disguise the withdrawal from Sherman and his

94 Thomas Horne and Edward Ruger, History of the Army of the Cumberland, its Organization, Campaigns and Battles. Volume 2. (Cincinnati, Robert Clarke and Co 1875) 157. Describes the invasion of Napoleon into Russia while the Russians retreat farther into Russia and the Confederates feel they will be triumphant like the Russians because they can retreat farther into the south. It is of note that the Russians can retreat into the harsh winters of Siberia where as the southern can only retreat farther into a fertile southern territory.
95

George Nichols, The Story of the Great March from the Diary of a Staff Officer. (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1865) 117. Describes how Sherman had an astonishing memory just like Napoleon was known to have.

40

army.96 Corresponding with much of Sherman and his march, the Federal soldiers have their own explanation of events with the soldiers leaving Savannah. His men trusted that he did not want to fight just to fight as a one of his artillerymen, Thomas Osborn, commented in his journal in December 1864. He describes how Sherman did not fire upon the army fleeing the city. He notes that Sherman did not want to fight; he just wanted to occupy the ports.97 Sherman’s choice to march will always be a debate that military historians will discuss. However his soldier’s response to his choices was a testament to his leadership. As one of his soldiers was known to say, “I’d follow Uncle Billy to hell.”98 When General Sherman realized how much the march became a legend in the war he felt it was important only because it was used as a means to an end. The strategy was a shift in base in order to better position his army to aid Grant while taking a strong strategic victory in the South. He felt that he could position himself by flanking Lee, a maneuver he became known for in Atlanta. Sherman made it clear that he felt the rebellion had gone on long enough and he wanted the war to be over and America restored to a whole. He comments shortly after the war that people found the event unique and extraordinary and he wanted little to do with that idea. He felt it was part of his job and that given the situation they were in it was the best-case scenario for his army. He does realize the benefit of the march and its crippling effects on the Southern economy as well as bolstering the amount of supplies that his men either acquired or destroyed along the

96 Charles Jones, The Siege of Savannah in December 1864, and the Confederate Operations in Georgia and the Third Military District of South Carolina During General Sherman’s March from Atlanta to the Sea. (New York: Joel Munsell 1874) 155.
97

Editor Richard Harwell, The Fiery Trail: A Union Officers Account of Sherman’s Last Campaigns (Tennessee: University of Tennessee. 1986)

98

Corydon Foote, With Sherman to the Sea: A Drummer’s Story of the Civil War. Editor Olive Hormel. (New York: John Day, 1960) 190.

path. However, according to his memoirs, that was not the means in which he was operating.99 At a time where conventional warfare was still dictated with the idea of chivalric fighting

41

with attacking one’s opponent head on, General Sherman stepped outside this formality and felt that preserving his men was more important. However, William Tecumseh Sherman’s march from Atlanta to Savannah will always be recognized as something of controversy. There is no denying the devastation upon the land of Georgia; Sherman himself totaled the amount of the damage to be astronomical.100 The impact was felt for years if not decades to come as he burned crops and leveled buildings. He attacked the economy and spirit of the Southern people, which was considered questionable practice. What also is clear is he avoided heavy causalities by not turning and fighting the Confederate armies and their entrenchments. As the other military leaders of the time were charging head long into deadly battles; Sherman avoided it at all cost. He protected the lives of his soldiers as well as the lives of the enemies. His choice to march to Savannah and living off the land was the best choice he could make at the time to end the war as quickly as possible. General Sherman was able to return many of his men to their wives, children and parents. Crops can be replanted and buildings can be rebuilt however lives are lost forever.

99 William Sherman, From Atlanta to the Sea. Edited B. H Liddell Hart,19.
100

William Sherman, General Sherman’s Official Account of His Great March through Georgia and the Carolinas. (New York: Bunce and Huntington, 1865). 83. Sherman stated that the damage that his army cost was an estimated one hundred million dollars. Of that he calculated around twenty million was used for the Army while the other 80 or so million was destroyed. He seemed to understand the amount of damage was large when in his official report stated, “This may seem a hard species of warfare, but it brings the sad realities of war home to those who have been directly or indirectly instrumental in involving us in its attendant calamities.”

Bibliography Primary Sources Bailey, George. A Private Chapter of the War. St. Louis: G. I. Jones and Company, 1880. Byers, H.M. “The March to the Sea.” The North American Review 145, 1887. Pg 235-245.

42

Brockett, LP. Our Great Captains: Grant, Sherman, Thomas, Sheridan and Farragut. New York: Charles B Richardson, 1866. Capron, Thaddeus. “War Diary of Thaddeus H Capron, 1861 – 1865” Journal of the Illinois State Historical Society. Vol. 12 No. 3, 1919. 330-406. Clark, Walter. Under the Stars and Bars or, Memories of Four Years Service with Oglethorpe’s, of Augusta, Georgia. Georgia: Chronicle Printing Press, 1906. Conygham, Capt, David. Sherman’s March through the South: with Sketches and Incidents of the Campaign. New York: Sheldon and Company, 1865. Foote, Corydon. With Sherman to the Sea: A Drummer’s Story of the Civil War. Ed. Olive Hormel. New York: John Day, 1960. Grant, Ulysses. The Complete Personal Memoirs of Ulysses S Grant. New York: Empire Books, 2012. Hays, Rutherford. Howard, O.O, Childs, Geo, Slocum, Henry. King, Horatio. Manderson. Deprew, Chauncey. Porter. Porter, Horace. Hawley. Flecther, Thomas. Talmage, T, Life and Reminiscences of General W.M. T . Sherman by Distinguished Men of His Time. Baltimore: R. H Woodward Company, 1891. Headley, Jon. Grant and Sherman; Their Campaigns and Generals. New York: EB treat and Company, 1865. Hitchcock, Henry, Marching with Sherman: Passages from the Letters and Campaign Diaries of Henry Hitchcock, Major and Assistant Adjutant General of Volunteers, November 1864 – May 1865, ed. M.A. DeWolfe Howe, Yale University Press, 1927. Reprinted in 1995 by the University of Nebraska Press. Horne, Thomas and Ruger, Edward. History of the Army of the Cumberland, its Organization, Campaigns and Battles. Volume 2. Cincinnati, Robert Clarke and Company, 1875. Graham, Stephen. “Marching Through Georgia: Following Sherman’s Footsteps to-day Part II”. Harper’s Magazine 140, 1920. 813-23.

43

Jackson, Oscar. The Colonels Diary, 1922, http://archive.org/stream/colonelsdiaryjou00jack#page/116/mode/2up (accessed September 22, 2012). 183. Johnson, Robert and Bule, Clarence, Battles and Leaders of the Civil War. New York: The Century Company, 1884. Jones, Charles. The Siege of Savannah in December 1864, and the Confederate Operations in Georgia and the Third Military District of South Carolina During General Sherman’s March from Atlanta to the Sea. New York: Joel Munsell, 1874. Lieber, Francis. Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field. Washington: Government Printing Press, 1861. Mertens, Nova and Carmony, Donald “Jacob W Barmess Civil War letters” Indiana Magazine of History Vol 52. No. 2, 1956, 157-86. Moody, John Sheldon et al., The War of the Rebellion: A compilation of the official records of the Union and Confederate Armies. Series 1 volume 39 part III. Washington: Offical Government Printing Press, 1892. Pepper, Captain George. Personal Recollections of Sherman’s Campaigns in Georgia and the Carolinas. Ohio, Hugh Dunne, 1866. Nichols, George. The Story of the Great March from the Diary of a Staff Officer. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1865. Sherman, William. From Atlanta to the Sea. Edited B. H Liddell Hart. London: The Folio Society, 1961. Sherman, William. Sherman’s Civil War: Selected Correspondence of William T. Sherman 18601865. Edited by Simpson and Berlin. North Carolina: The University of North Carolina Press, 1999. Sherman, William. The Sherman Letters: Correspondence Between General Sherman and Senator Sherman from 1837 – 1891. Edited by Rachel Sherman Thorndike. New York: Da Capo Press, 1969. Sherman, William. Memoirs of General William T Sherman. New York: D Appleton and Company, 1889. Sherman, William. General Sherman’s Official Account of His Great March through Georgia and the Carolinas. New York: Bunce and Huntington, 1865.

44

Von Boyton, Henry. Sherman’s Historical raid: the Memoirs in the Light of the Record. A review Based Upon Compilations from the Files of the War Office. Cincinnati: Wilstach, Baldwin and Co, 1875. Secondary Sources Bennett Walters, John. “General William T. Sherman and Total War” The Journal of Southern History 14, 1948. 447-480. Bowman, Colonel S. M. and Irwin, Lieutenant Colonel R. B. Sherman and His Campaigns: A Military Biography, New York: Geo. C. Bard & Avery, 1865. Castel, Albert “Sherman: Propaganda as History.” The Journal of Military History 67, 2003. 40526. Caudill, Edward and Ashdown, Paul. Sherman’s March in Myth and Memory. New York: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2008. Coffin, Charles Carelton. “Late Scenes in Richmond” The Atlantic Monthly, a Magazine of Literature, Art, and Politics. Volume XV, 1865. 744 – 755. Davis, Burke. Sherman’s March. New York, Random House. 1980. Fellman, Michael. Citizen Sherman: A life of William Tecumseh Sherman. New York, NY: Random House, 1995. Glatthaar, Joseph. The March to the Sea and Beyond. New York, New York University Press, 1985. Gray, Tom “The March to the Sea” The Georgia Historical Quarterly 14, 1930. 111-38. Harwell, Richard. Editor. The Fiery Trail: A Union Officers Account of Sherman’s Last Campaigns: Tennessee, University of Tennessee, 1986. Hirshson, Stanley. The White Tecumseh. New York, John Wiley and Sons, 1997. Jones, Katherine. When Sherman Came: Southern Women and the “Great March”. Indiana, BobbsMerrill Company. 1964. Kennett, Lee. Marching through Georgia: The Story of Soldiers and Civilians During Sherman’s Campaign. New York, Harper Collins, 1995, MacGregor Clauss, Errol. “Sherman’s Failure at Atlanta” The Georgia Historical Quarterly 53, 1969. 321-29.

Marszalek, John. Sherman: A Soldier’s Passion for Order. Illinois, Southern Illinois University Press, 1993. McPherson, James. Ordeal by Fire. Massachusetts: McGraw Hill, 1982. McPherson, James. Battle Cry of Freedom. New York: Oxford, 1988. Miers, Earl. The General Who Marched to Hell. William Tecumseh and His March to Fame and Infamy. New York, Dorset Press, 1951. Miles, Jim. To the Sea: A history and Tour Guide of Sherman’s March. Tennessee: Rutledge Hill Press, 1989. Neely, Mark. The Civil War and the Limits of Destruction. Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2007. Neely, Mark. “Was the Civil War a Total War?” Civil War History 50, 2004. 434-58. Padgett, James. “With Sherman through Georgia and the Carolinas: Letters of a Federal Soldier. Part I”. The Georgia Historical Quarterly volume 32 no 4, 1948. 284-332. Randall, James. “The Newspaper Problem in its Bearing Upon Military Secrecy During the Civil War” The American Historical Review Vol. 23 no. 2, Jan. 1918. 303-23.

45

Rhodes, James. “Sherman’s March to the Sea.” The American Historical Review 6, 1901, 466-74. Royster, Charles. The Destructiveness of War: William Tecumseh Sherman, Stonewall Jackson, and the Americans. New York: Vintage Books, 1991. Sandberg, Carl. Abraham Lincoln: The War Years. New York, Harcourt, Brace and Co, 1939. Trudeau, Noah. Southern Storm; Sherman’s March to the Sea. New York, Harper, 2008.