Applying the 8 Elements of Thought In the WMD Report 1

Applying the 8 Elements of Thought In the WMD Report

HLS-355
October 20, 2012
Applying the 8 Elements of Thought In the WMD Report 2 There are eight elements of thought that are used when analyzing a document. These “Eight basic structures are present in all thinking: Whenever we think, we think for a purpose within a point of view based on assumptions leading to implications and consequences. We use concepts, ideas and theories to interpret data, facts, and experiences in order to answer questions, solve problems, and resolve issues (Criticalthinking.org)”. The eight elements of thought are think about the purpose, state the question, gather information, watch your inferences, check your assumptions, clarify your concepts, understand your point of view, and think through the implications. These eight elements of thought come from Dr. Linda Elder and Dr. Richard Paul. We will use Dr. Elder’s and Dr. Paul’s eight elements of thought to analyze and discuss about The Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction. This is also known as the overview of the WMD Report. The main purpose of this report is to determine and expose the lack of critical thinking that was used by each of the intelligence agencies that assumed that Iraq’s leader, Saddam Hussein, had reconstituted his nuclear weapons program, had biological weapons, had mobile biological weapon production facilities, and had stockpiled and was producing chemical weapons. The coverage of the most public and most damaging intelligence failure in recent American history will be used by the authors to offer their conclusions on what needs to be done to avoid such disastrous misinterpretations and misconceptions. There are several key questions addressed by the authors in this report. First, what led the intelligence community to assume that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destructions? Then, was the information collected relevant and in enough abundance for the analysts to analyze? Also, did the U.S. intelligence community mention the lack of information and data to the policymakers? In other words, was there an effective communication
Applying the 8 Elements of Thought In the WMD Report 3 between both parties? As far as communication is concerned, were all agencies efficiently sharing and comparing information? Did they consult one another before drawing conclusions, or did they use proper interagency communication if used at all? One key question clearly stated in the overview of the report is Was the failure in Iraq typical of the Community’s performance? Also, has the Community been able to evolve with current situations by adapting its resources, training, and thinking methods to an ever changing environment? What lessons have we learned from this failure as well as other case studies? Finally, the commission’s report is addressing the question pertaining to what should be done to improve the intelligence community’s capabilities as well as their competences. The author’s point of view is that the assessments of the U.S. Intelligence community regarding Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction program could not be confirmed when the war was over. A war which caused a significant amount of casualties among both military members and civilians was based on false pretexts as well as a hasty generalization and therefore it could have been prevented. In the report, the authors also made several assumptions. The authors determined that the intelligence community was completely wrong in its assessments of Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction capabilities. The authors also assumed that the analysts were too wedded to assumptions about Saddam Hussein’s intentions and also that the analysts were influenced by the desire not to repeat the community’s underestimation of Iraq’s capabilities from prior events in 1991. The authors also assumed that the analysts blindly accepted poor and incomplete evidence in tune with their theory of there being weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. The authors also pointed out that the analysts disregarded those refuting it. Finally, the authors also mention the possibility that the community was pressured by the policymakers to change their judgments about Iraq’s nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons
Applying the 8 Elements of Thought In the WMD Report 4 programs. The authors also assumed that the intelligence community is too slow to change the way in which they conduct business. As evidence, the authors formulate an opinion at the end of the very first paragraph of the introduction. By the authors doing so, they affirm that none of the United States government’s assertions and assumptions about Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction program could be confirmed when the war was over. This is a strong opening that was intended to convince the reader about the veracity of their arguments. Not to look too unenthusiastic about the intelligence community’s capabilities, evidence about its past achievements in Libya can be found to remind the audience that this report is specifically focusing on the failure that occurred in Iraq. Another evidence, which factual this time, about the priority intelligence targets being far greater in number and often more diffuse in character than fifty years ago. The Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction helps reinforce the authors arguments about the intelligence community’s incapacity to evolve and make changes to match our enemies’ capabilities. These are the enemies who tend to learn from their mistakes. They also mention the existence of a division within the intelligence community constituted of fifteen fully capable and different organizations that are unwilling and unable to work efficiently as a team. The authors also uses the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 passed by Congress, as evidence of endorsing the trueness of their arguments throughout the report. To strengthen their position on Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction program, the authors cite the conclusion of the Iraq Survey Group, which concluded that the intelligence community’s assessment of the existence of such as program was completely wrong. Lastly, the failure of the intelligence community to properly assess Iraq’s nuclear program and to identify all of its chemical weapons storage sites
Applying the 8 Elements of Thought In the WMD Report 5 prior to the invasion in 1991, is used as evidence that demonstrates the craving of the community to recoup quickly. This is therefore making them susceptible to the eventual lapses in judgment. The concepts found throughout this report are communication, adaptation, homeland security, intelligence analysis and collection, interpretation, critical thinking, experience, and management. The inferences made by the authors about the intelligence community are clearly presented all through the report. They include a poor target development, a lack of rigorous analysis, a lack of political context and imagination, an inadequate information sharing, poor human intelligence, the declining utility of traditional imagery intelligence against unconventional weapons programs, and also an absence of strong leadership. The implications of the authors, as long as we follow their line of reasoning, are their recommendations. For example, the authors recommend that strengthening the leadership and management of the intelligence community, building a modern workforce with critically important skill sets, creating a new human intelligence directorate, developing innovative human intelligence techniques, encouraging diverse and independent analysis, and also communicating effectively to policymakers are all recommendations that come from the authors. The authors’ inferences also imply the demanding more from analysts, sharing information between agencies and increasing interagency communication, and finally working more closely with the chemical, biological and nuclear sciences community. This report showed the lack of use in the process of critical thinking as well as the incomplete proof which was used for the reasoning behind the intelligence community to confirm that Iraq did indeed have weapons of mass destruction.

Applying the 8 Elements of Thought In the WMD Report 6
References
Dr. Elder, Linda and Dr. Paul, Richard. (2010). The Thinker’s Guide to Analytic Thinking. Dillon Beach, CA: The Foundation for Critical Thinking Press
Elements and Standards Learning Tool. (n.d.). Retrieved October 19, 2012, from http://www. criticalthinking.org/pages/elements-and-standards-learning-tool/783
Overview of the Report. (n.d.). Retrieved October 19, 2012, from http://myedison.tesc.edu/ tescdocs/ Web_Course s/HLS-355-OL/Summaries/WMD_Report_overview.pdf