How adequate is Mill’s conception of happiness? How good are his arguments to show that “higher” pleasures are intrinsically more desirable than “lower” ones? Is this distinction consistent with the thesis that pleasure is the only thing of value?

In “Utilitarianism” Mill argues that ‘higher’ pleasures are intrinsically more valuable than ‘lower’ pleasures, citing the invariable preference of men who have access to both available (pp.140). I am inclined to disagree, particularly with regards to his assertion that ‘higher’ pleasures have such a “superiority of quality”(pp.139), so as to render any quantity of ‘lower’ pleasures “in comparison, of small account”- this non-cardinal view of pleasure raises many discontinuities. This is particularly the case when we take Mill at his word: “actions are right in proportion as they tend to increase happiness… By happiness is intended pleasure and the absence of pain”(pp.137), and view pleasure as the only good. It is the twin beliefs; of pleasure as the only good-making exercise and Mill’s non-cardinal conception of pleasure that form the core of my disagreement with Mill. I will begin by presenting Mill’s arguments for intrinsically more valuable ‘higher’ pleasures and evaluating them. To support his assertion that ‘higher’ pleasures are intrinsically more valuable, Mill asks the reader to consider a thought experiment. Would an “intelligent human being… consent to be changed into a fool”(p.139), if they could be persuaded that the fool “is better satisfied with his lot than they are with theirs”. As Mill attests, almost everyone (with the possible exception of the severely depressed or unsatisfied) would answer in the negative. This suggests that the pleasures available to the intelligent man are greater than those of the fool- so much greater in fact, that we are willing to accept the possibility for these ‘higher’ pleasures with an understanding that we also have to accept lower contentment. But does this mean that ‘higher’ pleasures are intrinsically better? Not necessarily. It is a non sequitur argument- the conclusion doesn’t necessarily follow from the premise. After all, even if they were just as enjoyable as ‘lower’ ones, we may still choose to be the intelligent man in Mill’s example. There are numerous arguments for this:
1. We may simply prefer a diversity of pleasures. The intelligent man has access to physical pleasures as well as those of the higher faculties. Even if both are equally enjoyable, it is reasonable to prefer the possibility of both in exchange for a slightly lower level of ‘contentment’.
2. Tellingly, in one of a series of comparisons used to highlight our intuitive respect and desire for a consciousness that has can employ the higher faculties, Mill compares “Socrates”, and a “fool” (pp.140). The fact that Mill even knows of Socrates, more than 2,000 years after his death suggests one reason why we may wish to chose the intelligent man over the fool- society as a whole respects these men and women, and they leave a far greater impact on history. Apart from the ‘higher’ pleasures available to the intelligent, there are other reasons that may lead us to choose their lifestyle, such as historic recognition.
3. There is nothing in this argument to suggest that ‘higher’ pleasures are better in kind- that our preference for them is not simply a matter of degree. Higher pleasures may be more pleasurable than ‘lower’ ones, but this is not necessarily enough to render considerations of duration or intensity “of small account” (pp.139).
Of course, we may be inclined to agree with Mill despite these objections- they do not prove him wrong, merely weaken his argument. In Mill’s favour is the seemingly fundamental difference between human and animal pleasures, and ‘higher’ and ‘lower’ pleasures as an extension of this. He draws our attention to this with his assertion that we would prefer to be a “human being unsatisfied than a pig satisfied” (pp.140). This seems similar to earlier comparisons, but there is an important distinction. Mill highlights that anyone who doesn’t believe there are intrinsically more desirable higher pleasures is forced to concede it would be better to live as a beast. ‘Higher’ pleasures are an embodiment of our higher faculties and I believe that our enjoyment of these is an important marker of what makes us human. Which animal enjoys solving mathematics? Thus, as far as the distinction between human and animal pleasures, Mill’s claim seems reasonable.
Another strength of Mill’s argument is his choice of words surrounding the ‘lower’ pleasures. We are told of a “satisfied” pig, and a “content” fool (pp.139-140). These sound like oxymoron, but also remind us of the much higher capacity for enjoyment of more intelligent people. A fool is easily contented, for he can easily exhaust the pleasure sources available to him. For the intelligent man or woman, the myriad of options available to them ensures they can never be lazily “content”.
In addition, Mill’s views surrounding the ‘higher’ pleasures cannot be taken in isolation. He viewed them as a means of elevating all of humanity to a higher plane of existence. This is shown when he remarks “there is absolutely no reason… why an amount of mental culture sufficient to give an intelligent interest… should not be the inheritance of everyone” (pp.145). An increased interest in the ‘higher’ pleasures will necessarily bring about social improvement, as citizens are awakened to the inequality and poor living standards that surround them. Under this generous interpretation, Mill also partly resolves the potential problem of pleasure being the only ‘good-making’ exercise. After all, at times it seems as though pleasure and other qualities are entwined and interchangeable. On balance though, this viewpoint requires more clarification. This may explain Mill’s belief in ‘higher’ pleasures as intrinsically more desirable, but he doesn’t spell it out clearly for the reader.
Convincing though Mill’s arguments are, there are key flaws that prevent them from being persuasive.
One of his central beliefs is that pleasure isn’t cardinal- as shown by his saying that higher pleasures have such a “superiority of quality”, as to render any quantity of lower pleasures “in comparison, of small account” (pp.139). This idea of pleasure being ordinal, leads to both discontinuities and apparent absurdities, as pointed out by Roger Crisp (pp.32). For example, taking Mill at his word, he suggests that a single instance of a ‘higher’ pleasure- perhaps reading one word of philosophy is incalculably more enjoyable than an infinite quantity of physical pleasures. This is an indefensible position, as it goes directly against our own experiences and intuition. In the real world we frequently see people consciously make the decision to engage in lower pleasures, even in preference to higher ones. Mill’s explanation of this is unsatisfactory. He remarks that men have a desire for “the nearer good” (pp.141). Human weakness works as an explanation if ‘higher’ pleasures were only slightly more enjoyable than lower ones. But this wouldn’t occur if the difference were as great as Mill suggests. No one would ever freely engage in base acts if what he says were true. This is compounded by Mill’s belief that pleasure is the only thing of value. Perhaps it would be possible to agree with Mill if he accepted that ‘higher’ pursuits were of value for reasons other than pleasure. He explicitly states the opposite, repeating his commitment to said position.
This is not the only discontinuity or even the most glaring. If (as Mill frequently attests) pleasure is non-cardinal, there must be some point where any amount of a lower pleasure won’t compensate for a higher pleasure. The problem is multiplied when one realizes that pleasure exists on a continuum of ‘highness’- there are not simply clearly demarcated ‘higher’ and ‘lower’ pleasures’. As Roger Crisp suggests, a man savouring a glass of whiskey is engaging his higher faculties in a manner unknown to the runner (pp.33), but there is also clearly a physical aspect to the pleasure. This lowers it in comparison to the philosopher. Where do we draw the line? Does the type of whiskey a man is drinking determine whether it is counted as a high or low pleasure? To fully emphasise the scale of this problem, I will sketch out a possible belief that Mill would be forced to endorse.

‘An infinite quantity of pleasures directly to one side of the line is incomparably inferior to an infinitesimally small quantity of pleasures just to the other side of the line’.

This is clearly absurd, and represents a serious fault in Mill’s arguments.
As well as this, I agree with Crisp that Mill’s conception of ‘higher’ and ‘lower’ pleasures is too simplistic (pp.135). It leaves no room for marginal returns. The first 5, 10 or even 50 mathematical problems that you apply yourself to, may be incomparably more pleasurable than any quantity of lower pleasures. But can Mill assert that solving a 5,000th would be infinitely preferable to a tasty steak? Eventually there must be decreasing marginal returns, and whenever they set in, they lead to a hole in Mill’s argument. Once again we are led to consider Mill’s twin beliefs in pleasure being non-cardinal, and it being the only thing of value as irreconcilable. If solving a maths problem had some hidden quality apart from the fact that it directly leads to happiness, Mill’s arguments would work. But he cannot combine the two. An alternative solution to this problem could be a ‘lexical system of welfare maximization’ (pp.36), as Crisp recommends. This would suggest that at the start of any activity, ‘higher’ pleasures are incomparably better than ‘lower’ ones, but as time goes on and marginal returns set in, pleasure would become cardinal, and eventually lower pleasures may be more enjoyable. However, in my opinion- and that of the critic JJ Smart (pp. 24), Mill would be better placed to allow higher pleasures to stand on their own from the start, instead of relying on an indefinable intrinsic value to distinguish them. Even a pure hedonist like Bentham would be forced to agree that they are almost always more desirable. They provide much greater extrinsic good- a concept that would fit in neatly with Mill’s general utilitarian beliefs and the Greatest Happiness Principle. To return to his earlier example, we should prefer to be Socrates not because there is something intrinsically more pleasurable about philosophy than drinking beer, but because he had an enormous positive impact for human thought- an impact that would not have occurred if we were to substitute the former for the latter.
This could be combined with an understanding that if higher pleasures are intrinsically more valuable, it is not because of the incomparable pleasure they provide. Rather, they encompass other qualities, such as nobleness and virtue, that are good-making. This allows for a belief system where higher pleasures are intrinsically better, but their impact on happiness can still be compared. Mill himself seems to touch on this idea, remarking (with regards to “heroes” and martyrs” ), “it is noble to be capable of resigning entirely one’s own portion of happiness” provided that it earns other “immunity” (pp.147) from similar sacrifices. Mill says that the good from this is still included as pleasure, because it helps to increase the general happiness, but I believe it is a clear and distinct concept. Virtue is unquestionably a good thing, and this is in proportion to the extent to which it increases the general happiness, but it does not count as pleasure in and of itself. In conclusion, I am opposed to the thesis that they are intrinsically more desirable pleasures- at least when we must also consider pleasure to be the only thing of value. I believe that Mill’s arguments could be improved by a slight reduction in ambition- if he argued that pleasure was a cardinal variable, it wouldn’t change the practical prescriptions of his views. If he were to combine this with an understanding that pleasure is not the only good-making exercise- that virtue, or self-realisation were also desirable he would remove the discontinuities and inconsistencies within his argument without impacting the prescriptive advice he provides.

References:
Crisp, Roger Mill on Utilitarianism Routledge
Mill, J.S. On Liberty and Other Essays Oxford University Press
Smart and Williams Utilitarianism For and Against Cambridge University Press