Alexander III, Tsar of Russia, 1881-1889

Alexander III of Russia was born on 26th February 1845. Clumsy and gruff as a child, he grew up to be a man of great physical strength. Everything about him suggested imperial power. He was six feet four inches tall, broad and very strong. Stories circulated about Tsar Alexander bending (and then restraightening) iron fire pokers, crushing silver roubles in his fingers, and tearing packs of cards in half for the entertainment of his children, and about the occasion in 1888 when, after the imperial train was derailed by terrorists at Borki, he held up the wrecked carriage’s roof on his shoulders while his family escaped. (It seems that Alexander’s kidney disease dated back to this incident.) The first tsar to wear a full beard since the time of Peter the Great, whose Europeanising reforms changed fashions to such an extent that untrimmed facial hair had become a sign of a lack of western sophistication, Alexander suited the imperial Russian stereotype. He could be rude and blunt in conversation, and was terrifying when angry. He used foul language when frustrated and senior officials were intimidated by him, though they felt secure when working for him, partly because they were confident of his personal support and partly because Alexander’s physical and personal strength heightened the sense of autocratic might surrounding him.

Alexander was the second son of Tsar Alexander II, and as such was not provided with the education necessary for an emperor. His tutor, Konstantin Pobedonostsev, neglected Alexander in his early years because he considered him unintelligent. Even when Alexander’s

Alexander appointed Nikolai Bunge as Minister of Finance as Russia’s industry and economy wobbled towards modernisation. Under Reutern the Russian economy had developed surer foundations, but major cities were expanding quickly (Kiev doubled in size, 1861-74) and at the same time the incidence of urban strikes doubled. Terrified by socialism, Bunge believed that Russia’s workers might well become revolutionary as a result of the state’s repressive intervention in the economy as well as from capitalist exploitation. He believed that a better way to defeat socialism was to protect workers from distress. Between 1882 and 1885 he introduced labour legislation to improve working conditions for women and children via a system of factory inspection. An 1886 law specified the procedures for hiring and firing workers and paying wages, and regulated factory owners’ systems of workers’ fines. These reforms were inadequate, however. That factory inspectors were mistrusted by both owners and workers alike was less problematic than the fact that there were just 267 of them in the whole of Russia by 1897.

Bunge’s planned further reforms. There would be improved living conditions, legalised trades unions, industrial training for workers, accident insurance, the investigation of owner-worker disputes, and the construction of workers’ houses, laundries, cafes and even reading rooms; and these might have significantly improved the lives of Russia’s workers. Yet, unsurprisingly at a time when conservatives were so influential, his policies attracted criticism for raising expectations unrealistically high and encouraging further demands. Katkov said Bunge’s ideas came out of ‘German books’ and drew up alternative proposals. Pressure from conservatives accusing him of incompetence and his inability to overcome the budget deficit led Bunge to resign on 1 January 1887.

The Ministry of the Interior saw a similar attempt to bolster the power of the tsarist regime through less repressive methods. Alexander replaced Loris-Melikov with Nikolai Ignatiev as Interior Minister. He attempted to strengthen the state and increase the base of social support for tsarism. The peasantry’s loyalty could be increased, he argued, by granting certain limited improvements. Two pieces of legislation that aimed at reducing the burden on the peasantry were enacted before the end of 1881. In May a law made it easier for peasants to rent state land, and by the end of December a law brought all of Russia’s remaining serfs into the emancipation and redemptions process, whilst lowering payments for all. Ignatiev also planned an Assembly of the Land. Modelled on the assemblies seen in Russia before Peter the Great, this would be a consultative body of 3,000 representatives directly elected by the nobility, the merchant class, and the peasantry. It would, Ignatiev hoped, satisfy calls for parliamentary processes without limiting Alexander’s authority. The scheme had many supporters, and Ivan Aksakov boasted the Assembly of the Land was capable of ‘shaming all the constitutions in the world. It is broader and more liberal than they are, while at the same time it maintains Russia’s historical, political and national foundations’. However, it all came to nought, as Alexander rejected the Assembly under pressure from Katkov and Pobedonostsev, and Ignatiev was sacked in May 1882.