In this paper, I will argue in support of Wykstra’s criticism of the Evidential Problem of Evil’s (EPE) claim that ‘probably, there exist pointless evils’. I will contest the arguments against Wykstra’s criticism and give alternative examples.
Wykstra’s Argument
Wykstra asserts that man’s cognitive limitations cannot be compared with the omnipotent and omniscient nature of God, and it is unsurprising that the evil in the world is inscrutable to us.
To illustrate, he utilizes the good parent analogy. We view the relationship between God, a perfectly loving being, and humans as analogous to that of good parents and their children. Loving parents permit the administering of a painful injection for vaccinations to their young child. The child cannot comprehend this suffering, but this does not allow the claim that the medicine (evil) is pointless, nor does it undermine the love of the parents (God).
Criticism of Wykstra
Wykstra’s response is deemed inadequate as some argue:
A) God should comfort humans, just as you would expect loving parents to comfort their child.
B) A perfectly good being would reveal his reasons to you for allowing this suffering, just as a parent would to their child.
In response to A, we ask the question: Why does a parent comfort their baby? Not because the baby will understand, but partially because they are helpless to do anything else. These acts can be seen as more a form of ‘self comfort’ for a parent. Subsequently, self-comforting acts are not expected of a perfectly loving being.
Next, the issue that a perfectly good being would feel obligated to inform you of his actions. It can start to sound very self-entitled when we put it in the manner of ‘That’s the least he could do, we would understand’. Will knowing the reasons make a significant difference in the suffering? Given the gap in cognitive abilities, humans may not be able to