Jemaah Islamiya (JI)
For decades, the Indonesia-based Jemaah Islamiyah has expounded its idea of amalgamating Indonesia, Malaysia and the southern Philippines into a regional Islamic state. Kumpulan Mujahideen Malaysia also has the same ambition.
In October 2002, the United States Government designated the Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) a Foreign Terrorist Organization. JI is an extremist group linked to al-Qaida and other regional terrorist groups and has cells operating throughout Southeast Asia. Extremist groups in the region have demonstrated their capability to carry out transnational attacks in locations where Westerners congregate. Terrorist groups do not distinguish between official and civilian targets.
Jemaah Islamiya is a Southeast Asian terrorist network with links to al-Qaida. The network plotted in secrecy through the late 1990s, following the stated goal of creating an idealized Islamic state comprising Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, the southern Philippines, and southern Thailand.
The name Jemaah Islamiyah dates to the late 1970s, but experts aren’t certain if the name referred to a formal organization or an informal gathering of like-minded Muslim radicals—or a government label for Islamist malcontents. The group has its roots in Darul Islam, a violent radical movement that advocated the establishment of Islamic law in Indonesia, the world’s most populous Muslim country and also home to Christians, Hindus, and adherents of other faiths. Darul Islam sprang up as the country emerged from Dutch colonial rule in the late 1940s, and it continued to resist the postcolonial Indonesian republic, which it saw as too secular.
Activities
Militant islamic group active in Southeast Asia that seeks to etablish an Islamic fundamentalist state in the region. J.I. is allegeed to have attacked or plotted against U.S. and Wesern targets in Inodnesia, Singapore and the Philippines. Several J.I. members have been jailed for the planning of the October 12, 2002, bombing that killed 202 people in Bali. J.I. is also suspected in the August 5, 2003 bombing of the J.W. Marriott hotel in Jakarta that killed 12.
The group—or individuals affiliated with it—is thought to be tied to several terrorist plots. Among them:
The August 2003 car bombing of the J.W. Marriott hotel in Jakarta that killed 12 people. The October 2002 bombing of a nightclub on the predominantly Hindu island of Bali that killed 202 people, most of them foreign tourists from Australia and elsewhere. Amrozi bin Nurhasyim, a 41-year-old mechanic from east Java, was convicted on August 8 for buying the vehicle used in the main explosion and buying and transporting most of the chemicals used for the explosives. He was the first of 33 suspects arrested for the bombings to be convicted.
The JI was responsible for the Bali bombings on 12 October 2002, which killed nearly 200 and wounded 300 others. The Bali plot was apparently the final outcome of meetings in early 2002 in Thailand, where attacks against Singapore and soft targets such as tourist spots in the region were considered.
In December 2001, Singapore authorities uncovered a JI plot to attack the US and Israeli Embassies and British and Australian diplomatic buildings in Singapore.
A December 2000 wave of church bombings in Indonesia that killed 18. Asian and U.S. officials say Hambali had a hand in these attacks, and Indonesian officials arrested J.I. leader Bashir for questioning in connection with this anti-Christian campaign. Recent investigations linked the JI to December 2000 bombings where dozens of bombs were detonated in Indonesia and the Philippines.
A December 2000 series of bombings in Manila that killed 22. The State Department says Hambali helped plan these attacks. Fathur Rahman al-Ghozi, a Bashir follower, reportedly confessed to a role in the bombings. In April 2002, he was convicted in the Philippines on unrelated charges of possessing explosives.
A 1995 plot to bomb 11 U.S. commercial airliners in Asia that, the State Department says, Hambali helped plan.
Jemaah Islamiyah has also been linked to aborted plans to attack U.S., British, and Australian embassies in Singapore.
Location/Area of Operation
Jemaah Islamiya operates across Southeast Asia, including Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and possibly in the Philippines and Thailand. Due to weak central authority and lax or corrupt law enforcement and open borders allows J.I. to operate easily throughout the region.
Following the regional crackdown against JI, it is unclear how the network has responded. The JI is believed to have cells spanning Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, the Philippines, and southern Thailand and may have some presence in neighboring countries.
The Singapore Jemaah Islamiyah is part of a much larger regional terrorist network spanning Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines. Singapore Jemaah Islamiyah members have identified Abu Bakar Baasyir and Abu Jibril as among those responsible for the establishment and operation of the Singapore Jemaah Islamiyah. Abu Jibril has been implicated in crimes committed by the Kumpulan Mujahideen Malaysia, while Abu Bakar Baasyir and another Indonesian Mujahidin Council leader, Hambali, are said to be behind the movement to establish an Islamic state comprising Indonesia, Malaysia and southern Philippines.
Six of the 13 Jemaah Islamiyah members being held in Singapore had links with the Moro Islamic Liberation Front, while the two who were arrested and then released had visited Moro Islamic Liberation Front camps in the past.
Jemaah Islamiyah may also have Thai connections. In January this year, a Singaporean Jemaah Islamiyah fugitive, Mas Selamat Kastari, and four others were believed to have fled to Thailand. Kastari was suspected to be planning to hijack an aircraft from Indonesia, Malaysia or Thailand, and crash it into Changi Airport.
Strength
Peaked in the late 1980s at about 500 hundred plus limited overseas support structure.
Exact numbers are currently unknown, and Southeast Asian authorities continue to uncover and arrest additional JI elements. Singaporean officials have estimated total JI members to be approximately 5,000. The number of actual operationally oriented JI members probably is several hundred.
External Aid
Based on information from ongoing investigations, in addition to raising its own funds, the JI receives money and logistic assistance from Middle Eastern and South Asian contacts, NGOs, and other groups, including al-Qaida.
Has received considerable support, including safehaven, training, logistic assistance, and financial aid from Iraq, Libya, and Syria (until 1987), in addition to close support for selected operations. Abu Nidal was residing in Baghdad at his death in 2002.
Key Personalities
Abu Bakar Bashir, an Indonesian of Yemeni descent, is thought to be the group’s spiritual leader—and, some speculate, an operational leader as well. Bashir joined Darul Islam in the 1970s and was imprisoned in Indonesia for Islamist activism. In 1985, after a court ordered him back to prison, Bashir fled to Malaysia. There, he recruited volunteers to fight in the anti-Soviet Muslim brigades in Afghanistan and sought funding from Saudi Arabia while maintaining connections with former colleagues in Indonesia.
After the Indonesian dictator Suharto stepped down in 1998, Bashir returned home to run a pesantren—a Muslim seminary— in Solo, on the Muslim-majority island of Java. He also took up leadership of the Indonesian Mujahedeen Council, an Islamist umbrella group. Bashir has denied involvement in terrorism. Following the October 2002 Bali bombing, Indonesian officials demanded that Bashir submit to questioning about earlier attacks. He is currently on trial in Indonesia for treason for his alleged links to terrorism.
U.S. and Asian intelligence officials say that Hambali played a key leadership role in the organization. He was J.I.’s operational chief, they say, and was closely involved in several terrorist plots. U.S. officials announced August 14 that he was arrested by Thai authorities in Ayutthaya, about 60 miles north of Bangkok, and handed over to the Central Intelligence Agency. The U.S. State Department says Hambali is the head of Jemaah Islamiyah’s regional shura, its policymaking body, and is suspected of being al Qaeda’s operations director for East Asia.
The State Department in January 2003 froze Hambali’s assets and the assets of another suspected terrorist, Mohamad Iqbal Abdurraham, a.k.a. Abu Jibril. The department said that, until his arrest in Malaysia in June 2001, Abu Jibril was “Jemaah Islamiyah’s primary recruiter and second-in-command.”
Mujahidin KOMPAK [Mujahedeen KOMPAK]
Mujahidin KOMPAK [Mujahedeen KOMPAK] was formed in Indonesia's Sulawesi province. KOMPAK's leaders were sometimes drawn from Jemaah Islamiyah [JI], but it is institutionally distinct. KOMPAK is an acronym which translates as Action Committee for Crisis Response. Kompak is involved in the Muslim/ Christian conflicts in the Moluccas. The group exists in the Central Sulawesi province, and is concentrated in the Poso region. KOMPAK is responsible for attacks against Christians. Members have trained in international militant camps in Mindanao and Afghanistan. In contrast to JI, Mujahidin KOMPAK was focused on getting recruits into battle as quickly as possible.
On November 9, 2001 two members of Mujahidin KOMPAK, a 17-year-old and a 20-year-old, tossed a series of bombs and nails through the Petra Church in North Jakarta during an evening prayer service. The bombs destroyed several of the church windows. There are no reported casualties among the 400 in attendance. The attack aimed to kill minister Diana Akyuwen, who led her people to safety across a high mountain after their village of Waal was destroyed by jihad warriors. KOMPAK was involved in an outbreak of violence in Poso and Morowali districts in October 2003 in which thirteen people were killed, most of them Christian villagers. Most of the attackers proved to be locally recruited men from the Mujahidin KOMPAK militia group, and most had family members killed in a wave of attacks on Muslims in May-June 2000 and were likely motivated by revenge.
Indonesia Backgrounder: How the Jemaah Islamiyah Terrorist Network Operates
Asia Report N°43 11 Dec 2002
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
As the Indonesian-led investigation proceeds, the Bali attack on 12 October 2002 looks more and more like the work of Jemaah Islamiyah (JI). But what exactly is Jemaah Islamiyah and how does it operate? It is one thing to describe, as many have by now, a network of Islamic radicals extending across Southeast Asia, led by Indonesian nationals, with a loose structure characterised by four territorial divisions known as mantiqis that cover peninsular Malaysia and Singapore; Java; Mindanao, Sabah, and Sulawesi; and Australia and Papua respectively.
It is another to get a feel for how people are drawn into the network, what characteristics they share, what motivates them, and what resources they can draw on.
ICG examined earlier bombings in Indonesia linked to JI to try to answer some of these questions. There was no shortage of cases: JI has been linked to dozens of deadly attacks across Indonesia, the Philippines, and Malaysia from 1999 to the present. ICG looked in particular, however, at the Christmas Eve bombings of December 2000, in part because they covered so much territory: more than 30 bombs were delivered to churches or priests in eleven Indonesian cities across six provinces, all wired to explode around the same time. If we could understand who the foot soldiers were from one end of the country to the other, perhaps we could get a better sense of JI as an organisation.
The report, therefore, takes the Christmas Eve bombings in Medan, North Sumatra; Bandung and Ciamis, West Java; and Mataram, Lombok, in Nusa Tenggara Barat Province as a starting point. Using trial documents, police information, and extensive interviews, it examines the network linked to JI in each area. Research for this report was conducted over a two-month period by a team consisting of ICG staff and consultants.
Several findings emerge:
• JI does appear to operate through cells but with a rather loosely organised and somewhat ad hoc structure. The top strategists appear to be protégés of Abdullah Sungkar, the co-founder with Abu Bakar Ba’asyir, of Pondok Ngruki, a pesantren (religious boarding school) in Central Java, mostly Indonesian nationals living in Malaysia, and veterans of the anti-Soviet resistance or, more frequently, the post-Soviet period in Afghanistan. A trusted second tier, who share many of those characteristics, appear to be assigned as field coordinators, responsible for delivering money and explosives and for choosing a local subordinate who can effectively act as team leader of the foot soldiers.
The bottom rung, the people who drive the cars, survey targets, deliver the bombs, and most often risk arrest, physical injury, or death, are selected shortly before the attack is scheduled. They are mostly young men from pesantrens (religious boarding schools) or Islamic high schools. The schools that provide the recruits are often led by religious teachers with ties to the Darul Islam rebellions of the 1950s or to Pondok Ngruki.
• Until the Bali attack, the motivation for bombings appears to have been revenge for massacres of Muslims by Christians in Indonesia –Maluku, North Maluku, and Poso (Central Sulawesi) where communal conflict erupted in 1999 and 2000. With a few exceptions, such as the attack on the residence of the Philippine ambassador in Jakarta in August 2000, the targets were mostly churches and priests. Recruitment of foot soldiers was often preceded by discussions about Maluku and Poso or the showing of videos about the killings taking place there. Those conflicts not only served to give concrete meaning to the concept of jihad, a key element of JI’s ideology, but also provided easily accessible places where recruits could gain practical combat experience.
The U.S.-led war on terror now appears to have replaced Maluku and Poso as the main object of JI’s wrath, especially as those conflicts have waned, and the targeting in Bali of Westerners, rather than Indonesian Christians, may be indicative of that shift.
• Abu Bakar Ba’asyir, now under arrest in a police hospital in Jakarta, is the formal head of Jemaah Islamiyah, but a deep rift has emerged between him and the JI leadership in Malaysia, who find him insufficiently radical. Ba’asyir undoubtedly knows far more than he has been willing to divulge about JI operations, but he is unlikely to have been the mastermind of JI attacks.
• A curious link appears in the Medan Christmas Eve bombing between the Acehnese close to JI and Indonesian military intelligence, because both are bitterly opposed to the Acehnese rebel movement, Gerakan Aceh Merdeka or GAM. This link needs to be explored more fully: it does not necessarily mean that military intelligence was working with JI, but it does raise a question about the extent to which it knew or could have found out more about JI than it has acknowledged.
This is a background report, containing more in the nature of conclusions than familiar ICG recommendations. But there are three courses of action which the Indonesian government authorities should, in the light of our findings, certainly now pursue:
• Reopen investigations into earlier bombings, with international assistance if possible, as to an extent is being done, but as a top priority and with a new investigation strategy involving systematic pooling of all information from across the country and review of cases where “confessions” were alleged to have been extracted under torture.
• Strengthen intelligence capacity and coordination, but through a focus on the Indonesian police, rather than on the National Intelligence Agency (Badan Intelijen Nasional) or the army.
• Address corruption more seriously in the police, army, and immigration service, with particular attention to the trade in arms and explosives.
Jakarta/Brussels, 11 December 2002
Indonesia, Philippines boost co-op to paralize terror network

English.news.cn 2011-03-08 14:58:40 Feedback Print RSS

JAKARTA, March 8 (Xinhua) -- The governments of Indonesia and the Philippines on Tuesday pledged to step up cooperation to paralyze terrorist network in the region, presidents of the two countries said here.
The Philippine President Benigno S. Aquino III told a joint press conference with his Indonesian counterpart President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono at the State Palace that isolating the militants and preventing them from migration were some of efforts to weaken their strength.
"So the training that has been done and sharing of intelligence .... will enhance the cooperation of prevention of the migration of these terrorists," said Aquino.
President Yudhoyono stressed that the regional cooperation, such as exchange of intelligence information, must be carried out in an effective way and be boosted.
Besides, there must be no area in the region that become a safe heaven for terrorist, said Yudhoyono. "Should the steps be implemented, I am confident that our efforts to combat terrorism would be more effective," he said after meeting with Aquino.
Both sides also vowed to step up patrol in border to prevent the militants from crossing marine borders which its precise line is still unsettled.
According to the police, Al-Qaida network in Southeast Asia, the Jemaah Islamiyah terrorist network, has made the Philippines as the base of terror training and Indonesia as the base for operation and Malaysia as the base for finance.
Two top terrorist figures in Indonesia whom had been killed by the police Azahari Husain and Noerdin Moh. Top were Malaysian citizen.
Many of terrorists captured in Indonesia had been trained in the southern Philippine training camp.
Indonesia has suffered a series of terrorist attacks since 2000 that have killed over 270 people.
Editor: Xiong Tong

Key Facts TOP
 Group name: Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), or Islamic Community.
 Level of threat: JI remains a threat but more and more splits have appeared as it struggles to cope with arrests of senior figures and widespread infiltration by Indonesian security forces. The JI 'mainstream' continues to focus on consolidation and rebuilding; a small group of more militant younger members appears to be under government surveillance. The head of a JI splinter faction, Noordin Mohammad Top, suspected by Indonesian security forces of responsibility for the 17 July 2009 Jakarta hotel bombings, was killed by police during a raid in September. To the extent that any mainstream JI members are committed to ongoing jihad in Indonesia, they are more focused on local targets - 'apostate' officials and non-Muslims in conflict areas. There is a general consensus in the group that attacks on foreigners have been counter-productive. JI remains committed to providing military training for members and amassing weapons for a future jihad but finds itself hard-pressed to do either. A new organisation formed by former JI leader Abu Bakar Baasyir in September 2008, Jama'ah Ansharut Tauhid, may eat into JI's membership.
 Status: Active. The Indonesian government has not banned JI although a judicial ruling in April 2008 as part of the guilty verdict in the trials of senior JI figures Ainul Bahri alias Abu Dujana and Zuhroni alias Nuaim alias Zarkasih declared the organisation to be a "forbidden corporate entity". The main impact of the ruling will be to encourage prosecutors to seek harsher sentences for senior JI members who have not been directly involved in violence.
 Date of founding: JI emerged on 1 January 1993 as a breakaway faction of the Darul lslam movement; all of its top leaders were originally Darul Islam members. The group first came to international prominence in 2002 with the Bali bombings, but its existence had become known following information about a plan to mount an attack in Singapore that was found in Afghanistan after the American offensive against the Taliban in late 2001.
 Group type: Militant Islamist.
 Aims and objectives: The aim of mainstream JI is the creation of an Islamic state in Indonesia as the first step toward the restoration of a caliphate. The aim of the Noordin-led splinter group was "to make Western nations tremble"; Noordin followed the Al-Qaeda strategy of urging attacks on the US and its allies whenever and wherever they can be hit, but it is unclear whether these objectives will change following Noordin's death in September 2009. Mainstream JI shuns the notion of such attacks on Indonesian soil.
 Leaders: No hard information has emerged about the successor to acting amir (commander) Zuhroni alias Nuaim after his arrest on 9 June 2007. One possible candidate, Abdurrahim (also written as Abdul Rohim) alias Abu Husna, the brother of Abdullah Anshori alias Abu Fatih from Pacitan, East Java, was himself arrested in Malaysia in January 2008, together with Agus Purwantoro who allegedly ran JI's operations in Sulawesi. Both were later extradited to Indonesia where on 9 February 2009 they were convicted by the Central Jakarta district court of aiding senior JI members. Two other possibilities are Para Wijayanto, an alleged member of the central command from Kudus, Central Java, who reportedly took part in all of the leadership meetings attended by Abu Dujana and Zuhroni in early 2007, and Hadi Surya, an alleged longtime member of the Central Java wakalah (territorial sub-division). Two former amirs of the group, Abu Bakar Baasyir alias Abu Somad and Thoriquddin alias Abu Rusdan, continue to be influential, particularly the latter.
Threat Assessment TOP
Most countries acknowledge that the threat from JI has declined, as reflected in the US decision in late May 2008 to lift a travel warning on Indonesia. Singapore remains deeply concerned about the threat posed by the group, particularly after the escape from custody of Mas Selamat Kastari, the suspected former head of JI's Singapore wakalah, in February 2008. He was recaptured in Malaysia in April 2009. No country in the region believes that JI poses any threat to domestic political stability. In Indonesia, which has suffered most from JI attacks, law enforcement and intelligence agencies tend to treat JI as a more serious problem than do civilian politicians. The fact that there had been no major bombings since 2005 had convinced many Indonesians that the threat posed by JI is over. This perception changed following the bombing of the JW Marriott and Ritz-Carlton hotels on 17 July 2009, which killed nine people, including the suicide bombers, and injured 55 others.
A handful of Indonesian and Malaysian JI members in the Philippines, working together with compatriots from Mujahidin KOMPAK and Darul Islam, have provided important strategic and technical assistance to the radical Islamist Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG). An important suspected leader of those militants was arrested in the Philippine province of Davao Oriental in February 2008. The JI wakalah in Poso, Central Sulawesi, which had been responsible for attacks on non-Muslims (mostly Christian but some Balinese Hindu), officials and police informers, was crushed, at least temporarily, by police operations in January 2007 and remains moribund in 2008.
Some 35 JI schools, mostly in Java but also in Sumatra and Lombok, continue to produce a new generation of members, particularly through a teacher training programme. The membership, particularly in East and Central Java, was an important recruiting pool for Noordin, and could be a source for the emergence of other splinters in the future, but, as noted, there is little interest among the leaders of JI mainstream in attacking Western targets on Indonesian soil, both because Indonesians themselves are not under attack and because such operations squander resources that could be better spent on building a mass base - a goal that may require 25 to 30 years, according to a document found in July 2003.
JI has experienced and skilled fighters, bomb-makers and planners. The generation of leaders who trained in Afghanistan (mostly before JI was officially founded) in the period 1985-94 is gradually ceding place to those with combat experience at the height of the Ambon and Poso conflicts in 1999-2001 or to Mindanao-trained leaders.
Noordin's splinter faction relied heavily on Azhari Husin for bomb-making expertise, acquired in a special two-week explosives course in Afghanistan in 2000. With his death in November 2005 and the deaths in April 2006 of two other key members of Noordin's inner circle who were responsible for recruiting and logistics, Noordin's capacity to undertake operations was temporarily weakened. Nevertheless, his faction proved its capacity to undertake sophisticated attacks when it carried out the suicide bomb attacks in Jakarta in July 2009, which together with being detonated almost simultaneously, reportedly involved the explosive devices being assembled within the JW Marriott Hotel itself. However the splinter faction suffered a major setback in September when Noordin himself was killed by police during a raid in Central Java. It is unclear whether the splinter faction possesses an individual, or persons, capable of replacing Noordin and maintaining the faction's operational tempo. In a further blow to the group, a potential successor to Noordin, Syaifudin Zuhri bin Jaelani, was killed by police along with his brother, Mohammed Syahrir, in October.
Other influential JI leaders also remain at large. If Umar Patek, reportedly in hiding in Mindanao, was to return to Indonesia he might be able to galvanise a quiescent organisation with new leadership, derived from direct combat experience and proven jihadist credentials. However, another senior JI leader, also capable of carrying out such a resurgence, Dulmatin, was killed by security forces in the capital Jakarta on 9 March 2010, significantly reducing this threat. Dulmatin was accused by the Indonesian government of planning the 2002 Bali bombings, and the US government had placed a USD10 million reward on his head as part of its Rewards for Justice programme.
On the same day as Dulmatin's death, two other suspected JI militants were killed during a separate operation in Jakarta. Security officials alleged that the suspects had links to an organisation identifying itself as Al-Qaeda in Indonesia, against whom security officials had launched a series of operations in Aceh province in the preceding week. While no further evidence of links between the group was provided by the authorities - or even confirmation that such a group exists in any meaningful form - such links could be indicative of an attempted resurgence by JI.
Major attacks TOP
JI members were responsible for an attack on churches in Medan, North Sumatra (May 2000); the Christmas Eve attacks on Indonesian churches in 11 different cities across the country (December 2000); the Bali bombings of October 2002 (202 dead) and October 2005 (23 dead, including the bombers); the JW Marriott Hotel bombing in Jakarta in August 2003 (12 dead); and the Australian embassy bombing in September 2004 (10 dead). It is important to stress however, that the latter three attacks did not have the endorsement of the JI leadership and JI as an institution was not involved.
A JI cell in Poso was responsible for the bombing of a marketplace in the Christian town of Tentena in May 2005 that killed 22 people and for the beheadings of three Christian schoolgirls on 29 October 2005, as well as several other acts of violence in the Poso area, some of which involved targeted assassinations.

The scene outside the Australian embassy on 10 September 2004 following the bombing. (EMPICS)
0584445

Noordin's faction was responsible for an attack targeting foreigners in Bali on 1 October 2005. He claimed responsibility not in the name of JI but in the name of Al-Qaeda for the Malay Archipelago (Tanzim al-Qaedat al-Jihad untuk Gugusan Kepulauan Melayu). It was very much an operation of his faction, not one of JI as an organisation per se.
In the attack, suicide bombers targeted two restaurants on Jimbaran beach and one on nearby Kuta beach. The attack had been meticulously planned as a document later found on Azhari's computer, called 'The Bali Project' (Proyek Bali), illustrates, but to the bombers' chagrin, more Indonesians than foreigners were killed. The document stressed that the location was chosen because Bali and Jakarta were the only two places in Indonesia where international publicity could be assured. One of the bombers had attended a JI-linked school; two others had been newly recruited. The leader of one Semarang (Central Java)-based cell involved in the operation told police that he had moved from JI to Noordin's faction in early 2005 because JI was not sufficiently active in pursuing jihad - reinforcing the notion that Noordin's group is distinct from the mainstream.
In September 2006, four people were tried and convicted of terrorism for assisting in the planning of the Bali bombings in October 2005. In April 2008, another man was arrested and accused by the authorities of working with Noordin Top. He is currently awaiting trial. In late June and early July 2008, ten men were arrested in Palembang, South Sumatra, in connection with a series of crimes including the murder of a Christian teacher, the attempted murder of a Muslim convert to Christianity, and the preparation of bombs intended for a cafe in West Sumatra frequented by foreigners. The men included two senior JI members, one of them a Singaporean who had trained in Afghanistan, but they had reportedly formed a separate group with its own amir.

The Raja steakhouse, one of three sites bombed on 1 October 2005 causing at least 23 deaths, including those of the bombers, in attacks purportedly carried out by JI. (EMPICS)
0581554

Noordin's anti-Western ideology was again reinforced when his faction carried out an attack on the JW Marriott and Ritz-Carlton hotels in Jakarta on 17 July 2009. Three of the people killed were from Australia and another was from New Zealand, while those wounded included people from Canada, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, South Korea, the United States and the United Kingdom.
Tactics and methodology TOP
Attacks attributed to JI have mostly involved explosives, but JI members have also used firearms and machetes, particularly in Poso and Ambon; an early JI operation in Medan in 2000 involved the shooting of an Indonesian priest. Outside Poso and Ambon, JI has tended to reserve guns for the commission of armed robberies.
The Christmas Eve 2000 attacks targeted scores of churches across Indonesia using bombs triggered by mobile phones or left with simple timers. More than 20 people were killed, although many bombs reportedly failed to detonate. The operation was planned by Hambali, then head of Mantiqi I, the regional division of JI covering Malaysia and Singapore, and like all subsequent bombings, relied heavily on people associated with that division, particularly those who had spent time at a JI pesantren (Islamic boarding school) called Lukmanul Hakiem. The key figures in the first Bali bombings - Imam Samudra, Ali Ghufron alias Mukhlas, and Dulmatin - were associated with the school, as was Noordin Mohammed Top.
The subsequent attacks in Bali (2002) and Jakarta (2003/2004) relied on suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (SVBIED). The Bali bombs were large well-constructed devices clearly intended to cause mass casualties, a goal which they achieved. Neither of the subsequent bombs at the JW Marriott Hotel (2003) and Australian Embassy fulfilled their potential for mass casualties because of misjudgements over the detonation point, inability to penetrate security and the inexperience of the drivers.
With the exception of one of the two suicide bombers in the first Bali attacks, the bombers have all left written statements attesting to their determination to die as martyrs for Islam. The 'backpack' bombers in the October 2005 Bali bombings left video statements. There is no information as yet to whether either of the two suicide bombers involved in the July 2009 Jakarta hotel bombings left statements.

The wreckage of the Sari night club and surrounding buildings following the 2002 Bali attack. (EMPICS)
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Personnel and recruitment TOP
Membership of the mainstream JI in Indonesia is estimated to be over 900, while Noordin's followers are probably no more than a few dozen. The number of foreign jihadists, mostly Indonesian, in the Philippines may be more than the 20 to 25 previously estimated. Information from suspects detained in 2008 suggests the number may be as high as 50, of whom perhaps half are JI (the others are from Mujahidin KOMPAK and factions of Darul Islam). A document dating from 1999 prepared by the Central Java wakalah, a subdivision of JI's Mantiqi II (the regional division covering most of Indonesia, including Java, Sumatra, Bali and Lombok), stated that membership in that Mantiqi had reached 2,000, mostly in Java and Lampung, Sumatra. With the disruptions and defections caused by arrests since the first Bali bombings, those numbers have certainly been reduced.
Recruitment takes place through religious discussion groups based in mosques and in high schools and university campuses, both secular and Islamic. The process starts with a tabligh akbar (public forum for religious discussion) led by a JI teacher. Individuals who stand out in the tabligh will be invited to take part in more specialised courses, called taklim. Those who stand out in these courses are invited to further specialised courses, with fewer students; the classes are called tamrin, and are focused on principles of Islam, morals, and worship. Graduates of these classes are invited to go on to the fourth stage, tamhish, which concludes with induction into the organisation. When the JI structure was functioning, each wakalah would set recruitment goals for how many people it hoped to admit.
A small number of Islamic boarding schools - around 35 - are directly affiliated with JI and recruit students through a teacher training programme, but students are not invited to join the group until after graduation.
Formal induction as a member of JI, whether through the religious discussion groups or the JI schools, involves swearing an oath to a JI leader.
Area of operation TOP
At the height of its strength in early 2002, JI had four major mantiqi (regional divisions, called mantiqoh in Arabic):
 Mantiqi I: peninsular Malaysia and Singapore.
 Mantiqi II: most of Indonesia, including Java, Sumatra, Bali and Lombok.
 Mantiqi III: Sulawesi, East Kalimantan, Sabah and Mindanao.
 The "other" Mantiqi, sometimes known as Mantiqi IV: Australia.
JI has been reduced to Mantiqi II, with the Sulawesi cells brought under the control of the Java-based leadership. The administrative structures covering Malaysia, Singapore, the Philippines and Australia have effectively been demolished, though there is almost certainly a residual JI membership in Malaysia, especially Sabah, and JI members continue to be active in the Philippines. A US military officer confirmed in June 2009 that JI militants were active in the Philippines' Sulu province. Java remains the organisation's stronghold, but there are active JI cells in Sumatra, Central Sulawesi, Lombok and elsewhere.
Southeast Asian network
JI had a network of contacts in mainland Southeast Asia - Cambodia, Thailand, and Myanmar - but has never had any structure or members there.
Cambodia: In December 2004, a Cambodian court sentenced JI leader Hambali (in absentia) - the head of JI's Mantiqi I until 2001 and JI's main contact with Al-Qaeda - and five other Muslims, including Thai, Malaysian and Egyptian nationals, to life in prison for plotting terrorist attacks in the country in 2002-03. The judge stated that Hambali had planned to attack the British embassy in Phnom Penh.
The suspects were thought to have received funds and support from local Islamic schools via Pakistani middlemen. An Islamic school north of Phnom Penh became the focus of authorities' attention; a Cambodian Muslim teacher and 28 foreign teachers were subsequently expelled.
Myanmar: In 1994, two JI members entered Myanmar from Cox's Bazaar, Bangladesh, to explore the possibility of setting up a military training academy to succeed the one in Afghanistan that had to be abandoned as civil war intensified. They decided the Rohingya area was too insecure and settled on the Philippines instead. In 1999, JI invited members of the Myanmar Rohingya Solidarity Organisation (RSO) and the Arakanese Rohingya Nationalist Organisation (ARNO) to take part in a regional Mujahideen Council (Rabitatul Mujahideen: RM); JI's contact with the RSO may have been forged initially in Afghanistan, since its delegate to the Mujahideen Council meeting had trained there. However, there is no indication that anyone from Myanmar has ever taken part in JI operations. The one decision taken by the RM that led directly to violence was a decision to attack the Philippines in the wake of the attack by the Philippine military on the Moro Islamic Liberation Front's (MILF; a national separatist group based in the southern Philippines) Camp Abu Bakar in mid-2000. That decision led to an assassination attempt on the Philippine ambassador in Jakarta in August 2000 through a carefully planned bombing at his residence. Two men were killed but the ambassador survived. The RM dissolved shortly thereafter.
Thailand: To date, no evidence has appeared of JI involvement in the violence in southern Thailand, but JI has a well-developed network of contacts in Thailand and has reportedly offered assistance several times, only to be turned down. Some 16 Thais, mostly from the Patani United Liberation Organisation (PULO) trained with Indonesians, beginning in 1987, in the military academy set up on the Pakistan-Afghan border under the auspices of Afghan mujahideen leader Abdul Rasul Sayyaf. While Mantiqi I was still active, JI members frequently travelled across the border in Kelantan into southern Thailand, for reasons including the purchase of arms. By late 2001, Thailand had become a place of refuge for Mantiqi I members being hunted by Malaysian and Singaporean police.
In December 2001, Hambali travelled to Bangkok with Zulkifli Marzuki, the alleged 'secretary' of JI, and Mohammed Mansour Jabarah alias Sammy, a Canadian of Kuwaiti origin, who has been listed by Canadian police as an Al-Qaeda operative and was sentenced to life imprisonment by a US court on 18 January 2008 for a plot to attack US embassies in Singapore and the Philippines. While in Thailand, Hambali is believed by the authorities to have ordered Ali Ghufron alias Mukhlas to plan attacks on nightclubs, bars and cafes frequented by Westerners in Thailand, as well as in other countries in the region.
Before the first Bali bombs, Hambali allegedly arranged for USD25,000, apparently obtained from Al-Qaeda, to be stored with a group called Jemaah Salafi, based in the southern Thai province of Narathiwat. A younger generation of Thai students known as the Al-Bayan study group established links to the Karachi-based JI cell known as al-Ghuraba in 2000. After he fled to Thailand in 2003, Hambali was reportedly in contact with some of these students. In mid-August 2003, Hambali was arrested in the town of Ayutthaya, 80 km north of Bangkok, in a joint operation between Thai and US authorities.
Operational preparedness TOP
Equipment
JI makes use of a wide range of sophisticated communications technology. More than a dozen JI members arrested since 2005 sold, traded or repaired mobile phones for a living and much communication takes place through coded SMS texts. As police tapping and tracing of mobile phones has become more effective, JI members have learned to never use the same handset for long. Virtually all JI members are computer literate, and those who are not are instructed in internet use as a priority. Internet chat rooms are widely employed to communicate with other members, with prisoners who have access to mobile phones or communicators and therefore to the internet, and with like-minded individuals abroad. Some prisoners, notably Imam Samudra, were able to acquire laptop computers in prison through the services of corrupt guards, and Ali Ghufron alias Mukhlas produced a series of audio cassettes about jihad from his prison cell in Bali.
Training
Before JI split from Darul Islam in 1993, many of the men who would become its top leaders studied in the three-year military academy established under Afghan mujahideen leader Abdul Rasul Sayyaf's Ittihad-e-Islami party in Sadda, on the Pakistan-Afghanistan border. Trainees received instruction in weaponry, infantry and guerrilla tactics, and map reading, as well as religion. Indonesians trained with other Southeast Asians but also had extensive contacts with Egyptians, Bangladeshis and Kashmiris, according to some of the 'Afghan alumni'.
In late 1992, Indonesians associated with JI set up a training camp in Torkham, Afghanistan, where they trained their own members as well as some members of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and other like-minded organisations. The Torkham camp was closed in 1995 but even before then, in late 1994, JI had begun to set up training facilities in the southern Philippines region of Mindanao. In December 1994, Camp Hudaibiyah was established near a point where the provinces of Lanao, Manguindanao and North Cotabato meet. The initial trainees were all MILF recruits, but JI members from Indonesia, Singapore and Malaysia began arriving, and by 1998 a formal military academy along the lines of its Afghan predecessor was established. The academy, offering both two-year and much shorter training, continued until at least 2003, and moved to Camp Jabal Quba after the Joseph Estrada government's "all-out war" against the MILF in 2000.
In 1999, JI, through Hambali, resumed training in Afghanistan, this time in Kandahar at Camp al-Faruq. Unlike the Torkham camp or Camp Hudaibiyah, which were purely JI initiatives, Camp al-Faruq was run directly by Al-Qaeda. The training was mostly short-term, and mainly involved men from Mantiqi I. From April to August 2000, for example, four men were given weaponry training, and Azhari was given an intensive course in explosives. Additional JI recruits, still mostly from Mantiqi I, continued to go to Kandahar through Karachi for training until the US-led attack on Afghanistan in October 2001.
JI also carried out training for mujahideen recruits in Maluku and Poso from 1999 and 2000 respectively, but the insistence of its leaders on lengthy religious indoctrination led to the establishment of shorter training under the auspices of the jihadist group Mujahidin KOMPAK, in order that would-be mujahideen could go into battle more quickly against non-Muslims.
Information from JI members arrested in 2007 revealed that the organisation remains determined to carry out rudimentary military training but funding constraints, security concerns and the absence of any central training camp have permitted only the occasional weekend for small groups of five or six militants to train in nearby hills or on the beach, with the focus on physical fitness.
A small group of JI members continue to be based at Camp Jabal Quba, and in mid-2008 there appeared to be a trickle of people back and forth from Indonesia.
Weaponry
Most operations attributed to JI have involved the use of bombs and improvised explosive devices (IEDs); JI has utilised ammonium nitrate and potassium chlorate for these purposes. The former is readily available in Indonesia and the Philippines for agricultural purposes, and while restrictions have been tightened there is little doubt large quantities can still be easily obtained. Investigations into the 1 October 2005 Bali explosions led authorities to believe that the bombs were based around a charge of TNT, surrounded by ball bearings and other improvised shrapnel to enhance its anti-personnel effect.
JI has access to small-arms and assault weapons, used for both personal protection and armed robberies. A huge cache of weapons was uncovered in Ambon following a Mujahidin KOMPAK-led attack on police in West Ceram, Maluku in May 2005. Another cache of weapons and explosive material was discovered in the home of a JI member in Sukoharjo, Solo, in March 2007, but it was sealed in a concrete bunker and clearly not planned for immediate use. A collection of pipe bombs was uncovered in Palembang after arrests there in early July 2008. Other such caches are likely to exist.

Weapons and explosives discovered in a raid on a JI member's house in Solo on 21 March 2007. (EMPICS)
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Limiting factors TOP
Counter-terrorism environment
The Indonesian government takes the threat of terrorism seriously, and an internal political constituency that had been convinced that the government was arresting jihadists only because of US and Australian pressure has shrunk. Police operations in Poso in January 2007 that killed 14 jihadists (both JI members and supporters) drew remarkably little criticism.
In the aftermath of the 2002 Bali bombing, then president Megawati Sukarnoputri issued two "emergency regulations in lieu of legislation" that were enacted into the country's anti-terrorism laws in early 2003. They enabled the government to detain suspects for a week without charge, instead of the 48 hours stated under the criminal code, and allowed videotapes and electronic communications to be used in court for the first time. Indonesian police would like to have the equivalent of the Singaporean or Malaysian Internal Security Act (ISA) which would allow long-term preventive detention, but a potent political alliance of advocacy groups, Muslim political parties, and the urban intelligentsia has prevented more draconian provisions from being enacted, due to fears of witch-hunts and a return to Indonesia's authoritarian past.
In July 2004, Indonesia's constitutional court ruled that the provisions of the anti-terror laws could not be applied retroactively. The decision was controversial, but even more problematic from a legal perspective was the court's decision that all existing convictions would stand regardless. The ruling meant that new evidence about the alleged role of Abu Bakar Baasyir in JI prior to January 2003 when the laws were passed could not be used.
Arrests: Indonesian police have arrested more than 350 people in connection with terrorist activity since the first Bali bombings, fewer than half of them JI members. The police have been scrupulous about releasing within seven days anyone against whom there is no prima facie evidence. All the others have been tried relatively speedily, in trials that are fully open to the public, and are released when their sentences have been served. In 2006-2007 alone, around 70 men and one woman were released after serving their sentences for terrorism-related crimes. Most suspects have benefited from short remissions in their sentences for good behaviour.

Fathur Rahman al-Ghozi being escorted by Philippines security forces inside the Department of Justice court in Manila in June 2003. He escaped from police headquarters on 14 July and was killed after a police manhunt on 13 October 2003. (EMPICS)
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In 2007, Indonesian police made a series of arrests that further disrupted JI networks. Police operations in Poso, Central Sulawesi in January broke up the JI network there, leading to the flight of several Mindanao-trained Javanese and the arrest of more than 20 local recruits, all of whom have now been tried and sentenced. One of these, Wiwin Kalahe, led police to a series of safe houses in Java that became the target of new operations in March 2007. Seven men arrested in or around the Javanese cities of Solo, Semarang and Surabaya, most of whom were working with Ainul Bahri Abu Dujana (a senior JI military commander), provided a wealth of information that led police to mount a multiple city operation on 9 June 2007. These arrests netted both Abu Dujana and Zarkasih alias Nuaim, alleged by authorities to be the group's "emergency amir", along with a number of other operatives.
In January 2008, Malaysian police arrested two suspected senior members of JI travelling on passports that had allegedly been stolen from Indonesian businessmen in London in 2003 and 2005. Abdurrahim alias Abu Husna and Agus Purwantoro had allegedly received the passports and air tickets to Damascus with the help of a North African in Jakarta, whose real identity and organisational affiliation remains unclear. Both suspects were later extradited to Indonesia where on 9 February 2009 they were convicted by the Central Jakarta district court of aiding senior JI members.
Detachment 88, the counter-terrorism unit of the police, and a separate counter-terrorism task force of the police criminal investigation department, have together been responsible for most of the arrests of JI members since 2003. Both have been the recipient of much international aid, particularly from Australia and the US. Together, the two counter-terrorism units, now integrated into a single command structure, have initiated a 'de-radicalisation' programme involving the provision of economic assistance to families of prisoners and to newly released individuals, based on the theory that if militants who consider police the enemy are willing to accept aid, they may be persuaded to reconsider other long-held tenets. Over 20 Afghan-trained men were working with the police as of early 2008, but most had been opposed to indiscriminate bombing in the first place.
External Assistance TOP
Funding TOP
The group does not appear to have established a steady source of funding, relying on members' infaq (contributions), business activities, charitable contributions and the occasional armed robbery to support day-to-day activities. JI members were initially required to contribute a percentage of their income, between 2.5 and five per cent, with members in Malaysia and Singapore subjected to the higher levy. This system broke down as the Mantiqi structure collapsed outside Indonesia. Funding from a number of JI-linked corporations in Malaysia also stopped as the government there cracked down on JI activities. In Indonesia, petty trade, production of Muslim garments, Islamic publishing, and other commercial activities provide enough to keep the organisation afloat, but both the JI mainstream and Noordin's group appear to be hunting for funds.
Alliances TOP
JI's links to Al-Qaeda were through a group around Hambali and there were qualms as early as 1999 from some in JI's central command about adopting the Al-Qaeda line on targeting the US and its allies. However, JI members and others continue to disseminate Al-Qaeda teachings through Indonesian translations of online magazine Sawt al-Jihad (Voice of Jihad) articles posted on jihadist websites.
JI had very close ties with the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) until the senior MILF leadership began to distance itself from JI as it inched toward a peace agreement with the Philippines government. There is almost certainly ongoing contact between JI members in Mindanao and a few individual MILF commanders, notably Mugasid alias Abu Badrin, allegedly part of the 108th Base Command and reportedly a classmate of Umar Patek's in Afghanistan. Ties between the two groups were underlined in June 2009 when Philippine security forces announced the arrest of a senior MILF militant responsible for the transfer of funds from JI to MILF and for facilitating the travel arrangements of JI militants when they visited MILF camps.
Many of the Indonesians in Mindanao have moved closer to the more radical Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG). A handful of fugitives in Mindanao - Dulmatin (until he was killed in Jakarta in March 2010); his brother-in-law, Hari Kuncoro (an alleged member of Mujahidin KOMPAK - not JI); Umar Patek; Asep alias Darwin; and Zulkifli bin Hir alias Marwan - appear to be working so closely with the ASG that some JI members in Java consider them to be more ASG members than JI.
Within Indonesia, JI has close communication with other jihadist groups such as Mujahidin KOMPAK, and Ring Banten (a West Java-based Darul Islam faction that co-operated with JI on the first Bali bombing and with Noordin on the Australian embassy bombing).
Two suspected JI militants were killed in Jakarta on 9 March 2010. Security officials alleged that the suspects had links to an organisation identifying itself as Al-Qaeda in Indonesia, against whom security officials had launched a series of operations in Aceh province in the preceding week. However, the extent to which this newly identified group exists as a distinct, operational outfit is uncertain.
Sources of weapons TOP
JI's arsenal has been greatly depleted through police operations. The remaining weapons include those stolen in raids, obtained through arms dealers in Indonesia, or brought in from Mindanao. Explosives have mostly been obtained locally.
JI is not an insurgent group and does not need regular supplies of arms, ammunition or military equipment. All of the operations ascribed to the group have utilised materials that can either be obtained on the open market or though connections with other groups or corrupt security officials.
Group Structure and Logistics TOP
Organisation TOP
The basic building block of the organisation remains a five or six-person religious study group, with these groups then incorporated into a territorial command structure.
Structural view of JI
From 1996 to 2004, the structure of JI was set out in a document entitled Pedoman Umum Perjuangan Al-Jama'ah Al-Islamiyah, more commonly known by its acronym: PUPJI. At the top of the structure was an amir, advised by four councils: a consultative council, a religious council, a disciplinary council, and a fatwa council which was to issue opinions on matters of Islamic law (but which was in fact rarely consulted). The consultative council contained a central command that oversaw activities of the mantiqis (regional divisions). The mantiqis themselves were further divided into wakalahs (battalions), khatibah (companies), qirdas (platoons) and fiahs (squads or cells).
In 2004, after the arrest of then acting amir Sunarto Karodiharjo alias Adung (later sentenced to seven years' imprisonment), Zuhroni alias Nuaim took the initiative to form a search committee for a new amir, called Lajnah Ihtiar Linasbil Amir (LILA). Zuhroni became head of the LILA and simultaneously acting amir. The committee appears either to have replaced the markaziyah (central command), or to be a subset of it. It was divided into four functional units: dakwah (religious outreach), education, logistics and military affairs, which were reportedly headed respectively by Abdul Halim, Abdul Rohim alias Abu Husna (currently imprisoned in Jakarta), Para Wijayanto and Abu Dujana. The basic concept of a territorially-based military structure with wakalahs and various subdivisions, however, remained in place. In 2005, at a meeting in Sukoharjo, Solo, Abu Dujana formed a special forces unit called sariyah which was subdivided into four branches called ishoba, based in Solo, Semarang, Surabaya and Jakarta. The head of the Solo ishoba was initially Abdul Hakim alias Riansyah, who was sent to Poso later that year and killed in police operations in January 2007. The ishoba heads for Semarang and Surabaya, Sarwo Edi Nugroho and Maulana Yusuf Wibisono alias Kholis, were arrested in March 2007 and were each sentenced to 10 years' imprisonment in February 2008.
While JI previously had a special operations unit called Laskar Khos, responsible among other things for military training, bombing operations from May 2000 onwards were carried out entirely outside the JI structure. Wakalah members were recruited without the approval or even in some cases knowledge of the wakalah head; not even all members of the central command knew when or how specific operations were planned.
Hambali led these operations beginning in May 2000, and he was able to do so in part because he had access to independent funding through Al-Qaeda, and in part because the suspected amir of JI at that time, Abu Bakar Baasyir, allegedly never tried to stop him, much to the chagrin and sometimes anger of other JI leaders.
Noordin Mohammed Top continued that practice. While he sought the approval of Abu Dujana for the Marriott attack, there is no indication that he worked through the JI structure for subsequent operations. Instead, he saw himself as having to act on his own by force of circumstance, and argued for the creation of firqatul maut ('dare-to-die' brigades) that would function as urban hit squads. There is no evidence that he has had any success in the creation of such units.
Political/Religious representation TOP
The JI organisation was founded around the principles of Salafist jihadism, effectively a puritanical Islam with a global jihadist overlay. Salafist jihadism puts the concept of jihad, understood in the sense of physical combat, on par with prayer, fasting, and other "pillars of Islam" as an individual obligation. JI sees itself as a religious organisation, committed to the implementation of Islamic law; it is considered that jihad against Islam's enemies is critical to carving out territory in which that law can be applied.
Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia and Jama'ah Ansharut Tauhid
The Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI), founded in August 2000, was led by the alleged 'spiritual' head of JI, Abu Bakar Baasyir, and allegedly included several JI members. However, rifts over his leadership style led to Baasyir's resignation in mid-2008 and the formation of a new organisation, Jama'ah Ansharut Tauhid (JAT) with Baasyir as amir. MMI chapters in Jakarta, East Java, West Java, Kalimantan and Sumbawa went over to the new organisation as, allegedly, did many JI members from the Central and East Java wakalahs. The new organisation was formally established with a ceremony in Bekasi, outside Jakarta, on 17 September 2008. The new organisation, like MMI, plans to work for the implementation of Islamic law through open, non-violent and above-ground means.
The creation of JAT leaves MMI as a much smaller and less influential organisation. Former JI member Fihiruddin Moqthie bin Abdurrahman alias Mohammed Iqbal alias Abu Jibril is its dominant figure, although formally he serves as deputy to a lesser known Islamic scholar, Muhammed Thalib. The MMI's third congress went ahead as scheduled in July 2008 but turnout was much lower than in previous congresses.
Information campaigns TOP
JI members are actively engaged in the publishing industry and in the production of DVDs about the persecution of Muslims around the world. They also are active in downloading material in Arabic from jihadist websites and getting it to the few JI members fluent enough in modern Arabic to translate it for commercial publication. Much of this translation is done by prisoners serving sentences on terrorism charges. Noordin's group has established several websites, the best known of which was www.anshar.net, now closed.
Background Information TOP
Leader biographies TOP
Noordin Mohammed Top
Noordin Mohammed Top, the most wanted terrorist in Southeast Asia, was born in Skudai, Johor, Malaysia on 11 August 1968. It was while he was enrolled at Universiti Teknologi Malaysia (UTM) that he began attending religious lectures at the Lukmanul Hakiem boarding school set up by the radical Indonesian preacher, Abdullah Sungkar in Ulu Tiram, Johor, in 1992. The following year, Sungkar formally established Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) and the school became the nerve centre of the organisation.
In 1998, Noordin was formally inducted into JI,undertaking a two-week course at the JI training camp in Mindanao the same year. Up to that point, this was his only international foray as, unlike many JI leaders, he never travelled to Pakistan or Afghanistan. Some time after his return he agreed to become director of Lukmanul Hakiem, not because he was particularly steeped in religious knowledge, but because the school needed a Malaysian national to register with the authorities so it could remain open. At the time, most of the JI leaders later to become notorious terrorists were either studying or teaching there.
In late 2001, the Malaysian government began a crackdown on JI, so Noordin left for Riau, Sumatra in February 2002 where he met up with his wife and brother-in-law, Muhmammad Rais. A few months later, he and Rais moved to Bukittinggi, West Sumatra with their families and opened a shop repairing shock absorbers. Azhari Husin joined them there in November 2002.
Despite his brief stint in Mindanao, Noordin had not been involved in bombing operations up until this point, although Azhari had taken part in one of the so-called Christmas Eve bombings across Indonesia in December 2000. However, another Lukmanul Hakiem student based in Sumatra had some explosives left over from the bombings and went to Noordin for advice on how to dispose of them. Consequently, Noordin allegedly masterminded the idea to bomb the Marriott Hotel in Jakarta: an operation that took nine months to plan. Noordin seems to have been the strategist and ideologue and Azhari the planner and technician, on account of the latter's much more advanced bomb-making skills. The two men worked as a team - they spent considerable time on the run together in 2005, and seem to have still been loosely working within the JI command structure at this stage.
The Marriott bombing on 5 August 2003 was followed 13 months later by the attack on the Australian embassy on 9 September 2004. In the intervening year, Noordin moved across Java with Azhari, finding refuge with JI members, especially in East and Central Java.
Short of funds after the embassy bombing, he tried to forge alliances with other local jihadist organisations that had better access to training and resources, but without success. He approached Abdullah Sunata from Mujahidin KOMPAK, which ran training operations in Mindanao that were separate from JI, and a faction of Darul Islam led by a man named Akram, but both turned him down because they disagreed with his tactics. He appears to have stayed in contact with some of the imprisoned Bali bombers, including Mukhlas. It was at this time that his Al-Qaeda sympathies began to grow and he started referring to his group as Al-Qaeda for the Malay archipelago.
Noordin showed a talent for escape. He narrowly avoided arrest around six times and was the target of what may be the biggest manhunt in Indonesian history. In November 2005, Azhari was killed by Indonesian police outside Malang, East Java. Following his death, a video threat was aired on Indonesian television, depicting a masked man - believed by the authorities to be Noordin - threatening the West: "As long as you keep your troops in Iraq and Afghanistan and intimidate Muslim people, you will feel our intimidation and our terror... America, Australia, England and Italy. You will be the target of our next attack. Especially for Australia, as long as its troops are in Afghanistan and Iraq".
In April 2006, several other members of Noordin's inner circle were either killed or arrested in a raid, which the authorities believe Noordin escaped, in Wonosobo, Central Java. Noordin himself was reportedly working out of central Java for much of 2007. Testimony from Abu Husna in 2008 suggested that the same individual who helped him get false passports may have helped Noordin flee Indonesia, but there was no hard evidence to that effect.
In July 2009, following the Jakarta hotel bombings, police named Noordin as the mastermind of the attacks. Efforts to locate him were intensified and led to several arrests and raids on suspected safe houses. On 7-8 August, the media erroneously reported that Noordin had been killed during a clash in Temanggung, Central Java, but this was later disproved.
On 17 September Noordin was killed, along with three other members of his splinter faction, in a police raid in Central Java. DNA tests confirmed Noordin's death.
Noordin has been designated by the US Department of Treasury and the UN Security Council as a terrorist financier.

File images of Noordin Top from Indonesian police handouts in 2003 (left) and 2006. (EMPICS)
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Zuhroni alias Nuaim alias Zarkasih
Zuhroni was born in Pekalongan, Central Java on 29 December 1962. He joined Darul Islam in the 1980s, possibly while he was attending Muhammadiyah University in Jakarta. In 1987, before he graduated, he left for the Pakistan-Afghanistan border for three years to attend what became the JI military academy there, and became an instructor in map-reading and navigation. At one point during his stay, he was one of several Indonesians assigned to teach a group of 100 Kashmiris for a month in an Egyptian camp inside the Afghan border. When he returned to Indonesia, he became the head of military affairs for the Jakarta wakalah, and then later became head of the wakalah. From mid-2000 until early 2001, he served as head of Camp Hudaibiyah, the JI military training camp in Mindanao, and in April 2001 he replaced Abdullah Anshori alias Abu Fatih as head of Mantiqi II. He became the "emergency head" of the group in 2004. On 9 June 2007, Zuhroni was arrested in Yogyakarta, Central Java, six hours after the arrest of Abu Dujana. His trial began in late November 2007 and in April 2008 he was sentenced to 15 years in prison.

Zuhroni alias Nuaim alias Zarkasih escorted by police officers upon arrival at a police camp in Jakarta, Indonesia, on 14 July 2007. (EMPICS)
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Thoriqudin
Thoriqudin alias Hamzah alias Abu Rusdan was born in Kudus, Central Java in 1960 and has a diploma in mass communications from a secular university in Solo. He served as the leader of operational affairs for Mantiqi II and was a member of JI's central command. Thoriqudin took over the duties of amir in mid-2002 from Abu Bakar Baasyir, without formally adopting the title (he was known as 'caretaker amir').
Thoriqudin was inducted into Darul Islam at the age of 15; his father was a Darul Islam member. He trained on the Afghanistan border in 1986, in the same batch of recruits as Ali Ghufron alias Mukhlas. He was arrested by Indonesian authorities in April 2003, imprisoned for three and a half years in February 2004 for harbouring two suspects of the 2002 Bali bombings, and released in late 2005. He is known to be opposed to the Noordin group, but since 2006 has allegedly been actively engaged in an effort to revive the JI organisation, focusing on education and dakwah (religious outreach). He frequently lectures on the need to apply Islamic law in public meetings organised by mosque-based groups.

Image of Thoriqudin alias Abu Rusdan taken on 16 March 2007 in Kudus, Indonesia. (EMPICS)
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Abu Bakar Baasyir
Abu Bakar Baasyir alias Abu Somad was born in 1938 in Jombang, East Java, and is of Yemeni descent. As a youth he was a leader of a student group, the Indonesian Muslim Youth Movement (Gerakan Pemuda Islam Indonesia: GPII), that had close ties to the Muslim political party Masjumi, which was banned in 1960. In 1963, after two years at a famous pesantren (religious boarding school) called Gontor, Baasyir moved to Solo where he met Abdullah Sungkar, later to become the founder of JI. Sungkar was a dissident from the outset, committed to Islamic law and deeply opposed to the Indonesian government, particularly after Suharto came to power. Baasyir and Sungkar joined forces in 1972 to establish a school called Pesantren al-Mukmin in Ngruki, Solo and together joined the Darul Islam rebellion in 1976. They were arrested in 1978 on subversion charges, tried in 1982, released in 1983, and were about to be re-arrested in 1985 when they fled to Malaysia. It was here that they set up an exile community which later became the nucleus of JI.
Baasyir allegedly became the amir of JI following Sungkar's death in 1999. He returned to his school in Ngruki, and was arrested in October 2002 after the Bali bombings on charges that as amir of JI, he had endorsed the bombings. He was also charged with immigration violations for having left and re-entered Indonesia illegally.
In September 2003, an Indonesian court jailed Baasyir for four years on charges of rebellion and violation of immigration laws. However, a high court decision of December 2003 cleared him of the first charge and reduced his sentence to three years on immigration charges. On appeal, the sentence was further reduced to 18 months.
He was re-arrested on 30 April 2004, the day of his release from his first sentence. However, the government's effort to build a case against him over his alleged involvement in the Bali bombing was frustrated by the 2004 constitutional court ruling on non-retroactivity of the anti-terrorism laws. He was eventually sentenced to 30 months' imprisonment on 3 March 2005 for violating a provision of the criminal code relating to conspiracy to commit the Bali bombings. He was released on 14 June 2006.

Abu Bakar Baasyir in the South Jakarta District Court in March 2005. (EMPICS)
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Hambali
Hambali alias Encep Nurjaman or Riduan Isamuddin, born in 1964, is a permanent Malaysian resident of Indonesian nationality, and was head of Mantiqi I from 1996 to 2001. After travelling to Malaysia as a migrant worker in the 1980s, he joined the exile community that evolved around Abu Bakar Baasyir and Abdullah Sungkar and went to the Pakistan-Afghanistan border for training from 1987 to 1989. He helped establish Mantiqi I at the JI school called Lukmanul Hakiem in Johor, Malaysia.
Hambali allegedly had close ties to Al-Qaeda, and particularly to Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, and arranged for the training of JI members in Kandahar in 1999-2001. He reportedly hosted two of the nine 11 September 2001 hijackers in Kuala Lumpur in January 2000. Later in 2000, he also allegedly hosted Zacharias Moussaoui, the so-called 20th hijacker, who wanted to take flying lessons at the Malaysian Flying School in Malacca.
Hambali was arrested on 15 August 2003 in Ayutthaya, Thailand and was swiftly handed over to US authorities. He was subsequently detained for more than a year in Jordan, then moved in 2006 to the US detention facility at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. In a closed pre-trial hearing there in April 2007, Hambali denied any links to Al-Qaeda. Indonesian police have not been allowed to interview him despite numerous requests to do so.

A file photograph showing Riduan Isamuddin alias Hambali. (EMPICS)
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Ainul Bahri, alias Abu Dujana
Ainul Bahri was born in Cianjur, West Java, on 20 August 1969. After graduating from high school in 1989, he left for Malaysia and from there went to Pakistan - specifically the Afghan border region, where he attended what would become the JI military academy on the premises of a camp run by Afghan mujahideen leader Abdul Rasul Sayyaf's Ittihadi-i-Islami group.
Since virtually all of the Indonesians in his training group would have been members of Darul Islam, JI's parent organisation, the Indonesian police have suggested that Abu Dujana was also a member. He reportedly met Osama bin Laden while training, but such an occurrence would not be unusual for Southeast Asians in Sayyaf's camp. In late 1992, the military academy closed, and some of the senior Indonesians set up their own camp in Torkham, Afghanistan.
Abu Dujana allegedly became one of the camp's instructors together with Nasir Abbas; Nuaim, who became the commander of one of JI's three Mantiqi and was the emergency amir of JI between 2004 and his arrest in June 2007; Umar Patek, who is one of the most wanted men in the region and believed by the authorities to be in the Philippines with the ASG militant group; and Fathur Rahman al-Ghozi, the Indonesian who escaped from Camp Crame in the Philippines in 2003 only to be tracked down and shot later that year.
In 1993, Abu Dujana worked briefly at the JI office in the Pakistani town of Peshawar, and then returned as head of the Torkham camp later that year, according to a report in the Indonesian newspaper Kompas. Abu Dujana was the last man out of the Torkham camp in 1995 when it was closed due to intensifying Taliban raids against rival mujahideen groups. He was also responsible for destroying documents and equipment so they would not fall into Taliban hands, according to Nasir Abbas.
After overseeing the camp's closure, Abu Dujana returned to Indonesia for a year, living in Cisadang, West Java. He went back to Malaysia where he became a teacher at the Lukmanul Hakiem school in Kelanten, Malaysia, a sister school to the JI school in Johor.
In 1999, Abu Dujana left again to become an instructor at the JI academy in Mindanao, in the southern Philippines for a period of one year. When he came back in 2000, he became the secretary of the markaziyah (the central command of the JI organisation), a senior post, and one he held until at least mid-2003.
According to the authorities, he met other senior JI members just prior to the October 2002 Bali bombings and it is possible that he was apprised of the plan. Abu Dujana also allegedly helped the perpetrators flee, ordering one follower to hide Mukhlas. He met bombing suspect Noordin Top and his late partner Azhari Husin both before and after the August 2003 Marriott Hotel bombing. Abu Dujana became the head of a JI special forces unit in 2005. He was arrested in June 2007, and went on trial in late November 2007. In April 2008 he was sentenced to 15 years in prison.

Ainul Bahri alias Abu Dujana, centre, is escorted by plain-clothed police officers at a police camp in Yogyakarta, central Java. (EMPICS)
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Abdurrahim bin M Thoyib alias Abu Husna
Abu Husna was born on 9 October 1959 in Pacitan, East Java. He attended Islamic schools there, then in 1977 moved to the teacher training programme at Al-Mukmin pesantren in Ngruki, Solo - the school set up by JI founder Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Baasyir. He also took Arabic language courses at a salafist institute in Jakarta. From 1984-99 he taught at Ngruki.
In 1993 he was reportedly in Malaysia at Abdullah Sungkar's home when a group around Sungkar made the decision to leave the Darul Islam organisation and set up a new organisation. Sungkar allegedly made him co-ordinator of the new group - which was eventually called Jemaah Islamiyah - in Indonesia and he proceeded to gather pledges of loyalty from hundreds of prospective members. In 1994, when Abu Husna's brother, Abu Fatih, was allegedly made head of JI in Indonesia, later to be called Mantiqi II, Abu Husna was reportedly put in charge of education. As the JI structure changed and adapted over the years, he kept the education portfolio. This involved ensuring that graduates of JI schools were sent across the country to disseminate salafist jihadist teachings.
From 1995 onwards he allegedly taught an another JI school in Solo, and also owned a business selling clothes and Islamic books. He has two wives, one in Solo and another who lives in the complex of another JI school.
He was arrested in Malaysia alongside Agus Purwantoro on 31 January 2008. Both were later extradited to Indonesia where on 9 February 2009 they were convicted by the Central Jakarta district court of aiding senior JI members. Husna was sentenced to nine years'