From Jomini to Clausewitz: Tactics and Strategy
HIST 202 SEC 6380
Christopher P. McCuiston
22 September 2013

In times of war there always the unknown and even known factors that are unpredictable. Many seasoned war veterans from generals to seargent majors have contemplated the strategies and theories of how to win a war. Throughout history wars have been fought for a multitude of reasons; religion, politics, economic, land disputes, and to defeat tyrannical leaders who have committed atrocities against mankind. War has been waged for other than the aforementioned reasons, but are usually related to political or economic causes. Historically there are many strategist and tacticians who have put forth theories that have stood the test of time, however two have provided theoretical and philosophical concepts that are still being taught to our most prominent military leaders to date. Major General Carl von Clausewitz and General Antoine-Henri Jomini who both lived and fought during the late 18th century and early 19th century attacked the premise of war from two very different angles, yet they brought forth enough substance in each of their theories to stand the test of educational time. Experience earned from fighting in a military campaign can jog the mind to contemplate the major aspects of strategy and tactics. During the course of the French Revolution there were three theoriest that emerged and wrote of their experience; the Austrian Archduke Charles, General Antoine-Henri Jomini, and Major General Carl von Clausewitz [1]. Jomini and Clausewitz were translated into English and other languages which proved to aid their longevity, but they have also survived because of their strong theories on strategy and tactics. Not only did they live during the same time period, they also fought in the Napoleonic Wars on different sides, and yet even though they had differences shared similarities that forged the basis for their theories. From time in which they lived and fought they both pulled from three main sources: they studied the historical references of Frederick the Great, their experiences in the Napoleonic Wars, and the fact that they read each other’s books [1]. I think that the shared interest in Frederick the Great who was the King of Prussia from 1740 to 1786 encouraged both study and write about the complexities of war. Major General Carl von Clausewitz (1780-1831) wrote the treatise “On War” which is widely taught in military schools around the globe. Clausewitz established premise that war belongs more to realm of philosophy than to the realm of art or science [2]. With this theory he developed his “concept of “critical analysis” or Kritik, which forms the basis for his approach to the study of war” [3]. To separate the idea of war being more in tune with philosophy you have to understand that war is ever evolving and proves to go beyond the proof of fact. In science we have the scientific theory which one poses a hypotheses and then looks to prove it false or to find the “truth” through the use of the scientific method. The Kritik involves three distinct steps; uncover or discover the facts, trace those effects to the causes, and investigate and evaluate the means [3]. I can draw parallels to the scientific theory and scientific method, but Clausewitz uses his own philosophical method to extract tactics and strategy from historical battles and wars in which he has participated. Not only did Clausewitz see war being in a separate realm, he focused on calling the defense stronger than that of the offense. He did state “that the defender must usually go over to the offensive to bring war to a satisfactory conclusion” [3], meaning at some point you must abandon your defensive stance in order to win the war. There is always unpredictability in battle and this is where it plays into the hands of the side that takes the defensive posture. Clausewitz also believed in friction, which was the cause of the unpredictability. He felt that there was a definable difference between war that was studied or plotted on paper as opposed to the war that took place on the battlefield [4]. As the enemy advances on the offensive friction is created and I think that he sees the defensive being able to adapt as the offensive surges forward, suffers losses, and attempts to recover and advance. Of the benefits of defense, Clausewitz noted they had the element of “surprise, the benefit of terrain, and concentric attack” [2]. This also leads into the area of friction allowing the defense to surprise the offensive when suffering losses, know the terrain as they wait for the advancing enemy, and fight for that center of attack. The last aspect that I feel is an important learning tool from Clausewitz that is notably worthy of being utilized in all areas of war is the use of the flank. Using the terrain to conceal troops and attempt to hold an advantage is a usual benefit during a battle. To support his approach of defense being most important Clausewitz states “if we recapitulate what has been said about terrain, the following appears most important for the defender, i.e, for the choice of positions” support of one or both flanks, open view on front and flanks, obstacles to approach the front, masked disposition of troops, and finally intersected country in the rear, to render pursuit more difficult in case of defeat” [5]. This concept has been used throughout history and well before Clausewitz began writing On War. We see it when the Persians took on the Greek Spartans in the battle of Thermopylae, it took Xerxes who had to flank the Spartans in order to achieve victory. General Antoine-Henri Jomini (1779-1869) was member of the Swiss army, the French army, and later served with the Russian army. He wrote several treatise on war, most notably Precis of the Art of War deriving mainly from his experiences in the Napoleonic Wars. Jomini draws some comparisons on strategy and tactics and also the relationship of diplomacy and war [2]. From a variety of experiences he wrote about the use of “resources and military institutions of different states; at the same time he extends the work to include formations, tactics, various kinds of special operations such as crossing rivers, and logistic” [6]. Throughout his military career he served in many campaigns which elevated his ideas and thoughts regarding lines of communication to the rear and supplies. In the same sense he spoke a war being fought on the battlefield to that of operations on a “chess board” and having an army with two lines of supply would be less vulnerable than those with only one [6]. Using the concept of terrain and supply lines you could cut our enemy off and they would essentially run out of supplies which would render them incapable of continuing to fight. Jomini also had the belief that “attacks should be conducted against weak points in enemy formations and fortifications” and “identify the decisive point and strike” [7]. Here we see an offensive approach to taking out the enemy using a concentric striking concept, hit the mass in a weak spot and they will go down. With this idea I also see Jomini and being a strike first and strike hard type of theorist. He was not a supporter of plowing through countries, utilizing their supplies, taking advantage of their people and supplies, and he was against unnecessary killing. He was against Napoleons “chaotic and the demonical” way in which he fought [8]. So much as he was for victory and swarming on your enemy in a surging manner, he was for diplomacy and humility in victory. Last I will look at how Jomini wanted to utilize strategy during the course of battle. As much as Jomini was offensive minded and his strategy played into this idea, he says “strategy, is defined to be the art of directing masses on decisive points, or the hostile movements of armies beyond the range of each other’s cannon” [8]. His ideas here show that he is clearly on the offensive and yet he was concerned about the order of defense by the means of getting your troops out of the way of the range of the enemies artillery. Fighting on the offensive can be beneficial but only if you can sustain the high level of soldiers in order to defeat the enemy. Major General Carl von Clausewitz and General Antoine-Henri Jomini forged similar yet very different paths in defining their ideals and theories on war. Both lived during the same time period and participated in many military campaigns. Of the differences between the two I support the theory of General Jomini in regard to flanking he enemy, cutting off supply lines, and communication with their command. Battlefield decisions can be made during contingency operations and small squirmishes or large battles won in the absence of higher direction. However, if you cut off the enemies supply lines, out flank them so they have nowhere to get ammunition, medical care, or food. You are taking away the enemies ability to fight a prolonged battle.

Bibliography
[1] Bassford, Christopher, Jomini and Clausewitz: Their Interaction, 26 February 1993, accessed 19 September 2013, http://www.clausewitz.com/readings/Bassford/Jomini/JOMINIX.htm

[2] Zeller, P. Slides, UMUC, HIST 202

[3] Eliot A. Cohen and John Gooch, The Anatomy of Failure in War: Military Misfortunes, 2006 Free Press, New York, NY. 44-45

[4] Beyerchen, Alan D., Clausewitz, Nonlinearity and the Unpredictability of War, 1988, accessed 20 September 2013, http://www.clausewitz.com/readings/Beyerchen/CWZandNonlinearity.htm

[5] Carl von Clausewitz, Translated and edited by Hans W. Gatzke, Principles of War, 1942, The Military Service Publishing Company. 27-28

[6] Martin Van Creveld, The Art of War: War and Military Thought, 2000, HarperCollins Publishers, New York, NY. 99-105

[7] Osgood, John COL (RET), Carl von Clausewitz and Antoine-Henri Jomini and Military Strategy, 2000, accessed 20 September 2013, http://www.lexrixa.com/mil/w12.htm

[8] Russell F. Weigley, The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy, 1973, Indiana University Press. 84-85, 210-211