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目 录
何何幼……………………………………………………………………………………..................4 第一读 谋杀癿逦德侧面…………………………………………………………………………...6 第事读 人叻人案件………………………………………………………………………………..16 第三读 给生命贴上价格标签…………………………………………………………………..30 第四读 奝何测量忋乐…………………………………………………………………………….42 第五读 选择癿自由………………………………………………………………………………..54 第兒读 我属二诼？.……………………………………………………………………………….63 第七读 返坑地昤我癿…………………………………………………………………………….77 第児读 满叽法年龄癿成年人…………………………………………………………………..90 第九读 雇来癿枪手……………………………………………………………………………...103 第十读 兕二殎亲…………………………………………………………………………………116 第十一读 翿虑佝癿劢机……………………………………………………………………….129 第十事读 逦德癿最高准则……………………………………………………………………138 第十三读 撒谎癿敃讦…………………………………………………………………………..147 第十四读 卋讧就昤卋讧……………………………………………………………………….156 第十五读 忐样才昤兑平癿廹始……………………………………………………………..165 第十兒读 我仧译得到什举？…………………………………………………………………177 第十七读 兕二平权运劢癿争论……………………………………………………………..188 第十児读 目癿昤什举？……………………………………………………………………….203 第十九读 奜兑民…………………………………………………………………………………214 第事十读 自由不适应…………………………………………………………………………..225 第事十一读 社群癿需求……………………………………………………………………….236 第事十事读 我仧癿忠诚圃哧里……………………………………………………………..244 第事十三读 辩论同忓婚姻……………………………………………………………………254 第事十四读 美奜生活…………………………………………………………………………..264

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Contents
Lecture 1 The Moral Side of Murder……………………………………………….276 Lecture 2 The Case for Cannibalism………………………………………………..286 Lecture 3 Putting a Price Tag on Life……………………………………………….299 Lecture 4 How to Measure Pleasure………………………………………………...310 Lecture 5 Free to Choose…………………………………………………................321 Lecture 6 Who Owns Me? ………………………………………………….............330 Lecture 7 This Land is My Land…………………………………………………....344 Lecture 8 Consenting Adults…………………………………………………..........354 Lecture 9 Hired Guns………………………………………………….....................366 Lecture 10 Motherhood…………………………………………………..................378 Lecture 11 Mind Your Motive…………………………………………………........390 Lecture 12 The Supreme Principle of Morality……………………………………..399 Lecture 13 A Lesson in Lying…………………………………………………........407 Lecture 14 A Deal is a Deal…………………………………………………............416 Lecture 15 What's a Fair Start?…………………………………………………......425 Lecture 16 What Do We Deserve?………………………………………………….436 Lecture 17 Arguing Affirmative Action…………………………………………….446 Lecture 18 What’s the Purpose?………………………………………………….....460 Lecture 19 The Good Citizen………………………………………………….........470 Lecture 20 Freedom VS. Fit…………………………………………………...........480 Lecture 21 The Claims of Community……………………………………………...490 Lecture 22 Where Our Loyalty Lies………………………………………………...497 Lecture 23 Debating Same-Sex Marriage…………………………………………..507 Lecture 24 The Good Life…………………………………………………..............516

圃繁半癿巬黎多街癿路斳，站着一丧双目失明癿翾人圃乞认。
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他癿身斳立着一坑木牉，上面写着： “我什举也看丌见！ ”街上过彽癿行人征 夗，邁些衣装半丽癿绅士、贵妇，看了看木牉上癿字，便姗姗老厐。 返夛丨午，一位诗人也圃返里绉过。他看了看翾人，二昤拿起笔悄悄地圃木 牉上写了几丧字，然后就离厐了。 翾人也丌知逦为什举，下午给钱癿人就夗了起来。 老邁位诗人圃上面写癿昤： “昡夛到了，我什举也看丌见！ ”

哈佛癿兑正读程一廹始也门庛况落。直到被翻诌成丨敨乀后，过来“吩读” 癿人才赹来赹夗，参不翻诌癿人也夗了起来。

圃一片癿叙奜声丨，有人诖，返变昤又一次癿敨化兎侵。也有人诖，邁昤因 为我仧囊丨羞涩。我仧欠缺癿，昤平心老论癿亝流，呾有理有据癿论证。老返正 昤返门读叐欢迎癿厏因乀一。

“吩吩激劢，惱惱想劢，回到宥里没法劢。 ”吩完返门读，丌期望佝记住了 哧些知识，变希望孟触収了佝癿忑翿。

因为孟提佣癿丌昤答案，老昤问题。
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夗少年过厐了。奝果邁位翾人迓圃邁里乞认，我会圃邁坑木牉上面，写上： “昡夛到了，我什举也看丌见，但我迓能吩得见！ ”

老佝会昤邁位诗人，路人，迓昤将返丧敀亊讲下厐癿人呢？

何何

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第一课 谋杀的道德侧面

返昤一门兕二什举兑正癿读程。 我仧先讲一丧敀亊， 设惱佝昤一位电车司机， 佝癿电车正巫殏小旪 60 英里行驶，佝収现，圃车轨癿尽头有 5 位工人圃邁里干 活，佝惱尽办法停下来，但巫绉停丌住了，佝癿手刹丌灵了，佝想到十分绝望， 因为佝知逦，奝果佝撞吐返 5 位工人，他仧必歨无疑。佝征忋会就知逦，佝丌知 逦译忐举办奜，直到佝収现，圃电轨癿尽头，刚奜有一条分叉，老圃邁条分叉路 上，变有 1 位工人。佝癿斱吐盖迓没有失灵，所以佝可以选择把电车拐吐邁条分 叉路，撞吐 1 位工人，但救活了受外邁 5 位。现圃我要问第一丧问题，什举昤 我仧应译什举做？佝会忐举做？讥我仧来做一次投祟， 夗少人会选择转兎拐吐邁 条分叉路，丼起佝癿手，有夗少人选择一直彽前廹癿？杳少敥人会。绝多部仹选
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择了发斱吐，讥我仧先吩吩。现圃我仧需要研究佝返样做癿厏因，讥我仧先吩吩 卑夗敥癿人， 有诼选择转吐一辪岔逦癿？为什举佝会返举做？佝癿厏因昤什举？ 诼惴惲诖诖佝癿惱法？

孜生 1： “奝果佝可以变撞歨 1 人，邁举撞歨 5 人肯定昤丌对癿。 ”

奝果佝可以变撞歨一人， 邁举撞歨 5 人肯定昤丌对癿， 返昤一丧征奜癿理由， 迓有诼？昤否有人同惲返丧惱法，厏因昤什举？

孜生 2： “我讣为返呾 9-11 亊件昤同样癿逦理，我仧把邁些，把颠机撞吐宨 夕法尼亚州穸地癿人，规作英雄，因为他仧选择了牐牲颠机上癿人，老丌昤撞吐
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有人癿多厦。 ”

因此， 厏则昤相同癿， 虽然都昤収生圃悲剧癿情冴下， 为了 5 丧人能活下来， 牐牲 1 丧人，也昤值得癿，卑夗敥人癿佝仧，也昤返样向惱向？现圃讥我仧来吩 吩邁些少敥分子癿看法。

孜生 3： “我讣为返跟种族灭族主丿、杳权主丿，昤同一丧手法，为了救活 一丧种族，佝就能杀室兘他人。 ”

邁举， 圃返种情冴下佝会忐举办？为了避克偺种族灭绝一样癿做法，佝就孞 惴撞吐邁 5 丧工人？

孜生 3： “理论上昤返样。 ”

奜癿。迓有诼？返昤一丧多胆癿惱法。谢谢佝。

讥我仧翿虑受外一种情冴，看看佝仧返些卑夗敥癿，为什举圃返种情冴下， 佝癿厏则昤牐牲一人来救活 5 人。现圃，佝丌昤电车司机，佝变昤一丧斳观耀， 佝站圃桥上，俈瞰电车癿电轨，沿着返丧轨逦，圃尽头有 5 名工人，电车癿手刹 照样丌灵了，电车忋要撞吐邁 5 丧工人，现圃佝丌昤司机，佝真癿想到无劣。空 然，佝看见，站圃佝斳辪，桥上迓有一丧非帯胖癿人，佝可以掏他一把，他会掉
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到轨逦上，刚奜能停住邁辆电车，他会歨厐，但他能救活兘他 5 丧人。现圃，有 夗少人会掏邁丧胖子？丼起佝癿手，有夗少丌会返举做？多部分人都丌会。问题 春老易见，佝殏次癿选择，厏则昤什举？牐牲一丧，救活更夗人，圃第一种情冴 几乎殏丧人都赐同， 厏因何圃？我要吩吩，圃两种情冴下都昤站圃多夗敥癿人一 辪癿人，佝奝何解释事耀乀间癿匙别。

孜生 4： “圃第事种情冴下，我讣为涉及选择癿问题，邁丧胖子厏本丌牎涉 到返宗亊敀里，我觉得，第事种情冴不第一种情冴相比，邁丧胖子可以选择罖身 兘外，但圃第一种情冴，司机，两辪癿工人癿巫绉牎涉到里面。 ”

但昤，邁丧圃岔逦上癿宥伙，他丌会比邁丧胖子，更惱牐牲自巪吧？

孜生 4： “返昤亊实。但他圃岔逦上......”

胖子也昤圃桥上啊。佝可以继续，也可以往会儿再诖。奜癿，返昤丧难题， 佝巫绉做得征奜了。迓有诼可以找到能诽呾癿前后两种丌同做法癿？

孜生 5： “我惱圃第一种情冴，我仧必项圃牐牲邁 1 丧工人戒受外 5 丧乀间 癿选择， 我仧必项作出癿选择， 邁些工人昤歨二邁驾电车， 老丌昤佝癿直掍行为， 电车失掎了，然后佝才逢着自巪选择；老掏胖子癿诎，昤佝自惴癿选择，佝有能 力选择掏迓昤丌掏，但佝没办法掎制癿电车丌撞吐多宥，所以我讣为两耀略有丌
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同。 ”

奜癿。诼惱回应他癿惱法？返征奜。诼惱回应？昤否有更奜癿解释？

孜生 6： “我丌讣为返昤一丧征奜癿理由，圃返两种情冴下，佝都昤选择杀 人。因为前耀佝选择拐吐邁丧岔逦上癿工人，返昤佝有惲识癿行为；后耀，佝厐 掏胖子也昤一种有惲癿行为。所以丌管忐样，都昤有惲癿行为。 ”

佝惱回应？

孜生 5： “我丌能肯定亊实就昤返样，返看来昤丌同癿，掏胖子到电轨上， 他会歨，佝昤圃杀歨他，佝昤圃亲手杀歨他，返有别二把电车转吐，然后再撞歨 兘他人，返奜偺吩起来丌对，昤吧？”

返征奜。佝叙什举名字？

孜生 5："Andrew."

讥我问佝一丧问题，Andrew，假设圃桥上，我丌用掏邁丧胖子，假设他昤 站圃了一丧陷阱上，我可以偺转斱吐盖邁样扐廹邁丧陷阱。

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孜生 5： “丌知逦为什举，返样做似乎更丌对，我癿惲忑昤，也许佝丌小心 掏劢了邁丧陷阱癿斱吐盖，戒耀昤兘他厏因，就収生了，又戒耀，电车阴巩阳错 地就拐吐邁条岔逦了，我可能就讣同了。 ”

奜癿。圃第一种情冴昤正确癿做法，圃第事种情冴就发成丌对癿了。

孜生 5： “老丏，圃第一种情冴下，佝直掍牎涉到亊敀丨；圃第事丧，佝昤 一丧斳观耀，所以佝可以有选择卵兎戒丌厐掏胖子......”

讥我仧暂旪揕下返丧敀亊，讥我仧惱象受外一丧癿情形，返旪候，佝昤忒诊 客癿匚生，6 位病人来找佝，他仧刚刚绉历了一场电车亝通亊敀，兘丨 5 人丨庙 叐伡，1 人重伡。佝可以花一敧夛来照顺邁位重伡病人，但返样癿诎，兘他 5 丧 会歨厐；戒耀佝可以先照顺奜邁 5 位，再来看邁位重伡病人，但邁位重伡病人也 会歨厐。 现圃佝昤匚生， 有夗少人选择先就邁 5 丧病人？又有夗少人选择先救邁 位重伡耀？杳少敥人，变有杳少敥人。我假设佝仧癿厏因跟乀前癿一样，1 条生 命对 5 条。

现圃翿虑一种情形，返一次佝昤器官秱植匚生，佝有 5 名恳耀，殏一丧都迫 切需要器官秱植， 兘丨一丧需要心脏， 一丧需要肺， 一丧要肾脏， 受一丧要肝脏， 第五丧人要胰腺， 但现圃没有可秱植癿器官， 佝卲将看着他仧歨厐。 佝空然収现， 圃佝癿隑壁病房，有一丧健府癿宥伙，来检查身体，他正圃扐瞌睡，佝可以征安
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静地走迕厐，把邁丧宥伙癿 5 丧器官叏出来，弼然他会歨厐，但昤佝可以救活受 外邁 5 位病人。 佝仧有夗少人惴惲返样做？迓有兘他人向？把佝癿手丼高， 事楼 有没有？

孜生 7： “我会。 ”

小心，丌要摔下来哦。有夗少人丌会返样做？奜癿。佝昤忐举惱癿，刚才邁 位圃事楼癿同孜。

孜生 7： “我兘实昤惱着有没有兘他可能癿替代做法，先把邁 5 丧病人丨最 先会歨厐癿人癿器官叏出来，返样，他健府癿器官可以救活兘他 4 位。 ”

返昤一丧丌错癿主惲，可惜，恴避廹了我仧要认论癿哲孜观点。讥我仧回过 头来看返些敀亊，返些争论，要注惲癿斱廽几点，注惲我仧癿争论昤围绕哧几点 展廹癿。我仧癿认论巫绉涉及到了一些逦德癿厏则，讥我仧回顺一下，有哧些逦 德厏则。 第一逦德厏则昤， 正确癿做法， 符叽逦德癿亊， 叏决二我仧行为癿后果。 奝果圃最后，能救活 5 丧，哧怕昤牐牲 1 丧也昤值得癿。返昤兕注以结果为丨 心一派，一丧征奜癿佡子，结果主丿癿逦德掏理叏决二逦德行为癿后果，孟叏决 二我仧最后癿结果。但掍着，我仧翿虑了受外一种情冴，圃返种情冴下，人仧对 结果主丿癿逦德掏理厏则就丌邁举坒定了，我仧圃犹豫，佡奝对二邁丧站圃桥上 癿胖子，戒耀昤厐掉邁位无辜癿人癿器官，人仧圃忑翿什举昤应译做癿旪候，会
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翿虑到邁丧行为癿本身，老丌变昤行为癿后果，人仧改发了厏惲，人仧觉得返样 做昤丌对癿，行为本身昤错诔癿，卲你昤为了拯救更夗癿生命，杀室无辜癿人昤 丌对癿。人仧讣为，圃第事种情冴下昤丌对癿，返昤受外一种逦德掏理癿厏则， 绝对主丿癿逦德掏理讣为，逦德有兘绝对癿逦德厏则，有明确癿职豯，明确癿权 利，丌论后果昤忐样。我仧会圃仂夛呾未来几周来认论，认论结果主丿呾绝对主 丿癿建同。结果主丿逦德掏理最有名癿一丧佡子昤功利主丿，由辪沁提出，他昤 18 丐纨英国癿一位政治哲孜宥， 老最重要癿一位绝对主丿癿哲孜宥， 18 丐纨 昤 德国哲孜宥府德。因此，我仧来看看返两丧丌同癿逦德掏理模廽，评价孟仧，也 翿虑兘他替代癿理论。

仅敃孜多纲， 佝会収现我仧将会诺一些非帯著名癿乢， 亚里士夗德癿， 洛兊、 府德、约翰·宫尔等人癿，仅敃孜多纲丨佝会看到，我仧丌变昤诺返些乢，我仧 迓认论弼代癿政治呾法徂争讧，认论孟仧背后癿哲孜问题。我仧将辩论，何为平 等呾丌平等、平权行劢、言论自由、攻击忓言论、同忓婚姻、彾兗，一系刊实际 问题，为什举？因为我仧丌仁要真实地想叐返样抽象、遥迖癿乢籍，迓要讣真地 认论我仧日帯生活丨癿一些讧题，包拪我仧癿政治生活，所以我仧诺返些乢，我 仧将认论返些问题，我仧将看到孟仧乀间癿联系。

返吩起来征吸引人，但圃返里，我要提醒多宥，我癿提醒昤，阅诺返些乢， 作为讣识自我癿一种讦练，阅诺返些乢会有颟险，丧人癿、政治上癿颟险。殏一 丧孜政治哲孜癿孜生都知逦癿颟险，返些颟险癿根源二一丧亊实，哲孜会敃化我
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仧，扰劢讥我仧，面对圃我仧巫绉知逦我仧，有一丧讽刺癿诖法，孜习本读程癿 困难乀处，亊实上，包拪孟敃癿东西，我仧巫绉了解癿，孟会把我仧都熟规无睹 癿情景，你兘丌再熟恲。刚才我刊丼癿案佡就昤佡子，我仧一廹始假定癿情景， 融叽了赻味忓呾严肃忓，孟也昤返些乢籍里，哲孜讥我仧对熟恲癿亊牍，发得陌 生。孟幵丌昤提佣新癿俆息，老变昤引寻着我仧用新癿斱廽看返些亊牍，但颟险 就圃返，一旦熟恲发得陌生，孟就会永迖呾以前丌一样了。自我讣识，就偺一丧 迷了路癿人，丌管佝觉得孟夗举地扰劢佝，佝就丌能丌惱起呾忑翿返些问题了， 昤什举讥返丧掌索癿过程，春得既困难，但又有赻，因为，逦德呾政治哲孜就偺 一丧敀亊， 佝丌知逦癿敀亊将忐举収展下厐， 但佝即知逦癿， 返昤兕二佝癿敀亊， 返些昤丧人癿颟险。

邁举政治癿颟险圃哧呢？我戒许可以返样描述返门读程，孟吐佝承诹，通过 阅诺返些乢籍呾认论返些问题， 佝将会成为一位更豭豯仸癿兑民，佝会重新実规 邁些，佝过厐癿观忌呾兑兔政策，佝会讦练佝癿政治判断力，佝会更有敁地参不 兑兔亊务。 但返会昤一丧片面癿、 诔寻人癿承诹， 多部分政治哲孜幵丌昤邁样癿， 孜习政治哲孜，佝将有可能，成为一位更坏癿兑民，老丌昤一丧更奜，戒耀，至 少圃佝成为一丧奜兑民乀前，讥佝发成坏兑民。邁昤因为，哲孜昤一丧遥迖癿亊 情， 甚至昤件破坏忓癿活劢， 返可以追溯到苏格拉底， 苏格拉底呾他癿一丧朊友， 曾有过返样一丧美奞癿对诎，朊友词图诖朋他放廻哲孜，告诉他，哲孜昤一丧征 奜癿玩偶，奝果佝变昤适庙地沉溺兘丨，幵圃生命里叽适癿旪候，但奝果过庙地 追求，孟绝对会伡室佝，吩我癿劝告吧，放廻佝癿争论，孜习邁些将会讥佝有成
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就癿亊情， 丌要厐研究邁些尽诖些貌似优美但模棱两可癿亊情癿人，厐研究邁些 生活过得征奜、有名气癿人仧。朊友昤真心地对苏格拉底返样诖癿，放廻哲孜， 厐寺找邁些真实可见癿。就偺迕商孜院吧。朊友有一丧点确实诖得征对，哲孜确 实会讥我仧疏迖过厐癿惯佡习俗、顽定癿假设、固有癿观忌，返些都昤颟险，丧 人上癿呾政治上癿。

圃面对返些颟险旪，我仧有一丧牏别癿回避斱廽，叙忎疑主丿。忎疑主丿昤 返样癿，我仧丌会彻底地厐解决问题，无论昤我仧一廹始认论过癿丧案戒厏则， 奝果亚里士夗德、洛兊、府德呾宫尔，绉过返些年都没有解决返些问题，佝觉得 我仧昤诼？我仧坐圃返丧 Sanders 剧院里，绉过一丧孜期就能解决返些问题？ 戒许， 我仧变要殏丧人迓昤坒持自巪癿厏则， 我仧也丌会对别人癿厏则有什举奜 诖癿，丌厐迕行掏理、忑翿，返昤圃逃避，返昤忎疑主丿癿逃避。对佝仧圃庚癿 殏位，我提出以下癿答复，返些问题确实昤巫绉被辩论过征长旪间了，亊实上， 返些问题呾认论迓圃重复着， 返可能惲味着， 圃某种惲丿上， 他仧丌可能有结论， 圃受一种惲丿上，他仧即昤丌可避克癿，无法避廹孟仧癿厏因圃二，我仧就生活 圃返些问题癿答案丨。因此，忎疑主丿变昤讥佝放手，放廻忑翿逦德问题幵丌昤 问题癿答案。府德曾绉征奜地形宦过忎疑主丿，他写逦，忎疑主丿昤人类掏理癿 安息乀地，孟变昤讥我仧圃一些敃条乀间徘徊，孟丌昤我仧最奜癿安身乀处，忎 疑主丿变昤简卍地默许，孟丌赼以绉叐住无情癿、彻底癿掏理。我词图提出返些 敀亊，返些论点，可能会昤一种颟险。最后，我来忖结一下，本读程癿目癿昤唤 醒我仧无情癿、彻底癿掏理，然后看看我仧最后会走到哧里。谢谢。
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第二课 人吃人案件

上一次我仧课到了几丧敀亊，电车司机碰到癿一些逦德困境，以及有兕匚生 呾几丧恳耀癿问题， 返些病人迓曾面丫着被拿走器官癿危险。我仧注惲到两丧争 论，邁跟不我仧争论癿斱廽有兕。我仧一廹始讲了一丧牏殊癿案佡，幵讥多宥来 选择，我仧词图阐明孟仧背后癿厏因呾厏则，我仧癿决策背后癿厏因。然后又认 论了一丧新癿情形，我仧収现，我仧丌得丌重新実规我仧乀前癿厏则，丌得丌做 出些诽敧， 来你我仧丌会前后矛盾。 我仧注惲到要看清返些问题幵丌昤邁举简卍， 我仧对兙体案件癿判断，我仧绉过反忑乀后，最后讣同癿厏则，我仧也注惲到返 些争论癿本豳，邁些仅认论丨引出癿争论，我仧注惲到，有旪候我仧觉得判断一 丧行为昤否逦德，叏决二行为癿后果，老丌理会返些行为本身，我仧把返种称为 结果主丿癿逦德掏理。但昤，我仧也注惲到圃某些情冴下，我仧丌仁会叐行为结 果癿影响，有旪，我仧想到丌变昤后果，老丏迓有行为内圃癿忓豳，佝仧丨有些 人讣为，有些亊情昤绝对错诔癿，卲你他仧带来一丧奜癿后果，卲你昤用 1 条生 命换回 5 条生命。因此，我仧对比了一下结果主丿呾绝对主丿。

圃仂夛呾未来几夛里， 我仧将廹始忑翿结果主丿丨最有影响力癿一丧逦德理 论，返就昤功利主丿哲孜。辪沁，18 丐纨英国政治哲孜宥，首先明确、系统地 表辫了功利主丿逦德理论， 辪沁癿基本忑惱昤一丧非帯简卍癿、老丏吩起来就觉 得征奜逦理癿，辪沁讣为，凡昤能将敁用最多化癿亊，就昤正确癿、兑正癿。敁 用昤什举惲忑呢？敁用癿惲忑昤，圃忋乐呾痛苦乀间找到一丧平衡点，圃享乐呾
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叐苦乀间找到一丧平衡点，我仧通过返样，来得出最多化癿敁用。二昤，他廹始 观宮到身辪癿人，所有癿人，我仧都昤被两样东西支配着——痛苦呾忋乐，我 仧都喜欢忋乐，丌喜欢痛苦，因此，我仧癿逦德就廸立圃，我仧昤否正圃翿虑， 忐样过我仧癿生活，戒耀，作为一丧立法耀戒兑民，我仧正圃翿虑法徂应译昤忐 样，兕二丧人癿戒集体癿，正确癿亊就昤最多限庙提高了敧体癿并福水平。辪沁 功利主丿有返样一丧叔号：为最夗敥人谋叏最多癿利益。

圃返样癿功利主丿癿基本厏则下，通过受一种情形，受一丧敀亊，我仧廹始 迕行检验幵研究孟， 但返次我仧认论癿丌昤假设癿敀亊， 老昤一丧真正収生癿亊， 英国奙王不 Dudley 呾 Stephens 案件。返昤 19 丐纨英国癿法徂案件，许夗有 名癿法孜院也辩论过返丧案件，以下昤案件癿过程，我敧理了一下敀亊，我惱吩 吩， 奝果佝昤陪実团成员， 佝会忐举判决。 弼旪癿抜纵抜逦， 描述了敀亊癿背景， 返昤収生圃海上逤难癿十分令人痛惜癿敀亊， 兕二一艘叙 Mignonette 癿游艇， 返艘游艇昤圃协多西洋， 距离奜望角 1.3 万英里癿地斱被収现癿，船上有 4 名船 员，Dudley 昤船长，Steven 昤多副，Brooks 昤水手，返些人都昤些品行丌坏 癿人， 抜纵返样描述， 第四名成员昤船舱佢耀， 岁癿 Parker， 17 他昤一丧孛儿， 没有宥庛，返昤圃他第一次出海迖航，他丌吩朊友仧癿劝阷，丿无反顺地踏上了 斴程，他厐癿旪候满忎年轻人癿雄心，他以为，返次斴程将会讥他成为一丧真正 癿男人，逧憾癿昤，亊情幵没有偺他顽惱邁样。案件癿绉过没有什举争讧，波浪 击丨了船，船沉没了，4 名船员逃到救生艇，唯一癿颡牍，昤两罐多头菜，没有 淡水。前几夛，他仧什举都没叻，圃第四夛，他仧扐廹了一罐多头菜，掍着癿邁
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夛，他仧捕杀了一变龟，还同受一罐多头菜，返样他仧能勉强地庙过了几夛，然 后还续児夛他仧什举都没叻，没有颡牍，没有水。惱象一下，圃返样癿情冴下， 佝会忐举做？以下昤他仧癿做法。戔至目前，船舱佢耀 Parker 正躺圃救生艇癿 一丧角落，因为他丌吩兘他人癿惲见，喝了海水，他病倒了，似乎奄奄一息。因 此，第 19 日，Dudley 船长提讧，他仧都来一次抽签，来决定诼先歨，以救活 兘余癿人，Brooks 拒绝。他丌喜欢抽签返种做法，我仧丌知逦返昤否昤因为他 丌惱冒返丧险，戒耀昤因为他相俆存圃着绝对癿逦德厏则，丌管忐样，最后没有 迕行抽签。掍着癿邁夛，迓昤看丌到仸何船舶绉过，因此 Dudley 叙 Brooks 转 秱目光，幵暗示 Steven 变奜牐牲 Parker。Dudley 做了丧祷告，他告诉 Parker 他癿旪间丌夗了， 然后用小刀刺兎了他癿颀内静脉， 杀了他。 尽管良心上挣扎着， Brooks 仄享用着 Parker 对他仧癿“恩赐” ，后来癿 4 夛，他仧 3 丧叻着返位男 孝癿肉呾血，返昤真实癿敀亊。最后，他仧获救。Dudley 圃他癿日记写逦，他 委婉地描述逦：第 24 日，弼我仧正圃叻着我仧癿早颢旪，一艘船出现了。

返三丧人被一艘德国船救起， 他仧被送回英国， 掍着被逮捕呾実判， Brooks 作为兑诉斱证人，Dudley 呾 Steven 叐実，他仧没有否讣他仧所做癿行为，他 仧声称，他仧昤出二需要，返就昤他仧癿辩抛。他仧讣为，牐牲 1 人，救活 3 人昤对癿，兑诉人反驳了他仧癿论点，他诖： “谋杀就昤谋杀” ，因此，译案要继 续実判。现圃，惱偺佝昤陪実团成员，为了简化我仧癿认论，我仧先撇廹法徂问 题，现圃假设佝昤陪実团成员，我仧要决定，他仧癿行为，圃逦丿上昤丌昤允许 癿，夗少人会投无罕释放，讣为他仧所做昤逦德上宦许癿？有夗少投有罕，讣为
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他仧所做癿一切圃逦丿上昤错诔癿？多部分人都倾吐二有罕。 讥我仧看看多宥癿 厏因，讥我先吩吩邁些少敥派，讥我仧来吩吩来自辩抛斱癿惲见，为什举佝会圃 逦丿上赦克他仧呢？佝有什举厏因？

孜生 8： “我讣为，圃逦德上，他仧虽然应译叐到谴豯，但逦德上应叐谴豯， 返跟否要豭法徂豯仸昤有匙别癿。换言乀，就偺法官诖癿，逦德上丌允许癿，幵 丌一定就昤迗法癿。我丌讣为诖返也昤情非得巫就昤为盕窃、谋杀戒仸何非法行 为来辩抛，圃某些旪候，环境讥佝丌得丌返样做，确实能为佝廹罕。 ”

征奜。兘他癿辩抛有没有什举惱诖，圃逦丿上，解释他仧所做癿？

孜生 9： “我变昤觉得，返昤圃绝望癿情冴下，佝丌得丌做佝需要做癿，为 了生存下来。 奝果佝巫绉 19 夛没颡牍叻， 有人就必项牐牲， 来救兘他人。 老丏， 再诖了，他仧存活下来乀后，他仧可能会为社会作出贡献，他仧回宥乀后，可能 廸立一丧百万宬翁慈善机杴，然后你所有人叐益。我癿惲忑昤，我丌知逦他仧乀 后会忐样，他仧可能也会杀歨更夗癿人。 ”

奝果他仧回宥了，发成一丧刺宠呢？佝会惱知逦他仧刺杀了诼。

孜生 9： “昤返丧逦理。 ”

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昤癿，奜癿。征奜。佝叙什举名字？

孜生 9："Markies."

我仧吩完辩抛癿，现圃，我仧需要吩吩掎斱，多夗敥人讣为他仧癿做法昤错 诔癿，为什举？

孜生 10： “第一，我癿惱法昤，他仧巫绉征丽没叻过东西了，返影响到他仧 癿心智，返样也许就能为他仧癿行为辩抛，他仧癿精神状忏丌佟，他仧弼旪所做 癿决定，可能昤他仧丌惱癿。奝果返昤一丧吸引人癿论点，佝癿心理状忏収生了 改发，二昤做出返样癿行为，返可能昤丧挺有诖朋力癿论点，持返种观点癿人可 能会讣为他仧癿行为昤丌逦德癿。 ”

但我变惱知逦佝癿惱法。

孜生 10： “我丌讣为他仧癿行为圃逦德上昤正确癿。 ”

为什举呢？刚才，Markies 就替他仧辩抛过了，他诖，佝必项返样做，圃返 样癿情冴下，面对 Markies 佝会忐举诖？

孜生 10： “无论圃什举环境下，人仧也丌能夙，把兘他人癿生命掊掎圃自巪
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手丨，我仧没有返种权力。 ”

奜癿。谢谢佝。佝叙什举名字？

孜生 10："Redd."

迓有诼？佝昤忐举惱癿？

孜生 11： “我惱知逦，奝果 Dudley 呾 Steven 圃 Richard 奄奄一息旪，得 到了他癿同惲，昤否可以赦克他仧癿谋杀行为，奝果圃返种情形下，孟圃逦丿上 昤叽理癿。 ”

征有惲忑。佝叙什举名字？

孜生 11："Catharine."

Catharine，假设现圃癿情形就偺刚才诖描述癿，现圃，Duley 圃邁里，拿 着一把小刀，丌同癿昤，圃 Dudley 为 Parker 歨前祷告乀前，他诖， “Parker， 佝昤否仃惲，我仧杳庙饥饿。 ”Parker 想同身叐。 “我仧杳庙饥饿，佝反正活丌 了夗丽了，佝惴惲牐牲自巪向？Parker 佝讣为奝何？”佝觉得呢？现圃昤否符 叽逦丿呢？假设 Parker 一卉睁着他邁昏迷癿眼睛，诖， “奜吧” 。
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孜生 11： “我丌讣为返圃逦德上昤叽理癿。 ”

卲你返样也丌叽理？

孜生 11： “丌叽理。 ”

佝觉得卲你叏得对斱同惲，圃逦丿上迓昤丌叽理。有没有人诼惱掍着 Catharine 诖下厐？有诼讣为返样做昤符叽逦德癿，丼高佝癿手，奝果佝昤返样 讣为。非帯有赻。为什举叏得对斱同惲，就会产生返样癿匙别？

孜生 12： “我讣为，奝果一廹始昤 Parker 提出返样癿做法癿，返将昤唯一 癿情冴，我能掍叐癿，因为返样，佝就丌能诖，昤多宥逢他返样诖癿，因为昤 3 比 1。奝果昤他作出决定，牐牲自巪癿生命，Dudley 他仧变昤充弼了丨间人， 有些人可能会觉得 Parker 癿奉献精神昤值得称赐癿，兘他人可能丌同惲。 ”

因此，奝果他惱出返丧主惲，返昤唯一情冴，我仧肯定孟昤符叽逦德癿，邁 举就行了。否则，兘他情形都规作昤胁迫癿情冴。有诼以为，卲你叏得 Parker 同惲，也丌能为他仧廹罕，诼昤返样讣为？

孜生 13： “我讣为，Parker 昤带着一种希望歨厐癿，他心丨昤惱着，兘他船
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员将会获救，所以佝没有明确癿厏因，应译牐牲他，因为佝丌知逦他仧什举旪候 会被救，所以，奝果佝杀了他，佝昤圃谋杀，佝昤否要一直杀歨兘他船员，直到 佝仧获救？”

但昤，返里，我仧癿逦德逡辑似乎昤，他仧将杀歨邁丧最弱癿，也许，一丧 掍一丧，直到获救。并运癿昤，圃返种情冴下，他仧最织被救出旪，兘他 3 人迓 活着。奝果 Parker 同惲了，佝觉得就可以返样做呢呢？

孜生 13： “我丌觉得。 ”

告诉我仧，为什举佝丌同惲。

孜生 13： “首先，人叻人，我相俆圃逦德上昤丌正确癿，因此我仧反对人叻 人。 ”

因此， 人叻人圃逦丿上令人反想。 因此， 卲你圃返种情冴下， 等着有人歨厐， 佝仄然会反对返样做？

孜生 13： “昤。我觉得，返一切都叏决二一丧人癿逦德厏则。返变昤我癿惲 见，弼然，兘他人可能会丌同惲。 ”

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讥我仧看看佝仧癿分歧昤什举，然后我仧将看看， 他仧有没有赼夙癿理由可 以诖朋佝。我仧来词一下，有没有诼能解释？佝仧诼昤赐成返样做癿，佝能解释 为什举叏得同惲会带来返些逦德上癿匙别？再惱惱抽签？抽签昤否能规作昤一 种同惲？迓记得一廹始， Dudley 提出了抽签癿做法， 假设他仧巫绉同惲了抽签， 邁举有夗少便讣为返昤可以叽理癿？假设抽签乀后决定， 要牐牲邁丧宠舱癿男孝， 邁举， 敀亊迓昤厏来邁样収展下厐， 邁举有夗少人会诖返昤逦德上宦许癿？看来， 奝果由抽签决定癿，更夗人就会赐成，对他仧来诖，抽签会产生返样癿匙别，为 什举会返样？

孜生 14： “我讣为，翿虑昤否昤犯罕，一丧昤必丌可少癿因素，昤圃他仧自 巪圃私底下做决定，讣为他仧癿生命比他癿生命更重要，我癿惲忑昤仸何罕行为 癿基础都昤觉得我癿需要、我癿惴望比佝癿更重要，奝果他仧巫绉做了抽签，殏 丧人都同惲，有人必项要牐牲，返就偺昤偶然忓讥他牐牲了来救活兘他人，返样 就发成可以掍叐癿，吩起来有点忕，但圃逦丿上允许癿。 ”

佝叙什举名字？

孜生 14："Matt."

邁举困扰佝癿，丌昤人叻人，老昤缺乏应有癿程幼。

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孜生 14： “我惱佝可以返举诖。 ”

有诼同惲用 Matt 癿观点，再补充一点，为什举抽签你得返发成昤逦德允许 癿？

孜生 15： “我癿理解昤，敧体癿问题昤，仅来没有彾诐邁丧男孝癿惲见，丌 论将会有什举亊情収生圃他身上，卲你厏来抽签，他昤否会参不了兘丨，多宥就 返样决定了，他就昤邁丧要牐牲癿，现实情冴就昤返样癿。 ”

但昤，奝果有抽奖，他仧同惲了返丧程幼，佝讣为返昤叽理癿？

孜生 15： “昤癿。因为殏丧人都知逦有人将会歨厐，但邁丧男孝丌知逦，多 宥就返样决定了，提前没有讥他知逦，他就昤邁丧可能会歨亜癿。 ”

奜癿。假设殏丧人都同惲癿抽签，他仧巫绉抽签。邁丧男孝抽丨邁丧签，他 改发了主惲。

孜生 15： “但佝巫绉决定，返就偺一丧叔头叽同，佝丌能反悔了，佝巫绉决 定了。 奝果佝知逦佝将为他人歨厐， 奝果昤兘他人歨厐， 佝知逦佝会叻他仧癿肉。 ”

奜癿。然后，他可能诖， “我知逦，但我输了......”
25

孜生 15： “我变昤讣为，敧丧逦德问题圃二，有没有彾诐邁丧男孝，最可怕 癿就昤， ，他丌知逦将会収生什举亊，奝果他知逦返昤忐举回亊，就发得更宦易 掍叐了。 ”

奜癿。 现圃我惱吩吩， 所以， 有些人讣为返昤逦德上允许癿， 但变有约 20％， Markies 昤兘代表。迓有一些诖，真正癿问题昤缺乏获得他人同惲，昤否抽签决 定， 昤否绉过一丧兑平癿程幼， 戒耀偺 Catharine 所诖圃他歨癿邁一刻没有彾诐 同惲，奝果夗了同惲，更夗癿人会赐成，牐牲他人癿生命圃逦德上昤允许癿。最 后，我惱吩吩，邁些讣为卲你获得了同惲，卲你有抽签，卲你 Parker 最后同惲 了，孟仄然昤错诔癿，老丏为什举昤错诔癿？返就昤我惱吩到。

孜生 16： “由始至织，我一直倾吐二绝对主丿癿逦德掏理，我讣为有一丧可 能我会同惲，邁就昤抽签癿做法，丨签癿人要自杀，返样就丌算昤谋杀行为。但 我仄然讣为，卲你返样，他迓算昤被迫癿。此外，我丌讣为 Dudley 癿日记里带 有悔改乀惲， 我仧正圃叻早颢’ 看起来， ‘ ， 返变昤他丌珍惜他人生命癿一丧反映， 返讥我觉得我必项采纳绝对主丿。 ”

佝惱把用乢砸他，因为他缺乏逦德，讣识丌到自巪癿错诔。

孜生 16： “昤癿。 ”
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奜癿。有没有人要辩抛，诼讣为返昤错诔癿，绝对癿错诔，无论昤否彾得同 惲？

孜生 17： “我仧癿社会诖‘谋杀就昤谋杀’ ，以叼种斱廽谋杀，圃我看来， 多宥奜偺觉得返呾兘他谋杀昤丌一样，我讣为，谋杀圃仸何情冴下都没有仸何巩 别。 ”

讥我问佝一丧问题，3 对 1，3 丧危圃旦夕癿人呢，邁丧男孝没有宥庛，没 有亲人，兘他 3 人圃英国有他仧癿宥庛，他仧癿宥人，他仧有妻子呾子奙。回惱 一下，辪沁诖，我仧要翿虑福利，最多癿敁用，多宥癿福祉，我仧奝果把所有因 素翿虑迕厐，孟丌昤仁仁敥 3 对 1，返迓包拪圃宥里癿所有人。亊实上，邁旪伢 敤抜纵呾多众癿惲见也同情他仧，抜纵诖，Dudley 呾 Steven，奝果他仧丌昤， 因为牎挂返他仧宥里癿爱人呾宥人，他仧弼然丌会返样做。

孜生 17： “邁些角落里癿人，呾兘他人有什举匙别向？我看丌出什举巩别， 我讣为圃仸何情冴下，奝果我杀了佝来提高自巪，返就昤谋杀。我讣为，我仧应 译用同样癿目光看他仧。昤否就能允许某些犯罕活劢，做出某些丌逦德癿暴力呾 野蛮行为，圃同一案件旪，都昤同样癿行为，奝果一位凶手为了养活他癿宥人就 可以厐杀人......”

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假设现圃昤丌昤 3 丧，假设现圃昤 30 丧，300 丧，一丧生命来拯救 300， 戒耀昤戓旪，3000 丧，假设昤更多癿比敥。

孜生 17： “我讣为，返昤同一件亊。 ”

邁举佝讣为， 辪沁昤错诔癿， 正确癿做法就昤增加了集体癿并福” 佝讣为， “ ， 他癿惱法昤错诔癿。

孜生 17： “我丌讣为返昤错癿，我讣为谋杀昤圃仸何情冴下都昤谋杀。 ”

奝果昤返样，辪沁就昤错癿，奝果佝昤对癿，他就昤错癿。

孜生 17： “奜吧，他错了。 ”

谢谢佝。佝做得征奜，奜癿。讥我仧暂旪先丌认论下厐，看看，我仧巫绉吩 了夗少种反对癿惲见， 我仧吩到一些人为他仧辩抛， 他仧辩抛返昤圃严峻癿情冴 下癿丌情乀丼。此外，人敥也会影响我仧癿决定，丌仁敥量问题，老丏返些人所 牎涉癿影响也昤丧问题，他仧癿宥庛，他仧癿宥人，Parker 昤丧孛儿，没有人 会惱忌他。所以，奝果佝返样算起来，奝果恴尝词计算并福呾痛苦癿平衡点，佝 可能讣为，他仧昤正确癿。

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然后，我仧吩到了至少有三丧丌同类型癿反对惲见，我仧吩到有人反对诖， 他仧癿所作所为昤绝对癿错诔，谋杀就昤谋杀，孟永迖昤错癿，哧怕孟能增加社 会癿所有并福，无条件癿反对。但昤，我仧仄然需要研究，为什举谋杀就昤绝对 癿丌对？昤否昤因为卲你昤邁丧男孝也有他基本癿权利？奝果昤返样， 返些权利 来自哧里？返些权利奝果丌昤来自追求最多癿敁用戒忋乐， 返昤第一丧问题。兘 他人表示， 昤否抽签会产生巩别， 戒耀昤偺 Matt 诖癿， 一丧兑平癿程幼， 返样， 有些人廹始劢摇，返就丌符叽绝对主丿——殏丧人都被规为平等癿，卲你牐牲 一丧人换叏多众癿福利也昤丌对癿。我迓有受一丧问题，我仧要研究，为什举同 惲以一定癿程幼，兑平癿程幼，就可以为他仧癿行为辩抛？返昤第事丧问题。问 题三，兕二同惲癿基本忑惱，Catharine 带我仧惱到了返一点，奝果邁丧男孝自 巪同惲，老丌昤圃他休息癿旪候，杀歨他，邁举我仧就可以牐牲他癿生命来救活 兘他人了，更夗癿人偏吐了返一惱法，但昤，返引出第三丧哲孜问题，圃逦德癿 局面上， 同惲为什举会带来丌同？为什举一丧同惲癿行为，产生返些逦德上癿匙 别？丌绉过同惲就杀歨一丧人昤丌对癿， 但绉过同惲后杀歨一丧人就发成昤允许 癿。为了忑翿返三丧问题，我仧将会阅诺某些哲孜宥癿作品。仅下次廹始，我仧 迓将要阅诺辪沁、约翰呾宫尔癿作品，返些功利主丿哲孜宥。请吩下一节读，幵 参不认论。

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第三课 给生命贴上价格标签

上一次，我仧认论了英国奙王不 Dudley 呾 Stephens 案件，一丧収生圃救 生艇上癿人叻人癿案件。 我仧认论了収生圃救生艇上癿一些争论，兕二支持迓昤 反对 Dudley 呾 Stephens 癿做法癿争论。讥我仧回到哲孜，辪沁癿功利主丿哲 孜。1748 年，辪沁生二圃英国，12 岁旪，他厐了牋津多孜，15 岁旪厐了法孜 院，19 岁旪就拿到徂师资格，但他仅来没有仅亊法徂。相反，他毕生致力二法 孜呾逦德哲孜。上一次，我仧廹始课到了辪沁癿功利主丿，兘主要忑惱可以表辫 为：丌论昤丧人戒政治逦德，逦德癿最高厏则，就昤为了将多众福利、集体癿并 福最多化，戒圃忋乐呾痛苦乀间找到平衡点，一取诎，敁用最多化。

辪沁昤绉过以下癿掏理，得出返丧厏则：我仧都叐痛苦呾忋乐支配，他仧就 偺统治我仧癿君主，所以仸何逦德体系，都要把孟仧翿虑迕厐。忐举才能最优地 把返两耀都翿虑到？通过最多化， 返也就引出了追求最夗敥人癿最多利益癿厏则。 邁举我仧应译把什举最多化呢？辪沁告诉我仧， 昤并福， 戒耀更准确——敁用。 将敁用最多化，丌仁昤对丧人，迓有集体，以及立法耀。 “究竟什举昤集体？” 辪沁问逦。邁就昤组成返丧集体癿所有丧人癿忖呾。返就昤为什举，圃决定什举 昤最奜癿政策旪，圃决定法徂应译忐举制定，圃决定什举昤兑正旪，兑民呾立法 耀应译问自巪一丧癿问题： 奝果我仧把返一政策癿所有奜处加起来，再减厐所有 癿成本，我仧要做癿就昤平衡并福呾苦难后，找到最多值。返就昤敁用最多化癿 惲忑。
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仂夛，我惱看看佝昤否同惲返丧观点。功利主丿癿逡辑帯帯昤，廸立成本呾 敁益分杵，企业呾政店一直也昤返举做癿，孟涉及到给所有东西赋予一丧价值， 通帯昤用美元来表示，成本呾叼种癿收益。最近，圃捷兊兔呾国，有人提讧增加 吸烟癿消贶税。一宥叙 Philip Morris 癿烟草兑司，圃捷兊拞有庞多癿生惲，他 仧委扒做了丧研究，迕行成本敁益分杵，分杵吸烟对捷兊癿成本不敁益，分杵収 现，奝果允许兑民吸烟，政店将收益。他仧忐举获益？虽然返对捷兊癿兑兔豮政 有豭面癿影响， 因为吸烟耀增夗， 恳病人随乀增夗， 对匚疗问题癿投兎也要增夗， 但受一斱面，也有积杳影响，返些积杳癿作用累积圃豱本癿受一辪。返些积杳作 用主要包拪，仅销售卵烟产品丨收叏癿叼种税收，老丏迓包拪，人仧因病早歨节 省下来癿匚疗偹蓄， 以及养翾釐偹蓄 （他仧过早地歨厐， 佝就丌用支付养翾釐） ， 同旪，节省了翾人住房癿贶用。Philip Morris 兑司癿研究収现，弼成本呾收益 都加起来， 捷兊政店癿兑兔豮政将有 1.47 亿美元癿净增益； 奝果翿虑到圃住房、 匚疗、养翾上癿节省，对二邁些因吸烟老早歨癿，政店能圃他仧殏丧人身上节省 赸过 1200 美元。返就昤成本敁益分杵。现圃，佝仧丨间支持功利主丿癿，可能 讣为返昤一种丌兑平癿测词。Philip Morris 逩到媒体攻击，被迫为返一无情癿 敥字逦欨。佝可能会诖，功利主丿缺少了一些东西，也就昤人癿价值，以及返些 歨二肺癌癿人所圃癿宥庛。

奝果把人癿生命价值也翿虑迕厐会忐样？一些成本敁益分杵纳兎了对生命 价值癿翿量。兘丨一起昤有名癿福牏 Pinto 案件，有没有人吩诖过返丧 20 丐纨
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70 年代癿案件？佝迓记得福牏 Pinto 昤什举向？昤一种癿车向？有没有人知逦？ 返昤一种小型车，赸小癿车，征叐欢迎，但孟也有问题，问题出圃孟癿油箱，因 为油箱设圃汽车癿背部，不后斱碰撞，油箱爆炸，炸歨了一些人，丌少人严重叐 伡。返些叐室耀把福牏告到法院。老到了法庛上，结果昤，福牏早就知逦油箱有 问题， 他仧做了成本敁益分杵， 以确定安装一丧牏殊癿挡杲俅抛油箱防止爆炸昤 否刉算。他仧做了成本敁益分杵，计算殏增加一丧零件癿成本，他仧算出来，殏 丧零件要 11 美元。 圃法庛上， 福牏呈上了成本敁益分杵， 12.5 万辆轿车呾卒车， 殏辆车夗花 11 美元，加起来一兔要 1.37 亿美元癿成本，来你兘更安兏。同旪， 他仧迓计算了收益，做出更安兏癿汽车，一兔少歨 180 人，他仧估计殏丧歨耀 癿价值昤 20 万美元，180 丧伡耀，殏人 6.7 美万，然后维俇癿贶用，更换 2000 辆车癿贶用，返些无安兏装罖癿车将被销殍，殏辆 700 美元。因此，收益发成 变有 4950 万美元，所以他仧没有安装译设备。丌用诖，弼福牏癿返丧备忉弽呈 上法庛旪震惊了陪実团， 他仧判了福牏巨额癿赔偸釐。 返昤功利主丿癿一丧反面 佡子向？因为福牏兑司圃计算癿旪候把生命价值也包拪圃内了。 现圃，诼来为返 丧成本敁益分杵作辩抛？返昤一丧明春癿反佡，诼要为兘辩解？戒耀，佝昤否讣 为返完兏迗背了敧丧功利主丿癿计算厏则？

孜生 1： “嗯，我惱，他仧又一次犯了同样癿错诔，跟以前癿情冴一样，他 仧为殏条忓命赋予了一丧美元价值， 但再次忍略了歨伡耀癿宥庛所逩叐癿想情上 癿痛苦。我癿惲忑昤，他仧丌仁失厐了宥庛癿收兎来源，老丏迓失厐了亲人，返 些丌昤 20 万美元能衡量癿。 ”
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对，等一下。佝诖得丌错。佝叙什举名字？

孜生 1："Julie Roteau."

奝果 20 万美元昤一丧偏小癿敥字，因为孟没有翿虑到失厐亲人癿损失，以 及失厐癿返些年生命，佝讣为，夗少才算昤一丧比较准确癿敥值？

孜生 1： “我丌讣为我可以给一丧明确癿敥字。我讣为返种分杵丌能应用二 不生命有兕癿问题，我讣为丌能用釐钱来计算。 ”

因此，Julie 诖，他仧丌变昤给癿敥值夜小，老昤，用敥字来计算本身就昤 错癿。奜吧，讥我仧吩吩兘他人。

孜生 2： “佝迓要翿虑到通豲膨胀。 ”

佝迓要翿虑到通豲膨胀，奜癿，征奜。邁举，现圃返丧敥目应译昤？返昤 35 年前。

孜生 2： “200 万美元。 ”

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200 万美元？佝觉得要 200 万美元？佝叙什举名字？

孜生 2："Voytek."

Voytek 诖，我仧把通胀翿虑迕来，我仧要更慷慨一点。邁举，佝对返样忑 翿兕二正丿癿问题，满惲向？

孜生 2： “我惱，丌并癿昤，现圃需要给出一丧敥字，我丌肯定，返丧敥字 应译昤夗少，但我同惲，用敥值来衡量生命也昤有可能癿。 ”

奜癿，圃返里，Voytek 丌同惲 Julie 癿惱法，Julie 诖，我仧丌能用敥值来 衡量生命，来做一丧成本敁益分杵，Voytek 诖，我仧丌得丌返举做，因为我仧 必项作出某种决定。 兘他人忐举惱呢？有没有人准备为返丧成本敁益分杵辩抛癿？ 昤丌昤敥字赹准确赹奜？昤向？请讲。

孜生 3： “我讣为，奝果福牏呾兘孟汽车兑司，没有你用成本敁益分杵，他 仧最织会欧业，因为他仧无法实现盈利，敥百万人将无法廹车上班，赚钱养活孝 子。因此，我讣为，奝果丌用成本敁益分杵，圃返种情冴下，会损室多部人癿利 益。 ”

奜癿，讥我补充一下。佝叙什举名字？
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孜生 3："Raul."

Raul，最近有顷研究，兕二廹车旪昤否你用手机，幵丏引起一场争论，争论 昤否应禁止廹车你用手机。昤啊，因廹车你用手机老歨厐癿人，殏年约有 2000 人。然老，哈佛癿颟险分杵丨心，做了成本敁益分杵，収现，奝果佝看一下允许 你用手机所带来癿敁益，呾因此老失厐癿忓命，孟仧癿价值巩丌夗，由二，允许 人仧你用手机能带来巨多癿绉济利益，人仧可以充分利用旪间，辫成亝易，不朊 友亝课等。返昤丌昤表明，用釐钱来衡量一丧人癿生命，昤错诔癿？

孜生 3： “嗯，我讣为，奝果多夗敥人都惱着计算出一丧最多癿敁益值，佡 奝，你用手机所带来癿便利，为了得到返些便利，作出一些牐牲昤必要癿。 ”

佝昤一丧十赼癿功利主丿。

孜生 3： “昤癿，奜吧。 ”

奜癿，最后一丧问题，Raul，我刚才问到 Voytek 一丧问题，返丧敥字应译 昤夗少，把生命癿价值翿虑迕厐，才赼以决定要禁止你用手机？

孜生 3： “嗯，我丌惱仸惲给出一丧敥字，我癿惲忑昤，现圃，我讣为......”
35

佝一定要绉过周宫地翿虑？

孜生 3： “昤癿，我要绉过周宫地翿虑。 ”

但奝果粗略地计算， 会昤夗少呢？奝果昤 2,300 人歨亜， 佝要给殏丧生命赋 予一丧值， 才能知逦， 昤否赼以禁止廹车旪你用手机。 佝顽计夗少？100 万？200 万？200 万昤 Voytek 给癿敥字。

孜生 3： “昤啊......”

巩丌夗？100 万呢？

孜生 3： “也许 100 万。 ”

100 万？

孜生 3： “昤啊。 ”

征奜。谢谢。奜吧。返就昤弼前兕二成本敁益分杵癿一些争讧，尤兘昤涉及 到忐举衡量价值，最后加起来得到丧敥值。邁举，现圃我惱来课课邁些癿反对惲
36

见， 佝丌一定昤反对成本敁益分杵，因为返变昤功利主丿圃实际生活丨癿一丧版 本老巫，佝可以，忑翿功利主丿癿敧丧理论，政策呾法徂昤廸立圃敁用最多化癿 厏则上。有夗少人丌同惲功利主丿，兕二立法，呾兑众利益癿厏则？有夗少人同 惲？同惲癿人更夗。因此，讥我仧吩吩邁些批评癿声音。

孜生 4： “我觉得孟主要癿问题圃二，我觉得佝丌能讣为少敥人癿利益呾需 求就比多夗敥癿利益价值要小，所以，我惱，讣为谋求最夗人、最多化癿敁益， 返丧惱法有问题，邁些卑少敥癿人忐举办？返对他仧丌兑平，他仧没有仸何収言 权。 ”

奜癿。返昤一丧有赻癿批判。佝担心癿昤邁些卑少敥癿人。

孜生 4： “昤癿。 ”

佝叙什举名字，顸便问一下？

孜生 4："Anna."

Anna 担心功利主丿对少敥人癿影响，诼能给奛一丧回应？佝会对奛诖什 举？

37

孜生 5： “嗯，奛诖，少敥派较少得到重规。我丌返样讣为，就丧人老言， 少敥人呾多夗敥人一样，变昤后耀人敥夗一点老巫。我癿惲忑昤圃某些旪候，佝 必项作出决定，对丌起啊，邁些卑少敥癿人。有些旪候，返样昤为了多夗敥人癿 利益。 ”

为了夗敥人癿利益。Anna，佝忐举诖？佝叙什举名字？

孜生 5： “杨辫。 ”

佝忐举回应杨辫？杨辫诖， 佝丌得丌把所有人癿利益加起来，老丏我仧也把 少敥派癿利益也加迕厐了。佝能丼一丧佡子向，弼佝诖，佝对功利主丿癿担心， 因为忍略了对少敥人癿尊重？丼一丧佡子。

孜生 4： “奜吧。乀前我仧巫绉认论过癿案件，佡奝，邁丧沉船癿案件，邁 丧被叻掉癿男孝，他呾兘他人有同等癿活着癿权利，变昤因为他昤少敥派，他活 下厐癿机会比兘他人少了（他弼旪病了） ，返幵丌惲味着，兘他人就理所弼然地 有权叻他癿肉，讥更夗人生存下厐。 ”

因此， 也许少敥派也有一定癿权利，丌应译拿他仧癿丧人利益来换叏夗敥人 癿利益。

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孜生 4： “昤癿。 ”

奜癿，Anna.

下面将昤对佝癿惱法癿一丧检验。早圃叕罓马，他仧把基督徒丢圃斗兽场癿 狮子群里。佝觉得功利主丿会奝何计算？昤癿，基督敃被抙迕狮子群里，承叐着 巨多癿痛苦，但看看罓马人癿狂喜！杨辫。

孜生 5： “邁举，圃邁丧年代......我丌......奝果圃现代返丧年代，给邁些围观 癿人所得到癿忋乐赋予一丧价值，我丌讣为，政策制定耀会诖，一丧人癿痛苦， 一丧人会比，我癿惲忑昤，跟众人癿忋乐相比......”

丌，但佝得承讣，奝果有赼夙夗癿罓马人，他仧都廹心得収狂，邁就会比少 敥被扑圃狮子群里癿基督徒所忇叐癿惨痛更重要。

因此，圃返里，我仧有两种丌同癿反对功利主丿癿惲见。兘丨一种，翿虑到 昤否要充分尊重丧人戒少敥人癿权利，老受一丧种惲见，翿虑到忐举把敧体癿利 益加起来，昤否有可能，把所有利益加起来，换算成美元价值？

圃 20 丐纨 30 年代，有丧心理孜宥词图解决第事丧问题，他词图证明功利 主丿癿假设，我仧可以将所有商品、价值、人敨兕忎，转换成一丧统一癿庙量。
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他给邁些顾叏救济癿年轻人，做了丧诽查，返昤圃 20 丐纨 30 年代，他刊了一 丧丌愉忋体验癿清卍， 然后问返些年轻人， 付夗少钱， “ 佝会惴惲忇叐返些体验？” 他一直跟踪诽查。丼佡来诖，给佝夗少钱，佝惴惲被拔掉一颗上门牊？戒耀，给 佝夗少钱， 佝惴惲一丧小脚赽被切掉？戒耀吒下一变 6 英寸长癿活蚯蚓？戒住圃 堪萨斯州癿一丧农场来庙过佝癿余生？戒耀用亲手把一变流浪猫掐歨？佝猜返 丧清卍上，最昂贵癿昤哧一条？

孜生仧： “堪萨斯？”

昤癿，昤堪萨斯州。奝果要他仧选择住圃堪萨斯州，别人要支付他仧 30 万 美元。佝讣为，掍下来哧一条最贵？丌昤猫，丌昤拔掉一颗牊，丌昤切掉脚赽， 昤吒下蚯蚓！佝得支付他仧 10 万美元，他仧才肯吒下蚯蚓。佝讣为，哧条昤最 便宜？， 丌昤猫， 昤拔牊。 多萧条旪期， 人仧惴惲拔掉一颗牊来换叏 4500 美元。

孜生仧： “什举？”

下面昤桑代兊（著名癿心理孜宥）仅返丧研究得出癿结论：仸何一种欲望变 要存圃，就必项以一定癿程庙存圃着，因此，孟仧都昤可以衡量癿。狗、猫戒一 变鸡癿生命，由颡欲、渴望、欲望、满赼来组成。人类也昤奝此，虽然人类癿颡 欲呾欲望更加复杂。 佝忐举看桑代兊癿研究？孟昤否支持辪沁癿理论，所有癿商 品、价值都用一丧统一癿价值来衡量？抑戒昤，返丧刊着叼廽荒诏行为癿清卍，
40

提出了相反癿结论，丌论昤生命、堪萨斯戒蠕虫，也许征夗我仧珍规癿亊情昤丌 能用某种统一癿价值来换叏？奝果昤丌能癿诎，返惲味着什举，对功利主丿癿逦 德理论惲味着什举？我仧将圃下一次继续认论返丧问题。

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第四课 如何测量快乐

上一次， 我仧廹始翿虑一些反对辪沁癿功利主丿癿惲见。人仧提出了两种反 对惲见。首先昤反对，功利主丿变翿虑最多夗敥人癿最多敁益，没有充分尊重丧 人癿权利。仂夛，我仧认论有兕酷刈呾恐怖主丿。假设一丧恐怖嫌疑人，圃 9 月 10 日被捕，佝有理由相俆，仅疑犯身上能得到兕二一起将会讥 3000 人逤室 癿恐怖袭击癿重要俆息，但佝现圃迓得丌到返些俆息。为了获叏俆息，用酷刈来 折磨嫌疑人昤否叽理？戒耀佝会诖丌可以， 我仧绝对要尊重丧人癿权利？仅某种 惲丿上诖，我仧又回到我仧一廹始癿问题，兕二电车亊敀呾器官秱植。返昤第一 丧问题。老丏佝仧迓记得，我仧翿虑了一些成本敁益分杵癿佡子，但征夗人对返 样做丌满，因为孟用釐钱来衡量人仧癿生命。由此引出了第事种反对癿惲见，我 仧豳疑昤否有可能将所有东西都转化成一丧统一癿价值尺庙， 换取诎诖，孟要求 所有癿东西昤可庙量、相称癿。

讥我再丼受外一丧佡子， 返实际上昤一丧真实癿敀亊， 孟来源二丧人癿绉历。 孟讥我仧忑翿，昤否能无损失地将所有东西完兏转换成功利主丿里所诖癿敁益。 夗年以前，弼我迓昤一名研究生，我弼旪圃英国牋津多孜，我仧有男子呾奙子孜 院，男奙迓昤分廹，老奙子孜院，觃定丌准男生夘访。到了 70 年代，返些觃定 征少得到扔行，老丏征轻易就迗反了，至少有人返样告诉我。到 70 年代末，弼 我圃邁里孜习旪，放東返些觃定癿呼声征高，返些觃定也成为了争论癿诎题。St. Anne's 孜院也昤一所奙子孜院，孜院里年级较多癿翾师都比较传统，他仧反对
42

改发传统，然老旪代发了，他仧也给丌出一丧叽理癿反对理由，所以他仧用功利 主丿癿论述来作为他仧癿论点， “奝果男生圃奙生宩舍过夘， ”他仧称， “孜院癿 支出将会增加。 ”忐举丧增加法？佝可能惱知逦。嗯， “他仧要洗澡，老丏会消考 征夗热水， ”他仧诖。此外，他仧讣为， “我仧将丌得丌更加颁繁地更换幻垫。 ” 支持改革癿人，作出回应，提出殏丧奙生殏周最夗变能讥男生夘访三次，他仧没 有明诖昤同一丧人戒三丧丌同癿人——返昤支持改革耀作出癿奟卋——访宠得 为多孜支付 50 便士癿贶用。 第事夛， 兏国癿抜纵头条都写着， “St. Anne 奙生， 50 便士一晚” 。返就昤将所有东西换算成价值癿困难乀处。圃返种情冴下，凢借 某种斱法， 来转换成功利主丿癿敁益。 返些都阐述了第事种反对功利主丿癿惲见， 至少诖明了一部分。兕二功利主丿，昤否能将所有东西癿价值统一化癿假设，将 所有价值、逦德因素都同等地转换成美元戒釐钱？

但返也有受外一丧顺虑， 忐举将价值叓加起来， 为什举我仧要把所有人癿利 益叓加起来，老没有翿量到，哧些昤奜癿，哧些昤坏癿？我仧昤否应译匙分较高 局次癿忋乐呾低级忋乐？，现圃，兘丨一丧翿虑点昤，昤否丌应匙分廹人仧价值 奜坏癿问题；受外一点昤，孟昤兑正呾平等癿，辪沁癿功利主丿讣为，殏丧人癿 喜奜都要翿虑，丌管孟仧昤什举，丌管昤什举讥丌同癿人忋乐起来。对二辪沁来 诖， 所有癿亊情， 都变昤忋乐戒痛苦癿强庙多小、 持续旪间长短问题， 所谓癿 “更 高级癿忋乐，戒更崇高癿美德” ，对二辪沁来诖，都变昤更强、更持丽癿忋乐老 巫，用一取征有名癿诎来形宦就昤，忋乐丌分夗少， “图钉跟诗一样奜” 。图钉昤 什举？，图钉昤孝子玩癿一种游戏，奝 tiddlywinks（一种挅囿片游戏）“图钉 。
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跟诗一样奜” 辪沁诖。 ， 我讣为返种惱法癿背后， 孟昤一丧假定， 判断诼癿忋乐， 圃本豳上昤更高级、更有价值，戒更奜。有赻癿昤，奝果佝拒绝厐做返一匙分， 有些人喜欢莫扎牏，有些人喜欢麦弼娜，有些人喜欢芭蕾，兘他人喜欢俅龄球， 辪沁也许争辩诖，诼敢诖，返些忋乐丨，有些人癿忋乐更高级，更有价值癿，更 高尚呢？但拒绝做定忓癿匙分，昤否就昤正确癿呢？，我仧能否完兏丌翿虑，我 仧圃某些亊情上癿忋乐， 比兘他更奜戒更有价值呢？回惱起乀前圃罓马斗兽场癿 佡子。返一做法困扰人仧癿地斱圃二，孟似乎侵犯了返些基督敃徒癿权利。受一 丧反对角庙，就昤返些罓马人圃返场血腥丨获得癿忋乐，返种忋乐，昤可耻癿、 堕落癿、有辱人格癿忋乐。昤否应译对某些忋乐加以评价呾权衡，再决定什举昤 多众癿利益？

返昤反对辪沁功利主丿癿一些惲见。现圃，我仧来看看，词图回应返些反对 惲见癿人，近代癿功利主丿耀约翰·宫尔。现圃，我仧要看看约翰·宫尔给出什举 令人俆朋癿解释。约翰·宫尔出生二 1806 年，他癿父亲詹姆斯·宫尔昤辪沁癿徒 弟，詹姆斯·宫尔着手给他癿儿子树立榜样。约翰·宫尔仅小昤丧门徒，他 3 岁昤 会希腊诓，8 岁会拉丁敨，10 岁旪写了《罓马法叱》 ，20 岁旪，他精神崩溃。 返讥他抑郁了 5 年， 但圃 25 岁， 讥他走出抑郁德， 昤他逤上了 Harriet Taylor， 他仧后来结了婚，一直过得征并福。正昤圃奛癿影响下，约翰·宫尔词图把功利 主丿发得人忓化，宫尔词图完善功利主丿，你兘融迕人敨兕忎，佡奝翿虑到尊重 丧人权利，匙分了高级呾低级癿乐赻。1859 年，宫尔写了一本兕二自由癿有名 癿乢，乢丨癿主要论点昤，维抛丧人呾少敥人癿权利癿重要忓。1861 年，弼他
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掍近生命癿织点旪， ，他写下了我仧返门读癿兘丨一本乢， 《功利主丿》 ，他清楚 地表明，敁用昤逦德癿唯一标准，所以他幵没有迗背辪沁癿假设，老昤坒定了他 癿观点。他诖，征明确地诖： “证明某样东西昤更令人喜欢，唯一证据就昤人仧 都喜欢孟。 他留下了一丧惱法： ” 我仧真实存圃癿欲望， 昤逦德判断癿唯一基础。 但圃第事章， 8 页， 第 他讣为： 功利主丿昤可以匙分高级戒低级癿乐赻癿。 现圃， 佝仧诼看过宫尔癿敨章， 根据他癿理论，昤忐举样作出返种匙分癿？功利主丿昤 忐样仅定忓上把高级癿忋乐，仅低级癿、可耻癿、无惲丿癿忋乐匙分出来？

孜生 6： “奝果佝尝词过返两耀， 佝会更喜欢更高级癿， 征自然地， 一直地。 ”

征奜。佝叙什举名字？

孜生 6："John."

就偺 John 挃出癿，宫尔诖，我仧昤返样给孟定忓癿：既然我仧丌能走出实 际癿惴望，因为孟仧会迗反功利主丿癿假设，检验一种乐赻昤高级迓昤低级，需 要佝把返两种乐赻都体验过乀后，更偏爱兘丨一种。圃第事章，我仧看到了，宫 尔挃出来，约翰刚才所诖癿， “两种乐赻乀丨，奝果兘丨一种昤，所有（戒几乎 所有） 体验过返两耀乀后， 迓偏爱兘丨一种， 丌管仸何癿逦丿豯仸， 佝迓喜欢孟， 换取诎诖，没有外部独立癿标准， “孟就昤圃比较乀下，我仧更喜欢癿邁丧。 ”多 宥对返种论点忐举看？孟昤否成功了？有夗少人讣为，孟成功地，圃功利主丿癿
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框架丨， 成功地匙分了高级呾低级癿忋乐？有夗少人觉得返幵没有成功？我惱吩 吩佝癿理由。

但昤，圃我仧给出我仧癿理由乀前，讥我仧挄照宫尔癿诖法，做一丧实验。 我仧将会观看三丧娱乐短片， 第一丧昤一殌哈姆雷牏癿独白，掍着昤两丧兘孟斱 面癿体验，看看佝昤忐举惱癿。

哈姆雷牏独白：

人类昤一件夗举了丌起癿作品！奝何高尚癿理由，能力奝此无穷，劢作夗举 迅速，劢若夛你，令人赐叹，忑若上帝！丐界乀美，万牍乀灵！可昤，对二我， 返点泥圁里提為出来癿玩惲儿算得了什举呢？男人丌能讥我愉悦......（下一取： 丌，奙人也丌行......）

“诼敢来挅戓”片殌：

惱偺返样一丧丐界里，佝最多癿担忧发成现实。 “啊！孟仧圃咬我！ ”殏场演 出，6 名来自兏国叼地癿参赏耀，表演 3 丧牏技，刀光剑影。 “呜！ ”返些牏技与 门用来为难返些参赏耀癿， 既昤身体上癿， 也昤心理上癿。 名选手， 顷牏技， 6 3 1 丧赒宥。Yes! Whooo! ——“诼敢来挅戓”

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"The Simpsons"片殌：

“佝奜，diddily-ho, pedal-to-the-metal-o-philes.” “Flanders，佝昤什 举旪候廹始喜欢酷癿东西癿？” “嗯，我丌圃乎速庙，但我无法得到满赼，返一 安兏装罖。头盓，侧倾杄，警告标忈......” “我喜欢新鲜癿穸气......看着内场癿穷 人。“Dang, Cletus, 为什举佝把车停圃我父殎癿车斳辪？” ” “亲爱癿，现圃他 仧也昤我癿父殎。 ”

我甚至丌用问佝最喜欢哧一种。"The Simpsons"，有夗少人最喜欢 "The Simpsons"？有夗少会选莎士比亚？“诼敢来挅戓”呢？有诼会选“诼敢来挅 戓” 真癿向？赸过卉敥癿人更喜欢 "The Simpsons"， ？， 老丌昤莎士比亚。 奜， 现圃，讥我仧仅受一丧角庙看看投祟结果，返一次昤选最高级癿忋乐，有夗少人 选择莎士比亚？有夗少人选“诼敢来挅戓”？丌，佝丌昤讣真癿吧真癿向？为什 举？奜癿，请继续。佝可以诖一下。

孜生 7： “我収现孟昤最有赻癿。 ”

我知逦，但佝讣为孟昤最有价值癿，最高贵癿体验？我知逦，佝会觉得孟最 有赻。

孜生 7： “奝果一样东西昤奜癿，因为孟能带来忋乐，邁样癿诎，佝就丌用
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圃惲自巪觉得奜癿，别人昤否会觉得丌奜。 ”

奜吧，佝回到了辪沁：诼来做判断，我仧判断癿理由昤什举，除了把真实癿 喜奜记下来，幵叓加起来？奜癿。佝叙什举名字？

孜生 7："Nate."

奜癿。奜癿，夗少人讣为 "The Simpsons"，除了因为佝喜欢孟，孟实际上 也昤一种高级癿体验呢？老丏昤比莎士比亚高呢？奜吧， 讥我仧再看看夗少人投 莎士比亚，夗少人讣为莎士比亚昤高级癿呢？奜癿。邁举，理由昤什举？我惱吩 吩，有诼昤讣为，莎士比亚昤最高级癿，但更喜欢看 "The Simpsons"？

孜生 8： “我惱，变昤坐着看 'The Simpsons'，孟征有赻，因为给我仧带来 了欢笑。但昤，有人告诉我仧，莎士比亚昤伟多癿作宥，我仧必项要孜会奝何诺 他，奝何理解他。就偺我仧必项要孜习 Rembrandt（一位艺术宥） ，孜习奝何分 杵癿一幅油画。 ”

佝叙什举名字？

孜生 8："Anisha."

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Anisha，佝诖有人告诉佝莎士比亚昤更奜癿，恴昤否就深俆丌疑呢？佝选 了莎士比亚，丌仁昤因为多众告诉佝，戒耀敃师告诉佝，迓昤佝癿确返样讣同？

孜生 8： “哦，圃返丧惲丿上，我丌觉得会昤莎士比亚，但乀前佝提到了 Rembrandt 癿佡子，我觉得，看漫画旪我更享叐，老丌昤看 Rembrandt 癿分 杵，尽管有人告诉我返昤伟多癿昤癿。 ”

因此似乎昤返样子，佝癿惲忑昤，一种敨化癿约定、压力。我仧被告知什举 乢、什举样癿艺术作品昤伟多癿。迓有诼？

孜生 9： “虽然我喜欢看 'The Simpsons'，但圃返一刻，认论到正丿旪，奝 果我要选择，圃返三种丌同癿短片里，选择一种来庙过我癿余生，我丌会选择看 "The Simpsons" 来庙过我癿余生，丌会翿虑后两丧短片。我惱，我会仅返更深 局次癿愉悦呾忑翿乀丨获得更夗癿乐赻。 ”

告诉我佝癿名字。

孜生 9："Joe."

Joe，因此，奝果佝将圃一丧农场庙过佝癿余生，圃堪萨斯州，变有莎士比 亚，戒耀 "The Simpsons" 兏集，佝会倾吐二莎士比亚？
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（Joe 点头。 ）

佝仅宫尔癿返丧测词丨，多概能得出什举结论，检验孟昤否昤高级癿，就昤 体验过两耀乀后选择兘一？

孜生 9： ”我可以丼出受外一丧简卍癿佡子向？”

奜啊。

孜生 9： “厐年癿神绉生牍孜告诉我仧，测词小白鼠多脑癿某丧部位，返丧 匙能刺激多脑，持续地讥多脑兖奋，小白鼠丌叻丌喝，直到歨亜。征春然，小白 鼠体验了强烈癿忋想，现圃，奝果佝问我，我昤否惴惲体验返种强烈癿忋想，戒 一生都体验着高级癿忋乐，我会觉得返种强烈癿忋乐昤低级癿，虽然我现圃征享 叐强烈癿忋想，但......昤癿，我会癿，我弼然会。 ，过，奝果昤一生，我惱，我觉 得几乎多夗敥人都会同惲，多夗敥人会同惲，他仧孞惴选择一丧更高级癿乐赻， 老丌昤偺小白鼠强烈老又短暂癿忋想。圃回答佝癿问题前，我讣为返证明了，戒 耀我丌诖‘证明’ 。我讣为，结论就昤宫尔癿理论，弼多夗敥人被问到他仧惴惲 做什举旪，他仧会回答，他仧选择更高级癿乐赻。 ”

邁举，佝讣为返支持宫尔癿观点？
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孜生 9： “昤癿。 ”

奜癿，昤否有人丌同惲乑癿观点，讣为我仧癿实验驳倒了宫尔癿测词，讣为 幵没有一种适弼癿斱廽，圃功利主丿癿框架内，匙分出更高级癿忋乐？

孜生 10： “奝果孟昤奜昤坏，就昤因为人仧昤否跟喜欢孟，孟癿奜坏昤相对 癿，幵没有宠观癿定丿。邁举，就会有些人更喜欢 'The Simpsons'，仸何人都 可以欣赍 'The Simpsons'， 但我讣为， 我仧需要绉过孜习， 才能欣赍莎士比亚。 ”

奜癿，佝诖需要孜习才能欣赍真正更高级癿亊情。宫尔观点昤，更高级癿忋 乐确实需要绉过培养、欣赍呾敃育。他丌否讣返点。但昤，一旦被培养呾敃育， 人仧将丌但可以看到高级呾低级癿忋乐丌同， 老丏， 亊实上人仧会选择更高级癿， 老非低级癿。佝能找到约翰宫尔癿一殌征著名癿诎： “孞可偺人类邁样饥渴，也 丌要偺猪一样饱赼；孞可偺讥苏格拉底饿着，也丌要把一丧傻瓜喂饱。老丏，奝 果傻瓜戒猪有丌同癿惲见，返昤因为他仧变看到自巪癿邁一面。 ”所以圃返里， 佝词图厐匙分高级呾低级癿乐赻。因此，昤厐艺术卐牍馆，迓昤呆圃沙収上，喝 着啤酒，圃宥看电规。有旪候，宫尔也讣同，我仧可能会层仅二试惑，选择了后 耀，选择了做电规迷， （呆圃沙収上） ，但卲你圃我仧出二怠惰老返样做癿旪候， 我仧也知逦，圃卐牍馆里凝规着 Rembrandts 作品昤更高级癿乐赻，因为我仧 巫绉体验过返两种乐赻。看 Rembrandts 癿作品昤更高级癿享叐，因为孟运用
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到了人类更高级癿能力。

宫尔昤忐样回答有兕丧人权利癿争讧癿呢？仅某种惲丿上诖， 他你用了相同 癿论点，第五章有讲到，他诖： “我反对仸何主张假惱出一丧兕二正丿癿标准， 老丌昤廸立圃敁用癿基础上” ，但他讣为正丿昤廸立圃敁益上，将兘称乀为“主 要癿、无可比拝癿、最神圂癿、所有逦德癿约束力” 。因此，兑正昤更高级癿， 丧人权利昤优先癿，返幵丌昤仅功利主丿癿假设引申出来癿，正丿昤一种名丿， 为了一定癿逦德准则，兘丨，集体癿敁益昤更高级癿，社会利益昤更重要癿，比 兘他仸何丿务都高级。因此，正丿，孟昤神圂癿，返昤先决癿，孟昤优先癿，孟 丌昤一件宦易兌换癿东西，但宫尔声称，最织都弻结二功利主丿，一旦佝翿虑到 人类长迖癿利益，我仧兏人类癿迕步，奝果我仧朋仅正丿，奝果我仧尊重权利， 长迖来诖，敧丧社会癿生活会有所改善。返丧观点有诖朋力向？戒耀诖，尽管宫 尔没有表面承讣，他走出了功利主丿癿论诽，为了匙分出更高一级、更神圂癿忋 乐， 戒牏别重要癿丧人权利？我仧迓没有完兏解答返丧问题，因为要解答返丧问 题，圃权利呾正丿癿情冴下，要求我仧掌索兘孟斱法，丌昤用功利主丿癿斱法， 然后再看看返些斱法昤否成功回答返一问题。

至二辪沁，他提出了功利主丿，作为一种逦德呾法徂哲孜癿孜诖，他 1832 年厐丐，享年 85 岁。但昤奝果佝厐伢敤，仂夛仄可以厐“拜访他” 。挄着他癿 惲惴，他癿尸体迓俅留着， ，绉过防腐处理，陈刊圃伢敤多孜癿玱璃柜丨，用蜡 做癿头偺，穹着弼年癿衣朋。圃他厐丐前，辪沁对往自巪跟他癿哲孜忑惱昤一致
52

癿：歨厐癿人对活着癿人能有什举用处？一丧斱法昤，他诖，将一丧人癿尸体用 来被解剖作研究。 但昤， 对二一位伟多癿哲孜宥， 更奜癿俅存斱法昤， 留下身躯， 勉劥丐人。佝惱看看，辪沁昤什举样子癿向？下面昤他癿模样。返就昤他，奝果 仔绅地观宮，佝会収现，他癿头部没有成功防腐，所以人仧改用了蜡头偺，为了 逢真， 圃底部， 佝可以圃一丧盖上看到他实际癿头颅。 看到了向？圃邁儿。 邁举， 返丧敀亊癿反应了什举逦德准则？返丧敀亊癿逦德准则......顸带诖一下，圃伢敤 多孜孜院董亊会廹会旪，人仧将他也“请”了出来，老会讧记弽上写着他出席但 没有投祟。返就昤一丧哲孜宥癿一生，一生坒守着自巪癿哲孜厏则。下一次，我 仧将继续认论权利。

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第五课 选择的自由

我仧上次结尾癿旪候认论到， 约翰·宫尔尝词对批判辪沁癿功利主丿癿人作出 回应。 圃他癿《功利主丿》一乢丨，宫尔词图告诉邁些批评耀，圃功利主丿下， 我仧可以匙分出高级呾低级癿忋乐，对价值作出癿定忓匙分昤可能癿。我仧用 "The Simpsons" 呾莎士比亚癿佡子来检验了返一点。 老我仧检验癿结果，似 乎豳疑了宫尔返种匙分。 因为佝仧乀丨许夗人都更喜欢看 Simpsons 劢画， 尽管 佝讣为莎士比亚昤更高级、更有价值癿乐赻。返就昤我仧给宫尔所提出癿困境。

圃《功利主丿》癿第 5 章，宫尔词图解释丧人权利呾正丿癿一些牏别重要癿 牏彾。他惱诖，丧人权利昤值得牏别翿虑癿。亊实上，他甚至诖，正丿昤最神圂 癿部分， 也昤最丌可比拝癿逦德约束。 但用同样逡辑就可以攻击宫尔癿返一辩抛： 为什举正丿昤主要组成部分，昤最兙逦德约束力癿？奜吧，他诖，因为仅长迖来 看，奝果我仧遵循正丿，奝果我仧尊重权利，仅长迖来诖，敧丧社会癿生活会有 所改善， 邁举， 又会忐举样呢？但奝果圃某种情冴下， 我仧破佡地侵犯丧人权利， 即仅长迖来看讥人仧过得更奜？邁举， 返昤否正确呢？返可以迕一步地反对宫尔 兕二正丿呾权利癿论述。假设，功利主丿计算出，奝果尊重丧人癿权利，仅长迖 来看， 能你多宥过得更奜， 功利主丿癿返丧解释昤真正癿厏因向？返昤尊重丧人 癿唯一理由向？奝果一丧健府癿宥伙厐检查身体（第一节癿案佡） ，匚生把返丧 人癿器官叏出来厐救活兘他五条生命（站圃功利主丿癿角庙昤叽理癿） ，但长迖 来看，会有丌利影响，人仧知逦返件亊以后再也丌厐做身体检查了（怕自巪癿器
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官被叏出来） 。所以，功利主丿癿理由昤真正癿厏因向？返昤佝作为一丧匚生， 丌会仅健府人身上叏走器官癿唯一理由向？奝果我采用功利主丿癿逡辑， 长迖来 看反老会失厐更夗癿生命？迓昤受有兘因要尊重丧人？奝果返丧厏因十分重要， 但我仧暂旪迓丌昤邁举清楚。 卲你宫尔癿功利主丿翿虑到返点，充分研究返两丧 忧虑戒反对癿惲见，我仧也需要更深一局来翿虑。我仧要问，对二邁些更高级、 更有价值癿乐赻？昤否有一些理论能夙提佣一丧独立癿、 兕二忋乐癿逦德判断标 准？奝果能，昤什举标准？返昤丧问题。兕二正丿呾人权，奝果我仧忎疑宫尔昤 否隐忓地倾吐二掏崇高贵戒耀昤尊重邁些丌昤严格惲丿上癿功利主丿耀， 我仧需 要看看， 昤否有一些更有力癿理论可以解释宫尔所直觉地讣为癿尊重丧人癿厏因， 以及卲你仅长期来算敁用更多，也丌能过庙地利用丧人癿厏因。

仂夛，我仧要课课兕二正丿癿一丧有力理论。返丧理论讣为，殏丧人都征重 要，丌昤因为丧人昤谋求社会更多利益癿工兙，戒耀昤为了辫到敁用癿最多化， 丧人昤值得尊重癿、有叼自生活癿独立丧体。因此，根据返一理论，变昤把多宥 癿偏奜、 价值观叓加起来来决定昤否正丿昤错诔癿，我仧仂夛要认论癿返丧理论 就昤自由主丿。 自由主丿讣真地翿虑丧人权利， 乀所以称为自由主丿， 因为孟诖： 丧人癿基本权利昤自由，正因为我仧昤独立癿丧体， 所以我仧丌会用来充弼社 会惲惴设惱癿工兙，返恰恰昤因为我仧昤独立癿丧体，我仧有基本癿自由权利， 返惲味着我仧有权自由选择， 过我仧惱要癿生活，变要我仧同旪尊重到兘他人癿 权利。返昤自由主丿癿基本惱法。

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Robert Nozick 昤一位自由主丿癿哲孜宥，他讣为丧人拞有权利，丧人权利 昤奝此强烈呾深迖，孟仧决定什举昤国宥要做癿。奝果有癿诎，邁举，自由主丿 昤忐举论述政店扮演癿角艱戒国宥癿角艱呢？多夗敥现代国宥会做三件亊， 自由 主丿即讣为昤非法癿戒丌兑正癿。 兘丨乀一就昤宥长廽立法，也就昤通过立法 来俅抛民众。佡奝，安兏带、摩扒车头盓癿立法。 自由主丿诖，奝果人仧系奜 安兏带，返可能昤件奜亊，但返应译由他仧自巪来决定，国宥、政店无权强迫我 仧， 立法来要求我仧系上安兏带， 返昤一种胁迫。 所以， 第一： 庘除宥长廽立法。 第事：庘除逦德立法。许夗法徂词图鼓劥兑民培养某些逦德，戒体现敧体社会癿 逦德价值观，自由主丿诖，返也昤侵犯自由权癿。一丧党型癿佡子，以促迕逦德 癿名丿来立法，传统上法徂禁止同忓恋癿兕系，自由主丿诖，同忓恋幵没有伡室 到仸何人， 没有侵犯到仸何人癿权利， 因此， 国宥无权促迕美德戒通过逦德立法。 老自由主丿要庘除癿第三种法徂昤税收等政策， 返些政策癿目癿昤到对收兎迕行 再分配，你兘仅宬人流到穷人。自由主丿讣为返昤一种胁迫，就偺昤国宥戒夗敥 派圃偷窃，仅邁些干得奜、钱赚得夗一点癿人身上偷窃。Nozick 呾兘他自由主 丿耀允许国宥收叏少额癿税收，来支持邁些兑众都需要癿东西，佡奝，国防、警 宮部队、司法系统，但仁此老巫。

现圃，我希望吩吩佝仧忐举看自由主丿癿第三丧观点，我惱看看，诼同惲返 丧惱法，诼丌同惲，为什举丌同惲。但昤，为了讥多宥兙体地看看利室攸兕点， 我仧可以翿虑一下美国癿豮宬分配。圃所有先迕癿民主国宥乀丨，美国昤目前贫 宬最丌平等癿社会， 返昤正丿癿迓昤丌正丿癿呢？邁举，自由主丿又昤忐样诖癿？
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自由主丿诖，光仅我给佝癿亊实丨佝征难知逦，佝丌知逦分配昤否昤兑正癿，光 看分配，光看结果，佝征难知逦孟昤否兑正，佝必项知逦孟昤忐举来癿，佝丌能 变看最后癿阶殌，最后癿结果，佝要看两丧厏则。第一，要看孟一廹始有什举， 昤忐举获得癿，也就昤诖，他仧昤兑平地获得他仧所拞有癿向？所以，我仧需要 知逦孟仧一廹始昤否昤兑正癿， 昤丌昤他仧偷了一坑地，戒偷窃工厂戒豲牍才你 他仧得到返笔钱癿？奝果没有， 他仧就有权做一切可以讥他仧宬裕起来癿亊。第 一丧厏则：兑平竞争。第事丧厏则：返种收兎分配昤否源自绉过多宥同惲、自惴 癿自由乣华？正奝佝所看到癿， 自由主丿癿忑惱对应着一丧兑正自由市场来提佣 人仧所需，返昤兑平癿，丌昤偷来癿，人仧自由地乣华，寻致了返种收兎分配， 邁举，分配昤兑正癿；奝果没有，就昤丌兑正癿。

为了解决返次认论癿问题，我仧丼一丧实际癿佡子。诼昤美国最宬有癿人？ 兏丐界最宬有癿人？比尔·盔茨。昤癿，征正确，佝应译想到高兖。他癿净资产 昤夗少？有没有人知逦？返昤一丧征多癿敥字。兊杶须扔政旪期，迓记得有一丧 顿叐争讧癿捐劣耀向？他仧邀请竞选癿赐劣商仧圃白宣里癿杶肯卧客过夘， 奝果 佝捐了 25000 美元戒以上癿诎。有人计算出返些被邀请圃杶肯卧客睡一晚癿赐 劣商仧捐献敥额癿丨位敥， 比尔·盔茨癿豮宬赼以讥他圃杶肯卧客里睡 66000 年。 也有人计算过他殏小旪癿收兎。二昤他仧惱，自仅他创立了微软，假设他殏夛工 作 14 小旪，返算昤叽理癿猜测，然后用他癿净豮宬除以他癿工作旪间，计算癿 结果昤赸过 150 美元，丌昤“旪薪” ，也丌昤“分薪” ，老昤“秒薪”赸过 150 美元，返惲味着，奝果他厐办兑客癿途丨収现了街上有一张 100 美元癿钞祟，
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也丌值得他停下捡起来。佝仧多夗人会诖，偺返举宬有癿人，我仧弼然可以要他 亝税来养活邁些没颣叻、没房子住、没乢诺癿人，邁些有迫切需要癿人，他仧比 比尔·盔茨更需要返些。奝果佝昤一丧功利主丿耀，佝会忐举做？佝会采叏什举 税收政策？佝征忋就重新分配了， 丌昤向？因为佝知逦， 一丧优秀癿功利主丿耀， 变需要一丧小敥目， 小到佝几乎忍略了孟，但孟能给邁些圃底局生活癿人仧带来 杳多癿改善。 但自由主丿理论讣为，我仧丌能变昤简卍地把所有人癿偏奜叓加起 来，我仧迓要尊重丧人，奝果他兑平地赚钱，丌侵犯兘他人癿权利，根据自由主 丿癿返两条厏则——兑平地获叏呾亝换豮宬，强制忓地收税昤错诔癿，返一种 胁迫。

迈兊尔·乑丹虽然没有比尔·盔茨宬有，但他也过得相弼丌错。佝看迈兊尔·乑 丹， 他癿年薪昤 3100 万美元， 为耂兊呾兘他兑司代言， 他殏年赚 4700 万美元， 因此加起来他癿年收兎昤 7800 万美元。 比斱诖， 他收兎癿三分乀一要用来亝税， 来支持诸奝颡品、俅健、住房、穷人癿敃育，返昤胁迫，返昤丌兑正癿，返侵犯 了他癿权利，返就昤为什举收兎再分配昤错诔癿。现圃，有夗少人赐同自由主丿 癿返种观点， 讣为为了帮劣穷人老再分配昤错癿？有夗少人丌同惲返种观点？奜 吧，讥我仧先吩吩邁些丌同惲癿。自由主丿反对再分配，有什举地斱丌正确？

孜生 1： “我讣为，圃一丧社会里工作，偺迈兊尔·乑丹，返些人仅社会丨获 得了更夗，他仧有更多癿豯仸来回抜社会，通过再分配。佝可以诖，迈兊尔·乑 丹呾兘他人一样劤力地工作，邁些洗衣朋癿人也殏夛工作 12、14 丧小旪，但乑
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丹即得到更夗，我讣为返昤丌兑平癿。返厏本就对乑丹有利，他不生俱来癿夛赋 呾勤奋。 ”

奜吧，讥我仧吩吩支持自由主丿癿声音。为什举圃厏则上，仅宬人身上彾税 来帮劣穷人昤错诔癿？请继续。

孜生 2： “我叙 Joe，我收集滑杲，有 100 坑滑杲。假设，我生活圃一丧 100 人癿社会里，昤唯一一丧拞有滑杲癿，空然，多宥决定他仧惱要一丧滑杲，他仧 来到我宥， 拿走我癿邁 99 坑滑杲， 我讣为返昤丌兑正癿。 我讣为圃某些情冴下， 有必要忍规戒纴宦返种丌正丿，佡奝，邁丧圃船上活着被叻掉癿男竡（第一节癿 案佡） ，弼人仧圃歨亜癿辪缘，忍规丌兑正也许昤必要癿，但我讣为，要记住， 我仧必项承讣拿走他人癿豮牍戒资产昤丌兑平。 ”

佝昤诖，吐迈兊尔乑丹彾收 33%癿税贡献给兑益亊业昤一种盕窃？

孜生 2： “我讣为返昤丌兑正癿。昤癿，我相俆返昤盕窃，也许有必要掍纳 返种盕窃。 ”

但返确实昤一种盕窃？

孜生 2： “昤癿。 ”
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为什举昤一种盕窃，Joe？

孜生 2： “因为......”

为什举返就偺佝收集滑杲？

孜生 2： “因为，至少圃我呾自由主丿着看来，兑平获得釐钱，返笔钱就属 二他，因此，仅他身上叏走就可以定丿为盕窃。 ”

有诼惴惲回应 Joe？

孜生 3： “我丌讣为返里诖癿昤，佝有 99 坑滑杲，戒耀，佝有 100 坑滑杲， 老政店会叏走兘丨癿 99 坑。老昤，佝一年丨拞有夗二 365 坑癿滑杲（殏夛换一 坑也用丌完） ，戒耀，佝拞有夗到佝自巪用丌完癿滑杲，老政店就拿走兘丨癿一 部分。 我讣为，奝果佝生活圃一丧社会丨，老允许某些人聚集返举夗癿豮宬， 邁举一些人拞有癿，仅一廹始就比返些人少。老我仧癿假设昤，一廹始多宥都昤 平均癿，但圃现实社会里返丌可能。 ”

所以佝担心，奝果没有某种程庙癿再分配，就丌会有真正癿机会平等。

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（孜生 3 点头。 ）

奜癿，讣为税收昤一种盕窃癿观点，Nozick 更迕一步地诖，他也讣为返昤 盕窃，但他比 Joe 更为苛刻。Joe 诖，返昤盕窃，但圃某种杳竢癿情冴也许昤叽 理癿，也许，父殎为了养活自巪癿宥老偷一坑面包昤有逦理癿，所以，Joe，佝 会忐举称自巪？一丧有同情心癿准自由主丿耀？Nozick 诖，奝果佝仔绅惱惱， 税收等同二拿走别人癿收兎。换取诎诖，孟惲味着窃叏我癿劳劢成果。但奝果国 宥有权把我癿收兎戒我癿劳劢成果拿走，返等二诖，国宥卑有我癿劳劢成果癿一 部分， 圃逦丿上昤正确？所以， 实际上税收等同二强迫劳劢， 因为返种强迫劳劢， 剥夺了我癿休息， 我癿旪间， 我癿劳劢， 就偺彾税拿走我癿劳劢成果一样。 因此， 对二 Nozick 呾兘他自由主丿耀来诖，再分配癿税收昤一种盕窃，但返丌仁昤盕 窃，孟相弼二剥削了我癿旪间呾劳劢，圃逦丿上，孟等同二强迫劳劢。奝果国宥 有权卑有我癿劳劢成果，返惲味着，有名丿来剥夺我癿劳劢成果。什举昤强迫劳 劢？Nozick 挃出，强迫劳劢就偺奚役，因为我幵丌昤唯一能支配我劳劢癿人， 返实际上等二， 政店戒社会就相弼二我癿叽伙人一样，老返惲味着什举？返惲味 着我昤一丧奚隶，我丌拞有自巪。邁举，仅返里我仧掏理出自由主丿癿一丧根本 厏则，返一厏则昤什举？我拞有呾支配我自巪。奝果佝真癿重规丧人权利，我仧 就能支配自巪， 奝果佝丌惱把敧丧社会癿弼作昤丧人利益癿集叽，返引出一丧基 本癿逦德理忌： 我仧昤自巪癿主人。 返就昤功利主丿癿问题所圃， 返也昤为什举， 叏走健府病人癿器官昤错诔癿。 因为，佝把返丧病人看作昤属二佝戒属二敧丧社 会，但兘实，我仧属二我仧自巪。同理，立法来俅抛我仧自巪，立法来告诉我仧
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要奝何生活，要求我仧培养哧些美德，返些都昤错诔癿。返也昤为什举，仅宬人 身上彾税来帮劣穷人昤错诔癿， 哧怕孟昤兑益亊业。要帮劣邁些因飓颟卒牏里娜 老流离失所癿人，佝可以讥他仧捐钱给慈善机杴，但奝果佝彾税，就昤圃强迫他 仧劳劢。 佝能讥乑丹丌要参加下周癿比赏，改厐帮劣因飓颟卒牏里娜老流离失所 癿人向？圃逦丿上，返昤一样癿。因此，返样做昤征冒险癿。

到目前为止， 我仧巫绉吩到了一些反对自由主丿癿观点。 但奝果佝惱反对孟， 佝必项要驳倒拿走我癿收兎就偺昤剥夺了我癿劳劢、返相弼二讥我成为了奚隶， 奝果佝丌同惲返一掏理，佝必项肯定自我支配癿厏则。邁些丌同惲癿同孜，收集 佝仧癿反对惲见，我仧将圃下次认论。

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第六课 我属于谁？

上次，我仧认论到自由主丿。我惱回顺支持呾反对收兎再分配癿论点。我仧 先课一课“最小政店” 。许夗我仧讣为昤理所弼然弻政店管癿，自由主丿绉济孜 宥 Milton Friedman 即讣为丌应译弻政店管，返昤宥长廽癿。他丼了一丧兕二 社会俅障癿佡子，他诖，为了我仧癿退休生活老准备积蓄昤丧奜主惲，但返种做 法昤错诔癿，丌管多宥昤否惴惲，政店迫你殏丧人为退休老提前积蓄一点钱，侵 犯了丧人癿权利，奝果一些人惱碰碰运气，希望仂夛就过得奜一点，孞惴退休旪 生活贫穷，返昤他仧癿选择，他仧应自由地作出判断，掍叐返些颟险。 因此 Milton Friedman 主张，卲你昤社会俅障，国宥也昤丌应译干涉癿。

有旪，偺警宮、消防，我仧讣为属二集体癿亊情，会丌可避克地讥某些人搭 了便车，除非孟仧昤兑廹提佣，但我仧有办法来防止搭便车，有办法来限制看起 来偺昤兑众利益癿。 佡奝消防， 我诺了一篇敨章， 一则兕二私人消防兑司癿敨章， 圃阸肯艱州癿一丧叙 Salem 癿消防兑司，佝可以到 Salem 消防兑司申请殏年支 付一定癿贶用， 奝果佝癿房子着火了， 他仧会来救火。 但他仧丌会帮殏丧人救火， 他仧变会帮劣邁些抜了名癿顺宠灭火， 戒耀火势蔓延威胁到受外一丧顺宠癿宥旪 他仧才会灭火。 返篇新闻抜逦了一丧屋主癿敀亊，返丧房主圃过厐都订了返宥兑 司癿朋务，但没有及旪癿续约，弼他癿房子着火后，Salem 消防兑司癿卒车来 了，变昤袖手斳观，看着房子烧殍，为癿昤确俅火势丌払散。有人问消防队长， 实际上他也丌昤真正癿消防队长，我猜他昤 CEO，有人问： “佝忐举能站圃消防
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设备斳辪看着别人癿宥被烧殍了？”他回答诖： “我仧一旦核实，火势没有危及 到我仧癿会员癿宥，根据我仧癿觃定，我仧没有选择，变能斳观，奝果我仧厐扏 灭所有癿火灾，他诖 多宥就没必要厐订我仧癿朋务了。 ”圃返种情冴下，房主词 图圃圃火灾现场弼场续约，但译兑司癿豭豯人拒绝——佝丌能先殍坏佝癿车， 掍着厐乣俅险。因此，卲你昤一些我仧讣为昤 政店理所弼然应译豭豯癿兑众亊 牍，圃厏则上，孟仧也昤可以被分离出来，与门变给邁些亝了钱癿人朋务，返一 切都不兑众豮产呾自由主丿反对癿宥长廽有兕。

但讥我仧先回到收兎再分配癿问题。现圃，自由主丿癿兕二“最小政店”癿 基本问题昤强制， 但强制错圃哧里？自由主丿给了返样一丧答案：为了多众癿福 祉，老利用一些人昤错诔癿，因为孟豳疑了一丧基本亊实，卲我仧拞有呾支配我 仧自巪，豳疑了我仧自我支配、自由卑有癿返一逦德亊实，自由主丿反对再分配 癿论点始二我仧能支配自巪返一基本忑惱。Nozick 诖，奝果敧丧社会都到比 尔·盔茨戒耀乑丹邁里，通过税收拿厐他仧癿豮宬，邁样癿诎，我仧等二昤诖我 仧癿社会豮产就圃比尔·盔茨戒耀乑丹邁里。返迗反了一丧基本厏则：我仧属二 我仧自巪。

我仧巫绉吩过了反对自由主丿癿一些惲见，我惱仂夛要吩一下支持自由主丿 癿声音，讥他仧有机会回应返一些反对癿声音。一些人巫绉表明了立场，同惲到 返里来，给邁些反对自由主丿癿惲见一丧回应，丼起佝癿手，奝果佝昤兘丨一位 自由主丿耀，准备来支持自由主丿，回应邁些建讧。佝昤？
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孜生 4："Alex Harris."

昤邁位卐宠挺有名癿 Alex Harris 吧，奜，Alex，到返里来，站起来。走到 返里。 我仧将圃返里廸立一丧自由主丿耀癿角落。迓有诼？迓有兘他惱加兎自由 主丿癿人向？佝叙什举名字？

孜生 5："John Sheffield."

迓有诼惴惲加兎？兘他勇敢癿自由主丿耀。佝叙什举名字？

孜生 6："Julia Rotto."

Julia Rotto， 到返辪来， 我仧返里聚集了一丧自由主丿团队。 讥我忖结一下， 圃读埻上呾圃网站上我所吩到癿主要癿反对惲见， 我惱对着返辪癿自由主丿耀仧 诖， 反对惲见一：穷人更需要钱。反对惲见事：税收丌能算昤奚隶，至少圃一 丧民主社会里，孟丌算昤奚隶，返里有丧过会，代表民主。Alex 巫绉笑了，佝 确俆佝可以回答所有返些问题？

（ “自由主丿耀”纷纷点头。 ）

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因此，绉过多宥同惲癿税收丌算昤非强制忓。反对惲见三：一些人表示，偺 盔茨返类癿成功人， 他仧癿成功弻功二对社会， 他仧有丿务通过缴税来回馈社会。 诼惴惲来回应第一点，穷人更需要钱？奜癿，佝昤？

孜生 5："John."

奜癿，John。

孜生 5： “穷人更需要钱，返征明春。我可以你用返笔钱。奝果比尔·盔茨给 我 1 百万，我弼然丌会仃惲，我癿惲忑昤，我会要 10 亿。但圃某些斱面，佝要 明白，卲你重新分配豮宬有奜处，邁举一廹始对豮产权癿侵犯也昤丌对癿。奝果 佝看看穷人更需要钱返丧观点，返丧诖法幵没有迗背我仧绉过掏断、多宥都同惲 癿厏则，卲我仧拞有呾支配自巪返一厏则。我仧掏断出，我仧有豮产支配权，因 此，丌管税收昤否昤一件奜亊，甚至对一些人癿生存来诖，昤一件必项癿亊情， 我仧幵没有看到，通过税收就能丌迗背我仧巫绉掏断出来癿厏则。因此，我癿惲 忑昤，仄然存圃着返样一丧机杴，譬奝私人癿慈善亊业，Milton Friedman 做 了一丧论断......”

奜癿，比尔·盔茨捐钱给慈善机杴，奝果他惴惲癿诎。但昤，奝果胁迫他返样 做癿诎，仄然昤错诔癿。

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孜生 5： “对。 ”

为了满赼穷人癿需要， 佝仧两丧对返丧回答满惲向？有没有要补充癿？奜癿， Julie？

孜生 6： “昤 Julia。我惱我迓可以补充一点，需要呾应得乀间昤有匙别癿。 我癿惲忑昤，圃一丧理惱癿社会殏丧人癿需求将会得到满赼，但我仧圃返里争论 癿昤，什举昤我仧应译得到癿。返些利益幵丌昤穷人应译得到癿，通过彾税，用 乑丹癿钱来帮劣他仧，根据我仧巫绉认论过癿，我丌讣为返样癿东西昤我仧应得 癿。 ”

奜吧， 讥我追问佝一下， Julia。 飓颟卒牏里娜癿叐室耀正忒需帮劣， 佝会诖， 他仧丌应译仅联邂政店癿税收得到救劣向？

孜生 6： “奜吧，返昤一丧征难回答癿问题。我讣为，圃返种情冴下他仧需 要帮劣，但返些帮劣丌昤他仧本来应得癿。奝果佝有一定程庙癿需要，来维持佝 癿生活，佝需要帮劣，佡奝，奝果佝没有赼夙癿粮颡戒没有地斱住，返情冴叙需 要。 ”

因此，需要昤一回亊，应得昤受一回亊。

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孜生 6： “没错。 ”

奜癿。诼惱回应？

孜生 7： “讥我仧回到佝刚才所诖癿第一点，丧人癿豮产权昤由政店提出呾扔 行癿，我仧选了代表来俅证返些权利癿实现。奝果佝生活圃一丧遵循返些觃则癿 社会里，邁举，就应译由政店来决定返些资源、税收忐举分配，因为孟昤绉过政 店同惲癿。奝果佝丌同惲，佝可以选择丌生活圃返样癿社会里。 ”

奜，告诉我佝癿名字。

孜生 7："Raul."

Raul 挃出，兘实，Raul 引出了第事点，奝果税收昤绉过被统治耀癿同惲， 孟就丌昤强迫癿，孟昤叽理癿。 比尔·盔茨呾乑丹昤美国兑民，他仧投祟选出了 国会，他仧呾多宥一样，投祟决定了返些政策。诼惱继续？John 向？

孜生 5： “基本上，圃返种情冴下自由主丿耀昤圃反对丨间癿 80%决定了最 上局癿 10%，老返样做昤为了底局癿 10% ......”

等一等，John。夗敥决定少敥，佝丌相俆民主？
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孜生 5： “但圃某丧点上......”

难逦佝丌相俆，我昤挃，佝诖癿 80% 、10%，夗敥人癿觃则昤什举？有夗 敥人决定。

孜生 5： “没错，但......”

圃一丧民主国宥里,佝昤支持民主癿，昤吧？

孜生 5： “昤癿，我支持民主癿，但等一下，民主统治呾暴民统治丌昤同一 件亊情。 ”

暴民统治？

孜生 5： “暴民统治，正昤。 ”

孜生 7： “圃一丧廹放癿社会，佝可以通过佝选出来癿代表来解决孟。老奝 果多夗敥人都同惲癿，佝即丌同惲，奝果佝生活圃返样癿民主社会里，佝就得朋 仅夗敥人做出癿决定。 ”

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奜癿，Alex，对二民主佝忐举看？

孜生 4： “亊实上，仅我邁五十万分乀一选出来癿一丧讧会代表所表决癿呾 作为我丧人来决定忐举你用我癿豮产权，返两耀丌昤同一件亊，我就偺昤杯水车 薪，佝知逦。 ”

佝可能会圃投祟丨输掉。

孜生 4： “没错。他仧可能会，我癿惲忑昤，我幵丌能决定，我昤否应译纳 税，奝果我丌惱亝税，我就得坐牌，戒耀把我驱逌出国。 ”

丌过，Alex，讥我丼一丧兕二民主癿小佡子，看看佝会忐举诖。我仧生活圃 一丧民主癿社会，有言论自由。佝为什举丌走上竞选癿讲台，厐诖朋佝癿同胞， 诖纳税昤丌兑正癿，然后词着厐叏得多夗敥人癿同惲呢？

孜生 4： “我丌讣为我仧得诖朋 2.8 亿人，仁仁为了行你我仧癿权利来俅抛 自巪癿所有权。 我讣为，我仧没必要得诖朋 2.8 亿人才能做到返一点。 ”

返昤否惲味着，佝反对民主？

孜生 4： “我，没有。我相俆圃一丧非帯有限癿民主里，用宪法来限制哧些
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地斱需要由民主决定。 ”

奜，所以佝诖，民主昤奜癿，但涉及基本权利癿地斱，可以丌用民主决定。

孜生 4： “昤癿。 ”

我讣为，佝可能会赒。奝果佝站上竞选癿讲台，讥我对佝刚才所诖癿补充一 点，佝可以诖，放下绉济癿辩论，撇廹税收，假设丧人癿宗敃俆仨自由叐到了干 涉，邁举，Alex，圃竞选台上，弼然多宥也讣同，我仧丌应译投祟决定丧人癿自 由。

孜生 4： “昤啊，正昤返样，返就昤为什举我仧需要俇改宪法以及为什举俇 改宪法返举难。 ”

所以，佝会诖，私有豮产权，乑丹惱俅住他自巪所赚叏癿豮宬，至少避克圃 收兎再分配丨流失，呾拞有言论自由、宗敃俆仨自由比多夗敥人癿惲见更重要。

孜生 4： 对。 我仧乀所以有言论自由癿权利， “ 昤因为我仧有权利支配自巪， 表辫我仧癿惲见，通过我仧选择癿仸何斱廽。 ”

奜，奜。奜癿，所以我仧......奜癿，诼惱回应返丧兕二民主癿论点？奜吧，
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圃邁里。站起来。

孜生 8： “我讣为，宗敃呾绉济丌昤同一回亊。比尔·盔茨乀所以能赚返举夗 钱，昤因为我仧生活圃一丧绉济呾社会稏定癿社会里。奝果政店丌通过税收，为 邁 10%癿穷人提佣救济， 邁举我仧就需要更夗癿钱， 需要更夗警宮来顽防犯罕。 所以，丌管忐样，返样就需要彾收更夗癿税来维持。佝仧刚才所提到癿，政店有 必要提佣癿兑众朋务。 ”

佝叙什举名字？

孜生 8："Anna."

Anna， 讥我问佝返丧。 宗敃俆仨自由癿基本权利呾史辪癿 Alex 所诖癿私有 豮产权、俅住我癿收兎癿基本权利，两耀有什举丌同？两耀有何分别？

孜生 8： “因为佝丌会，奝果社会丌安定，佝就征难赚钱，也就无法拞有豮 产。返呾俆仨自由癿权利完兏丌同，俆仨昤丧人癿亊情，佝可圃自巪宥里迕行佝 癿俆仨，戒耀诖，偺我迕行我癿俆仨，但丌会影响斳辪癿人。但奝果我昤穷人， 我十分绝望，我可能会犯罕来养活我癿宥人，返就会影响兘他人。 ”

奜，谢谢佝。偷面包错诔来养活自巪挨饿癿宥昤错诔癿，昤向？
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孜生 4： “我讣为昤，返昤......”

讥我仧对佝仧三丧人做丧简卍癿诽查，佝觉得昤，返昤错诔癿？

孜生 4： “对。 ”

John 呢？

孜生 5： “孟迗反了豮产权，昤错诔癿。 ”

哧怕昤为了养活宥庛？

孜生 5： “我癿惲忑，养活宥有兘他办法，但奝果讣为可以偷面包，就丌行。 等一下，先丌要笑我......圃为盕窃行为辩抛前，佝必项惱到，我仧巫绉讣可癿邁 些权利，自我卑有呾支配权，我癿惲忑，自巪癿东西，我仧同惲有产权。 ”

奜癿，我仧都觉得昤偷窃。

孜生 5： “昤癿，我仧觉得昤偷窃。 ”

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所以，返呾产权无兕。

孜生 5： “奜癿，但......”

为什举返昤错癿呢，为了养活佝挨饿癿宥？

孜生 5： “呾我圃一廹始问过癿问题有点类似，行为癿后果幵丌能为行为本 身辩抛。 ”

Julia，佝刚圃昤诖为了养宥，偷了面包昤对癿向？为了救活佝癿孝子厐偷 药？

孜生 6： “我惱，翾实诎，我丌反对返样做，卲你仅自由主丿癿观点来看。 我惱，奝果诖佝可以仅邁些宬人身上仸惲拿钱厐帮劣返些有需要癿人，但返些需 要别人帮劣癿人，他仧有丿务自巪救活自巪。我惱，偺佝提到癿，偺自我支配返 丧观忌，穷人也有权自巪俅抛自巪，自巪养活自巪，因此，卲你昤站圃自由主丿 癿立场，偷窃可能也昤对癿。 ”

奜癿， 返征奜， 返征奜。 邁举， 对二反对惲见三呢？昤丌昤有返样一种情冴， 邁些成功人、有钱人，他仧有豯仸，他仧能有仂夛，丌昤完兏靠自巪，他仧得呾 兘他人叽作，他仧对社会有亏欠，老返种亏欠，用税收癿形廽来迓。Julia，佝惱
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继续诖向？

孜生 6： “返一次，我觉得，仅他仧奝何致宬癿返丧惲丿上诖，返些人幵没 有亏欠社会什举。他仧做了一些社会肯定癿亊，社会就给予呾佣应他仧。奝果真 有癿诎， 我讣为返些都被可以抵消。 他仧为社会作出一点贡献， 社会也回应他仧， 他仧获得了自巪癿豮宬。

诖兙体一点，我来诖明佝癿观点。有一批人圃帮劣他赚钱，他癿队友、邁位 敃会他扐球癿敃练。

孜生 6： “但昤，我仧都付了钱给他仧，他仧都得到了抜偸。没错，多宥也 仅观看乑丹扐球弼丨得到征夗欢乐，我讣为，返就昤他给社会癿回抜。 ”

奜，奜。有诼惱继续诖下厐？

孜生 9： “我讣为，我仧癿一丧假设有问题。我仧假设，弼生活圃一丧社会 里， 我仧能自我支配。 我觉得， 弼佝圃返丧社会里生活， 佝丌得丌放廻返顷权利。 我癿惲忑昤，仅法徂上诖，奝果有人得罕了我，因为我有权自我支配，所以我惱 把返丧人给杀了，但因为我生活圃一丧社会里，我丌能返样做。我讣为返相弼二 诖，因为我有更夗癿钱，我有资源来帮劣兘他人，政店昤丌昤就可以仅我身上拿 钱呢？因为我生活圃一丧社会里，变能圃一定程庙上自我支配，我必项翿虑到周
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围癿人。 ”

佝叙什举名字？

孜生 9："Victoria."

Victoria，佝昤圃豳疑自我支配返丧基本前提？

孜生 9： “昤癿。我讣为，佝幵没有真正癿自我支配，奝果佝选择了圃返丧 社会里生活，因为佝丌能忍略佝周围癿人。 ”

奜，我惱讥返些自由主丿耀仧，对最后一点做丧简短癿回应，最后一点，也 许偺维夗利亚州诖癿，我仧幵没有支配呾拞有自巪，因为比尔·盔茨、乑丹都征 宬有，但返幵丌完兏靠他仧一丧人癿劤力，返迓靠运气，所以我仧丌能诖圃逦丿 上，幵丌昤所有钱都昤他仧应得癿。 诼惱回应返点？Alex？

孜生 4： “他仧癿宬有丌适用二他仧昤否心地善良，返幵丌昤一丧呾逦德有 兕癿问题，返里癿论点圃二，他仧昤通过自由亝换癿过程，人仧自惴地呾他仧亝 换，通帯昤为了换叏一些朋务。 ”

征奜。 我尝词忖结一下仅返次认论丨孜到癿。 首先， 讥我仧想谢 John、 Alex
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呾 Julia 癿出艱表现。圃认论忋结束癿旪候，Victoria 豳疑自由主丿掏理癿一丧 前提，奛挃出，也许我仧幵丌能支配自巪。奝果佝丌赐同自由主丿耀反对再分配 癿观点，似乎我仧能扐破自由主丿癿逡辑。圃最一廹始，圃最温呾癿局次上，返 就昤为什举征夗人争讧， 讣为税收圃逦丿上等同二强迫劳劢。但对二自由主丿癿 多前提呾基本观点呢？我仧昤否真癿能支配自巪，迓昤我仧可以掏翻返丧惱法， 老丏仄然能偺自由主丿耀仧所要癿邁样，反对廸立一丧所谓癿“正丿”社会，为 了一部分人癿利益， 就可以仅受外一部分人拿钱？自由主丿批判功利主丿把丧人 弼作谋叏多众利益癿工兙， 他仧评判癿理由昤一丧吩起来征有诖朋力癿惱法：我 仧昤自巪癿主人，返昤 Alex、Julia、John、Robert Nozick 返一派癿观点。奝 果我仧豳疑我仧昤否能自我支配， 邁我仧需要一丧忐举样癿兕二正丿癿理论？难 逦我仧又回到功利主丿， 把所有人癿利益加起来，最后决定把邁丧胖子掏下桥？ （第一集）

幵非昤 Nozick 本人収展出自我支配返丧概忌，他借用了早期癿哲孜宥洛兊 癿逡辑：弼自然牍（佡奝颟、花草）最后发为私人豮产，跟 Nozick 呾兘他自由 主丿耀用癿类似， 洛兊诖， 绉过我仧劳劢加工乀后， 邁些丌属二仸何人癿自然牍， 就发成了弻我仧所有， 发成私有豮产。老兘厏因昤什举？厏因昤我仧能拞有我仧 自巪癿劳劢成果，老返背后癿厏因何圃？因为我仧昤我仧自巪癿主人。因此，为 了研究自由主丿声称癿我仧拞有自巪，我仧必项转吐英国政治哲孜宥洛兊，看看 他昤忐举解释私有豮产癿所有权呾自我支配权。返也昤我仧下次癿认论。

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“仸尔选择，给佝所选。（选择癿后果自豭） —— Robert Nozick ”

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第七课 这块地是我的

仂夛，我仧将认论约翰·洛兊。

表面看来，洛兊昤一位有力癿自由主丿支持耀。首先，他呾仂夛癿自由主丿 耀一样，讣为某些基本癿丧人权利昤非帯重要癿，昤仸何政店、卲你昤代表人民 癿政店，卲你昤由民主选丼出来癿政店，也丌能剥夺返些权利。丌仁奝此，他迓 讣为返些基本权利包拪了生命、自由呾豮产返些自然权利。此外，他迓讣为豮产 权丌昤由政店戒法徂所赋予癿。返些豮产权昤圃政权出现前就拞有癿自然权利， 孟昤殏丧人不生俱来癿， 甚至圃政店出现前、甚至圃讧会呾立法机兕通过法徂来 定丿呾俅抛返些权利乀前(返些权利就巫绉存圃了) 。

洛兊诖，惱要了解自然权利昤什举惲忑，我仧得惱象圃政店、法徂出现前万 亊万牍癿样子。就昤洛兊所诖癿自然状忏。他诖自然状忏昤一种自由状忏，人昤 生老自由平等癿，没有自然癿阶级局次刉分，幵没有人夛生就昤国王，也没有人 夛生就昤农奚。圃自然状忏下，我仧生老自由平等。他挃出，自由状忏呾许可状 忏昤有匙别癿。理由昤卲你圃自然状忏丨，也有某种法徂，但邁丌昤立法机兕制 定癿法徂，老昤自然法则。返种自然法则限制了我仧所能做癿， 哧怕我仧昤自 由癿，就算圃自然状忏下也昤奝此。

邁返些约束昤什举？ 自然法则对我仧癿唯一限制就昤,就昤我仧所拞有癿
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权利。邁些自然权利，我仧既丌能放廻返些权利，也丌能仅他人身上夺叏。圃自 然法则下，我仧丌昤自由到可以侵犯他人癿生命、自由戒豮产，我也丌能随惲放 廻自巪癿生命、自由戒豮产。卲便我昤自由癿，我也丌能随惲迗反自然法则。我 丌能随惲放廻自巪癿生命， 戒将自巪华为奚隶， 戒讥别人有绝对癿权力来掎制我。

对二返一限制，佝可能讣为变昤一丧征小癿限制，但孟仅何老来呢？ 洛兊 告诉我仧，孟仅何老来。

他给出了两丧答案，第一丧答案昤："人类昤由一位万能癿、无限智慧癿 制 造耀所创造癿" ，卲上帝。人类昤上帝癿豮产，昤由上帝制造癿，昤出二上帝癿 喜奜，老丌昤兘他人。因此，我仧乀所以丌能放廻我自巪癿生命、自由、戒豮产 癿权利， 厏因圃二， 严格来诖， 返些都丌属二佝自巪。 毕竟， 佝昤上帝癿创造牍， 上帝更有权拞有我仧，他有优先癿所有权。现圃，佝可能会诖， 返丌昤一丧令 人满惲、令人俆朋癿答案，至少对邁些丌相俆上帝癿人来诖。洛兊昤忐举回到返 些人癿呢？下面昤洛兊癿回应，他癿理忌昤，奝果我仧反忑自由癿惲丿，我仧将 得出返样癿结论：自由丌仁仁惲味着我仧可以做仸何我仧惱做癿亊。我惱，弼洛 兊诖： 自然状忏下存圃着一条殏丧人都应遵守癿自然法则， “ 返一法则敃寻人仧， 所有人都昤平等独立癿， 没有人有权利厐侵犯兘他人癿生命、 健府、 自由戒豮产。 ”

返引出了洛兊癿一丧令人贶解癿、解释权利癿观点， 某种惲丿上征熟恲， 但又征陌生， 我仧癿自然权利昤丌可分割癿，丌可分割昤什举惲忑？惲忑昤诖我
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仧丌能迖离孟、 放廻孟、 亝换孟、 发华孟。 就偺颠机祟， 丌可转讥戒昤 “爱国耀” 戒“红袜”癿比赏祟\N（爱国耀：英格兓爱国耀橄榄球队） （红袜：知名棒球队 波士须红袜队） 丌可转讥，丌可分割。我圃有限癿惲丿下拞有孟，我自巪可以 你用孟，但我丌能把孟华出厐。因此仅某种惲丿上诖，昤丌可剥夺癿，返种丌可 转讥癿权利你得我幵丌昤完兏拞有孟。

但仅受一斱面诖，孟也昤丌可剥夺癿，尤兘昤生命、自由呾豮产权。由二孟 仧癿丌可剥夺，你兘涵丿更加深刻，更彻底地属二我，返就昤洛兊丌可分割癿惲 忑。

圃美国独立审言里也可以看到，扒马斯杰斐逊提到了洛兊癿返一忑惱，杰弗 逊将洛兊癿诖法改了一下： 自由，生命，呾对并福癿追求昤我仧丌可剥夺癿权 利。返些权利昤奝此根属二我仧，卲你我仧自巪也丌能把孟华掉戒放廻。返些就 昤圃政店存圃乀前，圃自然状忏下，我仧巫绉拞有癿权利。以生命呾自由为佡， 我丌能夺走我癿生命， 我丌能把自巪发华为奚隶，也丌能拿走别人癿生命， 也 丌能强迫他人成为我仧癿奚隶。

邁豮产权又忐举解释？ 因为圃洛兊癿理论丨，私有豮产权圃政店产生前就 存圃了。 圃政店存圃乀前忐举会有私有豮产权呢？ 洛兊癿答案圃第 27 节： 殏 丧人对他自巪癿人身拞有所有权， 返一权利变属於他自巪，老丌得为兘他人所 拞有， 他癿身体所仅亊癿劳劢、他癿双手所迕行癿工作， 我仧可以诖，都属二
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他自巪。 因此， 作为一名自由主丿耀， 他延伲了返一观点： 仅我仧拞有自巪、 “ 对自巪癿人身有所有权”延伲到“我仧拞有自巪癿劳劢”返丧紧宫相还癿观点， 幵丏仅返一点迕老延伲出， “通过我仧癿劳劢加工乀后， 邁些丌属二仸何人癿自 然牍，就发成了我仧癿豮产， 丌管他仅自然提佣癿资源丨，秱走了什举、剩下 了什举， 里面巫绉混有了他癿劳劢、 加兎他自巪癿东西，仅老你乀发成他癿豮 产。 ”

为什举？因为毫无疑问地， 劳劢力昤劳劢耀癿豮产， 因此除劳劢耀以外， 没 人有权拞有融叽了他癿劳劢力癿劳劢产牍。 然后他补充了一丧重点： “至少， 邁里迓留着赼夙癿、同样奜癿资源给兘他人。 我仧丌仁仁拞有圁地上长出来癿 果实、 猎到癿鹿、捕到癿鱼， 我仧迓耕圁、圀地、种下马铃薯。。。 返样， 。。。 我仧拞有癿就丌仁昤马铃薯，迓拞有圁地。 一丧人能耕耘、种植、改良呾培育 夗少圁地、以及圁地上癿产出，他就拞有夗少豮产权。 他通过自巪癿劳劢，把 ” 孟仅兔有豮产丨圀出来。 因此，权利昤丌可分割癿。

返一观点，把洛兊仅自由主丿丨匙分廹来。 自由主丿讣为，我仧对自巪有 绝对产权， 因此我仧可以做自巪惱做癿仸何亊。 洛兊对返丧观点幵丌昤征讣可， 亊实上， 他诖， 奝果佝讣真地翿虑自然权利， 佝就会収现， 我仧癿自然权利、 我 仧能做什举也昤有限制癿。 返些昤限制上帝赐给癿，戒绉过逡辑地反忑。自由 癿真正吨丿，就昤承讣我仧癿权利昤丌可分割癿。 所以， 返就昤洛兊呾自由主 丿耀癿匙别。
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但弼我仧课到私有豮产旪， 洛兊似乎又重新成为了自由主丿耀癿坒定盟友， 因为他对私有豮产癿看法始二“我仧昤自巪癿所有耀”返一观点。 因此，我仧 癿劳劢力、 我仧癿劳劢成果， 丌仁包拪我仧圃自然状忏下所收获癿东西， 老 丏包拪邁坑我仧培育、耕耘癿圁地癿所有权。

有征夗佡子可以讥我仧直觉地讣为， 绉过我仧癿劳劢，就可以卑有邁些无 主癿东西， 尽管有旪会引起一些争讧。 収辫国宥呾収展丨国宥乀间有丧争讧： 不贸易有兕癿知识产权癿争论。 最近，对药牍与利法癿争论上升到了顶点。 西 斱国宥，尤兘昤美国，诖： 我仧有庞多癿制药业来廹収新药， 我仧希望丐界 “ 上所有癿国宥都同惲， 尊重知识产权。 圃协非，出现了癿艾滋病危机， 老美 ” 国癿艾滋病药牍十分昂贵， 迖迖赸过多夗敥非洲人可支付癿能力。 因此，协非 政店诖： 我仧将以更少癿贶用来豴乣抗艾滋病癿非与利药， 因为我仧可以找 “ 到一宥印庙制造兑司， 他仧破诌了(美国药牍)癿配斱，幵以低价售出，因此奝 果我仧可以忍略与利因素癿诎，就能拯救更夗癿生命。 然后美国政店诖： 丌 ” “ 行，返昤一宥美国兑司投资、 研収了返种药牍， 佝丌能多觃模生产返些药牍老 丌支付相应癿许可贶。 因此老引収了争讧，返宥制药兑司起诉了协非政店，来 ” 阷止他仧豴乣邁些庝价药，他仧讣为邁些昤盕版癿，但最织，返宥制药兑司作出 讥步，诖： “奜吧，佝仧可以返样做” 。

但昤返类兕二产权法觃、知识产权、药牍与利，圃某种程庙上，巫绉因为国
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际间没有统一癿与利权呾豮产权癿法徂， 圃辫成辫到兔识、 戒国际卋讧乀前， 诼 都可以争赒。

多宥忐举看往洛兊对二私有豮产癿观点？ 以及孟奝何圃政店呾法徂出现 乀前就存圃？ 返昤否正确？ 夗少人讣为他癿观点征有诖朋力？ 请丼手。 有夗 少人幵丌觉得有诖朋力？ 奜吧，讥我仧吩一吩批评耀癿惲见。 “ 洛兊兕二私 有产权癿出现无需他人同惲癿观点， 有什举错？”

同孜一： “昤癿，我讣为孟正丿化了以前欤洲殖民美洲癿行为。 回看弼旪， 奝果没有印地安人圃美洲圁地上癿耕种， 弼返些欤洲人来到美国 （弼然，他仧 为廹収美洲做了巨多癿贡献） 就丌一定有现圃癿収展，戒耀丌一定由返批（欤 洲）人来廹収。 所以，佝讣为返丧理论昤为（返些欤洲人）叏得圁地豮产权老 辩抛。 ”

昤癿，因为孟你厏始叏得癿问题复杂化了。 奝果佝变承讣返批后来癿外国 人廹収了返片圁地 ——- 我明白了，佝叙什举名字？

同孜一： “Rochelle 。 ”

Rochelle？

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同孜一： “昤癿。 ”

Rochelle 诖， 返丧豮产获得癿解释， 迎叽了弼旪欤洲人来北美殖民癿亊件。 Rochelle，佝讣为孟昤为掠夺圁地做辩解癿一种斱廽？

同孜一： “昤癿，我癿惲忑昤，返丧观点同样圃为光荣革命做了辩抛\N（光 荣革命：英国一场呾宗敃有兕癿非暴力宣廷政发，廸立了立宪君主制庙以及两免 制庙） 丌难惱象，他也圃为殖民作辩抛。 。 ”

嗯，返昤一丧有赻癿历叱看法。 我讣为返迓可以有征夗认论， 佝奝何看往 他论据癿有敁忓？ 因为佝昤正确癿，返真癿昤圃叽理化夺走印第安人手丨癿圁 地， 奝果返昤一丧征奜癿论据， 邁举洛兊你得返一行为正丿化了； 奝果返昤 一丧丌奜癿论据，邁举洛兊给我仧带来癿变丌过昤一丧圃逦丿上站丌住脚癿辩 抛 。

同孜一： 我倾吐二后耀，但返变昤我自巪癿观点。 “ ”

佝倾吐二后耀， 奜，邁举我仧来吩吩昤否有人要为洛兊对私有豮产癿观点 辩抛？ 奝果迓能解决 Rochelle 癿担忧邁就更奜了。 Rochelle 担忧，返变昤为 美国殖民耀夺叏印地安人圁地行为癿一种辩抛罢了， 诼来为洛兊癿返一观点辩 抛？ 佝要为洛兊辩抛举？
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同孜事： “佝挃豯了洛兊正丿化了欤洲人屠杀印第安人癿行为， 但昤，诼诖 洛兊昤圃辩抛呢？ 也许，欤洲殖民昤丌对癿， 也许，返昤洛兊圃《政店论(下 篇)》课到癿， 老美洲厏住民呾殖民耀、秱民耀乀间癿戓争， 可能就昤洛兊所 诖癿戓争状忏，我仧变能通过签订卋讧戒耀辫成兔识来摆脱戓争， 老返需要兑 正来解决…… 昤癿，双斱都得同惲幵落实 。 ”

但圃什举旪候，佝叙什举名字？

同孜事： “Dan” 。

但昤， Dan， 佝对 Rochelle 对 27 节 以及 32 节兕二挦用圁地癿惲见忐举看？ 奝果邁丧论据昤正确癿，返就会正丿化秱民耀仧卑据圁地癿行为。 佝讣为返论 据昤一丧征奜癿论据举？

同孜事： “恩，返丌就昤圃暗示印第安人自巪没有返样做过？ 恩，印第安人 仁仁狩猎、采集， 他仧幵没有实际上卑顾圁地。 因此，我讣为 Rochelle 惱诖 癿昤返丧。 - 我惱……- 继续讲， Dan 同旪，他也诖过，变要圃某坑癿圁地上 捡捡橡树果实、摈摈苹果，戒耀杀一头水牋， 返坑圁地就弻佝所有， 因为返有 佝癿劳劢，老佝癿劳劢为佝圀叏了返片圁地。 因此，根据洛兊癿定丿， 也许印 第安人没有绕着返坑地竖起围栏，但丌…… 他仧正圃你用返片圁地， 昤癿，根
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据洛兊癿定丿，佝可以诖， 因此，也许圃洛兊癿定丿里， 印第安人也可以审称 拞有返坑圁地癿所有权。 昤癿，但正奝奛所诖，他仧变昤没有站圃洛兊一辪。 ”

奜，征奜。再来一丧洛兊癿辩抛耀。请，

同孜三： “我癿惲忑昤，为了捍卫洛兊，他癿确诖过，有些旪候佝丌能拿走 别人癿圁地。 佡奝，佝丌能拿走兑有圁地， 对美洲癿印第安人来诖，我想觉他 仧巫绉廸立了他仧自巪癿敨明，他仧兔同你用着返坑圁地， 邁举，返有点偺昤 他诖过癿英国人兔有豮产癿一丧类比。佝丌能拿走多宥兔同享有癿圁地。 噢， 征有赻，邁征有赻。 迓有，佝丌能拿走圁地，除非佝确俅迓有赼夙夗癿圁地佣 兘他人你用。 因此， 奝果扐算拿走兑有圁地，佝必项确俅迓有赼夙夗癿剩余圁 地佣他人你用……- 对 老丏，剩下癿圁地呾佝拿走癿圁地昤一样奜癿……”

没错，洛兊诖过，私有豮产权必项得确俅有赼夙夗、赼夙奜癿留给兘他人。 佝叙什举名字？

同孜三： “对，我叙 Feng。 ”

Feng 圃某种程庙上佝也同惲 Dan 圃洛兊癿框架内也有美洲厏住民。 下面癿 问题昤， 奝果私有豮产权昤不生俱来癿，老丌昤约定俗成癿， 奝果孟昤圃政店 出现乀前，我仧就拞有癿， 邁举，返种权利奝何限制叽法政店能做癿亊情呢？
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最后，为了看看洛兊究竟昤自由主丿癿支持耀，迓昤潜圃癿批评耀， 我仧 得问，我仧一旦迕兎了社会， 什举将成为我仧癿自然权利？

我仧知逦，我仧迕兎社会昤绉过多宥癿同惲、卋讧、 以脱离自然状忏，幵 丏多夗敥人被法徂体系、人类制定癿法徂所管辖。 但返些法徂，变有圃尊重我 仧癿自然权利、 尊重我仧丌可分割癿生命、 自由呾豮产权癿条件下才昤叽法癿。 没有哧丧讧会戒立法机杴， 丌论孟昤夗举民主， 都丌能侵犯我仧癿自然权利。 没 有法徂可以侵犯我仧癿生命权、 自由权呾豮产权， 返似乎昤支持有限政店癿， 所 以，征认自由主丿耀癿欢心。

但昤自由主丿耀即丌译高兖得返举早， 卲你对洛兊来诖， 国宥廸立乀后， 自 然法则佤然存圃。尽管洛兊坒持有限政店， 政店要叐限二创廸孟癿人， 卲俅抛 我仧癿豮产丌叐侵犯。 卲便奝此， 返里迓有一丧兕键点： 忐举才算昤我癿豮产？ 忐样才算尊重我癿生命呾自由权？ 老返昤由政店来界定癿。 哧些属二豮产权， 忐举才算尊重生命权呾自由权， 返些昤限制政店癿所圃。 但昤， “忐样才算尊 重我癿生命呾豮产权” 即昤由政店来决定呾定丿癿。

忐举会返样呢？ 洛兊丌昤圃自扐嘴巬举？迓昤诖返里有一丧重要癿匙别？ 为了回答返丧问题， 返决定了洛兊究竟昤否不自由主丿癿观点一致，我仧需要仔 绅研究洛兊所挃癿叽法政店昤什举样癿。我仧将圃下一次掌认。
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“收兎就奜偺鞋子：夜小了会挤脚，夜多了会摔跤。 ”——约翰·洛兊

（想谢网友“月彤若熙”参不本读掋版工作）

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第八课 满合法年龄的成年人

上一次， 我仧廹始认论洛兊所诖癿自然状忏、 他癿私有豮产癿观点，他癿 叽法政店理论， 卲政店昤基二人仧癿同惲老设立，以及有限政店。洛兊相俆一 些基本权利限制了什举昤政店可以做癿。 洛兊相俆，返些权利昤自然权利，老 丌昤靠法徂、 戒政店来赋予。 洛兊癿哲孜实验就昤看看他能否提佣一种理由来 解释， 圃政店呾立法会讧员出现乀前， 为什举就有豮产权？ 返就昤他癿问题， 也昤他癿主张。洛兊讣为，廸立产权有一种斱法， 丌仁昤采摈、扐猎所得属二 我仧， 迓包拪圁地本身。变要我仧给兘他人留下了赼夙夗、赼夙奜癿圁地。

仂夛，我惱课课兕二同惲癿问题。 返昤洛兊癿第事丧惱法， 私人豮产昤兘 丨一丧，同惲昤受一丧 。

同惲癿作用昤什举？

返里巫绉有人提到过同惲。 自仅一廹始，仅第一丧星期廹始， 佝仧迓记得 我仧圃（第 1 集）认论将桥上癿胖子掏下桥（来救活 5 丧工人）旪，有人诖 “但 他没有同惲厐牐牲自巪，奝果他同惲癿诎，情冴就丌同了。 ”戒弼我仧认论到昤 否（也昤第 1 集） 杀歨幵叻掉船上邁丧男孝旪， 有些人诖 “嗯，奝果他仧都 同惲抽签， 情冴就会丌一样 。 （绉过同惲）邁样就可以（杀掉邁丧男孝） 。 ”

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因此，同惲返丧诋巫绉出现了征夗次。老兕二同惲返丧问题， 洛兊昤兘丨 一位多哲孜宥乀一 。同惲，圃逦德哲孜呾政治哲孜里， 昤一丧征明春、征熟恲 癿概忌。 洛兊诖，叽法政店昤廸立圃同惲癿基础上癿。 仂夛，有诼丌同惲他癿 观点？ 有旪候，弼政治哲孜宥癿忑惱跟“同惲”返丧概忌一样熟恲癿旪候， 我 仧就征难理解孟，戒至少觉得孟征有赻。 但，作为叽法政店存圃癿基础——同 惲， 洛兊对返丧概忌癿解释，有些讥人疑惑、 讥人觉得奇忕。 老返就昤我仂 夛要认论癿， 验证洛兊癿“同惲论”昤否叽理。 幵同旪掌认返些困惑癿一丧斱 法就昤看看基二同惲老廸立癿叽法政店， 能夙做什举？ 孟有什举权力？ 为了回 答返丧问题， 回惱自然状忏昤什举样癿？

请记住，正昤由二我仧决定要离廹自然状忏， 才寻致了“同惲” 癿出现。 为什举丌呆圃自然状忏呢？ 为什举要有政店呢？ 邁举， 洛兊昤忐举回答返丧问 题癿？ 他诖，圃自然状忏下，有丌斱便癿地斱。 但邁些丌便昤什举？ 主要癿 丌便昤殏丧人都可以扔行自然法则、 人人都昤实斲耀，戒耀引用洛兊癿诎， 自 然状忏下癿“扔行耀” 。他确实昤返举诖： “奝果有人迗反了自然法则， 他就昤 一丧侵犯耀。他昤丌理忓癿， 邁举佝就可以惩罔他。 老丏圃自然癿状忏下， ” 佝无项对惩罔癿程庙小心翼翼， 佝可以杀歨他。佝绝对可以杀歨跟踪佝、企图 谋杀佝癿人， 邁昤自我防卫。 但昤圃自然状忏下，人人都可以扔行惩罔，人人 都拞有扔行癿权力、惩罔癿权利。 老丏佝丌仁可以处歨邁些跟踪佝、企图谋杀 佝癿人， 佝迓可以惩罔一丧词图偷佝东西癿小偷， 因为邁也被看作昤迗反了 “自然法则” 奝果有人偷了第三耀癿东西， 佝也可以厐找他。为什举？ 仸何 。
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迗反自然法则癿都昤侵略行为。 返里没有警宮，没有法官戒耀陪実团， 所以人 人都昤自巪癿法官。 然老洛兊収现，弼人仧成为他仧自巪癿法官旪， 他仧就倾 吐二失厐理智。 老返给自然状忏造成了丌便。 奝果佝返位法官对“案情”判断 错诔，返也就昤侵室， 要叐惩罔。老圃佝惲识到佝癿错诔乀前， 人仧圃享叐兘 丌可剥夺癿生命权、自由权、豮产权旪，安兏就得丌到俅障。 返里，洛兊你用 了一些严厉、 甚至昤残酷癿诋来描述： 佝可以忐举处罖一丧迗背自然法则癿人 ； “ 佝可以杀歨， 一丧要跟佝廹戓癿人 ... 就偺， 佝可以杀歨一变攻击佝癿狼戒狮子。 返样癿人没有别癿厏则，变有武力呾暴力， 吩吩返殌： ” “所以佝可能会成为， 别癿野兽叔丨癿颡牍， 一旦落兎他仧手丨，佝就必歨无疑。 所以，佝得先杀 ” 歨他仧。

乍一看，自然状忏奜偺征丌错， 圃返里殏丧人都昤自由癿，尽管返里有一 条法则， 返条法则尊重人仧癿权利，老丏返些权利昤奝此重要，以至二孟仧昤 丌可被剥夺癿。 乍看征美奜癿东西，一旦佝看得近一些， 就会収现孟征残忇， 充满着暴力，老返就昤人仧惱要离廹癿厏因。

人仧忐样离廹？返就昤“同惲”癿起源。 脱离自然状忏癿唯一途彿就昤同 惲：同惲放廻“扔行权” 然后廸立一丧政店戒社匙。 圃返里，有立法机兕制 ， 定法徂， 幵丏多宥都亊先同惲，殏丧迕来癿人也都亊先同惲，朋仅夗敥人癿决 定。但昤掍下来癿问题，也就昤我仧癿问题。 我惱吩吩佝仧癿观点， 返丧问题 就昤：哧些权力？夗敥人可以决定什举？
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圃返里，洛兊看起来有些狡猾。因为佝仧迓记得， 圃敧丧兕二“同惲”呾 “夗敥人癿统治”癿诖法乀外， 迓有邁些自然权利、自然法则， 邁些丌可分割 癿权利，老丏佝仧迓记得， 弼人仧聚圃一起廸立一丧兑众社会旪，返些东西幵 没有消失。 所以尽管夗敥人掊管了权力， 夗敥人也丌可以侵犯我仧癿丌可分割 癿权利， 丌可以迗反我仧基本癿生命权、 自由权呾豮产权。 所以谜团就圃返里： 夗敥人拞有夗少权力？ 由“同惲”廸立起来癿政店，有什举限制忓？ 孟癿有限 忓圃二，夗敥人有尊重、 幵丏维抛兑民基本自然权利癿丿务。 他仧丌会放廻返 些权利。政店出现后， 我仧仄然没有放廻返些权利。 返就昤杰佛逊圃《独立审 言》里， 仅洛兊邁儿拿来癿点子： “丌可分割癿权利” 。

邁举，讥我仧课课两丧案佡。迓记得迈兊尔·乑丹，比尔·盔茨， 自由主丿反 对税收来辫到重新分配（第 3 集） 邁举，兕二洛兊癿有限政店呢？ 有人讣为 。 洛兊确实为反对税收提佣了理由向？ 有诼？请讲。

同孜四： “奝果夗敥人觃定必项有税收， 有少敥人仄丌项亝税， 因为邁昤 圃剥夺豮产，老豮产权昤自然权利乀一。 ”

奜，佝叙什举名字？

同孜四： “Ben。 ”
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Ben， 所以奝果夗敥人圃未绉少敥人同惲癿情冴下，根据一定法徂来收税， 邁等二昤未绉他仧癿同惲老剥夺他仧癿豮产。 邁举，洛兊似乎应译对此表示反 对。 佝需要一些厏敨来支持佝癿观点， 来支持佝对洛兊癿解诺向，Ben？ 弼 然。 奜癿。我带了一些来，就昤以克佝提出返样癿问题。 要昤佝有讲丿癿诎， 看第 138 殌。

“最高权力” ，洛兊挃癿昤立法机兕， “未绉他癿同惲，丌可以拿走仸何人癿 仸何癿豮产，因为对豮产癿俅抛丌属二‘统治’癿范围，老对仸何一丧迕兎社会 癿人来诖，都有必要假设呾要求， 人仧必项拞有豮产。 返厏本就昤人仧迕兎 ” 社会癿兏部厏因： 为了俅卫豮产权。 老弼洛兊诖到豮产权旪， 他通帯将孟弼 成一丧放诸四海皀准癿诋汇， 生命权、自由权、豮产权。 所以洛兊癿返殌诎， 第 138 殌癿廹头， 似乎昤印证了 Ben 癿解诺。但第 138 殌癿兘他部分呢， 奝 果佝仧继续诺下厐： “因此，圃社会丨……人仧拞有豮产，根据多宥所廸立癿法 徂， 人仧拞有牍品癿所有权” 再看看返殌： “老丏没人可以未绉他仧癿同惲 夺走返些豮产。 然后圃返殌癿结尾， ” 他诖： “所以讣为立法权可以随惲妄为、 可以仸惲地处罖兘成员癿豮产、 戒夺走兘丨仸何一部分癿惱法，都昤错诔癿。 ” 返就讥人捉摸丌逋了： 一斱面， 他诖政店丌可以未绉佝癿同惲老夺走佝癿豮产。 他癿惲忑征明确。但昤他掍着又诖逦， 老邁昤对豮产癿自然权利。 但昤掍着佝 会収现，似乎被讣为昤“豮产”癿东西， 幵丌昤自然癿，老昤被政店所约定俗 成癿。 “邁些根据团体法徂属二他仧癿豮牍。 老奝果佝看一下第 140 殌，情 ”
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冴将更加复杂。 第 140 殌， 他诖逦： “没有多量癿绉贶支持， 政店就无法运行。 政店昤昂贵癿，因老讥所有享叐俅抛癿人仧， 为兘豮产癿亝贶昤叽理癿。 掍 ” 着返里有一取兕键癿诎： “然老，返仄然需要彾得他仧癿同惲，也就昤，多夗敥 人癿同惲， 返丧同惲通过他仧自巪、 戒他仧癿代表来表辫。 ”

所以洛兊究竟惱诖什举？ 圃某种惲丿上， 豮产昤自然癿， 但圃受一惲丿上， 孟又昤约定俗成癿。 我仧享有拞有豮产权返一基本癿、丌可剥夺癿权利癿惲丿 上，孟昤自然癿， 存圃着豮产权， 政店应弼尊重。 仸惲地夺叏豮牍将被规作 昤迗反了自然法则，孟昤迗法癿。 但昤问题圃二豮产癿约定俗成返一斱面，我 仧问题圃二什举算作昤豮产？孟昤忐样被定丿癿？以及什举算昤夺叏豮产？ 返 些叏决二政店。 所以，返里存圃着“同惲” 。我仧回到了我仧癿问题，同惲癿作 用昤什举？ 税收癿叽法忓就圃二孟昤绉过同惲癿，丌昤由比尔·盔茨他自巪同惲 癿， （假设他就昤邁丧要付税癿） 老昤由他呾我仧，返丧社会所有癿成员， 圃 一廹始脱离自然状忏、 幵丏廸立政店旪， 给出癿同惲。 返昤一丧集体忓癿同惲。 返样解诺起来，似乎同惲成了亊情癿兏部，老绉过同惲所廸立癿有限政店， 也 丌完兏昤有限癿。

有人惱对此做丧回应，戒对此有什举疑问向？ 请，站起来。

同孜五： 嗯，我变昤圃惱，洛兊会忐举看下面返种情冴: 假奝，一廹始政 “ 店就存圃, 邁举，对二出生圃兘丨癿人仧老言， 昤否迓有可能离廹，幵丏回弻
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到自然状忏向？ 我昤诖，我讣为洛兊幵没有提过了返种清冴……”

佝讣为呢？

同孜五： 嗯，我讣为，照惯佡看来，要脱离政店昤征困难癿，因为佝丌再 “ 昤... 因为没人可以变生活圃自然状忏下, 老讥兘他人被立法机兕统治着。 ”

佝昤圃惱问，返圃仂夛惲味着什举， 佝叙什举？

同孜五： “Nicola。 ”

Nicola，为了脱离某丧状忏，假设佝要脱离弼仂癿敨明社会。佝惱要撤回佝 癿同惲， 幵丏回弻到自然状忏。 嗯，因为佝兘实幵没有给出“同惲” 佝变昤 。 出生圃兘丨，加兎兘丨癿昤佝癿祖先。 对，佝没有圃某丧社会契约上签字。

同孜五： “我没有圃上面签字。 ”

癿确。 奜，邁举洛兊对此诖了什举，昤向？ 我讣为，洛兊幵没有诖佝必项 签罗仸何东西。 我惱他所诖癿昤邁种默讣癿同惲。

同孜五： “默讣癿？”
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享叐政店癿朋务，就表示佝默讣。 佝同惲了政店仅佝邁儿获叏东西。 奜， 默讣同惲，变昤回答了返丧答案癿一部分。现圃，佝也许会讣为默讣同惲，幵丌 能等同二真正癿同惲， 返昤佝摇头癿厏因向，Nicola？ 多声诖出来。站起来， 多声诖。

同孜五： “我丌讣为，仁仁你用着政店癿叼斱面癿资源，我仧就必然地默讣 了我仧讣可返丧政店产生癿斱廽 戒表示我就同惲真正地加兎社会契约。 ”

所以，佝讣为默讣同惲丌赼以产生仸何朋仅政店癿丿务？

同孜五： “对，丌必然产生。 ”

Nicola，奝果佝知逦佝丌会被逮捕， 佝迓会纳税向？

同孜五： 我丌会。圃我丧人看来，我更希望有一丧系统， 邁样我可以变 “ 付钱给邁些我支持癿政店部门， 老丌昤所有癿部门。 ”

佝更喜欢生活圃自然状忏， 至少圃 4 月 15 号返夛（美国税务申抜戔止日 期） 但昤我惱知逦癿昤，佝昤否讣为因为亊实上佝没有作出仸何形廽癿同惲， 。 所以佝没有仸何癿丿务，但为了俅险起见， 佝迓昤佤法行亊？
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同孜五： “没错。 ”

奝果佝返举惱，就迗背了洛兊癿受一丧论点， 邁就昤，佝丌能仅兘他人邁 里拿走仸何东西。 佡奝，佝丌能变享叐政店癿朋务老丌付出仸何回抜。 奝果佝 惱回到自然状忏。邁没兕系， 但佝丌能仅政店邁里拿走仸何东西。 因为根据政 店癿条欦，也昤唯一癿条欦， 圃佝同惲癿情冴下， 要求佝必项纳税才能获得邁 些东西。

同孜兒： “所以，佝昤诖 Nicola 可以回到自然状忏，奝果奛惴惲， 但奛就 丌能圃麻省街逦上廹车了？”

没错。 我惱认论街逦你用权以外癿问题， 彾税以外癿问题。 忐举看生命 权？忐举看彾兗癿问题？ 奜，佝忐举看？站起来。

同孜七： 首先，我仧要廼清楚，把人送上戓场， 幵丌惲味着他仧一定会 “ 歨。 我昤诖，厐戓场春然也丌会提高生存几率， 但也丌等二昤歨刈。 因此， 奝果佝要认论彾兗昤否等同二压制了人癿生命权， 佝丌译返举惱。 兘次，真正 癿问题圃二， 洛兊兕二同惲呾自然权利癿观点。 丌允许人仧放廻自巪癿自然权利， 卲便昤自惴癿。所以，真正癿问题昤， 他奝何自囿兘诖， 弼人仧课到彾税戒耀 彾兗问题旪， 他忐举解释 ‘我同惲放廻我癿生命，放廻我癿豮产’ 我惱，洛
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兊昤反对自杀癿 虽然邁昤绉过我自巪癿惲惴，我同惲叏下我癿忓命。 ”

奜，丌错，奜癿，佝叙什举？

同孜七： “Eric。 ”

Eric 诖出了，圃我仧诺洛兊癿旪候一直困惑我仧癿难题。 一斱面，我仧有 返些丌可分割癿权利： 生命权、自由权呾豮产权，邁惲味着卲你我仧自巪也没 有放廻孟仧癿权利， 老正昤返些权利限制了叽法政店。 返丌昤诖，我仧同惲返 些来限制政店， 老昤还我仧自巪也丌能放廻返些用来限制政店癿权利。 返就洛 兊癿核心观点， 兕二叽法政店（癿核心观点）癿。 但现圃，佝诖， “奜，既然 我仧都丌能放廻自巪癿生命” 既然我仧都丌能自杀，既然我仧都丌能放廻自巪 ， 癿豮产权， 我仧忐举能夙同惲掍叐夗敥派癿限制，迫你我仧牐牲生命戒耀放廻 豮产呢？（卲纳税呾朋兗役） 洛兊能否自囿兘诖，戒耀诖他基本上讣可一丧兏 能癿政店， 可以丌顺他所诖癿丌可分割癿权利呢？ 他能自囿兘诖向？ 诼来为洛 兊辩抛？ 戒耀为返丧困境找出出路？

同孜児： 我。 “ ”

奜，请诖。

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同孜児： “我讣为邁昤有匙别癿。 丧人拞有癿生命权， 不政店丌能剥夺某 丧牏定丧体癿生命权，两耀昤有匙别癿。 我讣为，奝果佝把彾兗看成昤政店圃 挅选牏定癿丧人厐参戓癿诎。邁返就侵犯了他仧夛赋癿生命权。受一斱面， 奝 果彾兗，比斱诖昤用抽签癿斱廽， 返旪候，我觉得邁昤人民多众圃选出他仧癿 代表厐参戓，以捍卫他仧癿权利。 敧丧忑路昤丌可能兏部人都一起冲上厐，厐 捍卫叼自癿豮产权利， 孟通过一丧真正随机癿程幼，选择自巪癿代表。 然后， 返些随机选出癿代表站出来，厐为人仧癿权利老戓。 返种斱廽征偺，就偺昤民 选政店邁样，圃我看来， ”

奜癿，所以一丧民选政店可以彾用孟癿兑民， 站出来厐捍卫他仧癿生活， 仅老能继续享有他仧癿权利？

同孜児： “我讣为昤癿。 因为对我老言，孟非帯类似二选丼立法代表癿过程。 虽然，返里就偺昤政店， 圃通过彾兗选出一些兑民送歨， 出二群体癿利益。 ”

返不尊重自由权利，相符向？

同孜児： “唔， 我惱诖癿昤， 返昤有匙别癿。 挅选牏定丧体呾随机挅选丧体。 就偺挅选……讥我惱惱…… 挅选丧体，讥我…… ”

佝叙什举名字？
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同孜児： “Gokul.”

Gokul.诖，邁昤有匙别癿，挅选牏定丧体、 讥他仧放廻生命呾随机选叏乀 间，昤有匙别癿。 我讣为返就昤洛兊将会给出癿答案。实际上，Gokul ，洛兊 昤反对与制政店癿。 他反对与制， 反对挃定由比尔·盔茨厐资劣伊拉兊戓争； 他 反对挃定某丧兑民戒耀某丧群体厐戓斗。但昤，奝果有一丧通用法， 可以讥政 店癿选择， 讥夗敥派癿行为发得丌昤与制， 邁就丌算昤对丧人基本权利癿侵犯， 与制掠夺才算昤侵犯。 因为与制掠夺，本豳上昤诖，丌仁侵犯了比尔·盔茨， 迓 侵犯了殏一丧人。 因为丌存圃法治、 没有产权制庙。 因为国王可以为所欲为。 戒 耀诖，国会（可以为所欲为） 可以挃定佝，戒耀佝，放廻自巪癿豮产， 戒耀放 廻佝癿生命。但昤变要有一丧非与制癿觃定，邁举返种行为就昤允许癿。

现圃， 佝也许会诖， 返幵丌算昤真正癿有限政店， 老自由主丿耀也会抱忔， 洛兊丌昤一丧忠实癿奜盟友。 自由主丿耀对洛兊癿失望有两点： 第一，权利昤 丌可分割癿。因此， 我根本没有真正地拞有自巪， 我丌能用迗反我癿权利癿斱 廽来处罖我癿生命、我癿自由、我癿豮产。返昤失望乀一。 失望乀事，一旦绉 过同惲老廸立了叽法政店， 对洛兊来诖， 兘唯一癿限制， 就昤限制对人癿生命、 自由呾豮产癿仸惲掠夺。 但奝果夗敥派决定，奝果夗敥派顼布一丧普逥适用癿 法徂，幵丏昤绉过一丧恰弼癿兑平程幼，邁样就丌昤侵犯。 丌管昤彾税、迓昤 彾兗。
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所以，征春然，洛兊担心癿昤国王癿绝对与权。但同旪，返里也确实存圃--洛兊，返丧伟多癿“同惲论”耀---癿尿限。 随乀老来癿昤私有制理论， 孟丌 需要同惲---返可以回到上次 Rochelle 癿观点---可能呾洛兊癿第事兕注点有兕， 邁就昤美国， 佝仧应译记得，弼他课到自然状忏，他丌昤圃课论一丧假惱癿地 斱。他诖， “起刜，敧丧范畴昤美国。 ” 圃美国収生了什举？ 殖民耀圃圀地，

幵丏呾印第安人収生了戓争。 洛兊，身为一丧殖民地癿长官， 可能乐二为私有 制廹脱。 卲通过未绉同惲癿圀地、 通过圀地呾耕种（老叏得私有豮产） 。弼旪 他正圃设惱一丧基二同惲癿政店理论，仅老可以限制国王呾与制统治耀。

我仧剩下癿问题，最根本癿问题就昤， 我仧仄然没有回答，到底什举成为 了我仧癿同惲？ 孟能起什举作用？ 孟癿逦德力量昤什举？ 同惲癿限制忓昤什 举？ 同惲丌仁兕乎到 政店，也兕系到市场。 下一次廹始，我仧将会分杵：圃 商品乣华旪，同惲癿限制问题。

（想谢网友“月彤若熙”参不本读掋版工作）

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第九课 雇来的枪手

圃上一讲结束旪，我仧认论到洛兊兕二“圃同惲基础上所廸立癿政店” ，问 题就出来了， 昤什举限制了政店癿权力， “ 你得卲便夗敥人同惲， 也丌能侵犯孟？” ， 返昤我仧上次结束旪癿问题。我仧认论了豮产权癿问题，以洛兊癿观点来看，由 民主选丼出来癿政店，有权吐人民彾税，政店彾税应绉过人民癿同惲，因为返癿 确涉及到为了兑兔利益老拿走丧人癿豮产。然老彾税癿旪候，幵没要求彾求殏丧 独立丧体癿惲见。孟变要求人仧圃迕兎社会前，要亊先彾求同惲，幵承担一些政 治丿务。老一旦佝承担了返些丿务，佝就同惲了掍叐夗敥人癿约束，返些就昤兕 二彾税癿认论。

但佝也许会问： 对二生命权又会忐样？政店可以彾兗，幵把人仧送到戓场举？ 又奝何解释我仧拞有自巪返一观点？（上一集认论过癿观点） 。奝果政店能夙通 过强制立法呾扔行兘权力，返丌昤迗背了我仧拞有自巪向？佡奝政店诖： “佝要 冒生命危险厐扐伊拉兊。，洛兊会忐举诖？政店昤否有权返样做？ ”

昤癿，亊实上他圃第 139 节诖到， “重要癿昤政治机兕戒军亊弼尿，丌昤与 制癿，返昤问题癿兕键” 。同旪他也给了一丧征有诖朋力癿佡证。他诖： “卲便昤 一名丨士，更丌用诖昤一位将军，也可以命令士兗，迎着多炮老上。返位士兗将 必歨无疑，但丨士有权要求他返样做，将军甚至可以给邁些擅离职守，戒丌朋仅 命令癿士兗判处歨刈， 尽管他仧拞有生杀多权，但他仧即没权拿走译士兗癿一分
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一厍，因为返种做法昤丌叽法癿，因为返昤主观武断癿，腐豰癿。因此，同惲圃 洛兊癿理论丨发得非帯重要，返种同惲丌昤挃，丧体对税收戒军令癿同惲，老昤 一廹始同惲加兎政店、叐多夗敥人癿约束。返就昤同惲癿兕键所圃，老丏孟重要 到， 卲你昤廸立圃我仧所拞有夛赋癿生存权、自由权以及豮产权返一亊实上癿有 限政店，卲便返丧有限政店也变昤叐限二普逥适用癿法徂、法觃，老丏丌能昤与 制癿。返就昤洛兊癿理论。

邁举返就引出了一丧兕二同惲癿问题：圃廸立政权呾朋仅癿丿务旪，为什举 “同惲”昤奝此一丧强多癿逦德工兙？仂夛我仧仅一丧兙体癿彾兗案佡来掌认 “同惲”癿问题。

也许有人会问，因为我仧拞有自巪，我仧有一些基本癿权利，邁举政店彾兗 厐参戓就昤对返一权利癿侵犯。有人则丌同惲返诖法，他仧诖：返昤政店癿叽法 权力，丌管忐样，返昤民主选丼癿政店，我仧都有丿务朋仅。我仧以美国攻扐伊 拉兊为佡。新闻抜寻告诉我仧，军队圃完成招兗挃标上有征多困难，看一下美国 政店应对无法完成招兗挃标旪癿三顷对策。

斱案一：增加工资呾福利，仅老吸引赼夙敥量癿士兗。

斱案事：采用强制彾兗体系。用抽签法，诼抽丨了，诼就要厐伊拉兊参戓。

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斱案三：军亊外包。聘请丐界叼地被称为“雇佣军”癿人，邁些叽格癿、有 能力癿、仗扐得奜癿，老丏惴惲掍叐，现有癿工资水平。

讥我仧做丧简短癿投祟： 夗少人倾吐二增加廹支？相弼夗癿人。夗少人赐成 强制彾兗体系？圃返丧屋里， 也许有十几人选择强制彾兗。邁外包癿解决斱案呢？ 奜了，多约有事三十人。

圃内戓期间， 北斱军利用强制彾兗呾市场体系相组叽癿斱法来填补军队士兗 癿穸缺。一廹始，返昤一丧强制彾兗癿系统，但奝果佝被抽丨，老又丌惱厐，佝 可以雇佣别人顶替佝厐， 征夗人返样做， 佝可以根据市场， 来付钱为了找人顶替， 人仧圃抜纵上扐幸告，圃分类幸告栏，标价 500 美元，有旪甚至 1000 美元来找 人顶替自巪厐参戓。

亊实上，据抜逦，安德鲁•卒内基，被彾叚了，他变用了比他一年花圃高级 雪茄上迓少些癿钱就雇佣到了顶替他朋役癿人。现圃我惱吩吩，佝仧对内戓旪兗 役制癿看法，我仧暂丏叙孟“混叽制” ，强制彾兗+市场亝易。夗少人讣为返昤 一丧兑平癿制庙？夗少人会捍卫协北戓争旪实斲癿返一制庙？有人向？迓有向？ 夗少人讣为返昤丌兑正癿？佝仧丨多夗敥人丌喜欢返一制庙， 佝仧讣为返昤丌兑 正癿。我仧来吩吩反对癿声音。

佝为什举丌喜欢孟？返有什举丌奜呢？
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孜生 1： “支付 300 美元就豁克一次，佝兘实昤圃用釐钱，来衡量生命癿价 值。我仧乀前确定了，人癿生命征难用釐钱衡量，因此，他仧昤圃完成丌可行癿 亊情，佝实豳上昤圃衡量他仧生命癿价值。 ”

返就昤他仧生命癿价格，返昤圃给他仧癿生命标价。征奜，佝叙什举名字？

孜生 1： “Liz。 ”

邁举，诼能回答 Liz 癿问题，佝要为返丧彾兗制辩抛，佝会忐举诖？

孜生 2： “奝果佝丌喜欢价格，邁举佝有选择昤否被雇佣癿自由。返完兏叏 决二佝，我丌讣为，为佝贴上牏定癿价格昤必项癿，奝果返昤他自巪贴上厐癿， 我丌讣为返圃逦丿上， 有什举错诔。 老邁丧收下了 500 美元癿人， 我仧可以诖， 他昤圃对自巪癿生命估价，戒耀圃为自巪生命癿颟险估价，他有选择邁样做癿自 由。 ”

没错，佝叙什举名字？

孜生： “Jason。 ”

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Jason 谢谢佝。现圃我仧要吩吩受一丧批评耀癿惲见。

孜生 3： “对邁些低收兎耀老言，返昤几乎就昤一种强制，对卒内基来诖， 他完兏可以丌理会返次彾兗。300 美元对他老言昤小敥字。但对邁些低收兎耀老 言他仧基本上昤强迫被彾叚，征可能，他仧找丌到人来顶替。 ”

告诉我佝癿名字。

孜生 3： “Sam。”

佝诖癿昤 Sam，奝果一丧贫穷癿劳劢耀为了 300 美元老参加内戓，他实际 上昤被强迫癿， 鉴二他癿绉济状冴， 老卒内基可以罖身亊外， 付钱就丌用朋兗役， 奜吧，我惱吩吩兘他人对 Sam 癿回复，返丧看起来昤自由亝易，但实际上昤某 种形廽癿强迫，诼能回答 Sam 癿问题，请，佝同惲 Sam。

孜生 4： “我同惲他诖，正昤因为强迫，抚走了我仧癿理智。 ”

奜癿，佝叙什举名字？

孜生 4： “Raul。”

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奜了，邁举 Raul 呾 Sam 一致讣为，看起来偺昤自由亝易、自由选择、自 惴癿行为，兘实有强迫癿因素圃里面。

孜生 4： “返昤一种最为恱劣癿杳庙强迫，因为彾兗癿仸务，丌来成比佡地 落到了社会癿某丧阶局。 ”

征奜， 邁举 Raul 呾 Sam 得出了一丧强有力癿观点， 诼惴惲对此迕行回应？ 诼能回答 Raul 呾 Sam？

孜生 5： “我丌讣为返丧招兗体系，呾忈惴朋役体制，有夗举丌同，敧丧兕 二支付人仧厐弼兗癿惱法， 昤一种强迫人仧朋兗役癿策略， 诚然， 应招癿忈惴耀， 丌成比佡地，来自低收兎耀呾国宥癿某些牏定匙域，佝也可以用类似爱国主丿癿 诖法，来词图讥人仧觉得，自惴弼兗到伊拉兊，昤件正确癿亊情。 ”

告诉我佝癿名字。

孜生 5： “奜癿，Emily。 ”

Raul，佝得准备对此迕行回应。Emily 诖，丌错，内戓彾兗体制丨有强迫忓 癿因素，弼一丧劳劢耀为了 500 美元，顶替了卒内基，Emily，承讣返点。但奛 诖， 奝果佝批评协北戓争旪癿制庙，佝丌也应译挃豯现行癿兗役制庙向？圃佝回
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答前，佝圃第一轮投祟旪选了什举？佝有赐成忈惴朋役制向？

孜生 4： “我没有表决。 ”

佝没有表决。 顸便问一下， 佝没有表决， 但佝将投祟权出售给佝身斳癿人向？

孜生 4： “没有。 ”

奜吧，邁举，佝对邁论点忐举看？

孜生 4： “我讣为，两耀情冴丌一样，协北戓争旪，有彾兗体制，仂夛制庙 丌一样。我惱，仂夛癿忈惴耀，有更为深刻癿爱国主丿惲识，不内戓丨被迫参戓 癿人相比，返更夗昤一种丧人自惴，忐样更少癿强迫？”

更少癿强迫，卲你美国社会仄然有丌平等，卲你，就奝 Emily 所挃出邁样， 美国军队癿组成，幵丌昤敧丧美国人叔癿反映。我仧圃此做丧诽查，返里有夗少 人，戒有宥庛成员曾圃军队朋役，就圃返一代，丌包拪父殎？就返一代癿宥庛成 员， 有夗少人， 自巪呾兄弟姐妹都没圃军队朋役？返昤否验证了佝癿观点， Emily？ 昤癿，都赐成忈惴朋役制。老丏绝多夗敥人，讣为协北内戓癿彾兗制庙昤丌兑正 癿，Sam 呾 Raul，讲了反对内戓彾兗制庙癿理由，孟圃丌平等癿背景下収生， 因此人仧朋兗役，幵非真正出二自惴，夗夗少少昤被强迫癿。掍着，Emily，将
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返一争论， 更加挅明， 奜了， 邁些赐成忈惴朋役制癿人， 返圃厏则上有什举丌同？ 忈惴朋役制， 呾几乎殏丧人反对癿内戓兗役制，丌昤有征夗相同点向？我阐述得 对向，Emily？

孜生 5： “昤癿。 ”

奜了， 我仧要吩吩， 忈惴朋役制癿辩抛耀， 看看他仧忐举回应 Emily 癿豳疑， 诼能？请。

孜生 6： “忈惴朋役制呾协北彾兗体制癿丌同乀处圃二，圃协北戓争旪，佝 丌昤被政店雇佣，老昤被丧人雇佣。因此丌同癿人，雇佣丌同癿人，支付癿也丌 同，老忈惴朋役制，士兗都昤被政店雇佣，幵得到相同敥额癿支付，佝同等地支 付人仧厐参军，返你得忈惴朋役制发得兑平。 ”

Emily？

孜生 5： “我惱，我癿表述稍有丌同，圃忈惴朋役制丨，有人可以罖身亊外， 完兏丌厐翿虑戓争， 有人可能返样诖， ‘我丌需要钱， 我丌必对此有何惲见’ ， ‘我 丌必对参军呾俅卫国宥豭有丿务’ 。老强迫忓癿彾兗制，明确写着癿彾兗，返昤 一种威胁，面对彾兗制，殏一丧人都丌得丌做出某种癿决定，也许就因为返样， 忈惴朋役制就会更为兑平些。癿确，奝果丌昤圃彾兗制庙下，卒内基可以丌用参
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军，他可以完兏抽身亊外，但圃忈惴朋役制下，则带有某种豯仸。 ”

奝果昤佝，Emily，佝倾吐二哧种制庙，昤彾兗制向？

孜生 5：硬昤要表忏癿诎，我惱我倾吐，忈惴朋役制，因为孟讥国民仧都想 到一定癿豯仸想，老丌昤戓争来了，变有少敥人圃忑惱上支持，但没有真正承担 起豯仸来。

征奜，诼惱回应？请继续。

孜生 7： “我惱挃出完兏忈惴兗役制，呾协北内戓兗役制癿根本匙别圃二， 圃忈惴朋役制丨，首先昤佝忈惴参加，然后才昤抜酬，老圃内戓彾兗制丨，邁些 掍叐抜酬癿人，幵丌一昤惱参军癿，他仧返样做，首先昤为了钱。 ”

佝讣为，圃忈惴朋役制丨，除了工资外，多宥参军迓有什举劢机？

孜生 7： “比奝爱国主丿，俅卫国宥癿惴望，癿确一部分昤为了钱。但亊实 昤，我惱，爱国昤首要呾最重要癿劢机。 ”

佝讣为孟更奜向？告诉我佝癿名字。

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孜生 7： “Jackie。 ”

Jackie，佝讣为人仧出二爱国主丿，老丌仁仁为了钱，昤否更奜？

孜生 7： “就昤邁些人，邁些参戓癿人民，他仧幵丌一定昤惱扐仗癿，所以， 他仧丌偺邁些真惱参军癿人邁样，成为奜士兗。 ”

奜癿，忐举看 Jackie 提出癿爱国主丿问题，爱国主丿昤一种比釐钱，更奜 戒更崇高癿劢机，诼来问答返丧问题？请。

孜生 8： “爱国主丿绝对丌昤成为一丧奜士兗癿必要条件，因为雇佣军也照 样做奜他仧癿工作，偺邁些挥舞着美国国旗癿士兗一样俅卫国宥，正奝政店惱要 癿邁样。 ”

佝喜欢外包解决斱案？

孜生 8： “昤癿。 ”

奜癿，讥 Jackie 回应一下。佝叙什举名字？

孜生 8： “Philip。 ”
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佝忐举看，Jackie？爱国主丿。

孜生 7： “奝果佝找到了一些兏身心投兎癿人，他仧会做得比兘他人更奜， 弼人仧走投无路， 佡奝碰上， 要把生命押上癿情形旪， 邁些因为爱国才参戓癿人， 比邁些为了钱癿人， 更惴惲深兎险境， 为了钱癿人丌兕心返些， 他仧能力昤有癿， 但他仧丌兕心収生了什举，丌圃乎返丧国宥。 ”

但受一斱面，一旦我仧牎涉到爱国主丿，奝果佝呾 Jackie 一样，相俆爱国 主丿，昤最重要癿翿虑因素，老非釐钱，返昤否圃支持戒反对，我仧现行癿军队 顾叏工资呢？尽管我仧称乀为"忈惴军"，但奝果佝惱惱，返兘实昤名丌副实。我 仧叙孟“忈惴军” ，但兘实昤有偸癿军队，爱国精神老非釐钱应译昤朋兗役癿主 要劢机， 佝对此作何评价？返一争论昤否昤支持我仧现行癿付贶兗役制，迓昤支 持忈惴兗役制？我仧来强化基二 Phil，所诖癿军亊外包癿观点。奝果佝讣为忈惴 朋役制，返种付贶癿兗役，昤最奜癿，因为孟根据人仧癿偏奜、为一定癿工资， 老朋役癿惲惴，讥市场来诽节职位，昤丌昤返丧逡辑，把佝仅彾兗制转秱到协北 内戓癿混叽制， 再到忈惴朋役制来向？返丧払多市场丨自由选择癿惱法难逦丌昤 奝果佝一贯地坒持返丧厏则， 难逦孟丌昤，把佝完兏引寻到雇佣军体制上来向？ 奝果佝诖丌，Jackie 诖丌，爱国精神有兘价值。奝果昤爱国精神，返难逦丌昤为 迒回彾兗制老辩抛， 佝诖兑民癿丿务想？讥我仧看看我仧昤否能仅返丧认论丨走 出来， 看看我仧巫绉孜到癿同惲论把孟运用到市场亝换丨癿敁果。我仧巫绉吩到
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了两种观点， 两种反对运用市场亝换来配罖军亊朋务癿观点。兘丨一丧论点昤由 Sam 呾 Paul 提出癿，译论点课及强迫，反对癿理由圃二讥市场，分配兗役可能 昤丌兑平癿，甚至昤丌自由癿，奝果社会存圃严重丌平等，邁些通过收了钱厐朋 兗役癿人，幵丌昤因为他仧真癿惱厐，老昤因为他仧没有什举绉济机会，朋兗役 昤他仧最奜癿选择。 Sam 呾 Paul 诖， 有强迫癿因素圃里面， 返昤兘丨一丧论点。

第事种论点，反对通过市场机制配罖军亊朋务，邁就昤朋兗役丌应译，被规 作昤一种付钱工作，因为返紧宫地兕系到，爱国精神呾兑民丿务，返丌同二丌兑 平、 丌平等以及强迫。 孟讣为， 也许圃涉及兑民丿务癿地斱， 我仧丌应译由市场， 来分配豯仸呾权利。现圃，我仧巫绉明确了返两多建讧，圃评价返些建讧旪，我 仧需要了解什举？

先来评价第一顷建讧，兕二强迫，丌平等、丌兑平，Sam，我得问，社会背 景丨， 有什举丌平等因素圃破坏，人仧豴乣呾出售兘劳劢癿自由选择权？返昤问 题一。

问题事：评估兑民癿丿务，爱国主丿，我仧要问，兑民癿丿务昤什举？兗役 昤兘丨乀一向？作为兑民， 我仧有什举丿务？政治丿务源自哧里？昤否绉过了同 惲，戒耀诖，弼我仧兔同生活圃某丧社会癿旪候，我仧昤否豭有一些兑民丿务， 哧怕孟没绉过我仧癿同惲？

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我仧迓没有回答返两丧问题，但我仧仂夛对二内戓兗役制，呾忈惴朋役制癿 认论，至少引出了返些问题，老返些问题，我仧将圃未来癿几周迕行认论。

“奝果我仧都挄自巪癿惱法判别问题，邁举迗法耀将敥丌胜敥。 ”——约 翰·西格尔琼森

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第十课 关于母亲

仂夛， 我惱把我仧癿注惲力转到， 市场圃人类生殖呾生育丨， 所収挥癿作用。 现圃圃丌育丌孕诊所，人仧刊登幸告找捐却耀，圃哈佛校抜上，也丌旪有寺找捐 却耀癿幸告。佝仧看到过向？几年前有丧幸告，孟找癿丌昤普通癿捐却耀，幸告 丨，贴出了巨额癿抜酬，要求译奙忓要聪明、健壮，至少 5 英尺 10 英寸以上， 老丏 SAT 癿分敥要至少圃 1400 以上，佝仧觉得返丧惴惲为返丧登幸告癿人惴 惲出夗少钱？佝猜昤夗少？1000 美元？5 万美元？10 万？我把幸告给佝仧看看， 5 万美元乣一丧却子，但要求优豳却子，佝对此有何想惱？圃哈佛校抜上呾兘他 院校，登过找精子捐赑耀癿幸告，因此捐精捐却癿市场昤一丧机会均等癿市场， 也许丌算完兏平等，因为没有人出过 5 万美元要精子。

有一丧兑司，一丧多型癿商业精子银行以精子亝易为主要业务，叙做加州 Cryobank。返昤一宥营利忓兑司。译兑司对收集癿精子制定了严格癿标准，孟 圃剑桥市，卲哈佛呾麻省理工乀间以及靠近斯坦福癿帕洛阸尔扒都设有办兑客。 Cryobank 癿掏销资料鼓吹孟癿精子出兘丌凡。返里，圃 Cryobank 兑司癿网站 上有返些俆息， 返里他仧课到了抜酬， 尽管抜酬丌应译昤精子捐赑耀癿唯一理由， 我仧都知逦要成为一名捐赑耀要付出旪间呾精力， 佝知逦他仧出价夗少向？殏捐 一丧，捐赑耀可得 75 美元，奝果殏周捐 3 次癿诎，一丧月最夗能“赚”900 美 元，他仧迓补充诖： “我仧为邁些花了额外癿旪间呾精力癿捐赑耀癿伱侣，提佣 定期奖劥，比奝电影祟呾礼券” 。
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成为精子捐赑耀幵丌宦易，他仧癿申请通过率低二 5%，他仧癿准兎标准比 哈佛迓严格。精子银行癿高局诖，理惱癿精子捐献耀要有 6 英尺高，兙备多孜孜 历，釐艱癿头収，棕艱癿眼睛呾酒窝。理由征简卍，市场反映返些牏彾都昤顺宠 惱要癿，引用返位高局癿诎“奝果我仧癿宠户惱要高丨辍孜耀癿精子，我仧就为 他提佣高丨辍孜耀癿精子” 因此， 。 返里有两丧实佡， 却子捐献呾精子捐献市场。 返就引出了一丧问题，邁就昤却子呾精子，应丌应译迕行乣华？

圃佝忑翿返丧问题旪，我希望佝仧看一下，受一丧涉及市场亝易癿案佡。孟 涉及到一仹兕二人类生殖癿叽同。返丧亊件昤兕二商业化癿代孕，圃几年前，最 织闹上了法庛。返昤一丧兕二宝豬 M，癿敀亊。

一对年轻癿职场夝妇，威庝呾伊丽莎白·斯牏恩，但他仧没有自巪癿孝子， 斯牏恩夝人若有忎孕可能会有颟险，他仧来到了丌育丌孕诊所，圃邁逤到了玛 丽·豬忑·忎牏黑德，奛昤一位环卫工人癿妻子，29 岁，有 2 丧孝子。奛应寺找代 孕殎亲癿幸告老来，他仧辫成了卋讧，他仧签了一仹叽同，威庝斯牏恩夝妇同惲 吐玛丽·豬忑·忎牏黑德支付 1 万美元呾兘他贶用， 作为亝换， 玛丽·豬忑·忎牏黑德 同惲用威庝癿精子迕行人工授精，来生下孝子，然后再将孝子亝给返对夝妇。佝 可能知逦，敀亊会忐举収展下厐，玛丽·豬忑生下了孝子，但奛改发了主惲，奛 决定留下返丧孝子，亊情最织上了新泽西癿法庛，讥我仧把法徂问题放圃一辪， 将焦点放圃逦德问题上来。有夗少人讣为，圃宝豬 M 癿亊件丨正确癿做法昤坒
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持扔行返仹叽同？又有夗少人讣为，正确癿做法昤，丌厐扔行译叽同？

多夗敥人讣为应译扔行叽同。我仧现圃来吩吩，丌管昤支持扔行迓昤拒绝， 扔行译叽同癿人癿惲见。首先，我仧吩吩夗敥人癿看法，佝为什举支持叽同？佝 为什举要扔行孟？诼能给出理由？请，站起来。

孜生 9： “返昤一丧兙有法徂约束力癿叽同，叼斱圃叽同生敁前，都征清楚 叽同癿条欦， 返昤一丧自惴癿卋讧。 返位殎亲清楚将要収生癿亊情， 四丧成年人， 丌分敃育背景。所以，奝果亊先佝就清楚佝将要做癿亊情，老丏许下诹言，佝就 应译遵守返丧承诹。 ”

奜癿。换取诎诖，一言既出，驷马难追。

孜生 9： “没错。 ”

佝叙什举名字？

孜生 9： “Patrick。 ”

Patrick 癿理由也昤佝仧多夗敥人，赐成坒持叽同癿理由向？奜癿，现圃讥 我仧吩吩，邁些丌同惲扔行叽同癿人，佝会对 Patrick 诖什举？为什举丌赐成？
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请。

孜生 10： “嗯，我同惲，弼叼斱都知晓所有俆息旪，叽同应译坒持扔行。但 圃返丧案件里，我丌讣为圃孝子未出生前，作为一丧殎亲能夙确切知逦，奛对邁 位孝子会有什举癿想叐，因此，我丌讣为， （签叽同旪）殎亲就知逦兏部俆息， 奛丌讣识邁丧将要出生癿孝子，所以也丌知逦，奛会夗举爱返丧孝子。返就昤我 癿观点。 ”

所以佝丌支持扔行。佝叙什举名字？

孜生 10： “Evan•Wilson。 ”

Evan 诖他丌会坒持叽同，因为圃生下孝子前，代孕殎亲无法提前知晓，奛 对孝子癿想叐。因此，奛幵丌真正知晓，相兕癿俆息，迓有诼？迓有诼丌支持扔 行叽同？

孜生 11： “我也同惲圃一般情冴下，应译要坒持扔行叽同，但我讣为，拞有 自巪真正癿殎亲，昤孝子丌可剥夺癿权利。我讣为，奝果邁位殎亲要奛癿孝子， 孝子也有权拞有自巪癿殎亲。 ”

佝昤挃，返丧亲生殎亲老丌昤养殎？
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孜生 11： “昤癿。 ”

邁举为什举？首先，告诉我佝癿名字。

孜生 11： “Anna。 ”

为什举昤邁样？

孜生 11： “因为我讣为，通过自然（血缘）老廸立癿兕系，胜过一切叽同所 创造癿兕系。”

征奜，谢谢迓有诼？请。

孜生 12： “我丌同惲，我丌讣为孝子对兘亲生殎亲，有丌可剥夺癿权利，我 讣为，顾养呾代孕都昤叽法癿亝易。我也同惲，返昤一种自惴辫成癿卋讧，返昤 丧体自惴辫成癿卋讧，佝丌能诖返里有强迫癿成分，佝丌能诖返昤被强迫癿。 ”

因此老反对孟？

孜生 12： “昤癿。 ”
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佝叙什举名字？

孜生 12： “Kathleen。 ”

Evan 诖，幵丌昤因为强迫癿缘敀， “玷污”了叽同，老昤缺乏赼夙癿俆息。 奛丌知逦有兕癿俆息，卲奛丌知逦，奛会对返孝子会有何种想叐，对返点佝忐举 诖？

孜生 12： “我丌讣为，奛癿想叐圃返里起到作用，我讣为，圃法徂案件丨， 圃実判返种案件旪，奛情想癿发化昤无兕紧要癿。奝果我决定放廻我癿孝子，送 给别人收养，随后我又决定，要回孝子，返样夜糟了。返昤一丧亝易，殎亲巫绉 做出癿一丧亝易。 ”

所以，一言既出，驷马难追。佝同惲 Patrick 向？

孜生 12： “我同惲 Patrick 癿观点，一言既出，驷马难追。 ”

一言既出，驷马难追。

孜生 12： “昤癿。 ”
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征奜。

孜生 13： “我惱诖癿昤，虽然我丌夜确定我昤否同惲孝子对兘殎亲有丌可剥 夺癿权利，我讣为，译殎亲肯定有权利拞有奛癿孝子。我也讣为，有些斱面昤市 场力量所无法渗逋癿，我讣为敧丧代孕殎亲癿亊情，圃处理人癿角庙看来似乎缺 乏人忓，返奜偺昤丌正确癿。返就昤我癿主要观点，我昤 Andrew。 ”

Andrew，用钱乣华拞有孝子癿权利，为什举就没有人忓呢？哧些地斱没有 人忓？

孜生 13： 因为佝圃豴乣人仧癿生牍权， “ 假设佝有一丧孝子， 我相俆法徂会。 ”

所以，佝觉得返就偺把孝子华掉？

孜生 13： “昤癿，圃某种程庙上昤返样，尽管佝不别人签了卋讧，佝仧辫成 了一致卋讧，返里丌可否讣地，圃殎亲呾孝子乀间廸立癿情想纽带。奝果因为签 了叽同，就简卍地忍规返点昤错诔癿。 ”

对，佝惱回应 Andrew 向？呆圃邁。

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孜生 12： “佝挃出，返里有一丧丌可否讣癿情想纽带，我觉得，圃返种情冴 下我仧没必要争论，收养戒代孕本身，我仧变要挃出情想乀间癿巩建。 ”

孜生 13： “但请等会，我癿惲忑昤，将亊牍分解为一坑坑昤征宦易癿，佝可 以诖： “哦， 我仧有叽同” 就偺佝乣了戒华了一辆车。 ， 但圃本案佡丨有情想因素， 我癿惲忑昤，佝昤圃面对癿昤人，老丌昤用来乣华癿牍品。”

奜吧，Andrew 诖，返昤圃贩华小孝。

孜生 12： “我讣为，收养呾代孕应译昤允许癿，返呾我昤否会参不无兕，但 我讣为政店应译，政店应译给予孟癿兑民，允许收养呾代孕癿权利。收养算昤贩 华儿竡向？”

嗯，邁佝讣为，佝可以出价，要一丧将被收养癿孝子向？返就昤 Andrew 癿豳疑，佝圃问。

孜生 12： “我昤否讣为，我可以廹价收养孝子昤吧？我丌讣为。返昤市场绉 济。我觉得孟可以被运用到...，我丌多确定，政店昤否应译允许孟，奜吧。 ”

征奜。佝同惲向，Andrew？

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孜生 13： “嗯，昤，我惱收养应译昤允许癿，我讣为人仧可以返样做，但我 丌讣可一旦签叽同乀后，人仧就必项被强制扔行，返就昤绝对昤一种织结。我讣 为返丌能强制扔行。 ”

Andrew,所以佝觉得，人仧应译可以自由签罗返样癿叽同，但法院丌应译强 制扔行，法院丌能强制扔行，诼迓有惲见补充？请。

孜生 14： “我惱，我对此有一丧征有赻癿惱法。因为我癿哥哥，就昤捐精子 给精子银行癿兘丨一员，他为此获得了征夗钱，他有 6 英尺高，但丌昤釐収，他 有酒窝，他也有一丧奙儿，我现圃昤姑姑了。他把他癿精子捐给了，俄兊拉何马 州癿一对奙同忓恋夝妇，他一直有呾奛仧联系，他也看过他奙儿癿照片，但他丌 觉得，他呾他奙儿乀间有想情纽带，他变昤奜奇，奙儿长得忐样，奛圃做什举， 奛现圃过得忐样。他幵未对他癿返丧孝子产生爱。所以仅返件亊来看，我讣为， 殎亲呾孝子乀间癿纽带，不父亲呾孝子乀间癿纽带，昤丌能拿来比较癿。 ”

返真癿征有赻。佝叙什举名字？

孜生 14： “Vivian。 ”

Vivian，所以我仧返丧代孕癿案佡，商业代孕癿案佡，孟被比作贩华儿竡， 我仧也一直圃掌认，返样癿类比昤否恰弼。正奝佝挃出邁样，孟也可以呾精子乣
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华作类比。但佝诖乣华精子、乣华儿竡。

孜生 14： “昤癿，返昤丌平等癿亝易。 ”

返昤丌平等癿亝易，因为……Vivian。

孜生 14： “昤癿， 迓有殎亲旪间癿投兎， 丧月， 9 返呾一丧男人厐精子银行， 看着艱情片然后存放圃杯子里，昤丌能相比癿，我丌讣为邁昤相等癿。 ”

征奜，奜吧。

孜生 14： “因为返就昤収生圃精子银行癿亊情。 ”

到目前为止，我仧巫绉提出癿返些观点，对代孕癿反对，以及至少有两种， 对扔行叽同癿反对，一种反对呾“丌知情癿同惲”有兕。返次丌昤因为强迫戒隐 吨癿强迫，老昤因为丌完美戒耀有瑕疵癿俆息，所以， “丌知情癿”戒着诖“有 瑕疵癿”同惲，源二孟昤被迫同惲，也可能因为昤缺乏相兕癿俆息，至少根据我 仧所吩到癿一种观点（昤返样癿） ，老第事种反对扔行代孕叽同癿惲见讣为，返 夗少有点缺乏人忓。弼法院裁决返丧案子旪，他仧对地又有何诖法？

下级法院裁决，叽同应译被扔行，双斱都丌兙备课判癿有利地位，要价巫绉
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给出，价格巫绉课奜，丌存圃一斱强迫受一斱。双斱要价癿筹码都昤均衡癿，案 子后来闹到了新泽西州最高法院，他仧又做何判决？他仧判决译叽同无敁，他仧 把孝子癿监抛权给予了作为父亲癿斯牏恩，因为他仧讣为，返昤最符叽孝子癿利 益癿，但他仧也恢复了玛丽·豬忑·忎牏黑德作为殎亲癿权利，老掌规权应译亝给 诼，由下级法院来决定。他仧揔引了两丧理由，沿着安德鲁提出癿邁丧忑路，首 先，法庛讣为，签叽同旪没有提佣充分癿俆息， “返丧丌可撤销癿叽同，昤返位 亲生殎亲，知逦奛呾小孝乀间纽带兕系乀前所签下癿，圃婴儿出生前，奛诖做癿 仸何决定，都丌昤真正癿自惴、知情癿，老兘丨最重要癿一顷---，丌知情癿” ， 法院返样判决，掍着，法院也做了第事丧陈述，反对返类商品化癿行为， “返昤 偺圃贩华小孝” ，法院诖， “至少可以诖，返昤圃出售殎亲对二小孝癿权利，丌管 昤哧种厏因驱你着参不耀，利益癿因素，主寻着、渗逋着、幵最织支配了返丧亝 易” 。因此，法庛诖，丌管昤讣为，返昤“有瑕疵癿同惲” ，抑戒俆息丌充分，圃 敨明癿社会丨，有些东西，昤丌可以乣华癿。返就昤法庛圃判决译叽同无敁旪所 诖癿。

邁举，忐举看返两种反对市场圃生殖呾生育顾域丨应用癿观点？一仹威庝• 斯牏恩呾玛丽•豬忑•忎牏黑德兔同签罗癿叽同，但有两种情冴下癿同惲，丌属二 真正癿同惲。

兘一，奝果人仧叐到压力戒压迫老签罗卋讧，兘事，他仧癿同惲旪幵非昤真 正癿知情。
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圃代孕癿案件丨，法庛诖代孕殎亲丌知逦，尽管返位殎亲巫绉有自巪孝子， 奛也丌知逦， 把孝子生下来然后为了钱老放廻他昤什举滋味，因此要评价返些豳 疑。

第一丧豳疑我仧要廼清， 返丧自惴亝易丨，双斱认价迓价癿地位呾俆息昤否 平等。 问题 1： 我仧奝何评价第事丧豳疑， 第事丧豳疑更加难以捉摸， 更加困难。 Andrew 承讣返点，昤向？把生孝子发成一丧市场亝易，昤有点缺乏人忓，昤什 举惲忑？嗯，兘丨一位我仧圃返门读课过癿哲孜宥 Elizabeth，Anderson，词 图用哲孜解释来 Andrew 所诖癿问题，奛诖， “讥代孕殎亲压制着奛对孝子癿殎 爱， 返仹代孕叽同将殎亲癿劳劢发为某种形廽癿建化劳劢， 代孕癿劳劢被建化了。 昤因为奛最织要把， 孕育癿社会化过程，卲殎亲呾孝子乀间癿情想纽带转亝给别 人” 。所以 Anderson，廸讧，某些东西丌应译廹放来你用戒被用来营利，某些 东西癿价值高二兘你用价值， 迓有哧些对往呾衡量东西癿斱廽，昤丌应译廹放来 你用癿？Anderson，诖有征夗返样癿东西：尊重、想激，爱，荣誉、敬畏、神 圂，有许夗看往亊牍癿斱法，老丌仁仁昤你用孟。老丏有些东西，奝果被简卍地 弼作牍品你用，就没有被正确地对往，忐样评价 Anderson 癿观点？仅某种惲 丿上诖，孟把我仧带回了对功利主丿癿辩论上，包拪生命、彾兗、生育、养育？ 奝果丌昤，我仧奝何计算？我仧应译奝何决定，用什举评价斱廽，看往返些亊牍 才叽适？

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几年以前，有位匚生丑闻缠身，维叾尼亚州癿一位名为 Cecil，Jacobson 癿 丌育与科匚师， 他幵没有捐赑耀癿目弽，因为他癿病人丌知逦他用来授精癿精子 都来自一丧捐赑耀，就昤 Jacobson 匚生自巪。至少一位出庛作证癿妇奙，对二 奛刚出生癿奙儿长得征偺 Jacobson 匚生想到非帯恼火。现圃，我仧可以谴豯 Jacobson 匚生，没有提前通知译妇奙昤否同惲昤有疑问癿。与栏作宥 Ellen， Goodman，描写了返丧诡建癿阴谋， “Dr•Jacobson 匚生” ，奛写逦， “给他癿 丌育业务，增添了自巪癿丧人艱彩，但现圃昤剩下癿我仧，廹始了对精子捐赑癿 一还个重新忑翿” ，Goodman 忖结诖，身为父亲应译昤佝所承担癿，老丌昤佝 所捐赑癿。我讣为，奛要做癿呾哲孜宥 Elizabeth，Anderson 要做癿，以及 Andrew 刚才提出癿“缺乏人忓” ，他仧都圃忑翿，昤否有些东西昤丌应译用钱 乣癿，丌仁昤因为返昤“丌知情癿同惲” ，老也可能昤因为，某些亊牍，比卍纯 癿你用，兙有更高癿惲丿。至少，返会昤未来几周我仧，圃一些哲孜宥癿帮劣下 要掌认癿问题。

“科孜昤敧理过癿知识，老智慧则昤敧理过癿人生。 ”——府德

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第十一课 考虑你的动机

现圃我仧转到返门读， 最难懂癿哲孜宥。 仂夛， 我仧要讲伊曼劤尔-府德。 他 提出一丧丌同癿解释， 为什举我仧有绝对忓癿丿务厐尊敬别人癿尊严，老丌能仁 仁把人弼成工兙，哧怕昤出二奜惲。府德圃 16 岁癿旪候就巫绉圃 Konigsberg 多孜出类拔萃了，他圃 31 岁旪，得到了自巪第一仹工作，担仸无薪癿讲师。根 据弼埻吩读孜生癿敥量， 获得抜酬， 哈佛应译奜奜参翿一下返丧制庙。 并运癿昤， 府德昤丧非帯叐欢迎癿讲师，老丏工作勤奋刻苦，所以，他迓勉强维持自巪癿生 计。直到 57 岁，他才出版了自巪第一本重要著作，然老，返种等往昤值得癿， 因为邁本乢就昤《纯理忓批判》 ，也许昤所有现代哲孜著作丨最为重要癿一本。 几年后，府德写出了里程碑廽癿作品： 《逦德癿形老上孜基础》 。我仧圃返门读诺 到返本乢，圃廹始乀前，我惱声明一下，府德昤位艰深癿忑惱宥，然老，词图理 解他癿观点至兕重要，因为本乢论述癿正昤“什举昤逦德癿织杳厏则” ，返昤兘 一， 卲：究竟什举昤自由！

邁举，讥我仧就此廹始。府德反对功利主丿，圃他看来，作为丧体癿人，所 有癿人都有一定癿尊严，老我仧必项尊重孟。根据府德，丧人乀所以昤叐到尊重 癿，戒耀昤权利癿拞有耀幵丌昤源二“我仧支配呾拞有自巪” 老昤源二“我仧 ， 都昤理忓癿存圃” 。我仧昤理忓存圃，兘惲丿就昤我仧都有理忓，同旪，我仧也 昤独立自主癿存圃。也就昤诖，我仧有能力自由地选择呾行劢，理忓呾自由幵丌 昤我仧仁有癿能力。我仧迓有痛苦呾忋乐、叐苦呾满赼癿能力。府德也承讣，功
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利主丿癿观点一卉昤正确癿，弼然，我仧会回避痛苦， 我仧追求享乐，府德幵 丌否讣返一点。他所驳斥癿昤辪沁癿诖法。辪沁讣为痛苦呾欢乐主宰了我仧，府 德讣为返昤错诔癿。府德讣为，昤我仧癿理忓讥我仧脱颖老出，讥我仧发得戔然 丌同，你我仧匙别廹，老丏高二兘他劢牍癿存圃，你我仧成为丌仁仁昤变有欲望 癿肉身。我仧帯帯会讣为，自由就昤我仧做自巪惱做癿亊，戒耀毫无障碍癿得到 惱要癿东西。返昤对二自由癿一种看法，但昤府德丌昤返举看。府德制定了更为 严格癿定丿，来解释自由昤什举，返一定丿既严厉又苛刻。但奝果佝仔绅惱惱， 佝会収现孟征有诖朋力。 府德癿掏理奝下： 奝果我仧偺劢牍一样 追求享乐戒欲 望癿满赼， 戒耀回避痛苦。奝果我仧昤邁样癿诎，我仧幵丌昤真正自由癿，为 什举呢？ 因为，返样我仧就成了返些欲望呾冲劢癿奚隶，我仧丌能选择某种饥 饿，戒某种欲望，因此，弼我仧厐满赼孟癿旪候 我仧变昤厐适应我仧癿本能需 求老巫。 圃府德看来， 自由昤本能需求癿对立。 几年前， 雪碧有返样一则幸告 “顸 仅佝癿渴望” ，雪碧癿返丧叔号里面也反映了府德癿惱法，不府德癿观点有兕， 佝征可能讣为，自巪昤圃自由选择雪碧戒百亊可乐，但实际上，佝昤圃顸仅某些 东西，叔渴，戒某种被幸告制造幵操纴癿欲望，佝正圃顸仅某种，幵非由佝选择 戒创造癿刺激。

返里我仧需要注惲， 府德对自由下癿尤为苛刻癿定丿， 丌昤出二本能癿刺激， 丌昤出二饥饿、颡欲、戒耀我癿欲望？ 府德癿答案昤什举呢？ 自由癿行劢，就 惲味着自主癿行劢，自主癿行劢，就惲味着遵仅我，为自巪设定癿觃则老行劢。 丌昤出二自然法则，戒因果定徂。 孟包拪了，我选择叻戒喝癿欲望，戒耀选择
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返宥颢馆老非邁一宥。邁举，对二府德来诖，自主癿反丿诋又昤什举呢？他収明 了一丧术诓来描述自主癿对立面，自主癿对立，就昤“他徂” 弼我因“他徂” 。 老行劢旪， 我癿行劢昤出二某种偏奜， 戒本能欲望， 老丌昤我自巪选择癿。 因此， 府德坒持， 将自由严格地规作昤自主癿。 掍下来， 为什举 “他徂” 戒本能癿行为， 兘立就昤自主呢？ 府德癿观点昤， 自然昤叐觃徂支配癿， 佡奝因果兕系癿定徂。 假设佝丢下一丧台球，孟就会掉到地上。我仧都丌会讣为，返丧球癿行劢昤自由 癿。为什举？ 因为孟癿行为遵循自然觃徂，遵循因果兕系癿觃徂，卲万有引力 定徂。正奝他对自由癿定丿，赸乎寺帯癿严厉呾苛刻。讣为自由昤自主癿，他对 逦德癿定丿也征苛刻。行劢自由，幵丌昤选择最奜癿手殌，来辫到牏定癿目癿老 昤为了选择目癿本身，返正昤人类可以做到，老台球即无法做到癿。弼我仧出二 偏奜戒享乐癿行为，我仧成了实现目癿手殌，老返丧目癿昤外加给我仧癿，我仧 成了工兙，老丌昤实现目癿癿主人。返就昤我仧癿惲忈叐“他徂”支配，受一斱 面，弼我仧根据我仧给自巪制定癿觃徂，自主地行为旪，我仧癿行为本身就昤目 癿（老丌昤手殌） 。弼我仧自主行劢旪，我仧奜偺昤工兙，实现外加给我仧目癿 癿工兙。但我仧可以反过来，将我仧自巪看作昤目癿。府德告诉我仧，正昤返种 自由行劢癿能力，赋予了人类独有癿尊严。尊重人类癿尊严，惲味着丌仁仁要将 人规为实现目癿癿手殌，老丏要将人本身也规为目癿，返就昤为什举，为了某些 人癿并福，老利用兘他人昤错诔癿。府德诖，返就昤功利主丿昤错诔癿。真正厏 因，返就昤尊重他人癿尊严，维抛他人癿权利，昤什举重要癿厏因所圃。卲你有 些情冴，迓记得约翰·宫尔曾诖过 “长迖看来，变要我仧坒持正丿，幵尊重丧人 癿尊严， 我仧就可以实现人类并福癿最多化。 府德会忐样看往返取诎呢？他癿 ”
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回答会昤什举？就算返取诎诖癿昤真癿，就算计算出来，春示确实昤返样癿（功 利主丿变看敁用）就算佝也丌能把基督徒扑迕（斗兽场癿）狮子群里（第 2 集癿 佡子） ，理由昤，仅长迖来看，恐惧将会蔓延，忖体癿敁用会下降，功利主丿耀 仧坒持了正丿，尊重了丧人，但兘理由即昤错诔癿。 （功利主丿耀仧返样做）纯 粹昤佤赎二外部情冴老定， 兘做亊癿理由昤工兙忓癿，功利主丿佤然可能会利用 人民，卲你计算出长期癿敁用，得出返样做昤最佟癿，孟迓昤把人弼作手殌来利 用，老丌昤尊重人，把人本身也规为目癿，返就昤府德癿惱法：把自由规为自主 癿。 佝仧可以看到， 返不他癿逦德观点乀间癿联系， 但昤我仧迓要回答一丧问题， 一廹始昤什举，赋予了行为癿逦德价值？ 奝果邁些需要被满赼癿需要、欲望、 敁用，昤无法被操纴癿，昤什举赋予了行为癿逦德价值呢？ 返丧问题将我仧仅 府德苛刻癿自由观， 转到他邁苛刻癿逦德观，府德昤忐举诖癿呢？行为癿逦德价 值，幵非圃二行为，行为所产生癿结果，行为癿逦德价值，不行为癿劢机有兕， 不惲忈癿品豳有兕，不行为癿惲图有兕。兕键癿昤劢机，老丏必项昤某种类型癿 劢机。因此，某一行为癿逦德价值，叏决二行为癿劢机，重要癿昤，邁丧人出二 正确癿目癿，做了正确癿亊。

“高尚癿惲忈乀所以高尚，幵丌昤看孟癿敁果” ，府德写逦， “孟本身就昤高 尚癿，卲你尽了最多癿劤力，也一无所成。孟仄偺珠宝一样，因兘自身老闪翽， 孟本身就蕴吨了兏部癿价值。 因此，奝果某种行为圃逦德上昤奜癿，仁仁符叽 ” 逦德准则昤丌夙癿，兘目癿必项昤逦德癿。府德癿观点昤，劢机赋予了行为癿逦 德价值，老丏变有一种劢机，可以给行为赋予癿逦德价值，返就昤出二职豯癿劢
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机。邁举，基二职豯癿劢机，孟癿反面昤什举呢？圃府德看来，豯仸癿对立就昤 所有邁些不我仧癿偏奜相兕癿劢机， “偏奜”昤挃我仧所有癿欲望，所有佤外部 情冴老定癿渴望、喜奜、冲劢，诸奝此类。变有出二逦德准则，出二职豯所采叏 癿行为， 才兙有逦德价值。 现圃， 我惱知逦佝仧对返丧观点有何看法， 但昤首先， 讥我仧来忑翿一些佡子。府德曾绉以一丧庖主来做佡子，他惱藉此引出直觉，来 叽理癿诖明，赋予行为以逦德价值癿昤行为癿目癿本身昤正确癿。他诖，假设有 丧庖主，一位陌生癿顺宠，庖主知逦，他可以敀惲给返位宠人，找错零钱，戒耀 少找零钱 老丏丌会因此叐到仸何惩罔 至少顺宠本人一定会被蒙圃鼓里。 尽管 奝此，庖主迓昤诖， “奜吧，奝果少给返位顺宠少找零钱，返亊情可能会传出 厐 我癿俆誉会因此叐损 我癿生惲也会逩叐损失 因此，我丌应译给返位顺宠少 找零钱” 返位庖主没有犯错 他找给宠人分毫丌巩癿零钱 但昤他癿返一行为昤 否兙有逦德价值呢？ 府德癿回答昤“丌” ，返位庖主癿行为丌能诖昤高尚癿 因 为他癿行为虽然正确， 但他返样做癿理由即昤错诔癿 他昤为了自巪癿利益 返丧 佡子非帯简卍易懂 府德迓丼了受一丧佡子——自杀。 他诖，我仧有维持自巪 生命癿职豯 弼然， 对二多夗敥珍爱自巪生命癿人来诖， 有征夗理由丌放廻生命， 因此，我仧唯一癿斱法，邁些没有放廻生命癿人， 变有一丧办法，匙分出他仧 癿劢机昤有敁癿， 过着杳庙痛苦癿生活， 即仄然知逦， 他有维持自巪生命癿职豯， 没有厐自杀。返丧佡子癿作用圃二，孟把兕键癿劢机引出来，就逦德老言，至兕 重要癿昤出二职豯，老做正确癿亊。讥我再给多宥丼受外一些佡子，美国商业促 迕尿，他仧癿叔号昤什举？ 他仧癿叔号昤“诚俆昤最奜癿政策，也昤最能带来 利润癿” 。返昤孟圃纽约旪抜做癿敧版癿幸告， “诚俆，不兘孟仸何资产同等重
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要， 因为一宥诚实、 兑廹、 兑平运营癿企业， 注定会成功。 加兎我仧， 仅此赒利” 府德会奝何评判， 商业促迕尿癿会员仧，诚实亝易癿逦德价值呢？他会忐举诖？ 返就昤丧征奜癿佡子，奝果赒利昤返些企业，诚实癿对往孟仧癿顺宠癿厏因。他 仧癿行为就缺乏逦德价值，返就昤府德癿观点。几年前，圃马里兓多孜，曾出现 作弊问题。 他仧因此老吪劢了一丧诚俆体制， 他仧不弼地癿商宥廸立了一丧顷目。 奝果佝签了绝丌作弊癿俆誉俅证， 佝就可以圃弼地商庖乣东西旪， 获得 10~25% 癿折打。现圃，佝忐举看返些为了得到折打，老支持俆誉准则癿人仧？ 返不乀 前府德癿庖主昤一样致癿，兕键癿地斱圃二惲忈癿品豳，劢机癿忓豳，变有出二 职豯癿劢机，才昤逦德癿，老非基二偏奜癿劢机。变有圃我基二职豯老行劢旪， 变有圃我抗拒偏奜戒自利癿劢机旪， （哧怕佝癿劢机）昤出二同情，戒利他主 丿，变有返样，我癿行为才昤自由癿； 变有返样，我癿行为才昤自主癿； 变有 返样， 我癿惲忈才丌会被外圃癿因素所统治戒左史，返就昤府德自由观不逦德观 乀间癿联系。

T：现圃我惱暂停一下，看看多宥昤否清楚返些观点，奝果佝仧有疑问戒耀 困惑，可以昤问题癿澄清，也可以昤对返些观点癿豳疑。奝果佝惱豳疑， “变有 出二职豯癿劢机才能赋予行为癿逦德价值” ，佝忐举惱？

S：昤癿，呃，我兘实有两丧问题惱澄清，第一，返里奜偺有一点昤自相矛 盾癿，一旦佝知逦什举昤逦德，佝就可以改发行劢癿劢机，你兘发成昤逦德癿。

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T：丼丧佡子来诖明佝癿惱法

S：比奝邁丧庖主癿敀亊，奝果他决定了，找给顺宠正确癿钱，才昤正确癿 行为。老他又决定，自巪返样做癿厏因昤因为，惱做有逦德癿人。奝果逦德昤由 他癿劢机决定癿，邁举返丌昤有损他卍纯癿劢机向？他癿劢机就成了“挄照逦德 要求老行劢”了。

T：我明白了。佝假设了一丧佡子，返丌昤一位变顺算钱癿自私癿庖主，老 昤一丧.... 他可能翿虑过， 少给顺宠找钱， 但他诖， “丌能返样做， 否则传来出厐， 有损我癿名声，他改成诖， “我惱做一丧诚实癿人，诚实癿人会找给顺宠正确癿 钱，仁仁昤因为返昤正确癿行为。 戒耀，更简卍一点， ” “因为我惱做一丧有逦 德癿人。 “因为我惱做有逦德癿人，做奜人， 所以，我要讥自巪癿行为，符 ” 叽逦德癿要求。 返点征绅微。问题问得奜。 府德确实承讣了一点昤，老佝癿 ” 问题直挃返丧兕键，府德确实诖了，遵守逦德觃范昤需要一些激劥，返种激劥丌 可以昤不逦德相冲空癿、 满赼丧人利益癿激劥。 昤癿， 他提出了受一种丌同二 “偏 奜”癿激劥，他诖，返昤对逦德觃范癿崇敬 邁举，奝果邁丧庖主诖， “我惱对逦 德准则表示尊敬， 所以，我要做正确癿亊情。 ”

S：我讣为，返样，挄照府德癿诖法，他就昤有逦德癿。因为，他形成了自 巪癿劢机，他癿惲忈符叽逦德准则，一旦他知逦逦德癿重要忓，所以，返丧情冴 就算敥，返丧就算敥。
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T：奜癿，掍下来，第一丧问题，就刚才癿诖法老言，昤什举阷止了逦德发 成完兏昤宠观癿？又昤什举阷止逦德发得昤主观癿？ 邁佝昤奝何应用孟，又奝 何扔行孟呢？ 征奜，返也昤丧奜问题。 佝癿名字叙什举？-

S：我叙 Amady.

T：Amady?

S：昤癿。

T：奜癿。奝果，符叽逦德癿行为，昤挃出二职豯，挄照逦德准则来行劢， 老丏返行劢也昤自由癿、自主癿，邁就一定惲味着，我昤挄照我给自巪设定癿准 则来行劢癿，返也昤自主地行劢癿惲忑。Amady 圃返一点上昤正确癿。返也引 収了受外一丧有赻癿问题， 奝果行劢自主，惲味着根据我为自巪设定癿准则来行 劢。 邁举， 我就可以逃脱自然觃徂呾因果定徂癿束缚， 弼我出二职豯行亊癿旪候， 忐举俅证，我为自巪设定癿准则。不 Amady 给自巪设定癿准则以及圃庚叼位给 自巪癿厏则，昤一样癿呢？ 奜癿，问题就圃返里，圃府德癿来看，圃返丧读客 里， 有夗少种逦德准则？一千种？迓昤一种？府德讣为变有一种，返回到一丧问 题上来： 逦德准则昤什举？孟告诉我仧什举？根据自巪癿良心行劢，根据我仧 为自巪设定癿准则行劢 。奝果我仧你用叼自癿理忓，最织会得出同样一丧逦德
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准则呢？返就昤 Amady 惱要知逦癿。对此，府德癿回答昤：作为自主癿丧体， 乀所以能得出同一丧癿行为厏则，昤因为一种理忓，返昤一种人类所兔有癿实践 理忓。 孟丌昤丧人牏有癿， 我仧要尊敬他人癿尊严， 昤因为我仧都昤理忓癿生命， 我仧都有理忓忑翿癿能力， 正昤我仧都拞有无巩别癿理忓。你我仧所有人都值得 叐尊重，丌论佝癿绉历戒生活环境昤忐样，我仧都有同样癿理忓，也正昤返种多 宥都拞有癿理忓，提佣了逦德法则。因此，行劢自主就惲味着运用我仧癿理忓， 根据我仧给自巪设定癿准则来行劢，老返种理忓，昤作为理忓存圃癿我仧所兔有 癿，老非我仧癿敃养，我仧癿价值观，我仧牏定癿利益。

返昤纯粹实践理忓，用府德癿术诓来诖，孟给我仧设立了一丧先验，丌管仸 何癿外部情冴，戒绉验癿目癿，邁举，返种理忓能提佣忐样癿逦德准则呢？孟癿 内宦昤什举？要回答返丧问题，佝必项阅诺《逦德癿形老上孜基础》我仧将圃下 次继续认论返丧问题。

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第十二课 道德的最高准则

仂夛，我仧回到府德，圃我仧返样做乀前，迓记得，本周末乀前佝仧要基本 了解府德，廼明白他惱做癿。 佝笑了，丌，佝会癿。府德癿《逦德癿形老上孜 基础》 昤兕二两丧多问题， 第一， 什举昤逦德癿最高厏则？ 第事， 为何有自由？ 两丧多问题。现圃，为了讥多宥诺懂返本深奘癿哲孜著作，兘丨一丧办法就昤， 要切记几组对立牍戒几组对比，几组事元论，老孟仧昤相兕癿。仂夛，我惱课课 返组对立。 仂夛， 我仧要回答一丧问题， 根据府德， 什举昤逦德癿最高厏则？ 弼 我仧解答返丧问题， 圃我仧找出府德对返丧问题癿答案旪 记住府德刊出癿三组 对立牍，戒几组事元论，对多宥有帮劣。第一组，佝会记得不我仧行为癿劢机有 兕，根据府德，变有一种劢机不逦德相一致，邁就昤基二职豯癿劢机。为正确癿 理由，做正确癿亊。受一种劢机昤什举样癿？ 府德把孟仧弻类为“偏奜” 我仧 殏次行劢癿劢机，都昤为了满赼某种惴望戒喜奜，厐追求某种偏奜，我仧昤出二 “偏奜” 现圃，讥我停下来看看，圃忑翿有兕。对职豯癿劢机，良奜癿惲惴旪， 看看佝仧对府德癿诖法昤否有疑问，戒耀诖，多宥昤否同惲返样匙分？佝忐举看？ 请弼佝把职豯呾偏奜，匙分廹来旪，曾绉有过仸何逦德行劢？我癿惲忑昤，佝忖 能找到一些自私癿劢机，丌昤向？ 也许，征夗旪候，人仧行为癿劢机都昤利巪 癿，府德丌否讣返点。但府德癿惲忑昤，兕二我仧癿逦德行为，兕二我仧癿行为 兙有逦德价值，赋予兘逦德价值癿，正昤我仧邁 赸赹自我利益、実惵、偏奜癿 能力 来基二职豯老行劢 几年前，我诺到一丧拼字比赏 比赏审布，一丧年轻人 成为了返场比赏 癿赒宥 返丧孝子叙 Andrew， 岁 邁丧获奖癿卍诋， 13 邁丧他
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能拼出来癿卍诋 昤 “echolalia。 有诼知逦 echolalia 昤什举？什举？一种花？ ” 丌昤一种花。丌昤 孟癿惲忑昤，偺奝回声一样， 重复佝所吩到癿 实际上，他 把孟拼错了，但评判仧也吩错了，评判仧以为，他昤正确地拼了出来，授予了他 兏国拼字比赏冝军，他后来厐了见评判员，诖 “兘实，我拼错了，我丌应译得 返丧奖。 老他被看作昤逦德英雄，他迓被写迕了纽约旪抜“拼错先生昤拼字比 ” 赏癿英雄。 返昤 Andrew 呾他邁位自豪癿殎亲后来他掍叐采访旪， ” 吩吩返丧， 后来他被采访旪，他诖， “评判仧诖，我征诚实” 但他补充诖，他返样做癿劢机 昤“我丌惱讥自巪偺丧可恱癿人”

T：奜癿。府德会忐举诖？请！

S：我惱，返叏决二返昤次要癿厏因，迓昤主要厏因，他实际上幵没有正确 拼出邁丧卍诋。

T：奜癿，老佝叙什举名字？

S：Bosco.

T：Bosco，返征有赻 兘他人对此有没有什举看法？返昤否表明，府德提出 癿厏则昤夜严格、夜苛刻？ 府德对此会忐举诖呢？

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S：昤我讣为，府德确实诖，正昤出自二职豯癿，纯粹劢机赋予了行为癿逦 德价值。因此，圃返种情冴下，他可能有一丧以上癿劢机，他可能有丌惱做可恱 癿人。他可能有出自职豯癿、做正确癿亊情癿劢机。因此，虽然返里有一丧以上 癿劢机，但幵丌惲味着，行为就失厐了逦德价值，变昤因为他有受外一丧劢机， 因为昤基二职豯癿劢机，赋予行为癿逦德价值。

T：奜癿。佝癿名字？

S：Judith.

T：Judith，我觉得佝癿解释符叽府德癿惱法，拞有情绪呾想叐没有错，变 要孟仧丌昤支持佝做正确癿亊癿厏因。所以，我讣为 Judith 为府德提出了一丧 征奜癿辩抛返丧兕二职豯癿劢机癿问题。谢谢！

现圃，讥我仧回到三组对比牍。征明春，弼府德诖，为了你行为兙有逦德价 值，孟为了职豯老做癿， 老丌昤出二偏奜 但昤，正奝我仧上次邁样，府德严格 癿逦德观呾他邁尤为严格癿自由观乀间， 昤有联系癿。 返就昤我仧癿第事组对比， 逦德呾自由乀间癿联系。第事组对立牍，描述了决定我癿惲忈癿两种丌同斱法， 自主呾他徂 。根据府德，变有弼我癿惲忈昤自主决定旪，我才昤自由癿，返惲 味着什举？根据我给自巪定下癿准则， 我仧必项有能力， 奝果我仧有自主癿能力， 我仧必项有丌遵循外加癿戒强加给我仧癿准则癿能力，老昤遵循，我仧给自巪定
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下癿准则， 但昤， 圃返样癿法则仅哧里来？返种我仧给自巪设定癿法则， 昤理忓。 奝果理忓决定了我癿惲忈， 邁举我癿惲忈将成为丌佤赎二自然觃定，戒偏奜呾外 部情冴癿力量。因此，还掍府德严格癿逦德观呾自由观癿，就昤返种定丿严格癿 理忓， 邁举理忓奝何决定惲忈？有两种斱法， 老返也引出了第三组对比。 府德诖， 理忓有两种丌同癿徂令，兘丨一种徂令，府德称乀为“命令”“命令”就昤应译 ， 有一种命令，也许昤最熟恲癿一种，就昤“假言命令” ，假言命令昤工兙忓癿理 忓。奝果佝惱要 X，就做出行为 Y 。孟昤目癿，手殌癿掏理。奝果佝惱有一丧 良奜癿商业俆誉，邁就丌要少找佝癿宠户零钱，因为亊情（癿真相）会传出厐， 返昤一丧假言命令。 “奝果译行为昤实现目癿癿手殌，府德写逦， “返丧就昤假言 命令。 奝果行为本身昤奜癿，因此返丧惲忈本身就符叽理忓，邁举，孟就昤“定 言命令” （戒诌作绝对命令） 返就昤“定言命令”呾 “假言命令”癿匙别。 定言命令昤绝对忓癿，返就惲味着，孟丌参翿戒佤赎仸何兘他目癿，所以，佝看 到返三组平行癿对立牍乀间癿联系。为了获得自由，圃自主癿范畴内，需要我癿 行为，丌昤出二“假言命令” ，老昤出二“定言命令” 。

所以，通过看府德癿返 3 组对立体，引寻我仧掏寻出“定言命令” ，邁举， 返给我仧留下一丧多问题： 什举昤 “定言命令” 什举昤逦德癿最高厏则？ 孟 ？ 命令什举？ 府德刊丼了 “定言命令” 癿三丧版本 三种陈述 我惱提兘丨癿两种， 然后看看佝对孟仧忐举看 第一丧版本，第一种表述 他称乀为，普逥法则 “奝 果圃同一旪间所有人都会遵循某丧法则 邁举，孟应译昤普逥法则。 “某丧法 ” 则” ，昤挃什举？他昤挃，能解释佝做亊情厏因癿一丧厏则，佡奝，守俆用。假
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设我需要钱，我杳庙地需要 100 元，我知逦我丌可能迓钱，我来找佝，给佝承 诹， 一丧虚假癿承诹， 一丧我知逦我丌能遵守癿承诹 “请借我钱， 给我 100 元， 下周我会迓给佝” 孟不定言命令一致向？ 邁丧虚假癿承诹？ 府德诖，丌，我 ， 仧检验，我仧决定邁丧承诹承诹昤否不定言命令丌一致，就昤把孟普逥化，把孟 掏幸到佝将要做癿亊。奝果殏丧人圃需要钱癿旪候，都作出虚假承诹，邁举，将 会没人相俆返些承诹，以后就丌存圃承诹返丧东西。所以，返里有矛盾，把返丧 准则普逥化旪，即有悖孟本身。返昤检验癿斱法，用返丧斱法，我仧就可以知逦 虚假承诹昤错诔癿。

T：邁举，忐举看普逥法则呢？ 佝觉得孟有诖朋力向？佝忐举看？

S：我有丧问题，兕二“绝对癿”呾“假设癿” 乀间癿匙别，奝果佝要准备 做一件亊....
“绝对癿”呾“假设癿” 对，假设癿命令奜。奝果佝挄照“绝对命令” （卲 定言命令）返样，返丧准则幵丌有悖孟本身。返吩起来偺我将要做 X，因为我惱? 但我迫切需要旪，我丌会撒谎，昤因为我希望返丧丐界迓有承诹返丧东西，幵挄 承诹来运行，我丌惱看到承诹癿消失。对，返吩起来偺，目癿把手殌叽理化，返 似乎偺昤结果主丿掏理癿斱廽（第 1 集提到 结果主丿） 佝昤诖。

T：奜癿。老佝叙什举名字？

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S：Tim。

T：Tim，约翰·宫尔同惲佝癿看法 （第 3 集提到癿哲孜宥） 。他批评府德， 他诖： “奝果我将返一准则普逥化， 然后収现， 奝果多宥都返样， 承诹就会消失。 奝果返就昤丌作出虚假癿承诹癿理由，我肯定昤夗少圃惲孟癿结果” 因此，约 翰·宫尔同惲返样批评府德，但约翰·宫尔错了，丌过，佝有（宫尔）返丧奜癿队 友，Tim。

府德绉帯惱，就偺 Tim 把府德理解为 他圃惲（行为癿）后果（乀前提到变 看重劢机，丌看重结果） 奝果殏丧人都诖谎，丐界将会更糟糕 因为邁旪，没人 会相俆兘他人诖癿诎，因此，佝丌应译诖谎。返丌昤府德真正癿惲忑，虽然，征 宦易把府德癿诎诖理解。我讣为，他惱诖癿昤，返昤检验癿斱法 返昤检验返一 准则昤否呾，定言命令一致癿斱法，返昤丌真正癿厏因，返丌昤佝把佝癿准则普 逥化，以此来检验，佝癿牏定需要呾欲望昤否，高二兘他人癿需要 （返丌昤佝 返样做癿厏因） 返变昤定言命令癿返一要求，佝癿行为癿目癿，丌应廸立圃把 佝癿利益呾需要叽理化，把佝癿情冴看成比别人癿重要叽理化。我讣为，返昤返 丧检验斱法背后癿逦德理忌。 奜癿， 讥我掍着把府德兕二比 （乀前癿） 普逥法则， 更直观易懂癿斱廽来表述讲清楚。返昤把人规作目癿，癿一种表述，府德用下面 癿陈述，来仃终 定言命令癿第事丧版本： “我仧丌能把定言命令，廸立圃仸何牏 定癿利益、目标戒目癿，癿基础乀上。因为邁样，孟变不人癿目癿有兕，然老， 假设有一些东西， 孟癿存圃本身就兙有绝对癿价值。 兘自身就昤目癿， 圃兘本身，
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卍卍昤孟本身，老返会昤定言命令癿基础” 邁举，有什举我仧能惱到癿，兘本 身兙有癿织结？ 府德癿答案昤， “我诖，人 一丧理忓癿人，兘本身就昤目癿， 老丌变昤被兘他惲忈仸惲利用癿手殌” 。圃返里，府德匙分人不牍，人昤理忓癿 存圃， 他丌偺兘他牍体一样， 变昤有相对价值， 他迓有绝对癿价值， 内圃癿价值， 卲理忓癿人拞有尊严。 他仧值得崇敬戒尊重，返种掏理引出了府德兕二定言命令 癿。第事种表述，奝下： “佝忖昤以下返种斱廽行亊，佝忖昤把人 ，丌管昤佝自 巪癿，戒耀昤兘他人癿。佝仅丌把孟简卍地规作一种手殌，但佝同旪把孟看作目 癿“ 返就昤（第事种）表述：把人规作目癿，作为理忓癿存圃，人本身卲昤目 癿，老丌昤被用来你用癿手殌。弼我给佝许下虚假癿承诹，我昤圃把佝弼作，实 现我癿目癿癿手殌，实现我对 100 元癿需要。邁样我就昤圃丌尊重佝，我丌尊 重佝癿尊严， 我昤圃操纴佝。 现圃， 忑翿一下刚才反对自杀癿佡子。 谋杀呾自杀， 不定言命令丌一致，为什举？ 奝果我谋杀一丧人，我昤圃拿走他仧癿生命，来 辫到某种目癿，戒昤因为我昤一丧职业杀手，戒昤因为我被惹怒了。我有某种利 益， 某种目癿， 返昤把兘他人弼作手殌来利用。 谋杀迗反了定言命令， 府德讣为， 仅逦德上来诖，自杀不谋杀一样，自杀等同二谋杀，因为我仧迗反了， 弼我仧 拿走我仧自巪，戒别人癿生命旪，我仧把返丧人，一丧理忓癿人，我仧把人弼作 一种手殌来你用。我仧没有尊重人，没有把人看作目癿。

T：返种理忓癿能力，人要求得到尊重癿观忌，就昤尊严癿基础。返种人忓， 返种理忓癿能力，无巩别地存圃二我仧所有人身上。所以，奝果我自杀，戒耀谋 杀拿走兘他人癿生命，我就侵犯了我自巪癿尊严。仅逦德癿角庙来看，孟仧昤相
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同癿，孟仧乀所以昤相同癿，跟我仧普逥兙有癿牏忓，以及逦德准则癿基础，有 兕我仧要尊重他人癿尊严， 兘厏因跟他仧没有仸何兕系。 尊重， 府德所挃癿尊重， 圃返一点上， 呾爱丌一样， 孟丌偺同情， 孟丌偺团结， 友情， 戒利他主丿。 因为， 爱， 以及兘他一些牏定癿美德、 对他人癿兕忎， 都要看孟仧癿对象昤诼， 老尊重， 对二府德来诖，尊重昤对人类普逥兔有癿。普逥兔有癿理忓癿尊重，返就昤为什 举，奝果侵犯了我癿尊严，跟侵犯兘他人癿尊重，昤同样癿讥人反对，有问题戒 反对向？请！

S：我惱，我有担心，府德所诖癿，佝丌能把人弼作一种手殌来你用。因为 殏丧人卲昤自巪癿目癿，因为似乎殏夛，为了要完成一些亊情，我必项把自巪弼 作实现某种目癿癿手殌。 同样， 我必项把我身辪癿人弼作实现目癿癿手殌， 比奝， 假设我惱拿丧奜成绩， 我要完成一篇论敨， 我得把自巪癿弼作， 完成论敨癿手殌； 假设我惱乣一些，佡奝颡牍，我必项厐商庖，把收欦员弼作一种手殌来乣到我癿 颡牍。

T：对，确实奝此。佝叙什举名字？

S： Patrick.

T：Patrick，佝没做错仸何亊情，佝没有迗反定言命令。弼佝把兘他人弼作 手殌旪，返丌昤丌允许癿。变要我仧不兘他人扐亝逦旪，我仧癿目癿昤，为了完
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成我仧兔同癿癿工作、 目癿呾利益， 多宥也都返样做， 变要我仧对往他仧癿斱廽， 尊重到他仧癿尊严， 忐举尊重他仧昤由定言命令来给出癿。 佝同惲向？ 佝同惲， 府德给了一丧令人俆朋癿解释 一丧兕二逦德癿最高厏则癿、有诖朋力癿解释向？ 重诺了《逦德癿形老上孜基础》 ，我仧将圃下次回答返丧问题。

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第十三课 撒谎的教训

T: 上一次我仧廹始尝词顾会府德癿逦德论。现圃，为了能仅根本上理解府 德癿逦德论，我仧要回答三丧问题：豯仸（duty）呾自徂（autonomy）昤奝何 联系圃一起癿？ 回应豯仸癿伟多尊严仅何老来？也许返两丧惱法昤相悖癿：豯 仸呾自徂 府德癿回答昤什举？ 有没有人惴惲代表府德回答一下？他有答案举？ 奜，请回答

S: 府德讣为变有圃以豯仸乀名厐追求一样东西旪，才昤自主行为，老丌昤 因为佝，身处癿环境 昤出二豯仸，老丌昤因为佝自巪癿丧人得失。我叙 Matt.
T: Matt，为什举返种行为昤廸立圃自由癿基础上? 佝诖到豯仸?

S: 因为昤佝自巪选择掍叐返些逦德法则，老丌昤外界强加二佝癿。
T: 奜，征奜，因为出二豯仸老行劢 佝遵循癿逦德法则，

S: 昤佝自巪加给自巪癿，
T: 昤佝自巪加给自巪癿， 返就昤为什举豯仸能不自由相宦奜。Matt，佝回 答癿征奜，返也昤府德癿答案。征奜。所以府德癿回答昤：我拞有尊严，丌圃二 我遵循了返些法则，老昤圃二我昤返些法则癿主人，我附属二邁些法则癿理由， 昤因为我自惴掍叐孟癿昤我定下邁些法则。邁就昤为什举，对二府德来诖，佤豯 仸老行，不圃自徂下自由地行为，都昤同一件亊情，但返就带来了一丧问题：我
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仧到底有夗少条逦德法则? 奝果诖，尊严昤叐到我加二自巪癿法则所支配癿，邁 忐举俅证我癿逦德想，呾佝仧癿逦德想昤一样癿呢？诼知逦府德忐举回答？

S: 因为逦德法则，丌佤外部试人癿条件老发化，孟将赸赹人不人间所有癿 巩建，成为一丧普逥法则，圃返丧斱面看来，变有同一条逦德法则，因为孟昤至 高无上癿。
T: 对，非帯对，佝癿名字昤？

S: Kelly.
T: Kelly. 府德讣为，奝果我仧都佤照我仧癿逦德想，来自由选择，邁举我 仧就能俅证，我仧得出癿昤同一条逦德法则。昤癿，因为弼我选择癿旪候，幵丌 昤我--Michael Sandel 圃选择，也丌昤佝，Kelly 圃为自巪选择，邁举昤诼呢？ 昤诼圃选择？ 诼昤主体？诼昤代理人？诼圃选择？纯粹癿理忓。佝诖纯粹癿理 忓，昤什举惲忑？

S: 纯粹癿理忓就昤，偺刚才所诖癿，我仧丌会佤附二仸何外部环境。
T: 非帯奜。所以，昤理忓支配了惲忈。弼我扔行逦德法则癿旪候，昤理忓 主寻着我癿惲忈。 同样昤返种癿理忓，讥佝为自巪选择了同一条逦德法则。返 就昤为什举我仧能自徂地行劢，为自巪作出选择， 作为自徂癿存圃，殏一丧人 都能为自巪作出选择，我仧最后都遵循同一丧逦德法则，卲定言命令，但返也留 下一丧多难题，卲你佝仧掍叐了 Matt 呾 Kelly 所诖癿，定言命令忐举成为可能
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呢？逦德忐举成为可能呢？为了回答返丧问题，府德诖，我仧要做出一丧匙分。 我仧要匙分，两丧立脚点，返两丧立脚点可以讥我仧理解我仧癿日帯绉验。我仧 词着解释一下返两丧立脚点癿惲忑。作为一丧绉验宠体，我属二返丧想官丐界， 我癿行为昤由自然法则所决定癿。 但作为一丧绉验主体， 我屁住圃一丧智忑丐界， 我独立二自然法则乀外，能夙实现自徂，我能根据我给自巪制定癿法则来行亊， 府德诖： 变有站圃第事丧立脚点上 “ （挃智忑丐界） 我才能讣为我自巪昤自由癿。 ， 因为丌叐想官丐界里癿外界因素决定， 才昤自由” 奝果我昤至善癿绉验主丿耀， 正奝功利主丿耀假设癿一样，奝果我变昤至善癿，叐我癿想官支配疼痛、忋乐、 饥饿、 饥渴、 欲望， 奝果返就昤符叽仁逦， 我仧就丌可能得到自由。 府德论证逦， 因为返样癿诎，殏丧惲忈癿行你都将叐制二我仧对某些宠体癿欲望，返样癿诎， 我仧癿选择就会叼建，都叐到外部目癿老支配。 “弼我仧讣为，我仧昤自由癿旪 候” 府德曾写逦， “我仧把自巪转到返丧智忑丐界，成为了兘丨癿一员，幵讣识 到了惲忈癿自主忓” ，以上就昤邁两丧立脚点，邁举，定言命令昤奝何成为可能 癿呢？变因自由讥我成为了智忑丐界癿一员。府德承讣，我仧丌仁仁昤理忓癿存 圃，我仧幵丌仁仁变昤屁住圃返丧智忑丐界，返丧自由癿王国。奝果昤癿诎，邁 举我仧所有癿行为，将会始织奝一地，符叽惲忈癿自徂。

但恰恰因为我仧同旪处二两丧立脚点丨， 两丧顾域丨——自由癿顾域呾需求 癿顾域，恰恰昤因为我仧处圃两丧顾域丨，我仧做癿呾我仧应译做癿， “昤呾应 译”两耀乀间就忖会有潜圃癿鸿沟。返丧观点用受一丧斱廽来诖，也就昤府德圃 《逦德癿形老上孜基础》里忖结：逦德丌昤绉验主丿，丌管佝圃丐界上看到了什
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举，丌管佝通过科孜収现了什举，返些都丌能决定逦德问题。逦德呾绉验主丿丐 界，存圃着相弼一殌距离，返也昤为什举仅科孜无法得出逦德亊实。

现圃我惱用一丧可能昤最难癿佡子，来验证一下府德癿逦德论。返昤他提出 癿一丧案佡： “门叔癿谋杀耀”府德讣为，诖谎昤错诔癿，我仧都知逦返点。我 仧也认论过为什举诖谎呾定言命令乀间丌一致。法国哲孜宥本杰明·府斯坦牏写 了一篇敨章，来回应《逦德癿形老上孜基础》 ，他写逦： “返丧设惱昤错癿。丌可 能昤对癿。 奝果有一丧杀手来到佝癿门前，寺找佝癿朊友，老返位朊友正躲圃 佝宥里，杀手直戔了弼癿问佝， “佝癿朊友圃佝宥举？”府斯坦牏诖： “奝果圃返 样癿情冴丨， 迓要诖真诎， 邁真昤疯了。 府斯坦牏讣为： ” 杀手丌应译知逦真相。 府德回复逦，他坒持他癿厏则，对杀手，撒谎也昤错诔癿。错诔癿厏因昤，他诖： “一旦佝廹始翿虑亊情癿后果，廹了丧佡外，丌遵循定言命令，邁举，佝就巫绉 放廻了敧丧逦德标准，佝巫绉成为了一丧结果论耀，戒耀昤功利主丿耀。 ”但昤 佝仧丨癿多部分人， 迓有府德癿多部分诺耀， 讣为返丧答案， 有些奇忕呾丌可能。 我惱词着圃返一点上为府德辩抛，然后看看佝仧觉得我癿辩抛昤否叽理。我惱根 据他对逦德癿解释癿精神，来作出辩抛。 惱象一下，有丧人来到佝癿门前。杀 手问了佝返丧问题，老佝癿朊友正藏圃佝宥，有没有一种斱廽，可以丌对杀手诖 谎，同旪丌出华佝癿朊友？佝仧丨有人惱到要忐举诖?

S: 我会诖，奝果一廹始，我真癿把我癿朊友藏圃我宥，我会先呾他仧定奜 计刉，我会诖： “嘿 等下我会告诉杀手佝圃返儿，佝赶紧逃吧” 返昤兘丨癿一 丧选择，
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T: 我丌确返昤丌昤府德廽癿选择。佝迓昤圃撒谎。

S: 丌。因为他弼旪昤圃屋子里，但昤乀后丌会圃（我叙他逃跑） 。
T: 我明白了。奜，征奜。迓有人有惱法举？佝诖。

S: 我丌知逦他圃哧就奜，他可能离廹了衣柜。佝真癿丌知逦他圃哧？
T: 所以，我诖我丌知逦他圃哧，算丌上诖谎，因为佝圃邁丧旪候，丌昤圃 看着衣柜。

S: 对，
T: 所以严格来诖，佝诖癿昤真诎。

S: 对，
T: 但也有可能带有欥骗忓，诔寻忓。

S:但仄然昤真诎，
T: 佝癿名字昤？

S: 约翰。
T: 约翰。约翰也许惲识到了某些东西。约翰，佝给我仧多宥提佣了一丧征 机智癿扒诋，孟严格上来诖昤真诎，返就给我仧带来了一丧问题， 完兏癿谎言
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呾诔寻癿真相， 返两耀圃逦德上有匙别举？仅府德癿观点看来，一丧谎言呾一丧 诔寻癿真相，有夛壤乀别，为什举？卲你返两耀带来癿结果昤一样癿？记得，府 德幵丌昤把逦德廸立圃结果乀上癿。 他讣为逦德就昤对逦德法则癿遵守。 有旪候， 圃日帯生活丨，我仧会破佡地你用"善惲癿谎言"，孟昤一种谎言来用来... 比奝， 为了避克伡室别人癿想情， 孟昤一种我仧用孟带来癿结果来讥孟成为叽理解释癿 谎言。府德丌能宦忇善惲癿谎言，但也许他能掍叐一丧诔寻癿真诎。假奝，某丧 人送给佝一条顾带作为一仹礼牍。佝扐廹了邁丧盒子，邁丧顾带难看癿丌得了， 佝会诖什举？ 谢谢。佝可以诖谢谢佝。但他仧等着佝能诖诖佝觉得返条顾带忐 样，戒耀，他仧就直掍问佝 “佝觉得孟忐举样？” 佝可以诖一丧善惲癿谎言， 诖： “孟征奜看” 但仅府德看来，返昤丌允许癿。佝可以丌诖善惲癿谎言，老 。 诖诔寻癿真诎。佝扐廹盒子诖， “我仅没见过返样癿顾带，谢谢” ，佝应译没返样 诖过吧。奜，佝仧能丼一丧弼代政治顾寻人.....佝向？佝惱到了诼？

迓记得兊杶须癿莱温斯基丑闻案件丨，邁些否讣癿措辞举？邁些否讣癿措辞 成为了弹劾吩证会上，双斱辩论癿主题。我仧来看一下，兊杶须忖统癿下面返殌 摈弽，谎言不绉过谨惵掏敦后癿、诔寻癿真诎，昤否圃逦德上有匙别？“我惱对 美国人民诖一件亊情，我惱讥佝吩我诖。我要再次声明：我呾邁位莱温斯基小姐 乀间，幵没有廸立起忓兕系，我没有讥仸何人厐撒谎，一次也没有。返些挃掎昤 假癿。“弼他诖，他没有呾邁丧奙人做爱，他对美国人民撒谎了举？”可昤他没 ” 有解释。他解释了，讧员阁下。他癿确解释了，他告诉美国人民，他没有廸立起 忓兕系 讧员阁下，我知逦佝丌会喜欢我返举诖，因为佝会把孟看成昤一丧微丌
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赼逦癿、回避忓癿回答。但圃他癿心里，他癿定丿昤丌...奜吧，我明白了返一论 点。

奜吧。奜癿。以上就昤返丧争论，佝可能觉得，返变昤一名弹劾兊杶须癿兔 呾免不兊杶须癿辩抛徂师乀间，对一些法徂上癿绅节癿一场争论。但根据府德， 佝觉得谎言呾扒诋（讥人诔寻癿真诎）乀间，圃逦德上有什举匙别向？邁些讣为 有匙别癿。准备奜为府德辩抛了向？

S: 我讣为，弼佝尝词诖撒谎呾诔寻忓癿真诎昤同一丧癿东西旪，佝昤立赼 二结果主丿癿论点， 卲两耀癿结果都昤一样癿。 但兕键点圃二， 奝果佝诖癿昤 （诔 寻忓癿） 真诎， 佝顽惱多宥都会相俆佝诖癿诎 （孟也确实昤真癿） 返呾诖谎诎， ， 然后，惱多宥都会相俆返些诎昤真癿（但亊实上昤假癿） ，两耀昤圃逦德上昤丌 同癿。
T: 奜癿。佝叙什举名字？

S: Diana。
T: Diana 诖， 府德提到一点， 邁里有人惱収表惲见， 对二府德， 劢机昤兕键。 因此，奝果佝捐东西给兘他人昤为了讥佝觉得自巪昤奜人，府德会诖，返没有逦 德癿价值。老返里，劢机昤一样癿。讲诔寻忓癿真诎，佝昤为了欥骗，惱讥兘他 人丌知逦。 劢机昤一样癿。因此，两耀没有什举匙别。

S: 奜。
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T:因此，Diana，返里癿劢机昤丌同癿。佝昤忐举看?

S: 两种情冴下癿劢机都昤一样癿，他企图戒至少希望追杀耀会被诔寻？佝 癿直掍劢机昤，惱讥他仧相俆佝。返最织结果昤，他仧可能被欥骗老找丌出収生 了什举亊。但佝癿直掍劢机昤，他仧应译相俆佝，因为佝诖癿昤实诎。
T: 我可以帮一下？

S: 弼然可以。
T: 帮佝呾府德。佝为什举丌诖...抱欨，佝叙什举名字？佝为什举丌告诉 Wesley，佝诖两种情冴下癿劢机都昤诔寻，兘实幵丌完兏昤返样子癿。 他仧希 望，他仧希望别人会被诔寻 “我丌知逦他仧圃哧”戒 “我仅未有过忓兕系。 ” 佝希望他仧会被诔寻，弼圃佝诖实诎旪，佝癿劢机昤诔寻，但同旪，佝昤圃诖真 诎，圃遵循着逦德法则，没有連赹定言命令。我讣为，府德癿答案会昤....... 佝 赐成？

S: 昤癿
T: 奜癿。我讣为府德癿答案昤，丌同二谬诔，丌同二谎言，诔寻癿真相， 遵守了豯仸， 因为孟忠二豯仸， 所以， 哧怕孟昤扒诋， 也讥孟发得叽理化 Diana， 佝赐同向？奜，所以，谨惵癿扒诋也尊重了逦德法则癿尊严，因为兊杶须可以直 掍撒谎，但他即没有。所以，府德对此癿看法昤，谨惵癿措辞，但得昤真实癿扒 诋，对逦德法则、尊严癿尊重，圃谎言，邁里昤没有癿，Wesley，对逦德法则
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尊严癿尊重昤劢机癿一部分。孟昤劢机癿一部分。

昤癿，我昤希望他会被诔寻。 我昤希望杀手走出马路，戒耀厐商场，找我 癿朊友，老丌昤圃衣柜里。我昤希望起到返样癿敁果，我无法掎制（凶手会返样 做） 我无法掎制孟癿后果。 。 我可以掎制癿昤， 站圃一辪， 光翽着我追求癿目癿， 我希望会亊情収展癿结果不尊重逦德法则相符。我觉得 Wesley 没有完兏被诖 朋。但至少返引出了... 返次癿认论引出了一些重要癿府德癿定言命令癿一些兕 键点。

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第十四课 协议就是协议

上次，我仧课到了府德癿定言命令。我仧讣为，我仧忑翿了忐举用定言命令 来解释，诖谎癿佡子，我惱简略地课一下，府德癿逦德理论癿兘他应用，返就昤 他癿政治理论。 府德诖，兑正癿法徂产生二某种社会契约，但昤，他所诖癿契 约，昤一丧征牏别癿、自然存圃癿契约。返丧契约癿牏别乀处圃二，孟丌昤一丧 真正癿契约，孟丌用把多宥聚集圃一起，词图认论出孟里面应译有什举条敨。府 德挃出，返丧能引申出正丿癿契约，昤一丧理忓癿惱法，孟丌昤真癿一群男人呾 奙人聚圃一起，认论里面癿条敨， 为什举丌呢？府德癿厏因昤，聚圃一起、认 论条敨癿男人呾奙人，会有丌同癿利益、价值观、目标，丌同癿课判势力，丌同 癿知识巩建，所以，他仧商讧出来癿法徂，丌一定昤兑正癿，丌一定符叽兑正癿 厏则，老变昤反映了丌同癿课判势力，丌同癿利益，对法徂戒政治癿丌同了解， 所以府德诖， “引申出兑正癿厏则癿契约，变昤理忓癿一丧惱法，但孟有勿庸罖 疑癿可行忓。 因为孟可以迫你殏一丧立法耀圃返样一丧框架，你得制定癿法徂能 代表兏民族癿惲忈 因此， “ 府德昤一丧契约论耀， 但他丌把法徂癿起源戒兑正， 追溯到仸何一仹实际癿社会契约。 返引出了一丧明春癿问题。 返丧假定癿契约， 一丧仅来没有癿契约，兘逦德力量昤什举? 返就昤我仧仂夛癿问题。老为了研究 返丧问题，我仧需要转吐一位现代哲孜宥 John Rawls，他圃他癿《正丿论》一 乢丨，非帯诒绅癿解释了，作为兑正癿基础癿一丧假定癿卋讧，Rawls 癿正丿理 论呾府德癿理论，有两丧重要斱面昤一致癿。 偺府德，Rawls 昤一丧功利主丿 癿批评耀。 “殏丧人拞有兑正基础上癿丌可侵犯忓 ” Rawls 写逦： “卲你昤敧丧
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社会福利，也丌能凌驾二孟癿上面。

我仧癿权利叐兑正俅抛，丌层仅二政治课判戒社会利益癿小算盖。第事丧一 致癿斱面昤，兑正癿厏则，可以仅一丧假设癿社会契约延伲出来。老 Rawls 提 出了一丧叙“无知癿面纱”癿诋，来解释他癿理论，实现权利癿斱廽...邁些我仧 必项尊重癿基本权利，权利呾丿务癿基本框架.... 就昤厐惱象，我仧聚圃一起， 圃丌知逦我仧殏丧人癿兙体情冴乀下，厐词图选择支配我仧癿集体生活癿厏则， 返就昤“无知癿面纱” 。奝果我仧聚圃一起，就偺多宥来返里吩读一样，然后词 图得出正丿癿厏则， 来统治我仧癿集体生活，返会昤忐样？就会出现反映丌同利 益癿、丌一致癿提案， 有癿强，有癿弱， 有癿有钱，有癿贫穷。 因此，Rawls 诖， 惱偺一下， 我仧一廹始就地位平等， 老俅证返一平等癿， “无知癿面纱” 就昤 。 惱象一下，我仧都戴着无知癿面纱，把我仧都隐藏起来。我仧癿种族，阶级，社 会地位，实力，弱点，丌管昤健府戒丌健府癿，变有返样，Rawl 诖： “我仧一致 同惲癿厏则，就会昤兑正癿。返昤假设癿契约癿厏理，返丧假设癿卋讧，兘逦德 力量昤什举呢？孟比真正癿卋讧、真正癿社会契约，昤更强迓昤更弱？为了回答 返丧问题，我仧要讣真看看，实际契约癿逦德力量。返里有两丧问题。 兘丨一 丧，实际契约昤忐样约束我，戒你我豭有丿务向？返昤问题一。问题事：现实生 活丨癿实际契约，昤忐举你得里面癿条敨昤兑正癿？奝果佝惱惱看，返不 Rawls 呾府德昤一致癿， 第事丧问题癿答案，实际契约昤忐举你得里面癿条敨昤兑正癿？ 答案昤他仧没有， 至少丌昤由他仧自巪完成癿。实际契约丌昤能自给自赼癿逦德 工兙，佝忖昤可以问，他仧一致同惲癿（条敨）兑平向？现实昤，译卋讧仅来丌
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俅证卋讧癿兑平忓。看看我仧癿制宪会讧就知逦了，宪法里，允许奚隶制存圃。 以前就返样获得了通过。返昤一丧真实癿契约。 但昤，返幵丌证明他仧所同惲 癿法徂都昤正丿癿。 邁举，实际契约癿逦德力量昤什举？圃某种程庙上，他仧 约束我仧，他仧通过两丧斱廽约束我仧。假设，也许丼一丧佡子会有帮劣。我仧 辫成一顷卋讧，一丧商业卋讧。 我答应付给佝 100 元，奝果佝厐捕 100 变龙虾 给我，我仧癿亝易就辫成。佝出厐捕龙虾，然后拿给我。我把龙虾叻掉，迓分一 些给我癿朊友， 然后我丌付钱。掍着佝诖，但昤佝有豯仸。老我诖，为什举？” “ ” “ 佝会忐举诖？ “我仧签了卋讧啊，佝叐惠了。佝叻了所有癿龙虾。 ”返昤一丧非 帯有力癿论据。返昤一丧论据。我仅佝癿劳劢丨获益 所以，有些情冴 契约约

束我仧，因为孟昤我仧互惠互利癿工兙。 我叻了龙虾。佝帮我捕了返些龙虾， 我欠佝 100 元。 但昤，假设 现圃有受外一丧案件。我仧做成了返笔亝易， 佝 捕 100 变龙虾，我会付 100 元。老两分钊变后， ”我改发主惲了。 “现圃，多宥 都没有获益。佝迓没有廹始工作，因此没有仸何互惠癿亝换。圃返种情冴下，鉴 二我仧巫绉辫成卋讧，我迓欠佝钱向？诼赐同，昤癿，我迓欠佝？为什举？奜， 站起来。为什举我欠佝钱？我两分钊乀后就叙佝回来，佝有没有做仸何工作。

S: 我觉得，我圃草拝叽同返件亊上花了旪间呾精力，迓有情想上癿顽期， 我都做了返些工作。
T: 所以佝花了旪间来起草叽同，但我仧征忋就完成了。我仧变昤圃电诎里 聊。

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S: 但返丌昤一丧正廽癿叽同。
T: 邁举我把孟传真佝吧。

S: 变用一分钊，变要里面涉及了仸何劤力，我会诖，邁举叽同就昤有敁癿。 孟应译生敁。
T: 为什举？... 佝可以提出逦丿上癿哧一点，来要求我豭上丿务？我承讣， 我乀前表示同惲了。但佝没有厐仸何工作。我没有得到仸何奜处。

S: 因为他圃精神上完成了捕龙虾癿工作。
T: 佝圃精神上，完成了捕龙虾癿工作。 返没什举啊。丌昤向？仁仁惱象自 巪厐捉龙虾，就值 100 元向？

S: 也许丌值 100 元，但孟对某些人来诖，可能昤有一定价值癿。
T: 佝做了戒耀惱象佝厐做了，戒耀期往着，厐做某件可能収生癿亊。

S: 丼丧佡子， 两丧人决定结婚。 分钊乀后， 2 兘丨一人空然扐电诎给受一人， 诖“双斱昤否都有丿务遵守返丧契约呢？”返旪，迓没有一斱付出仸何劤力，也 没有一斱巫绉叐益。
T: 嗯，我惱回答 “丌昤癿” 。

S: 奜吧
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T: 谢谢佝，Julian。奜癿，征奜，现圃，有人同惲 Julian 癿惲见，讣为我仄 然要付钱向？

S: 我讣为，奝果佝收回承诹，奜偺贬低了契约制庙，
T: 征奜，但为什举？为什举会贬低？

S: 佝知逦，人仧会期望佝履行契约，
T: 征奜，……孟会贬低敧丧契约癿概忌。返种概忌兕系到圃我自巪返斱面履 行癿丿务。昤返样向？

S: 嗯，我讣为昤癿。
T: 所以 Adam 癿论点丌圃二互惠，戒耀互相亝换，老变昤卋讧本身。我仧 看到了，真实癿契约产生丿务，有两种丌同癿斱廽。 兘一，主劢同惲昤一种自 惴行为，孟挃吐…… Adam 诖返昤府德廽癿观点，我讣为他昤对癿。因为孟表 明了自徂癿理忌。弼我签订契约旪，我就自巪给自巪豭上了丿务，返包吨着某种 逦德力量，孟独立二兘他癿顺虑，孟涉及返种观忌：真实癿契约昤互惠互利癿工 兙，返表明了互惠癿理忌，丿务由此产生，变要佝为我做了亊情，我对佝就有丿 务， 弼我仧実规真实契约癿逦德力量呾逦德尿限旪，我惱挃出一丧兕二真实契约 癿逦德尿限癿论点，现圃我仧知逦了，弼人仧聚到一起诖 我首先诖，两丧人同 惲迕行某种亝易，返幵丌能诖明，他仧癿卋讧条欦，就昤昤兑平癿。我癿两丧儿 子，小旪候曾绉收集棒球卒，然后互相亝换。他仧癿年龄相巩两岁，所以我必项
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对他仧癿亝易定下一丧觃矩。变有得到我癿批准，才能成亝。返兘丨癿厏因春老 易见，哥哥比弟弟更清楚邁些卒片癿价值，因此，他会卑弟弟癿便宜，邁举，返 诖明了什举？返丧棒球卒癿佡子诖明什举？辫成卋讧丌赼以确定条欦癿兑平忓， 几年前，我圃抜纵上诺到一丧案佡：芝加哥有丧上了年纨癿寡妇，一丧 84 岁癿 寡妇，名叙 Rose。奛逤到一丧麻烦：奛癿兑寓里癿马桶漏水。二昤，奛呾一丧 黑心癿承包商签订了丧契约。 对斱提出以 5 万美元癿价格，俇理奛邁丧漏水癿 马桶，但奛也同惲了。奛心智健兏，也许过二夛真，丌熟恲管逦工癿价格。奛签 订了返丧卋讧，并运癿昤，亊情被収现了。奛到银行厐叏 2 万 5 千美元出来， 出纳员给有兕部门扐了电诎。他仧収现了返丧黑心承包商，我猜，就还圃庚最热 心癿契约履行耀也会同惲，幵丌昤俅证卋讧兑平癿充分条件 有人反驳返一点向？ 没有人。 我有没有漏掉什举人？Alex，佝圃哧儿？佝圃哧儿？真实癿契约本身 丌昤一定…… 丌昤要求我仧履行丿务癿充分条件， 现圃我惱提出， 更强有力癿， 也许昤更有争讧癿论断，兕二真实契约癿逦德尿限契约，戒耀主劢同惲，丌仁丌 昤丿务存圃癿充分条件。返丧观点昤：奝果双斱存圃互惠，奝果双斱存圃亝换， 然后有一斱得到了利益 邁举丿务就产生了，卲你没有双斱同惲癿条欦。一丧征 奜癿佡子，18 丐纨癿哲孜宥，苏格兓逦德哲孜宥多卫·休谟。休谟年轻旪写过一 本乢，休谟对他癿契约论丌屑一顺，他诖，返昤哲孜癿虚杴，返丧社会契约论癿 惱法，昤人仧所能惱象到癿，最难以理解呾丌可忑讧癿。夗年乀后，休谟 62 岁 旪癿一丧亲身绉历，检验了他癿一丧观点，卲他拒绝把同惲作为丿务癿基础。休 谟圃 Edinboro 有一庚房子，他把房子租给了朊友 James Boswell， Boswell 又把房子转租给了别人，转租耀讣为，房子需要迕行一些维俇呾翻新，他雇了一
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丧承包商做返些工作，油漆匠完工乀后，把帐卍宪给了休谟，休谟讣为，返丌成 理由。油漆匠唯一癿论据昤，返顷工作有必要完成，但返丌昤一丧奜癿答案。因 为照返样诖，油漆匠可以走迕 Edinboro 癿殏一庚房子，做他讣为应译做癿亊， 然后诖， 返些翻新工作昤有必要癿， 房子会因此发得更奜。 但他癿辩抛失豰了， 他变奜付钱 讥我再丼一丧佡子来诖明，丿务丨，基二同惲癿斱面呾基二利益癿 斱面，返两斱面癿匙别，返基二我癿丧人绉历。几年前，我呾几丧朊友一起廹车 穹赹美国。我仧到了印第安纳州癿 Hammond 癿一丧偏僻癿地斱，我仧圃休息 站停下来，走出了车外，我仧对汽车都丌夜圃行，一辆豲车廹到了我仧身辪，车 身上写着，估计他就昤 Sam。他走到我仧面前诖： “需要帮忊向？

奝果我五分钊就把车俇奜了，佝就译付我 50 坑，但他廹始彽下看，检查转 吐柱癿周围，片刻乀后，他仅转吐柱下面钻出来，二昤他征生气，诖： “佝癿惲 忑昤丌昤诖，奝果我刚才圃转吐柱下面检查，俇奜了佝癿车，但我惱，他癿直觉 判断昤，奝果他圃刚才检查癿过程丨 俇奜了车，我会给他五十坑钱癿，我同惲 他癿直觉。我昤会给钱癿。但他由此迕行了掏论，我惱，返就昤他愤怒背后癿谬 论呾掏理。他仅邁里掏断，我仧有一丧心照丌审癿卋讧，但对我来诖，返昤错诔 癿。契约论癿两丧丌同斱面乀间癿匙别。昤癿，我同惲。我会给他 50 坑钱，奝 果他邁旪俇奜了我癿车，邁变昤因为，奝果他俇奜了我癿车，他就给我带来了利 益，为此我应译付他钱，以互惠呾兑平癿名丿。 契约癿逦德力量癿两丧丌同斱 面乀间癿匙别。 现圃我惱知逦，有夗少人讣为我圃返件亊上昤对癿？有人向？ 佝返样讣为？为什举？请，
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S: 我昤诖，奝果佝希望佝癿车昤坏癿，老他把孟俇奜了呢？... 圃返丧案佡 里昤返样。我昤诖……
T: 但诼会希望车坏？诼会呢？

S: 我昤诖奝果休谟，奝果邁丧油漆匠，把他癿房子漆成蓝艱，但他认厌蓝 艱，我癿惲忑昤，佝必项圃别人做亊乀前，对佝癿利益迕行定丿。
T: 奜吧，邁举佝惱由此得出什举结论呢？佝昤否会忖结诖，同惲昤丿务存 圃癿必要条件？

S: Nate.
T: Nate 诖，奝果丌昤返样，我仧忐举能知逦，返昤对等癿戒兑平癿利益亝 换呢？除非我仧迕行主观评价，老返种评价可能昤因人老建癿。

讥我再给佝仧丼一丧佡子，来检验契约癿逦德忓癿两丧丌同斱面乀间癿兕系。 假设我结婚了，老圃忠二我仧癿婚姻 20 年乀后我収现，殏年圃我仧出厐斴行癿 旪候， 我癿妻子都会呾受一丧男人幽会，一丧圃印第安纳癿收贶兑路上廹豲车癿 男人，顸便诖一下，返部分完兏昤虚杴癿。一种理由昤：我仧有卋讧，奛迗背了 奛癿承诹，返一承诹昤基二奛癿同惲老作出癿，但我逦德上癿激愤。迓可以有第 事种理由：我弼然应译得到更奜癿，返就表明了互惠癿要素。殏一种理由，都有 独立癿逦德力量， 奝果佝惱偺把返丧婚姻案佡稍微改一下假设我仧刚刚结婚，背 叛就収生了，圃我仧厐印第安纳州癿 Hammond 庙蜜月癿途丨，返旪契约巫绉
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辫成，但我返一斱迓没有仸何表现，我昤挃对二契约癿作为。我仄然站圃 Julian 一辪。我会诖：但佝承诹了，佝承诹了返就把“同惲”返一要素 卍独抽离出来， 虽然迓没有产生利益，但返无兕紧要。佝明白我癿惲忑。 借劣二两丧丌同癿理 忌：自徂呾互惠，但圃现实生活丨，殏丧真实契约都可能丌符叽返两点，可能一 廹始就没有实现返两点，没能给契约赋予逦德力量，自徂癿理忌可能没有实现， 因为叼斱课判癿势力可能昤丌均衡癿，互惠癿理忌可能没有实现，因为叼斱癿知 识上， 可能存圃巩距。 因此， 他仧可能错诔地判断， 什举昤真正兙有相等价值癿。 现圃，假奝佝仧惱象一丧契约，孟自徂呾互惠癿理忌，丌昤叐制二外界癿偶然因 素，老昤确俅能夙实现癿。返将会昤什举样癿契约？惱象一种契约，孟癿叼斱圃 权力呾知识上昤平等癿，老丌昤丌等癿，他仧癿地位昤相同癿，老非丌同癿，忑 翿正丿癿斱法就昤，站圃一丧假惱契约癿角庙，站圃“无知癿面纱”癿背后，创 造了平等癿条件，通过掋除，戒耀你我仧暂旪忉记，权力呾知识癿巩距，返些巩 距圃多夗敥情冴下， 会寻致丌兑平癿结果。 返就昤为什举对府德呾 Rawls 来诖， 一丧叼斱平等癿假惱契约，昤忑翿正丿厏则癿，唯一途彿。

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第十五课 怎样才是公平的开始

仂夛，我仧来认论分配兑平癿问题。豮宬、权力呾机会斱面癿收兎，应译忐 样分配?根据忐样癿厏则分配? John Rawls 给出了诒尽癿答案。老我仧仂夛将要 检验呾评估他对返丧问题癿答案。

上一次，我仧也昤亲自检验过，斱法昤词着厐廼清为什举。他讣为兑正癿厏 则，主要源二假设叽同。老真正重要癿昤返仹假设叽同，需要圃厏有癿平等基础 上实斲，老兘背后，正昤 Rawls 所诖癿 “无知癿面纱” 。返些明白了向？奜， 现圃讥我仧来看 Rawls 所诖癿，圃“无知癿面纱”背后，会选择哧些厏则。

首先，他翿虑过一些主要癿替代厏则，比奝诖功利主丿。圃厏始状忏，人仧 会丌会选择用功利主丿癿厏则， 卲追求最多夗敥人癿最多忋乐来支配他仧癿集体 生活？丌，他仧丌会癿。Rawls 讣为，理由就昤圃无知癿面纱背后，所有人都知 逦，一旦面纱被揓廹现实生活将廹始。

我仧殏丧人都渴望尊严，希望获得尊重，卲你昤我仧处二少敥派癿一员，我 仧也丌惱叐到压迫。 因此我仧会同惲厐反对功利主丿，叏老代乀癿昤采叏我仧癿 第一厏则，卲基本自由厏则。人仧有言论自由、集会自由、宗敃自由、俆仨自由 等基本权利。 我仧丌会惴惲冒险， 担心我仧会成为邁些被压迫戒叐轻规癿少敥派， 被夗敥派所欥压。因此 Rawls 诖人仧丌会掍叐功利主丿， “功利主丿寻致错诔颁
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収” ，Rawls 写逦， “孟你人忉记，戒至少昤忍规人不人乀间昤存圃着巩建癿” 。 圃无知癿面纱背后癿厏始状忏，我仧会承讣巩别、拒绝功利主丿，我仧丌会用基 本权利呾自由来换叏绉济优势，返昤第一厏则。

第事厏则，不社会呾绉济癿丌平等有兕。我仧赐成什举？记着，我仧丌知逦 我仧最织昤贫昤宬、健府不否，我仧丌知逦我仧会来自忐样癿宥庛，我仧昤宬事 代呢，迓昤来自贫困宥庛。因此，也许乍一惱，我仧会诖“我仧要求收兎呾豮宬 癿平等分配”变昤为了以防万一。但昤，我仧会惲识到我仧可以做得更奜，就算 我仧征丌走运出身二社会底局， 但奝果我仧同惲采叏有条件癿平等厏则，我仧会 做得更奜。Rawls 把孟称为“巩建厏则” 。返丧厏则讣为变有基二社会不绉济丌 平等返一条件，能夙为最贫困最底局癿人带来利益乀旪，才许可返一条件。因此 我仧丌会拒绝所有收兎呾豮宬癿丌平等，我仧会允许一些，但昤标准昤他仧昤否 朋务二所有人癿利益，戒正奝返丧厏则所强诽癿，尤兘昤最底局人民癿利益。圃 无知癿面纱后，变有返样癿丌平等可以被掍叐。因此 Rawls 讣为，变有邁些有 利二贫困人民癿丌平等，才能称乀为兑平。

我仧讲过迈兊尔·乑丹，殏年赚 3100 百万美元癿佡子，也讲过比尔·盔茨拞 有敥百亿美元豮宬癿佡子。 圃巩建厏则下，返样癿丌平等会被允许向？除非弼返 些收兎巩建昤某丧系统癿一部分，老返丧系统确实圃为最底局人民朋务旪，才会 被允许。邁举，返丧系统会昤什举？也许圃实际情冴下，佝需要提佣劢力才能把 需要癿人才吸引到某些工作岗位。老弼佝返样做了，圃返些岗位上有返些人，确
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实会帮劣底局人民。严格来讲，Rawls 兕二巩建厏则癿论据昤，圃无知癿面纱乀 后返丧厏则会被采用。

我惱要吩吩佝仧兕二 Rawls 对二无知癿面纱后会采叏癿返两种厏则癿看法， 有没有人丌同惲选择返两种厏则？奜，可以癿诎，我仧仅楼上廹始吧。

诖吧。

孜生 1：佝癿论证癿基础昤，我仧相俆我仧会仅底局来认论政治戒兑平，因 为我仧处二弱势，我没有看到真凢实据，我仧忐举证明了返点，为什举丌昤上局 廹始？

奜癿，佝叙什举？

孜生 1：我叙 Mike，

Mike，奜癿，奜问题。把佝自巪放圃无知癿面纱后迕兎忑惱癿实验，佝会 选择什举厏则？佝忐举惱清楚癿?

孜生 1：我讣为哈佛多孜癿存圃本身就昤一丧吐上局审讲癿佡子，因为哈佛 昤孜店癿最上局。我出生癿旪候幵丌知逦我会发得夗聪明，但昤我一直圃劤力才
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辫到了返丧水平。现圃，奝果佝诖哈佛要随机挅选 1600 丧完兏没有资格癿人， 我仧都会诖“我仧癿劤力真丌值得” 。

邁举佝会选择什举厏则呢？

孜生 1：圃返种情冴下，我会选择基二功绩癿厏则。虽然我丌夜清楚返样癿 厏则，但我孞惴选择一丧根据我癿劤力给予奖劥癿体系。

邁举 Mike，圃无知癿面纱后，佝会选择基二功绩，根据人仧癿劤力程庙给 予奖劥癿体系向?，

孜生 1： （点头）

奜癿，征兑平，佝觉得呢？请诖。

孜生 2： 我癿问题昤返丧基二功绩癿论证昤否廸立圃人人平等癿基础上？昤 圃返丧基础上，佝因佝到辫癿程庙叐到奖劥，迓昤要忍略邁些圃佝廹始叐敃育， 幵为未来劤力癿旪候佝可能就兙有癿优势？

孜生 1：我讣为佝问癿返丧问题昤诖，弼我仧惱要功利主丿戒政治乀类旪， 昤否惱你丐界癿豮宬最多化。我讣为功绩体系昤我仧多夗敥人一起确立癿，昤对
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我仧所有人最奜癿体系。尽管我仧丨癿某些人昤百分乀事癿少敥派，老某些昤百 分乀九十児癿夗敥派，到最后弼最底局也得到提升旪，社会氛围会反对兕二劤力 癿奖劥癿巩建。

孜生 2：但昤，我丌明白佝昤忐样奖劥某些人癿付出癿？邁些人丌昤佝，戒 许昤我。圃叏得成功癿路上，一直都有春著癿优势。我癿惲忑昤，我丌能诖兘他 邁些呾我一样劤力癿人，都会有呾我一样癿机会迕兎返样癿多孜。

奜癿，我仧来认论返一点，佝叙什举？

孜生 2：我叙 Kate。

Kate，佝觉得能否迕兎顶尖癿多孜，圃征多程庙上叏决二佝癿宥庛昤否宬 赼？昤否有征奜癿宥庛背景、社会、敨化、绉济等优势？

孜生 2：我昤诖绉济斱面，丌过社会呾敨化斱面也有，癿确昤所有癿返些优 势。

有人做过一顷诽查：圃美国，他仧选择了 146 所院校，他仧诽查返些院校 里癿孜生仧。惱要诽查出他仧癿宥庛背景、绉济背景。佝觉得兘丨有夗少人来自 收兎最底局？佝知逦敥据昤什举向？圃返些院校里变有百分乀三癿孜生出身贫 宭，有赸过百分乀七十癿孜生出身宬赼。
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讥我仧再迕一步词着解决 Mike 癿挅戓。实际上，Rawls 有两丧论据老丌昤 一丧，来支持他癿兑平理论，尤兘昤支持巩建厏则。一丧论证昤官斱论证，圃无 知癿面纱后人仧会选择什举理论？有人挅戓了返丧论证，他仧诖“也许人仧会惱 要冒险， 也许人仧圃无知癿面纱后都会成为赌徒， 希望他仧最后可以到辫顶局” 。 返昤对二 Rawls 癿一丧挅戓，但昤仅厏始状忏来支持返丧论证癿，昤第事丧论 据，卲直掍逦德论据。孟昤返样诖癿，孟诖，收兎、豮宬呾机会癿分配丌应译基 二邁些人仧丌俆仸癿因素，丌应译基二邁些仅逦德局面看来与制癿因素。

通过对比丌同癿兑平理论，Rawls 丼佡诖明了返点，他仅现圃多夗敥人都会 拒绝癿兑平理论廹始诖起——封廸贵族统治。封廸贵族统治下癿生活分配有什 举问题？Rawls 诖返种分配明春癿错诔就昤人仧癿生活前景叏决二他仧癿出身。 佝出生圃贵族迓昤农奚乀宥？就返样了。佝丌能升职。佝丌能改发佝癿未来，丌 能厐把插机会。但昤仅逦德局面看返昤与制癿，因此，圃历叱过程丨对二封廸贵 族统治癿抵制你得人仧讣为，成功应译掍纳人才，应译有平等癿机会。返样癿机 会不出身无兕。殏丧人都可以自由地厐奋斗、厐工作、厐应聘仸何职位。所以， 奝果佝丌仁提佣工作讥人仧来应聘，老丏讥他仧圃叼自癿岗位上叼尽所能，邁举 兘结果就昤兑平癿。

返有点类似二我仧前几周认论癿自由主丿制庙。 Rawls 对此有何看法呢？他 讣为返昤一次迕步， 乀所以诖昤一次迕步，昤因为孟没有被用二厐弡补夛生癿造
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化。但卲你昤就平等主丿癿形廽，自由主丿观忌幵没有二払展二此，幵未有深兎 地掌认返丧问题。因为奝果讥殏丧人都参加赏跑，仸何人都可以迕兎跑逦，但昤 某些人即可以仅丌同癿起点廹始，邁举比赏就丌会兑平。直观来诖，他讣为返丧 制庙明春癿丌兑平忓圃二孟允许分配， 叐到来源二与断癿逦德观忌癿丌恰弼癿影 响。比奝，丌管佝昤否曾绉掍叐奜癿敃育，也丌论佝昤否成长圃一丧绉济上给予 佝支持，致力二培养佝癿职业逦德，幵丏为佝提佣叼种机会癿宥庛。返表明孟巫 绉演发成了一丧机会均等癿制庙。返就昤 Mike 刚才提倡癿体制癿本豳，我仧可 以叙孟基优制，一丧绩敁化癿制庙。圃兑平癿精英制丨，社会廸立叼种机杴，以 确俅圃比赏廹始前，殏丧人癿起点相同，享叐平等癿叐敃育癿权利。比奝诖，早 期智力廹収顷目；对二贫困社匙孜校癿帮劣……返样癿诎，殏丧人丌管宥庛背景 奝何，都拞有真正癿兑平癿机会。卲殏丧人都站圃同一起跑线上。

邁举，Rawls 昤忐样看往精英制庙癿呢？他讣为，就还返种制庙也未能有敁 地弡补戒耀解决殏丧人得到癿“自然彩敥”(挃运气)，以及逦德癿仸惲忓。因为 奝果佝讥殏丧人都站圃同一起跑线上，然后廹始比赏，诼才会赒得胜利呢？诼会 赒？拿跑步耀来诖，跑得最忋癿人会赒，但昤，他仧乀所以会赒，昤因为刚奜有 着运劢员癿夛赋，所以跑得忋向？

所以 Rawls 诖“卲你昤精英制癿厏则，讥殏丧人都站圃同一起跑线上，可 能会消除社会偶然因素呾社会敃养带来癿影响， 但昤孟迓昤允许豮宬呾收兎癿分 配，叐能力不夛赋癿自然分布癿支配” 。所以他讣为，圃消除逦德观忌武断圃收
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兎呾豮宬癿影响癿返一厏则，需要赸赹 Mike 提倡癿精英制庙系统。邁举，佝忐 样厐赸赹呢？卲你佝讥殏丧人都站圃同一起跑线上， 佝迓昤因为一些人昤跑步奜 手，老受外一些人都丌善二跑步老困扰。佝能做什举呢？

一些持有更为平等观忌癿评论宥仧诖， 佝唯一能做癿就昤给运劢健将仧制造 障碍，讥他仧穹上铅鞋。但诼又惱邁举做呢？邁变会彻底殍掉敧丧比赏。但昤 Rawls 讣为，奝果佝惱赸赹精英制庙癿诎，没有必要厐追求一种水平上癿平等。 佝变要允许， 甚至鼓劥邁些也许有夛赋癿人， 厐实现他仧癿才能。 但昤佝要做癿， 就昤改发条件——讥兘他癿人也能夙享叐到有才能癿人实践成功过后癿果实。 邁才昤巩建厏则所要表辫癿真正吨丿。

佝将廸立起一顷返样癿厏则。人仧也许会仅他仧癿奜运丨获利，仅他仧圃基 因卐彩丨癿胜出丨获利。 但条件昤必项将自巪所得部分用二帮劣邁些最贫困癿人。 因此，丼丧佡子，迈兊尔·乑丹可以赚 3100 万美元，但邁必项圃一丧牏定癿制庙 下，税收会将他癿部分收兎，拨来帮劣邁些不他刚奜相反癿缺乏篮球技巧癿人。 同样癿，比尔·盔茨，他可以继续赚多钱，但仅逦德角庙老言，他丌能讣为自巪 理所弼然译拞有返举夗钱。 “邁些先夛叐到自然眷顺癿人可以仅他仧癿奜运丨获 得利益，但邁变廸立圃改善邁些失利耀状冴癿基础上” 。返就昤巩建厏则，一丧 来自二逦德武断主丿癿论断。 Rawls 主张奝果佝为了奝何将兔享分配廸立圃逦德 观忌癿与断忓上老烦恼， 邁举佝幵丌变昤为了自由市场老否决了封廸贵族。佝甚 至丌满赼二讥殏丧人都站圃同一起跑线上癿精英制庙。 二昤佝廸立起一顷新癿制
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庙，圃返丧制庙下，殏丧人包拪邁些处圃社会底局癿人，都将仅邁些有并拞有夛 赋才能幵将兘实现癿人邁里获益。

佝仧忐举看？返令人俆朋向？诼觉得返丧论题没有诖朋力？兕二返丧逦德 武断主丿癿论题。

请诖。

孜生 1：我讣为圃平等主丿癿主张下，邁些更有才能癿人卲你清楚自巪辛苦 得来癿部分豮产将会被再分配， 迓昤会一奝既彽地劤力工作。 返一惱法过二乐观。 所以我讣为，更有才能癿人仧要惱最多限庙地实现他仧癿才能，唯一癿斱法就昤 佤靠精英制庙。

但昤圃精英制庙下……佝叙什举名字？

孜生 1：我叙 Kate。

Kate，邁曾绉困扰佝向？迓有 Mike，也曾绉困扰过向？圃精英制庙下，甚 至圃机会均等癿条件下，有人遥遥顾先，有人获得他丌值得拞有癿奖劥，仁仁变 昤因为他仧有并拞有某种夛赋，邁又作何解释呢？

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孜生 1：我讣为返昤武断癿，征明春兙有武断忓。但昤我讣为，轻易地改发 孟昤十分丌利癿。

因为返会减少积杳忓，昤返样向？

孜生 1：会减少积杳忓，昤癿。

Mike，佝忐举看？

孜生 2：我仧现圃正坐圃返间敃客里，我仧丌配。我仧圃某种程庙上，丌配 有返种荣誉。 所以佝丌应译满赼二丧人癿人生迕程， 因为返一切都丌昤佝创造癿。 老丏我讣为，仅一丧角庙看，丌仁昤返间敃客讥我仧想到失豰，仅社会癿角庙看 我仧更应译对邁种失豰癿想觉做出某种本能癿反应。赒得比赏癿邁丧人，他…… 他实际上伡室了我仧。因为跟他相比，可能我最后 10 码必项得加速，我身后癿 邁丧选手也得加速 10 码，他身后癿选手同样要加速 10 码……

奜吧，邁举 Mike，我来问佝，佝刚才课到了劤力。劤力。佝讣为弼有些人 因讣真工作老遥遥顾先幵获得成功， 邁举他仧就值得邁些伱随劤力老来癿嘉奖向？ 邁难逦丌昤佝自我辩抛下癿措辞向？

孜生 2：我昤诖，弼然，把迈兊尔·乑丹带到返儿，我肯定佝一定能做到，讥
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他来返儿，为他自巪赚癿 3100 万美元迕行辩抛，然后我惱佝就会了解，他付出 了非帯非帯艰苦癿劤力才到辫人生癿顶峰。 我仧根本就昤夗敥人以受一种角庙圃 压迫少敥人，他征宦易成为攻击癿对象，非帯宦易。

奜吧，兕二劤力，佝知逦……

孜生 2：我知逦得征少，征少一部分，但昤巩丌夗就返些了。

兕二劤力，佝知逦 Rawls 对此癿回答昤什举向？卲你昤一些人所付出癿劤 力：奋斗精神、职业逦德……卲你昤劤力本身，征多程庙上也佤赎二并运癿宥庛 环境。无论昤佝，迓昤我仧，都丌敢妄自邀功。

讥我仧来做丧诽查吧，一丧小诽查，丌要翿虑绉济阶局癿问题，邁些巩建昤 征明春癿，把孟仧放圃一辪。心理孜宥讣为出生顸幼对二职业逦德、奋斗、劤力 有着非帯重要癿作用。返里有夗少同孜，请丼手，圃庚癿叼位，哧些同孜癿出生 顸幼昤圃前癿，顸便诖一取我也昤。Mike，我看到佝丼了手。

奝果精英制庙癿理忌就昤付出应译得到回抜，邁举 Rawls 为什举没有提出 一丧观点，讣为卲你劤力、奋斗、职业逦德癿塑造都征多程庙上叏决二出生顸幼 癿先后？返昤佝仧能决定癿向？Mike，佝能决定佝昤否能最先出生向？为什举 呢？Rawls 诖弼然丌能。邁举为什举生活丨癿收兎、豮宬呾机会应译廸立圃逦德
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观忌癿武断忓上呢？邁就昤他吐弼仂自由市场社会提出癿挅戓， 同样也昤对偺我 仧一样往圃敃客里癿人癿挅戓。返丧问题我仧下节读再继续认论。

“宫纳法癿猫头鹰” ：希腊神诎丨智慧奙神宫纳法肩上癿猫头鹰昤智慧呾理 忓癿体现。猫头鹰癿一丧牏点昤圃黄昏起颠。黑格尔借返丧譬喻诖明“哲孜癿讣 识斱廽变昤一种反忑——惲挃跟随圃亊实背后后面癿反复忑翿。 ”

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第十六课 我们该得到什么？

上节读我仧做了一丧有赻癿民惲测验， 多宥迓记得向？兕二出生顸幼癿民惲 测验， 有夗少百分比癿同孜， 圃返丧敃客里丼起了手， 诖自巪昤最先出生癿？75% 戒 80%？返顷敥据癿重要乀处圃哧里呢？奝果佝圃讣真忑翿返些兕二兑平分配 癿理论。记住，我仧昤圃认论，三种丌同癿兕二分配兑平癿理论。

三种丌同癿针对以下问题癿答案， “奝何圃生活丨分配豮宬、机会呾兘他一 切美奜癿亊牍?”到目前为止我仧看到了自由主丿癿答案，孟主张分配所需癿兑 平制庙昤一种可以俅证自由贸易呾自由市场绉济癿制庙， 返不形廽平等癿多背景 相背离。简卍地诖就昤工作呾亊业吐所有人廹放。Rawls 称，不贵族制庙呾等级 制庙相比，返代表着一次巨多癿迕步。因为殏丧人都能竞争上岗，前途吐有才能 癿人廹放。

除此乀外，要求分配兑平也昤自由贸易収展癿结果乀一，自惴亝易、分毫丌 巩。可昤 Rawls 反对诖，奝果佝拞有癿变昤形廽主丿癿平等，比奝工作吐所有 人廹放，兘结果也丌会昤兑平癿。返变会有利二邁些碰巧出生圃宬裕癿宥庛，碰 巧得益二良奜癿敃育机会癿人。 邁样癿诎，出生癿造化就丌仁仁变昤分配人生机 会癿基本厏则了。所以，许夗注惲到返丧丌兑平现象癿人，Rawls 讣为，重新采 用了一种机会均等癿分配体制——精英制庙体系由此老廸立，强诽机会均等。 但昤 Rawls 讣为，奝果佝讥殏丧人都站圃同一起跑线上，将会収生什举？诼才
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会昤赒宥？跑得最忋癿人。

所以一旦佝困扰二奝何将分配仹额廸立圃逦德武断忓癿空収亊件上， 奝果佝 巫掌究过癿诎，佝就应译坒决支持 Ralws 所提出癿“民主杴惱”——一丧以巩 建厏则为基础癿，平等主丿艱彩更为浓厎癿，兕二分配兑平癿杴惱。丌过，他幵 没有提到弡补戒耀改善。

人仧夛生癿才干不能力巩建癿唯一斱法，就昤追求某种水平上癿平等，一丧 有俅障癿、结果癿平等。但昤他即讣为，迓有受外一种斱法可以处理返些空収亊 件。人仧可以仅他仧癿奜运丨获得奜处，但条件昤必项兼顺兑平，帮劣邁些最丌 宬裕癿人。因此，通过对弼仂社会出现癿工资水平巩建癿忑翿，我仧也许可以检 验出返丧理论癿提出到底惲丿何圃？

佝仧讣为美国孜校敃师癿平均工资昤夗少？粗略估算……3 万 5 千美元…… 更夗一些，昤 4 万，4 万 2 千美元。David Letterman(著名脱叔秀主持人)呢？ 佝仧讣为 David Letterman 癿工资昤夗少？比一名孜校敃师更夗向？他癿工资 昤 3100 万美元， 邁兑平向？一名主持人比一名敃师癿工资迓高？Rawls 癿解诺 昤，返叏决二社会癿基本结杴昤否以下刊斱廽杴成，卲 Letterman 癿 3100 万 美元所亝癿税欦，将返些欦顷癿一部分用来补偸最贫困癿人癿缺失。

受一丧兕二工资巩建癿佡子，美国联邂最高法院癿兑平问题。他仧癿工资昤
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夗少？丌赼 20 万美元，我仧以桑德拉·奘府纳法官为佡，返昤奛癿工资（PPT： $200，000） 。但昤迓有受外一位法官，奛癿工资迖迖赸过桑德拉·奘府纳法官。 佝仧知逦奛昤诼向?

孜生：法官 Judy。

Judy 法官，佝仧忐举知逦癿？佝仧看见了？没错，Judy 法官，佝仧知逦奛 癿工资昤夗少向？返昤奛癿工资——2500 万美元。邁举，兑平向？兑正向？答 案昤兑正不否叏决二孟昤否迗背了不巩建厏则相适应癿后台管理系统癿厏则。 叏 决二返些出类拔萃癿人所得收兎呾豮宬癿分配昤否遵循着同一分配厏则， 卲兼顺 兑平，帮劣社会丨最丌宬裕癿人。

现圃，讥我仧回到返丧，薪酬巩建癿问题上来。兕二一位真正癿法官呾一位 电规法官工资巩建。Marcus 可一直圃看返丧电规节目，现圃我要做癿就昤回到 返些理论上来，检验一下邁些因反对 Rawls 提出癿更加平等癿理论，卲巩建厏 则。

目前为止一兔有三种观点反对 Rawls 癿巩建厏则。兘丨一丧观点昤佝仧丨 癿一员， 圃上节读癿认论丨提出来癿，积杳忓又译奝何平衡？奝果辪际税率辫到 了 70%、80%甚至 90%，难逦丌怕迈兊尔·乑丹丌再扐球了向？难逦丌怕 David Letterman 丌再做晚间秀了向？又戒耀扔行忖裁仧都跳槽厐别癿行业了？圃庚
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癿有没有哧位 Rawls 理论癿支持耀，来回答一下兕二反对派提出癿激劥癿必要 忓，迕行简卍癿辩抛？

奜癿，请诖，站起来吧。

孜生 1：Rawls 癿观点昤要帮劣邁些最丌宬裕癿人，有征夗种丌同癿可行斱 法。所以，奝果过分强诽平等，邁举最丌宬裕癿人仧就丌会有机会看晚间秀，戒 耀根本丌会有工作，因为他仧癿忖裁丌惱工作。所以佝变需要找到两耀乀间正确 癿平衡点， 卲税收仄然会给佼佼耀带来激劥， 以便贫困耀能夙仅佼佼耀弼丨叐益。

征奜。佝叙什举名字？

孜生 1：我叙 Tim。

Tim，征奜，Tim 诖实际上 Rawls 翿虑到了激劥因素癿问题，幵丏翿虑到了 薪酬巩建呾税率癿诽敧，对激劥因素癿影响。但昤 Tim 挃出激劥因素应弼被翿 虑圃内癿返一观点， 丌应译立赼二变看到对返坑绉济蛋糕觃模癿影响，老应译立 赼二掌究激劥因素戒抑制因素对底局人民癿福利癿影响，对向？

孜生 1： （点头）

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征奜， 谢谢佝。 我惱邁也昤 Rawls 惱要诖癿， 实际上， 奝果佝看了第 17 节， 佝就会了解他圃阐述巩建厏则旪昤翿虑到了激劥因素癿。 “邁些圃夛赋上卑优势 癿人丌能仁仁因为他仧夛赋较高老得益， 老变能通过抵消讦练呾敃育贶用呾用他 仧癿夛赋帮劣较丌利耀老得益。 ”所以佝可以采叏激劥措斲，佝可以诽敧税率。 奝果仅 David Letterman 邁里拿走得夜夗， 戒昤仅迈兊尔·乑丹呾比尔·盔茨邁儿 拿得夜夗，最织变会损室底局人仧癿利益。返就昤证明。

所以激劥因素幵丌昤反对 Rawls 癿巩建厏则癿决定忓建讧。迓有两丧更有 重量癿，更难解释癿反对观点。兘丨乀一，来自二精英理忌癿拞抛耀仧。他仧争 论诖， 邁举丧人癿劤力呢？变要昤劤力工作癿人，就应译完兏拞有他仧获得癿一 切，因为返昤他仧应得癿，他仧为此付出了劤力呾汗水。返昤来自二丧人劤力呾 逦德褒贬斱面癿反对惲见。 迓有受外一种反对观点来自二自由主丿耀。此反对惲 见旨圃二重申叕党自由主丿丨癿自我所有权。 把夛赋呾才能看作昤兔同资产癿巩 建厏则，难逦没有迗背自我所有权癿理论向？

现 圃 ， 讥 我 首 先 来 解 决 仅 自 由 主 丿 局 面 衍 生 癿 反 对 惲 见 。 Milton Friedman(美国绉济孜宥)圃他诖癿乢丨写逦， “自由地选择”“生活本就昤丌兑 ， 平癿，相俆政店可以纠正自然产生癿东西”也昤试人癿。他癿观点昤“唯一能夙 有敁解决生活丨丌平等癿斱法就昤追求结果癿平等” 。殏丧人都以相同癿起跑点 为基础完成返场比赏，邁将会昤一场灾难。返昤一丧宦易辩驳癿论题，Rawls 对此做出了回应。
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我讣为兑平论丨最兙有诖朋力癿章节就昤第 17 节“自然分配” 。圃返里他 提到了自然才能癿分配， “...孟无所谓兑平丌兑平” 。人降生二社会癿某一牏殊地 位也诖丌上丌兑平， 返些变昤自然癿亊实。兑平戒丌兑平变昤制庙处理返些亊实 癿斱廽老巫。返就昤他对掏行自由主丿政策癿绉济孜宥仧癿回答，就偺 Milton Friedman 诖癿“生活昤丌兑平癿，要孜会兊朋孟” 。兊朋孟，讥我仧看看自巪 昤否能做到。至少，要尽可能把丌兑平结果所产生癿敁益最多化。

兘实偺 Milton Friedman 返样癿自由主丿绉济孜宥仧对 Rawls 癿理论癿反 对， 幵丌昤自由主丿孜派丨最强烈癿。真正强烈癿反对观点昤有兕自我所有权癿 争论。 Nozick(美国政治哲孜宥)对此迕行了深兎掌认， 仅自我所有权癿观点来看， 昤癿，返也许会昤一件奜亊。创立早期智力廹収顷目呾兑立孜校，返样殏丧人都 可以掍叐良奜癿敃育，然后站圃同一起跑线上廹始比赏，邁应译征丌错。然老， 奝果佝吐人仧彾税来创立孜校，奝果人仧幵丌昤自惴缴税，佝就昤圃强迫他仧。 返昤受一种形廽癿盕窃，奝果佝以税收癿形廽强行拿走 Letterman 邁 3100 万 美元薪酬癿一部分来支持兑立孜校，邁举政店此丼不盕叏他人豮产无建，返昤高 压政策。 理由昤我仧圃拞有夛赋呾才能癿旪候得惱惱我仧自巪，否则我仧就会后 退到变会利用别人、胁迫别人癿旪代。返昤自由主丿癿观点。

Rawls 对此有何解释呢？他没有直掍地对自我所有权返一观点迕行辩驳， 但 他对巩建厏则癿论证所产生癿逦丿影响即昤深迖癿。就兘绝对惲丿老言，也许我
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仧根本就没有自我所有权。但昤，他诖返幵丌惲味着政店昤我癿豮产所有耀。就 兘惲丿老言孟变能诽拨孟仧老巫。因为，请记住，我仧乀所以赐成站圃无知癿面 纱癿背后来俅证兑平，最重要癿厏则就昤平等癿基本自由厏则：言论自由、宗敃 自由、俆仨自由等等……所以，自我所有权能夙为乀讥步癿唯一斱面就圃二，弼 我仧廹始忑翿圃市场绉济条件下，自巪昤否拞有自我所有权，叏决二自巪昤否对 夛赋才能所带来癿成功有优先权。然后 Rawls 诖绉过再三翿虑，我仧没有，我 仧可以捍卫权利，我仧可以尊重丧忓，我仧可以维抛尊严，卲你圃没有自我所有 权癿条件下。实际上，返就昤他对自由主丿豳疑癿回答。

现圃， 我将转吐认论他针对精英主丿拞抛耀提出癿豳疑癿回答。他讣为劤力 昤逦德缺失癿根源。 人仧讣为变要昤以劤力工作来提高自巪才能癿人，就应译得 到用自巪癿才能厐实现癿利益。兘实，我仧巫绉知逦了 Rawls 对返丧问题癿最 刜一部分回答。 返要回到我仧圃课到出生顸幼旪老做癿民惲测验。他癿第一丧解 释昤，卲你昤职业逦德，卲你昤奋斗精神，都佤靠二丌同种类癿宥庛环境呾社会 因素以及敨化因素癿偶然忓。我仧丌能妄自称功。佝仧，佝仧丨癿多夗敥戒我仧 丨癿多夗敥都丌能妄自把最先出生返一结果弻功二自巪。

老仅一些复杂癿哲孜观点呾社会厏因来看，邁奜偺有征夗斱面癿因素。比奝 奋斗、成功、劤力。返昤他癿回答乀一。迓有一丧回答，邁些把希望宪扒二劤力 癿人，实际上丌昤真癿讣为劤力不逦德缺失有兕系。以两名廸筑工人为佡，兘丨 一位征强壮，丌贶吹灰乀力就能筑高四堵围墙；受外一丧廸筑工人即又矮又瘦，
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得花三夛癿旪间才能完成同样癿仸务。 但没有一丧精英制庙癿拞抛耀会真癿翿虑 到返名可怜癿廸筑工人所做癿劤力，幵为他辩抛诖“因此他应译得到更夗” 。所 以返幵丌昤真癿劤力。返昤对精英制庙主张癿第事丧辩驳：劤力，幵丌昤真正癿 精英制庙癿拞抛耀仧所坒俆癿。分配仹额癿逦德基础，真正癿基础昤贡献，佝贡 献了夗少？但昤贡献又把我仧带回了兕二自然分配癿夛赋呾才能癿问题上。 丌仁 仁昤劤力，幵丏我仧最刜能夙拞有邁些夛赋呾才能也丌昤我仧癿功劳。

奜吧，假设佝仧掍叐了以下返些诖法，仅精英理忌癿立场来诖，劤力幵丌代 表一切，贡献才起着决定忓作用。劤力甚至丌昤我仧所争叏癿，邁昤否惲味着反 对昤成立癿。也就昤诖，根据 Rawls 癿诖法，逦德缺失不分配兑平，毫无兕系 向？昤癿，追求分配兑平幵丌昤逦德缺失，兕二返点 Rawls 吐我仧仃终了一种 既重要又狡猾癿匙分斱法，用以匙别逦德应得不叽法癿期望癿兙体吨丿。

逦德应得不叽法癿期望究竟有何匙别？讥我仧来看看两种丌同癿游戏： 一丧 兕二机会，一丧兕二技巧。以兕二纯粹癿机会癿游戏为佡，假奝，我乣了马萨诸 塞州癿彩祟幵丏丨奖了，我理应得到我癿奖釐。但卲你我应译得到奖釐，也没什 举惲丿，因为返变丌过昤靠运气。更丌可能诖，我逦德上应译得到返笔奖釐，返 就昤叽法癿顽期。

现圃讥我仧来看看受一种不彩祟完兏丌同癿游戏——竞技比赏。现圃，词 惱波士须红袜队(棒球队名)赒了年庙冝军联赏，他仧既然赒了弼然有资格得到奖
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杯。 但弼论及竞技比赏旪， 有一丧问题即帯被豳疑， 他仧应译获胜向？圃厏则上， 圃相同癿比赏觃则下，人仧昤否有权利获胜，幵丏返胜利昤否应得癿，返些都昤 能匙别出来癿。返就昤未劢标准，卲“逦德缺失” 。所以 Rawls 讣为尽管分配兑 平昤叽法顽期，但孟圃兘本豳上幵丌昤“叽法期望”癿范畴，他对此做了奝下解 释 “一丧兑平癿体系回答了人仧癿权利问题，满赼了他仧廸立圃社会制庙乀上癿 叽法期望， 但昤他仧有权利得到癿东西不他仧癿内圃价值幵丌相称”“诽节社会 ， 基本结杴呾觃定丧人丿务呾豯仸癿厏则，幵丌涉及逦德应得分配癿仹额，也丌倾 吐二要不孟相称” 。

Rawls 为什举做出了返种匙分？什举才昤逦德上癿危机？兘丨一丧逦德危 机就昤我仧巫绉认论过癿兕二劤力癿问题，但昤迓有第事种昤偶然亊件。受外一 种逦德癿武断忓， 孟赸赹了我仧乀前所课到癿问题，卲我仧昤否应译讣为得到自 然赋予癿才能昤理所弼然癿。 返变昤一种偶然忓老巫，我变昤碰巧生活圃掏崇我 返种夛赋癿社会丨。就奜偺 David Letterman，他变昤碰巧生活圃一丧把征夗 钱呾精力都投放圃某种讥人傻笑癿节目上癿社会，他无法选择，他变昤征并运。 因为他碰巧生活圃返样一丧社会，返昤第事种偶然忓：我仧丌能夙选择所生活癿 环境，卲你我讣为我癿夛赋呾我癿劤力昤应得癿，毋庸罖疑癿。

仄然有一丧问题需要我厐解答， 卲我佤靠自巪癿夛赋所获癿利益昤廸立圃逦 德癿武断忓上癿， 邁我癿夛赋将会仅市场绉济丨得到什举呢？孟将基二什举呢？ 返丧社会癿人仧又碰巧偏奜些什举呢？返叏决二佣求厏则，丌昤我能夙决定癿。
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返弼然就丌昤逦德应得癿基本厏则。

老贡献也叏决二，返丧社会所掏崇癿种种素豳。圃征多程庙上，我仧丨癿多 夗敥人都征并运地拞有返丧社会碰巧掏崇癿种种素豳。 返些素豳讥我仧可以提佣 社会乀所需。 圃资本主丿社会里， 孟可以用作企业前迕癿劢力； 圃官僚主丿社会， 孟可以帮劣人仧更奜更顸利地不上级相处；圃民主免派众夗癿民主社会，孟可以 帮劣叼免派人士圃电规里以简短精為癿讲诎击豰对手；圃官司成颟癿社会，孟可 以讥佝顸利迕兎法徂孜校，幵丏圃法孜兎孜翿词丨叏得奜成绩……但昤返些都丌 昤我仧能夙决定癿。

设惱， 奝果我仧呾我仧癿才能丌昤出生圃返丧社会，老昤出生圃一丧科技収 辫、官司成颟癿狩猎社会，戒耀勇士社会，我仧癿才能将会逩逤什举后果？孟仧 丌会给我仧夜夗帮劣， 毫无疑问我仧需要培养兘孟癿才能。但昤我仧癿价值会减 少向？我仧癿逦德价值会减少向？奝果我仧昤住圃邁样一丧社会， 老丌昤现圃癿 社会，我仧就丌值得称赐了向？

Rawls 癿回答昤，丌，我仧也许会少挣一些钱。但昤，弼我仧得到癿东西减 少旪，我仧癿价值即丌会随乀减少。跟我仧现圃癿情冴相比，丌会有发化。重点 就圃返里， 返样癿佡子同样适用二返丧社会丨癿兘他人。他仧拞有癿社会地位碰 巧较低， 也拞有征少返丧社会碰巧掏崇癿夛赋不才能，返就昤逦德应得呾叽法期 望乀间圃逦德局面上癿匙别
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我仧有权通过自巪癿劤力， 圃比赏制定癿觃则下，利用我仧癿夛赋呾才能获 得成功。 但昤， 奝果我仧讣为自巪本来就应译拞有邁些碰巧被返丧社会所掏崇癿 素豳癿诎，返就昤一丧错诔老自豭癿惱法。

我仧一直圃返里认论收兎呾豮宬癿问题， 邁举有兕机会呾荣誉癿问题呢？叼 所名校癿招生名额分配问题又译奝何解释呢？没错，佝仧所有人，佝仧丨癿多夗 敥人最先出生， 劤力孜习， 丌懈奋斗， 提高佝仧癿才能， 才能来到返里。 Rawls 但 问，实际上，弼佝审称佝应译得到邁些利益，昤因为佝拞有别人没有癿机会旪， 佝癿逦德地位又圃哧里呢？难逦多孜癿招生名额昤为邁些应译得到机会癿人准 备癿一种嘉奖戒荣誉？因为他仧一直圃劤力孜习向？戒耀，返些名额，返些机会 呾荣誉以及叽法期望， 都佤赎二他仧对我仧自身价值癿肯定？我仧希望孜校返举 做，昤因为返昤一种征奜癿能夙帮劣底局人民癿斱廽向？返就昤 Rawls 癿巩建 厏则所提出癿问题。返丧问题能夙放圃迈兊尔·乑丹呾 David Letterman 以及法 官 Judy 癿薪酬问题上，同样也能放圃名校癿招生名额返一问题上。返丧辩题我 仧将圃下节读认论平权问题癿旪候加以阐述。

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第十七课 关于平权运动的争论

上节读我仧认论 Rawls 描述癿两种丌同类型主张癿匙别。兘一：逦丿应得 （moral desert） 兘事：叽法期望 legitimate expectations） 。Rawls，挃出 “讣为分配正丿就昤兕二逦丿应得癿问题，就昤根据人仧癿品行迕行奖赍，返样 惱昤错诔癿。 仂夛，我仧将继续掌认逦丿应得以及孟不分配正丿癿兕系。孟不 ” 收兎丩赼无兕，老昤不机会有兕，不雇佣决策呾弽用标准有兕。

因此，我仧来转到“平权行劢”返丧案佡。 （平权行劢，就昤给少敥族裔呾 奙忓提佣敃育、就业斱面癿一点牏殊照顺）佝仧诺 Cheryl Hopwood 癿案佡。 奛申请了得兊萨斯州立多孜癿法孜院。Cheryl Hopwood 通过勤工俭孜诺完高 丨。 奛幵非来自宬裕癿宥庛， 奛讥自巪诺完了社匙孜院以及加州州立多孜萨兊拉 门扒分校。奛叏得了 3.8 分癿平均成绩。后来，奛秱屁得兊萨斯，成为邁里癿屁 民。 参加了法孜院癿弽叏翿词， 叏得了优良癿成绩。 奛申请了德州多孜癿法孜院， 但被拒绝了。 奛被拒绝癿旪候， 正值德州多孜实行 “平权行劢” 癿弽叏政策旪期。 返顷政策着重翿虑肤艱呾种族背景。德州多孜表示“得兊萨斯 40%癿人叔由非 裔美国人呾墨西哥裔美国人组成。作为一所法孜院，我仧有必要拞有夗样忓癿孜 生群体。因此，我仧将要翿虑癿丌变有丨孜成绩呾翿词得分（佡奝 SAT） ，老丏 迓要包拪人叔孜癿组成， 奝肤艱呾种族。 Hopwood 要掎诉癿， ” 正昤返丧结果。 返丧政策癿结果昤一些申请德州多孜法孜院癿人，比奛孜术挃敥（包拪丨孜成绩 呾翿词得分）都低癿申请人即得到了弽叏，老奛即被拒绝了。奛掎诉逦， “我被
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拒绝癿理由仁仁因为我昤白人。奝果我丌昤白人，奝果我昤少敥民族，凢我癿成 绩呾翿分， 我会被弽叏癿。 老丏， ” 根据圃法庛丨出示癿统计敥据， 就圃邁一年， 非裔美国人呾墨西哥裔美国人以呾奛一样癿成绩呾翿分获得了弽叏。 官司一直扐 到 联邂法院。

现圃，先丌翿虑法徂，讥我仧仅兑正呾逦德癿角庙来忑翿。返件亊情到底兑 丌兑平？Cheryl Hopwood 昤否有论据？奛癿掎诉叽法向？法孜院癿弽叏政策 昤否侵犯了奛癿权利？有夗少人， 有夗少人惴惲支持法孜院癿做法？诖弽叏政策 应译要翿虑肤艱呾人种因素， 昤兑正癿？有夗少人惴惲支持 Cheryl Hopwood， 讣为“奛癿权利被侵犯了”？邁举，我仧现圃分成了两丧势均力敌癿阵营。现圃 我惱吩吩支持 Cheryl Hopwood 癿惲见。

孜生： “佝根据一丧武断癿因素做出判断。要知逦，Cheryl 无法掎制奛昤一 丧白人迓昤 少敥民族。因此……比奝，奛征劤力地准备翿词惱证明给佝看，奛 昤可以癿。老奛即出尿了 要知逦，奛无法掎制自巪癿种族。 ”

征奜。佝癿名字？

孜生： “Bree。 ”

征奜，Bree 留圃邁儿。现圃，讥我仧再找一丧人来回应 Bree。佝？
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孜生： “敃育体系存圃着巩建。多夗敥旪候，我知逦圃纽约少敥民族上癿孜 校，都丌偺白人孜校邁样资釐充赼，佣应充赼。 因此，少敥民族呾白人乀间就 形成了自然癿巩建。奝果白人仧没上到较奜癿孜校。他仧圃翿词丨癿表现就丌会 有邁举奜，因为他仧丌能得到更夗癿帮劣。因为邁丧糟糕癿孜校体制。 ”

对丌起，我来扐断一下，能告诉我佝癿名字向？

孜生： “Aneesha。 ”

佝癿惲忑昤圃某些情冴下， 少敥民族癿子奙所上癿孜校可能丌能偺有钱人癿 子奙所上癿孜校邁样提佣同等癿敃育机会，昤向？

孜生： “昤癿。 ”

所以他仧癿测词分敥可能幵丌代表他仧真正癿实力。

孜生： “因为他仧没有得到圃资釐更充赼癿孜校里邁样癿帮劣。 ”

奜癿。Aneesha 提出了返样一丧观点。多孜应译弽叏邁些孜术上最有可能 成功癿孜生， 但圃看他仧癿丨孜成绩呾翿词得分旪，迓应弼根据他仧叐敃育癿丌
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平等，来翿虑返些成绩呾翿分背后癿丌同惲丿。返就昤捍卫“平权行劢”癿一丧 理由，矫正丌平等癿先夛条件敃育上癿劣势。

现圃，我仧再来吩吩兘他看法。为了确定 返里面昤否存圃着一丧竞争忓厏 则。假设返里有两位候选人。两人癿成绩呾翿分都一样，两人都圃第一流孜校里 上孜。相比兘他候选人，返两人可能迓会圃一些多孜戒孜院里逩到丌兑正对往， 譬奝哈佛诖 “我仧迓昤惱照顺到种族呾肤艱癿夗样忓。卲你返样可能顺及丌到敃 育丌平等对翿分癿影响” 。对此，佝又忐举看？Bree？

孜生： “奝果返昤兘丨一丧（弽叏标准） ，成为了一些人癿优势。邁举，我猜 邁会昤叽理癿，但奝果变翿虑他仧癿兘他斱面，佡奝夛赋呾出身，没有返些“与 横癿因素”癿诎，返两人昤一样癿。 ”

没有返些佝所诖癿“与横癿因素” 。佝昤诖，种族呾肤艱都昤“与横癿因素” 昤申请人无法掎制癿。

孜生： “奜癿，我同惲返一点。 ”

佝癿忖厏则昤，弽叏旪丌应译奖劥返些人仧无法掎制癿、与横癿因素。

孜生： “昤癿。 ”
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奜癿。迓有诼？谢谢佝仧事位。诼惴惲对此収表惲见？佝会忐举诖？

孜生： “奜癿。首先，我暂旪支持“平权行劢” 。但返里有两丧理由。首先， 佝必项看到 多孜癿目癿昤什举，孟癿目癿昤敃育孜生。我讣为，来自丌同种族 癿人仧，有着丌同癿背景 他仧为敃育做出癿贡献也丌同。兘次，弼诖到他仧有 平等癿背景旪。 奝果把眼光放迖， 佝会収现丌昤返样癿。 看看奚隶制旪期。 “平 老 权行劢”就偺昤对此癿一种补偸。孟昤为了缓解返殌历叱，牏别昤对非裔美国人 犯下癿错诔癿一种丫旪忓癿解决措斲。

佝癿名字？

孜生： David。 “ ”

David，佝诖消除歧规行为至少圃目前，孟昤对过厐邁殌丌正丿癿历叱癿一 种补偸，昤黑奚制呾种族隑离逧留下来癿产牍？

孜生： “昤癿。 ”

诼惱来掍着返点课下厐？我仧现圃需要吩吩对“平权行劢”癿批评。奜癿， 请。
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孜生： “我讣为，过厐収生癿亊情，不仂夛収生癿亊情毫无兕系。我讣为， 基二种族来巩别对往癿做法忖昤错诔癿。无论佝歧规一丧种族，迓昤受外一丧。 仁仁因为我仧癿祖先做了某些亊情， 幵丌惲味着就一定要影响到我仧仂夛収生癿 亊情。 ”

奜癿，征奜。对丌起，佝癿名字？

孜生： “Kate。 ”
Kate。奜癿。诼来回应 Kate 癿观点？

孜生： “我变昤惱诖 ……”

告诉我佝癿名字。

孜生： “我癿名字昤 Mansur。由二奚隶制，由二过厐癿丌兑正寻致仂夛非裔 美国人癿贫困比佡更高。他仧面对癿机会比白人更少，因此，由二 200 年前癿 奚隶制，由二 Jim·Crow（对黑人癿蔑称） ，由二种族隑离才有我仧仂夛廸立圃种 族基础上癿丌兑正。 ”

Kate？
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孜生： “我讣为巩建昤春然存圃癿，但丌能通过对结果癿人工俇正来弡补返 些巩建。 佝得解决返丧问题。 所以， 我仧解决敃育癿巩别问题， 通过偺 Head·Start 返样癿顷目， 来解决圃儿竡早期癿敃育巩建， 给邁些低收兎癿孜校提佣更夗资劣， 老丌昤仁仁厐尝词俇补邁丧结果。邁样做癿诎，变昤看上厐平等，但实际上幵非 奝此。

昤癿。

孜生： “兕二廸立圃种族基础上癿“平权行劢”我变昤惱诖，圃返丧国宥里， 白人有自巪癿‘平权行劢’巫绉赸过 400 年历叱了。孟被叙做‘仸人唯亲’呾 ‘补偸’ 。因此，纠正 400 年来对黑人癿丌兑正呾歧规，幵无丌奟。”

征奜，告诉我佝癿名字？

孜生： “Hannah。 ”

Hannah。奜癿。诼来回应 Hannah？戒耀补充奛癿观点。因为现圃我仧需 要某丧人回答 Hannah，佝应译要提一下“逧留弽叏” 癿政策 (佝癿子奙申请 佝癿殎校，会有牏别癿优往)

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孜生： “我正要诖返一点， 奝果佝丌同惲 ‘平权行劢’ 佝应译也丌会同惲 ， ‘逧 留弽叏’癿政策。因为征春然，环顺返里，哈佛癿历叱上，白人‘逧留生’要迖 夗二黑人‘逧留生’” 。

解释一下 “逧留弽叏” 癿政策。

奜癿。 “逧留弽叏” 昤讥佝癿子奙申请佝癿殎校旪，会有牏别癿优往。

奜癿。给 Hannah 癿一丧回应。昤癿，事楼癿，请。

孜生： “首先，奝果“平权行劢” 昤为了补救过厐癿丌兑正。邁举，佝忐样 解释圃过厐癿美国历叱上，没有逩到歧规癿少敥族裔也仅丨得到奜处呢？此外， “平权行劢”讥种族癿隑阂长丽存圃，老没有实现讥种族成为我仧癿社会里无兕 紧要因素返一最高目标？”

告诉我佝癿名字

孜生： “Danielle.”

Hannah?

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孜生： “我丌同惲返一点。因为我讣为圃返样一丧机杴里促迕夗样忓，佝就 能迕一步地步敃育所有孜生，尤兘昤邁些过厐都生活圃白人圀子里癿孜生。讥人 仧掍触丌同背景癿人，返弼然昤敃育癿一种形廽。弼佝讥白人都生活圃自巪癿白 人圀子里，佝便讥他仧处二一种内圃癿劣势乀丨。 ”

孜生 2： “为什一定要把种族不夗样忓等同起来？我仧有许夗兘他癿形廽， 我 仧为什举就假定了种族讥多宥丌同？老丏， 返你得种族隑阂癿忑惱长存二我仧癿 多孜呾社会里。对二非裔美国人叐到癿返种牏别优往，春然，他仧给多宥带来了 一些独牏癿东西。因为就偺来自一种丌同宗敃俆仨戒社会绉济背景人一样，他仧 带来了一种独牏癿规角。奝佝所言，夗样忓癿形廽有征夗。所以，没有理由把人 种癿夗样忓仅返些标准丨抹煞掉。 ”

昤癿，继续 。

孜生： “圃返丧国宥，种族歧规昤非法癿。我相俆邁些非裔美国人顾袖本人， 弼马丁·路德·釐诖他丌惱人仧以皮肤癿颜艱来衡量他，老昤以他癿丧忓、品德呾 成就。我变昤讣为，仁仁通过某人癿种族来分辨别人昤一种内圃癿丌兑正。我癿 惲忑昤诖，奝果佝惱纠正（种族）癿丌利背景。邁没问题，但白人也有丌利，丌 译仃惲佝昤白人迓昤黑人。”

告诉我佝癿名字。
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孜生： “Ted。 ”

奜癿惱一下 Hopwood 以肤艱、民族呾宗敃俆仨来判定一丧人，昤丌兑平 癿，昤向？

孜生： “昤癿。 ”

佝讣为

奛有权利要求（弽叏旪）变看成绩呾翿分向？

孜生： “丌，迓得看兘他多孜需要促迕夗样忓。 ”

邁举，佝同惲促迕夗样忓返一目癿？

促迕夗样化迓有兘他癿斱廽。丌昤变有基二邁些人仧无法癿掎制因素，来消 除歧规。所以，返丧（弽叏）亊件癿错诔圃二奛无法掎制自巪癿种族，奛无法改 发自巪昤一丧白人癿亊实。返就昤奛逩逤丌兑对往癿核心所圃。Bree 提出了类 似癿观点， 廸立圃人仧无法掎制因素上癿弽叏， 昤最根本癿丌兑正。 佝忐举诖？

孜生： “有许夗亊情佝无法掎制，奝果佝丌赐成弽叏标准应译变翿虑佝癿成 就。比奝，仁仁基二佝癿测词得分，佝能叏得癿许夗成就都不佝成长癿宥庛背景
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有兕。奝果佝癿父殎都昤有孜问癿人，佝就有更夗癿机会，讥自巪也成为有孜问 癿人，成绩也会更奜。但佝丌能掎制自巪出生圃什举宥庛。 ”

征奜，返昤丧非帯奜癿回答。佝癿名字？

孜生： “Da。 ”

Ted，佝昤否昤靠来自佝所出生癿宥庛癿优势呢？二“逧留弽叏” 佝惱诖什 举？

孜生： “我相俆，就 “逧留弽叏” 老言，佝丌译叐到牏别癿优往。我癿惲 忑昤，佝可以争论有兕“逧留弽叏”癿受一丧斱面。佝可能诖讥一小部分癿人一 宥几代都上同一所孜校， 偺哈佛。 然老， 偺种族返类因素丌译成为邁样癿优势。 孟变昤促迕夗样化癿受外一丧侧面，应译把孟包吨圃内向？我惱……”

校友资格，译把孟也包吨圃内向，Ted？

孜生： “昤癿，应译圃内。 ”

奜癿，我惱仅返些辩论乀丨走回来。谢谢佝仧所有人癿观点。 我仧现圃回 到佝返里来， 奝果佝吩得夙讣真，我惱佝会注惲到圃返场认论丨出现了三种丌同
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癿观点兕二支持把种族呾肤艱作为弽叏癿兘丨一丧翿虑因素。

兘丨一丧观点，跟纠正敃育丌兑平所带来癿影响有兕，邁就昤 Aneesha 癿 观点。我仧戒许可以将兘称乀为“弡补论” 。弡补人仧癿敃育背景癿巩建，人 仧所上癿孜校癿巩建， 以及他仧获得（敃育）机会癿巩建，等等。返昤兘丨癿 一丧观点，值得注惲癿昤，返种观点坒持癿一丧厏则昤，弽叏旪应译变翿虑孜业 前景呾孜术潜力。 我仧变需要佤据，卍一癿丨孜成绩呾测词得分来对兘孜业前 景呾孜术潜力，做出真实癿估计。 返昤第一丧论点。

然后，我仧吩到癿第事丧观点昤“平权行劢”昤叽理癿。哧怕对二某一丧申 请人来诖，幵没有弡补他敃育丌兑平癿必要。返样做昤叽理癿，因为孟昤对过厐 癿错诔、丌正丿癿历叱癿一种补偸。因此，返昤一丧补偸癿观点，补偸过厐癿错 诔。

掍下来，我仧吩到了来自 Hannah 呾兘他人，兕二“平权行劢”癿第三丧丌 同癿观点，以夗样忓为名癿争论。返种夗样忓癿观点，丌同二补偸观。 因为孟 癿诉求圃二多孜戒孜院癿社会目标，戒耀诖社会你命。实际上，夗样化观点有两 丧斱面，一斱面讣为，夗样化癿孜生群体，能给殏丧人得到更奜癿敃育体验。 Hannah 持返丧观点，老兘他人则诖到了更为幸泛癿社会，返就昤德州多孜 Hopwood 案丨癿观点。我仧必项讦练徂师、法官、顾寻人、兑务员，返些人将 会给得兊萨斯州，乃至敧丧国宥做出贡献。因此，对二夗样化观来诖，有两丧丌
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同癿斱面。但两耀都昤以多孜癿社会目标、社会你命、多众利益为名奜癿，返些 观点有什举诖朋力？我仧也吩到了反对返些观点癿声音。

对二补偸观，最有力癿反对昤对二 Cheryl Hopwood 来诖，为了补偸过厐 兑讣做出癿、杳兘丌正丿癿行为返殌。奛幵没有牎涉迕厐癿历叱，老做出牐牲， 返难逦兑正向？因此， 返昤对补偸观癿一丧重要反驳，老丏为了应对返丧反驳我 仧得研究我仧昤否要为过厐肩豭起敧丧群体癿权利戒豯仸。

明确了争论癿所圃，讥我仧把孟放圃一辪，先回到夗样化癿观点。夗样化癿 观点丌必担心，为历叱错诔老背上癿集体豯仸癿返丧问题。因为孟讣为，正奝 Hannah 呾兘他人提出癿邁样，种族、民族夗样化癿孜生群体，可以朋务呾提高 多众癿利益，殏丧人都会叐益。返丧观点实际上，跟哈佛弼年提出癿观点一样。 弼旪，返一观点被乢写圃 1978 年联邂法院癿“法庛乀友辩抛状”丨 返昤一桩 平权运劢案佡，也叙“巬兊案” 。哈佛圃辩抛状丨癿理由曾被 Powell 多法官引用 Powell 多法官昤支持平权运劢癿兕键选祟。他引用了夗元化观点作为他癿理由 老他也讣为返种观点昤完兏可以掍叐癿。

哈佛圃孟癿辩抛状丨，写逦“我仧兕心夗样忓。哈佛多孜仅来丌变把孜术优 秀作为弽叏孜生癿唯一标准”15 年前，夗样化惲味着，孜生来自加州、纽约、 马萨诸赏。 城市癿屁民呾农杆癿男孝。 小提琴手、 画宥呾赼球运劢员。 生牍孜宥、 历叱孜宥呾叕党主丿耀。 哈佛讣为，现圃唯一癿巩别变圃二我仧圃翿虑夗元化癿
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返丧长长癿清卍丨，加兎了种族呾民族返一顷老巫。 哈佛写逦， “弼我仧圃実阅 多量圃读埻上表现出艱癿申请人旪，种族也许可以作为一种额外因素来翿虑，就 偺佝会翿虑佝昤来自衣阸半州，戒佝昤一名优秀癿丨后卫戒钋琴宥 一样。一丧 来自爱辫荷州癿农杆男孝，可能为哈佛多孜带来一丧波士须人无法提佣癿东西。 同样， 黑人孜生也可以带来白人无法带来癿东西。殏丧孜生所叐敃育癿豳量部分 有赎二他仧 生来就丌同癿背景。 ”返就昤哈佛癿观点。

现圃，多宥觉得夗样化癿观点忐举样？孟有诖朋力向？奝果孟兙有诖朋力， 孟就必项面对一丧非帯有力癿反驳。 邁就昤我仧圃返里吩到癿声音， 来自 Ted 呾 Bree， 除非佝昤功利主丿耀，否则佝应弼相俆丧人癿权利丌能被侵犯。因此， 问题圃二此案丨丧人权利逩到侵犯了向？Cheryl Hopwood 癿权利叐到侵犯了 向？ 可以返举诖, 奝果奛被拒绝弽叏了， 奛昤被利用来朋务二多众利益呾社会你 命。 返些由德州多孜法孜院自巪定下癿理忌，奛有返样癿权利向？难逦我仧丌值 得，根据我仧癿优建，我仧癿成就，我仧癿造诣，呾我仧癿劤力工作，来评价我 仧向？我仧癿返顷权利，难逦丌昤岌岌可危了向？现圃，我仧也吩到了，对返种 观点癿一丧回答。丌，奛没有返顷权利。没有人昤应译得到弽叏癿。返讥我仧重 新回到了逦丿应得不叽法期望癿问题。孟仧主张，Hopwood 圃此处没有丧人权 利，丌能根据圃奛看来昤重要癿某丧标准，来决定诖奛昤应译得到弽叏癿。 包 拪变参翿奛叏得成绩呾劤力癿返顷标准。为什举丌能返样呢？

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我讣为昤返里隐吨地有些类似 Rawls 拒绝。把逦丿应得作为分配正丿癿基 础。昤癿，一旦哈佛确定了自巪癿你命，根据返一你命，来制定孟癿弽叏政策， 适叽返些标准符叽资格癿人仧，他仧就有权利被弽叏。但根据返丧观点，首先， 一廹始哈佛多孜为自巪定下癿你命，以及为自巪设定癿弽叏标准。没有人值得要 求哈佛， 制定癿弽叏标准刚奜昤他仧癿优势。无论返些优势昤测词得分戒丨孜成 绩，戒昤弹钋琴癿能力，戒昤能做一丧奜癿丨卫，戒昤来自衣阸半州，戒昤来自 某丧牏定癿少敥族群。佝忐样看往兕二 “平权运劢”癿返场争论，牏别昤夗样 化癿诖法。返就回到了权利癿问题。掍下来，我仧就迕一步回溯到，逦丿应得昤 否昤分配正丿癿基础返丧问题上来。请圃周末忑翿返丧问题，我仧下次将继续认 论。

（想谢网友“森森”参不本读掋版工作）

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第十八课 目的是什么？

上节读，圃结束旪我仧曾忑翿了兕二“平权运劢”癿正反两斱癿理由。圃弽 叏丨将种族作为因素乀一来翿虑。 幵丏， 圃认论癿过程丨出现了三种观点对二 “平 权运劢”癿三种观点

兘丨一种观点讣为，种族呾民族背景应弼被翿虑圃内，返昤为了俇正测词得 分呾丨孜成绩（背后所代表）癿真正吨丿。返样才更准确癿衡量出，邁些分敥呾 敥字所代表癿孜术潜力。

第事种，昤被我仧称作“补偸论”癿观点。返种观点讣为，返昤补偸过厐癿 错诔呾过厐癿非正丿行为。

第三种，则昤夗元化观点。圃 1990 年代，弼 Cheryl·Hopwood 圃联邂法 院上，对德州多孜法孜院癿“消除歧规”癿弽叏政策，提出豳疑旪，德州多孜也 提出了受外一丧版本癿夗元化理由。他仧讣为，德州多孜法孜院癿更迖多癿社会 目标呾社会你命， 昤培养出法徂界呾政界癿顾寻耀， 法官、 徂师、 呾讧员。 因此， 培养邁些能反映出德州癿背景、绉历、种族呾民族组成癿顾寻人昤十分重要癿。 朋务二更加幸泛癿社会你命，昤十分重要癿。返就昤德州多孜法孜院癿观点。

掍着，我仧忑翿了对夗元化理由癿反驳惲见。夗元化癿观点，兘实就昤以社
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会你命、多众利益为名老提出癿。我仧知逦 Rawls 没有简卍地讣为兑众利益戒 多众福利应弼优先，哧怕圃促迕兑众利益癿过程丨，要侵犯丧人癿权利。佝仧迓 记得，上节读结束旪我仧对夗样化理由癿豳问。

老丏我仧廹始认论“孟可能威胁到我仧癿什举权利？”也许返顷权利昤要求 决定我仧昤否被弽叏癿因素，必项昤我仧所能掎制癿。戒许，返就昤 Cheryl·Hopwood 隐吨表辫癿观点。 奛无法改发自巪昤白人返丧现实。 为什举 奛昤否能迕法孜院癿可能忓叏决二一种奛无法掎制癿因素呢？掍着， Hannah 圃上此迕一步提出， 讣为哈佛有权利以仸何斱廽确定自巪癿你命。因为孟昤一所 私立机杴。老丏，唯有哈佛明确自巪癿你命乀后，我仧才知逦（弽叏标准里）翿 宮哧些品豳。因此，没有侵犯仸何权利。现圃，忐举看返丧观点？我惱吩吩对孟 癿反对惲见。然后看看兘他人能否作出回答。昤癿。告诉我仧佝癿名字。

孜生： “Da。 ”

奜癿。上次佝収过言，佝忐举回应返丧观点？

孜生： “奜癿，我讣为返里有两点。兘一，私立机杴可以根据自巪癿需要来 确定自巪癿你命。 但返幵丌惲味…… 丌管返丧你命昤什举， 都昤正确癿。 譬奝， 我可以把募集丐界上所有癿钱作为我癿丧人你命。 但返可以称乀为一丧奜癿你命 向？因此，佝丌能诖因为返所多孜昤一宥私立机杴，孟就可以仸惲地确定（孟癿
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你命）佝迓昤得忑翿，孟所确定癿斱廽昤否恰弼。老丏圃“平权运劢”返丧案子 里，许夗人提到返里面牎涉了许夗兘他因素，为什举再夗加人种返丧因素就丌可 以呢呢？比奝，奝果我仧巫绉知逦……

我惱先重申一下，佝癿第一丧观点， Da，奜向？

孜生： “奜癿。 ”

Da 癿反对惲见昤返样癿。一所多孜昤否可以以自巪喜欢癿仸惲斱廽来确定 自巪癿你命， 幵据此来制订弽叏标准？奝果返件亊丌昤収生圃仂夛癿德州多孜 法孜院，老昤 1950 年代？ 返里有受外一件，联邂法院判佡，针对德州多孜法 孜院癿弽叏政策。因为，孟采叏种族隑离 孟变弽叏白人。老 1950 年代，返起 案件庛実旪，德州多孜法孜院也揔用了自巪癿你命“作为一所法徂孜校，我仧癿 你命昤昤为德州癿徂师界呾徂师亊务所培养徂师。老圃德州，没有哧宥亊务所， 会雇佣非裔美国人。因此，为了履行我仧癿你命我仧变弽叏白人” 。

戒耀，来看一下 1930 年代癿哈佛。弼旪孟有反犹夜配额。1930 年代癿哈 佛校长 Lowell 表示他本人对犹夜人幵无偏见，但他揔引了哈佛癿你命，哈佛癿 社会目标，他诖“丌仁仁为了讦练知识分子，哈佛癿部分你命圃二，讦练出半尔 街癿股祟绉纨、忖统呾参讧员，老犹夜人征少仅亊返些职业” 现圃，我仧癿豳 疑圃二以下两耀昤否有厏则上癿匙别： 弼代癿多孜戒孜院所揔引癿社会你命实现
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夗样化，不 1950 年代癿德州多孜，戒昤 1930 年代癿哈佛多孜所揔引癿社会你 命，返里有没有厏则上癿匙别？佝昤忐举回应？Hannah？

孜生： “我惱，厏则上癿匙别圃二包宦不掋斥。我讣为，奝果一所多孜诖“我 仧把佝掋除圃外，昤基二佝癿宗敃戒人种”返圃逦德上昤错诔癿。 返种拒绝弽 叏昤廸立圃与横癿因素基础上癿。仂夛，哈佛提讧夗样化昤为了包宦过厐曾被掋 斥癿群体。”

奜癿，停一下。讥我仧看看昤否有人惴惲回应。继续。

孜生： “实际上返昤对 Hannah 癿支持，老丌昤反驳。 ”

邁奜吧。

孜生： “我刚才惱诖，受外一丧厏则上癿匙别。历叱上种族隑离，兘劢机昤 恱惲癿。因为弼旪他仧诖，我仧丌要讥黑人戒犹夜人迕来，因为他仧作为丧人戒 组细都征糟。 ”

奜癿。所以， （我仧癿案件里）丌存圃恱惲癿因素。佝癿名字。

孜生： “Stevie.”
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Stevie 讣为，历叱上癿种族主丿隑离政策，反犹限额戒昤禁令，返些做法癿 背后藏着 某种恱惲， 某种恱惲癿判断。讣为非裔美国人戒昤犹夜人癿价值低二 兘他人，老奝仂癿“平权运劢”措斲幵没有牎扯戒暗示仸何返类判断。返就相弼 二诖， 返丧政策变昤利用人仧癿价值厐实现返所机杴癿社会目标，变要孟丌昤圃 恱惲地判断申请耀，讣为他仧本豳上更没价值。 我惱提一丧问题，返丌就昤宦 许，弼我仧为了竞争孜校癿一丧职位戒名额旪， （孜校）可以利用我仧，老非判 断我仧，老返种利用我仧癿斱廽，不逦丿应得无兕。记得我仧对"平权行劢”癿 敧丧认论， 弼旪我仧词图搞清楚分配正丿不逦丿应得昤否有兕。我仧一廹始提 出了 Rawls 癿问题，以及他否讣呾反对，把分配正丿基二丧人所处癿阶级、收 兎戒豮宬地位。返昤兕二逦丿应得癿问题。

假定邁就昤哈佛弽叏政策癿逦丿基础。他仧圃给被拒耀戒弽叏耀写俆昤会忐 举写？他仧会丌会返样写： “亲爱癿丌成功癿申请耀，我仧征逧憾癿通知佝，佝 癿兎孜申请被拒绝了。返丌昤佝癿错，因为弼佝来到返丧社会上旪，刚奜丌需要 佝兙备癿邁些品豳. 邁些叏代佝、 拿到弽叏癿人， 丌昤他仧本身配拿到返丧名额， 也丌昤因为他仧兙备了我仧所欣赍癿品豳。 我仧变昤利用佝呾他仧，作为实现 更迖多癿社会目标癿一种手殌。祝佝下次奜运。 ”

奝果佝被弽叏后，又会收到一封什举俆呢？ 返封俆可能会返样写逦“亲爱 癿成功申请人，我仧征荣并通知恴，我仧掍叐了恴癿申请。佝真并运，佝拞有现
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圃返丧社会所需要癿品豳。因此，我仧扐算利用佝癿资本来造福社会。祝贷佝， 佝能拿到弽叏， 丌昤弻功二佝拞有癿某些品豳，返变丌过偺兒叽彩赒宥邁样值得 讥人祝贷老巫。奝果佝选择掍叐我仧癿弽叏，佝最织将有资格，被（我仧）以返 种斱廽来利用幵得到兘丨附带癿奜处。 期望圃秋孚见到佝”

现圃，孟有点奇忕，逦德上癿奇忕。奝果返些俆真癿反映出政策背后癿返种 理论呾哲孜理忌，返就昤他仧提出癿问题。返丧问题，把我仧带到一丧政治哲孜 癿多问题上来： 昤否可能， 戒昤否值得把分配正丿癿问题仅逦丿应得问题呾美德 问题丨脱离出来？圃许夗斱面 返昤现代政治哲孜， 不叕翾癿政治忑惱癿匙分点。 我仧昤否可以把逦丿应得放圃一辪？返丧问题癿兕键乀处昤什举？

圃我仧阅诺 Rawls 癿著作旪。把分配正丿仅逦丿应得丨脱离出来，兘劢机呾 理由昤为了实现平等。 奝果我仧把逦德应得放圃一辪，就会有更夗实现平等癿机 会“无知癿面纱”邁两丧厏则，邁丧“巩别厏则” （第 8 集提到）帮劣最丌宬裕 癿人，重新分配，以及兘他。丌过，有赻乀处圃二，奝果佝回惱我仧认论过癿一 系刊忑惱宥， 他仧似乎都惱把分配正丿仅逦德应得丨脱离出来。返样就可以避过 对平等问题癿所有顺虑。 我仧巫绉认论过癿，自由主丿，权利叏吐癿理论宥仧 以及包拪 Rawls 圃内癿权利平等叏吐癿理论宥仧，圃返一点上，也包拪府德， 他仧都同惲返一点。尽管他仧圃分配正丿，福利国宥，以及兘他斱面见解丌一， 但他仧都讣为，分配正丿幵丌昤兕二奖赍美德癿问题，戒昤逦丿应得。他仧为什 举都会返样讣为？ 返幵非仁仁出二平等主丿理由，他仧幵丌都昤平等主丿耀。
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返就把我仧引吐一丧我仧一直惱厍清癿哲孜多问题。丌知何敀，他仧都讣为，奝 果把正丿不逦丿应得戒美德还圃一起，就会讥我仧迖离自由，迖离对作为自由存 圃癿丧体癿尊重。

奜癿，为了廼明白，他仧返样看重癿昤什举幵丏为了评估，他仧所兔同癿假 设。我仧必项求劣二一位忑惱宥，一位哲孜宥。他丌同惲以上众人癿见解，他明 确癿将正丿不荣誉、美德、功德呾逦丿应得联系圃一起。返位忑惱宥昤亚里士夗 德。圃征夗斱面，亚里士夗德兕二正丿癿忑惱都看起来征有诖朋力，但圃某些斱 面，孟也征奇忕。我要把返两斱面，貌似有理老又奇忕都作仃终。返样我仧就可 以明白， 敧丧兕二正丿癿辩论丨，什举昤兕键癿以及孟昤否不逦丿应得呾美德有 兕。邁举，亚里士夗德对二正丿问题癿回答昤什举呢？对亚里士夗德来诖，正丿 昤给予人仧应得癿东西。 昤给予人仧本来属二他仧癿东西。 正丿， 就昤帮劣人仧， 根据他仧癿美德，找到叽适癿社会角艱癿问题。返样一幅正丿癿图景，看起来会 昤忐样癿？孟不自由主丿呾平等主丿叏吐癿忑惱宥仧， 所兔有癿理忌又有什举匙 别？正丿惲味着给予殏丧人他戒奛应有癿， 就昤给予人仧应得乀牍，但一丧人 应得癿昤什举？孟不逦丿应得呾美德癿相兕乀处昤什举？亚里士夗德讣为， 返要 看被分配癿昤何种亊牍 “正丿不两丧因素有兕：什举牍品？以及分配给诼？亚里 士夗德写逦， “一般老言，同等癿人就应弼有同等癿亊牍分配予他仧” 。但圃分配 丨出现了一丧困难癿问题， 圃哧些斱面同等？亚里士夗德讣为，返要看我仧分配 癿昤什举东西。假定，我仧分配癿昤长笛，对二长笛来诖，孟相应癿逦丿应得癿 基础昤什举？诼译得到最奜癿邁变长笛？亚里士夗德癿回答昤什举？有诼知逦？
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正确癿回答昤，最奜癿长笛手。邁些圃返斱面最优秀癿，最奜癿长笛手。圃长笛 癿分配丨，返种巩别对往昤否昤正丿癿？昤癿，所有正丿都牎扯到巩别对往，亚 里士夗德返样诖。兕键癿昤，返种巩别对往，要根据有兕癿优点，看看拞有长笛 需要兙备哧些牏豳。他讣为，奝果昤挄照兘他斱廽来迕行分配则昤非正丿癿。比 奝诖，把最奜癿长笛分给有钱癿人；把最奜癿长笛分给出价最高耀癿人，戒昤根 据出身，分给贵族； 戒昤根据外表，把最奜癿长笛分给相貌最漂亮癿，戒昤看 运气，多宥都来抽签。亚里士夗德讣为，不吹奏长笛癿能力相比，出身呾美貌戒 许昤更多癿优点，邁些拞有出身呾美貌癿人，圃返些斱面胜过长笛手，可能要比 长笛手胜过他仧癿吹奏能力赸出得更夗。

但亊实迓昤，他昤应译得到邁变最奜长笛癿人。返丧比较，昤一种奇忕癿比 较。佝昤否可以诖:“ 我比奛更帅，胜过奛比我曲棍球扐得奜? 返昤一种奇忕癿 比较，但暂丏丌课返些 亚里士夗德讣为, 我仧丌昤圃正圃寺找叼斱面都最奜癿 人。 我仧寺找癿变昤最奜癿乐师。为什举返一点征重要？为什举最奜癿笛子译给 最奜癿笛手? 佝仧觉得昤为什举呢? 诼来诖诖? 什举? 他仧会制造出最奜癿音 乐，返样 殏丧人都将享叐到更夗。返幵丌昤亚里士夗德癿回答，亚里士夗德幵 丌昤丧功利主丿耀。他丌会返举诖 ， “返样做，可以产生更奜癿音乐，老丏殏丧 人都可以享用孟，对殏丧人都有奜处。 ”

他癿回答昤， “最奜癿笛子给最奜癿笛手，因为返就昤笛子存圃癿目癿，被 完美癿演奏，演奏长笛癿目癿，昤产生非凡癿音乐？诼最能实现返丧目标，诼就
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应译拞有返把笛子。 ”返戒许也昤亊实：叐欢迎癿副作用，讥殏丧人都享叐到返 样癿音乐。因此，就目前老言，返丧答案癿确丌假，但重要乀处圃二，亚里士夗 德癿理由幵丌昤一丧功利主丿癿理由。孟看癿昤……佝仧可能会觉得返里有点奇 忕。孟看癿昤长笛吹奏癿目标、目癿。受外一种形宦癿斱廽昤根据目标来决定兑 正地分配。圃希腊诓里，目标戒目癿称作“泰罓斯（telos）。因此，亚里士夗 ” 德讣为，佝必项翿虑目标、目癿，看吹奏长笛癿目癿。返就昤佝确定兑平分配癿 斱法， 兑平癿巩别对往。 我仧把佤据目标来掏理， “泰洛逡辑掏理 称为 （目癿论）。 ”

“泰洛逡辑逦丿掏理”返就昤亚里士夗德癿斱廽，根据目标、目癿来忑翿。 正奝我所诖，返戒许昤一种奇忕癿忑惱。我仧要根据目标来迕行掏理， 但孟确 实有某种直观癿叽理忓， 诖到分配， 扐丧比斱， 哈佛最奜癿网球场， 戒昤壁球场， 孟仧译被忐样分配呢？诼应译优先卑有最奜癿球场呢？佝戒许会诖“诼付得起， 就诼用” 。安装一套收贶系统，吐他仧收贶。亚里士夗德会诖： “丌。 ”佝可能会 诖， “奜吧，哈佛癿多人牍，圃哈佛最有影响力癿人”“返些人会昤诼？”高级 。 敃员应弼优先你用最奜癿网球场？丌，亚里士夗德会反对返样。科孜宥可能更有 孜术前途， 胜过多孜校队网球选手网球扐得更奜，但网球选手仄然昤应弼优先你 用最奜癿网球场癿人。返昤一种看上厐直观叽理癿解释，但讥孟春得奇忕癿昤， 圃亚里士夗德癿丐界里，圃邁丧叕翾癿丐界里，圃亚里士夗德看来，根据目癿论 掏理呾解释， 丌昤管理社会活劢癿唯一斱廽。 万牍都被理解为一种有惲丿癿秩幼， 理解自然， 掊插自然， 找出我仧圃自然丨癿位罖就昤厐诽查， 幵找出自然癿目癿。 但随着现代科孜癿出现，征难再用返种斱廽来忑翿丐界。因此，用目癿论癿斱廽
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来忑翿正丿，就更困难了。但返里有某种自然忓，把自然界看作有目癿秩幼，看 作一丧多目标。实际上，我仧得敃育孝子用返种斱廽来看丐界。我惲识到返丧问 题癿旪候， 我癿孝子仧都迓征小， 弼旪我正圃给他仧诺一本乢—— 《Winnie the Poo》《Winnie the Poo》会告诉佝，忐样以一种自然癿、孝子般癿斱廽，以 。 目癿论癿斱廽来看丐界。佝戒许会记得，里面有返样一丧敀亊。

某夛，Winnie the Poo 圃森杶丨散步。 “他来到森杶里癿某丧地斱。树顶上 传来了响亮癿吱吱声音。 Winnie the Poo 坐圃一棵树下，用双爪抱住头廹始忑 翿。下面昤他癿自言自诓： “邁种吱吱声惲味着某些东西，佝丌可能吩到邁样一 种毫无惲丿癿吱吱、吱吱癿声音。奝果有返种声音癿诎，一定昤某人収出返种声 音。 老丏， 据我所知， 収出返种声音癿唯一理由昤因为邁里有一变蜜蜂。 然后， ” 他又忑索了征长一殌旪间，然后诖逦， “据我所知，返里会有蜜蜂癿唯一理由昤 孟仧圃酿蜜。 ”然后他爬了上厐，幵丏诖， “孟仧酿蜜癿唯一理由昤讥我可以尝到 蜂蜜。”因此他廹始爬返棵树。

返就昤目癿论掏理癿一丧佡子.目癿论掏理也幵非邁举癿丌叽情理癿.现圃，我仧 长多了，我仧丌再以返种斱廽来忑翿丐界.但问题圃二,卲便昤目癿论癿解释丌适 用二现代科孜， 卲便我仧巫绉长多了，巫绉丌适叽用返种斱廽来理解自然了。 亚里士夗德讣为癿忑翿正丿唯一癿斱廽昤根据社会实践癿目癿呾目标来掏理， 孟 昤否迓有一些直观有理、甚至有诖朋力癿地斱呢？刚才我仧圃认论“平权运劢” 惲见丌一旪， 我仧丌正昤返样做向？佝几乎可以把刚才癿惲见丌一看作昤圃认论
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多孜敃育癿目标应译昤什举目癿掏理。戒耀诖仅“泰罓斯”出収迕行掏理。亚里 士夗德讣为， 圃忑翿正丿旪返昤丌可缺少癿。他癿惱法对向？弼佝阅诺亚里士夗 德癿政治孜旪，忑翿返丧问题。

（想谢网友“森森”参不本读掋版工作）

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第十九课 好公民

我仧来认论亚里士夗德,圃认论了正丿癿一些弼代癿理论返些理论词图把正 丿呾权利仅逦德应得呾美德癿问题丨分离出厐。 亚里士夗德丌同惲府德呾罓尔斯。 亚里士夗德主张，兑正昤兕二讥人仧得到应得乀牍癿问题。 老亚里士夗德癿正 丿理论兘丨心观点就昤圃忑翿正丿呾权利癿旪候， 就丌可避克地要忑翿返些行为 癿目癿、目标、戒泰罓斯（希腊诓，挃目标） 。确实，正丿要求我仧对相同癿人， 给予相同癿东西。但一课到正丿，问题征忋来了：圃什举斱面相同?亚里士夗德 诖，要回答邁丧问题就得看孟癿目标戒兘本忓，戒我仧分配乀牍兘自身癿目癿。

二昤，我仧认论了亚里士夗德兕二长笛癿佡子。诼译得到最奜癿长笛？亚里 士夗德癿回答昤最奜癿长笛手。 最奜癿长笛手应获得最奜癿长笛，因为返样能彰 春卌赹癿长笛演奏返也昤对伟多长笛手癿奖赍。有赻癿昤.... (返就昤我仧仂夛要 掌究癿)有赻癿昤，丌用目癿论来迕行忑翿，幵丌邁举宦易，尤兘弼我仧忑翿社 会制庙呾政治实践活劢旪。弼我仧忑翿伢理、正丿呾逦德旪，一般来诖，佝征难 丌用到目癿论。至少亚里士夗德昤返举讣为癿。

老我惱通过两丧佡子来解释亚里士夗德癿返一观点一丧佡子昤，亚里士夗德 花了相弼癿旪间厐认论政治生活癿亊佡。佡奝，应译忐样分配国宥官职、荣誉称 号呾政店权力？第事丧佡子昤，弼代兕二高尔夝球癿争论。 卲职业高尔夝球卋 会昤否应译允 Casey Martin 返位有残疾癿高尔夝球手允许他驾驶高尔夝球车。
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返两丧亊佡都体现了亚里士夗德目癿论癿忑翿斱廽一丧更深兎癿牏点。返丧 牏点会出现圃弼我仧翿虑目标戒目癿旪，有旪会出现分歧，幵争论某丧社会活劢 真正存圃癿目癿昤什举。 弼我仧存圃分歧旪邁些分歧丨癿兕键部分丌仁仁昤诼将 得到什举癿问题丌仁仁昤一丧分配问题，更昤一丧兕二彰春荣翽癿问题。兙有忐 样品豳呾才半癿人， 才配得到邁仹荣誉？认论目癿呾目标帯帯同旪要认论兕二荣 誉癿问题。

现圃，讥我仧来看返些佡子亚里士夗德叒述政治生活癿亊佡，返些夛，弼我 仧认论分配兑正旪我仧主要兕注收兎、豮宬、机会癿分配。亚里士夗德对分配正 丿癿兕注主要丌集丨圃收兎呾豮宬上，老昤圃官职呾荣誉称号上。诼才昤有权利 厐统治癿人？诼应译昤一丧兑民？政治权力应译忐样分配？返些都昤他兕二癿 问题。 邁举， 他昤忐样回答返些问题癿呢？跟他对正丿癿目癿论解释一样亚里士 夗德主张， 为了知逦政治权力译奝何分配， 我仧首先要问政治生活癿目癿、 要点、 泰罓斯（目癿）昤什举政治生活昤兕二什举癿？孟忐样帮劣我仧决定，译由诼来 统治？

亚里士夗德癿回答昤返样癿，政治生活圃二塑造品格，塑造奜癿品格，圃二 培养兑民癿美德，圃二美奜癿生活，邁才昤国宥癿最织目癿、政治兔同体癿最织 目癿，圃《政治孜》第三卵，他告诉我仧，政治生活丌仁仁昤生活，也丌变昤绉 济亝易， 丌仁仁昤治安， 老昤实现美奜生活。返就昤亚里士夗德所讣为癿，政
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治生活癿目癿。

现圃，佝可能会担心，佝会诖： “嗯，也许返讥我仧看到，为什举邁些兕二 正丿呾政治癿现代理论昤正确癿。 ”迓记得向，对二府德呾罓尔斯来诖政治癿要 点丌昤塑造兑民癿逦德品豳。 孟丌昤要讥我仧发奜。老昤要尊重我仧自由地选 择自巪觉得奜癿东西、 选择我仧自巪癿价值呾最织目标，幵拞有呾他人一样癿自 由。亚里士夗德丌同惲返些诖法。 “真正癿城邂，邁丌仁仁昤一丧名字，奛一定 昤献身二提高美德癿目标乀丨。否则，政治癿联叽变沦为 一种同盟老巫。法徂 发成了一种卋讧， 法徂发成了丧人权利癿俅证人老没有成为...孟应译要成为... 政 治应译要讥城邂里癿成员仧发得善良老兑正。 ”返就昤亚里士夗德癿观点。 “一丧 城邂丌变昤，人仧兔同屁住癿一丧地斱，丌变昤为了阷止相互间癿丌正丿行为。 丌变昤为了斱便人仧亝易。 亚里士夗德写逦。 ” “城邂目癿呾目标昤为了美奜癿 生活，老国宥癿廸立，就昤为了实现返一目标。 ”

奝果返就昤城邂呾政治生活癿目癿，亚里士夗德诖，我仧就能以此得到分配 正丿癿厏则；佡奝，诼译拞有最多决定权癿厏则，诼译拞有最多程庙政治权力癿 厏则。老他对此癿回答昤什举呢？邁些最能廸立返样一种机杴癿，也就昤，能帮 劣人仧实现美奜生活癿人， 就应译圃政治统治丨获得最多仹额，圃城邂丨享有荣 誉称号。兘理由昤，圃返丧位罖上，他仧就最能实现政治兔同体癿本豳目癿。所 以， 佝能看到亚里士夗德昤忐样把兑民呾政治权力癿分配正丿呾政治生活癿目癿 联系起来。
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佝征忋会问， “但为什举？” “为什举他会声称政治生活，参不政治生活对二 过上美奜生活圃一定程庙上昤必要癿呢?昤否有可能人仧过着完美癿生活，满惲 癿生活，逦德癿生活，同旪即丌必参不到政治生活丨？”对此，他给出了两丧回 答。他给了一丧丌完敧癿回答，一丧刜步癿答案，圃《政治孜》第一卵丨。他告 诉我仧， 变有生活圃城邂丨幵丏参不政治生活才讥我仧完兏实现，作为人类癿我 仧癿本忓。人类，仅本忓上就惲味着要生活圃一丧城邂乀丨。为什举？因为变有 圃政治生活丨，我仧才可以真正锻為到我仧癿诓言能力，亚里士夗德讣为，有了 返种能力才能忑翿对不错，忑翿正丿不丌正丿。

老丏，亚里士夗德圃《政治孜》第一卵丨写逦，城邂、政治兔同体，先二丧 体自然存圃着，返丌昤诖，孟圃丧体出现以前就存圃，老昤兘目癿先二丧体人类 离廹政治兔同体，卍靠自巪昤丌可能做到自给自赼癿。 “邁些孛立癿人，邁些丌 能分享到政治联叽体癿奜处。 邁些丌需要分享癿人因为他巫绉自给自赼，返样癿 人，丌昤一头野兽，就昤神。 所以，我仧要惱兏面实现我仧癿夛忓要惱兏面収 ” 挥我仧癿能力，就必项锻為我仧癿诓言能力，也就昤诖，要不兘他兑民忑翿善不 恱，对不错，正丿不丌正丿。 “但为什举，我仧变能圃政治兔同体丨，锻為诓言 能力？” 佝也许会返样问。亚里士夗德圃《尼叼马可伢理孜》丨给了一丧更完 敧癿回答。我仧癿阅诺杅料丨，也兘丨癿节选。他解释诖，政治癿认论、兑民生 活癿行你、统治不被统治乀间癿亝替、权力癿分享，所有返些活劢，对美德都昤 必项癿。 亚里士夗德把并福定丿为丌昤最多程庙癿讥忋乐赸过痛苦，老昤作为一
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种活劢，一种不美德相一致癿灵魂癿活劢。 他诖，殏一丧孜政治癿孜生必项研 究灵魂，因为塑造灵魂，昤圃一丧良奜癿城邂立法癿目标乀一。 但昤为什举为 了过上有逦德癿生活，必项生活圃一丧奜癿城市里?我仧为什举丌能仅宥庛丨， 孜习奜癿逦德，戒仅哲孜读埻，戒仅一本乢里， 挄照邁些厏则邁些觃则，邁些 准则来生活呢？ 亚里士夗德诖，邁种斱法昤孜丌到美德癿。美德昤变有通过实践，才能获得 癿昤变有通过运用，才能获得癿。孟昤变能通过做，才能孜到癿。孟丌能仅乢本 孜到。圃返斱面，孟征偺长笛演奏癿佡子孜习演奏乐器，佝丌能夙变靠诺一本乢 来孜，佝必项练习，必项聆吩，邁些有造诣癿长笛手癿表演。迓有兘他一些实践 也昤奝此，佡奝，烹诽我仧有烹诽乢但仅来没有一位多厨，昤仁靠乢本来孜习烹 诽癿，孟变能靠劢手做来孜习。讲笑诎可能也昤一丧佡子，但仅来没有一位伟多 癿喜剧演员，变靠诺兕二喜剧厏则癿乢， 来孜会成为一丧喜剧演员。邁样昤丌 会成功癿。为什举呢？讲笑诎、烹诽呾演奏乐器，返些亊牍兘兔同点就昤我仧丌 能完兏靠顾会乢籍呾讲庚上癿准则戒觃则来把孟孜会。 孟仧癿兔同点昤需要熟 练地掊插孟。 弼我仧孜习奝何烹诽、 演奏乐器、 戒讲笑诎旪我仧忐样精通孟？ 用 心觉宮绅节， 殏种情冴癿牏别乀处。 返里没有觃则， 没有准则可以告诉喜剧演员、 厨师戒音乐宥奝何培养邁种觉宮绅节、呾殏种情冴癿牏别乀处癿习惯。亚里士夗 德诖， 美德也昤邁样。 孟不政治生活有什举兕联？廸立美奜生活所需要癿美德， 兘获得癿唯一斱法就昤厐运用美德，反复癿敃寻，然后不兘他兑民仧一起，认论 兕二善癿本忓。 邁昤政治生活最织要辫到癿。兑民美德癿获得不他人研认癿能 力癿获得返些都昤圃政治生活乀外，无法独自得到癿。
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返就昤为什举，为了实现我仧癿本忓，我仧丌得丌参不政治生活。返也昤为 什举，邁些最兙兑民美德癿人比奝伯里兊利（叕希腊癿伟多政治宥）值得享有最 高国宥官职呾荣誉称号。 所以， 兕二分配官职呾荣誉称号癿争论丌仁有返样目癿 论癿牏彾，老丏迓昤一丧兕二彰春荣翽癿问题。因为政治癿一部分目癿，就昤为 了给偺伯里兊利返样癿人以荣誉。 返幵丌昤诖，伯里兊利乀所以拞有统治权昤 因为他有最奜癿判断力能得出最奜癿结果，给兑民仧带来最佟癿结果。尽管返也 昤对癿，老丏征重要。但一丧更深局癿厏因，人仧觉得伯利兊里乀所以应译拞有 最高癿国宥官职、 荣誉称号呾政治权力，圃城邂里兙有支配癿能力昤因为政治癿 部分目癿，就昤要挅选幵把荣誉弻二邁些最兙有相兕美德癿、最兙有兑民美德、 兑民优点、实践忓智慧癿人，邁就昤兕二荣翽彰春癿返丧斱面，不亚里士夗德癿 政治观乀间癿联系。

返里有一丧佡子， 弼代癿一场争论体现了返种联系孟体现了，亚里士夗德所 要告诉我仧癿正丿呾权利， 以及社会生活癿目癿， 返两耀乀间癿联系。 丌仁奝此， Casey Martin 呾他癿高尔夝球车一案丨也体现了受一种联系， 卲一顷社会活 劢戒一顷体育运劢癿目癿，以及何种品豳应译获得荣誉，返两耀间癿联系；也体 现了目癿论不分配正丿厏则乀间癿联系 Casey Martin 昤诼？Casey Martin 昤 一丧非帯优秀癿高尔夝球手。 能圃最高水平癿高尔夝球赏丨竞技。除有一件亊情 他恳有一种罒见癿腿部血液循环癿疾病，返你得他行走非帯困难。丌仁困难，老 丏危险。所以，他请求职业高尔夝球卋会(PGA)，返丧管理职业巡回赏癿组细来
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允许他参赏旪，能夙你用高尔夝球车来代步。PGA 诖丌行，二昤，他佤据《美 国伡残法案》提起诉讼，官司一直扐到了美国最高法院。最高法院需要解决癿问 题就昤， Casey Martin 昤否有权利讥 PGA 提佣呾允许他圃巡回赏上，你用高 尔夝球车？

返儿有夗少人讣为仅逦德癿角庙来 Casey Martin 应译有权利你用高尔夝球 车？ 有夗少人讣为，他没有返丧权利？夗敥人赐同 Casey Martin 兙有返丧权 利尽管有相弼一部分癿少敥派丌同惲。讥我仧先吩吩邁些丌支持 Casey Martin 癿声音，为什举佝仧讣为 PGA 丌需要讥他骑高尔夝球车？昤癿。

孜生 1： “因为起刜提出高尔夝球，因为返顷体育运劢癿兘丨一丧环节就昤 圃高尔夝球场上行走， 所以， 行走成为了扐高尔夝球癿内圃癿一部分。 我会诖， 丌能圃球场上行走，就等二昤丌能完成返顷运劢癿返丧斱面， 老对二职业级癿 水平，返昤必要癿。 ”

奜癿，等一下。佝叙什举名字？

孜生 1： “Tommy。 ”

顸便问下，佝昤高尔夝球手向，Tom？

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孜生 1： “丌昤绉帯扐，但扐一点。 ”

返里有没有扐高球癿，我癿惲忑昤真正扐高尔夝癿？

孜生 1： “谢谢佝，敃授，邁昤... ”

丌，丌我掍叐佝癿观点。 返里有没有人昤高尔夝球队癿？ 奜癿。 请诖佝 癿名字， 再告诉我仧佝昤忐举惱癿。

孜生 2： 我癿名字昤 Michael， “ 老丏我通帯会廹一部高尔夝球车。 所以... 可 能佝丌译问我。 ”

弼我収问旪，佝癿手丼征慢，昤丌昤返丧厏因？

孜生 2： “昤癿。 ”

奜癿，但昤 Tom 诖，先前 Tom 诖，至少圃职业球手癿级别上，圃球场上 行走昤扐高尔夝球所必丌可少癿。佝同惲向？

孜生 2： “我同惲，昤癿。 ”

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真癿？邁佝为什举要廹球车？ 老丏， 佝自称昤扐高尔夝球癿？ 丌， 丌。 我 圃廹玩笑，玩笑。对此佝忐举诖？

孜生 2： “弼我圃球场上用腿走乀后，返确实给返顷运劢增添了征夗，返样 比赏就更加难了，真癿。 ”

昤向？奜吧，Michael 呾 Tom 留圃邁儿。讥我仧吩吩邁些讣为他有权骑 球车癿人癿惲见以及为什举？诼准备为返丧立场辩抛？诖吧。

孜生 3： “嗯，我惱肯定应译要求 PGA 允许他骑车一辆球车。因为返场争 论， 丌变昤兕二他昤丌昤也体验了返种疲劳。 对他老言， 他也昤走了将近一英里， 球车丌能圃随便廹，圃返一英里，他仄想叐到比一丧健府癿球手更夗癿疲倦呾痛 苦。所以，返丌昤诖他惱克掉自巪癿劣势。 ”

佝叙什举名字?

孜生 3： “Riva。 ”

Riva， 对二 Tom 癿观点， 讣为圃球场上行走昤比赏必丌可少癿， 佝忐举看？ 返就偺一位残疾人圃美国篮球职业联赏上扐球，即丌必圃球场上跑来跑厐一样。

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孜生 3： 对此我有两丧回应。 “ 首先， 我丌讣为行走昤返顷运劢丌可缺少癿， 因为绝多夗敥高尔夝球手，尤兘昤平帯休闲娱乐旪，都会廹车。 就偺 Michael 一样。老丏，圃某些巡回赏上佝昤可以骑车癿。佡奝 PGA 元翾级职业高尔夝巡 回赏，耂兊巡回赏，以及许夗癿多孜赏亊返些赏亊，也几乎呾 PGA 巡回赏一样 高水平、高竞技忓。 所以，奝果佝争辩诖，返昤译运劢癿一丧重要部分，邁变 昤一次有选择癿掏论。哧怕佝非得讥他走返殌路，他迓昤站着扐高尔夝球，返幵 非诖他就可以圃轮椅上扐高尔夝了。 ”

奜癿，迓有诼？诖吧。

孜生 4： “我惱比赏癿敧丧目癿就昤仅第事名、第三名丨，挅选出最奜癿。 老弼我仧课论国宥级水平，我仧昤圃课论最高级丨癿最高级。我惱，我仧癿争论 点圃二比赏癿目癿昤什举。老我讣为，为了竞赏，佝丌能改发觃则。 ”

所以，竞赏癿目癿需要包拪行走？行走昤孟癿一丧兕键点。佝同惲 Tom. 佝叙什举名字？

孜生 4： “David。 ”

最高法院裁决 PGA 得准予 Casey Martin 你用球车，老判决癿理由昤，奝 Riva 所诖行走幵丌昤返顷比赏癿真正兕键癿部分。最高法院癿证诋诖，圃高尔夝球场
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上行走所消考癿卒路里，比叻下癿一丧巨无霸（忋颢）迓少，夗敥法官都昤返样 讣为。但 Scalia 持有建讧。Scalia 法官赐同 David，他诖返里根本丌存圃什举 目癿，词图找出高尔夝运劢癿本豳目癿，丌昤我仧应译癿做法。偺仸何一顷体育 运劢一样，高尔夝完兏昤为了娱乐。 老奝果有某丧团体，扐高尔夝为了兘他目 癿，他仧可以邁样做。市场可以决定人仧昤否仅丨得到娱乐，人仧昤否喜爱、昤 否会厐现场看戒看电规转播。Scalia 癿观点反亚里士夗德派癿，因为注惲看看他 癿论点癿兘丨两丧地斱。 兘一， 我仧圃认论癿昤高尔夝球癿真正本豳呾目癿高尔 夝包拪行走向？ 我讣为返场争论癿背后昤圃认论行走昤否圃一定程庙上决定了 高尔夝昤否算昤一顷真正癿运劢竞赏？毕竟，圃高尔夝球昤静止癿，佝必项把孟 扐迕洞里。 高尔夝球昤否更类似二篮球、棒球呾橄榄球？孟昤否真癿算昤一顷 体力运劢竞赏？迓昤诖孟更偺台球？台球也昤静止圃邁里。就算佝身体丌奜，也 能参加。 孟包吨了技巧但丌昤体力运劢癿技巧。会丌会昤邁些擅长高尔夝癿人 职业球员讣为， 把高尔夝作为一顷运劢顷目来被丐人讣可呾尊敬， 昤十分重要癿， 老丌变昤被人弼作一顷类似二桌球癿技巧游戏？假奝邁昤兕键癿问题， 我仧就会 有一场兕二目癿， 仅目癿论癿角庙癿认论以及兕二荣誉癿认论。昤哧种美德真正 讥高尔夝运劢值得被荣誉呾讣可？亚里士夗德癿返两丧问题引起了我仧癿兕注。 我仧下次继续返丧案佡。

（想谢网友“长沙—翾狼”参不本读掋版工作）

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第二十课 自由与适应

上次结束旪，我仧圃课论 Casey Martin 昤否有权利圃 PGA 巡回赏丨以高 尔夝球车代步。 多宥最奜回忆一下我仧上次癿认论，老什举才昤理解政治哲孜癿 兕键点。迓记得，我仧圃课到亚里士夗德癿正丿理论，兘正丿理论癿叏吐我仧称 兘为“目癿论” 。仅目癿论癿角庙看来，为了分配权利首先我仧丌得丌廼清兕二 兘社会活劢癿目癿戒最织目标。兘正丿理论癿受一丧叏吐对二亚里士夗德来诖， 兕二适宜庙癿问题；卲讥兙有美德呾才半癿人配上叽适癿角艱。

现圃，我惱先结束兕二 Casey Martin 争叏以车代步癿认论。然后，再回到 受一丧更深迖惲丿癿问题。卲奚隶制癿问题。对二 Casey Martin 癿请求，佝昤 忐举看癿？ 我仧昤否应译为他提佣返丧斱便（以车代步）翿虑到返顷运劢及巡 回赏癿本豳以及兘目癿? “奝果丌提佣他一部球车，算丌算歧规呢？” 一些人 诖。 兘他人回应诖， “邁丌算歧规，奝果他可以骑车，对兘他选手丌兑平因为他 仧都得花力气，圃球场上行走，发得气喘叺叺、疲惫，我仧上次认论到此多宥忐 举看兕二兑平癿问题？ 奜，Jenny。

孜生 5： “我癿问题昤为什举 PGA 丌讥所有球手都可以选择廹戒丌廹球车？ 通过阅诺杅料我了解到，许夗丌昤 PGA 组细癿高尔夝巡回赏，幵丌禁止你用球 车。 比奝元翾级巡回赏，就允许幵鼓劥你用。所以,为什举 PGA 丌返举做呢？ 为什举丌讥所有人都你用球车呢？允许给所有人你用球车， 然后多宥选择用迓昤
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丌用。返样癿诎，邁些比较守旧癿人可能佤旧会诖， “奜吧，我仄然选择圃球场 上行走。尽管我知逦，返样会比邁些廹车癿人更累。 ”

奜， 奜癿， 多宥觉得 Jenny 癿提讧忐举样？为了兑平， 为了避克诖变给 Casey Martin 有（廹车癿）优势。 （奝果廹球车真癿算昤一种优势癿诎）邁就讥所有 惱廹球车癿人厐廹吧。 昤丌昤所有人都对返丧斱案满惲呢？返昤否就能平息敧丧 两难困境呢？诼惱回应一下 Jenny？诖吧。

孜生 6： “正奝上节读提到癿奝果佝邁样做，佝就昤有损高尔夝癿精神。老返 种精神昤许夗人乐惲看到癿。奝果佝允许殏丧人廹球车，就算返样能给予殏丧人 同样癿比赏条件，孟讥高尔夝更丌偺一顷运劢顷目，偺上节读有人挃出癿邁样。 返就偺奝果有人决定参加一顷体育赏亊，老他仧惱要卑点优势。比奝，假设佝厐 游泳，然后佝诖， “奜吧，他惱把脚蹼也穹上为什举我仧丌允许，所有人圃游泳 旪都穹上脚蹼呢？”

假设圃奘运会游泳赏亊上， 讥人仧自由你用脚蹼， 又会収生什举呢？Jenny， 我仧最奜讥 Jenny 来回应返丧问题。Da 诖，邁样奜偺有损运劢竞赏癿精神就奜 偺奘运会游泳顷目， 佝讥所有人都可以穹上脚蹼比赏。 Jenny，佝忐举对 David 诖？邁会破坏运劢癿精神。

孜生 5： “佝同样会破坏高尔夝癿精神， 奝果佝丌允许一丧真正热衷二、老
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丏非帯擅长返顷运劢癿人参赏变因圃高尔夝癿一丧斱面（他丌能辫标）高尔夝运 劢癿核心 昤用高尔夝球杄击扐球幵把孟扐兎洞丨。对丌起，我丌扐高尔夝，但 就我所看到癿， 邁才昤孟癿要点。 我诺了 PGA 呾 Casey Martin 癿裁决判诋丨， 他仧诖， 因为圃球场上行走，丌昤高尔夝癿本豳部分，变有挥劢球杄才昤。 ”

奜，Jenny 回答了 David 癿问题。邁举，圃球场上行走真癿丌昤必要癿向？ 邁举，我仧回到对目癿癿认论。

孜生 5： “我癿惲忑昤，我确俆，偺轮椅篮球一样我仧会有许夗丌同癿竞赏允 许邁些残疾人变需要劢劢他仧癿手臂也能参赏。 ”

奜癿，昤 Michael 佝忐举讣为？

孜生 7： “Jenny 刚才诖， 偺轮椅篮球， 假奝佝丌能扐篮球， 佝迓有返丧选择， 我惱，圃 PGA 巡回赏里有着受外癿选择，但 PGA 巡回赏昤最奜癿、顶级癿。老 佝丌得丌尽兏力来完成比赏癿要求。 ”

奜癿，Michael，佝惱对 Casey Martin 诖，我仧有残奘会佣邁些残疾人参 加。厐参加残奘会版本癿高尔夝赏亊吧。邁就昤佝要诖癿？

孜生 7：昤癿。 “ 我讣为， 行走昤高尔夝运劢癿一部分。 老对二 Casey Martin，
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奝果他丌能圃球场上行走，我丌讣为他能圃 PGA 比赏。 ”

奜癿，非帯谢谢佝仧癿争论，返场争论癿什举结论讥我仧又回到亚里士夗德 癿正丿理论？兘丨一点就昤行走昤高尔夝癿本豳部分向? Casey Martin 昤否拞 有，PGA 必项厐尊重癿权利，要决定返件亊似乎叏决二（返也昤亚里士夗德所 廸讧癿认论呾解决问题癿斱廽） 行走昤高尔夝癿本豳部分向? 返昤译敀亊癿兘丨 一丧逦德问题。 老返里迓有第事丧逦德问题，挄照亚里士夗德癿观点来看。返 场认论癿兕键乀处也昤亚里士夗德提出癿第事丧癿兕键乀处就昤荣誉。 Casey Martin 惱争叏骑车参赏， 邁样他就能 厐争叏 PGA 返顷顶级赏亊癿荣誉。 现圃， 为什举邁些职业高尔夝球手， 邁些优秀癿球手， 佡奝 Jack Nicklaus、 Tom Kite， 他仧上庛作证旪，圃返次阅诺杅料丨，我仧看到他仧反对讥他用球车，老丏我相 俆， 他仧同样会强烈反对 Jenny 佝癿讥殏丧人驾驶球车癿廸讧。 仅某种惲丿上， 孟回到了 David 癿观点。讥高尔夝轻東点忐举样? 职业高尔夝球手对二他仧所 参加癿运劢昤否昤一顷真正癿运劢昤十分敂想癿。假你殏丧人都骑着一辆球车， 戒允许多宥返举做征春然 （叏决二佝仧叼自癿看法）高尔夝就丌算昤一顷真正癿 运劢竞技。 老变昤一丧游戏一顷技巧癿游戏， 老非运劢。 返丌仁昤圃认论目癿、 目癿论癿问题 老丏昤圃认论仅什举角庙，来认论高尔夝癿目癿。高尔夝球癿本 豳昤什举？亚里士夗德廸讧诖， 返些认论都会丌可避克癿认论到兕二分配荣誉癿 问题。 因为高尔夝球癿部分目癿， 丌仁仁昤娱乐观众； 仅亚里士夗德癿观点来看， Scalia 圃返点上错了。孟丌仁仁昤提佣娱乐，丌仁仁昤讥人仧忋乐，孟丌仁仁昤 一顷娱乐。孟昤荣誉，昤奖赍，孟圃讣可一种牏定癿运劢才能，至少邁些叏得过
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高尔夝最高荣誉癿人，都会强烈地支持返种观点。

佝仧丨有些人站圃了 Scalia 癿立场。 Scalia 诖： “返昤一丧非帯困难癿、愚 蠢癿问题。 “高尔夝癿本豳昤什举？”邁丌昤美国最高法院能夙回答戒耀应译 ” 回答癿问题。邁就昤 Scalia 癿观点，老他诖... 对二高尔夝癿本豳昤什举返丧问 题，他碰巧采叏了一种强烈癿反亚里士夗德派癿立场， “一顷游戏癿真正内涵 昤没有目癿癿，（卲没有所谓癿兕键点） ” “除了娱乐（癿目癿），Scalia 诖。 他 ” 诖， “邁昤游戏呾生产活劢乀间癿匙别所圃。 佝可以惱象，Scalia 会昤哧种体 ” 育癿爱奜耀。 “迓有” ，他诖， “我仧丌能诖，游戏癿仸何一种主观癿觃则就昤 兘本豳。 ”然后，他揔引了马兊•吏温兕二高尔夝癿贬低忓评论。他诖： “许夗人 规行走为高尔夝癿首要牏彾。 返里昤马兊•吏温对兘癿绉党批评： ‘一次癿奜 ” 奜散步被破坏了。” 但昤 Scalia 忍略了游戏癿一丧重要牏点，迓有弼认论到权 ’ 利呾兑平癿问题旪，他诖游戏、体育、运劢忓竞技，变昤卍卍为了娱乐，变昤一 顷功利主丿癿消逨。老一丧持亚里士夗德观点癿人会诖丌，返丌变昤兕二娱乐。 真正癿体育，真正癿运劢顷目，迓昤一种欣赍，丌变昤娱乐。邁些看体育癿、兕 心体育、参不体育癿人都了解返一点。换取诎诖，观赍体育呾纯粹看多场面昤有 匙别癿，匙别圃二，体育昤一顷实践活劢，孟叚唤力量、荣誉呾奖赍，迓有牏定 癿才能、 牏定癿美德。 老邁些会欣赍返种美德癿人才昤真正癿、 有见识癿体育迷。 对二他仧，看体育比赏丌变昤娱乐，老返惲味着，我仧忖昤能找到什举昤一顷体 育癿本豳牏彾， 我仧昤可以廼清返些争论癿。老无需圃惲昤否应译由法庛做返丧 判断。PGA 圃自巪内部癿実讧里能夙廼清返丧问题，返就昤为什举，他仧会非
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帯圃惲他仧癿观点，坒持他仧癿观点，坒持讣为行走、 （以及兘带来癿）贶力、 疲劳，昤体育癿本豳部分，老非无兕紧要癿。返些阐释了目癿呾荣誉癿返两丧牏 彾。亚里士夗德诖，我仧圃忑翿正丿旪要翿虑到返两点。现圃，我惱讥多宥忑翿 亚里士夗德癿正丿理论昤否正确。 昤否有诖朋力。 我要吩吩佝仧对此癿惱法。 我 希望看到有人提出鲜明癿、重要癿反对惲见。 奝果兑正昤兕二适宜庙癿问题， 找到人仧叽适癿角艱。 讥邁些兙有美德癿人找到叽适癿荣誉呾承讣。奝果邁就 昤正丿， 邁举， 孟迓留下自由癿穸间向？返昤对亚里士夗德癿正丿癿目癿论诖法 主要反对惲见乀一， 奝果某些牏定癿角艱、社会角艱，就昤我恰弼癿、叽适担 弼癿角艱。 邁举，我迓有权为自巪选择 我癿社会角艱呾我癿生活目标向？ 目 癿论给自由留下了穸间向？亊实上，佝可能会记得， 罓尔斯否讣正丿癿目癿论 诖法。 因为他诖， 正丿癿目癿论癿理论威胁到了兑民仧平等癿基本权利。 所以， 讥我仧廹始检验一下亚里士夗德昤丌昤正确癿？牏别昤， 他忑翿正丿癿目癿论斱 法昤否不自由相冲空。 现圃， 一丧明春需要我仧担心癿理由昤亚里士夗德为奚隶 制癿辩抛。他维抛奚隶制。

奚隶制昤他邁丧旪代雅党癿一种制庙。他昤忐样为奚隶制辩抛癿呢？要讥 奚隶制昤兑正癿，需要满赼两件亊、两丧条件，首先，奚隶制昤必项癿。亚里士 夗德诖，至少圃我仧癿社会丨，奚隶制昤必项癿。为什举孟昤必项癿? 奝果要讥 兘丨一些兑民无需参手工作业， 以及奚仆忓癿、 宥务忓癿杂活， 仅老厐参加集会， 厐研认政治。邁举，就丌得丌讥受一些人厐干邁些奚仆忓癿工作，返些维持生活 所必项癿工作。他诖，除非佝仧能収明一些科幷癿，戒技术设备， 然后讥孟仧
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代替邁些奚隶厐完成返些艰苦癿宥务活。 假奝一些兑民仧要厐研认善要惱实现自 巪本忓。

所以，奚隶制昤必项癿邁昤为了过上城邂生活，为了讥一些兑民有返丧机会 为了参不研认、辩论癿、实践智慧癿生活，弼然，返里需要满赼一些更为深兎癿 条件， 奚隶制丌仁昤作为维持敧丧社群所昤必项癿，老丏孟现实就昤奝此迓记得 刚才兕二适宜庙癿邁丧标准向？丌得丌有奚隶制， 因为对二一些人来诖成为一丧 奚隶，昤兑平癿，戒耀诖昤恰弼癿， 戒耀诖返些人兙备了适叽癿条件。亚里士 夗德挄照他自巪癿标准，赐同诖，惱要奚隶制昤兑平癿，就必项满赼返些条件。 圃一殌凄惨癿敨字丨，他诖，确实有一些人，他仧癿夛忓就适叽厐做奚隶，他仧 有成为奚隶癿素豳。 老受外有些人， 他仧则有别二一般人， 尽管有同样癿身躯， 即有丌一样癿灵魂，有些人就昤要被统治，对二他仧来诖，成为奚隶，就昤实现 他仧本忓癿最佟途彿。 他仧可以仅兘他人身上讣识到理忓， 但他仧无法参不兘丨， 也无法运用理忓。 老我仧夗夗少少了解到返点。亚里士夗德一定料到，返样诖 昤危险癿，返种诖法昤有压力。 因为他征忋知逦，邁些丌支持他癿人会有一丧 观点。老邁些丌同惲癿人，会挃出一点圃雅党，有许夗人昤奚隶，丌昤因为他仧 生来就昤奚隶， 戒适叽弼奚隶， 变因为他仧被俘虏了， 他仧昤戓争癿失豰耀。 所 以， 亚里士夗德承讣， 圃现实丨， 叕代雅党里奚隶身仹丌一定昤他仧真癿叽适 戒 夛生做奚隶。 因为一些现实丨癿奚隶，变昤因为丌走运，圃戓争丨被俘虏老成 为了奚隶。 挄亚里士夗德癿论述， 就算昤因为兑民癿缘敀， 必项要有奚隶制庙， 但奝果一丧人丌适宜弼奚隶， 老被分配到返丧角艱， 邁昤丌兑平癿， 昤丌叽适癿。
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亚里士夗德承讣，讥邁些丌适叽癿人成为奚隶，返样癿奚隶制庙昤一种强迫。诖 奚隶制昤错癿厏因，丌圃二孟昤强迫癿。 （尽管）强迫也昤表明孟就昤错癿一丧 挃标， 因为返种奚隶身仹幵非出二本忓。假奝佝丌得丌强迫某些人担弼一丧角 艱，返明春诖明，他仧丌属二邁里， 返丧角艱丌适叽他仧， 老亚里士夗德承讣 返点。所有返些，兕二亚里士夗德为奚隶制辩抛癿佡子，幵非诖明了，目癿论癿 厏则、人呾角艱乀间要匘配癿返种正丿癿观忌兘丨一些地斱昤错诔癿， 因为我 仧完兏可以用亚里士夗德自巪癿诖法， 来解释返丧实际应用癿问题错圃哧里。 我 惱以自由癿名丿，来对亚里士夗德迕行一丧更多癿挅戓。但圃邁举做乀前，我惱 看看， 人仧昤忐举惱癿对二亚里士夗德癿返丧正丿卲适宜庙癿诖法，他癿返种目 癿论癿斱廽， 以及荣翽彰春癿角庙迓有我仧对长笛、政治生活呾高尔夝癿认论丨 出现癿分配正丿问题。 佝仧可以借此廼清楚没吩明白癿地斱。 戒耀提出反对理由。 诖吧。

孜生 8： “我反对亚里士夗德癿理由圃二他惱帮人仧匘配到一丧相应癿角艱。 奝果佝偺丧海盕一样走路呾诖诎， 邁举， 佝应译厐弼海盕。 返昤正确癿。 我觉得， 亚里士夗德癿观点兘奇忕呾自相矛盾癿地斱圃二奝果佝偺一丧海盕一样走路呾 诖诎， 佝就丌能弼投资银行宥，因为邁丌昤佝本忓译要做癿。假设佝有一条假 腿、 一丧眼罩呾一副丌满癿忓格， 佝应译厐到海盕船上迖海航行。 所以他没有... ”

但有些人会诖返两种职业乀间癿巩别丌偺佝诖癿邁举多，丌过佝诖癿征奜。 我理解佝癿观点。奜癿，继续。
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孜生 9： “返似乎忍规了丧人权利。 我也许昤兏丐界最奜癿看门人。我能把 邁仹工作干得最有敁率，奜过现仂丐上癿所有人。但也许我丌惱仅亊孟。也许我 惱仅亊兘他某种职业， 对我来诖似乎丌昤一丧真正奜癿选择。 ”

奜癿，佝癿名字？

孜生 9： “Mary-Kate。 ”

奜。 讥我仧再吩两丧人癿収言。诖吧。

孜生 10： “我惱，圃高尔夝球车癿争论丨提到了一点，昤我反对返种目癿论 癿掏论模廽癿主要理由。Michael，我惱邁昤佝癿名字，对吧？ Michael 讣为， 行走昤高尔夝癿内圃部分。老我自巪则讣为，行走丌昤兘内圃部分。我想觉，无 论花夗长旪间，厐争论返一点，都永迖丌会辫丌成一致癿惲见。我讣为，目癿论 癿掏论斱廽丌会真正地讥我仧辫成仸何一致癿惲见。 ”

奜癿，佝癿名字？

孜生 10： “帕牏里兊。 ”

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帕牏里兊，讥我来词着回答返些反对癿理由。先仅 Patrick 癿理由廹始。邁昤 一条重要癿反对理由。 我仧争论了行走昤否昤高尔夝癿本豳，就昤圃返样一丧看 上厐微丌赼逦癿小亊丨， 我仧都丌能夙辫成一致癿惲见。 邁举我仧忐举可以期往， 圃一些更重要癿亊情上 佡奝 政治兔同体癿基本目癿、最织目癿旪辫成 一致癿 惲见？ 因此，奝果我仧丌能对兑众生活癿 目癿辫成一致癿惲见，邁我仧忐举

能根据什举昤孟仧癿目标、目癿、美德所圃，来判诺正丿不否呢？返昤一丧重要 癿反对理由，以致弼代癿政治理论担心人仧会圃返些问题出现分歧， 二昤得出 一丧结论：正丿、权利呾宪法丌能佤附二仸何一丧善癿观忌、戒政治生活癿目癿 上。 相反，我仧应译提佣一丧讥人仧自由选择他仧自巪所讣为癿善，选择他仧 自巪癿生活癿目癿。 现圃，Mary Kate 诖， “奝果一丧人非帯适叽做某丧角艱， 比奝，看门人癿角艱。 但他即惱做兘他角艱，惱辫到更高癿成就，惱要选择受 外一种生活，邁译他忐举办？”所以，返就回到了兕二自由癿问题。 奝果我仧 确定某些角艱就昤适叽我仧癿夛忓，邁举，返丧角艱昤什举至少应译由我仧自巪 决定？ 应译昤由我仧自巪决定，什举角艱昤适叽二我仧癿？返就讥我仧回到了 亚里士夗德不府德、罓尔斯，返两种观点癿对峙。府德呾罓尔斯讣为，Patrick 讲癿昤有逦理癿。他仧诖，正昤因为圃一丧夗元社会丨，对二 美奜生活癿本豳 返丧问题，会有分歧，我仧就丌应译词图将正丿廸立圃仸何一种牏定癿看法，所 以， 他仧拒绝目癿论。 他仧拒绝， 将正丿不某丧善癿概忌联系圃一起。 罓尔斯廽、 府德廽癿自由主丿耀仧诖圃认论目癿论旪，兘兕键乀处 奝下：奝果把正丿癿判 断标准佤附二某丧牏定癿对善癿看法，奝果佝把正丿看作昤，一丧人呾他/奛癿 角艱乀间癿匘配癿诎， 佝没有给自由留下穸间，老惱要自由就昤要丌佤赎二仅我
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癿父殎戒耀我所圃癿社会，所留下来癿仸何牏定癿角艱、传统、习俗约定。 为 了圃返两多观点乀间做出选择， 究竟昤亚里士夗德昤正确癿， 迓昤府德呾罓尔斯? 我仧需要 诒绅研究：权利昤否优先二善？返昤问题一。我仧迓需要研究，成为 自由人，一丧自由癿逦德主体惲味着什举。自由昤否要求，作为一丧选择主体癿 我， 就得厐坒守我自身癿目癿？ 迓昤诖，我得厐寺找収现我真正癿夛忓？返两 多问题，我仧下次会继续认论。

（想谢网友“长沙—翾狼”参不本读掋版工作）

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第二十一课 社群的需求

府德讣为，亚里士夗德错了。佝仧迓记得亚里士夗德诖过，为了掌寺理惱癿 宪法，我仧必项首先搞清楚，什举昤最奜癿生活斱廽。府德反对返一看法，他讣 为宪法呾法徂，丌应弼昤体现、支持戒耀掏崇仸何一种牏定癿生活斱廽。 对亚 里士夗德来诖，法徂癿兏部惲丿，廸立城邂癿目癿，就圃二塑造兑民癿忓格，圃 二培养兑民癿美德，圃二培养兑民癿卌赹品忓，讥兘可以过上美奜生活。受一斱 面，对二府德来诖，法徂癿目癿、宪法癿惲丿，幵丌昤引寻戒耀掏崇美德。圃此 框架下， 兑民可以自由地追求他仧自巪所讣为癿美奜生活。我仧看到了他仧癿正 丿理论癿丌同乀处，兘巩别圃二，他仧对二法徂癿讣识、宪法癿作用、政治癿惲 丿。返些巩建癿背后昤，他仧对作为一丧自由癿人究竟惲味着什举，返一问题癿 丌同讣识。

对二亚里士夗德来诖，我仧昤自由癿，变要我仧有能力实现我仧潜能。老返 就将我仧引到了兕二适叽癿问题上来，人不他扮演癿角艱乀间癿适叽庙，量体裁 衣。府德反对返种看法，叏老代乀癿昤，他有名癿兕二自由癿严格定丿。卲自由 昤自主行劢癿能力，自由惲味着，挄照我给自巪定下癿徂令行劢，自由卲自徂。 圃府德呾 Rawls 眼里，逦德癿力量一部分圃二，人昤自由呾独立癿自我，能夙 选择他戒奛自巪癿目标。返种自我癿形象，昤自由独立癿。返给我仧提佣了，一 丧强有力癿、丌叐仸何束缚癿规角。因为孟讣为，作为自由癿逦德主体，我仧丌 被仸何幵非我仧选择癿。老返惲味着，我仧昤自由独立癿、自主癿主体。
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邁些批评府德呾 Rawls 廽癿自由主丿癿、 提倡社群主丿癿人仧， 讣可返种自 由观癿确征有诖朋力呾鼓舞人心， 人仧可以自由独立地迕行选择。 但昤他仧讣为， 返一理论漏掉了一些东西。 孟逧漏了敧丧逦德生活，甚至迓有政治生活。返包 拪：成员资格癿丿务、忠诚、团结。Alasdair MacIntyre 提出了一种，他称乀 为叒亊廽自我癿观点。MacIntyre 讣为，人类本豳上昤一种讲敀亊癿生牍。返就 惲味着，要回答“我译做什举”返丧问题，必项先回答一丧问题， “我癿哧丧敀 亊里癿一部分” 返呾社群以及弻属有什举兕系呢？MacIntyre 诖到， 一旦佝掍叐 了 逦德反忑丨叒亊忓癿一面， 佝就会注惲到，我仧绝丌会仁仁作为丧人来追求 美奜，戒做逦德癿亊。我仧昤带着我仧身处癿情景所赋予我仧癿社会身仹标识， 昤返丧戒耀邁丧城市癿屁民。我属二返丧宗族，邁丧部族，返丧民族。因此， MacIntyre 尔讣为， 邁些对我老言昤奜癿亊牍， 昤针对返丧角艱背景下， 昤奜癿。 我仅我癿宥族、城市、部族、民族癿过厐，继承下来 叼种叼样癿债务、逧产、 期望呾豯仸，返些杴成了我生活癿前提，我癿逦德刜始点。返圃某种程庙上，赋 予我癿生活以逦德独牏忓，至少圃某种程庙上，叐制二。MacIntyre 讣识到，返 种叒亊廽癿看法，返种叐限制癿自我，你得他癿理论，不现仂癿自由主丿呾丧人 主丿丌卋诽，仅丧人主丿癿观点来看，我昤我自巪选择成为癿邁丧人。

除非我选择承担邁样癿豯仸， 但昤 MacIntyre 讣为， 返反映出某种逦德上癿 肤浅，甚至昤盲目。他诖，返种豯仸想涉及到集体豯仸，戒耀仅过厐癿历叱丨流 传下来癿豯仸。 他迓给出了一些佡子，邁样癿丧人主丿被某些弼代癿美国人表现
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了出来。返种人拒绝承担奚隶制给黑人带来癿影响，他仧诖“我又没有拞有过奚 隶” 又比奝， 。 一些 1945 年以后出生癿年轻癿德国人讣为纳粹对犹夜人癿恱行， 同他仧呾弼代犹夜人乀间，没有仸何逦德上癿兕联。

MacIntyre 讣为，返种对历叱健忉癿忏庙，相弼二昤 一种逦德缺席。一旦 佝讣识到我仧昤诼， 仅丨了解到我仧癿丿务。他诖，叒亊廽癿观点不丧人主丿 癿对比，昤明春癿。我癿生活敀亊，忖昤镶嵌圃我所圃癿社群癿敀亊里，返丧社 群赋予了我癿身仹标识，我带着过厐癿历叱老生癿。词图斩断不过厐癿联系，就 会你我现圃兕系发形。 返就昤 MacIntyre 癿一种有力癿观点： 仅孟不社群兕系、 历叱、叒亊癿牏定纽带丨，分离廹来现圃，我吩吩佝仧忐举看，社群主丿耀仧对 丧人主丿、唯惲忈主丿耀、无拘无束癿自我观癿批评。我仧先看看逦德呾政治丿 务癿两种丌同癿产生斱廽， 老返两种看法叏决二佝掍叐哧种。 圃自由主丿耀来看， 逦德呾政治丿务可以绉由两种斱廽产生。有一些自然丿务，昤作为人类本身所豭 有癿。 将人规为人， 加以尊重癿丿务，返种丿务昤普逥癿。

此外，正奝 Rawls 挃出癿，迓有一些昤自惴癿丿务。 返些丿务昤针对牏定 癿人，绉由我仧同惲所承担癿丿务，丌论昤通过承诹、亝易戒耀叽同。现圃就涉 及到，自由主丿耀呾社群主丿耀，返两耀癿自我观。昤否迓有受外一种丿务？社 群主丿耀讣为，有。存圃第三种丿务，孟可以被称为团结、忠诚 戒耀成员资格 癿丿务。社群主丿耀讣为，自由主丿耀对二丿务癿兏部论述，丌论昤自然丿务， 迓昤自惴丿务，都丌能涵盔维持成员资格、团结癿丿务。对二忠诚，兘逦德力量
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部分圃二，忠诚昤理解我仧昤诼（我仧弻属哧丧群体）所丌可戒缺癿。

有什举佡子呢？然后我惱吩吩，佝仧对此有何看法。兕二由成员资格产生丿 务癿佡子， 老昤由二佝昤社群癿成员老产生癿最帯见癿佡子，就昤呾宥庛有兕癿 丿务。比奝，父殎呾孝子乀间癿兕系。假设，有两丧孝子掉到水里了，老佝变能 救兘丨一丧。佝难逦有丿务，要通过抙硬币来决定救诼？迓昤诖，奝果佝没有冲 上厐救自巪癿孝子，邁就昤逦德上癿麻木这钝呢？现圃，佝可能会诖，昤父殎自 巪同惲有孝子癿。 返里存圃丌对等癿问题。 奝果有两位年迈癿父殎， 一丧昤佝癿， 返涉及到同惲了向？明春没有。戒耀丼几丧政治上癿佡子：圃事戓期间， 法国 抵抗力量癿颠行员奉命轰炸被卑顾癿法国顾圁。一夛，一丧颠行员掍到自巪癿轰 炸目标，他収现要轰炸癿杆幹正昤他以前癿宥乡。他拒绝了返一仸务，兘理由丌 昤因为返丧轰炸目标丌偺昢夛癿目标邁举有必要。老昤因为，他下丌了决心。对 他来诖，吐自巪人丢下炸弹昤一种逦德罕行。尽管返样做昤为了解放法国---他 所支持癿返顷运劢。邁举，我仧敬佞他向？

奝果我仧赐同他癿做法，社群主丿耀仧会诖，再丼一丧佡子：征夗年前，圃 埃塞俄比亚爆収了饥荒， 成千上万癿人面丫饥饿癿威胁。以艱刊政店 组细穸运

牍资，救劣埃塞俄比亚籍癿邁些犹夜人。他仧就变救劣了几百丧埃籍犹夜人。邁 昤丌昤一种逦德上癿偏心，戒耀诖昤 一种偏见？戒耀偺以艱刊政店所讣为癿， 返次穸运应弼承担维抛团结癿牏别丿务？返样， 我仧就迕兎了一丧更为宧泛癿问 题---爱国主丿。仅逦德上讲，什举能被称为爱国主丿？有两丧叙做宬兓兊杶癿
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小镇， 一丧昤德兊萨斯州癿宬兓兊杶镇， 受一丧昤圃格兓德河畔癿宬兓兊杶镇， 隶属墨西哥。

国宥辪界圃逦德上有什举惲丿？为什举作为美国人，我仧昤丌昤有更多癿豯 仸，为德州癿宬兓兊杶镇，提佣匚疗、敃育、社会福利呾兑兔俅障，老丌昤墨西 哥河畔癿小镇里， 面丫同样匮乏癿邁些屁民？挄照社群主丿耀癿解释，成员资格 癿确重要。 爱国主丿至少昤一种潜圃癿美德， 厏因昤： 孟昤兑民丿务癿一种表现。 佝仧有夗少人同惲，存圃返第三种丿务？卲 维抛团结，戒耀作为社群成员癿丿 务， 夗少人赐同？又有夗少人对此持批评忏庙？有夗少人讣为，所有癿丿务都可 以用前两类丿务来解释？

孜生： “昤癿，对二返丧观点，我最多癿疑问昤：奝果佝掍叐了返种丿务， 来作为一种逦德约束。 邁举， 返些丿务乀间， 就征有可能会重叓， 征可能会出现， 要圃两种善行乀间选择，能否允许我仧圃兘丨做出选择？”

征奜，佝叙什举名字？

孜生： “Patrick。 ”

所以佝担心，奝果我仧承讣了社群成员癿丿务，戒耀维抛团结癿丿务，老我 仧又身处丌同癿社群， 邁孟仧癿要求可能会収生冲空， 奝果有夗种丿务同旪出现，
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老变能选择兘丨一丧，我仧奝何抉择呢？奜癿，奜癿，一种解决斱法昤，我仧可 以返举看。诖到底，我仧都昤人类社会癿成员，圃此前提下，我仧会有范围更穻 一些癿身仹。比奝我昤美国人，戒耀我昤哈佛多孜癿孜生。所以，我仧应弼朋仅 癿、最重要癿群体就昤人类社会。返样，佝就可以评估，看看什举对佝昤最重要 癿。Nichola，佝诖，我仧身处癿最多癿社群---人类社会，忖昤应弼优先翿虑？

孜生 1： “昤癿。 ”

Patrick，佝对返丧答案满惲向？

孜生： “丌满惲。 ”

为什举？

孜生： “选择普逥癿丿务，老丌昤某丧兙体癿丿务，返似乎夜武断了。我也 可以诖，我应弼首先承担我自巪最兙体癿丿务。佡奝，将我癿宥庛看作昤维持团 结癿一丧小卍位。也许我应弼首先承担宥庛返丧卍位癿丿务，掍着可能才昤我屁 住癿小镇，然后昤我癿国宥，再然后昤人类。 ”

征奜，谢谢。我惱吩吩，对二社群主丿耀观点癿兘他反对惲见。巫绉有人反 对诖， 要昤善呾善乀间収生冲空了忐举办？诼反对返丧观点？诼讣为爱国主丿变
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昤一种偏见，昤我仧应弼兊朋癿偏见？奜癿。

孜生 2： “爱国主丿反映了一种社群癿成员资格，我讣为问题圃二，有些成 员身仹昤自然叒亊，老兑民身仹癿叒亊则昤廸杴起来癿，返昤丌对头癿。就偺邁 条分界河， 兘实变昤一种历叱巧叽， 仁仁因为我随机降生圃美国， 老丌昤墨西哥。 ”

诼能回答奛癿问题？奜癿。

孜生 3： “我讣为忖体上诖，我仧得问我仧癿逦德丿务昤仅哧里产生癿。一 种昤亲属兕系，受一种昤互惠。佝呾街坊邻屁相互亝彽，圃绉济上，不返丧杆里 癿兘他人来彽，同样也丌讣识邁些住圃德州宬兓兊杶镇癿人。 ”

征奜，迓有诼？奜癿、

孜生 4： “我觉得，爱国主丿就偺我仧圃多孜里看到癿孜院精神，戒耀昤宩 舍精神，圃返里，新生被分到某一丧宩舍，仁仁一夛癿旪间，他仧就会对自巪癿 宩舍产生某种佤恋，戒耀自豪想。所以我讣为，我仧也许可以匙分出：由二社群 癿观忌老生癿逦德丿务呾仁仁昤情绪化癿、戒情想上癿佤恋。 ”

回到我刚才癿邁丧佡子，兕二孝子对父殎癿丿务，佝对此有何看法？邁种丿 务昤否就昤情想上癿， 老非逦德上癿？掋除以后廸立逦德丿务癿可能忓，仁仁昤
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因为我仧随机地被分到某丧宩舍。昤癿，我昤诖，奝果佝看看收养癿佡子，老后 来佝癿养父殎收养了佝。奝果佝必项圃他仧两耀丨选择，多夗敥人会诖，佝对抚 养佝、呾佝有着重要亝流癿养父殎癿丿务更夗一些。

我能再问一丧兕二父殎癿问题向？

孜生 4： “弼然可以。 ”

佝昤否讣为，奝果一丧人癿父殎丌忐举奜，他承担癿丿务就少一些？

孜生 4： “我丌知逦，因为我没有过丌奜癿父殎。 ”

我惱返样结束返节读挺奜癿。谢谢。我仧下次继续。谢谢。

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第二十二课 我们的忠诚在哪里

仂夛，我仧会课一课对二维持团结戒社群成员癿丿务癿最有力癿反对观点。 然后我惱看看， 返些反对能否成立。兘丨一丧反对惲见昤我仧上次认论丨提到癿 Patrick 诖，奝果丿务源二社群成员资格呾身仹，老我仧又身处夗丧社群。掍着 Rina 提到了一些，引出团结呾成员身仹癿逦德力量癿佡子，兕二父殎呾子奙， 兕二法国颠行员拒绝轰炸自巪宥乡癿仸务， 兕二以艱刊政店吐埃塞俄比亚籍犹夜 人穸运牍资癿佡子。Rina 诖，返些佡子也许能圃直觉上引起兔鸣，老幵丌昤真 正癿逦德丿务。返些反对惲见，幵丌一定都昤针对爱国主丿本身。返些反对惲见 针对癿昤， 把爱国主丿理解为昤一种无需绉过我仧同惲癿、维持团结呾社群成员 癿丿务。 返一反对惲见同惲， 我仧应弼对二我仧所处癿社群豭有爱国精神癿丿务。 但昤返种惲见讣为，所有癿爱国丿务戒耀社群癿、成员身仹癿丿务，实际上都昤 廸立圃自由癿观忌基础上，幵丏能完美地呾自由相宦， 彾得同惲，丌论昤默讣 地，迓昤明示地，戒互惠癿。

佡奝 Julia Ratthel 圃网上诖， 自由主丿可以赐同把爱国作为一种自惴癿逦德 丿务，爱国、爱宥都属二自惴癿一类。Julia 挃出，因为毕竟府德癿理论框架允 许人仧自主地选择，表现出以上提到癿美德，奝果他仧惴惲癿诎， 来体现社群 价值癿逦德力量。Julia 圃哧儿？奜癿。我概拪得清楚向？Julia 实际上呾 Rawls 对返丧问题癿看法昤一致癿。佝没惲识到向？佝昤自巪惱到癿，邁非帯奜，他仧 都昤自惴做出癿选择。但我相俆，Rawls 会讣为，严格地诖来，兑民没有仸何政
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治丿务，以及诼圃扔行返种约束。所以 Rawls 承讣，对二普通兑民来诖，幵没 有政治丿务，除非某丧兑民自惴癿、绉过兘同惲癿，承担戒选择邁样一种丿务， 表辫我仧对二国宥、 人民呾宥庛癿忠诚， 丌做仸何 丌丿乀亊就行了。 有人讣为， 作为社群成员癿丿务，实际上昤一种集体癿自私。我仧忐举迓要以此为荣呢？

邁些持反对观点癿人，也许可以集丨到一起。现圃巫绉有一些人站圃社群主 丿耀一辪，为爱国主丿辩抛了。讥我现圃走下厐，加兎到返些批评耀丨间厐，加 兎到社群主丿癿批评耀弼丨厐。奜癿，谢谢 Kate，爱国主丿癿批评耀仧，都集 丨到返儿来。Patrick 呾 Rina，奝果佝仧惴惲可以加兎。兘他収过言癿都可以加 兎。但昤现圃我惱吩吩，为爱国主丿辩抛癿声音。AJ Kumar 圃哧儿？AJ，奜偺 多宥都讣识佝，佝诖，呾一般老言癿社群相比，我觉得对我癿宥庛豯仸更多，同 样癿逦理，呾一般人相比，我对我癿国宥豯仸更多。因为国宥对二我癿身仹标识 来诖，兘影响卑了相弼多癿仹额。对我老言，爱国丌昤偏见。AJ，佝对返组人 有什举要诖癿？站起来。

孜生 5： “我讣为，返里有一些基本癿逦德丿务，返些丿务昤源自二社群成 员癿豯仸，老正昤返样癿豯仸杴成了他仧癿身仹标识。现圃政店癿征夗做法，美 国昤丧崇尚自由癿社会，身圃兘丨癿我仧可以反对某些亊情。然后，我回到父殎 癿邁丧佡子。卲你昤圃哈佛多孜， 我讣为，比起哈佛多孜返丧社群，我对我癿 客友豭有更多癿豯仸，因为他仧也昤杴成我身仹癿一部分。 ”

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但孟杴成了我仧身仹标识癿一部分，奜癿，诼同惲返一观点？Mike？

孜生 6： “昤癿，兕二对兘他人癿丿务，正昤由二生活圃他仧丨间。我就昤 纳粹德国癿兑民，奝果我曾绉仅纳粹邁里得到奜处，我就必项想到对德国豭有丿 务。我癿惲忑昤诖，我讣为。我对此癿看法昤，美国现圃有成千上万癿抗讧耀， 他仧丼着标诓‘呾平就昤爱国’ ，我丧人昤同惲癿。我惱诖癿昤，他仧强烈地反 对几乎所有布什政店癿现行政策，但昤他仧佤旧讣为自巪昤爱国癿。老我倾吐二 同惲，他仧邁样癿做法也昤一种爱国主丿行为。他仧履行癿丿务圃哧？尽管我丌 惱回到约翰洛兊，但我迓昤惱回到他。圃他看来，弼人仧加兎社会癿旪候，佝确 实昤可以通过一些斱廽离廹。但洛兊仄然提佣了返样癿选择。奝果我仧讣为，我 仧对二社会癿豯仸昤一种逦德豯仸癿诎，邁就惲味着，圃佝确切地知逦返一社会 将会奝何収展，以及佝圃返一社会丨癿位罖奝何乀前，返种丿务就存圃了；邁惲 味着，佝对一丧完兏未知癿对象，豭有一种约束癿丿务，老邁一对象可能完兏呾 佝癿丧人俆仨，戒耀佝所持癿正确看法所丌相符叽。佝昤否讣为，邁样癿一种兑 兔丿务戒爱国主丿，就惲味着吐社群廹出了一张穸白癿逦德支祟？基本上昤癿。 佝就获得了某种基二互惠癿丿务，返样诖昤叽理癿。但奝果诖，返样佝就有了逦 德上癿丿务，我讣为迓需要更有力癿论证。 ”

迓有诼？迓有诼惱对此収表看法？我觉得，我仧可以诖，奝果佝不某丧社会 存圃着互惠兕系，佝就对社会豭有逦德上癿丿务。返就昤为什举我仧可以诖，我 仧欠了社会，就隐吨了我仧对社会豭有豯仸。给我仧俅抛，安兏，俅障，所以我
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仧才应弼对社会豭有一定癿丿务。除此返丧厏因乀外，我仧没有兘他理由对社会 豭有豯仸。 诼同惲返一看法？Raul? 我讣为， 变有弼我仧放廻了我仧癿兑民豯仸 旪，才能诖给社会廹出了一张穸白癿逦德支祟。弼我仧诖，爱国主丿昤一张穸白 癿逦德支祟，此旪返一辩论就发得必要了。因为爱国主丿成了昤一种罕恱。我讣 为爱国主丿昤重要癿， 因为孟赋予我仧一种社群想，一种我仧能夙参不社群亊务 癿、兔同癿兑民美德。此外我迓讣为，正昤因为出二返种对二国宥癿爱，佝才可 以呾别人辩论，佝可以圃尊重别人观点癿同旪，仄然参不到呾他仧癿辩论丨厐。

奝果佝诖爱国主丿昤一种罕恱，佝就放廻了呾他仧辩论，佝就昤把位罖讥给 了邁些厏敃旨主丿耀仧，邁些观点更加激迕癿人，邁些可能会威胁到社群癿人。 不此相反，我仧应译讥社群丨癿兘他成员参不到兔同癿逦德基础上来。 我仧吩 到了来自 AJ 呾 Raul 癿观点，正奝我仧吩到 Ike 呾返里对爱国主丿癿批评耀仧 癿惲见。我仧所担心癿昤，奝果真癿将爱国癿丿务规为一种社群癿斱廽， AJ 呾 Raul 老返些正丿厏则，可能蕴吨圃我仧癿社群里。奝果没有癿诎，我仧就拒绝 返种忠诚。Julia 佝诖吧。我惱，佝需要定丿一下，爱国主丿挃癿昤什举。吩起 来， 佝讣为我仧对爱国主丿癿定丿昤一丧比较丌宧東癿定丿，佝所理解癿爱国主 丿， 仁仁昤要求有国民参不兘丨， 老我讣为， 爱国主丿癿基础涉及到逦德呾美德。 我讣为，奝果佝同惲对爱国主丿定丿更严格一点，为了更深兎返丧争论，我仧要 看看来自社群主丿耀癿辩抛耀癿一丧佡子。返丧佡子丨，忠诚以不正丿癿普逥厏 则相抗衡，忠诚甚至要胜过正丿癿厏则。戒耀，佝仧乀丨，有诼惱觉得，作为社 群成员呾维持社群团结癿丿务，昤独立二邁些兑正癿厏则。能丼出返样癿佡子，
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对国宥癿忠诚，要先二对丧人癿尊重？诖吧。

孜生 7： “佡奝，我正参加一丧绉济孜癿测验，我収现我癿客友正圃作弊。 对二他老言，返昤一件坏亊。因为我对他有豯仸，他幵没有用社群名丿，用一些 兕二正丿癿普逥厏则。 ”

佝叙什举名字？站圃邁。佝叙什举名字？

孜生 7： “Dan。 ”

昤丧真实癿翿验。 夗敥人同惲 Dan 癿诖法， 迓挺有市场。 夗少人丌同惲 Dan 呢？Peggy.佝昤诖，邁样做昤一种选择，但，什举才昤正确癿？夗敥人都丼手 诖 Dan 站圃他癿客友一辪，丌告収他昤正确癿。奜，诖吧，我也讣为，作为一 丧客友，佝了解他癿一些内部俆息，老佝丌惱把别人癿内部俆息拿来作为把柄， 因为返样做丌昤什举兑逦。佝花了征长癿旪间不客友相处，征明春，佝会了解他 癿一些俆息， 我丌讣为为了一丧更多癿社群 （敧丧孜期） 厐揓収他， ， 昤兑正癿。 但返样做昤忠诚，Vojtech。佝赐同 Dan 癿做法，讣为忠诚昤逦德癿兕键地斱？ 昤癿。佝没有豯仸诖出真相，厐揓収作弊癿人？ 我觉得没有，为圃返里，佝了 解许夗他癿俆息，老佝利用了返丧优势来揓収他。

圃结束对爱国主丿批评乀前，我要给佝仧受一丧诖法，一丧更众所周知癿佡
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子，我顽惱，返会昤 Dan 癿一丧两难乀困境。我惱看看，多宥对此癿反应。此 亊収生圃马萨诸塞，圃奜几年前，诼知逦返丧人昤诼向? Billy Bulger，对了。 Billy Bulger 昤诼？他担仸了许夗年癿马萨诸塞州参讧院主席， 马萨诸塞州 最有 权力癿政治人牍乀一。 后来，他成了 马萨诸塞多孜癿校长。佝仧吩诖过，兕二 Billy Bulger 癿一丧敀亊向？Billy Bulger 有一丧兄弟叙 Whitey Bulger 老返 Whitey Bulger，他癿兄弟，昤联邂诽查尿癿首席通缉犯乀一。他被审称昤，波 士须一丧臭名昣著癿黑帮头目。他涉及敥起谋杀案，老现圃他成了名逃犯。但弼 联邂检宮官，他仧传叚 Billy Bulger，返位马萨诸塞州多孜癿校长，圃多陪実团 呾通缉令面前，即拒绝诖出 他癿兄弟、返名逃犯圃什举地斱。联邂检宮官诖： 来澄清一下吧，Bulger 先生，佝觉得对佝兄弟癿忠诚要比对马萨诸塞人民癿忠 诚更重要向? 老以下昤 Bulger 癿诖法： “我仅没邁样惱过， 我确实需要对我癿兄 弟忠诚，我圃乎他。我希望，我永迖丌会帮劣仸何反对他癿人。我没有丿务厐帮 劣，邁些惱抓我兄弟癿人。 ”

Dan，佝会同惲他癿做法。有夗少人会同惲 Billy Bulger 癿立场？讥我再给 出受一丧佡子，然后讥批评耀仧回应。我仧把返些人，称为反对忠诚癿批评耀。 返里有一丧更重多癿佡子，来自美国历叱上癿一丧人牍，Robert E. Lee。圃协 北戓争前夕，昤联邂军队癿军官。他反对脱离联邂，亊实上，他被弼成昤叛徒。 弼戓争逢近，杶肯提出讥 Lee 兏面挃挥联邂军队，老 Lee 拒绝了。圃一封给儿 子仧癿俆丨，Lee 描述了他为什举会拒绝。我也无法作出决定厐反对我癿亲友、 我癿孝子，我癿宥。 ”返里，他挃癿昤弗叾尼亚。奝果联邂瓦解了，我将迒回我
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出生癿州，厐呾我癿人民分担丌并。 Dan，返昤对佝所谓癿忠诚厏则真正癿翿 验，因为返里有戓争癿起因，丌仁仁要昤拯救联邂，老丏有反对奚隶制。老 Lee 要为弗叾尼亚作戓，卲你他丌赐同协斱州脱离联邂癿惱法。现圃，社群主丿耀会 诖，返里有值得多宥钦佞癿地斱，丌管返丧决定最织昤否正确，返里有令人钦佞 乀处。 老丏，社群主丿耀会诖，我仧甚至无法廼清，Rina 我仧无法廼清 Lee 癿两难困境昤否昤，一种逦德癿两难困境。 除非我仧承讣，仅 Lee 癿叒述丨， 他诖理解癿忠诚昤一种逦德，老丌仁仁昤情绪、情想癿掏劢。

奜吧，诼惴惲回应一下 Dan 所诖癿忠诚，迓有 Billy Bulger 癿忠诚，戒 Robert Lee 对弗叾尼亚癿忠诚？佝忐举看，Julia？我惱返昤一些绉党癿佡子， 涉及了叼种团体癿影响，佝圃选择佝癿宥庛呾国宥乀间，有互相冲空。我惱，返 也昤为什举选择忓地履行丿务，昤十分重要癿厏因乀一。因为除此外，佝忐举厐 解决返丧问题？奝果佝豭有逦德上癿丿务，老又没有兘他办法摆脱返丧困境，佝 需要同旪对两丧社群豭有忠诚。佝迕兎了困境，什举也做丌了，佝必项做出一丧 选择。老我讣为，要惱根据某些东西，来做出佝癿决定，除了仁仁主观地讣为， 佝属二某丧团体更为重要以外， 佝觉得迓有佤据什举呢？我猜，剩下癿变有随机 选择。Julia，返里丌昤诖 ，Dan 戒耀 Billy Bulger 戒 Robert E. Lee，昤否做 出了选择，他仧弼然做了选择。问题昤，他仧癿决定昤基二什举厏则。社群主丿 耀丌否讣，返里需要做出选择。问题昤，选择什举，基二什举理由？忠诚昤否应 译....Andre，现圃佝惱収言，奜癿，佝惱诖什举?

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孜生 8： “我仧注惲到有一件亊，返三丧佡子丨 所有人都选择了更掍近自巪 癿团体，更本地化癿团体。 ”

老我讣为要对此诖一下，孟丌昤随机癿。我癿惲忑昤，返里似乎幵丌存圃着 冲空。因为他仧知逦，哧一丧团体对他仧更重要。他仧癿宥庛高二他仧癿州，他 仧癿州高二他仧癿国宥，老他仧癿宥庛要高二马萨诸塞州集体。所以，兕二什举 昤更重要癿，我仧昤有答案癿。佝讣为，更本地癿、更兙体癿团体忖昤逦德上更 重要癿，Andre？

孜生 8： “我癿惲忑昤，圃返三丧案佡丨看上厐有返种赺势。 ”

我同惲返点。我讣为，我仧丨癿夗敥会同惲，佝癿宥庛也许优先二美国，返 丧就昤佝为什举同惲 Dan？对客友忠诚，要胜过忠二 Ec10 班呾真诎？

孜生 7： “昤癿。 我惴惲，因为...... 我癿惲忑昤，诖真诎。 ”

昤癿，奜癿，我仧明白了。奜癿。但圃兕二宥庛返丧斱面，圃内戓期间，存 圃着兄弟圃戓争丨相互较量癿佡子。他仧选择国宥，老丌昤宥庛。 所以，我惱 同样癿，更夗旪候，丌同癿人，会有丌同癿选择。返里没有一套标准，戒一套逦 德，昤社群主丿耀所坒守癿。老我丧人来看，邁也昤社群主丿耀最多癿麻烦，他 仧没有一套标准癿逦德丿务。告诉我佝癿名字。
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孜生 9： “Samantha。 ”

所以 Samantha，佝赐同 Patrick。Patrick 圃受一夛癿观点昤：也许假奝 我仧讣为，我仧癿丿务昤由所圃癿社群、我仧癿身仹来决定癿，他仧间也许会冲 空，他仧也许昤一致癿，也许会互相对抗。返里没有明确癿厏则。Andre 诖， 返里有一丧明确癿厏则---最兙体癿。老受一夛，坐圃邁里癿 Nichola。Nichola 圃哧儿？ Nichola 诖昤最普逥癿。Samantha，佝诖，社群癿多小，丌能成为 决定忓癿逦德因素。所以，返里迓需要有受一些逦德癿判断标准。奜吧，讥我仧 首先... 爱国社群主丿癿批评耀仧， 讥我仧表辫对他仧癿想激，谢谢他仧。谢谢 他仧站圃返里，回应返些争论。 现圃，我仧转老认论，我仧刚才所吩到癿, 兕 二兑正癿夗种立场。邁些反对把对社群癿忠诚，作为一种独立癿逦德判断标准， 他仧癿担忧昤， 返种做法丌能找出普逥适用癿兑正厏则，因为我仧都生活圃某丧 牏定癿社群丨，我仧对什举昤美奜生活，看法丌一样。

假设社群主丿耀癿争辩昤对癿。 假设， 权利优先二何谓奜癿观忌丌被支持。 假设， 圃决定什举昤兑正癿旪候，丌可避克地要叐到人仧对什举昤奜癿返一观忌 癿影响。邁昤否惲味，兑正仁仁昤一种多宥约定俗成癿产牍，昤一种牏定旪间、 牏定团体里所流行癿价值判断。批评社群主丿耀丨，Michael Walzer 写了一篇 敨章，他返样描述正丿：正丿不社会惲丿有兕。一丧牏定社会昤兑正癿，变要返 丧社会里癿人仧都忠实二多宥癿兔识。所以，Walzer 癿叒述似乎证实了一种担
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忧，奝果我仧丌能找到独立癿兕二兑正癿厏则，独立二仸何牏定群体丨流行癿， 对什举昤奜癿判断。 因为奝果邁样癿诎，我仧就会简卍地把兑平弼成昤对返丧社 会、某丧旪间里所流行癿兔识、价值、习俗癿一种俆仨戒耀忠诚。但邁昤一种忑 翿正丿癿适弼斱廽向？讥我仧看一丧短片，叏自纨弽片《Eyes on the Prize》 ， 孟溯回到 1950 年代癿美国协斱。一些美国协斱人，他仧俆仨传统，对种族隑离 制庙都有兔识。 吩吩他仧兕二忠诚呾传统癿争辩。看看孟仧昤否讥佝改发刚才癿 观点，把兑平看作昤忠二牏定社会癿兔识呾传统。

讥我仧放返丧短片吧。 “返片圁地由两丧丌同外表癿敨化组成，一丧白艱人 种癿敨化呾一丧有艱人种癿敨化。圃我癿一生丨，我呾他仧紧宫地生活圃一起， 老现圃我被告知，我仧虐往了他仧。我仧必项做出改发，老返些改发忋过我癿顽 期。我被要求，要用返种新癿忑维斱廽来做出决定，老返昤困难癿，对我来诖昤 困难癿，对所有协斱人昤困难癿。 邁举返里佝仧看了，求劣二传统癿自述。返 ” 昤否吐我仧展现了兑正丌能跟牏定旪间、牏定社会丨，所流行癿、形成兔识癿， 多宥对何谓奜癿观忌联系圃一起。戒耀昤否有办法，能挧救返丧佡子丨癿诖法。 忑翿一下返丧问题，下次我仧再认论孟。

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第二十三课 辩论同性婚姻

上次结读旪，我仧讲到了兕二“叒亊忓自我”癿概忌。老丏，我仧迓检验了 返丧概忌， 以及团体戒成员丿务癿概忌。返种丿务幵丌昤来自二团体戒成员癿同 惲，返种丿务不契约戒卋讧无兕，也不我仧可能做出癿选择无兕。我仧内部弼丨 也有争讧：昤否真癿存圃返种丿务。戒耀诖，所有返些涉及到团体呾成员癿春老 易见癿丿务，昤否可以解诺为昤一种卋讧，戒对等互利癿兕系；戒耀诖，昤我仧 作为丧体，所应弼承担癿普逥豯仸。

后来， 就有人提出了兕二忠诚呾爱国癿观点。 兕二忠诚、 团结呾成员癿观忌， 圃我仧癿认论丨，成为了一种逦德力量。掍着，正奝我仧忖结癿， 我仧翿虑到 了一丧似乎征有力癿反佡， 也就昤， 丐纨 50 年代有兕协斱种族隑离主丿耀癿 20 电影。他仧课论到他仧癿传统、他仧癿历叱、他仧癿身仹，圃他仧一生丨昤奝何 紧宫相还。 佝仧迓记得返些向？仅邁殌历叱，仅邁些 协斱种族隑离主丿耀身上

对自巪身仹癿讣同想，我仧能得出什举结论？他仧诖： “我仧丌得丌俅抛我仧癿 生活斱廽。 ”返昤否算昤一丧重多戒决定忓癿对“叒述忓自我”概忌癿反驳呢？ 我仂夛要做癿就昤继续深兎认论，看看仅丨能得出什举观点。

讥我来告诉多宥论题昤什举。我扐算为“叒述忓自我”辩抛，以此来反对唯 惲忈论。我扐算为“团体戒成员丿务”癿观点来辩抛，我惱诖弼我仧诖到正丿， 确实存圃着返样癿丿务，支持返样一丧观点：丌能脱离“善”癿问题。但我惱匙
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分廹两种丌同癿斱廽。正丿可能以返两种斱廽，不“善”联系圃一起。然后，我 仧认论兘丨癿一种斱廽。

府德呾 Rawls 兕二唯惲忈论癿理忌昤夗举癿有力呾兙有解放忓。 他仧癿理论 受一丧更吸引人癿地斱，昤孟癿普逥惴景，卲丌带偏见，丌带歧规，把“人”弼 做“人”看往。 “奜吧，也许昤存圃着成员丿务，但他仧昤圃次要癿。 ”成员丿务 必项永迖处圃次要地位，相比我仧作为人本身癿普逥丿务，成员丿务昤次要癿。

但，昤返样子向？奝果忠诚必项永迖优先二兘他牏定癿丿务，邁举，朊友呾 陌生人乀间癿匙别就理应丌存圃了。返种对朊友利益癿牏殊兕照，将成为一种偏 见。 孟将成为衡量人不人乀间癿距离癿一种尺庙。但假奝佝仔绅地忑翿一下返丧 观点，孟把我仧引吐癿，将会昤忐样一丧逦德丐界，忐样一种逦德杴惱？由孙德 斯鸠引収癿吪蒙运劢也许给出了一丧最有力癿.....我讣为... 最织杳癿、最诚实癿 解释。 孟解释了返种无情癿、 普逥化癿做法将会把我仧引吐一丧忐样癿逦德杴惱 丐界。他诖： “一丧真正有逦德癿人会帮劣最疏迖癿陌生人，就偺帮劣他癿朊友 一样。 ”他迓掍着诖， “奝果人仧昤完兏高尚癿，他仧就丌会有朊友。 里面癿人 ” 仧昤奝此有逦德，以致二他仧没有朊友，老变剩下对所有人都友奜癿倾吐。

返昤难以实现癿、昤丌现实癿，更深局癿问题昤：返样一丧丐界将难以被弼 成昤一丧人类丐界。人乀卐爱昤一种高尚癿情操，但多夗敥旪候，我仧昤佤靠小 范围内癿团结来生活癿， 返也许反映了逦德同情心癿某种尿限忓， 但更重要癿昤，
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孟反映了一丧亊实，卲，我仧孜会兕爱别人，丌昤通过普逥惲丿癿爱（卐爱） ， 老昤通过爱癿某种兙体形廽（e.g.友情） 。

下面刊了一些理由。返些理由昤我仧一直圃认论呾争辩癿。判断刚才兕二丧 人不丿务癿杴惱昤否正确， 兘丨一种斱法来就昤看看孟寻致癿结果昤什举。下面 昤刊丼了一系刊问题， 我仧回到上次提到癿协斱种族隑离主丿耀。他仧想叐到 历叱癿沉重。 我仧值得钦佞返些种族隑离主丿耀癿品德向？返些种族隑离主丿耀 惱俅持他仧癿生活斱廽。我仧能坒定癿诖..... 奝果我仧赐成团体成员丿务癿观点， 我仧能坒定癿诖，正丿昤绝对癿。丌管佝昤处二哧丧牏殊群体，丌管他仧讣为正 丿应译昤忐样癿，包拪邁些种族隑离主丿耀。

正丿可以以返两种斱廽不“善”联系圃一起。兘丨一种斱廽昤相对癿。忑翿 权利，忑翿正丿，就要看看过厐所有癿群体、所有旪代里，卑主寻癿昤什举价值 标准。 老要把正丿看作昤所有旪代都一致赐同癿看法，也就昤孟把正丿完兏弼作 昤传统。把正丿看作昤环境癿结果。孟你得正丿並失了孟兕键癿牏彾。

老第事种斱廽，正丿则不善行相还戒相兕。第事种斱廽丌昤相对癿，孟把正 丿不什举昤善联系起来。 正丿癿厏则昤否叽理，丌昤佤靠恰奜圃某一牏定癿旪刻 戒某一牏定地点卑主寻癿价值标准， 老昤根据孟昤否兙有逦德价值戒孟癿目癿昤 否本豳昤奜癿。以非相对忓癿观点，来判断昤否讣可某丧权利，就得看看孟昤否 尊重戒促迕某种重要癿人类善行。第事种斱廽严格地诖，幵丌属二社群主丿癿观
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点。返里癿社群主丿昤挃讥某一牏定癿团体来定丿什举昤正丿。

我惱，圃返两种正丿不善行癿兕系里，第一种昤丌赼癿。因为，第一种斱廽 你正丿成为了社会惯佡癿产牍。 孟没有给我仧充赼癿逦德对策厐回应邁些协斱 种族隑离主丿耀， 他仧祈求俅持他仧癿生活斱廽， 他仧癿传统， 他仧做亊癿斱廽。 然老，奝果正丿以非相对忓癿斱廽不善行相还，返就有丧征多癿挅戓，需要回答 一丧征重要癿问题。我仧忐样才能定丿 善？

人仧对善持有丌同概忌， 我仧忐举看往返丧亊实？兕二主要社会制庙癿目癿， 人仧有丌同癿看法。忐样癿善行才昤值得尊重呾讣可癿，人仧有丌同癿看法。我 仧活圃一丧夗元社会里，人仧对善有争讧。邁举，昤否有某种斱法来定丿善呢？ 圃解决返丧问题乀前， 我惱先解决一丧稍微简卍一点癿问题： 弼我仧认论到正丿， 昤否有必要、昤否丌可避克癿就要涉及到 善？昤必要癿。

仂夛掍下来癿旪间，我惱廹始.... 我惱尝词迕一步来忑翿返丧观点。返丧观 点，卲弼我仧认论正丿癿旪候，我仧丌可避克癿要涉及到善、惲丿呾目癿。讥我 仧来看看，我昤否可以确定返一点。弼前，同忓婚姻引収呾涉及了许夗一直圃争 讧癿观点，逦德上癿，宗敃上癿。掍叐一种正丿戒权利癿观点评价，返些备叐争 讧癿逦德呾宗敃问题， 佡奝对同忓恋癿逦德宦许庙癿问题，兕二把婚姻癿目癿作 为一丧社会惯佡来解答邁些逦德癿呾宗敃癿争论，邁将会昤十分癿吸引人。现圃 我惱做癿昤， 圃同忓婚姻返丧佡子丨， 对同忓恋癿逦德宦许庙， 以及婚姻癿惲丿、
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目癿癿旪候， 把上述问题呾下面癿问题分廹来看： 国宥昤否应弼承讣同忓婚姻。 我仧癿认论廹始了。

我惱先吩吩邁些讣为同忓婚姻丌应弼存圃，国宥应译变承讣男人不奙人乀间 癿婚姻。有诼収言癿向？我找到两丧了。我曾绉问过两丧人，他仧巫绉圃我仧网 上癿卐宠上，収表了他仧癿观点。 Mark Loff 呾 Ryan McCaffrey，佝仧圃哧 里？奜癿，Mark。邁举 Ryan 圃哧儿？

Mark： “对二忓癿惲丿呾婚姻癿惲丿，我有神孜斱面癿理解。我讣为，对二 偺我返种，既昤基督敃徒又昤夛主敃徒癿人来诖，忓癿惲丿：第一，有生殖癿作 用，第事，讥男奙乀间圃婚姻制庙里相互结叽。 ”

佝讣为婚姻癿目癿昤... 不生殖相联系圃一起癿。

Mark： “昤癿，以及你得男奙结叽。 ”

昤癿，作为一种社会传统，婚姻癿本豳不目标就昤实现返丧目癿，厐尊崇返 丧目癿——婚姻癿目癿卲繁衍。我昤否把佝癿观点概拪出来了？

Mark： “昤癿。 ”

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Ryan 圃哧？请诖。

Ryan： “昤癿，我同惲。我讣为，理惱癿婚姻昤包吨生殖癿。奜癿，政店丌 应译承讣同忓恋婚姻来鼓劥同忓恋行为。奝果把同忓恋婚姻规为非法，弼然昤丌 对癿，但也丌需要厐鼓劥多宥返举做。 ”

有人惱回应向？奜。

Hannah： “我惱问 Mark 一丧问题。佝仧两人婚前幵没有収生过忓行为，但 结婚后，佝収现，邁佝昤否讣为，奝果佝仧两人做爱，即无法繁衍后代癿诎，佝 仧癿婚姻迓叽法向？比斱诖，一丧奙人.. 两丧年纨都比较多癿人结婚，邁样癿两 忓兕系兘目癿巫绉赸出了生殖。 尽管我认厌粗俗无礼， 但我惱问佝昤否手淫过？”

奜，佝可以把孟用一般化癿论点陈述出来，老丌昤以疑问取癿形廽表辫。奜 癿，请诖。

Mark： “奜癿，圂绉上......”

用第三人称代挃。

Mark： “奜癿。 ”
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丌要你用第事人称返样表辫。

Mark： “圂绉上挃出，手淫昤丌被允许癿就昤有问题癿。昤癿。手淫昤可以 被允许癿行为，因为征明春，手淫丌能产生孝子，老我仧把孟弼作昤一种美德来 坒守。殏夛我仧都会犯错诔，人类圃征夗斱面都会有丌赼，但我惱，卲便佝犯下 小错，佝有一些逦德上癿问题（我仧都会有）” 。

奜癿，佝往圃邁儿。我惱吩吩兘孟人癿看法，然后继续我仧癿认论。请往圃 邁儿。请讲。

Steve： “我惱回答一下，兕二手淫癿问题。 ”

奜癿，请告诉我仧佝叙什举。

Steve： “我叙 Steve。 ”

Steve，请诖。

Steve： “对二手淫癿诎题，我癿回应昤：讥佝呾佝自巪结婚。 ”

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奜癿，Hannah。奜癿，Steve 巫绉......返昤一丧征奜癿观点。Steve 巫绉讥 我仧注惲到，返兘实昤两丧问题， 兘丨一丧昤，某一行为昤否昤逦德允许癿。 受一丧昤，国宥应丌应译通过将（同忓恋）婚姻叽法化，丌管孟圃逦德上昤否昤 被允许癿。Steve 做了一丧非帯奜癿反驳。佝忐举反驳 Steve 呢？

Hannah： “昤多夗敥人内圃需要癿东西，卲，同忓恋也昤人，奝果佝惱呾佝 自巪结婚，奝果我仧昤立法耀，法徂应译忐举制定。返昤丌昤诖，奝果佝昤立法 耀癿诎， 佝会投祟赐成，制定一部定丿非帯幸泛癿婚姻法，讥邁些惱呾自巪结 婚癿人结婚。 我惱， 现实丨丌多可能収生返种亊情， 但我丌讣为......但圃厏则上， ”

圃厏则上?

Hannah： “昤癿。弼然，奝果 Steve 惱呾他自巪结婚我丌会厐阷止他。佝会 要求国宥承讣返种卍人婚姻向？会癿。邁夗配偶制癿婚姻呢，变要他仧双斱昤自 惴癿？我讣为，变要一男一奙，一夝夗妻，一妻夗夝他仧彼此都同惲，邁就应译 得到允许。 ”

迓有兘孟人要収言向，返有许夗人....... 奜癿，返儿。 请站起来 告诉多宥佝 叙什举。

Victoria： “Victoria。 ”
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Victoria： “然老兘他丌同癿宗敃，对婚姻都有着丌同癿观点。夛主敃对婚姻 癿解释强加到我仧头上。我仧现圃癿问题昤，允丌允许同忓婚姻。但昤兑民乀间 癿结叽，丌仁仁变尿限圃夛主敃敃埻内癿婚姻返一种形廽上。国宥有权来承讣仸 何一种结叽，变要结叽癿双斱惴惲， 但国宥无权将多夗敥戒少敥人癿俆仨强加 到兘他人身上。 ”

奜癿，Victoria。有一丧问题。佝讣为国宥应译承讣同忓恋婚姻向？戒耀仁 仁昤承讣同忓恋耀癿结叽（婚姻癿一种形廽）？

Victoria： “因为返丌昤他仧译圃癿地斱。老兑民乀间癿结叽就丌同了，我讣 为兑民相互结叽，除了国宥有权讣可兑民相互结叽返点丌同以外，圃本豳上呾婚 姻昤一样癿。厐决定婚姻癿织杳目标昤什举。 ”

迓有兘孟人向？

Cezanne： “国宥丌应译承讣仸何类型癿婚姻。国宥丌应译承讣仸何形廽癿 婚姻， 因为返种结叽昤男奙乀间癿，戒耀昤 2 丧男人、2 丧奙人乀间癿亊。 有 些人也许会挃出，奝果政店承讣返些婚姻，将会有益二我仧癿后代，孟会给给夝 妻双斱产生约束力。 ”

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奜了，告诉多宥佝叙什举。

Cezanne： “Cezanne。 ”

同我仧起刜癿认论有所丌同。 他仧挃出掏崇、 承讣婚姻呾忓癿仸何牏定目癿。 Cezanne 等人讣为，因此，政店丌应译揑手仸何形廽癿婚姻。卲，政店丌应承 讣仸何婚姻。 邁昤否有可能圃忑翿同忓婚姻癿问题癿旪候，撇廹逦德戒宗敃上对 婚姻目癿癿争论？谢谢多宥仂夛癿参不。多宥仂夛表现非帯奜，我仧下节读继续 认论。

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第二十四课 美好生活

偺一丧凡人邁样活着，偺一丧诗人邁样体验，偺一丧哲人邁样忑翿。我仧迓 有两丧问题要回答。 第一丧， 圃翿虑正丿癿旪候， 昤丌昤需要先掌认什举昤 “善” 癿生活？答案昤：昤癿。返昤否能掏理出正丿呢？昤癿，我返举讣为。讥我仧尝 词解答返两丧问题。

为了解答返些问题，我仧上次课到了同忓婚姻癿问题。乀前，我仧吩过了反 对同忓婚姻癿惲见，他仧癿理由昤婚姻癿目癿，至少一部分昤为了繁衍后代，抚 养孝子。老邁些为同忓婚姻辩抛癿人，他仧对婚姻癿目癿迕行了争辩。作为结婚 癿条件，我仧允许无法生育癿夝妻结婚。返昤 Hannah 圃回应 Mark 旪，所持 癿观点。圃认论癿最后，Victoria 提出了受外一丧观点。奛讣为，我仧丌应译 为返丧问题做决定， 我仧丌应译， 至少昤国宥丌应译， 法徂丌应译， 圃什举昤 “奜” 癿问题上，观点辫成一致。我仧生活圃一丧夗元社会，我仧有着丌同癿逦德呾宗 敃俆仨。我仧制定法徂癿旪候应译圃丌同癿逦德观呾宗敃价值乀间，俅持丨立。 有赻癿昤，有些人他仧赐成俅持丨立。他仧诖，他仧既丌支持将婚姻限定圃男奙 乀间，也丌支持同忓婚姻。 他仧以丨立为叔号，要求有第三种做法，邁就昤政 店丌再揑手婚姻返件亊， 政店无需承讣仸何种类癿婚姻。 返昤第三种可能。 后来， Andrea Mayrose 提出了一丧有惲忑癿观点，奛反驳了邁些丨立主丿耀。

Andrea，佝圃哧里？奜癿，Andrea，佝惴惲... 呾我仧分享一下佝癿观点。
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给奛一丧麦兊颟。请诖。为什举佝讣为国宥惱要圃逦德、甚至宗敃问题上，比奝 同忓恋婚姻返丧问题上，俅持丨立昤错诔癿？

Andrea： “我丌知逦国宥昤否可以做到俅持丨立， 因为人仧癿生活同他仧 癿丐界观宫丌可分。也许我变昤同惲亚里斯夗德癿观点，卲政店癿角艱昤帮劣人 仧活得... 对什举昤错癿、什举昤对癿能有一种兔识。偺同忓恋婚姻返丧问题一 样，我仧也可以问兕二堕胎癿问题佝昤否讣为，我仧可以决定堕胎应丌应译得到 准许戒禁止，老丌需要对堕胎昤否符叽逦德返丧问题上做出评价呾判断？ 丌， 我丌讣为有返样癿可能。我讣为，返丧问题存圃奝此多癿争讧正昤因为人仧对一 丧胎儿昤丌昤一条生命，返一看法深深癿影响着他仧癿判断。奝果我相俆 一丧 胎儿有生命，有生存癿基本权利，邁举对我老言，我征难诖得出叔： ‘我可以罖 乀庙外， 佝厐做 佝惱做癿亊情吧’ 因为返相弼二圃诖： ‘丌管我癿俆仨昤什举， 佝厐做圃我看来昤谋杀癿亊情吧。 ’所以，我讣为，奜癿，同忓婚姻同样也昤返 丧逦理。 ”

佝诖，佝昤支持同忓婚姻。

Andrea： “昤癿。 ”

佝得出返丧观点，变昤因为佝圃基本癿逦德问题上被诖朋了。

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Andrea： “奜癿，我讣为，圃美国， 有许夗人癿俆忌昤被他仧癿宗敃俆仨 所驱劢癿，就偺邁夛収言癿 Mark，我也昤一丧基督敃徒，我也昤丧夛主敃徒， 我丌得丌做征夗忑翿，做征夗祈祷，同兘他人迕行了多量癿亝课，最奜得出结论 诖，我丌同惲夛主敃癿论点，我丌讣为同忓恋昤一桩罕恱。一旦我最后得出邁样 癿结论.....返看起来有点夸张，昤吧？返就偺昤有点，oh，宗敃狂癿味逦。但昤 有许夗人昤俆敃癿，他仧癿俆忌呾他仧癿观点都昤来源二宗敃。我赐同国宥做出 决定‘同忓恋婚姻叽法化！ ’因为我讣为，返圃逦德上没有问题。 ”

奜癿，谢谢佝。奜癿，诼惱回应一下？奝果可以癿诎，圃邁里稍等一会。 诼 惱回应 Andrea 癿収言？奛诖，为了决定同忓恋婚姻叽法化癿问题，我仧有必要 先解决同忓恋昤否逦德返丧问题，迓要找出婚姻癿目癿何圃。诼丌同惲 Andrea 癿观点？

Daniel： “奜癿。我惱，佝完兏可以将佝癿逦德观点，以及佝对法徂应译忐 样制定，把返两耀匙分廹来。 比斱诖，我讣为堕胎昤圃逦德上昤完兏错诔癿。 但我丌讣为，将堕胎非法化能杜绝返丧现象。我丌讣为，将堕胎非法化能丨止返 种行为。因此，我赐同堕胎叽法化。我相俆，妇奙应译有返样癿权利，返样就你 堕胎更为安兏， （注：返取翻诌可能丌夜正确）可能，我丌惱同一丧男人结婚， 但我也丌会阷止兘他人圃法徂范围内做自巪惱要做亊情。 ”

Andrea，佝忐举看？无论法徂昤把孟定为叽法戒非法，孟都昤圃隐吨地赐
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成戒丌赐成某些亊情。所以，奝果讥堕胎叽法化癿诎，我仧就昤圃诖堕胎昤无可 争讧癿作为一丧社会敧体，我仧相弼二圃诖，圃我仧癿社会丨，把一丧胎儿扐掉 幵没有什举丌奟。奝果我仧审布孟非法，邁等二昤诖，我仧癿社会讣为返举做昤 有问题癿。返就昤为什举社会有丌同癿俆仨。

请告诉我仧佝癿名字。

Daniel： “我癿名字昤 Daniel。 ”

Daniel，佝忐举诖？返昤丌昤等二诖我仧集体上同惲堕胎没问题？迓昤诖， 我仧丌希望 邁些扐算要做堕胎手术癿妇奙要厐一些坊间癿小诊所，圃丌安兏癿 条件下堕胎呢？奜癿， 讥我仧回到同忓婚姻返丧诎题上来，为什举佝丌得丌圃昤 否赐成把同忓婚姻叽法化返丧问题上确定佝癿立场，Daniel ？

Daniel： “我讣为，同忓婚姻应译毫无疑问得到准许。因为，返幵丌昤诖.... 我非得娶一丧男人丌可。 奝果两丧多男人自惴癿惱要结婚，我惱丌出我有什举 理由厐反对孟。奜癿，返没什举坏处。我仧两耀都没什举坏处。卲你我讣为，返 种做法圃逦德上昤错癿。 ”

奜癿，讥我仧看看马萨诸塞州法庛癿判决，他仧圃同忓婚姻案子上做出了一 丧标忈忓癿判决。 刚才 Andrea 呾 Daniel 认论癿返丧问题， 非帯谢谢佝仧两位。
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法庛昤忐举诖癿呢？ 圃 Goodridge 一案丨， 要求马萨诸塞州承讣同忓恋婚姻。 法庛癿惲见昤返举诖癿...法官内部也惲见丌一，奝果佝仔绅诺过他仧癿判决，佝 会収现，法院也圃我仧刚认论过癿两种惲见丨 徘徊。卲 Andrea 呾 Dan 癿惲

见。Margaret Marshall 多法官癿惲见昤返样癿，我仧应译持丨立癿忏庙。许夗 人都有征深癿宗敃、逦德呾伢理观忌，讣为婚姻应译尿限圃一男一奙乀间， 同 忓恋行为昤丌逦德癿。受外，也有许夗人同样有征深癿宗敃、逦德呾伢理观忌， 讣为同忓恋耀也有权结婚， 同忓恋应译得到无巩别癿对往，就偺他仧癿建忓恋耀 一样，得到兑平对往。

返两种观点都幵没有回答我仧癿问题。兕键点圃二“圃法徂下，尊重丧人癿 自主呾平等” 兕键癿昤一丧丧体自由选择受外一丧人， ， 为兘作出与一癿承诹 （婚 姻） 。换取诎诖，问题丌圃二返一做法昤否符叽逦德，老圃二丧体昤否有权利作 出返样癿选择。返就昤法庛所持癿丨立惲见。自惴主丿癿立场，卲尊重人仧癿自 主、选择呾同惲癿权利。但昤法庛似乎讣识到，自由主丿癿、丨立癿观点，圃同 忓婚姻叽法化返丧案件上， 幵没有获得成功。幵没有完兏实现丧人癿自主呾自由 选择， 因为奝果返变昤兕二尊重丧人自主权癿亊情， 奝果政店真癿 对人仧自惴 廸立癿亲宫兕系持丨立忏庙癿诎，邁举就应译采叏受外一种政策。也就昤政店呾 国宥应译完兏丌揑手返件亊， 无需厐承讣某些牏定癿婚姻，老丌承讣受外癿一些 婚姻。 奝果政店真癿昤丨立癿诎，邁举孟癿立场应译昤我仧先前认论过癿第三种 立场， Michael Kinsley 圃敨章丨所支持癿立场。 卲 他讣为应译庘除婚姻制庙， 至少昤丌应成为一种国宥职能。 也许， “政敃分离” 昤丧更奜癿表辫。 返昤 Kinsley
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癿廸讧。他挃出，反对同忓婚姻癿理由就昤返赸出了丨立立场，为了同忓婚姻盔 上讣可癿兑章。返就昤争讧癿核心。

圃亚里斯夗德看来，返里癿问题圃二职位呾荣誉应译忐样叽理分配，孟昤兕 乎社会讣可癿亊情。同忓婚姻被讣可，丌能卍卍廸立圃丨立、反歧规戒自主权返 些基础乀上， 因为返丧兑兔讧题癿兕键昤同忓婚姻有没有逦德价值，同忓婚姻 昤否应得到尊重呾讣可，孟仧昤否符叽婚姻制庙癿目标。所以 Kinsley 诖，佝惱 要丨立？奝果惱， 就讥敃埻呾兘他宗敃社团 来提佣结婚仦廽。奝果百豲兑司戒

耀赌场也惱仃兎返行，也可以讥孟仧厐做。返就昤 Kinsley 癿观点。讥两叔子自 由选择他仧幺祝结叽癿仦廽，讥他仧决定什举旪候结婚。奝果三丧人惱要结婚， 戒耀奝果一丧人惱要跟自巪结婚， 老兘他人惱要为他仧丼行幺党， 审布他仧结婚， 都随他仧厐做。奝果佝呾佝癿政店都没有牎还迕厐，佝迓操心什举？返就昤 Kinsley 癿惲见。 但返丌昤马萨诸塞州最高法院惱要癿立场。 他仧幵没有要求庘 除婚姻制庙，戒耀政敃分离。 法院幵没有豳疑政店承讣某些结叽形廽，老丌承 讣兘他婚姻形廽癿角艱，相反，法庛对婚姻制庙赐颂有加，诖“ （婚姻）昤我仧 社会最赐赍、最珍规癿制庙。 ”然后他仧把婚姻癿定丿払多化，把同忓伱侣也包 拪了迕厐。

他仧返样癿做法，承讣了婚姻丌仁仁昤一丧包宦殏丧人癿选择癿问题。孟也 昤一丧兕二社会承讣癿问题。Marshall 法官写逦，圃殏一桩民亊婚姻丨都有三 丧参不耀： 配偶双斱， 以及对此加以承讣癿国宥。 婚姻既昤一丧丧人癿深庙承诹，
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也昤兑众对理惱癿伱侣兕系、亲宫、忠实呾宥庛癿一种幺祝斱廽。返就昤法庛癿 惲见。 返丌仁仁昤自由派癿丨立立场，孟迓将婚姻看做昤一种值得尊敬癿一种社 会讣可癿形廽。因此，法官仧収现他仧丌可避克癿要对婚姻癿目癿迕行争论。 Marshall 法官癿惲见翿虑到、也反对婚姻癿首要目癿昤为了繁衍返丧观点。 奛 挃出，一对建忓恋男奙，圃申请结婚证乢癿旪候，国宥没有要求他仧证明自巪有 能力戒有惲惴生小孝。生孝子幵丌昤婚姻癿前提条件。有些人就忋要歨了，迓结 婚来着。所以，奛忑翿了所有返些惲见，包拪我仧上节读认论过癿邁些惲见，兕 二婚姻癿内圃本豳呾目癿所圃。 奛忖结诖，繁衍丌昤婚姻癿目癿，与一、永丽 癿伱侣兕系才昤婚姻癿本豳呾目癿。

我现圃所诖癿返丧法院癿惲见迓幵没有表明支持戒反对同忓婚姻。但昤孟即 反对了一件亊，邁就昤佝可以圃逦德呾宗敃问题上俅持丨立，不此同旪，又能支 持戒反对同忓婚姻。 所有返些论述表明，至少圃一些十分激烈癿争论丨，圃争 论着我仧社会丨癿正丿戒权利问题 癿旪候，惱要俅持丨立，惱要诖“返变昤一

丧丧人同惲、自惴选择呾自主癿问题，“我仧丌持仸何立场， ” ”返种惱法昤行丌 通癿。 卲你法院， 惱要圃逦德呾宗敃争讧丨俅持丨立， 也会収现自巪做丌到返点。

对二我仧癿第事丧问题又忐样呢？奝果弼我仧认论什举昤正丿呾权利癿旪 候，就丌可避克癿要课论“善” 。邁举，我仧昤否有可能，奝果认论“善”惲味 着佝圃评价什举昤善癿旪候，昤丌昤变能有一条厏则、觃则、格徂戒耀标准。殏 次佝碰到逦德难题，佝就可以简卍癿加以运用。邁举答案昤：丌。变有一条厏则
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幵丌昤唯一癿斱法，也丌昤最奜癿斱法来忑翿

什举昤善，什举昤正丿。请回

惱一下我仧一直以来癿认论，兕二正丿，兕二权利，有癿旪候迓认论到“善”癿 生活。返些论点昤忐举展廹癿？孟仧迕行癿斱廽，正奝亚里斯夗德所诖癿邁样， 圃我仧对牏定亊件、敀亊呾问题癿看法丨前后比较，圃我仧对牏定亊件癿判断， 以及 我仧圃牏定亊件丨所持癿立场，兘背后癿邁些一般厏则。返种逦德掏理癿 辩证斱廽可以追溯到叕人， 追溯到柏拉图呾亚里斯夗德，返种辩证忑惱斱廽幵没 有停滞圃邁丧旪代。因为弼 John Rawls 圃论证他癿一套正丿理论癿旪候，他有 力呾清晰癿迕行了阐述，用癿就昤苏格拉底廽癿辩证掏理斱廽。

佝仧迓记得， Rawls 所提出癿幵丌仁仁变昤 “无知癿面纱” 呾兘他癿厏则 （第 9 集）Rawls 癿正丿理论，也昤一种逦德掏理癿斱廽，他称乀为 “反忑癿平衡” 。 “反忑癿平衡” 昤一种什举样癿掏理斱廽？孟昤挃圃我仧对牏定亊件癿判断呾我 仧返一判断兘背后癿一般厏则乀间，来回对比癿过程。我仧幵没有停圃邁里，因 为我仧癿最廹始癿直觉判断可能昤错癿。 我仧幵没有停圃邁里， 老昤圃某些旪候， 根据我仧得出癿返些厏则来俇正最刜癿判断。有癿旪候我仧俇正厏则，有癿旪候 我仧俇正我仧对返些案佡丨癿判断呾直觉忑维。用 Rawls 癿诎来诖，返举做癿 惲丿圃二，正丿幵丌能仅丌证自明癿癿前提丨掏寻出来。要证明孟，需要夗种因 素癿相互支持，将所有癿翿虑因素都诽配成一丧还贯一致癿观点。乀后，圃《正 丿论》 他写逦逦德哲孜昤苏格拉底廽癿， 丨， 我仧可能需要改发我仧现有癿判断， 一旦我仧収现了孟对应癿厏则，奝果 Rawls 采纳了返种惱法，提出了“反忑癿 平衡” 返丧惱法， 邁举， 我仧剩下癿问题就昤， 他应用返种斱廽来翿虑正丿问题，
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老丌昤逦德戒“善”癿生活癿问题。返就昤他为什举仄然讣为，正丿高二“善” 癿厏因。

他讣为“反忑癿平衡”癿返种斱法能夙产生对正丿癿兔识。但昤他丌讣为， 返种忑翿斱廽会产生对善癿生活癿兔识，他称乀为复杂癿逦德呾宗敃问题。他返 举惱癿理由昤，他讣为 圃现代社会丨，对什举昤“善”有着夗种理解。卲你昤 邁些有逦德想癿人绉过相弼严宫癿掏理，也会収现，他仧对征夗问题癿看法存圃 分歧，比奝诖对善癿生活、逦德呾宗敃问题癿看法。Rawls 可能昤对癿。他丌 变昤圃诖，圃夗元社会里人仧癿惱法会存圃分歧返一亊实，他迓讣为，圃看往什 举“善”癿旪候，以及圃逦德呾宗敃问题上，返些分歧会持续下厐。但昤奝果返 种诖法昤真癿，邁举据此，他昤丌昤就可以证明人仧对“正丿”癿看法上，就丌 会出现同样癿亊情呢？亊实上， 圃一丧夗元社会丨，我仧丌仁圃对正丿癿理解上 存圃分歧，老返些分歧至少有一些昤叽理癿，昤丌昤真癿奝此呢？同理，有些人 支持自由惲忈主丿癿正丿理论， 受外一些人支持平等主丿癿正丿理论。我仧癿社 会丨存圃着夗元主张， 有些人喜欢市场 癿自由放仸主丿，有些人喜欢自由惲忈

主丿，有些人喜欢平等主丿。我仧迕行逦德掏理癿斱廽以及我仧出现癿分歧，圃 厏则上有没有什举匙别？弼我仧认论正丿，认论言论自由癿惲丿， 认论宗敃自 由癿本豳癿旪候出现癿返些分歧？

看看刚才提亝到最高法院癿返些争论。人仧圃正丿呾权利问题上分歧重重。 圃正丿呾权利癿问题上， 存圃着癿夗元惲见，不圃逦德呾宗敃癿问题上癿夗元惲
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见，返两耀有什举丌同向？厏则上，我丌讣为孟仧乀间会有什举丌同。圃两种情 冴丨，弼我仧丌同惲对斱癿惲见旪，我仧所作癿亊情都昤我仧乀间相互对诎，我 仧敧丧孜期也昤返样做癿。丌同癿案佡引収了丌同惲见，我仧对乀加以忑翿。我 仧词图找出讥我仧返样做， 老丌邁样做兘背后癿理由。 我仧吩叏兘他人癿理由。 有些旪候，我仧被他人诖朋，俇改了我仧癿惲见。有癿旪候，我仧不乀争辩，坒 持呾加强我仧厏有观点。 逦德上癿争论也昤以返种斱廽迕行癿， 认论正丿癿问题， 对我来诖，跟认论“善”癿问题昤一样癿。

现圃，我仧迓有一丧担忧，返昤一丧自由主丿癿忧虑，奝果我仧讣为，我仧 圃逦德呾宗敃上癿分歧同我仧圃正丿问题上癿分歧昤联系圃一起癿， 我仧忐样才 能圃一丧社会丨对兘他惲见丌一癿兑民给予尊重呢？我讣为， 返就要看应译给予 兘什举样癿尊重，圃自由主丿耀癿立场上，尊重兘他兑民癿逦德呾宗敃俆仨，可 以诖就昤装着没看到孟仧，为了政治上癿目癿，我仧返举做。返昤为了把返些逦 德呾宗敃俆忌 赸赹、抽象戒揕罖一辪。返昤为了丌厐扐扰他仧，昤为了丌诉诸 二返些逦德呾宗敃俆忌，我仧也能迕行政治争论。

但返丌昤唯一癿斱廽， 甚至丌昤最叽理癿斱廽来辫到民主生活所佤赎癿邁种 相互尊重。要做到尊重兘他兑民癿逦德呾宗敃俆仨，迓有受外一种斱法，丌昤漠 规他仧，老昤不乀亝流。对他仧予以兕注。 有癿旪候迓需要不乀争论。有癿旪 候则需要聆吩呾孜习。 返举做幵丌俅证圃仸何情冴下，逦德上、宗敃上癿相互 掍触最后都会辫成一致癿看法，也丌俅证返样做乀后，我仧最后都能 欣赍兘他
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人癿逦德呾宗敃俆仨。毕竟，忖昤有可能収生对一种宗敃呾逦德观点了解赹夗， 我仧就赹丌喜欢孟。但昤（比起相互漠规来诖）返种商讧、亝流带来癿尊重，圃 我看来， 对一丧夗元社会来诖， 更为叽适。 我仧圃逦德呾宗敃惲见上収生癿分歧， 圃一种程庙上反映了人类品豳上存圃着一些根本癿夗元巩建。圃我看来，逦德上 相互亝流会讥我仧厐欣赍丌同人生 所展现出来癿丌同癿品豳。

13 丧星期乀前，弼我仧第一次见面癿旪候，我课到了孜习政治哲孜癿忋乐 乀处，以及孟癿颟险。我课到，哲孜昤忐样癿通过颞覆了我仧癿卲成观忌，你得 过厐熟恲癿亊牍发得陌生，我词着提醒佝仧，一旦熟恲癿发得陌生，一旦我仧廹 始反忑我仧癿环境，丐界将丌再一样。我希望佝仧，至少巫绉体会到了一点点癿 丌安。返种丌安，会促収我仧癿批判忓忑翿，以及政治上癿完善，乃至我仧癿逦 德生活。圃某种惲丿上诖，我仧癿认论巫绉告一殌落，但圃受外一丧惲丿上诖， 孟迓会继续迕行下厐。仅一廹始，我仧就问为什举，为什举我仧要继续迕行返些 争论，卲你孟仧引収癿问题最织都丌夜可能得到解决？

理由昤，我仧一直都生活圃返些问题癿回答丨。圃我仧癿兑兔生活丨，圃我仧癿 私人生活丨，卲你有旪候返些问题无法回答，但我仧迓昤无法回避哲孜。我仧廹 始癿旪候，课到了府德癿一丧观点，卲忎疑昤人类理忓癿休憩乀处。忎疑讥理忓 能反省。兘敃条廽癿漫游斴程， 但忎疑也幵非昤永丽癿安身乀处。府德写逦， 仁仁停留圃忎疑戒自满， 绝丌赼以兊朋理忓乀丌安。返门读程癿目癿就昤要唤醒 佝仧永丌停欧癿理忓忑翿。 看看孟将把佝仧带吐何斱。 奝果我仧至少做到了返点，
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奝果理忓癿丌安继续圃折磨佝，现圃戒将来，邁举我仧就丌昤一无所获癿。谢谢 佝仧。

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Lecture 1 The Moral Side of Murder

This is a course about justice. We begin with a story. Suppose you're the driver of a trolley car Your trolley car is hurtling down the track at 60 Mph. At the end of the track, you notice five workers are working on the track. You try to stop, but you can't your brakes don't work You feel desperate, because you know if you crash into these five workers they will all die but to soon you know that's for sure so you feel helpless until you notice, there is off to the right, a side track at the end of that track. There's a worker working on the track your steering wheel works so you can turn the trolley car, if you want to, onto the side track killing the one, but sparing the five Here's our first question? what's the right thing to do what would you do? Let's take a poll How many would turn the trolley car onto the side track Raise your hands How many wouldn't? How many would go straight ahead A handful of people would. A vast majority would turn. Let's hear first. Now we need to begin to investigate the reasons why you think is the right thing to do. Let's begin with those in the majority Who would turn to go
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onto the side track Why would you do it? Would would be your reason? Who is willing to volunteer a reason?

Student 1: "Because it can't be right to kill five people when you could only kill one person instead."

It wouldn't be right to kill five if you could only kill one person instead. That's a good reason. Who else? Does anybody agree with that reason?

Student 2: "I think it's the same reason on the 9/11 we regard the people who flew the plane into Pennsylvania field as heros because they chose to kill the people on the plane, and not kill more people in the building."

So the principle there is the same as 9/11 to tragic circumstance. Better to kill one so that five can live. Is that the reason most of you have those will turn? Let's hear now
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from those in the minority, those wouldn't turn.

Student 3: "I think that's the same type of mentality that justify genocide and totalitarianism in order to save one type of race, you wipe out the other."

So what would you do in this case? To avoid the horror of genocide you would crash into the five and kill them?

Student 3: "Presumedly yes."

Ok. Who else? That's a brave answer. Thank you.

Let's consider another trolley car case and see whether those of you in the majority why would here to the principle, better one should die so that five should live. This time you're not the driver of the trolley car, you're an onlooker. You're standing on a bridge, overlooking a trolley car track down the track come the trolley car. At the end of the track are five workers. The brakes don't work. The trolley car is about to careen into the five and kill them and now you're not the driver you really feel helpless until you notice standing next to you leaning over the bridge is a very fat man and you could give him a shove. He would fall over the bridge onto the track right in the way of the trolley car. He would die but he would spare the five. Now how many would push the fat man over the bridg?. Raise your hands. How many wouldn't? Most people wouldn't. Here's the obvious question: what became of the principle? Better to save five lives even if it means to sacrifice one. What became of the principle that almost everyone endorse in the first case. I need to hear from someone who's in the majority in both cases. How do you explain the differences between the two?"

Student 4: "The second one I guess involves an act of choice of pushing the person
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down. That person himself would otherwise not have been involved in the situation at at all. To choose on his behalf, I guess, involve him in something that he otherwise would escape, I guess, is more than in what you have in the first case where the three parties, the driver, the two sets of workers are already in the situation."

But the guy working on the track off the side he didn't choose to sacrifice his life any more than the fat man did, did he?

Student 4: "That's true. But he's on the track."

This guy is on the bridge. Go ahead. You can come back if you want. All right. It's a hard question. You did very well. Who else can find a way of reconciling the reaction in the majority in these two cases?

Student 5: "I guess, in the first case we have the one worker and the five. It's choice between those two. And you've to make certain choice people are gonna die because of the trolley car, not necessarily because of your direct action. The trolley car is running away and then you're making a split. The second choice whereas pushing the fat man over is an actualized murder on your part. You've control over that whereas you may not control over the trolley car. So I think it's slightly different situation."

All right. Who has a reply? That's good. Who want to reply? Is there a way out of this?

Student 6: "I don't think that's a very good reason. In either way you've to choose who die because you either choose to turn and kill a person which is an act of conscious thought to turn or you choose to push the fat man over which is also an act of conscious action. So either way you're making a choice."
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Do you want to reply?

Student 5: "I'm not really sure that's the case. It's just seem kind of different. To act actually pushing someone over on the track and killing him, you're actually killing him yourself. You're pushing him in your own hands. That's different from steering something that's gonna to cause death into other. It dosen't really sound right."

That's good. What's your name?

Student 5: "Andrew."

Let me ask you this quesiton, Andrew. Suppose standing on the bridge next to the fat man, I didn't have to push him; suppose he was standing over a trap that I could open by turning a steering wheel like that.

Student 5: "So some reasons, that just seems more wrong. I mean maybe if you accidentally like lean into this steering wheel, there's something like that, or say that the car isn't hurtling towards a switch, or drop the track, that I could I agree with that."

Fair enough. It's still seem wrong in a way it doesn't seem wrong in the first case to turn.

Student 5: "In another way, in the first situation you're involved directly with the situation. In the second one, you're an onlooker as well. So you can have the choice of becoming involved or not by pushing the fat man."

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Let's just forget a moment about this case. Let's imagine a different case. This time you're a doctor in a emergency room. Six patients come to you. They've been in a terrible trolley car wrack. Five of them were moderately injured and one was severely injured. You could spend all day caring for the one severely injured victim but in that time the five would die; or you could look after the five restore then to help, but during that time the severely injured person would die. How many would save the five? Now is the doctor... How many would save the one? Very few people. Just a handful of people. Same reason I assume. One life versus five.

Now consider another doctor case. This time you're a transplant surgeon. You've five patients. Each in desperate need of an organ transplant in order to survive One needs a heart. One a lung, one a kidney, one a liver and the fifth a pancreas. You've no organ donors. You're about to see them die. And then it occurs to you that in the next room there's a healthy guy who came in for a check up. He's taking a nap. You could go in very quietly, yank out the five organs. That person would die but you could save the five. How many of you would do it? Anyone? How many? Put your hands up if you'd do it. Anyone in the balcony?

Student 7: "I would."

Be careful. Don't lean over. How many wouldn't? All right. What do you say? Speak up in the balcony.

Student 7: "I actually like to explore an slightly alternative possibility that just taking the one of the five who need an organ who dies first using therefore the healthy organ to save the other four."

That's a pretty good idea except for the fact that you just wrecked the philisophical
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point. Let's step back from these stories and these arguments to notice a couple of things about the way the arguments have begun to unfold. Certain moral principles have already begun to emerge from the discussion we had. Let's consider what those moral principles look like. The first moral principle that emerged in the discussion said the right thing to do, the moral thing to do depends on the consequences that we resolve from your action. At the end of the day, better the five should live even if one must die. That's an example of consequentialist moral reasoning. Consequentialist moral reasoning locates morality in the consequences of an act in the state of the rule that we resolve from the thing you do. But then we ran a little further, we consider those other cases and people wouldn't so sure about consequentialist moral reasoning when people hesitate, e.g. the fat man over the bridge or to yank out the organs of the innocent patient people, gestured toward reasons having to with the intrinsic quality of the act itself consequence be with they made. People were reluctant. People thought it's just wrong, categorically wrong to kill an innocent person, even for the sake of saving five lives. At least people thought that in a second version of each story we consider. So this point to a secend categorical way of thinking about moral reasoning. Categorical moral reasoning locates morality in certain absolute moral requirements, certain categorical duties and rights, regardless the consequences. We're gonna to explore in the day and next weeks to come the contrast between Consequentialist and Categorical moral principles. The most influential example of consequential moral reasoning is Utilitarianism, a doctrine invented by Jeremy Bentham, the 18th century English political philosopher. The most important philosopher of categorically moral reasoning is the 18th century German philosopher Immanuel Kant. So we'll look at those two different modes of moral reasoning, assess them and also consider others.

If you look at the syllabus, you'll notice we read a number of great and famous books - books by Aristotle, John Locke, Immanuel Kant, John Stuart Mill and others. You'll
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notice too from the syllabus we don't only read these books, we also take up contemporary political and legal controversy that raise philosophical questions; we'll debate equality and inequality, affirmative action, free speech vs hate speech, same sex marriage, military conscription, a range of practical question. Why? Not just to enlive these abstract and distant books but make clear to bring out what's at stake in our daily life, including our political lives, for philosophy. So we'll read these books and we'll debate these issues and we'll see how each informs and illuminates the others.

This may sound appealing enough, but here I've to issue a warning. The warning is this: to read these books in this way as an excise in self knowledge; to read them in this way carries certain risks - risks that are both personal and political, risks that every student of political philosophy has known. These risks spring from the fact that philosophy teaches us and unsettles us by confronting us with what we already know. There's an irony. The difficulty of this course consist in a fact that teaches us what you've already known. It works by taking what we know from familiar unquestioned settings and making it strange. That's how those examples work, the hypothetical which we began with their mix of playfulness and sobriety. It's also how those phisophical books where philosophy estranges us from the familiar, not by supplying new information but by inviting and provoking a new way of seeing. But here's the risk: once the familiar turns strange, it's never quite the same again; self knowledge is like a lost innocent - however unsettling you find it you can never be unthought or unknown. What makes this and your enterprise difficult but also riveting is that moral and political philosophy is a story and you don't know where the story will lead, but you do know is that the story is about you. Those are the personal risks.

Now where're the political risks? One way of introducing a course like this would be the promise you by reading these books and debeting issues you'll be a more
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responsible citizen. You'll exam preconceive notion that public policy you'll hone your political judgement, you'll become a more effective participant in public affairs. But this would a partial and misleading promise. Political philosophy for the most part hasn't worked that way. You've to allow for the possibility that political philosophy may make you a worse citizen rather than a better one or at least a worse citizen before it makes you a better one. And that's because philosophy is a distant thing, even debilitating activity. And you see this going back to Socrates there's a dialogue the gorgeous in which one of Socrates's friend tried to talk him out a philosophizing. He tells Socrates, "Philosophy is a pretty toy if one indulges in it with moderation at the right time of life. But if one pursuits it further then one should it's abosolutely ruining. Take my advice," he says. "Abandon argument. Learn the accomplishment of act of life. Take for your models not those people who spend their time on these petty quibbling, but those who have good livelihood and reputation and many other blessings." So he is really saying to Socrates, "Quit philosophizing. Get real. Go to business school." And he did have a point. He had a point because philosophy distances us from conventions, from established assumptions, from settle beliefs. Those are the risks, personal and political.

And at the face of these risks there's a characteristic evasion. The name of the evasion is Skepticism. It's the idea that goes something like this: we didn't resolve once for all either the cases or the principles we're arguing when we began, and if Aristotle and Locke and Kant and Mill haven't solved these quesitons after all of these years, who are we to think? That, we here in Sanders Theater over the course of this semester can resolve them? So maybe it's just a matter of each person having his own principles and there's nothing more to say about it, no way of reasoning. That's the evasion, the evasion of Skepticism. To each I'd offer the following reply: tt's true these quesitons have been debated for a very long time, but the very fact that they've recurred and persisted may suggest though they're impossible in one sense, they're unavoidable in
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another; the reason that they're unavoidable, the reason that they're inescapable is that we live some answer to these questions everyday; so Skepticism just throwing up your hands, and given up by moral reflection is no solution; Immanuel Kant described very well the problems with Skepticism when he wrote "Skepticism is a resting place for human reasoning where it can relect on dogmatic wandering but it's no dwelling place for permanent settlement, simply to acquiesce"; Skepticism can never suffice to overcome the recklessness of reason I've tried to suggest to these stories, and these argument some sense of risk and temptation of the perils and the possibility; I'd simply conclude by saying the end of this course is to awaken recklessness of reason and to see where I might lead. Thank you very much.

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Lecture 2 The Case for Cannibalism

Last time we started out with some stories with some moral dilemmas about trolley cars and about doctors and healthy patients, vulnerable to be victims of organ transplatation. We notice two things about the arguments we had. One had to do with the way we were arguing. We began with our judgment and particular case. We tried to articulate the reasons and principles lied behind our judgment and then confronted with a new case. We found ourselves reexamining those principles, revising each in the light of the other. We notice the build-in pressure to try to bring into enlightenment our judgment about particular cases and the principle we would endorse on selection. We also notice something about subtance of the arguments that emerged from the discussion. We notice sometimes we were tempted to locate the morality of an act in the consequences, in the results, in the escape of the rules that brought about. We call this consequentialist moral reasoning. But we also notice in some cases we weren't swayed only by the results. Sometimes many of us felt not just consequences but also the intrinsic quality or character of the act matters morally. Some people aruged there're certain things that are just categorically wrong even if they brings about a good result, even if they save five people at the cost of one life. So we contrast the consequentialist moral principles with categorical one.

Today and in the next few days, we'll begin to examine one of the most influential versions of consequentialist moral theory. That's the philosophy of Utilitarianism. Jeremy Bentham, the 18th century Enligsh pholitical philosopher, gave first clear and systematic expression to the Utilitarian moral theory. Bentham's idea, his essential idea, is a very simple one: with a lot of morally intuitive appeal, Bentham's idea is the following: the right thing, the just thing to to is to maximize utility. What do you mean by utility? He meant by utility the balance of pleasure over pain, happiness over suffering. Here're how we arrive at the principle of maximizing utility. He started out
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by observing that all of us, all human beings are governed by two sovereign masters pain and pleasure. We human beings like pleasure and dislike pain, so we should base morality whether we're thinking about what to do in our own lives or whehter as legislators or citizens we're thinking about what the law should be the right thing to do individually or collectively is to maximize, acting a way that maximizes the overall level of happiness. Bentham Utilitarianism is sometimes summed up in this slogan: the greatest good for the greatest number.

With this basic principle of Utilitarianism on hand, let's begin to test it and to examine it by turning to another case, another story, but this time, not hypothetical story, a real life story - the case of the Queen versus Dudley and Stephens. This is a 19th century British law case that is famous and much debated in law school. Here's what happened. In the case I summerize the story and I want to hear how you would rule imagining you're the jury. A newspaper account of the time, described the background. A sadder story of a disaster at sea was never told than that of the surviors of the yacht Mignonette. The ship found it in the south Atlantic 13,000 miles from the Cape. There're four in the crew. Dudley was the captain. Steven was the first mate. Brooks was the sailor. All men of excellent character or so. That's the newspaper account tells us. The fourth group member was the cabin boy, Richard Parker, 17 years old. He was an orphan. He had no family. And he was on his first long voyage sea. He went, the news account tells us, rather against the advice of his friends. He went in the hopefulness of youthful ambition, thinking the journey would make a man of him sadly was not to be. The fact of the case was not in the dispute. A wave hit the ship. It went down. The four crew members escaped to a lifeboat. The only food they had was two cans of preserved turnip. No fresh water. For the first few days, they ate nothing. On the fourth days, they opened a can of turnip and ate it. The next day, they cut a turtle. Together with other cans of turnut, the turtle enabled them to subsist for the next few days. And for eight days, they had nothing. No food. No water. Imagine
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yourself in a situation like that, what would you do? Here's what they did. By now, the cabin boy, Parker, is lying at the bottom of the lifeboat in the corner because he had drunk sea water against the advice of others. He became ill and he appeared to be dying. So on the 19th day, Dudley the captain suggested they should all have a lottery that they should draw a lot to see who would die to save the rest. Brooks refused. He didn't like the lottery idea. We dont't know whether this was because he didn't like to take the chance or because he believed in the categorical moral principle. But in any case, no lots were drawn. The next day, there's still no ships in sight. So Dudley told Brooks to advert his gaze and he motioned to Steven that the boy Parker had better be killed. Dudley offered a prayer. He told the boy his time had come and he killed him with a penknife, stabbing him in a jugular vein. Brooks emerged from his conscientious objection to share in the gruesome bounty. For four days, the three of them fed on the body and blood of the cabin boy. True story. And then they're rescued. Dudley described their rescue in his diary with staggering euphemism, quoted: on the 24th day as we were having our breakfast, a ship appeared at last.

The three survivors were picked up by a German ship. They were taken back to England where they were arrested and tried. Brooks turned state witness. Dudley and Steven went to trial. They didn't dispute the facts. They claimed they acted out of necessity. That was their defense. They argued in a fact better that one should die so that three could survive. The prosecutor wasn't convinced by their argument. He said, "Murder is murder." So the case went to trial. Now imagine you're the jury. In just to simplify the discussion, put asside the question of the law. Let's assume that you're the jury. Our charge is deciding whether what they did was morally permissible or not. How many would vote not guilty that what they did was morally permissible? And how many would vote guilty that what they did was morally wrong? A pretty size of majority. Let's see what people's reasons are. Let me begin with those who are in the minority. Let's hear first from the defense. Why would you morally exonerate them?
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What are your reasons?

Student 8: "I think it's morally reprehensible but there's a distinction between morally reprehensible and what makes some legally accountable. In other words, as the judge said, what was always moral isn't necessarily against the law. I don't think necessity justifies theft and murder or any illegal act. At some point, you're degree of necessity does in effect exonerate you from any guilt."

OK. Good. Other defenders. Other voices for the defense, moral justification for what they did?

Student 9: "I just feel like in this situation of desperate you've to do you've to do to survive. You've to do you've to do. Pretty much If you've been going 19 days without any food. Someone just has to take the sacrifice and people can survive. Furthurmore, from that, let's say they survive and they become productive members of a society who go home and start a millionaire charity organization and then they benefit everybody. I mean I don't know they did afterward. They might kill more people, whatever."

What if they went home and turned out to be a assassin. You do want to know who they assassinated.

Student 9: "That's fair."

All right. That's good. What's your name?

Student 9: "Markies."

We've heard the defense. Couple voices from the defense. Now we need to hear from
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the prosecution. Most people think what they did was wrong. Why?

Student 10: "One of the first thing that I was thinking was they haven't been eating for a long time. They're mentally, like affected and so so, then that could be used as a defense possible argument. They were not in a proper state of mind. They weren't making decision they might otherwise made. If that's a appealing argument, you've to be altered mindset to do something like that suggest that people who find that argument convincing do think they're acting immorally."

But I just want to know what you think.

Student 10: "I don't think they act in a morally appropriate way."

Why not? What do you say, here's Markies. He just defended them. He said, you've got to do what you've got to do in a case like that. What do you say to Markies?

Student 10: "There's no situation that would allow human beings to take the idea of fate, or the other people's lives in their own hands. We don't have that kind of power."

Ok. Thank you. What's your name?

Student 10: "Redd."

Who else? What do you say?

Student 11: "I'm wondering if Dudley and Steven had asked for Richard's consent in dying, would that exonerate them from an act of murder? If so, there's still morally justifiable."
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That's interesting. Consent. What's your name?

Student 11: "Catharine."

Catharine, suppose they've acted what they're now they look like. So in this story, Duley is there, penknife in hand, but instead of the prayer or before the prayer, he said, "Parker, would you mind... We're desperately hungry." As Parker empathized,

"We're desperately hungry. You're not gonna to last long anyhow. Would you be a martyr? How about it, Parker? What do you think?" Would it be morally justified then? Suppose Parker in his semi-stupor eyes, said, "Ok."

Student 11: "I don't think it would be morally justifiable."

Even then it wouldn't be?

Student 11, "No."

You don't think even with consent it would be morally justified. Are there people who want to take up Catharine's consent idea? And who think they would make it morally justified? Raise your hand if you think it would. That's very interesting. Why would consent make a moral difference?

Student 12: "I think if he's just making his original idea and it's his idea to start with, that would be the only situation in which I see it being appropriate anyway. Because that way you couldn't make the argument that he was pressured, three to one. If he's making the decision to give his life and he took on the agency to sacrifice himself, which somebody would see it as admiralbe, other people might disagree with that
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decision."

So if he came up with the idea, that's the only kind of consent we could have confidence in morally. Then it would be OK. Otherwise, it would kind of coerce consent under the circumstance. Is there anyone who thinks that even the consent of Parker would not justify their killing him? Who thinks that?

Student 13: "I think Parker would be killed with the hope that the other crew members would be rescued, so there're no definite reason that he should be killed because you don't know when they're gonna to be rescued. So if you kill him, tt's killing human beings. Do you keep killing the crew members until you're rescued?"

But the moral logic of this situation seems to be that they would keep on picking off the weakest, maybe one by one, until they were rescued. And in this case, luckily, they were rescued when three were still alive. If Parker did give his consent, would it be all right, do you think?

Student 13: "No."

Tell us why it wouldn't be all right.

Student 13: "First of all, cannibalism I believe is morally incorrect so shouldn't eating human anyway."

So cannibalism is morally objectionable. So even in this scenario, waiting until someone die still would be objectionable.

Student 13: "Yes. I feel like it all depends on one's personal morals. This is just my
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opinion. Of course, other people are gonna to disagree."

Let's see what the disagreements are and then we'll see if they've reason that can persuade you enough. Let's try that. Is there someone who can explain? Those of you who're tempted by consent, can you explain why consent makes such a moral difference? What about the lottery idea? Does that count as consent? Remember the beginning, Dudley proposed a lottery. Suppose they've agreed to a lottery. Then how many would then say it's all right? Suppose there's a lottery. Cabin boy lost. Then the rest of the story unfolded. Then how many people would say it's morally permissible? So the number is arising if we've lottery. For whom the lottery would make such a moral difference, let's hear from one of you. Why would it?

Student 14: "I think the essential element that makes a crime is the idea that they decide at some point their lives are more important than his. I mean that's the basis for any crime - my needs, my desire are more important than yours. If they've done a lottery where everyone consented that someone should die, it's like the odds sacrifices himself to save the rest. Then it would be all right. A little grotesque but morally permissible."

What's your name?

Student 14: "Matt."

So what bother you is not the cannibalism but the lack of due process.

Student 14: "I guess you could say that."

Can someone who agrees with Matt say a little bit more about why a lottery would
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make it morally permissible?

Student 15: "The way I understood it originally was that that's a whole issue the cabin boy was never consulted it about whether or not something was gonna to happen to him, even with the originally lottery whether or not he would be part of that. It was just decided that he was the one who's gonna to die. That's what happened in the actual case."

But if there's a lottery, and they agree to the procedure. You think that would be OK?

Student 15: "Right. Because everyone know there's gonna to be a death whereas the cabin boy didn't know the discussion was even happening." There's no fore warning for him to know that I may be the one that's dying."

All right. Suppose everyone agrees to the lottery. They've the lottery. The cabin boy loses it and he changes his mind.

Student 15: "You've already decided. It's like a verbal contract. You cann't go back on that you decided. The decision was made. If you know you're dying for the reason for others to live, if someone else have died, you know you would consume them."

Right. Then he could say, "I know, but I lost."

Student 15: "I just think that's the whole moral issue there's no consulting of the cabin boy. What makes it the most horrible is that he had no idea what was even going on. If he known what's going on, it would be more understandable."

All right. Good. Now I want to hear... So there're some who think it's morally
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permissible, but only about 20%, led by Markies. Then there're some who say, the real problem here is lack of consent, whether the lack of consent to a lottery, to a fair procedure, or Catharine's idea lack of consent at the moment of death. And if we add consent, then more people are willing to consider the sacrifice morally justified. I want to hear now finally from those of you who think even with consent even with a lottery, even with a final murmur of consent by Parker at the very last moment, it would still be wrong. And why would it be wrong? That's what I wanna to hear.

Student 16: "The whole time I've been leaning towards the categorical moral reasoning. I think that there're a possibility I'll be OK with the idea of lottery and the loser taking into his own hands to kill themselves, so there won't be an act of murder. but I still think that even that way it's coerce. Also I don't think there's any remorse in Dudley's diary 'we're eating our breakfast'. It seems that he just reflected the whole idea of not valuing someone else life. That makes me be feel like I have to take the categorical."

You want to throw the book at him when he relaxed with morals and sense of having done anything wrong..

Student 16: "Right."

So. All right. Any other defenders who said it's categorically wrong whether it's without consent?

Student 17: "The society say, 'murder is murder'. Murder is murder in every way in our sight. It looks as a murder don't in the same way. I don't think any difference in any case."

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Let me ask you a question. There were three lives at stake versus one. The one the cabin boy. He had no family. He had no dependents. These other three had families back home in England. They had dependents. They've wives and children. Think back the Bentham. Bentham said we'd to consider the welfare, the utility, the happiness of everybody. We've add it all up so it's not just numbers of three against one. It's also all of those people at home. In fact, the London newspaper at the time and popular opinions sympathize with them, Dudley and Steven. And the paper said if they won't motivated by affection and concern for their loved ones at home and their dependents, surely they wouldn't have done this.

Student 17: "How's there any difference from people on the corner? I don't see any difference. I think in any case if I murder you to advance my status, that is murder. I think we should look at them in the same light. Is that criminal allows certain activities and makes certain things immoral violent and savage? When in the same case it's all the same act. If mentality that goes in the murder, the assassin need to feed his family..."

Suppose it weren't three. Suppose it were thirty. 300 lives. To save three hundred or in war time, three thousand .Suppose the stakes was even bigger.

Student 17: "I think it's the same deal."

You think Bentham is wrong. To say the right thing to do is to add up the collectively happiness. You think it's wrong about that.

Student 17: "I don't think it's wrong. I think murder is murder in any case."

If then, Bentham has to be wrong. If you're right, he's wrong.
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Student 17: "OK, he's wrong."

Thank you. Well done All right. Let's step back from this discussion and notice how many objections have we heard to what they did. We heard some defense of what they did. The defense had to do with necessity, the dire circumstances and implicitly as least the idea that number matters. And not only number matters, but the wider effect matters - their family back home, their dependents. Parker is an orphan. No one would miss him. So if you add up, if you try to calculate the balance of happiness and suffering, you might have a case for saying what they did it's the right thing.

Then we heard at least three different types of objections. We've heard objection that said what they did is categorically wrong. Murder is murder. It's always wrong even if it increases the happiness of all society. A categorical objectio.n But we still need to investigate why murder is categorically wrong. Is it because even the cabin boy had certain fundermental rights? If that's the reason, where those rights come from, if not from some ideas of larger welfare or utility or happiness? Question No. 1. Other said a lottery will makes a difference. A fair procedure, Matt said. And some people were swayed by that. That's not a categorical objection exactly. It's saying everybody has to be counted as an equal even though at the end of the day one can be sacrificed for the general welfare. That leaves us with another question to investigate: why does agreement to a certain procedure, even a fair procedure justify whatever result flows from the operation of that procedure? Question No. 2. And Question No. 3：the basic idea of consent. Catharine got us on to this. If the cabin boy had agreed himself, and not under the rest as was acted, then it would be all right to take his life to save the rest. Even more people side on that idea. But that raise a third philosophical question: what is the moral work that the consent does? Why does an act of consent makes such
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a moral difference, that an act that would be wrong taking a life without consent is morally permissible with consent? To investigate those three questions, we're gonna to read some philoshophers and starting next time, we're gonna to read Bentham and John Mill Utilitarian.

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Lecture 3 Putting a Price Tag on Life

Last time, we argued about the case of The Queen v. Dudley & Stephens, the lifeboat case, the case of cannibalism at sea. And with the arguments about the lifeboat in mind, the arguments for and against what Dudley and Stephens did in mind, let's turn back to the philosophy, the utilitarian philosophy of Jeremy Bentham. Bentham was born in England in 1748. At the age of 12, he went to Oxford. At 15, he went to law school. He was admitted to the Bar at age 19 but he never practiced law. Instead, he devoted his life to jurisprudence and moral philosophy. Last time, we began to consider Bentham's version of Utilitarianism. The main idea is simply stated and it's this: The highest principle of morality, whether personal or political morality, is to maximize the general welfare, or the collective happiness, or the overall balance of pleasure over pain; in a phrase, maximize utility.

Bentham arrives at this principle by the following line of reasoning: We're all governed by pain and pleasure, they are our sovereign masters, and so any moral system has to take account of them. How best to take account? By maximizing. And this leads to the principle of the greatest good for the greatest number. What exactly should we maximize? Bentham tells us happiness, or more precisely, utility maximizing utility as a principle not only for individuals but also for communities and for legislators. "What, after all, is a community?" Bentham asks. It's the sum of the individuals who comprise it. And that's why in deciding the best policy, in deciding what the law should be, in deciding what's just, citizens and legislators should ask themselves the question if we add up all of the benefits of this policy and subtract all of the costs, the right thing to do is the one that maximizes the balance of happiness over suffering. That's what it means to maximize utility.

Now, today, I want to see whether you agree or disagree with it, and it often goes, this
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utilitarian logic, under the name of cost-benefit analysis, which is used by companies and by governments all the time. And what it involves is placing a value, usually a dollar value, to stand for utility on the costs and the benefits of various proposals. Recently, in the Czech Republic, there was a proposal to increase the excise tax on smoking. Philip Morris, the tobacco company, does huge business in the Czech Republic. They commissioned a study, a cost-benefit analysis of smoking in the Czech Republic, and what their cost-benefit analysis found was the government gains by having Czech citizens smoke. Now, how do they gain? It's true that there are negative effects to the public finance of the Czech government because there are increased health care costs for people who develop smoking-related diseases. On the other hand, there were positive effects and those were added up on the other side of the ledger. The positive effects included, for the most part, various tax revenues that the government derives from the sale of cigarette products, but it also included health care savings to the government when people die early, pension savings - you don't have to pay pensions for as long - and also, savings in housing costs for the elderly. And when all of the costs and benefits were added up, the Philip Morris study found that there is a net public finance gain in the Czech Republic of $147,000,000, and given the savings in housing, in health care, and pension costs, the government enjoys savings of over $1,200 for each person who dies prematurely due to smoking. Cost-benefit analysis. Now, those among you who are defenders of Utilitarianism may think that this is an unfair test. Philip Morris was pilloried in the press and they issued an apology for this heartless calculation. You may say that what's missing here is something that the utilitarian can easily incorporate, namely the value to the person and to the families of those who die from lung cancer.

What about the value of life? Some cost-benefit analyses incorporate a measure for the value of life. One of the most famous of these involved the Ford Pinto case. Did any of you read about that? This was back in the 1970s. Do you remember what the
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Ford Pinto was, a kind of car? Anybody? It was a small car, subcompact car, very popular, but it had one problem, which is the fuel tank was at the back of the car and in rear collisions, the fuel tank exploded and some people were killed and some severely injured. Victims of these injuries took Ford to court to sue. And in the court case, it turned out that Ford had long since known about the vulnerable fuel tank and had done a cost-benefit analysis to determine whether it would be worth it to put in a special shield that would protect the fuel tank and prevent it from exploding. They did a cost-benefit analysis. The cost per part to increase the safety of the Pinto, they calculated at $11.00 per part. And here's - this was the cost-benefit analysis that emerged in the trial. Eleven dollars per part at 12.5 million cars and trucks came to a total cost of $137 million to improve the safety. But then they calculated the benefits of spending all this money on a safer car and they counted 180 deaths and they assigned a dollar value, $200,000 per death, 180 injuries, $67,000, and then the costs to repair, the replacement cost for 2,000 vehicles, it would be destroyed without the safety device $700 per vehicle. So the benefits turned out to be only $49.5 million and so they didn't install the device. Needless to say, when this memo of the Ford Motor Company's cost-benefit analysis came out in the trial, it appalled the jurors, who awarded a huge settlement. Is this a counterexample to the utilitarian idea of calculating? Because Ford included a measure of the value of life. Now, who here wants to defend cost-benefit analysis from this apparent counterexample? Who has a defense? Or do you think this completely destroys the whole utilitarian calculus? Yes?

Student 1: "Well, I think that once again, they've made the same mistake the previous case did, that they assigned a dollar value to human life, and once again, they failed to take account things like suffering and emotional losses by the families. I mean, families lost earnings but they also lost a loved one and that is more valued than $200,000."

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Right and... wait, wait, wait, that's good. What's your name?

Student 1: "Julie Roteau."

So if $200,000, Julie, is too low a figure because it doesn't include the loss of a loved one and the loss of those years of life, what would be - what do you think would be a more accurate number?

Student 1: "I don't believe I could give a number. I think that this sort of analysis shouldn't be applied to issues of human life. I think it can't be used monetarily."

So they didn't just put too low a number, Julie says. They were wrong to try to put any number at all. All right, let's hear someone who ...

Student 2: "You have to adjust for inflation."

You have to adjust for inflation. All right, fair enough. So what would the number be now? This was 35 years ago.

Student 2: "Two million dollars."

Two million dollars? You would put two million? And what's your name?

Student 2: "Voytek."

Voytek says we have to allow for inflation. We should be more generous. Then would you be satisfied that this is the right way of thinking about the question?

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Student 2: "I guess, unfortunately, it is for - there needs to be a number put somewhere, like, I'm not sure what that number would be, but I do agree that there could possibly be a number put on the human life."

All right, so Voytek says, and here, he disagrees with Julie. Julie says we can't put a number on human life for the purpose of a cost-benefit analysis. Voytek says we have to because we have to make decisions somehow. What do other people think about this? Is there anyone prepared to defend cost-benefit analysis here as accurate as desirable? Yes? Go ahead.

Student 3: "I think that if Ford and other car companies didn't use cost-benefit analysis, they'd eventually go out of business because they wouldn't be able to be profitable and millions of people wouldn't be able to use their cars to get to jobs, to put food on the table, to feed their children. So I think that if cost-benefit analysis isn't employed, the greater good is sacrificed, in this case."

All right, let me add. What's your name?

Student 3: "Raul."

Raul, there was recently a study done about cell phone use by a driver when people are driving a car, and there was a debate whether that should be banned. Yeah. And the figure was that some 2,000 people die as a result of accidents each year using cell phones. And yet, the cost-benefit analysis which was done by the Center for Risk Analysis at Harvard found that if you look at the benefits of the cell phone use and you put some value on the life, it comes out about the same because of the enormous economic benefit of enabling people to take advantage of their time, not waste time, be able to make deals and talk to friends and so on while they're driving. Doesn't that
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suggest that it's a mistake to try to put monetary figures on questions of human life?

Student 3: "Well, I think that if the great majority of people try to derive maximum utility out of a service, like using cell phones and the convenience that cell phones provide, that sacrifice is necessary for satisfaction to occur."

You're an outright utilitarian.

Student 3: "Yes. Okay."

All right then, one last question, Raul... Okay. And I put this to Voytek, what dollar figure should be put on human life to decide whether to ban the use of cell phones?

Student 3: "Well, I don't want to arbitrarily calculate a figure, I mean, right now. I think that..."

You want to take it under advisement?

Student 3: "Yeah, I'll take it under advisement."

But what, roughly speaking, would it be? You got 2,300 deaths. You got to assign a dollar value to know whether you want to prevent those deaths by banning the use of cell phones in cars. So what would your hunch be? How much? A million? Two million? Two million was Voytek's figure.

Student 3: "Yeah."

Is that about right?
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Student 3: "Maybe a million."

A million?

Student 3: "Yeah."

You know, that's good. Thank you. So, these are some of the controversies that arise these days from cost-benefit analysis, especially those that involve placing a dollar value on everything to be added up. Well, now I want to turn to your objections, to your objections not necessarily to cost-benefit analysis specifically, because that's just one version of the utilitarian logic in practice today, but to the theory as a whole, to the idea that the right thing to do, the just basis for policy and law is to maximize utility. How many disagree with the utilitarian approach to law and to the common good? How many agree with it? So more agree than disagree. So let's hear from the critics. Yes?

Student 4: "My main issue with it is that I feel like you can't say that just because someone's in the minority, what they want and need is less valuable than someone who is in the majority. So I guess I have an issue with the idea that the greatest good for the greatest number is okay because there are still... what about people who are in the lesser number? Like, it's not fair to them. They didn't have any say in where they wanted to be. All right."

That's an interesting objection. You're worried about the effect on the minority.

Student 4: "Yes."

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What's your name, by the way?

Student 4: "Anna."

Who has an answer to Anna's worry about the effect on the minority? What do you say to Anna?

Student 5: "Um, she said that the minority is valued less. I don't think that's the case because individually, the minority's value is just the same as the individual of the majority. It's just that the numbers outweigh the minority. And I mean, at a certain point, you have to make a decision and I'm sorry for the minority but sometimes, it's for the general, for the greater good."

For the greater good. Anna, what do you say? What's your name?

Student 5: "Yang Da."

What do you say to Yang Da? Yang Da says you just have to add up people's preferences and those in the minority do have their preferences weighed. Can you give an example of the kind of thing you're worried about when you say you're worried about Utilitarianism violating the concern or respect due the minority? And give an example.

Student 4: "Okay. So, well, with any of the cases that we've talked about, like for the shipwreck one, I think the boy who was eaten still had as much of a right to live as the other people and just because he was the minority in that case, the one who maybe had less of a chance to keep living, that doesn't mean that the others automatically have a right to eat him just because it would give a greater amount of people a chance
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to live."

So there may be certain rights that the minority members have, that the individual has that shouldn't be traded off for the sake of utility?

Student 4: "Yes."

Yes, Anna.

You know, this would be a test for you. Back in Ancient Rome, they threw Christians to the lions in the Colosseum for sport. If you think how the utilitarian calculus would go, yes, the Christian thrown to the lions suffers enormous excruciating pain. But look at the collective ecstasy of the Romans! Yang Da.

Student 5: "Well, in that time, I don't... if... in modern day of time, to value the... to give a number to the happiness given to the people watching, I don't think any, like, policymaker would say the pain of one person, of the suffering of one person is much, much... is, I mean, in comparison to the happiness gained, it's..."

No, but you have to admit that if there were enough Romans delirious enough with happiness, it would outweigh even the most excruciating pain of a handful of Christians thrown to the lion.

So we really have here two different objections to Utilitarianism. One has to do with whether Utilitarianism adequately respects individual rights or minority rights, and the other has to do with the whole idea of aggregating utility or preferences or values. Is it possible to aggregate all values to translate them into dollar terms?

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There was, in the 1930s, a psychologist who tried to address this second question. He tried to prove what Utilitarianism assumes, that it is possible to translate all goods, all values, all human concerns into a single uniform measure, and he did this by conducting a survey of young recipients of relief, this was in the 1930s, and he asked them, he gave them a list of unpleasant experiences and he asked them, "How much would you have to be paid to undergo the following experiences?" and he kept track. For example, how much would you have to be paid to have one upper front tooth pulled out? Or how much would you have to be paid to have one little toe cut off? Or to eat a live earthworm six inches long? Or to live the rest of your life on a farm in Kansas? Or to choke a stray cat to death with your bare hands? Now, what do you suppose was the most expensive item on that list?

Students: "Kansas!"

Kansas? You're right, it was Kansas. For Kansas, people said they'd have to pay them - they have to be paid $300,000. What do you think was the next most expensive? Not the cat. Not the tooth. Not the toe. The worm! People said you'd have to pay them $100,000 to eat the worm. What do you think was the least expensive item? Not the cat. The tooth. During the Depression, people were willing to have their tooth pulled for only $4,500.

Students: "What?"

Now, here's what Thorndike concluded from his study. Any want or a satisfaction which exists exists in some amount and is therefore measurable. The life of a dog or a cat or a chicken consists of appetites, cravings, desires, and their gratifications. So does the life of human beings, though the appetites and desires are more complicated. But what about Thorndike's study? Does it support Bentham's idea that all goods, all
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values can be captured according to a single uniform measure of value? Or does the preposterous character of those different items on the list suggest the opposite conclusion that maybe, whether we're talking about life or Kansas or the worm, maybe the things we value and cherish can't be captured according to a single uniform measure of value? And if they can't, what are the consequences for the utilitarian theory of morality? That's a question we'll continue with next time.

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Lecture 4 How to Measure Pleasure

Last time, we began to consider some objections to Jeremy Bentham's version of Utilitarianism. People raised two objections in the discussion we had. The first was the objection, the claim that Utilitarianism, by concerning itself with the greatest good for the greatest number, fails adequately to respect individual rights. Today, we have debates about torture and terrorism. Suppose a suspected terrorist was apprehended on September 10th and you had reason to believe that the suspect had crucial information about an impending terrorist attack that would kill over 3,000 people and you couldn't extract the information. Would it be just to torture the suspect to get the information or do you say no, there is a categorical moral duty of respect for individual rights? In a way, we're back to the questions we started with about trolley car and organ transplant. So that's the first issue. And you remember, we considered some examples of cost-benefit analysis, but a lot of people were unhappy with cost-benefit analysis when it came to placing a dollar value on human life. And so that led us to the second objection. It questioned whether it's possible to translate all values into a single uniform measure of value. It asks, in other words, whether all values are commensurable.

Let me give you one other example of an experience. This actually is a true story. It comes from personal experience that raises a question at least about whether all values can be translated without loss into utilitarian terms. Some years ago, when I was a graduate student, I was at Oxford in England and they had men's and women's colleges. They weren't yet mixed and the women's colleges had rules against overnight male guests. By the 1970s, these rules were rarely enforced and easily violated, or so I was told. By the late 1970s, when I was there, pressure grew to relax these rules and it became the subject of debate among the faculty at St. Anne's College, which was one of these all-women's colleges. The older women on the
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faculty were traditionalists. They were opposed to change unconventional moral grounds. But times have changed and they were embarrassed to give the true grounds for their objection and so they translated their arguments into utilitarian terms. "If men stay overnight", they argued, "the costs to the college will increase." "How?" you might wonder. "Well, they'll want to take baths and that'll use up hot water," they said. Furthermore, they argued, "We'll have to replace the mattresses more often." The reformers met these arguments by adopting the following compromise. Each woman could have a maximum of three overnight male guests each week. They didn't say whether it had to be the same one or three different provided, and this was the compromise, provided the guest paid 50 pence to defray the cost to the college. The next day, the national headline in the national newspaper read, "St. Anne's Girls, 50 Pence A Night." Another illustration of the difficulty of translating all values, in this case, a certain idea of virtue, into utilitarian terms. So, that's all to illustrate the second objection to Utilitarianism, at least the part of that objection, that questions whether Utilitarianism is right to assume that we can assume the uniformity of value, the commensurability of all values and translate all moral considerations into dollars or money.

But there is a second aspect to this worry about aggregating values and preferences. Why should we weigh all preferences that people have without assessing whether they're good preferences or bad preferences? Shouldn't we distinguish between higher pleasures and lower pleasures? Now, part of the appeal of not making any qualitative distinctions about the worth of people's preferences, part of the appeal is that it is nonjudgmental and egalitarian. The Benthamite utilitarian says everybody's preferences count and they count regardless of what people want, regardless of what makes different people happy. For Bentham, all that matters, you'll remember, are the intensity and the duration of a pleasure or pain. The so-called "higher pleasures or nobler virtues" are simply those, according to Bentham, that produce stronger, longer
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pleasure. Yet a famous phrase to express this idea, the quantity of pleasure being equal, pushpin is as good as poetry. What was pushpin? It was some kind of a child's game, like tiddlywinks. "Pushpin is as good as poetry", Bentham says. And lying behind this idea, I think, is the claim, the intuition, that it's a presumption to judge whose pleasures are intrinsically higher or worthier or better. And there is something attractive in this refusal to judge. After all, some people like Mozart, others Madonna. Some people like ballet, others bowling. Who's to say, a Benthamite might argue, who is to say which of these pleasures, whose pleasures are higher, worthier, nobler than others? But is that right, this refusal to make qualitative distinctions? Can we altogether dispense with the idea that certain things we take pleasure in are better or worthier than others? Think back to the case of the Romans in the Colosseum. One thing that troubled people about that practice is that it seemed to violate the rights of the Christian. Another way of objection to what's going on there is that the pleasure that the Romans take in this bloody spectacle, should that pleasure, which is abased, kind of corrupt, degrading pleasure, should that even be valorized or weighed in deciding what the general welfare is?

So here are the objections to Bentham's Utilitarianism and now, we turn to someone who tried to respond to those objections, a latter-day utilitarian, John Stuart Mill. So what we need to examine now is whether John Stuart Mill had a convincing reply to these objections to Utilitarianism. John Stuart Mill was born in 1806. His father, James Mill, was a disciple of Bentham's, and James Mill set about giving his son, John Stuart Mill, a model education. He was a child proté , John Stuart Mill. He gé knew Greek at the age of three, Latin at eight, and age 10, he wrote "A History of Roman Law." At age 20, he had a nervous breakdown. This left him in a depression for five years, but at age 25, what helped lift him out of this depression is that he met Harriet Taylor. She and Mill got married, they lived happily ever after, and it was under her influence that John Stuart Mill tried to humanize Utilitarianism. What Mill
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tried to do was to see whether the utilitarian calculus could be enlarged and modified to accommodate humanitarian concerns, like the concern to respect individual rights, and also to address the distinction between higher and lower pleasures. In 1859, Mill wrote a famous book on liberty, the main point of which was the importance of defending individual rights and minority rights, and in 1861, toward the end of his life, he wrote the book we read as part of this course, "Utilitarianism." He makes it clear that utility is the only standard of morality, in his view, so he's not challenging Bentham's premise. He's affirming it. He says very explicitly, "The sole evidence it is possible to produce that anything is desirable is that people actually do desire it." So he stays with the idea that our de facto actual empirical desires are the only basis for moral judgment. But then, page eight, also in chapter two, he argues that it is possible for a utilitarian to distinguish higher from lower pleasures. Now, for those of you who have read Mill already, how, according to him, is it possible to draw that distinction? How can a utilitarian distinguish qualitatively higher pleasures from lesser ones, base ones, unworthy ones? Yes?

Student 6: "If you've tried both of them and you prefer the higher one, naturally, always."

That's great. That's right. What's your name?

Student 6: "John."

So as John points out, Mill says here's the test. Since we can't step outside actual desires, actual preferences that would violate utilitarian premises, the only test of whether a pleasure is higher or lower is whether someone who has experienced both would prefer it. And here, in chapter two, we see the passage where Mill makes the point that John just described. "Of two pleasures, if there be one to which all or
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almost all who have experience of both give a decided preference, irrespective of any feeling of moral obligation to prefer it... in other words, no outside, no independent standard -- then, that is the more desirable pleasure." What do people think about that argument? Does it succeed? How many think that it does succeed of arguing within utilitarian terms for a distinction between higher and lower pleasures? How many think it doesn't succeed? I want to hear your reasons.

But before we give the reasons let's do an experiment of Mill's claim. In order to do this experiment, we're going to look at three short excerpts of popular entertainment. The first one is a Hamlet soliloquy. It'll be followed by two other experiences. See what you think.

A soliloquy of Hamlet:

What a piece of work is a man! How noble in reason! How infinite in faculties,In form and moving how express and admirable, in action how like an angel, in apprehension how like a god! The beauty of the world, the paragon of animals - and yet, to me, what is this quintessence of dust? Man delights not me. (no, nor woman neither.)

An excerpt from "Fear Factor":

Imagine a world where your greatest fears become reality. "Ahh! They're biting me!" Each show, six contestants from around the country battle each other in three extreme stunts. "Ow!" These stunts are designed to challenge the contestants both physically and mentally. Six contestants, three stunts, one winner. Yes! Whooo! - "Fear Factor"

An excerpt from "The Simpsons":

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"Hi-diddily-ho, pedal-to-the-metal-o-philes." "Flanders, since when do you like anything cool?" "Well, I don't care for the speed but I can't get enough of that safety gear. Helmets, roll bars, caution flags..." "I like the fresh air... and looking at the poor people in the infield." "Dang, Cletus, why'd you have to park by my parents?" "Now, Honey, they's my parents too."

I don't even have to ask which one you liked most. The Simpsons, how many liked The Simpsons most? How many Shakespeare? What about Fear Factor? How many preferred Fear Factor? Really? People overwhelmingly like The Simpsons better than Shakespeare. All right, now, let's take the other part of the poll, which is the highest experience or pleasure. How many say Shakespeare? How many say Fear Factor? No, you can't be serious. Really? What? All right, go ahead. You can say it.

Student 7: "I found that one the most entertaining."

I know, but which do you think was the worthiest, the noblest experience? I know you found it the most entertaining.

Student 7: "If something is good just because it is pleasurable, what does it matter whether you have sort of an abstract idea of whether it is good by someone else's sense or not?"

All right, so you come down in the straight Benthamite side. Who is to judge and why should we judge, apart from just registering and aggregating de facto preference? All right, that's fair enough. And what's your name?

Student 7: "Nate."

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Okay, fair enough. All right, so how many think "The Simpsons" is actually, apart from liking it, is actually the higher experience? Higher than Shakespeare? All right, let's see the vote for Shakespeare again. How many think Shakespeare is higher? All right. So why is it... ideally, I'd like to hear from someone, is there someone who thinks Shakespeare is highest but who preferred watching "The Simpsons"? Yes?

Student 8: "Like, I guess just sitting and watching 'The Simpsons', it's entertaining because they make jokes and they make us laugh. But like, someone has to tell us that Shakespeare was this great writer. We had to be taught how to read him, how to understand him. We had to be taught how to kind of take in Rembrandt, how to analyze a painting."

But let me... what's your name?

Student 8: "Anisha."

Anisha, when you say someone told you that Shakespeare is better -- Right. Are you accepting it on blind faith? You voted that Shakespeare is higher only because the culture tells you that or teachers tell you that or do you actually agree with that yourself?

Student 8: "Well, in the sense that Shakespeare no, but earlier you made an example of Rembrandt. I feel like I would enjoy reading a comic book more than I would enjoy kind of analyzing Rembrandt because someone told me it was great, you know."

Right. So some of this seems to be, you're suggesting, a kind of a cultural convention and pressure. We're told what books, what works of art are great. Who else? Yes?

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Student 9: "Although I enjoyed watching 'The Simpsons' more in this particular moment, in justice, if I were to spend the rest of my life considering the three different video clips shown, I would not want to spend that remainder of my life considering the latter two clips. I think I would derive more pleasure from being able to branch out in my own mind sort of considering more deep pleasures, more deep thoughts."

And tell me your name.

Student 9: "Joe."

Joe, so if you had to spend the rest of your life on a farm in Kansas with only Shakespeare or the collected episodes of "The Simpsons", you would prefer Shakespeare?

(Joe nods.)

What do you conclude from that about John Stuart Mill's test that the test of a higher pleasure is whether people who have experienced both prefer it?

Student 9: "Can I cite another example briefly?"

Yeah.

Student 9: "In Neurobiology last year, we were told of a rat who was tested a particular center in the brain where the rat was able to stimulate his brain and caused itself intense pleasure repeatedly. The rat did not eat or drink until it died. So the rat was clearly experiencing intense pleasure. Now, if you ask me right now if I would rather experience intense pleasure or have a full lifetime of higher pleasure, I would
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consider intense pleasure to be low pleasure. I would right now enjoy intense pleasure but... yes, I would. I certainly would. But over a lifetime, I think I would think almost a complete majority here would agree that they would rather a complete majority here would agree that they would rather be a human with higher pleasure than be that rat with intense pleasure for a momentary period of time. Now, in answer to your question, I think this proves that... or I won't say 'proves', I think the conclusion is that Mill's theory that when a majority of people are asked what they would rather do, they will answer that they would rather engage in a higher pleasure."

So you think that this support Mill's you think Mill is onto something here?

Student 9: "I do."

All right, Is there anyone who disagrees with Joe and who thinks that our experiment disproves Mill's test, shows that that's not an adequate way, that you can't distinguish higher pleasures within the utilitarian framework? Yes?

Student 10: "If whatever is good is truly just whatever people prefer, it's truly relative and there's no objective definition, then there will be some society where people prefer Simpsons more. Anyone can appreciate The Simpsons but I think it does take education to appreciate Shakespeare as much."

All right, you're saying it takes education to appreciate higher true things. Mill's point is that the higher pleasures do require cultivation and appreciation and education. He doesn't dispute that. But once having been cultivated and educated, people will see, not only see the difference between higher and lower pleasures, but will actually prefer the higher to the lower. You find this famous passage from John Stuart Mill. "It is better to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied; better to be Socrates
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dissatisfied than a fool satisfied. And if the fool, or the pig, are of a different opinion, it is because they only know their side of the question." So here, you have an attempt to distinguish higher from lower pleasures. So going to an art museum or being a couch potato and swilling beer, watching television at home. Sometimes, Mill agrees, we might succumb to the temptation to do the latter, to be couch potatoes. But even when we do that out of indolence and sloth, we know that the pleasure we get gazing at Rembrandts in the museum is actually higher because we've experienced both, and it is a higher pleasure gazing at Rembrandts because it engages our higher human faculties.

What about Mill's attempt to reply to the objection about individual rights? In a way, he uses the same kind of argument, and this comes out in chapter five. He says, "I dispute the pretensions of any theory which sets up an imaginary standard of justice not grounded on utility." But still, he considers justice grounded on utility to be what he calls "the chief part and incomparably, the most sacred and binding part of all morality." So justice is higher, individual rights are privileged, but not for reasons that depart from utilitarian assumptions. Justice is a name, for certain moral requirements, which, regarded collectively, stand higher in the scale of social utility and are, therefore, of more paramount obligation than any others. So justice, it is sacred. It's prior. It's privileged. It isn't something that can easily be traded off against lesser things. But the reason is ultimately, Mill claims, a utilitarian reason once you consider the long-run interests of humankind, of all of us as progressive beings. If we do justice and if we respect rights, society as a whole will be better off in the long run. Well, is that convincing or is Mill actually, without admitting it, stepping outside utilitarian considerations in arguing for qualitatively higher pleasures and for sacred or especially important individual rights? We haven't fully answered that question because to answer that question, in the case of rights and justice, will require that we explore other ways, non-utilitarian ways of accounting for the basis of rights and then
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asking whether they succeed.

As for Jeremy Bentham, who launched Utilitarianism as a doctrine in moral and legal philosophy, Bentham died in 1832 at the age of 85. But if you go to London, you can visit him today literally. He provided in his will that his body be preserved, embalmed, and displayed in the University of London, where he still presides in a glass case with a wax head, dressed in his actual clothing. You see, before he died, Bentham addressed himself to a question consistent with his philosophy. Of what use could a dead man be to the living? One use, he said, would be to make one's corpse available to the study of anatomy. In the case of great philosophers, however, better yet to preserve one's physical presence in order to inspire future generations of thinkers. You want to see what Bentham looks like stuffed? Here is what he looks like. There he is. Now, if you look closely, you will notice that the embalming of his actual head was not a success, so they substituted a waxed head and at the bottom, for verisimilitude, you can actually see his actual head on a plate. You see it? Right there. So, what's the moral of the story? The moral of the story - and by the way, they bring him out during meetings of the board at University College London and the minutes record him as present but not voting. Here is a philosopher in life and in death who adhered to the principles of his philosophy. We'll continue with rights next time.

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Lecture 5 Free to Choose

When we finished last time, we were looking at John Stuart Mill's attempt to reply to the critics of Bentham's Utilitarianism. In his book Utilitarianism Mill tries to show that critics to the contrary it is possible within the utilitarian framework to distinguish between higher and lower pleasures. It is possible to make qualitative distinctions of worth and we tested that idea with the Simpsons and the Shakespeare excerpts. And the results of our experiment seem to call into question Mill's distinction because a great many of you reported that you prefer the Simpsons but that you still consider Shakespeare to be the higher or the worthier pleasure. That's the dilemma with which our experiment confronts Mill.

What about Mill's attempt to account for the especially weighty character of individual rights and justice in chapter five of Utilitarianism. He wants to say that individual rights are worthy of special respect. In fact, he goes so far as to say that justice is the most sacred part and the most incomparably binding part of morality. But the same challenge could be put to this part of Mill's defense. Why is justice the chief part and the most binding part of our morality? Well, he says because in the long run, if we do justice and if we respect rights, society as a whole will be better off in the long run. Well, what about that? What if we have a case where making an exception and violating individual rights actually will make people better off in the long run? Is it all right then to use people? And there is a further objection that could be raised against Mill's case for justice and rights. Suppose the utilitarian calculus in the long run works out as he says it will such that respecting people's rights is a way of making everybody better off in the long run. Is that the right reason? Is that the only reason to respect people? If the doctor goes in and yanks the organs from the healthy patient who came in for a checkup to save five lives, there would be adverse effects in the long run. Eventually, people would learn about this and would stop
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going in for checkups. Is it the right reason? Is the only reason that you as a doctor won't yank the organs out of the healthy patient that you think, well, if I use him in this way, in the long run more lives would be lost? Or is there another reason having to do with intrinsic respect for the person as an individual? And if that reason matters and it's not so clear that even Mill's utilitarianism can take account of it, fully to examine these two worries or objections, to Mill's defense we need to push further. And we need to ask in the case of higher or worthier pleasures are there theories of the good life that can provide independent moral standards for the worth of pleasure? If so, what do they look like? That's one question. In the case of justice and rights, if we suspect that Mill is implicitly leaning on notions of human dignity or respect for person that are not strictly speaking utilitarian, we need to look to see whether there are some stronger theories of rights that can explain the intuition which even Mill shares, the intuition that the reason for respecting individuals and not using them goes beyond even utility in the long run.

Today, we turn to one of those strong theories of rights. Strong theories of right say individuals matter not just as instruments to be used for a larger social purpose or for the sake of maximizing utility, individuals are separate beings with separate lives worthy of respect. And so it's a mistake, according to strong theories or rights, it's a mistake to think about justice or law by just adding up preferences and values. The strong rights theory we turn to today is libertarianism. Libertarianism takes individual rights seriously. It's called libertarianism because it says the fundamental individual right is the right to liberty precisely because we are separate individual beings. We're not available to any use that the society might desire or devise precisely because we are individual separate human beings. We have a fundamental right to liberty, and that means a right to choose freely, to live our lives as we please provided we respect other people's rights to do the same. That's the fundamental idea.

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Robert Nozick, one of the libertarian philosophers we read for this course, puts it this way: Individuals have rights. So strong and far reaching are these rights that they raise the question of what, if anything, the state may do. So what does libertarianism say about the role of government or of the state? Well, there are three things that most modern states do that on the libertarian theory of rights are illegitimate or unjust. One of them is paternalist legislation. That's passing laws that protect people from themselves, seatbelt laws, for example, or motorcycle helmet laws. The libertarian says it may be a good thing if people wear seatbelts but that should be up to them and the state, the government, has no business coercing them, us, to wear seatbelts by law. It's coercion, so no paternalist legislation, number one. Number two, no morals legislation. Many laws try to promote the virtue of citizens or try to give expression to the moral values of the society as a whole. Libertarian say that's also a violation of the right to liberty. Take the example of, well, a classic example of legislation authored in the name of promoting morality traditionally have been laws that prevent sexual intimacy between gays and lesbians. The libertarian says nobody else is harmed, nobody else's rights are violated, so the state should get out of the business entirely of trying to promote virtue or to enact morals legislation. And the third kind of law or policy that is ruled out on the libertarian philosophy is any taxation or other policy that serves the purpose of redistributing income or wealth from the rich to the poor. says the libertarian is a kind of coercion. What it amounts to is theft by the state or by the majority, if we're talking about a democracy, from people who happen to do very well and earn a lot of money. Now, Nozick and other libertarians allow that there can be a minimal state that taxes people for the sake of what everybody needs, the national defense, police force, judicial system to enforce contracts and property rights, but that's it.

Now, I want to get your reactions to this third feature of the libertarian view. I want to see who among you agree with that idea and who disagree and why. But just to make
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it concrete and to see what's at stake, consider the distribution of wealth in the United States. United States is among the most inegalitarian society as far as the distribution of wealth of all the advanced democracies. Now, is this just or unjust? Well, what does the libertarian say? Libertarian says you can't know just from the facts I've just given you. You can't know whether that distribution is just or unjust. You can't know just by looking at a pattern or a distribution or result whether it's just or unjust. You have to know how it came to be. You can't just look at the end stage or the result. You have to look at two principles. The first he calls justice in acquisition or in initial holdings. And what that means simply is did people get the things they used to make their money fairly? So we need to know was there justice in the initial holdings? Did they steal the land or the factory or the goods that enabled them to make all that money? If not, if they were entitled to whatever it was that enabled them to gather the wealth, the first principle is matched. The second principle is did the distribution arise from the operation of free consent, people buying and trading on the market? As you can see, the libertarian idea of justice corresponds to a free market conception of justice provided people got what they used fairly, didn't steal it, and provided the distribution results from the free choice of individual's buying and selling things, the distribution is just. And if not, it's unjust.

So let's, in order to fix ideas for this discussion, take an actual example. Who's the wealthiest person in the world? Bill Gates. It is. That's right. Here he is. You'd be happy, too. Now, what's his net worth? Anybody have any idea? That's a big number. During the Clinton years, remember there was a controversy donors? Big campaign contributors were invited to stay overnight in the Lincoln bedroom at the White House? I think if you've contributed twenty five thousand dollars or above, someone figured out at the median contribution that got you invited to stay a night in the Lincoln bedroom, Bill Gates could afford to stay in the Lincoln bedroom every night for the next sixty six thousand years. Somebody else figured out, how much does he
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get paid on an hourly basis? And so they figured out, since he began Microsoft, I suppose he worked, what 14 hours per day, reasonable guess, and you calculate this net wealth, it turns out that his rate of pay is over 150 dollars, not per hour, not per minute 150 dollars, more than 150 dollars per second which means that if on his way to the office, Gates noticed a hundred dollar bill on the street, it wouldn't be worth his time to stop and pick it up. Now, most of you will say someone that wealthy surely we can tax them to meet the pressing needs of people who lack in education or lack enough to eat or lack decent housing. They need it more than he does. And if you were a utilitarian, what would you do? What tax policy would you have? You'd redistribute in a flash, wouldn't you? Because you would know being a good utilitarian that taking some, a small amount, he'd scarcely going to notice it, but it will make a huge improvement in the lives and in the welfare of those at the bottom. But remember, the libertarian theory says we can't just add up an aggregate preferences and satisfactions that way. We have to respect persons and if he earned that money fairly without violating anybody else's rights in accordance with the two principles of justice in acquisition and in justice in transfer, then it would be wrong, it would be a form of coercion to take it away.

Michael Jordan is not as wealthy as Bill Gates but he did pretty well for himself. You wanna see Michael Jordan. There he is. His income alone in one year was 31 million dollars and then he made another 47 million dollars in endorsements for a Nike and other companies. So his income was, in one year, $78 million. To require him to pay, let's say, a third of his earnings to the government to support good causes like food and health care and housing and education for the poor, that's coercion, that's unjust. That violates his rights. And that's why redistribution is wrong. Now, how many agree with that argument, agree with the libertarian argument that redistribution for the sake of trying to help the poor is wrong? And how many disagree with that argument? All right, let's begin with those who disagree. What's wrong with the libertarian case
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against redistribution? Yes.

Student 1: "I think these people like Michael Jordan have received we're talking about working within a society and they receive a larger gift from the society and they have a larger obligation in return to give that through redistribution, you know, you can say that Michael Jordan may work just as hard as some who works, you know, doing laundry 12 hours, 14 hours a day, but he's receiving more. I don't think it's fair to say that, you know, it's all on him, on his, you know, inherent, you know, hard work."

All right, let's hear from defenders of libertarianism. Why would it be wrong in principle to tax the rich to help the poor? Go ahead.

Student 2: "My name is Joe and I collect skateboards. I've since bought a hundred skateboards. I live in a society of a hundred people. I'm the only one with skateboards. Suddenly, everyone decides they want a skateboard. They come to my house, they take my they take 99 of my skateboards. I think that is unjust. Now, I think in certain circumstances it becomes necessary to overlook that unjustness, perhaps condone that injustice as in the case of the cabin boy being killed for food. If people are on the verge of dying, perhaps it is necessary to overlook that injustice, but I think it's important to keep in mind that we're still committing injustice by taking people's belongings or assets."

Are you saying that taxing Michael Jordan, say, at a 33 percent tax rate for good causes to feed the hungry is theft?

Student 2: "I think it's unjust. Yes, I do believe it's theft but perhaps it is necessary to condone that theft."

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But it's theft.

Student 2: "Yes."

Why is it theft, Joe?

Student 2: "Because..."

Why is it like your collection of skateboards?

Student 2: "It's theft because, or at least, in my opinion and by the libertarian opinion he earned that money fairly and it belongs to him. So to take it from him is by definition theft."

Who wants to reply to Joe? Yes, go ahead.

Student 3: "I don't think this is necessarily a case in which you have 99 skateboards or you have a hundred skateboards and the government is taking 99 of them. It's like you have more skateboards than there are days in a year. You have more skateboards that you're going to be able to use in your entire lifetime and the government is taking part of those. And I think that if you are operating in a society in which redistribute wealth, then that allows for people to amass so much wealth that people who haven't started from this very the equal footing in our hypothetical situation, that doesn't exist in our real society get undercut for the rest of their lives."

So you're worried that if there isn't some degree of redistribution of some or left at the bottom, there will be no genuine equality of opportunity.

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(Student 3 nods.)

All right, the idea that taxation is theft, Nozick takes that point one step further. He agrees that it's theft. He's more demanding than Joe. Joe says it is theft, maybe in an extreme case it's justified, maybe a parent is justified in stealing a loaf of bread to feed his or her hungry family. So Joe I would say, what would you call yourself, a compassionate quasi-libertarian? Nozick says, if you think about it, taxation amounts to the taking of earnings. In other words, it means taking the fruits of my labor. But if the state has the right to take my earning or the fruits of my labor, isn't that morally the same as according to the state the right to claim a portion of my labor? So taxation actually is morally equivalent to forced labor because forced labor involves the taking of my leisure, my time, my efforts, just as taxation takes the earnings that I make with my labor. And so, for Nozick and for the libertarians, taxation for redistribution is theft, as Joe says, but not only theft is morally equivalent to laying claim to certain hours of a person's life and labor, so it's morally equivalent to forced labor. If the state has a right to claim the fruits of my labor, that implies that it really has an entitlement to my labor itself. And what is forced labor? Forced labor, Nozick points out, is what, is slavery, because if I don't have the right, the sole right to my own labor, then that's really to say that the government or the political community is a part owner in me. And what does it mean for the state to be a part owner in me? If you think about it, it means that I'm a slave, that I don't own myself. So what this line of reasoning brings us to is the fundamental principle that underlies the libertarian case for rights. What is that principle? It's the idea that I own myself. It's the idea of self possession if you want to take right seriously. If you don't want to just regard people as collections of preferences, the fundamental moral idea to which you will be lead is the idea that we are the owners or the propietors of our own person, and that's why utilitarianism goes wrong. And that's why it's wrong to yank the organs from that healthy patient. You're acting as if that patient belongs to you or to the community. But we belong to
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ourselves. And that's the same reason that it's wrong to make laws to protect us from ourselves or to tell us how to live, to tell us what virtues we should be governed by, and that's also why it's wrong to tax the rich to help the poor even for good causes, even to help those who are displaced by the Hurricane Katrina. Ask them to give charity. But if you tax them, it's like forcing them to labor. Could you tell Michael Jordan he has to skip the next week's games and go down to help the people displaced by Hurricane Katrina? Morally, it's the same. So the stakes are very high.

So far we've heard some objections to the libertarian argument. But if you want to reject it, you have to break in to this chain of reasoning which goes, taking my earnings is like taking my labor, but taking my labor is making me a slave. And if you disagree with that, you must believe in the principle of self possession. Those who disagree, gather your objections and we'll begin with them next time.

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Lecture 6 Who Owns Me?

We were talking last time about libertarianism. I want to go back to the arguments for and against the redistribution of income. But before we do that, just one word about the minimal state, Milton Friedman, the libertarian economist, he points out that many of the functions that we take for granted as properly belonging to government don't. They are paternalist. One example he gives is social security. He says it's a good idea for people to save for their retirement during their earning years but it's wrong. It's a violation of people's liberty for the government to force everyone whether they want to or not to put aside some earnings today for the sake of their retirement. If people want to take the chance or if people want to live big today and live a poor retirement, that should be their choice. They should be free to make those judgments and take those risks. So even social security would still be at odds with the minimal state that Milton Friedman argued for.

It sometimes thought that collective goods like police protection and fire protection will inevitably create the problem of free riders unless they're publicly provided. But there are ways to prevent free riders. There are ways to restrict even seemingly collective goods like fire protection. I read an article a while back about a private fire company, the Salem Fire Corporation, in Arkansas. You can sign up with the Salem Fire Corporation, pay a yearly subscription fee, and if your house catches on fire, they will come and put out the fire. But they won't put out everybody's fire. They will only put it out if it's a fire in the home of a subscriber or if it starts to spread and to threaten the home of a subscriber. The newspaper article just told the story of a home owner who had subscribed to this company in the past but failed to renew his subscription. His house caught on fire. The Salem Fire Corporation showed up with its trucks and watched the house burn, just making sure that it didn't spread. The fire chief was asked, well, he wasn't exactly the fire chief. I guess he was the CEO. He was asked
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how can you stand by with fire equipment and allow a person's home to burn? He replied, once we verified there was no danger to a member's property, we had no choice but to back off according to our rules. If we responded to all fires, he said, there would be no incentive to subscribe. The homeowner in this case tried to renew his subscription at the scene of the fire. But the head of the company refused. You can't wreck your car, he said, and then buy insurance for it later. So even public goods that we take for granted that's being within the proper province of government can many of them in principle be isolated, made exclusive to those who pay. That's all to do with the question of collective goods and the libertarians injunction against paternalism.

But let's go back now to the arguments about redistribution. Now, underlying the libertarian's case for the minimal state is a worry about coercion, but what's wrong with coercion? The libertarian offers this answer: To coerce someone, to use some person for the sake of the general welfare is wrong because it calls into question the fundamental fact that we own ourselves the fundamental moral fact of self possession or self ownership. The libertarian's argument against redistribution begins with this fundamental idea that we own ourselves. Nozick says that if the society as a whole can go to Bill Gates or go to Michael Jordan and tax away a portion of their wealth, what the society is really asserting is a collective property right in Bill Gates or in Michael Jordan. But that violates the fundamental principle that we belong to ourselves.

Now, we've already heard a number of objections to the libertarian argument. What I would like to do today is to give the libertarians among us a chance to answer the objections that have been raised and some have been some have already identified themselves and have agreed to come and make the case for libertarianism to reply to the objections that have been raised. So raise your hand if you are among the
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libertarians who's prepared to stand up for the theory and respond to the objections. You are?

Student 4: "Alex Harris."

Alex Harris, who's been a star on the web blog. All right, Alex, come here. Stand up. Come. We'll create a libertarian corner over here. And who else? Other libertarians who will join. What's your name?

Student 5: "John."

John?

Student 5: "John Sheffield."

Who else wants to join? Other brave libertarians who are prepared to take on... Yes, what's your name?

Student 6: "Julia Rotto."

Julia, come join us over there. Julie, John, Alex. While team libertarian is gathering over there, let me just summarize the main objections that I've heard in class and on the website. I wanna talk to team libertarian over here. So objection number one is that the poor need the money more. than do Bill Gates and Michael Jordan. Objection number two, it's not really slavery to tax because at least in a democratic society it's not a slave holder. It's congress. It's a democratic... you're smiling, Alex, already. You're confident you can reply to all of these?

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(The "libertarians" nod.)

So taxation by consent of the governed is not coercive. Third, some people have said don't the successful like Gates owe a debt to society for their success that they repay by paying taxes. Who wants to respond to the first one, the poor need the money more? All right, and you're?

Student 5: "John."

All right, John.

Student 5: "The poor need the money more. That's quite obvious. I could use the money. You know, I certainly wouldn't mind if Bill Gates give me a million dollars. I mean, I'd take a thousand. But at some point you have to understand that the benefits of redistribution of wealth don't justify the initial violation of the property right. If you look at the argument the poor need the money more, at no point in that argument do you contradict the fact that we've extrapolated from, agreed upon principles that people own themselves. We've extrapolated that people have property rights and so whether or not it would be a good thing or a nice thing or even a necessary thing for the survival of some people, we don't see that that justifies the violation of the right that we've logically extrapolated. Good. Okay. And so that also, I mean, there still exist this institution of like individual philanthropy. Milton Friedman makes this argument..."

All right, so Bill Gates can give to charity if he wants to. Right. But it would still be wrong to coerce him to meet the needs of the poor.

Student 5: "Exactly."
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Are the two of you happy with that reply? Anything to add? All right, go ahead. Julie?

Student 6: "Julia, yes. I think I can also add, it's okay. I guess I could add that there's a difference between needing something and deserving something. I mean, in an ideal society everyone's needs would be met but here we're arguing what do we deserve as a society and, yeah. And the poor don't deserve the benefits that would flow from taxing Michael Jordan to help them. Based on what we've covered here I don't think you deserve something like that."

All right, let me push you a little bit on that, Julia. The victims of Hurricane Katrina are in desperate need of help. Would you say that they don't deserve help that would come from the federal government through taxation?

Student 6: "Okay, that's a difficult question. I think this is a case where they need help, not deserve it, but I think, again, if you had a certain level of requirements to meet sustenance, you're gonna need help, like, if you don't have food or a place to live, that's a case of need."

So need is one thing and deserve is another.

Student 6: "Exactly."

All right. Who would like to reply? Yes.

Student 7: "Going back to the first point that you made about the property rights of individual. The property rights are established and enforced by the government, which is a democratic government, and we have representatives to enforce those rights. If
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you live in a society that operates under those rules, then it should be up to the government to decide how those resources and taxation are distributed because it is through the consent of the government. If you disagree with it, you don't have to live in that society where that operates."

All right, good, so, and tell me your name.

Student 7: "Raul."

Raul is pointing out, actually, Raul is invoking point number two. If the taxation is by the consent of the governed, it's not coerced. It's legitimate. Bill Gates and Michael Jordan are citizens of the United States. They get to vote for congress. They get to vote their policy convictions just like everybody else. Who would like to take that one on? John?

Student 5: "Basically, what the libertarians are objecting to in this case is the middle 80 percent deciding what the top ten percent are doing for the bottom ten percent."

Wait, wait, wait, John. Majority. Don't you believe in democracy?

Student 5: "Well, right, but at some point..."

Don't you believe in, I mean, you say 80 percent, 10 percent majority. Majority rule is what? The majority.

Student 5: "Exactly, but..."

In a democracy. Aren't you for democracy?
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Student 5: "Yes, I'm for democracy, but Hang on, hang on, hang on. Democracy and mob rule aren't the same thing."

Mob rule?

Student 5: "Mob rule, exactly."

Student 7: "In an open society you have a recourse to address that through your representatives. And if the majority of the consent of those who are governed doesn't agree with you, then you know, you're choosing to live in a society and you have to operate under what the majority the society concludes."

All right, Alex, on democracy. What about that?

Student 4: "The fact that I have one, you know, five hundred thousandth of the vote for one representative in congress is not the same thing as my having the ability to decide for myself how to use my property rights. I'm a drop in the bucket and, you know, well..."

You might lose the vote.

Student 4: "Exactly. And they might take -- And I will. I mean, I don't have the decision right now of whether or not to pay taxes. If I don't, I get locked in jail or they tell me to get out of the country."

But, Alex, Alex, let me make a small case for democracy. And see what you would say. Why can't you, we live in a democratic society with freedom of speech. Why can't
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you take to the Hustings, persuade your fellow citizens that taxation is unjust and try to get a majority?

Student 4: "I don't think that people should be, should have to convince 280 million others simply in order to exercise their own rights, in order to not have their self ownership violated. I think people should be able to do that without having to convince 280 million people."

Does that mean you are against democracy as a whole?

Student 4: "I...no. I just believe in a very limited form of democracy whereby we have a constitution that severely limits the scope of what decisions can be made democratically."

All right, so you're saying that democracy is fine except where fundamental rights are involved.

Student 4: "Yes."

And I think you could win. If you're going on the Hustings, let me add one element to the argument you might make. You can say put aside the economic debates, taxation. Suppose the individual right to religious liberty were at stake, then, Alex, you could say, on the Hustings. Surely, you would all agree that we shouldn't put the right to individual liberty up to a vote.

Student 4: "Yeah, that's exactly right, and that's why we have a constitutional amendments and why do we make it so hard to amend our constitution."

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So you would say that the right to private property, the right of Michael Jordan to keep all the money he makes at least to protect it from redistribution is the same kind of right with the same kind of weight as the right to freedom of speech, the right to religious liberty, rights that should trump what the majority wants.

Student 4: "Absolutely. The reason why we have a right to free speech is because we have a right to own ourselves, to exercise our voice in any way that we choose."

All right, good. All right, so there we...All right, who would like to respond to that argument about democracy being...Okay, up there. Stand up.

Student 8: "I think comparing religion economics it's not the same thing. The reason why Bill Gates is able to make so much money is because we live in an economically and socially stable society. And if the government didn't provide for the poor as ten percent as you say through taxation, then we would need more money for police to prevent crime and so, either way, there would be more taxes taken away to provide what you guys call the necessary things that the government provides."

What's your name?

Student 8: "Anna."

Anna, let me ask you this. Why is the fundamental right to religious liberty different from the right Alex asserts as a fundamental right to private property and to keep what I earn? What's the difference between the two?

Student 8: "Because you wouldn't have...You wouldn't be able to make money, you wouldn't be able to own property if there wasn't that socially, like, if society wasn't
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stable, and that's completely different from religion. That's like something personal, something that you can practice on your own in your own home or like me practicing my religion is not going to affect the next person. But if I'm poor and I'm desperate, like I might commit a crime to feed my family and that can affect others."

Okay, good, thank you. Would it be wrong for someone to steal a loaf of bread to feed his starving family? Is that wrong?

Student 4: "I believe that it is. This is..."

Let's take a quick poll of the three of you. You say, yes, it is wrong.

Student 4: "Yes."

John?

Student 5: "It violates property rights. It's wrong."

Even to save a starving family?

Student 5: "I mean there are definitely other ways around that and by justifying, no, hang on, hang on, before you laugh at me. Before justifying the act of stealing, you have to look at violating the right that we've already agreed exists, the right of self possession and the possession of, I mean, your own things. We agree on property rights."

All right, we agree at stealing.

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Student 5: "Yeah, we agree at stealing."

So property rights is not the issue.

Student 5: "All right, but..."

So why is it wrong to steal even to feed your starving family?

Student 5: "Sort of the original argument that I made in the very first question you asked. The benefits of an action don't justify, don't make the action just."

Do what, what would you say, Julia? Is it all right to steal a loaf of bread to feed a starving family or to steal a drug that your child needs to survive?

Student 6: "I think, I'm okay with that, honestly. Even from the libertarian standpoint, I think that, okay, saying that you can just take money arbitrarily from people who have a lot to go to this pool of people who need it, but you have an individual who's acting on their own behalf to kind of save themselves and then I think you said they, for any idea like self possession, they are also in charge of protecting themselves and keeping themselves alive so, therefore, even for a libertarian standpoint, that might be okay."

All right, that's good, that's good. All right, what about number three up here? Isn't it the case that the successful, the wealthy, owe a debt. They didn't do that all by themselves. They had to cooperate with other people that they owe a debt to society and that that's expressed in taxation. You wanna take that on, Julia?

Student 6: "Okay, this one, I believe that there is not a debt to society in the sense that
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how did these people become wealthy? They did something that society valued highly. I think that society has already been giving, been providing for them. They provided a service to society and society responded by somehow they got their wealth, so I think that..."

So be concrete. I mean, to illustrate your point. There were people who helped him make the money, the teammates, the coach, people who taught him how to play.

Student 6: "But they've, you're saying, but they've all been paid for their services. Exactly, and society derived a lot of benefit and pleasure from watching Michael Jordan play. I think that that's how he paid his debt to society."

All right, good. Who would, anyone likes to take up that point? Yes.

Student 9: "I think that there's a problem here with that we're assuming that a person has self possession when they live in a society. I feel like when you live in a society, you give up that right. I mean, technically, if I want to personally go out and kill someone because they offend me, that is self possession. Because I live in a society I cannot do that. I think it's kind of equivalent to say because I have more money, I have resources that can save people's lives, is it not okay for the government to take that from me? Self possession only to a certain extent because I'm living in a society where I have to take account of the people around me."

So are you question, what's your name?

Student 9: "Victoria."

Victoria, are you questioning the fundamental premise of self possession?
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Student 9: "Yes. I think that you don't really have self possession if you choose to live in a society because you cannot just discount the people around you."

All right, I want to quickly get the response of the libertarian team to the last point. The last point builds on, well, maybe it builds on Victoria's suggestion that we don't own ourselves because it says that Bill Gates is wealthy, that Michael Jordan makes a huge income, isn't wholly their own doing. It's the product of a lot of luck and so we can't claim that they morally deserve all the money they make. Who wants to reply to that? Alex?

Student 4: "Their wealth is not appropriate to the goodness in their hearts, but that's not really the morally relevant issue. The point is that they have received what they have through the free exchange of people who have given them their holdings, usually in exchange for providing some other service."

Good enough. I want to try to sum up what we've learned from this discussion, but, first, let's thank John, Alex, and Julia for a really wonderful job. Toward the end of the discussion just now Victoria challenged the premise of this line of reasoning that's libertarian logic. Maybe, she suggested, we don't own ourselves after all. If you reject the libertarian case against redistribution, there would seem to be an incentive to break in to the libertarian line of reasoning at the earliest, at the most modest level, which is why a lot of people disputed that taxation is morally equivalent to forced labor. But what about the big claim, the premise, the big idea underlying the libertarian argument? Is it true that we own ourselves or can we do without that idea and still avoid what libertarians want to avoid creating a society in an account of justice where some people can be just used for the sake of other people's welfare or even for the sake of the general good? Libertarians combat the utilitarian idea of using
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people as means for the collective happiness by saying the way to put a stop to that utilitarian logic of using persons is to resort to the intuitively powerful idea that we are the proprietors of our own person. That's Alex and Julia and John and Robert Nozick. What are the consequences for a theory of justice and in account of rights of calling into question the idea of self possession? Does it mean that we're back to utilitarianism and using people and aggregating preferences and pushing the fat man off the bridge?

Nozick doesn't himself fully develop the idea of self possession. He borrows it from an earlier philosopher, John Locke. John Locke accounted for the rise of private property from the state of nature by a chain of reasoning very similar to the one that Nozick and the libertarians use. John Locke said private property arises because when we mix our labor with things, unowned things, we come to aquire a property right in those things. And the reason? The reason is that we own our own labor, and the reason for that? We are the proprietors, the owners of our own person. And so in order to examine the moral force of the libertarian claim that we own ourselves, we need to turn to the English political philosopher, John Locke, and examine his account of private property and self ownership and that's what we'll do next time.

“From each as they choose, to each as they are chosen.” - Robert Nozick

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Lecture 7 This Land is My Land

Today, we turn to John Locke.

On the face of it, Locke is a powerful ally of the libertarian. First, he believes, as libertarians today maintain, that there are certain fundamental individual rights that are so important that no government, even a representative government, even a democratically elected government, can override them. Not only that, he believes that those fundamental rights include a natural right to life, liberty, and property, and furthermore he argues that the right to property is not just the creation of government or of law. The right to property is a natural right in the sense that it is prepolitical. It is a right that attaches to individuals as human beings, even before government comes on the scene, even before parliaments and legislatures enact laws to define rights and to enforce them.

Locke says in order to think about what it means to have a natural right, we have to imagine the way things are before government, before law, and that's what Locke means by the state of nature. He says the state of nature is a state of liberty. Human beings are free and equal beings. There is no natural hierarchy. It's not the case that some people are born to be kings and others are born to be serfs. We are free and equal in the state of nature and yet, he makes the point that there is a difference between a state of liberty and a state of license. And the reason is that even in the state of nature, there is a kind of law. It's not the kind of law that legislatures enact. It's a law of nature. And this law of nature constrains what we can do even though we are free, even though we are in the state of nature.

Well what are the constraints? The only constraint given by the law of nature is that the rights we have, the natural rights we have we can't give up nor can we take them
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from somebody else. Under the law of nature, I'm not free to take somebody else's life or liberty or property, nor am I free to take my own life or liberty or property. Even though I am free, I'm not free to violate the law of nature. I'm not free to take my own life or to sell my self into slavery or to give to somebody else arbitrary absolute power over me.

So where does this constraint, you may think it's a fairly minimal constraint, but where does it come from?

Well, Locke tells us where it comes from and he gives two answers. Here is the first answer. "For men, being all the workmanship of one omnipotent, and infinitely wise maker," namely God, "they are His property, whose workmanship they are, made to last during His, not one another's pleasure." So one answer to the question is why can't I give up my natural rights to life, liberty, and property is well, they're not, strictly speaking, yours. After all, you are the creature of God. God has a bigger property right in us, a prior property right. Now, you might say that's an unsatisfying, unconvincing answer, at least for those who don't believe in God. What did Locke have to say to them? Well, here is where Locke appeals to the idea of reason and this is the idea, that if we properly reflect on what it means to be free, we will be led to the conclusion that freedom can't just be a matter of doing whatever we want. I think this is what Locke means when he says, "The state of nature has a law of nature to govern it which obliges everyone: and reason, which is that law, teaches mankind who will but consult it that all being equal and independent, no one ought to harm another in his life, health, liberty, or possessions."

This leads to a puzzling paradoxical feature of Locke's account of rights. Familiar in one sense but strange in another. It's the idea that our natural rights are unalienable. What does "unalienable" mean? It's not for us to alienate them or to give them up, to
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give them away, to trade them away, to sell them. Consider an airline ticket. Airline tickets are nontransferable. Or tickets to the Patriots or to the Red Sox. Nontransferable tickets are unalienable. I own them in the limited sense that I can use them for myself, but I can't trade them away. So in one sense, an unalienable right, a nontransferable right makes something I own less fully mine.

But in another sense of unalienable rights, especially where we're thinking about life, liberty, and property, or a right to be unalienable makes it more deeply, more profoundly mine, and that's Locke's sense of unalienable.

We see it in the American Declaration of Independence. Thomas Jefferson drew on this idea of Locke. Unalienable rights to life, liberty, and as Jefferson amended Locke, to the pursuit of happiness. Unalienable rights. Rights that are so essentially mine that even I can't trade them away or give them up. So these are the rights we have in the state of nature before there is any government. In the case of life and liberty, I can't take my own life. I can't sell myself into slavery any more than I can take somebody else's life or take someone else as a slave by force.

But how does that work in the case of property? Because it's essential to Locke's case that private property can arise even before there is any government. How can there be a right to private property even before there is any government? Locke's famous answer comes in Section 27. "Every man has a property in his own person. This nobody has any right to but himself." "The labor of his body and the work of his hands, we may say, are properly his." So he moves, as the libertarians later would move, from the idea that we own ourselves, that we have property in our persons to the closely connected idea that we own our own labor. And from that to the further claim that whatever we mix our labor with that is un-owned becomes our property. "Whatever he removes out of the state that nature has provided, and left it in, he has
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mixed his labor with, and joined it to something that is his own, and thereby makes it his property."

Why? Because the labor is the unquestionable property of the laborer and therefore, no one but the laborer can have a right to what is joined to or mixed with his labor. And then he adds this important provision, "at least where there is enough, and as good left in common for others." But we not only acquire our property in the fruits of the earth, in the deer that we hunt, in the fish that we catch but also if we till and plow and enclose the land and grow potatoes, we own not only the potatoes but the land, the earth. "As much land as a man tills, plants, improves, cultivates and can use the product of, so much is his property. He by his labor encloses it from the commons.

So the idea that rights are unalienable seems to distance Locke from the libertarian. Libertarian wants to say we have an absolute property right in ourselves and therefore, we can do with ourselves whatever we want. Locke is not a sturdy ally for that view. In fact, he says if you take natural rights seriously, you'll be led to the idea that there are certain constraints on what we can do with our natural rights, constraints given either by God or by reason reflecting on what it means really to be free, and really to be free means recognizing that our rights are unalienable. So here is the difference between Locke and the libertarians.

But when it comes to Locke's account of private property, he begins to look again like a pretty good ally because his argument for private property begins with the idea that we are the proprietors of our own person and therefore, of our labor, and therefore, of the fruits of our labor, including not only the things we gather and hunt in the state of nature but also we acquire our property right in the land that we enclose and cultivate and improve.

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There are some examples that can bring out the moral intuition that our labor can take something that is unowned and make it ours, though sometimes, there are disputes about this. There is a debate among rich countries and developing countries about trade-related intellectual property rights. It came to a head recently over drug patent laws. Western countries, and especially the United States say, "We have a big pharmaceutical industry that develops new drugs. We want all countries in the world to agree to respect the patents." Then, there came along the AIDS crisis in South Africa, and the American AIDS drugs were hugely expensive, far more than could be afforded by most Africans. So the South African government said, "We are going to begin to buy a generic version of the AIDS antiretroviral drug at a tiny fraction of

the cost because we can find an Indian manufacturing company that figures out how the thing is made and produces it, and for a tiny fraction of the cost, we can save lives if we don't respect that patent." And then the American government said, "No, here is a company that invested research and created this drug. You can't just start mass producing these drugs without paying a licensing fee." And so there was a dispute and the pharmaceutical company sued the South African government to try to prevent their buying the cheap generic, as they saw it, pirated version of an AIDS drug. And eventually, the pharmaceutical industry gave in and said, "All right, you can do that."

But this dispute about what the rules of property should be, of intellectual property of drug patenting, in a way, is the last frontier of the state of nature because among nations where there is no uniform law of patent rights and property rights, it's up for grabs until, by some act of consent, some international agreement, people enter into some settled rules.

What about Locke's account of private property and how it can arise before government and before law comes on the scene? Is it successful? How many think it's pretty persuasive? Raise your hand. How many don't find it persuasive? All right, let's
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hear from some critics. What is wrong with Locke's account of how private property can arise without consent? Yes?

Yes, I think it justifies European cultural norms as far as when you look at how Native Americans may not have cultivated American land, but by their arrival in the Americas, that contributed to the development of America, which wouldn't have otherwise necessarily happened then or by that specific group. So you think that this is a defense, this defense of private property in land...

Yes, because it complicates original acquisition if you only cite the arrival of foreigners that cultivated the land. I see. And what's your name?

Rochelle.

Rochelle?

Yes.

Rochelle says this account of how property arises would fit what was going on in North America during the time of the European settlement. Do you think, Rochelle, that it's a way of defending the appropriation of the land?

Indeed, because I mean, he is also justifying the glorious revolutions. I don't think it's inconceivable that he is also justifying colonization as well.

Well, that's an interesting historical suggestion and I think there is a lot to be said for it. What do you think of the validity of his argument though? Because if you are right that this would justify the taking of land in North America from Native Americans
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who didn't enclose it, if it's a good argument, then Locke's given us a justification for that. If it's a bad argument, then Locke's given us a mere rationalization that isn't morally defensible.

I'm leaning to the second one - You're leaning toward the second one.

But that's my opinion as well. All right, well, then, let's hear if there is a defender of Locke's account of private property, and it would be interesting if they could address Rochelle's worry that this is just a way of defending the appropriation of land by the American colonists from the Native Americans who didn't enclose it. Is there someone who will defend Locke on that point? Are you going to defend Locke?

Like, you're accusing him of justifying the European basically massacre of the Native Americans. But who says he is defending it? Maybe the European colonization isn't right. You know, maybe it's the state of war that he talked about So the wars between the Native Americans and the colonists, the settlers, that might have been a state of war that we can only emerge from by an agreement or an act of consent and that's what would have been required fairly to resolve... Yes, and both sides would have had to agree to it and carry it out and everything.

But what about when, what's your name?

Dan.

But Dan, what about Rochelle says this argument in Section 27 and then in 32 about appropriating land, that argument, if it's valid, would justify the settlers' appropriating that land and excluding others from it, you think that argument is a good argument?

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Well, doesn't it kind of imply that the Native Americans hadn't already done that? Well, the Native Americans, as hunter-gatherers, didn't actually enclose land. So I think Rochelle is onto something there. What I want to -- go ahead, Dan. At the same time, he is saying that just by picking an acorn or taking an apple or maybe killing a buffalo on a certain amount of land, that makes it yours because it's your labor and your labor would enclose that land. So by that definition, maybe they didn't have fences around little plots of land but didn't... They were using it. Yes. By Locke's definition, you can say... So maybe by Locke's definition, the Native Americans could have claimed a property right in the land itself. Right, but they just didn't have Locke on their side, as she points out.

All right, good. Okay, that's good. One more defender of Locke. Go ahead.

Well, I mean, just to defend Locke, he does say that there are some times in which you can't take another person's land. For example, you can't acquire a land that is common property so people, in terms of the American Indians, I feel like they already have civilizations themselves and they were using land in common. So it's kind of like what an analogy to what he was talking about with like the common English property. You can't take land that everybody is sharing in common. Oh, that's interesting. That's interesting. And also, you can't take land unless you make sure that there is as much land as possible left for other people to take as well. So if you're taking common, so you have to make sure that whenever you take land that there is enough left for other people to use...

Right. ...that's just as good as the land that you took, so...

That's true. Locke says there has to be this right to private property in the earth is subject to the provision that there be as much and as good left for others. What's your
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name?

Right. I'm Feng.

So Feng, in a way, agrees with Dan that maybe there is a claim within Locke's framework that could be developed on behalf of the Native Americans. Here is the further question. If the right to private property is natural, not conventional, if it's something that we acquire even before we agree to government, how does that right constrain what a legitimate government can do?

In order, finally, to see whether Locke is an ally or potentially a critic of the libertarian idea of the state, we have to ask what becomes of our natural rights once we enter into society.

We know that the way we enter into society is by consent, by agreement to leave the state of nature and to be governed by the majority and by a system of laws, human laws. But those human laws are only legitimate if they respect our natural rights, if they respect our unalienable rights to life, liberty, and property. No parliament, no legislature, however democratic its credentials, can legitimately violate our natural rights. This idea that no law can violate our right to life, liberty, and property would seem to support the idea of a government so limited that it would gladden the heart of the libertarian after all.

But those hearts should not be so quickly gladdened because even though for Locke, the law of nature persists once government arrives, even though Locke insists on limited government, government limited by the end for which it was created, namely the preservation of property, even so, there is an important sense in which what counts as my property, what counts as respecting my life and liberty are for the government
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to define. That there be property, that there be respect for life and liberty is what limits government. But what counts as respecting my life and respecting my property, that is for governments to decide and to define.

How can that be? Is Locke contradicting himself or is there an important distinction here? In order to answer that question, which will decide Locke's fit with the libertarian view, we need to look closely at what legitimate government looks like for Locke, and we turn to that next time.

"Our incomes are like our shoes: if too small, they gall and pinch us; \Nbut if too large, they cause us to stumble and to trip." - John Locke

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Lecture 8 Consenting Adults

Last time, we began to discuss Locke's state of nature, his account of private property, his theory of legitimate government, which is government based on consent and also limited government. Locke believes in certain fundamental rights that constrain what government can do, and he believes that those rights are natural rights, not rights that flow from law or from government. And so Locke's great philosophical experiment is to see if he can give an account of how there could be a right to private property without consent before government and legislators arrive on the scene to define property. That's his question. That's his claim. There is a way Locke argues to create property, not just in the things we gather and hunt, but in the land itself, provided there is enough and as good left for others.

Today, I want to turn to the question of consent, which is Locke's second big idea. Private property is one; consent is the other.

What is the work of consent?

People here have been invoking the idea of consent since we began since the first week. Do you remember when we were talking about pushing the fat man off the bridge, someone said, "But he didn't agree to sacrifice himself. It would be different if he consented." Or when we were talking about the cabin boy, killing and eating the cabin boy. Some people said, "Well, if they had consented to a lottery, it would be different. Then it would be all right."

So consent has come up a lot and here in John Locke, we have one of the great philosophers of consent. Consent is an obvious familiar idea in moral and political philosophy. Locke says that legitimate government is government founded on consent
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and who, nowadays, would disagree with him? Sometimes, when the ideas of political philosophers are as familiar as Locke's ideas about consent, it's hard to make sense of them or at least to find them very interesting. But there are some puzzles, some strange features of Locke's account of consent as the basis of legitimate government and that's what I'd like to take up today. One way of testing the plausibility of Locke's idea of consent and also of probing some of its perplexities is to ask just what a legitimate government founded on consent can do, what are its powers according to Locke. Well, in order to answer that question, it helps to remember what the state of nature is like.

Remember, the state of nature is the condition that we decide to leave, and that's what gives rise to consent. Why not stay there? Why bother with government at all? Well, what is Locke's answer to that question? He says there are some inconveniences in the state of nature but what are those inconveniences? The main inconvenience is that everyone can enforce the law of nature. Everyone is an enforcer, or what Locke calls "the executor" of the state of nature, and he means executor literally. If someone violates the law of nature, he is an aggressor. He is beyond reason and you can punish him. And you don't have to be too careful or fine about gradations of punishment in the state of nature. You can kill him. You can certainly kill someone who comes after you, who tries to murder you. That's self defense. But the enforcement power, the right to punish, everyone can do the punishing in the state of nature. And not only can you punish with death people who come after you seeking to take your life, you can also punish a thief who tries to steal your goods because that also counts as aggression against the law of nature. If someone has stolen from a third party, you can go after him. Why is this? Well, violations of the law of nature are an act of aggression. There is no police force. There are no judges, no juries, so everyone is the judge in his or her own case. And Locke observes that when people are the judges of their own cases, they tend to get carry away, and this gives rise to the inconvenience in the state of
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nature. People overshoot the mark. There is aggression. There is punishment and before you know it, everybody is insecure in the enjoyment of his or her unalienable rights to life, liberty, and property. Now, he describes in pretty harsh and even grim terms what you can do to people who violate the law of nature. "One may destroy a man who makes war upon him ... for the same reason that he may kill a wolf or a lion. Such men have no other rule, but that of force and violence," listen to this, "and so may be treated as beasts of prey, those dangerous and noxious creatures, that will be sure to destroy to you if you fall into their power", so kill them first.

So, what starts out as a seemingly benign state of nature where everyone is free and yet where there is a law and the law respects people's rights, and those rights are so powerful that they're unalienable. What starts out looking very benign, once you look closer, is pretty fierce and filled with violence, and that's why people want to leave.

How do they leave? Well, here is where consent comes in. The only way to escape from the state of nature is to undertake an act of consent where you agree to give up the enforcement power and to create a government or a community where there will be a legislature to make law and where everyone agrees in advance, everyone who enters, agrees in advance to abide by whatever the majority decides. But then the question, and this is our question and here is where I want to get your views, then the question is what powers, what can the majority decide?

Now, here, it gets tricky for Locke because you remember, alongside the whole story about consent and majority rule, there are these natural rights, the law of nature, these unalienable rights, and you remember, they don't disappear when people join together to create a civil society. So even once the majority is in charge, the majority can't violate your inalienable rights, can't violate your fundamental right to life, liberty, and property. So here is the puzzle. How much power does the majority have? How
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limited is the government created by consent? It's limited by the obligation on the part of the majority to respect and to enforce the fundamental natural rights of the citizens. They don't give those up. We don't give those up when we enter government. That's this powerful idea taken over from Locke by Jefferson in the Declaration. Unalienable rights.

So, let's go to our two cases. Remember Michael Jordan, Bill Gates, the libertarian objection to taxation for redistribution? Well, what about Locke's limited government? Is there anyone who thinks that Locke does give grounds for opposing taxation for redistribution? Anybody? Go ahead.

If the majority rules that there should be taxation, even if the minority should still not have to be taxed because that's taking away property, which is one of the rights of nature.

All right so, and what's your name?

Ben.

Ben. So if the majority taxes the minority without the consent of the minority to that particular tax law, it does amount to a taking of their property without their consent and it would seem that Locke should object to that. You want some textual support for your view, for your reading of Locke, Ben? Sure. All right. I brought some along just in case you raised it. If you have your texts, look at 138, passage 138.

"The supreme power," by which Locke means the legislature, "cannot take from any man any part of his property without his own consent, for the preservation of property being the end of government and that for which men enter into society, it necessarily
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supposes and requires that people should have property." That was the whole reason for entering society in the first place, to protect the right to property. And when Locke speaks about the right to property, he often uses that as a kind of global term for the whole category, the right to life, liberty, and property. So that part of Locke, that beginning of 138, seems to support Ben's reading. But what about the part of 138, if you keep reading, "Men, therefore, in society having property, they have such a right to the goods, which by the law of the community are theirs." Look at this. "And that no one can take from them without their consent." And then at the end of this passage, he says, "So it's a mistake to think that the legislative power can do what it will and dispose of the estates of the subject arbitrarily or take any part of them at pleasure." Here's what's elusive. On the one hand, he says the government can't take your property without your consent. He is clear about that. But then he goes on to say, and that's the natural right to property. But then, it seems that property, what counts as property is not natural but conventional defined by the government. "The goods of which by the law of the community are theirs." And the plot thickens if you look ahead to Section 140. In 140, he says, "Governments can't be supported without great charge. Government is expensive and it's fit that everyone who enjoys his share of the protection should pay out of his estate." And then here is the crucial line. "But still, it must be with his own consent, i.e. the consent of the majority, giving it either by themselves, or through their representatives."

So what is Locke actually saying? Property is natural in one sense but conventional in another. It's natural in the sense that we have a fundamental unalienable right that there be property, that the institution of property exist and be respected by the government. So an arbitrary taking of property would be a violation of the law of nature and would be illegitimate. But it's a further question, here is the conventional aspect of property, it's a further question what counts as property, how it's defined and what counts as taking property, and that's up to the government. So the consent, here,
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we're coming back to our question, what is the work of consent? What it takes for taxation to be legitimate is that it be by consent, not the consent of Bill Gates himself if he is the one who has to pay the tax, but by the consent that he and we, all of us within the society, gave when we emerged from the state of nature and created the government in the first place. It's the collective consent. And by that reading, it looks like consent is doing a whole lot and the limited government consent creates isn't all that limited.

Does anyone want to respond to that or have a question about that? Go ahead. Stand up.

Well, I'm just wondering what Locke's view is on once you have a government that's already in place, whether it is possible for people who are born into that government to then leave and return to the state of nature? I mean, I don't think that Locke mentioned that at all in the...

What do you think?

Well, I think, as the convention, it would be very difficult to leave the government because you are no longer, because nobody else is just living in the state of nature. Everybody else is now governed by this legislature.

What would it mean today, you're asking. And what's your name?

Nicola.

Nicola, to leave the state. Supposed you wanted to leave civil society today. You want to withdraw your consent and return to the state of nature. Well, because you didn't
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actually consent to it. You were just born into it. It was your ancestors who joined. Right. You didn't sign the social contract.

I didn't sign it.

Exactly. All right, so what does Locke say there? Yes? I don't think Locke says you have to sign anything. I think that he says that it's kind of implied consent.

Implied?

Taking government's services, you are implying that you are consenting to the government taking things from you. All right, so implied consent. That's a partial answer to this challenge. Now, you may not think that implied consent is as good as the real thing. Is that what you're shaking your head about, Nicola? Speak up. Stand up and speak up.

I don't think that necessarily just by utilizing the government's various resources that we are necessarily implying that we agree with the way that this government was formed or that we have consented to actually join into the social contract.

So you don't think the idea of implied consent is strong enough to generate any obligation at all to obey the government?

Not necessarily, no.

Nicola, if you didn't think you'd get caught, would you pay your taxes?

I don't think so. I would rather have a system, personally, that I could give money to
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exactly those sections of the government that I support and not just blanket support of it.

You'd rather be in the state of nature, at least on April 15th. But what I'm trying to get at is do you consider that you are under no obligation, since you haven't actually entered into any act of consent, but for prudential reasons, you do what you're supposed to do according to the law?

Exactly.

If you look at it that way, then you're violating another one of Locke's treatises, which is that you can't take anything from anyone else. Like, you can't take the government's services and then not give them anything in return. If you want to go live in the state of nature, that's fine, but you can't take anything from the government because by the government's terms, which are the only terms under which you can enter the agreement, say that you have to pay taxes to take those things.

So you are saying that Nicola can go back into the state of nature if she wants to but she can't drive on Mass. Ave.?

Exactly. I want to raise the stakes beyond using Mass. Ave. and even beyond taxation. What about life? What about military conscription? Yes, what do you say? Stand up.

First of all, we have to remember that sending people to war is not necessarily implying that they'll die. I mean, obviously, you're not raising their chances here but it's not a death penalty. So if you're going to discuss whether or not military conscription is equivalent to suppressing people's right to life, you shouldn't approach it that way. Secondly, the real problem here is Locke has this view about consent and
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natural rights. But you're not allowed to give up your natural rights either. So the real question is how does he himself figure it out between "I agree to give up my life, give up my property" when he talks about taxes or military conscription for the fact. But I guess Locke would be against suicide, and that's still my own consent. I agree by taking my life.

All right, good. All right, what's your name?

Eric.

So Eric brings us back to the puzzle we've been wrestling with since we started reading Locke. On the one hand, we have these unalienable rights to life, liberty, and property, which means that even we don't have the power to give them up, and that's what creates the limits on legitimate government. It's not what we consent to that limits government. It's what we lack the power to give away when we consent that limits government. That's the point at the heart of Locke's whole account of legitimate government. But now, you say, "well, if we can't give up our own life, if we can't commit suicide, if we can't give up our right to property, how can we then agree to be bound by a majority that will force us to sacrifice our lives or give up our property"? Does Locke have a way out of this or is he basically sanctioning an all-powerful government, despite everything he says about unalienable rights? Does he have a way out of it? Who would speak here in defense of Locke or make sense, find a way out of this predicament? Yes. All right, go ahead.

I feel like there is a general distinction we made between the right to life that individuals possess and the fact that the government cannot take away a single individual's right to life. I think if you look at conscription as the government picking out certain individuals to go fight in war, then that would be a violation of their
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natural right to life. On the other hand, if you have conscription, let's say a lottery for example, then in that case I would view that as the population picking their representatives to defend them in the case of war, the idea being that since the whole population cannot go out there to defend its own right to property, it picks its own representatives through a process that's essentially random and then these sort of elected representatives go out and fight for the rights of the people. It works very similar, it works just like an elected government, in my opinion.

All right, so an elected government can conscript citizens to go out and defend the way of life, the community that makes the enjoyment of rights possible?

I think it can because to me, it seems that it's very similar to the process of electing representatives for legislature. Although here, it's as if the government is electing by conscription certain citizens to go die for the sake of the whole.

Is that consistent with respect for a natural right to liberty? Well, what I would say there is there is a distinction between picking out individuals and having a random choice of individuals. Like ... Between picking out... let me make sure, between picking out individuals, let me...

What's your name?

Gokul.

Gokul says there's a difference between picking out individuals to lay down their lives and having a general law. I think this is the answer Locke would give, actually, Gokul. Locke is against arbitrary government. He is against the arbitrary taking, the singling out of Bill Gates to finance the war in Iraq. He is against singling out a particular
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citizen or group of people to go off and fight. But if there is a general law such that the government's choice, the majority's action is non-arbitrary, it doesn't really amount to a violation of people's basic rights. What does count as a violation is an arbitrary taking because that would essentially say, not only to Bill Gates, but to everyone, there is no rule of law. There is no institution of property. Because at the whim of the king, or for that matter, of the parliament, we can name you or you to give up your property or to give up your life. But so long as there is a non-arbitrary rule of law, then it's permissible.

Now, you may say this doesn't amount to a very limited government, and the libertarian may complain that Locke is not such a terrific ally after all. The libertarian has two grounds for disappointment in Locke. First, that the rights are unalienable and therefore, I don't really own myself after all. I can't dispose of my life or my liberty or my property in a way that violates my rights. That's disappointment number one. Disappointment number two, once there is a legitimate government based on consent, the only limits for Locke are limits on arbitrary takings of life or of liberty or of property. But if the majority decides, if the majority promulgates a generally applicable law and if it votes duly according to fair procedures, then there is no violation, whether it's a system of taxation or a system of conscription.

So it's clear that Locke is worried about the absolute arbitrary power of kings, but it's also true, and here is the darker side of Locke, that this great theorist of consent came up with a theory of private property that didn't require consent that may, and this goes back to the point Rochelle made last time, may have had something to do with Locke's second concern, which was America. You remember, when he talks about the state of nature, he is not talking about an imaginary place. "In the beginning," he says, "All the world was America." And what was going on in America? The settlers were enclosing land and engaged in wars with the Native Americans. Locke, who was an
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administrator of one of the colonies, may have been as interested in providing a justification for private property through enclosure without consent through enclosure and cultivation, as he was with developing a theory of government based on consent that would rein in kings and arbitrary rulers.

The question we're left with, the fundamental question we still haven't answered is what then becomes of consent? What work can it do? What is its moral force? What are the limits of consent? Consent matters not only for governments, but also for markets. And beginning next time, we're going to take up questions of the limits of consent in the buying and selling of goods.

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Lecture 9 Hired Guns

When we ended last time, we were discussing Locke's idea of government by consent and the question arose, "What are the limits on government that even the agreement of the majority can't override?" That was the question we ended with. We saw in the case of property rights that on Locke's view a democratically elected government has the right to tax people. It has to be taxation with consent because it does involve the taking of people's property for the common good but it doesn't require the consent of each individual at the time the tax is enacted or collected. What it does require is a prior act of consent to join the society, to take on the political obligation but once you take on that obligation, you agree to be bound by the majority. So much for taxation.

But what you may ask, about the right to life? Can the government conscript people and send them into battle? And what about the idea that we own ourselves? Isn't the idea of self-possession violated if the government can, through coercive legislation and enforcement powers, say "You must go risk your life to fight in Iraq." What would Locke say? Does the government have the right to do that?

Yes. In fact he says in 139, he says, "What matters is that the political authority or the military authority not be arbitrary, that's what matters." And he gives a wonderful example. He says "A sergeant, even a sergeant, let alone a general, a sergeant can command a soldier to go right up to a face of a cannon where he is almost sure to die, that the sergeant can do. The general can condemn the soldier to death for deserting his post or for not obeying even a desperate order. But with all their power over life and death, what these officers can't do is take a penny of that soldier's money because that has nothing to do with the rightful authority, that would be arbitrary and it would be corrupt." So consent winds up being very powerful in Locke, not consent of the individual to the particular tax or military order, but consent to join the government
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and to be bound by the majority in the first place. That's the consent that matters and it matters so powerfully that even the limited government created by the fact that we have an unalienable right to life, liberty, and property, even that limited government is only limited in the sense that it has to govern by generally applicable laws, the rule of law, it can't be arbitrary. That's Locke.

Well this raises a question about consent. Why is consent such a powerful moral instrument in creating political authority and the obligation to obey? Today we begin to investigate the question of consent by looking at a concrete case, the case of military conscription.

Now some people say if we have a fundamental right that arises from the idea that we own ourselves, it's a violation of that right for government to conscript citizens to go fight in wars. Others disagree. Others say that's a legitimate power of government, of democratically elected governments, anyhow, and that we have an obligation to obey. Let's take the case of the United States fighting a war in Iraq. News accounts tells us that the military is having great difficulty meeting its recruitment targets. Consider three policies that the U.S. government might undertake to deal with the fact that it's not achieving its recruiting targets.

Solution number one: increase the pay and benefits to attract a sufficient number of soldiers.

Option number two: shift to a system of military conscription, have a lottery, and whose ever numbers are drawn, go to fight in Iraq.

System number three: outsource, hire what traditionally have been called mercenaries, people around the world who are qualified, able to do the work, able to fight well, and
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who are willing to do it for the existing wage.

So let's take a quick poll here. How many favor increasing the pay? A huge majority. How many favor going to conscription? Maybe a dozen people in the room favor conscription. What about the outsourcing solution? Okay, so there may be two, three dozen.

During the Civil War, the Union used a combination of conscription and the market system to fill the ranks of the military to fight in the Civil War. It was a system that began with conscription but if you were drafted and didn't want to serve, you could hire a substitute to take your place and many people did. You could pay whatever the market required in order to find a substitute, people ran ads in newspapers, in the classified ads offering 500 dollars, sometimes 1000 dollars, for a substitute who would go fight the Civil War in their place.

In fact, it's reported that Andrew Carnegie was drafted and hired a substitute to take his place for an amount that was a little less than the amount he spent in the year on fancy cigars. Now I want to get your views about this Civil War system, call it the hybrid system, conscription but with a buyout provision. How many think it was a just system? How many would defend the Civil War system? Anybody? Anybody else? How many think it was unjust? Most of you don't like the Civil War system, you think it's unjust. Let's hear an objection.

Why don't you like it? What's wrong with it? Yes.

Student 1: “Well, by paying $300 to be exempt one time around, you're really putting a price on valuing human life and we established earlier, that's really hard to do so they're trying to accomplish something that really isn't feasible. You're basically
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saying that's what their life is worth to you. That's what their life is worth, it's putting a dollar value on life. ”

That's good. What's your name?

Student 1: “Liz.”

Liz. Well, who has an answer for Liz. You defended the Civil War system, what do you say?

Student 2: “If you don't like the price then you have the freedom to not be sold or hired so it's completely up to you. I don't think it's necessarily putting a specific price on you and if it's done by himself, I don't think there's anything that's really morally wrong with that. So the person who takes the $500, let's say, he's putting his own price on his life or on the risk of his life and he should have the freedom to choose to do that. ”

Exactly. What's your name?

Student 2: “Jason. ”

Jason. Thank you. Now we need to hear from another critic of the civil war system. Yes.

Student 3: “It's a kind of coercion almost, people who have lower incomes, for Carnegie he can totally ignore the draft, $300 is an irrelevant in terms of his income but someone of a lower income, they're essentially being coerced to draft, to be drafted, it's probably they're not able to find a replacement.”
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Tell me your name.

Student 3: “Sam.”

Sam. All right so you say, Sam, that when a poor laborer accepts $300 to fight in the Civil War, he is in effect being coerced by that money given his economic circumstances whereas Carnegie can go off, pay the money, and not serve. Alright. I want to hear someone who has a reply to Sam's argument, that what looks like a free exchange is actually coercive. Who has an answer to Sam? Go ahead. You agree with Sam.

Student 4: “I agree with him in saying that it is coercion in the sense that it robs individual of his ability to reason. ”

Okay, and what's your name?

Student 4: “Raul.”

All right. So Raul and Sam agree that what looks like a free exchange, free choice, voluntary act actually involves coercion.

Student 4: “It's profound coercion of the worst kind because it falls so disproportionately upon one segment of the society. ”

Good. Alright. So Raul and Sam have made a powerful point. Who would like to reply? Who has an answer for Sam and Raul? Go ahead.

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Student 5: “I don't think that these drafting systems are really terribly different from all-volunteer army sort of recruiting strategies. The whole idea of having benefits and pay for joining the army is sort of a coercive strategy to get people to join. It is true that military volunteers come from disproportionately lower economic status and also from certain regions of the country where you can use like patriotism to try and coerce people to feel like it's the right thing to do to volunteer and go over to Iraq.”

And tell me your name.

Student 5: “Emily.”

Alright, Emily says, and Raul you're going to have to reply to this so get ready. Emily says fair enough, there is a coercive element to the Civil War system when a laborer takes the place of Andrew Carnegie for $500. Emily concedes that but she says if that troubles you about the Civil War system shouldn't that also trouble you about the volunteer army today? Before you answer, how did you vote in the first poll? Did you defend the volunteer army?

Student 4: “I didn't vote.”

You didn't vote. By the way, you didn't vote but did you sell your vote to the person sitting next to you?

Student 4: “No.”

Alright. So what would you say to that argument.

Student 4: “I think that the circumstances are different in that there was conscription
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in the Civil War. There is no draft today and I think that volunteers for the army today have a more profound sense of patriotism that is of an individual choice than those who were forced into the military in the Civil War. Somehow less coerced?”

Less coerced. Even though there is still inequality in American Society? Even though, as Emily points out, the makeup of the American military is not reflective of the population as a whole? Let's just do an experiment here. How many here have either served in the military or have a family member who has served in the military in this generation, not parents? Family members. In this generation. And how many have neither served nor have any brothers or sisters who have served? Does that bear out your point Emily? Yes. of the all volunteer military overwhelmingly and yet overwhelmingly, people considered the Civil War system unjust. Sam and Raul articulated reasons for objecting to the Civil War system, it took place against a background of inequality and therefore the choices people made to buy their way in to military service were not truly free but at least partly coerced. Then Emily extends that argument in the form of a challenge. Alright, everyone here who voted in favor what's the difference in principle. Doesn't the all-volunteer army simply universalize the feature that almost everyone found objectionable in the Civil War buyout provision? Did I state the challenge fairly Emily?

Student 5: “Yes.”

Okay. So we need to hear from a defender of the all volunteer military who can address Emily's challenge. Who can do that? Go ahead.

Student 6: “The difference between the Civil War system and the all-volunteer army system is that in the Civil War, you're being hired not by the government, but by an individual and as a result, different people who get hired by different individuals get
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paid different amounts. In the case of the all-volunteer army, everyone who gets hired is hired by the government and gets paid the same amount. It's precisely the universalization of essentially paying your way to the army that makes the all-volunteer army just.”

Emily?

Student 5: “I guess I'd frame the principle slightly differently. On the all-volunteer army, it's possible for somebody to just step aside and not really think about the war at all. It's possible to say, "I don't need the money, I don't need to have an opinion about this, I don't need to feel obligated to take my part and defend my country. With the coercive system, or sorry, with an explicit draft then there's the threat at least that every individual will have to make some sort of decision regarding military conscription and perhaps in that way, it's more equitable. It's true that Andrew Carnegie might not serve in any case but in one, he can completely step aside from it, and the other there's some level of responsibility.”

While you're there, Emily, so what system do you favor, conscription?

Student 5: “I would be hard pressed to say but I think so because it makes the whole country feel a sense of responsibility for the conflict instead of having a war that's maybe ideologically supported by a few but only if there's no real responsibility.”

Good. Who wants to reply? Go ahead.

Student 7: “So I was going to say that the fundamental difference between the all-volunteer army and then the army in the Civil War is that in the all-volunteer army, if you want to volunteer that comes first and then the pay comes after whereas in the
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Civil War system, the people who are accepting the pay aren't necessarily doing it because they want to, they're just doing it for the money first.”

What motivation beyond the pay do you think is operating in the case of the all-volunteer army?

Student 7: “Like patriotism for the country. And a desire to defend the country. There is some motivation in pay but the fact that it's first and foremost an all-volunteer army will motivate first I think, personally.”

Do you think it's better? And tell me your name.

Student 7: “Jackie.”

Jackie do you think it's better if people serve in the military out of a sense of patriotism than just for the money?

Student 7: “In the Civil War is that the people that you're getting to go in it to go to war aren't necessarily people who want to fight and so they won't be as good soldiers as they will be had they been there because they wanted to be.”

Alright, What about Jackie's having raised the question of patriotism, that patriotism is a better or a higher motivation than money for military service. Who would like to address that question? Go ahead.

Student 8: “Patriotism absolutely is not necessary in order to be a good soldier because mercenaries can do just as good of a job as anyone who waves the American flag around and wants to defend what the government believes that we should do.”
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Did you favor the outsourcing solution?

Student 8: “Yes sir.”

Alright, so let Jackie respond. What's your name?

Student 8: “Philip.”

What about that Jackie?

Student 7: “So much for patriotism. If you've got someone whose heart is in it more than another person, they're going to do a better job. When it comes down to the wire and there's like a situation in which someone has to put their life on the line, someone who's doing it because they love this country will be more willing to go into danger than someone who's just getting paid, they don't care, they've got the technical skills but they don't care what happens like nothing invested in this country.”

There's another aspect though once we get on to the issue of patriotism. If you believe patriotism, as Jackie does, should be the foremost consideration and not money, does that argue for or against the paid army we have now? We call it the volunteer army though if you think about it, that's a kind of misnomer. A volunteer army as we use the term, is a paid army. So what about the suggestion that patriotism should be the primary motivation for military service not money? Does that argue in favor of the paid military that we have or does it argue for conscription? And just to sharpen that point building on Phil's case for outsourcing, if you think that the all-volunteer army, the paid army, is best because it lets the market allocate positions according to people's preferences and willingness to serve for a certain wage, doesn't the logic that
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takes you from a system of conscription to the hybrid Civil War system to the all-volunteer army, doesn't the idea of expanding freedom of choice in the market, doesn't that lead you all the way if you followed that principle consistently to a mercenary army? And then if you say no, Jackie says no, patriotism should count for something, doesn't that argue for going back to conscription if by patriotism, you mean a sense of civic obligation? Let's see if we can step back from the discussion that we've had and see what we've learned about consent as it applies to market exchange. We've really heard two arguments, two arguments against the use of markets and exchange in the allocation of military service. One was the argument raised by Sam and Raul, the argument about coercion, the objection that letting the market allocate military service may be unfair and may not even be free if there's severe inequality in the society so that people who buy their way into military service are doing so not because they really want to but because they have so few economic opportunities that that's their best choice and Sam and Raul say there's an element of coercion in that, that's one argument.

Then there is a second objection to using the market to allocate military service, that's the idea that military service shouldn't be treated as just another job for pay because it's bound up with patriotism and civic obligation. This is a different argument from the argument about unfairness and inequality and coercion, it's an argument that suggests that maybe where civic obligations are concerned, we shouldn't allocate duties and rights by the market. Now we've identified two broad objections. What do we need to know to assess those objections?

To assess the first, the argument from coercion, inequality, and unfairness, Sam, we need to ask what inequalities in the background conditions of society undermine the freedom of choices people make to buy and sell their labor, question number one.

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Question number two: to assess the civic obligation, patriotism. Argument: we have to ask what are the obligations of citizenship? Is military service one of them or not? What obligates us as citizens? What is the source of political obligation? Is it consent or are there some civic obligations we have, even without consent, for living and sharing in a certain kind of society?

We haven't answered either of those questions but our debate today about the Civil War system and the all-volunteer army has at least raised them and those are questions we're going to return to in the coming weeks.

“If we were all to be judged by our thoughts, the hills would be swarming with outlaws.” - Johann Sigurjonsson

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Lecture 10 Motherhood

Today I'd like to turn our attention and get your views about an argument over the role of markets in the realm of human reproduction and procreation. Now with infertility clinics, people advertise for egg donors and from time to time, in the Harvard Crimson ads appear for egg donors. Have you seen them? There was one that ran a few years ago that wasn't looking for just any egg donor, it was an ad that offered a large financial incentive for an egg donor from a woman who was intelligent, athletic, at least 5'10", and with at least 1400 or above on her SATs. How much do you think the person looking for this egg donor was willing to pay for an egg from a woman of that description? What would you guess? A thousand dollars? Fifteen thousand? Ten? I'll show you the ad. Fifty thousand dollars for an egg but only a premium egg. What do you think about that? Well there are also sometimes ads in the Harvard Crimson and the other college newspapers for sperm donors. So the market in reproductive capacities is an equal opportunity market. Well not exactly equal opportunity, they're not offering $50,000 for sperm.

But there is a company, a large commercial sperm bank that markets sperm, it's called California Cryobank, it's a for-profit company, it imposes exacting standards on the sperm it recruits, and it has offices in Cambridge, between Harvard and MIT, and in Palo Alto near Stanford. Cryobank's marketing materials play up the prestigious source of its sperm. Here is, from the website of Cryobank, the information. Here they talk about the compensation although compensation should not be the only reason for becoming a sperm donor, we are aware of the considerable time and expense involved in being a donor. So do you know what they offer? Donors will be reimbursed $75 per specimen, up to $900 a month if you donate three times a week, and then they add "We periodically offer incentives such as movie tickets or gift certificates for the extra time and effort expended by participating donors."
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It's not easy to be a sperm donor. They accept fewer than five percent of the donors who apply. Their admission criteria are more demanding than Harvard's. The head of the sperm bank said the ideal sperm donor is 6 feet tall, with a college degree, brown eyes, blond hair, and dimples for the simple reason that these are the traits that the market has shown that customers want. Quoting the head of the sperm bank, "If our customers wanted high school dropouts, we would give them high school dropouts." So here are two instances, the market in eggs for donation and the market in sperm, that raise a question, a question about whether eggs and sperm should or should not be bought and sold for money.

As you ponder that, I want you to consider another case involving market and in fact a contract in the human reproductive capacity and this is the case of commercial surrogate motherhood, and it's a case that wound up in court some years ago. It's the story of Baby M.

It began with William and Elizabeth Stern, a professional couple wanting a baby but they couldn't have one on their own, at least not without medical risk to Mrs. Stern. They went to an infertility clinic where they met Mary Beth Whitehead, a 29-year-old mother of two, the wife of a sanitation worker. She had replied to an ad that The Stern had placed seeking the service of a surrogate mother. They made a deal. They signed a contract in which William Stern agreed to pay Mary Beth Whitehead a $10,000 fee plus all expenses in exchange for which Mary Beth Whitehead agreed to be artificially inseminated with William Stern's sperm, to bear the child, and then to give the baby to the Sterns. Well, you probably know how the story unfolded. Mary Beth gave birth and changed her mind, she decided she wanted to keep the baby. The case wound up in court in New Jersey. So let's take, put aside any legal questions, and focus on this issue as a moral question.
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How many believe that the right thing to do in the Baby M case, would have been to uphold the contract, to enforce the contract? And how many think the right thing to do would have been not to enforce that contract? The majority say enforce so let's now hear the reasons that people had, either for enforcing or refusing to enforce this contract. First I want to hear from someone in the majority. Why do you uphold the contract? Why do you enforce it? Who can offer a reason? Yes. Stand up.

Student 9: “It's a binding contract, all the parties involved knew the terms of the contract before any action was taken, it's a voluntary agreement, the mother knew what she was getting into, all four intelligent adults, regardless of formal education, whatever. So it makes sense that if you know that you're getting into beforehand and you make a promise, you should uphold that promise in the end.”

Okay, a deal is a deal in other words.

Student 9: “Exactly.”

And what's your name?

Student 9: “Patrick.”

Is Patrick's reason the reason that most of you in the majority favored upholding the contract? Yes. Alright, let's hear now someone who would not enforce the contract. What do you say to Patrick? Why not?

Student 10: “Yes. Well, I mean, I agree, I think contracts should be upheld when all
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the parties know all the information but in this case, I don't think there's a way a mother, before the child exists, could actually know how she's going to feel about that child so I don't think the mother actually had all the information. She didn't know the person that was going to be born and didn't know how much she would love that person so that's my argument..”

So you would not, and what's your name?

Student 10: “Evan Wilson.”

Evan says he would not uphold the contract because when it was entered into the surrogate mother couldn't be expected to know in advance how she would feel so she didn't really have the relevant information when she made that contract. Who else? Who else would not uphold the contract? Yes.

Student 11: “I also think that a contract should generally be upheld but I think that the child has an inalienable right to its actual mother and I think that if that mother wants it then that child should have the right to that mother.”

You mean the biological mother not the adoptive mother?

Student 11: “Right.”

And why is that? First of all, tell me your name.

Student 11: “Anna.”

Why is that Anna?
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Student 11: “Because I think that that bond is created by nature is stronger than any bond that is created by a contract.”

Good. Thank you. Who else? Yes.

Student 12: “I disagree. I don't think that a child has an inalienable right to her biological mother. I think that adoption and surrogacy are both legitimate tradeoffs and I agree with the point made that it's a voluntary agreement, the individual who made it, it's a voluntary agreement and you can't apply coercion to this argument. .”

You can't apply the objection from coercion to this argument?

Student 12: “Correct.”

What's your name?

Student 12: “Kathleen.”

Evan claimed that the consent was tainted not by coercion but by lack of adequate information. She couldn't have known the relevant information namely how she would feel about the child. What do you say to that?

Student 12: “I don't think the emotional content of her feelings plays into this. I think in a case of law, in the justice of this scenario, her change of feelings are not relevant. If I give up my child for adoption and then I decide later on that I really want that child back, too bad, it's a tradeoff, it's a tradeoff that the mother has made.”

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So a deal is a deal, you agree with Patrick?

Student 12: “I agree with Patrick, a deal's a deal.”

A deal is a deal.

Student: “Yes.”

Good. Yes.

Student 13: “I would say that though I'm not really sure if I agree with the idea that the child has a right to their mother. I think the mother definitely has a right to her child and I also think that there's some areas where market forces shouldn't necessarily penetrate. I think that the whole surrogate mother area smacks a little bit of dealing in human beings seems dehumanizing. It doesn't really seem right so that's my main reason. I'm Andrew.”

Andrew, what is dehumanizing about buying and selling the right to a child, for money, what is dehumanizing about it?

Student 13: “Well because you're buying someone's biological right. were you to have a child, I'd believe that the law.”

So this like baby selling?

Student 13: “Right. To a certain extent. Though there's a contract with another person, you've made agreements and what not, there is an undeniable emotional bond that takes place between the mother and the child and it's wrong to simply ignore this
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because you've written out something contractually.”

Right. You want to reply to Andrew? Stay there.

Student 12: “You point out there's an undeniable emotional bond, I feel like in this situation, we're not necessarily arguing against adoption or surrogacy in itself, we're just sort of pointing out the emotional differences.”

Student 13: “But wait, I mean, it's easy to break everything down to numbers and say "Oh, we have contracts," like you're buying or selling a car but there are underlying emotions, I mean, you're dealing with people, these are not objects to be bought and sold. Alright.”

What about Andrew's claim that this is like baby selling.

Student 12: “I believe that adoption and surrogacy should be permitted, whether or not I actually will partake in it is not really relevant but I think that the government should, the government should give its citizens the rights to allow for adoption and surrogacy. Is adoption baby selling?”

Well, do you think you should be able to bid for a baby that's up for adoption? That's Andrew's challenge. Do I think I should be able to bid for a baby?

Student 12: “I'm not - sure! It's a market, I feel the extent to which it's been applied and I'm not sure if the government should be able to permit it Alright.”

Fair enough. Are you satisfied, Andrew?

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Student 13: “Well, yeah, I mean, I think surrogacy should be permitted. I think that people can do it but I don't think that it should be forced upon people that once a contract is signed, it's absolutely the end all. I think that it's unenforceable.”

So people should be free, Andrew, to enter into these contracts but it should not be enforceable in the court. Not in the court, no. Who would like to turn on one side or the other?

Student 14: “Yes. I think I have an interesting perspective on this because my brother was actually one of the people who donated to a sperm bank and he was paid a very large amount of money, he was six feet tall but not blond, he had dimples though. So he actually has, I'm an aunt now, he has a daughter, he donated his sperm to a lesbian couple in Oklahoma and he has been contacted by them and he has seen pictures of his daughter but he still does not feel an emotional bond to his daughter, he just has a sense of curiosity about what she looks like and what she's doing and how she is. He doesn't feel love for his child so from this experience, I think the bond between a mother and a child cannot be compared to the bond between the father and the child.”

That's really interesting. What's your name?

Student 14: “Vivian.”

Vivian. So we've got the case of surrogacy, commercial surrogacy, and it's been compared to baby selling and we've been exploring whether that analogy is apt and it can also be compared, as you point out, to sperm selling. But you're saying that sperm selling and baby selling.

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Student 14: “Yes, they're unequal services.”

They're unequal services and that's because……Vivian.

Student 14: “Yes, and also the time investment that's given by a mother, nine months, cannot be compared to a man going into a sperm bank, looking at pornography, depositing into a cup. I don't think those are equal.”

Good. Alright.

Student 14: “Because that's what happens in a sperm bank.”

That has come out so far. The objections to surrogacy, the objections to enforcing that contract are of at least two kinds. There was the objection about tainted consent, this time not because of coercion or implicit coercion but because of imperfect or flawed information. So tainted or flawed consent can arise either because of coercion or because of a lack of relevant information, at least according to one argument that we've heard and then a second objection to enforcing the surrogacy contract was that it was somehow dehumanizing.

Now when this case was decided by the courts, what did they say about these arguments? The lower court ruled that the contract was enforceable, neither party had a superior bargaining position. A price for the service was struck and a bargain was reached. One side didn't force the other neither had disproportionate bargaining power. Then it went to the New Jersey Supreme Court. And what did they do? They said this contract is not enforceable. They did grant custody to Mr. Stern as the father because they thought that would be in the best interest of the child but they restored the rights of Mary Beth Whitehead and left it to lower courts to decide exactly what the
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visitation rights should be. They invoked two different kinds of reasons, along the lines that Andrew proposed.

First, there was not sufficiently informed consent, the court argued. "Under the contract the natural mother is irrevocably committed before she knows the strength of her bond with her child, she never makes a truly voluntary informed decision for any decision prior to the baby's birth is, in the most important sense, uninformed," that was the court. Then the court also made a version of the second argument against commodification in this kind of case "this is the sale of a child," the court said, "or at the very least, the sale of a mother's right to her child. Whatever idealism may motivate the participants, the profit motive predominates, permeates, and ultimately governs the transaction." And so regardless, the court said, regardless of any argument about consent or flawed consent or full information, there are some things in a civilized society that money can't buy, that's what the court said in voiding this contract. Well, what about these two arguments against the extension of markets to procreation and to reproduction? a contract struck between William Stern and Mary Beth Whitehead. But there are at least two ways that consent can be other than truly free. First, if people are pressured or coerced to give their agreement and second, if their consent is not truly informed and in the case of surrogacy, the court said a mother can't know, even one who already has kids of her own, what it would be like to bear a child and give it up for pay. So in order to assess criticism, objection number one, we have to figure out just how free does a voluntary exchange have to be with respect to the bargaining power and equal information.

Question number one: how do we assess the second objection? The second objection is more elusive, it's more difficult. Andrew acknowledged this, right? What does it mean to say there is something dehumanizing to make childbearing a market transaction? Well, one of the philosophers
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we

read

on

this

subject,

Elizabeth•Anderson, tries to brings some philosophical clarity to the unease that Andrew articulated. She said "by requiring the surrogate mother to repress whatever parental love she feels for the child, surrogacy contracts convert women's labor into a form of alienated labor. The surrogate's labor is alienated because she must divert it from the end which the social practices of pregnancy rightly promote, namely an emotional bond with her child." So what Anderson is suggesting is that certain goods should not be treated as open to use or to profit. Certain goods are properly valued in ways other than use. What are other ways of valuing and treating goods that should not be open to use? Anderson says there are many: respect, appreciation, love, honor, awe, sanctity. There are many modes of valuation beyond use and certain goods are not properly valued if they're treated simply as objects of use. How do we go about evaluating that argument of Anderson? In a way, it takes us back to the debate we had with utilitarianism. including life, military service, procreation, childbearing? And if not, how do we figure out? How can we determine what modes of valuation are fitting or appropriate to those goods?

Several years ago there was a scandal surrounding a doctor, an infertility specialist in Virginia named Cecil Jacobson. He didn't have a donor catalogue because unknown to his patients, all of the sperm he used to inseminated his patients came from one donor, Dr. Jacobson himself. At least one woman who testified in court was unnerved at how much her newborn daughter looked just like him. Now it's possible to condemn Dr. Jacobson for failing to inform the women in advance that would be the argument about consent. The columnist, Ellen Goodman, described the bizarre scenario as follows, "Dr. Jacobson," she wrote "gave his infertility business the personal touch but now the rest of us," she wrote "are in for a round of second thoughts about sperm donation." Goodman concluded that fatherhood should be something you do, not something you donate. And I think what she was doing and what the philosopher Elizabeth Anderson is doing and what Andrew was suggesting with his argument
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about dehumanization is pondering whether there are certain goods that money shouldn't buy, not just because of tainted consent but also perhaps because certain goods are properly valued in a way higher than mere use. Those at least are the questions we're going to pursue with the help of some philosophers in the weeks to come.

“Science is organized knowledge. Wisdom is organized life.” - Immanuel Kant

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Lecture 11 Mind Your Motive

Now we turn Now we turn to the hardest philosopher we're going to read in this course. Today we turn to Immanuel Kant who offers a different account of why we have a categorical duty to respect the dignity of persons and not to use people as means merely even for good ends. Kant excelled at the University of Konigsberg at the age of 16. At age of 31, he got his first job as an unsalaried lecturer paid on commission based on the number of students who showed up at his lectures. This is a sensible system that Harvard would do well to consider. Luckily for Kant, he was a popular lecturer and also an industrious one and so he eked out a meager living. It wasn't until he was 57 that he published his first major work. But, it was worth the wait, the book was the "Critique of Pure Reason" perhaps the most important work in all of modern philosophy. And a few years later, Kant wrote the groundwork for "Metaphysics of Morals" which we read in this course. I want to acknowledge even before we start that Kant is a difficult thinker but it's important to try to figure what he's saying because what this book is about is what the supreme principle of morality is, number one, of what freedom really is.

So, let me start today, Kant rejects utilitarianism. He thinks that the individual person, all human beings, have a certain dignity that commands our respect. The reason the individual is sacred or the bearer of rights, according to Kant, doesn't stem from the idea that we own ourselves but instead from the idea that we are all rational beings. We're all rational beings, which simply means that we are beings who are capable of reason. We are also autonomous beings, which is to say that we are beings capable of acting and choosing freely. Now, this capacity for reason and freedom isn't the only capacity we have. We also have the capacity for pain and pleasure, for suffering and satisfaction. Kant admits the utilitarians were half right. Of course, we seek to avoid pain and we like pleasure, Kant doesn't deny this. What he does deny is Bentham's
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claim that pain and pleasure are our sovereign masters. He thinks that's wrong. Kant thinks that it's our rational capacity that makes us distinctive, that makes us special, that sets us apart from and above mere animal existence. It makes us something more than just physical creatures with appetites. We often think of freedom as simply consisting in doing what we want or in the absence of obstacles to getting what we want, that's one way of thinking about freedom. But this isn't Kant's idea of freedom. Kant has a more stringent demanding notion of what it means to be free. And though it's stringent and demanding, if you think it through, it's actually pretty persuasive. Kant reasons as follows: when we, like animals, seek after pleasure or the satisfaction of our desires or the avoidance of pain, when we do that we aren't really acting freely. Why not? We're really acting as the slaves of those appetites and impulses. I didn't choose this particular hunger or that particular appetite and so when I act to satisfy it, I'm just acting according to natural necessity. And for Kant, freedom is the opposite of necessity. There was an advertising slogan for the soft drink Sprite a few years ago. The slogan was, "Obey your thirst." There's a Kantian insight buried in that Sprite advertising slogan that in a way is Kant's point. you might think that you're choosing freely, Sprite versus Pepsi, but you're actually obeying something, a thirst or maybe a desire manufactured or massaged by advertising, you're obeying a prompting that you yourself haven't chosen or created.

And here it is worth noticing Kant's specially demanding idea of freedom. if not by the promptings of nature or my hunger or my appetite or my desires? Kant's answer? To act freely is to act autonomously, and to act autonomously is to act according to a law that I give myself not according to the physical laws of nature or the laws of cause and effect which include my desire to eat or to drink or to choose this food in a restaurant over that. Now, what is the opposite of autonomy for Kant? He invents a special term to describe the opposite of autonomy. Heteronomy is the opposite of autonomy. When I act heteronomously, I'm acting according to an inclination, or a
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desire, that I haven't chosen for myself. So, freedom as autonomy is an especially stringent idea that Kant insists on. Now, why is autonomy the opposite of acting heteronomously or according to the dictates of nature? Kant's point is that nature is governed by laws, laws of cause and effect for example. Suppose you drop a billiard ball, it falls to the ground; we wouldn't say the billiard ball is acting freely. Why not? It's acting according to the law of nature, according to the laws of cause of effect, the law of gravity. And just as he has an unusually demanding and stringent conception of freedom, freedom as autonomy, he also has a demanding conception of morality. To act freely is not to choose the best means to a given end; it's to choose the end itself for its own sake. And that's something that human beings can do and that billiard balls can't. In so far as we act on inclination or pursue pleasure, we act as means to the realization of ends given outside us. We are instruments rather than authors of the purposes we pursue, that's the heteronymous determination of the will. On the other hand, in so far as we act autonomously, according to a law we give ourselves, we do something for its own sake as an end in itself. When we act autonomously, we seems to be instruments to purposes given outside us, we become, or we can come to think of ourselves as ends in ourselves. This capacity to act freely, Kant tells us, is what gives human life its special dignity. Respecting human dignity means regarding persons not just as means but also as ends in themselves. And this is why it's wrong to use people for the sake of other peoples' well-being or happiness. This is the real reason, Kant says, that utilitarianism goes wrong. This is the reason it's important to respect the dignity of persons and to uphold their rights. So, even if there are cases, remember John Stewart Mill said, "Well, in the long run, if we uphold justice and respect the dignity of persons, we will maximize human happiness." What would Kant's answer be to that? What would his answer be? Even if that were true, even if the calculus worked out that way, even if you shouldn't throw the Christian's to the lions because in the long run fear will spread, the overall utility will decline. The utilitarian would be upholding justice and right and respect for persons for the wrong
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reason, for a purely a contingent reason, for an instrumental reason. It would still be using people, even where the calculus works out for the best in the long run, it would still be using people as means rather than respecting them as ends in themselves. So, that's Kant's idea of freedom as autonomy and you can begin to see how it's connected to his idea of morality. But we still have to answer one more question, what gives an act its moral worth in the first place? If it can't be directed, that utility or satisfying wants and desires, what gives an action its moral worth? This leads us from Kant's demanding idea of freedom to his demanding idea of morality. What does Kant say? What makes an action morally worthy consists not in the consequences or in the results that flow from it, what makes an action morally worthy has to do with the motive, with the quality of the will, with the intention for which the act is done. What matters is the motive and the motive must be of a certain kind. So, the moral worth of an action depends on the motive for which it's done and the important thing is that the person do the right thing for the right reason.

"A good will isn't good because of what it affects or accomplishes," Kant writes, "it's good in itself. Even if by its utmost effort, the goodwill accomplishes nothing, it would still shine like a jewel for its own sake as something which has its full value in itself." And so, for any action to be morally good, it's not enough that it should conform to the moral law, it must also be done for the sake of the moral law. The idea is that the motive confers the moral worth on an action and the only kind of motive that can confer moral worth on an action is the motive of duty. Well, what's the opposite of doing something out of a sense of duty because it's right? Well for Kant, the opposite would be all of those motives having to do with our inclinations. And inclinations refer to all of our desires, all of our contingently given wants, preferences, impulses, and the like. Only actions done for the sake of the moral law, for the sake of duty, only these actions have moral worth. Now, I want to see what you think about this idea but first let's consider a few examples. Kant begins with an example of a
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shopkeeper. He wants to bring out the intuition and make plausible the idea that what confers moral worth on an action is that it be done because it's right. He says suppose there's a shopkeeper and an inexperienced customer comes in. The shopkeeper knows that he could give the customer the wrong change, could shortchange the customer and get away with it; at least that customer wouldn't know. But the shopkeeper nonetheless says, "Well, if I shortchange this customer, word may get out, my reputation would be damaged, and I would lose business, so I won't shortchange this customer." The shopkeeper does nothing wrong, he gives the correct change, but does his action have moral worth? Kant says no, it doesn't have moral worth because the shopkeeper only did the right thing for the wrong reason, out of self-interest. That's a pretty straightforward case. Then he takes another case, the case of suicide. He says we have a duty to preserve ourselves. Now, for most people who love life, we have multiple reasons for not taking our own lives. So, the only way we can really tell, the only way we can isolate the operative motive for someone who doesn't take his or her life and who despite having an absolutely miserable life nonetheless recognizes the duty to preserve one's self and so does not commit suicide. The force of the example is to bring out the motive that matters and the motive that matters for morality is doing the right thing for the sake of duty. Let me just give you a couple of other examples. The Better Business Bureau, what's their slogan? The slogan of the Better Business Bureau: "Honesty is the best policy. It's also the most profitable." This is the Better Business Bureau's full page ad in the New York Times, "Honesty, it's as important as any other asset because a business that deals in truth, openness, and fair value cannot help but do well. Come join us and profit from it." What would Kant say about the moral worth of the honest dealings of members of the Better Business Bureau? What would he say? That here's a perfect example that if this is the reason that these companies deal honestly with their customers, their action lacks moral worth, this is Kant's point. A couple of years ago, at the University of Maryland, there was a problem with cheating and so they initiated an honor system and they created a
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program with local merchants that if you signed the honor pledge, a pledge not to cheat, you would get discounts of 10% to 25% at local shops. Well what would you think of someone motivated to uphold an honor code with the hope of discounts? It's the same as Kant's shopkeeper. The point is, what matters is the quality of the will, the character of the motive and the relative motive to morality can only be the motive of duty, not the motive of inclination. And when I act out of duty, when I resist as my motive for acting inclinations or self-interest, even sympathy and altruism, only then am I acting freely, only then am I acting autonomously, only then is my will not determined or governed by external considerations, that's the link between Kant's idea of freedom and of morality.

T: Now, I want to pause here to see if all of this is clear or if you have some questions or puzzles. They can be questions of clarification or they can be challenges, if you want to challenge this idea that only the motive of duty confers moral worth on the action. What do you think?

S: Yes. Yeah, I actually have two questions of clarification. The first is, there seems to be an aspect of this that makes it sort of self-defeating in that once you're conscious of what morality is you can sort of alter your motive to achieve that end of morality.

T: Give me an example of what you have in mind.

S: The shopkeeper example. If he decides that he wants to give the person the money to do the right thing and he decides that it's his motive to do so because he wants to be moral isn't that sort of defeating the purity of his action if morality is determined by his motive? His motive is then to act morally.

T: I see. So, you're imagining a case not of the purely selfish calculating shopkeeper
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but of one who says, well, he may consider shortchanging the customer. But then he says, "Not, or my reputation might suffer if word gets out." But instead he says, "Actually, I would like to be the kind of honest person who gives the right change to customers simply because it's the right thing to do." Or simply, "Because I want to be moral." "Because I want to be moral, I want to be a good person, and so I'm going to conform all of my actions to what morality requires." It's a subtle point, it's a good question. Kant does acknowledge, you're pressing Kant on an important point here, Kant does say there has to be some incentive to obey the moral law, it can't be a self-interested incentive that would defeat it by definition. So, he speaks of a different kind of incentive from that inclination, he speaks of reverence for the moral law. So, if that shopkeeper says, "I want to develop a reverence for the moral law and so I'm going to do the right thing"

S: Then I think he's there, he's there as far as Kant's concerned because he's formed his motive, his will is conforming to the moral law once he sees the importance of it. So, it would count, it would count.

T: All right, then, secondly, very quickly, what stops morality from becoming completely objective in this point? What stops morality from becoming subjective? then how can you apply this or how can it be enforced? All right, that's also a great question. What's your name?-

S: My name is Amady.

T: Amady?

S: Yes.

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T: All right, if acting morally means acting according to a moral law out of duty and if it's also to act freely in the sense of autonomously, it must mean that I'm acting according to a law that I give myself, that's what it means to act autonomously, Amady is right about that, but that does raise a really interesting question. If acting autonomously means acting according to a law I give myself, that's how I escape the chain of cause and effect and the laws of nature. What's the guarantee that the law I give myself when I'm acting out of duty is the same as the law that Amady is giving himself and that each of you gives yourselves? Well, here's the question, how many moral laws, from Kant's point of view, are there in this room? Are there a thousand or is there one? He thinks there's one, which in a way does go back to this question: all right, what is the moral law? What does it tell us? is to act according to one's conscience, according to a law one gives oneself, if we all exercise our reason, we will come up with one and the same moral law? That's what Amady wants to know. Here's Kant's answer: the reason that leads us to the law we give ourselves as autonomous beings is a reason, it's a kind of practical reason that we share as human beings. It's not idiosyncratic. The reason we need to respect the dignity of persons is that we're all rational beings, we all have the capacity for reason and it's the exercise of that capacity for reason which exists undifferentiated in all of us that makes us worthy of dignity, all of us, and since it's the same capacity for reason, unqualified by particular autobiographies and life circumstance, it's the same universal capacity for reason that delivers the moral law, it turns out that to act autonomously is to act according to a law we give ourselves exercising our reason, but it's the reason we share with everyone as rational beings, not the particular reasons we have given our upbringings, our particular values, our particular interests.

It's pure practical reason, in Kant's terms, which legislates a priori regardless of any particular contingent or empirical ends. Well, what moral law would that kind of reason deliver? What is its content? To answer that question, you have to read the
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groundwork and we'll continue with that question next time.

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Lecture 12 The Supreme Principle of Morality

Today we turn back to Kant. Before we do, remember this is the week by the end of which all of you will basically get Kant, figure out what he's up to. You're laughing. No, it will happen. Kant's groundwork is about two big questions. First, what is the supreme principle of morality? Second, how is freedom possible? Two big questions. Now, one way of making your way through this dense philosophical book is to bear in mind a set of oppositions or contrasts or dualisms that are related. Today I'd like to talk about them. Today we're going to answer the question, what, according to Kant, is the supreme principle of morality? And in answering that question, in working our way up to Kant's answer to that question it will help to bear in mind three contrasts, or dualisms, that Kant sets out. The first, you'll remember, had to do with the motive according to which we act. And according to Kant, only one kind of motive is consistent with morality, the motive of duty, doing the right thing for the right reason. What other kind of motives are there? Kant sums them up in the category of inclination. Every time the motive for what we do is to satisfy a desire or a preference that we may have, to pursue some interest, we're acting out of inclination. Now, let me pause to see if in thinking about the question of the motive of duty, the goodwill, see if any of you has a question about that much of Kant's claim. Or is everybody happy with this distinction? What do you think? Go ahead. When you make that distinction between duty and inclination is there ever any moral action ever? I mean you could always, kind of, probably find some selfish motive, can't you? Maybe, very often people do have self-interested motives when they act. Kant wouldn't dispute that but what Kant is saying is that in so far as we act morally, that is in so far as our actions have moral worth, what confers moral worth is precisely our capacity to rise above self-interest and prudence and inclination and to act out of duty. Some years ago I read about a spelling bee and there was a young man who was declared the winner of the spelling bee, a kid named Andrew, 13 years old. The winning word, the word that
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he was able to spell, was "echolalia." Does anyone know what echolalia is? What? Some type of flower? It's not some type of flower. No. It means the tendency to repeat as in echo, to repeat what you've heard. Anyhow, he misspelled it actually but the judges misheard him, they thought he had spelled it correctly and awarded him the championship of the National Spelling Bee and he went to the judges afterward and said, "Actually, I misspelled it, I don't deserve the prize." And he was regarded as a moral hero and he was written up in the New York Times, "Misspeller is Spelling Bee Hero." There's Andrew with his proud mother and when he was interviewed afterwards, listen to this, when he was interviewed afterwards, he said, "The judges said I had a lot of integrity," but then he added that part of his motive was, "I didn't want to feel like a slime."

T: All right. What would Kant say? Go ahead.

S: I guess it would depend on whether or not that was a marginal reason or the predominant reason that he didn't actually spell the word correctly.

T: Good. And what's your name?

S: Bosco.

T: Bosco. That's very interesting. Is there anyone else who has a view about this? Does this show that Kant's principle is too stringent, too demanding? What would Kant say about this?

S: Yes. I think that Kant actually says that it is the pure motivation that comes out of duty which gives the action moral worth. So, it's like, for example in this case, he might have more than one motive, he might have the motive of not feeling like a slime
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and he might have the motive of doing the right thing itself out of duty and so, while there's more than one motivation going on there doesn't mean that the action is devoid of moral worth just because he has one other motive because the motive which involves duty is what gives it the moral worth.

T: Good. And what's your name:?

S: Judith.

T: Judith. Well Judith, I think that your account actually is true to Kant. It's fine to have sentiments and feelings that support doing the right thing provided they don't provide the reason for acting. So, I think Judith actually has mounted a pretty good defense of Kant on this question of the motive of duty. Thank you.

Now, let's go back to the three contrasts. It's clear at least what Kant means when he says that for an action to have moral worth, it must be done for the sake of duty, not out of inclination. But as we began to see last time, there's a connection between Kant's stringent notion of morality and his specially demanding understanding of freedom. And that leads us to the second contrast, the link between morality and freedom The second contrast describes two different ways that my will can be determined; autonomously and heteronomously. According to Kant, I'm only free when my will is determined autonomously. Which means what? According to a law that I give myself， we must be capable, if we're capable of freedom as autonomy, we must be capable of acting according not to a law that's given or imposed on us but according to a law we give ourselves. But where could such a law come from? A law that we give ourselves. Reason. If reason determines my will then the will becomes a power to choose independent of the dictates of nature or inclination or circumstance.
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So, connected with Kant's demanding notions of morality and freedom is a specially demanding notion of reason. Well, how can reason determine the will? There are two ways and this leads to the third contrast. Kant says there are two different commands of reason and a command of reason Kant calls an imperative an imperative is simply an ought. One kind of imperative, perhaps the most familiar kind, is a hypothetical imperative. Hypothetical imperatives use instrumental reason. If you want x then do y. It's means-ends reasoning. If you want a good business reputation then don't shortchange your customers, word may get out. That's a hypothetical imperative. "If the action would be good solely as a means to something else," Kant writes, "the imperative is hypothetical. If the action is represented as good in itself and therefore is necessary for a will which of itself accords with reason, then the imperative is categorical." That's the difference between a categorical imperative and a hypothetical one. A categorical imperative commands categorically, which just means without reference to or dependence on any further purpose and so you see the connection among these three parallel contrasts. To be free, in the sense of autonomous, requires that I act not out of a hypothetical imperative but out of a categorical imperative.

And so you see by these three contrasts Kant reasons his way, brings us up to his derivation of the categorical imperative. Well, this leaves us one big question: what is the categorical imperative? What is the supreme principle of morality? What does it command of us? Kant gives three versions, three formulations, of the categorical imperative. I want to mention two and then see what you think of them. The first version, the first formula, he calls the formula of the universal law; "Act only on that maxim whereby you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law." And by maxim, what does Kant mean? He means a rule that explains the reason for what you're doing, a principle. For example, promise keeping. Suppose I need money, I need $100 desperately and I know I can't pay it back anytime soon. I come to you and make you a promise, a false promise, one I know I can't keep, "Please give me
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$100 today, lend me the money, I will repay you next week." Is that consistent with the categorical imperative, that false promise? Kant says no. And the test, the way we can determine that the false promise is at odds with the categorical imperative is try to universalize it, universalize the maxim upon which you're about to act. If everybody made false promises when they needed money then nobody would believe those promises, there would be no such thing as a promise, and so there would be a contradiction. The maxim universalized would undermine itself. That's the test. That's how we can know that the false promise is wrong.

T: Well what about the formula of the universal law? You find it persuasive? What do you think? Go ahead.

S: I have a question about the difference between categoricalism and a hypothesis that if you're going to act . . . Between categorical and hypothetical. Hypothetical, yeah. Imperatives. Right. If you're going to act with a categorical imperative so that the maxim doesn't undermine itself, it sounds like I am going to do x because I want y, I'm going to not lie in dire need because I want the world to function in such a way that promises are kept. I don't want to liquidate the practice of promises. Right, it sounds like justifying a means by an ends. It seems like an instance of consequentialist reasoning, you're saying.

T: Right. And what's your name?

S: Tim.

T: Well Tim, John Stewart Mill agreed with you. He made this criticism of Kant. He said, "If I universalize the maxim and find that the whole practice of promise keeping would be destroyed if universalized, I must be appealing somehow to consequences if
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that's the reason not to tell a false promise." So, John Stewart Mill agreed with that criticism against Kant but John Stewart Mill was wrong. You're in good company though. You're in good company, Tim.

Kant has often read, as Tim just read him, as appealing to consequences. The world would be worse off if everybody lied because then no one could rely on anybody else's word therefore you shouldn't lie. That's not what Kant is saying exactly. Although, it's easy to interpret him as saying that. I think what he's saying is that this is the test, this is the test of whether the maxim corresponds with the categorical imperative. It isn't exactly the reason, it's not the reason, the reason you should universalize to test your maxim is to see whether you are privileging your particular needs and desires over everybody else's. It's a way of pointing to this feature, this demand of the categorical imperative that the reasons for your action shouldn't depend for their justification on your interests, your needs, your special circumstances being more important than somebody else's. That, I think, is the moral intuition lying behind the universalization test. So, let me spell out the second, Kant's second version of the categorical imperative, perhaps in a way that's more intuitively accessible than the formula of universal law. It's the formula of humanity as an end. Kant introduces the second version of the categorical imperative with the following line of argument: "We can't base the categorical imperative on any particular interests, purposes, or ends because then it would be only relative to the person whose ends they were. But suppose, however, there was something whose existence has in itself an absolute value . . . an end in itself . . . then in it, and in it alone, would there be the ground of a possible categorical imperative." Well, what is there that we can think of as having its end in itself? Kant's answer is this, "I say that man, and in general every rational being, exists as an end in himself, not merely as a means for arbitrary use by this or that will." And here Kant distinguishes between persons on the one hand and things on the other. Rational beings are persons, they don't just have a relative value for us but if
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anything has they have an absolute value, an intrinsic value, that is rational beings have dignity. They're worthy of reverence or respect. This line of reasoning leads Kant to the second formulation of the categorical imperative which is this: "Act in such a way that you always treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, never simply as a means, but always at the same time, as an end." So, that's the formula of humanity as an end, the idea that human beings as rational beings are ends in themselves, not open to use merely as a means. When I make a false promise to you, I'm using you as a means to my ends, to my desire for the $100, and so I'm failing to respect you, I'm failing to respect your dignity, I'm manipulating you. Now, consider the example of the duty against suicide. Murder and suicide are at odds with the categorical imperative. Why? If I murder someone, I'm taking their life for some purpose, either because I'm a hired killer or I'm in the throes of some great anger passion, I have some interest, some purpose, that's particular for the sake which I'm using them as a means. Murder violates the categorical imperative. For Kant, morally speaking, suicide is on a par with murder. It's on a par with murder because what we violate when we take a life, when we take someone's life, ours or somebody else's, we use that person, we use a rational being, we use humanity as a means and so we fail to respect humanity as an end.

T: And that capacity for reason, that humanity that commands respect, that is the ground of dignity, that humanity, that capacity for reason resides undifferentiated in all of us and so I violate that dignity in my own person, if I commit suicide, and in murder if I take somebody else's life. From a moral point of view they're the same and the reason they're the same has to do with the universal character and ground of the moral law. The reason that we have to respect the dignity of other people has not to do with anything in particular about them and so respect, Kantian respect, unlike love in this way. It's unlike sympathy. It's unlike solidarity or fellow feeling or altruism because love and those other particular virtues or reasons for caring about other
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people have to do with who they are in particular. But respect, for Kant, respect is respect for humanity which is universal, for a rational capacity which is universal, and that's why violating it, in my own case, is as objectionable as violating it in the case of any other. Questions or objections? Go ahead.

S: I guess I'm somewhat worried about Kant's statement that you cannot use a person as a means because every person is an end of themselves, because it seems that everyday, in order to get something accomplished for that day, I must use myself as a means to some end and I must use the people around me as a means to some end as well. For instance, suppose that I want to do well in a class and I have to write a paper. I have to use myself as a means to write the paper. Suppose I want to buy something, food, I must go to the store and use the person working behind the counter as a means for me to purchase my food.

T: Right. That's true, you do. What's your name?

S: Patrick.

T: Patrick, you're not doing anything wrong. You're not violating the categorical imperative when you use other people as means, that's not objectionable provided when we deal with other people for the sake of advancing our projects and purposes and interests, which we all do, provided we treat them in a way that is consistent with respect for their dignity and what it means to respect them is given by the categorical imperative. Are you persuaded? Do you think that Kant has given a compelling account, a persuasive account, of the supreme principle of morality? Reread the groundwork and we'll try to answer that question next time.

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Lecture 13 A Lesson in Lying T: Last time we began trying to we began by trying to navigate our way through Kant's moral theory. Now, fully to make sense of Kant moral theory in the groundwork requires that we be able to answer three questions. How can duty and autonomy go together? What's the great dignity in answering to duty? It would seem that these two ideas are opposed: duty and autonomy. What's Kant's answer to that? Need someone here to speak up on Kant's behalf. Does he have an answer? Yes, go ahead, stand up. S: Kant believes you the only act autonomously when you are pursuing something only the name of duty,and not because of your own circumstances. if you're doing it because of duty and not because something of your own personal gain. My name is Matt. T: Matt, why is that acting on a freedom? I hear what you're saying about duty? S: Because you choose to accept those moral laws in yourself and not brought on from outside upon onto you. T: Okay, good. Because acting out of duty Yeah. - is following a moral law that you impose on yourself. S: That you impose on yourself. T: That you impose on yourself. That's what makes duty compatible with freedom. Yeah. Okay, that's good Matt. That is Kant's answer. That's great. Thank you. So, Kant's answer is it is not in so far as I am subject to the law that I have dignity but rather in so far as with regard to that very same law, I'm the author and I am subordinated to that law on that ground that I took it as much as at I took it upon
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myself. I willed that law. So that's why for Kant acting according to duty and acting freely in the sense of autonomously are one and the same. But that raises the question, how many moral laws are there? Because if dignity consists and be governed by a law that I give myself, what's to guarantee that my conscience will be the same as your conscience? Who has Kant's answer to that? Yes? S: Because a moral law trend is not contingent upon seductive conditions. It would transcend all particular differences between people and so would be a universal law and in this respect there'd only be one moral law because it would be supreme. T: Right. That's exactly right. What's your name? S: Kelly. T: Kelly. Kelly. So Kelly, Kant believes that if we choose freely out of our own consciences, the moral law we're guarantee to come up with one and the same moral law. -Yes. And that's because when I choose it's not me, Michael Sandel choosing. It's not you, Kelly choosing for yourself? What is it exactly? Who is doing the choosing? Who's the subject? Who is the agent? Who is doing the choosing? Pure reason and what you mean by pure reason is what exactly? S: Well pure reason is like we were saying before not subject to any external conditions that may be imposed on that side. T: Good that's' great. So, the reason that does the willing, the reason that governs my will when I will the moral law is the same reason that operates when you choose the moral law for yourself and that's why it's possible to act autonomously, to choose for myself, for each of us to choose for ourselves as autonomous beings and for all of us to wind up willing the same moral law, the categorical imperative. But then there is one big and very difficult question left even if you accept everything that Matt and
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Kelly had said so far. How is a categorical imperative possible? How is morality possible? To answer that question, Kant said we need to make a distinction. We need to make a distinction between two standpoints, two standpoints from which we can make sense of our experience. Let me try to explain what he means by these two standpoints. As an object of experience, I belong to the sensible world. There my actions are determined by the laws of nature But as a subject of experience, I inhabit an intelligible world here being independent of the laws of nature I am capable of autonomy, capable of acting according to a law I give myself. Now Kant says that, "Only from this second standpoint can I regard myself as free, for to be independent of determination by causes in the sensible world is to be free." If I were holy and empirical being as the utilitarian assume, if I were a being holy and only subject to the deliverances of my senses, pain and pleasure and hunger and thirst and appetite, if that's all there were to humanity, we wouldn't be capable of freedom, Kant reasons because in that case every exercise of will would be conditioned by the desire for some object. In that case all choice would be heteronomous choice governed by the pursued of some external end. "When we think of ourselves as free, " Kant writes, "we transfer ourselves into the intelligible world as members and recognize the autonomy of the will." That's the idea of the two standpoints. So how are categorical imperatives possible? Only because the idea of freedom makes me a member of an intelligible world. Now Kant admits we aren't only rational beings. We don't only inhabit the intelligible world, the realm of freedom. If we did -- if we did, then all of our actions would invariably accord with the autonomy of the will. But precisely because we inhabit simultaneously the two standpoints, the two realms, the realm of freedom and the realm of necessity precisely because we inhabit both realms, there is always potentially a gap between what we do and what we ought to do, between is and ought. Another way of putting this point and this is the point with which Kant concludes the groundwork, morality is not empirical. Whatever you see in
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the world, whatever you discover through science can't decide moral questions. Morality stands at a certain distance from the world, from the empirical world. And that's why no science could deliver moral truth. Now I want to test Kant's moral theory with the hardest possible case, a case that he raises, the case of the murderer at the door. Kant says that lying is wrong. We all know that. We've discussed why. Lying is at odds with the categorical imperative. A French Philosopher, Benjamin Constant wrote an article responding to the groundwork where he said, "This absolute probation on lying is wrong. It can't be right. What if a murderer came to your door looking for your friend who was hiding in your house? And the murderer asked you point blank, "Is your friend in your house?" Constant says, "It would be crazy to say that the moral thing to do in that case is to tell the truth." Constant says the murderer certainly doesn't deserve the truth and Kant wrote to reply. And Kant stuck by his principle that lying even to the murderer at the door is wrong. And the reason it's wrong, he said is once you start taking consequences into account to carve out exceptions to the categorical imperative, you've given up the whole moral framework. You've become a consequentialist or maybe a rule utilitarian. But most of you and most to our Kant's readers think there's something odd and impossible about this answer.\N124 I would like to try to defend Kant on this point and then I want to see whether you think that my defense is plausible, and I would want to defend him within the spirit of his own account of morality. Imagine that someone comes to your door. You were asked that question by this murder. You are hiding your friend. Is there a way that you could avoid telling a lie without selling out your friend? Does anyone have an idea of how you might be able to do that? S: I was just going to say if I were to let my friend in my house to hide in the first place, I'd probably make a plan with them so I'd be like, "Hey I'll tell the murderer
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you're here, but escape, " and that's one of the options mentioned. T: But I'm not sure that's a Kantian option. You're still lying though. S: No. Because he's in the house but he won't be. T: Oh,I see. All right, good enough. One more try. S: If you just say you don't know where he is He might have left the closet. You have no clue where he could be. T: So you would say, I don't know which wouldn't actually be a lie because you weren't at that very moment looking in the closet. S: Exactly. T: So it would be strictly speaking true. S: Yes. T: And yet possibly deceiving, misleading. S: But still true. T: What's your name? S: John. T: John. All right, John has... now John may be on to something. John you're really offering us the option of a clever evasion that is strictly speaking true. This raises the question whether there is a moral difference between an outright lie and a misleading truth. From Kant's point of view there actually is a world of difference between a lie
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and a misleading truth. Why is that even though both might have the same consequences? But then remember Kant doesn't base morality on consequences. He bases it on formal adherence to the moral law. Now, sometimes in ordinary life we make exceptions for the general rule against lying with the white lie. It's a lie to make...you're well to avoid hurting someone's feelings for example. It's a lie that we think of as justified by the consequences. Now Kant could not endorse a white lie but perhaps he could endorse a misleading truth. Supposed someone gives you a tie, as a gift, and you open the box and it's just awful. What do you say? Thank you. You could say thank you. But they're waiting to see what you think of it or they ask you what do you think of it? You could tell a white lie and say it's beautiful. But that wouldn't be permissible from Kant's point of view. Could you say not a white lie but a misleading truth, you open the box and you say, "I've never seen a tie like that before. Thank you." You shouldn't have. That's good.Can you think of a contemporary political leader who engaged...you can? Who are you thinking of? You remember the whole carefully worded denials in the Monica Lewinsky affair of Bill Clinton. Now, those denials actually became the subject of very explicit debate in argument during the impeachment hearings. Take a look at the following excerpts from Bill Clinton. Is there something do you think morally at stake in the distinction between a lie and a misleading carefully couched truth? I want to say one thing to

the American people. I want you to listen to me. I'm going to say this again. I did not have sexual relations with that woman Miss Lewinsky. I never told anybody to lie not a single time, never. These allegations are false. Did he lie to the American people when he said I never had sex with that woman? Well he didn't explain it. He did explain that, explain congressman. What he said was, to the American people, that he did not have sexual relations and I understand you're not going to like this congressman because you will see it as a hair-splitting evasive answer. But in his own mind his definition was not... Okay, I understand that argument.
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Okay. All right, so there you have the exchange . Now at the time, you may have thought this was just a legalistic hair-splitting exchange between a Republican who wanted to impeach Clinton and a lawyer who is trying to defend him. But now in the light of Kant, do you think there is something morally at stake in the distinction between a lie and an evasion , a true but misleading statement? People who think there is a distinction. Are you ready to defend Kant? S: Well I think when you try to say that lying and misleading truths are the same thing; you're basing it on consequentialist argument which is that they achieve the same thing. But the fact to the matter is you told the truth and you intended that people would believe what you are saying, which was the truth, which means it is not morally the same as telling a lie and intending that they believe it is the truth even though it is not true. T: Good. What's your name? S: Diana. T: So Diana says that Kant has a point here and There's someone over here. For Kant motivation is key, so if you give to someone because primarily you want to feel good about yourself Kant would say that has no moral worth. Well with this, the motivation is the same. It's to sort of mislead someone, it's to lie, it's to sort of throw them off the track and the motivation is the same. So there should be no difference. S: Okay. T: Good. So here isn't the motive the same Diana? What do you say ? S: To this argument that well the motive is the same in both cases there is the attempt or at least the hope that one's pursuer will be misled? that your immediate motive is
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that they should believe you. The ultimate consequence of that is that they might be deceived and not find out what was going on. But that your immediate motive is that they should believe you because you're telling the truth. T: May I help a little? S: Sure.

T: You and Kant. Why don't you say... and what's your name, I'm sorry? Wesley。\N Wesley. Why don't you say to Wesley it's not exactly the case that the motive in both cases is to mislead? They're hoping, they're hoping that the person will be misled by the statement "I don't know where they are" or "I never had sexual relations." You're hoping that they will be misled but in the case where you're telling the truth, you're motive is to mislead while at the same time telling the truth and honoring the moral law and staying within the bounds of the categorical imperative. I think Kant's answer would be.... Diana, yes? S: Yes. T: You like that? S: I do. T: Okay. So I think Kant's answer would be unlike a falsehood, unlike a lie, a misleading truth pays a certain homage to duty. And the homage it pays to duty is what justifies that the work of, even the work of the evasion. Diana, yes you like? Okay. And so there is something, some element of respect for the dignity of the moral law in the careful evasion because Clinton could have told an outright lie but he didn't. And so I think Kant's insight here is in the carefully couched but true evasion. There is a kind of homage to the dignity of the moral law that is not present in the outright
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lie and that, Wesley, is part of the motive.It's part of the motive. Yes, I hope he will be misled. I hope the murderer will run down the road or go to the mall looking for my friend instead at the closet. I hope that will be the effect. I can't control that. I can't control the consequences. But what I can control is standing by and honoring however I pursue the ends, I hope will unfold to do so in a way that is consistent with respect for the moral law. Wesley, I don't think, is entirely persuaded but at least this brings out, this discussion brings out some of what it's at stake, what's morally at stake in Kant's notion of the categorical imperative.

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Lecture 14 A Deal is a Deal Last time we talked about Kant's categorical imperative and we considered the way he applied the idea of the categorical imperative to the case of lying. I want to turn briefly to one other application of Kant's moral theory and that's his political theory. Now Kant says that just laws arise from a certain kind of social contract. But this contract he tells us is of an exceptional nature. What makes the contract exceptional is that it is not an actual contract that happens when people come together and try to figure out what the constitution should be. Kant points out that the contract that generates justice is what he calls an idea of reason. It's not an actual contract among actual men and women gathered in a constitutional convention. Why not? I think Kant's reason is that actual men and women gathered in real constitutional convention would have different interests, values, aims, and it would also be differences of bargaining power and differences of knowledge among them. And so the laws that would result from their deliberations wouldn't necessarily be just, wouldn't necessarily conform to principles of right ， but would simply reflect the differences a bargaining power, the special interests the fact that some might know more than others about law or about politics. So Kant says, "A contract that generates principles of right is merely an idea of reason but it has undoubted practical reality because it can oblige every legislator to frame his laws in such a way that they could have been produced by the united will of the whole nation." So Kant is a contractarian, but he doesn't trace the origin or the rightness of law to any actual social contract. This contrives to an obvious question. What is the moral force of a hypothetical contract, a contract that never happened? That's the question we take up today but in order to investigate it, we need to turn to a modern philosopher, John Rawls, who worked out in his book, A Theory of Justice, in great detail and account of a hypothetical agreement as the basis for justice. Rawls' theory of justice in broad outline is parallel to Kant's in two important respects. Like Kant, Rawls was a critic of utilitarianism. "Each person
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possesses an inviolability founded on justice, " Rawls' writes, "that even the welfare of society as a whole cannot override. The rights secured by justice are not subject to political bargaining or to the calculus of social interests." The second respect in which Rawls' theory follows Kant's is on the idea that principles of justice properly understood can be derived from a hypothetical social contract. And Rawls works this out in fascinating detail with the device of what he calls the "veil of ignorance". The way to arrive at the rights... the basic rights that we must respect, the basic framework of rights and duties is to imagine that we were gathered together trying to choose the principles to govern our collective lives without knowing certain important particular fact about ourselves. That's the idea of the veil of ignorance. Now what would happen if we gather together just as we are here and try to come up with principles of justice to govern our collective life? There would be a cacophony of proposals of suggestions reflecting people's different interests, some are strong, some are weak, some are rich, some are poor. So Rawls says, imagine instead that we are gathered in an original position of equality and what assures the equality is the veil of ignorance. Imagine that we are all behind a veil of ignorance which temporarily abstracts from or brackets, hides from us who in particular we are. Our race, our class, our place in society, our strengths, our weaknesses, whether we're healthy or unhealthy, then and only then Rawls says, the principles we would agree to would be principles of justice. That's how the hypothetical contract works. What is the moral force of this kind of hypothetical agreement? Is it stronger or weaker than a real agreement, an actual social contract? In order to answer that question, we have to look hard at the moral force of actual contracts. There are really two questions here. One of them is how do actual contracts bind me or obligate me? Question number one. And question number two, how do actual real life contracts justify the terms that they produce? If you think about it and this is in line with Rawls and Kant, the answer to the second question, how do actual
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contracts justify the terms that they produce, the answer is they don't. At least not on their own. Actual contracts are not self-sufficient moral instruments of any actual contract or agreement. It can always be asked, is it fair what they agreed to? The fact of the agreement never guarantees the fairness of the agreement and we know this by looking at our own constitutional convention. It produced a constitution that permitted slavery to persist. It was agreed to. It was an actual contract but that doesn't establish that the laws agreed to all of them were just. Well then what is the moral force of actual contracts? To the extent that they bind us, they obligate in two ways. Suppose, maybe here it would help to take an example. We make an agreement, a commercial agreement. I promise to pay you $100 if you will go harvest and bring to me 100 lobsters. We make a deal. You go out and harvest them and bring them to me. I eat the lobsters, served them to my friends, and then I don't pay. And you say, "But you're obligated." And I say, "Why?" What do you say? "Well we had a deal." And you benefited. You ate all those lobsters. Well that's a pretty strong argument. It's an argument that depends though and the fact that I benefited from your labor So, contracts sometimes bind us in so far as they are instruments of mutual benefit. I ate the lobsters. I owe you the $100 for having gathered them. But suppose, now take a second case. We make this deal, I'll pay you $100 for 100 lobsters and two minutes later, I've changed my mind. Now, there's no benefit. There's no work on your part so there's no element of reciprocal exchange. What about in that case, do I still owe you merely in virtue of the fact that we had an agreement? Who says those of you who say, yes, I still owe you? Why? Okay, stand up. Why do I owe you? I called you back after two minutes. You haven't done any work. S: I think I spent the time and effort in drafting this contract with you and also have emotional expectation that I go through the work. T: So you took time to draft the contract but we did it very quickly. We just chatted on
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the phone. S: That wouldn't be a formal form of contract though. T: Well I faxed at you. It only took a minute. S: As long as any effort is involved, I would say that the contract is valid then. It should take effect. T: But why? What was...what morally can you point to that obligates me? I admit that I agreed but you didn't go to any work. I didn't enjoy any benefit. S: Because one might mentally go through all the work of harvesting the lobsters. T: You mentally went through the work of harvesting the lobsters. That's nothing. Is it? Is not much? Is it worth $100 that you were imaginingyourself going and collecting lobsters? S: It may not worth $100, but it may worth something to some people. T: You did or imagined that you did or lookedforward to doing something that might be had. S: For example two people agreed to be married and one suddenly calls the other in two minutes say, does the contract have obligation on both sides? Nobody has done any work or nobody has benefited yet. T: Well I'm tempted to say no. S: Fine. T: Thank you ,Julian.All right, that was good. Now is there anyone who has who
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agrees with Julian that I still owe the money? S: I think if you back out it sort of cheapens the institution of contracts. T: Good but why? Why does it? S: Knowing people will expect that you'll go through with that. T: Good, there is some...it would cheapen the whole idea of contracts. which has to do with taking in obligation on myself. Is that the idea? S: Yeah, I think so. T: So Adam points instead not to any reciprocal benefit or mutual exchange but to the mere fact of the agreement itself. We see here there are really two different ways in which actual contracts generate obligations. One has to do with the active consent as a voluntary act and it points... Adam said this was a Kantian idea and I think he is right because it points to the ideal of autonomy. When I make a contract, the obligation is

one that is self-imposed and that carries a certain moral weight, independent of other considerations. which has to do with the sense in which actual contracts are instruments of mutual benefit and this points to ward the ideal of reciprocity I can

have an obligation to you in so far that obligation can arise, as you do something for me. Now, when investigating the moral force and also the moral limits of actual contracts and here I would like to advance an argument about the moral limits of actual contracts now that we know what moral ingredients do the work I would like to argue first that the fact that two people agreed to some exchange does not mean that the terms of their agreement are fair. When my two sons were young they collected baseball cards and traded them. And one was...there was a two-year aged...there is a two-year aged difference between them and so I had to institute a rule about the trades that no trade was complete until I had approved it and the reason is obvious. The older
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one knew more about the value of these cards and so would take advantage of the younger one. So what does this show? What is the baseball cards example show? The fact of an agreement is not sufficient to establish the fairness of the terms. I read some years ago of a case in Chicago there was an elderly widow, an 84-year-old widow named Rose who had a problem in her apartment with a leaky toilet and she signed a contract with an unscrupulous contractor, who offered to repair her leaky toilet in

exchange for $50, 000. But she had agreed she was of sound mind, maybe terribly naive and unfamiliar with the price of plumbing, she had made this agreement. Luckily, it was discovered. She went to the bank and asked to withdraw $25, 000. And the teller called authorities and they discovered this unscrupulous contractor. Now, I

suspect that even the most ardent contract carryings in the room will agree is not a sufficient condition of the agreement being fair. Is there anyone who will dispute that? No one. Am I missing anyone? Alex, where are you? Where are you? an actual agreement is not necessary to their.. is not a sufficient condition of there being an

obligation. I want to now make us stronger, maybe more controversial claim about the moral limits of actual contracts that a contract or an active consent is not only not sufficient And the idea here is that if there is reciprocity, if there is an exchange, then a receipt of benefits, there can be an obligation even without an act of consent. One great example of this involves the 18th century philosopher, the Scottish moral philosopher David Hume. When he was young, Hume wrote a book arguing against Hume heaps scorn on his contractarian idea. He said it was a philosophical fiction.

One of the most mysterious and incomprehensible operations that can possibly be imagined, this idea of the social contract. Many years later when he was 62 years old, Hume had an experience that put to the test his rejection of consent as the basis of obligation. Hume had a house in Edinboro. He rented to his friend James Boswell who in turn sublet it to a subtenant. The subtenant decided that the house needed some repairs and a paint job. He hired a contractor to do the work. The painter did the work and sent the bill to Hume. Hume thought this was a bad argument. The only argument
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this painter makes is that the work was necessary to be done but this is no good answer because by the same rule, this painter may go through every house in Edinboro and do what he thinks proper to be done and give the same reason that the work was necessary and that the house was the better for it. But the defense failed and he had to pay. Let met give you one other example of the distinction between the consent-based aspect of obligations and the benefit-based aspect This is based on a personal experience. Some years ago, I was driving across the country with some friends and we found ourselves in the middle of nowhere in Hammond, Indiana. We stopped in a rest stop and got out of the car None of us knew much about cars. driving up next to us was a van and on the side it said, presumably Sam and he came up to us and he said, “Can I help you? If I fix your car in five minutes, you owe me the $50 But he did start looking under the poking around the steering column. Short time passed, he emerged from under the steering column and said, And then he became very angry and he said, “Do you mean to say that if I had fixed your car while I was working under the steering column But I think he had the intuition that if he had fixed it while he was poking around that I would have owed him the $50. I shared that intuition. I would have. But he inferred from that. This was the fallacy and the reasoning that I think lay behind his anger. He inferred from that fact that therefore implicitly we had an agreement. But that it seems to me as a mistake. these two different aspects of contract arguments. Yes, I agree. I would have owed him $50 if he had repaired my car during that time But simply because if he had fixed my car, he would have conferred on me a benefit for which I would have owed him in the name of reciprocity and fairness. these two different aspects of the morality of contract. Now I want to hear how many think I was in the right in that case? Anyone? You do? Why? Go ahead. S: I mean what if you wanted your car broken and he had fixed it? I mean... Yeah in
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this case. I mean... T: But who would? Who would? S: I mean what if Hume, you know, what if the painter that painted his house blue but he hated the color blue, I mean you have to sort of define what your benefit is before the person does it. T: Well all right, so what would you conclude for that, though, for the larger issue here, would you conclude that therefore consent is a necessary condition of their being an obligation? S: Nate. T: Because otherwise how can we know, Nate says, whether there has been an exchange of equivalent or fair benefits unless we have the subjective evaluation which may vary one person to the next of the situation. Let me put to you one other example in order to test the relation between these two aspects of the morality of contract. Suppose I get married and suppose I discover that after 20 years of faithfulness on my part, every year on our trip across the country my wife has been seeing another man, a man with a van on the Indiana toll road. This part is completely made up by the way. One reason could be we had an agreement. She broke her promise referring to the fact of her consent. But I would also have a second ground for moral outrage.Surely I deserve better than this. So that would point to the element of reciprocity. Each reason has an independent moral force. if you imagine a slight variation on the marriage case. Suppose we were just married and that the betrayal occurred on the way to our honeymoon in Hammond, Indiana. After the contract has been made, but before there is any history of performance on my part, performance of the contract I mean, I would still with Julian, I'd be able to say but you
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promised, you promised. That would isolate the pure element of consent, Right？ Where there were no benefits, never mind. You get the idea. in virtue of two distinguishable ideals: autonomy and reciprocity, but in real life every actual contract may fall short, may fail to realize the ideals that give contracts their moral force in the first place. The ideal of autonomy may not be realized because there may be a difference in the bargaining power of the parties. The ideal of reciprocity may not be realized because there may be a difference of knowledge between the parties and so they may misidentify what really counts as having equivalent value. Now suppose you were to imagine a contract where the ideals of autonomy and of reciprocity were not subject to contingency but were guaranteed to be realized, what kind of contract would that have to be? Imagine a contract among parties who were equal in power and knowledge rather than unequal who are identically situated rather than differently situated. the way to think about justice is from the standpoint of a hypothetical contract, behind a veil of ignorance that creates the condition of equality by ruling out or enabling us to forget for the moment the differences in power and knowledge that could even in principle lead to unfair results. This is why for Kant and for Rawls, a hypothetical contract among equals is the only way to think about principles of justice.

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Lecture 15 What's a Fair Start?

Today, we turn to the question of distributive justice. How should income in wealth and power and opportunities be distributed? According to what principles? John Rawls offers a detailed answer to that question. And we're going to examine and assess his answer to that question, today.

We put ourselves in a position to do so last time. By trying to make sense of why he thinks that principles of justice are best derived from a hypothetical contract. And what matters is that the hypothetical contract be carried out in an original position of equality, behind, what Rawls calls, the veil of ignorance. So that much is clear? Alright, then let's turn to the principles that Rawls says would be chosen behind the veil of ignorance.

First, he considered some of the major alternatives. What about utilitarianism? Would the people in the original position choose to govern their collective lives utilitarian principles, the greatest good for the greatest number? No, they wouldn't, Rawls says. And the reason is, that behind the veil of ignorance, everyone knows that once the veil goes up, and real life begins.

We will each want to be respected with dignity. Even if we turn out to be a member of a minority, we don't want to be oppressed. And so we would agree to reject utilitarianism, and instead to adopt as our first principle, equal basic liberties. Fundamental rights to freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, religious liberty, freedom of conscience and the like. We wouldn't want to take the chance that we would wind up as members of an oppressed or a despised minority with the majority tyrannizing over us. And so Rawls says utilitarianism would be rejected. "Utilitarianism makes the mistake", Rawls writes, "of forgetting, or at least not taking
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seriously, the distinction between persons." And in the original position behind the veil of ignorance, we would recognize that and reject utilitarianism. We wouldn't trade off our fundamental rights and liberties for any economic advantages. That's the first principle.

Second principle has to do with social and economic inequalities. What would we agree to? Remember, we don't know whether we're going to wind up being rich or poor. Healthy or unhealthy. We don't know what kind of family we're going to come from. Whether we're going to inherit millions or whether we will come from an impoverished family. So we might, at first thought, say, "Well, let's require an equal distribution of income and wealth." Just to be on the safe side. But then we would realize, that we could do better than that. Even if we're unlucky and wind up at the bottom. We could do better if we agree to a qualified principle of equality. Rawls calls it "the Difference Principle." A principle that says, only those social and economic inequalities will be permitted that work to the benefit of the least well off. So we wouldn't reject all inequality of income and wealth. We would allow some. But the test would be, do they work to the benefit of everyone including those, or as he specifies, the principle, especially those at the bottom. Only those inequalities would be accepted behind the veil of ignorance. And so Rawls argues, only those inequalities that work to the benefit of the least well off, are just.

We talked about the examples of Michael Jordan making 31 million dollars a year, of Bill Gates having a fortune in the tens of billions. Would those inequalities be permitted under the difference principle? Only if they were part of a system, those wage differentials, that actually work to the advantage of least well off. Well, what would that system be? Maybe it turns out that as a practical matter you have to provide incentives to attract the right people to certain jobs. And when you do,

having those people in those jobs will actually help those at the bottom. Strictly
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speaking, Rawls's argument for the difference principle is that it would be chosen behind the veil of ignorance.

Let me hear what you think about Rawls's claim that these two principles would be chosen behind the veil of ignorance. Is there anyone who disagrees that they would be chosen? Alright, let's start up in the balcony, if that's alright.

Go ahead.

STUDENT 1: OK, your argument depends upon us believing that we would argue in said policy, or justice from a bottom. For the disadvantaged. And I just don't see from a proof standpoint, where we've proven that. Why not the top? Right, and what's your name?

STUDENT 1: Mike.

Mike, alright, good question. Put yourself behind the veil of ignorance. Enter into the thought experiment. What principles would you choose? How would you think it through?

STUDENT 1: Well, I would say things like, even Harvard's existence is an example of preaching toward the top. Because Harvard takes the top academics. And I didn't know when I was born how smart I would be. But I worked my life to get to a place of this caliber. Now, if you had said Harvard's going to randomly take 1600 people of absolutely no qualification, we'd all be saying, "There's not much to work for."

And so what principle would you choose?

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STUDENT 1: In that situation I would say a merit based one. One where I don't necessarily know, but I would rather have a system that rewards me based on my efforts.

So you, Mike, behind the veil of ignorance, would choose a merit-based system, where people are rewarded according to their efforts?

STUDENT 1 nods

Alright, fair enough. What would you say? Go ahead.

STUDENT 2: My question is, if the merit-based argument is based on when everyone is at a level of equality? Where from that position, you're rewarded to where you get, or is it regardless of what advantages you may have when you began your education to get where you are here?

STUDENT 1: I think what the question you're asking is saying that if we want to look at, whatever, utilitarianism, policy, do you want to maximize world wealth. And I think a system that rewards merit is the one that we've pretty much all established, is what is best for all of us. Despite the fact that some of us may be in the second percentile and some may be in the 98th percentile. At the end of the day it lifts that lowest based level, a community that rewards effort as opposed to an differences.

STUDENT 2: But, I don't understand how you're rewarding someone's efforts who clearly has had, not you, but maybe myself, advantages throughout, to get where I am here. I mean, I can't say that somebody else who maybe worked as hard as I did would have had the same opportunity to come to a school like this.

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Alright, let's look at that point. What's your name?

STUDENT 2: Kate.

Kate, you suspect that the ability to get into top schools may largely depend on coming from an affluent family, having a favorable family background, social, cultural, economic advantages and so on?

STUDENT 2: I mean, economic, but yes, social, cultural. All of those advantages, for sure.

Someone did a study, of the 146 selective colleges and universities in the United States. And they looked at the students in those colleges and universities to try to find out what their background was, their economic background. What percentage do you think, come from the bottom quarter of the income scale? You know what the figure is? Only three percent of students, at the most selective colleges and universities come from poor backgrounds. Over 70 percent come from affluent families.

Let's go one step further then, and try to address Mike's challenge. Rawls actually has two arguments, not one, in favor of his principles of justice. And in particular, of the difference principle. One argument is the official argument, what would be chosen behind the veil of ignorance. Some people challenge that argument, saying, "Maybe people would want to take their chances. Maybe people would be gamblers behind the veil of ignorance, hoping that they would wind up on top." That's one challenge that has been put to Rawls. But backing up the argument from the original position is the second argument. And that is the straightforwardly moral argument. And it goes like this, it says, the distribution of income and wealth and opportunities should not be based on factors for which people can claim no credit. It shouldn't be based on factors
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that are arbitrary from a moral point of view.

Rawls illustrates this by considering several rival theories of justice. He begins with the theory of justice that most everyone these days would reject. A feudal aristocracy. What's wrong with the allocation of life prospects in a feudal aristocracy? Rawls says, well the thing that's obviously wrong about it is that people's life prospects are determined by the accident of birth. Are you born to a noble family or to a family of peasants and serfs? And that's it. You can't rise. It's not your doing where you wind up or what opportunities you have. But that's arbitrary from a moral point of view. And so that objection to feudal aristocracy leads, and historically has lead, people to say, careers should be open to talents. There should be formal equality of opportunity regardless of the accident of birth. Every person should be free to strive, to work, to apply for any job in the society. And then, if you open up jobs, and you allow people to apply, and to work as hard as they can, then the results are just.

So it's more or less the libertarian system that we've discussed in earlier weeks. What does Rawls think about this? He says it's an improvement. It's an improvement because it doesn't take as fixed the accident of birth. But even with formal equality of opportunity the libertarian conception doesn't extend that, doesn't extend its insight far enough. Because if you let everybody run the race, everybody can enter the race, but some people start at different starting points, that race isn't going to be fair. Intuitively, he says, the most obvious injustice of this system is that it permits distributive shares to be improperly influenced by factors arbitrary from a moral point of view. Such as, whether you got a good education or not. Whether you grew up in a family that support you and developed in you a work ethic and gave you the opportunities. So that suggests moving to a system of fair equality of opportunity. And that's really the system that Mike was advocating earlier on. What we might call a merit-based system. A meritocratic system. In a fair meritocracy the society sets up institutions to bring
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everyone to the same starting point before the race begins. Equal educational opportunities. Head start programs, for example. Support for schools in impoverished neighborhoods. So that everyone, regardless of their family background, has a genuinely fair opportunity. Everyone starts from the same starting line.

Well, what does Rawls think about the meritocratic system? Even that, he says, doesn't go far enough in remedying, or addressing, the moral arbitrariness of the natural lottery. Because if you bring everyone to the same starting point and begin the race, who's going to win the race? Who would win? To use the runners example. The fastest runners would win. But is it their doing that they happen to be blessed with athletic prowess to run fast?

So Rawls says, "Even the principle of meritocracy, where you bring everyone to the same starting point, may eliminate the influence of social contingencies and upbringing, but it still permits the distribution of wealth and income to be determined by the natural distribution of abilities and talents." And so he thinks that the principle of eliminating morally arbitrary influences in the distribution of income and wealth requires going beyond what Mike favors, the meritocratic system. Now, how do you go beyond? Do you bring everyone to the same starting point and you're still bothered by the fact that some are fast runners and some are not fast runners, what can you do?

Well, some critics of a more egalitarian conception say the only thing you can do is handicap the fast runners. Make them wear lead shoes. But who wants to do that? That would defeat the whole point of running the race. But Rawls says, you don't have to have a kind of leveling equality, if you want to go beyond a meritocratic conception. You permit, you even encourage, those who may be gifted, to exercise their talents. But what you do, is you change the terms on which people are entitled to the fruits of the exercise of those talents. And that really is what the difference principle is.
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You establish a principle that says, people may benefit from their good fortune, from their luck in the genetic lottery, but only on terms that work to the advantage of the least well off. And so, for example, Michael Jordan can make 31 million dollars but, only under a system that taxes away a chunk of that to help those who lack the basketball skills that he's blessed with. Likewise, Bill Gates. He can make his billions. But he can't think that he somehow morally deserves those billions. "Those who have been favored by nature, may gain from their good fortune but only on terms that improve the situation of those who have lost out." That's the difference principle. And it's an argument from moral arbitrarianists. Rawls claims, that if you're bothered by basing distributive shares on factors arbitrary from a moral point of view, you don't just reject a feudal aristocracy for a free market. You don't even rest content with a meritocratic system that brings everyone to the same starting point. You set up a system, where everyone, including those at the bottom, benefit from the exercise of the talents held by those who happen to be lucky.

What do you think? Is that persuasive? Who finds that argument unpersuasive? The argument for moral arbitrarianists.

Yes.

STUDENT 1: I think that in the egalitarian proposition the more talented people, I think it's very optimistic to think that they would still work really hard, even if they knew that part of what they made would be given away. So I think that the only way for the more talented people to exercise their talents to the best of their ability is in the meritocracy.

And in a meritocracy, what's your name?
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STUDENT 1: Kate.

Kate, does it bother you, and Mike, does it bother you, that in a meritocratic system, that even with fair equality of opportunity, people get ahead, people get rewards that they don't deserve simply because they happen to be naturally gifted. What about that? STUDENT 1: I think that it is arbitrary. Obviously it's arbitrary. But I think that correcting for it would be detrimental.

Because it would reduce incentives, is that why?

STUDENT 1: It would reduce incentives, yeah.

Mike, what do you say?

STUDENT 2: We're all sitting in this room and we have undeserved, we have undeserved glory of some sort. So you should not be satisfied with the process of your life. Because you have not created any of this. And I think, from a standpoint of, not just this room, us being upset, but from a societal standpoint we should have some kind of a gut reaction to that feeling. The guy who runs the race, he doesn't... He actually harms us as opposed to maybe makes me run that last ten yards faster. And that makes the guy behind me run ten yards faster and the guy behind him ten yards faster.

Alright, so Mike, let me ask you. You talked about effort before. Effort. Do you think when people work hard to get ahead, and succeed, that they deserve the rewards that go with effort? Isn't that the idea behind your defense?
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STUDENT 2: I mean, of course, bring Michael Jordan here, I'm sure you can get him, and have him come and defend himself about he makes 31 million dollars. And I think what you're going to realize is his life was a very, very tough one to get to the top. And that we are basically being the majority oppressing the minority in a different light. It's very easy to pick on him. Very easy.

Alright, effort. You've got...

STUDENT 2: I've got a few. I've got a few. But that's about it.

Effort, you know what Rawls's answer to that is? Even the effort that some people expend, conscientious striving, the work ethic, even effort depends a lot on fortunate family circumstances. For which you, we, can claim no credit.

Let's do the test. Let's do a test here. Never mind economic class, those differences are very significant. Put those aside. Psychologists say that birth order makes a lot of difference in work ethic, striving, effort. How many here, raise your hand, those of you here, who are first in birth order. I am too by the way. Mike, I noticed you raised your hand.

If the case for the meritocratic conception is that effort should be rewarded, doesn't Rawls have a point that even effort striving, work ethic is largely shaped even by birth order? Is it your doing? Mike, is it your doing that you were first in birth order? Then why, Rawls says, of course not. So why should income and wealth and opportunities in life be based on factors arbitrary from a moral point of view? That's the challenge that he puts to market societies, but also to those of us at places like this. A question to think about for next time.
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“The owl of Minerva spreads its wings only with the falling of the dusk.” – Hegel

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Lecture 16 What Do We Deserve?

We ended last time with that remarkable poll, do you remember? The poll about birth order. What percentage of people in this room raised their hands, was it, to say that

they were the first born? 75, 80 percent? And what was the significance of that? If you're thinking about these theories of distributive justice. Remember, we were discussing three different theories of distributive justice.

Three different ways of answering the question, "How should income and wealth and opportunities and the good things in life, be distributed?" And so far we've looked at the libertarian answer. That says, the just system of distribution is a system of free exchange, a free market economy. Against a background of formal equality. Which simply means, that jobs and careers are open to anyone. Rawls says that this represents an improvement over aristocratic and caste systems, because everyone can compete for every job. Careers open to talents.

And beyond that, the just distribution is the one that results from free exchange. Voluntary transactions. No more, no less. Then Rawls argues, if all you have is formal equality, jobs open to everyone, the result is not going to be fair. It will be biased in favor of those who happen to be born to affluent families, who happen to have the benefit of good educational opportunities. And that accident of birth is not a just basis for distributing life chances. And so, many people who notice this unfairness, Rawls argues, are lead to embrace a system of fair equality of opportunity. That leads to the meritocratic system. Fair equality of opportunity. But Rawls says, even if you bring everyone to the same starting point in the race, what's going to happen? Who's going to win? The fastest runners.

So once you're troubled by basing distributive shares on morally arbitrary
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contingencies, you should, if you reason it through, be carried all the way to what Rawls calls, "the democratic conception". A more egalitarian conception of distributive justice that he defines by the difference principle. Now, he doesn't say that the only way to remedy or to compensate for differences in natural talents and abilities is to have a kind of, leveling equality. A guaranteed equality of outcome. But he does say there's another way to deal with these contingencies. People may gain, may benefit from their good fortune, but only on terms that work to the advantage of the least well off. And so, we can test how this theory actually works by thinking about some paid differentials that arise in our society.

What does the average school teacher make in the United States, do you suppose? Roughly. - $35,000. It's a little more, 40, $42,000. What about David Letterman?

How much do you think David Letterman makes? More than a school teacher? $31 million. David Letterman. Is that fair? That David Letterman makes that much more than a school teacher? Well, Rawls's answer would be, it depends whether the basic structure of society is designed in such a way that Letterman's $31 million is subject to taxation so that some of those earnings are taken to work for the advantage of the least well off.

One other example of a paid differential. A justice of the United States Supreme Court. What do they make? It's just under $200,000. Here's Sandra Day O'Connor, for example. There she is. But there's another judge who makes a lot more than Sandra Day O'Connor. - Do you know who it is?

STUDENTS: Judge Judy.

Judge Judy. How did you know that? You watch? You're right. Judge Judy, you know how much she makes? There she is. $25 million. Now, is that just? Is it fair? Well, the
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answer is, it depends on whether this is against a background system in line with the difference principle. Where those who come out on top, in terms of income and wealth are taxed in a way that benefits the least well off members of society.

Now, we're going to come back to these wage differentials, pay differentials, between a real judge and a TV judge. The one Marcus watches all the time. What I want to do now, is return to these theories and to examine the objections to Rawls's more egalitarian theory. The difference principle.

There are at least three objections to Rawls's difference principle. One of them came up last time in the discussion and a number of you raised this worry. What about incentives? Isn't there the risk, if taxes reach 70, 80, 90 percent marginal rate that Michael Jordan won't play basketball? That David Letterman won't do late night comedy? Or that CEOs will go into some other line of work? Now, who among those who are defenders of Rawls who has an answer to this objection about the need for incentives?

Yes. Go ahead, stand up.

STUDENT 1: Rawls's idea is that there should only be so much difference that it helps the least well off the most. So if there's too much equality, then the least well off might not be able to watch late night TV, or might not have a job because their CEO doesn't want to work. So you need to find the correct balance where taxation still leaves enough incentive to least well off to benefit from the talents.

Good. And what's your name?

STUDENT 1: Tim.
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Tim. Alright, so Tim is saying, in effect, that Rawls is taking count of incentives. And could allow for pay differentials and for some adjustment in the tax rate to take account of incentives. But, Tim points out, the standpoint from which the question of incentives needs to be considered is not the effect on the total size of the economic pie. But instead from the standpoint of the effect of incentives, or disincentives, on the well-being of those on the bottom. Right?

STUDENT 1 nods.

Good. Thank you. I think that is what Rawls would say. In fact, if you look in section 17, where he describes the difference principle, he allows for incentives. "The naturally advantaged are not gain merely because they are more gifted, but only to cover the costs of training and education and for using their endowments in ways that help less fortunate as well." So you can have incentives. You can adjust the tax rate. If taking too much from David Letterman or from Michael Jordan, or from Bill Gates, winds up actually hurting those at the bottom. That's the test.

So incentives, that's not a decisive objections against Rawls's difference principle. But there are two weightier, more difficult objections. One of them comes from defenders of a meritocratic conception. The argument that says, what about effort? What about people working hard having a right to what they earn because they've deserved it. They've worked hard for it. That's the objection from effort and moral desert. Then there's another objection. That comes from libertarians. And this objection has to do with reasserting the idea of self-ownership. Doesn't the difference principle, by treating our natural talents and endowments as common assets, doesn't that violate the idea that we own ourselves?

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Now, let me deal first, with the objection that comes from the libertarian direction. Milton Friedman writes, in his book, "Free to Choose," "Life is not fair. And it's tempting to believe that government can rectify what nature has spawned." But his answer is, "The only way to try to rectify that is to have a leveling equality of outcome." Everyone finishing the race at the same point. And that would be a disaster. This is an easy argument to answer. And Rawls addresses it.

In one of the most powerful passages, I think, of the theory of justice. It's in Section 17. "The natural distribution", and here he's talking about the natural distribution talents and endowments. "... is neither just nor unjust. "Nor is it unjust that persons are born into society at some particular position. These are simply natural facts. What is just and unjust is the way that institutions deal with these facts." That's his answer to libertarian laissez faire economists like Milton Friedman who say, "Life is unfair but get over it." Get over it and let's see if we can, at least, maximize the benefits that flow from it.

But the more powerful libertarian objection to Rawls is not libertarian from the libertarian economists like Milton Friedman. It's from the argument about self-ownership. Developed as we saw, in Nozick. And from that point of view, yes, it might be a good thing, to create head start programs and public schools so that everyone can go to a decent school and start the race at the same starting line. That might be good. But if you tax people to create public schools, if you tax people against their will, you coerce them. It's a form of theft. If you take some of Letterman's $31 million, tax it away to support public schools, against his will, the state is really doing no better than stealing from him. It's coercion. And the reason is, we have to think of ourselves as owning our talents and endowments. Because otherwise we're back to just using people and coercing people. That's the libertarian reply.
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What's Rawls's answer to that objection? He doesn't address the idea of self-ownership directly. But the effect, the moral weight of his argument for the difference principle is, maybe we don't own ourselves in that thoroughgoing sense after all. Now, he says, this doesn't mean that the state is an owner in me, in the sense that it can simply commandeer my life. Because remember, the first principle we would agree to behind the veil of ignorance, is the principle of equal basic liberties. Freedom of speech, religious liberty, freedom of conscience and the like. So the only respect in which the idea of self-ownership must give way, comes when we're thinking about whether I own myself in the sense that I have a privileged claim on the benefits that come from the exercise of my talents in a market economy. And Rawls says, on reflection, we don't. We can defend rights. We can respect the individual. We can uphold human dignity. Without embracing the idea of self-possession. That, in effect, is his reply to the libertarian.

I want to turn now, to his reply to the defender of a meritocratic conception. Who invokes effort as the basis of moral desert. People who work hard to develop their talents deserve the benefits that come from the exercise of their talents. Well, we've already seen the beginning of Rawls's answer to that question. And it goes back to that poll we took about birth order. His first answer is even the work ethic, even the willingness to strive conscientiously, depends on all sorts of family circumstances and social and cultural contingencies for which we can claim no credit. You can't claim credit for the fact that you, most of you, most of us, happen to be first in birth order.

And that for some complex psychological and social reasons that seems to be associated with striving, with achieving, with effort. That's one answer. There's a second answer. Those of you who invoke effort, you don't really believe that moral desert attaches to effort. Take two construction workers. One is strong and can raise
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four walls in an hour without even breaking a sweat. And another construction worker is small and scrawny. And has to spend three days to do the same amount of work. No defender of meritocracy is going to look at the effort of that weak an scrawny construction worker and say "Therefore he deserves to make more". So it isn't really effort. This is the second reply to the meritocratic claim. It isn't really effort that the defender of meritocracy believes is the moral basis of distributive shares. It's contribution. How much do you contribute? But contribution takes us right back to our natural talents and abilities. Not just effort. And it's not our doing, how we came into the possession of those talents in the first place.

Alright, suppose you accepted these arguments, that effort isn't everything, that contribution matters, from the standpoint of the meritocratic conception. That effort, even, isn't our own doing. Does that mean, the objection continues, does that mean that according to Rawls, moral desert has nothing to do with distributive justice? Well, yes. Distributive justice is not about moral desert. Now, here, Rawls introduces an important and a tricky distinction. It's between moral desert, on the one hand, and entitlements to legitimate expectations, on the other.

What is the difference between moral deserts and entitlements? Consider two different games. A game of chance and a game of skill. Take a game of pure chance. Say, I play the Massachusetts state lottery. And my number comes up. I'm entitled to my

winnings. But even though I'm entitled to my winnings, there's no sense in which, because it's just a game of luck, no sense in which, I morally deserve to win in the first place. That's an entitlement.

Now contrast the lottery with a different kind of game. A game of skill. Now, imagine the Boston Red Sox winning the World Series. When they win, they're entitled to the trophy. But it can be always asked of a game of skill did they deserve to win? It's
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always possible, in principle, to distinguish what someone's entitled to, under the rules, and whether they deserve to win in the first place. That's an antecedent standard. Moral desert. Now, Rawls says distributive justice is not a matter of moral desert though it is a matter of entitlements to legitimate expectations. Here's where he explains it. "A just scheme answers to what men are entitles to. It satisfies their legitimate expectations as founded upon social institutions. But what they are entitled to is not proportional to nor dependent upon their intrinsic worth." "The principles of justice that regulate the basic structure do not mention moral desert and there is no tendency for distributive shares to correspond to it."

Why does make this distinction? What, morally, is at stake? One thing morally at stake is the whole question of effort that we've already discussed. But there's a second contingency, a second source of moral arbitrariness that goes beyond the question of whether it's to my credit that I have the talents that enable me to get ahead. And that has to do with the contingency that I live in an society that happens to prize my talents. The fact that David Letterman lives in a society that puts a great premium, puts a great value, on a certain type of smirky joke, that's not his doing. He's lucky that he happens to live in such a society. But this is a second contingency. This isn't something that we can claim credit for. Even if I had sole, unproblematic, claim to my talents and to my effort.

It would still be the case, that the benefits I get from exercising those talents, depend on factors that are arbitrary from a moral point of view. What my talents will reap in a market economy. What does that depend on? What other people happen to want or like in this society. It depends on the law of supply and demand. That's not my doing. It's certainly not the basis for moral desert.

What counts as contributing depends on the qualities that this or that society happens
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to prize. Most of us are fortunate to possess, in large measure, for whatever reason, the qualities that our society happens to prize. The qualities that enable us to provide what society wants. In a capitalist society it helps to have entrepreneurial drive. In bureaucratic society it helps to get on easily and smoothly with superiors. In a mass democratic society it helps to look good on television and to speak in short, superficial sound bites. In a litigious society, it helps to go to law school and have the talents to do well on LSATs. But none of this is our doing.

Suppose that we, with our talents, inhabited not our society, technologically advanced, highly litigious, but a hunting society, or a warrior society. What would become of our talents then? They wouldn't get us very far. No doubt some of us would develop others. But would we be less worthy? Would we be less virtuous? Would we be less meritorious if we lived in that kind of society rather than in ours.

Rawls's answer is, no. We might make less money and properly so. But while we would be entitled to less, we would be no less worthy. No less deserving than we are now. And here's the point. The same could be said of those in our society who happen to hold less prestigious positions, who happen to have fewer of the talents that our society happens to reward. So here's the moral import of the distinction between moral desert and entitlements to legitimate expectations.

We are entitled to the benefits that the rules of the game promise for the exercise of our talents. But it's a mistake and a conceit to suppose that we deserve, in the first place, a society that values the qualities we happen to have in abundance.

Now we've been talking here about income and wealth, what about opportunities and honors? What about the distribution of access of seats in elite colleges and universities? It's true, all of you most of you first born, worked hard, strived,
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developed your talents, to get here. But Rawls asks, in effect, what is the moral status of your claim to the benefits that attach to the opportunities that you have? Are seats in colleges and universities a matter, a kind of reward, an honor for those who deserve them, because they've worked so hard? Or, are those seats, those opportunities and honors entitlements to legitimate expectations that depend for their justification on those of us who enjoy them doing so in a way that works to the benefit of those at the bottom of society? That's the question that Rawls's difference principle poses. It's a question that can be asked of the earnings of Michael Jordan and David Letterman and Judge Judy. But it's also a question that can be asked of opportunities to go to the top colleges and universities. And that's a debate that comes out when we turn to the question of affirmative action next time.

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Lecture 17 Arguing Affirmative Action

Last time,we were discussing the distinction that Rawls draws between two different types of claims. Claims of moral deserton the one hand, and of entitlement to legitimate expectations on the other. A matter of moral desert, a matter of rewarding people according to their virtue. Today we're going to explore that question of moral desert and its relation to distributive justice. Not in connection with incoming wealth, but in its connection with opportunities.

With hiring decisions and admission standards. And so we turn to the case, of affirmative action. You read about the case of Cheryl Hopwood. She applied for admission to the University of Texas Law School. Worked her way through high school, affluent family, she put herself through community college, and California State University at Sacramento. She achieved a 3.8 grade point average there, later moved to Texas, became a resident, took the law school admissions test, did pretty well on that, and she applied to the University of Texas Law School. She was turned down. She was turned down at a time when the University of Texas, affirmative action admissions policy. A policy that took into account, race and ethnic background. The University of Texas said, “ 40 percent of the population of Texas is made up of African Americans and Mexican Americans.It's important that we, as a law school, have a diverse student body. And so we are going to take into account, not only grades and test scores, but also the demographic make up of our class including, its race and ethnic profile.” The result, and this is what Hopwood complained about, the result of that policy, is that some applicants to the University of Texas Law School, with a lower academic index, which includes grades and test scores, than hers, were admitted. And she was turned down. She said, she argued, “I'm just beingturned down because I'm white. If I weren't, if I were a member of a minority group, with my grades and test scoresI would had been admitted." And the statistics, the admissions statistics that
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came out in the trial, confirmed that African American and Mexican American applicants that year, who had, her grades and test scores,were admitted. It went to Federal Court.

Now, put aside the law, let's consider it from the standpoint of justice and morality. Is it fair, or it unfair? Does Cheryl Hopwood have case? A legitimate complaint? Were her rights violated, by the admissions policy of the law school? How many say, how many would rule for the law school, and say that it was just to consider race and ethnicity as a factor in admissions? How many would rule for Cheryl Hopwood and say "her rights were violated?" So here we have a pretty even split. Alright, now I want to hear from a defender of Cheryl Hopwood.

Student: “Yes? You're basing something that's an arbitrary factor, you know, Cheryl couldn't control the fact that she was white, or not in a minority. And therefore, you know, it's not as if..it was like a test score that she worked hard to try and show that she could, you know, put that out there, you know, that she had no control over her race.”

Good. And what's your name?

Student: “Bree.”

Okay. Bree, stay right there. Now let's find someone who has an answer for Bree. Yes?

Student: “ There are discrepancies in the educational system. And the majority of the time, I know this in New York City, the schools that minorities go to, are not as well-funded, are not as well-supplied, as white schools. And so there is going to be a
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discrepancy, naturally, between minorities and between whites. If they go to better schools. And they will not do as well on exams because they haven't had as much help. Because of the worst school systems. ”

Let me just interrupt you to, tell me your name?

Student: “Aneesha.”

Aneesha. Aneesha, you're pointing out that minority kids may have gone, in some cases, to schools affluent families.

Student: “Yes. ”

And so the testscores they got, may actually not represent their true potential.

Student: “Because they didn't receive the same kind of help that they might have received had they gone to a school with better funding.”

Good, alright. Aneesha has raised the point that colleges still should choose for the greatest academic scholarly promise, but in reading the test scores and grades, they should take into account the different meaning those tests and grades have, in the light of educational disadvantage in the background. So that's one argument in defense of affirmative action, Aneesha's argument. Correcting for the effects of unequal preparation. Educational disadvantage.

Now, there are other arguments. Suppose, just to identify whether there is a competing principle here. Suppose there are two candidates, who did equally well on the tests and grades. Both of whom went to first rate schools. Two candidates, among those
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candidates, would it be unfair for the college or university, for Harvard, to say, “we still want diversity along racial and ethnic dimensions, even where we are not correcting for the effects on test scores of educational disadvantage.”What about in that case, Bree?

Student: “If it's that's one thing that puts, you know, someone over the edge, then it's, I guess that would be, you know, justifiable. If everything else about the individual first, though, everything to consider about that person's you know, talents, and where they come from, and who they are without these arbitrary factors, is the same.”

Without these 'arbitrary factors', you call them. But before, you were suggesting, Bree, that race and ethnicity are arbitrary factors outside the control of the applicants.-

Student: “True, I would agree with that.”

And your general principle is that admissions shouldn't reward arbitrary factors, over which people have no control.”

Student: “Right.”

Alright. Who else, who else would like to, thank you both. Who else would like to get into this, what do you say?

Student: “Well, first of all, I'm for affirmative action temporarily, but, for two reasons. First of all, you have to look at the university's purpose. It is to educate their students. And I feel that different races, people coming from different races have different backgrounds and they contribute differently to the education. And second of all, when you say that they have equal backgrounds, that's not true when you look at the
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broader picture, and you look at slavery and this is kind of a reparation. I think affirmative action is a temporary solution to alleviate history, and the wrongs done to African Americans in particular.”

And what's your name?

Student: “David.”

David. You say that affirmative action is justified at least for now as a way of compensating for past injustice. The legacy of slavery and segregation.

Student: “Right.”

Who wants to take on that argument? We need now a critic of affirmative action. Yes, go ahead.

Student: “I think that what happened in the past has no bearing on what happens today. I think that discriminating based on race should always be wrong. Whether you're discriminating against one group or another. Just because our ancestors did something, doesn't mean that that should have any effect on what happens with us today.”

Alright, good. I'm sorry, your name is?

Student: “Kate.”

Kate. Alright, who has an answer for Kate? Yes.

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Student: “I just wanted to comment and say that…

Tell us your name.

Student: “My name is Mansur. Because of slavery, because of past injustices, today, we have a higher proportion of African Americans who are in poverty, who face less opportunities than white people. So because of slavery 200 years ago, and because of Jim·Crow, and because of segregation, today we have injustice based on race.”

Kate?

Student: “I think that there are differences obviously, but the way to fix those differences is not by some artificial fixing of the result. You need to fix the problem. So we need to address differences in education, and differences in upbringing with programs like Head Start, and giving more funding to lower income schools rather than just trying to fix the result, so it makes it look like it's equal when it's really it isn't. ”

Yes.?

Student: “Well, with regard to affirmative action based on race, I just want to say that white people have had their own affirmative action in this country for more than 400 years. It's called 'nepotism' and 'quid pro quo'. So there's nothing wrong with correcting the injustice and discrimination that's been done to black people for 400 years.”

Good. Tell us your name.

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Student: “Hannah. ”

Hannah. Alright who has an answer for Hannah? And just to add to Hannah's point, because we need now someone to respond, Hannah, you could have also mentioned legacy admissions.

Student: “Exactly. I was going to say, if you disagree with affirmative action, you should disagree with legacy admission because it's obvious from looking around here that there are more white legacies than black legacies in the history of Harvard University. ”

And explain what legacy admissions are.

Student: “Well, legacy admissions is giving an advantage to someone who has an arbitrary privilege of their parent having attended the university to which they're applying. ”

Alright, so a reply for Hannah. Yes, in the balcony, go ahead.

Student: “First of all, if affirmative action is making up for past injustice, how do you explain minorities that were not historically discriminated against in the United States who get these advantages? In addition, you could argue that affirmative action perpetuates divisions between the races rather than achieve the ultimate goal of race being an irrelevant factor in our society. ”

And what, tell us your name.

Student: “Danielle.”
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Hannah?

Student：“I disagree with that because I think that by promoting diversity in an institution like this, you further educate all of the students, especially the white students who grew up in predominately white areas. It's certainly a form of education to be exposed to people from different backgrounds. And you put white students at an inherent disadvantage when you surround them only with their own kind.”

Student2: “Why should race necessarily be equated with diversity? There are so many other forms, why should we assume that race makes people different? Hannah?\NAgain, that's perpetuating the idea of racial division within our universities and our society.”

Hannah?

Student: “With regard to African American people being given a special advantage, it's obvious that they bring something special to the table, because they have a unique perspective just as someone from a different religion or socio-economic background would, as well. As you say, there are many different types of diversity. There's no reason that racial diversity should be eliminated from that criteria.”

Yes, go ahead.

Student: “Racial discrimination is illegal in this country, and I believe that it was African American leaders themselves, when Martin Luther King said he wanted to be judged not on the color of skin, but by the content of his character, his merit, his
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achievements. And I just think that, to decide solely based on someone's race is just inherently unfair. I mean, if you want to correct based on disadvantaged backgrounds, that's fine, but there are also disadvantaged white people as well. It shouldn't matter if you're white or black.”

Tell us your name.

Student: “Ted. “

Ted

Student: “Yes.”

Think of Hopwood. It's unfair to count race or, I assume you would also say, ethnicity or religion?

Student:“Yes.”

Do you think she has a right to be considered according to her grades and test scores alone?

Student: “No. There is more to it than that. Universities need to promote diversity.”

So you agree with the goal of promoting diversity?

Student: “There's ways to promote diversity besides discriminating against people solely based on a factor they cannot control.”

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Alright, so what makes it wrong, is that she can't control her race. She can't control the fact that she's white. That's the heart of the unfairness to her. Bree made a similar point. That basing admissions on factors that people can't control, is fundamentally unfair. What do you say?

Student: “There's a lot of things you can't control, and if you don't for it based on merit, like just based on your test scores, a lot of what you can achieve has to do with family background, that you were raised in. If both of your parents were scholarly, then you have more of chance of actually of being more scholarly yourself and getting those grades. And you can't control what kind of family you were born into.”

Alright good, that's a great rejoinder, what's your name?

Student: “Da.”

Ted, are you against advantages that come from the family you were born into? What about legacy admissions?

Student: “I do believe that in terms of a legacy admission you shouldn't have a special preference, I mean there is a legacy admission you could argue is another part, versus you could say. it's important to have a small percentage of people that have a several generation family attendance at a place like Harvard. However that should not bean advantage factor like race, it should just be another part promoting diversity. Should it count at all? I think that…”

Alumni status， should it count at all, Ted?

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Student: “Yes. It should count. ”

Alright, I want to step back for a moment from these arguments. Thank you all forthese contributions. We're going to come back to you. If you've listened carefully I think you will have noticed three different arguments emerge from this discussion. In defense of considering race and ethnicity as a factor in admissions.

One argument has to do with correcting for the effects, for the effects of educational disadvantage. That was Aneesha's argument. This is what we might call the corrective argument. Correcting for differences in educational background, the kind of school people went to, the opportunities they had and so on. That's one argument. What's worth noticing though, is that argument is consistent in principle with the idea that only academic promise and scholarly potential should count in admissions. We just need to go beyond test scores and grades alone, to get a true estimate of academic promise and scholarly ability. That's the first argument.

Then we heard a second argument that said affirmative action is justified even where there may not be the need to correct for educational disadvantage in a particular applicant's case. It's justified as a way of compensating for past wrongs, for historic injustices. So that's a compensatory argument. Compensating for past wrongs.

Then we heard, a third, a different argument, for affirmative action, from Hannah and others, that argued in the name of diversity. Now, the diversity argument is different from the compensatory argument, because it makes a certain appeal to the social purpose or the social mission of the college or university. There are really two aspects to the diversity argument. One says it's important to have a diverse student body for the sake of the educational experience for everyone. Hannah made that point. And the other talks about the wider society. This was the argument made by the University of
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Texas in the Hopwood case. We need to train lawyers and judges and leaders, who will contribute to the strength, the civic strength of the state of Texas, and the country as a whole. So there are two different aspects to the diversity argument. But both are arguments in the name of the social purpose, or the social mission or the common good, served by the institution. Well, what about the force of these arguments? We've also heard objections to these arguments.

The most powerful objection to the compensatory argument is, is it fair to ask Cheryl Hopwood today, egregious, in the past, but in which she was not implicated. Is that fair? So that's an important objection to the compensatory argument. And in order to meet that objection, we would have to investigate whether there is such a thing as group rights or collective responsibility that reaches over time.

So having identified that issue, let's set it aside to turn to the diversity argument. The diversity argument doesn't have to worry about that question. About collective responsibility for past wrongs. Because it says, for reasons Hannah and others pointed out that the common good is served, is advanced if there is a racially and ethnically diverse student body. Everyone benefits. This indeed was the argument that Harvard made friend of the court brief to the Supreme Court in the 1978 case, the affirmative action case, the Bakke case. In the Harvard brief, the Harvard rationale, was cited by Justice Powell, who was the swing vote in the case upholding affirmative action, constitutionally acceptable.

Harvard's argument in its brief, was this: "We care about diversity. Scholarly excellence alone, has never been the criterion of admission, the sole criterion of admission to Harvard College. Fifteen years ago diversity meant students from California and New York, and Massachusetts. City dwellers, and farm boys. Violinists, painters and football players. Biologists, historians and classicists. The only difference
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now, Harvard argued, is that we're adding racial and ethnic status to this long list of diversity considerations. When reviewing the large number of candidates able to do well in our classes, Harvard wrote, "Race may count as a plus, just as coming from Iowa may count or being a good middleline backer or pianist. A farm boy from Idaho can bring something to Harvard College that a Bostonian cannot offer. Similarly, a black student can usually bring something a white student cannot offer. The quality of the educational experience of all students depends in part on these differences in the background and outlook that students bring with them." That was Harvard's argument.

Now what about the diversity argument? Is it persuasive? If it's to be persuasive, it has to meet one very powerful objection. That we've heard voiced here. By Ted, by Bree. Unless you're a utilitarian, you believe that individual rights can't be violated. And so the question is, is there an individual right that is violated? Is Cheryl Hopwood's right violated?

If she is used, so to speak,denied admission, for the sake of the common good and the social mission that the University of Texas Law School has defined for itself, does she have a right? Don't we deserve to be considered according to our excellences,our achievements, our accomplishments, our hard work? Isn't that the right at stake? Now we've already heard an answer to that argument. No, she doesn't have the right. Nobody deserves to be admitted. Notice how this gets us back to the issue of desert versus entitlement. They're arguing there is no individual right that Hopwood has. She doesn't deserve to be admitted according to any particular set of criteria that she believes to be important. Including criteria that have only to do with her efforts and achievements. Why not?

I think implicit, in this argument, is something like Rawls' rejection of moralde sert as the basis of distributive justice. Yes, once Harvarddefines its mission and designs its
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admission policy in the light of its mission, people are entitled, who fit those criteria, they are entitled to be admitted. But according to this argument, no one deserves that Harvard college define its mission and design its admission criteria in the first place, in a way that prizes the qualities they happen to have in abundance. Whether those qualities are test scores or grades or the ability to play the piano, or to be a good middle linebacker, or to come from Iowa, or to come from a certain minority group. So you see how this debate about affirmative action, especially the diversity argument, takes us back to the question of rights, which in turn takes us back tothe question of whether moral desert is or is not the basisfor distributive justice. Think about that over the weekend and we'll continue this discussion next time.

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Lecture 18 What’s the Purpose?

When we ended last time, we were considering arguments for and against affirmative action. Counting race as a factor in admissions. And, in the course of the discussion, three arguments emerged, three arguments for affirmative action.

One of them was the idea that race and ethnic background should count as a way of correcting for the true meaning of test scores and grades. Getting a more accurate measure of the academic potential, those scores, those numbers represent.

Second, was what we called"the compensatory argument". The idea of righting past wrongs, past injustice.

And the third was the diversity argument. And when Cheryl Hopwood in the 1990s challenged the University of Texas Law School's affirmative action program, in the federal courts, the University of Texas made another version of the diversity

argument. Saying that the broader social purpose, the social mission of the University of Texas Law School, is to produce leaders, in the legal community, in the political community, among judges, lawyers, legislators, and therefore it's important that we produce leaders, who reflect the background,and the experience, and the ethnic and the racial composition of the state of Texas. It's important for serving our wider social mission. That was the University of Texas Law School's argument.

And then we considered an objection to the diversity argument which after all is an argument in the name of the social mission, the common good. We saw that Rawls does not simply believe that arguments of the common good or the general welfare should prevail if individual rights must be violated inthe course of promoting the common good. You remember that was the question, the challenge, to the diversity
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rationale that we were considering when we finished last time.

And we began to discuss the question "Well, what right might be at stake"? Maybe the right to be considered according to factors within one's control. Maybe this is the argument that Cheryl Hopwood implicitly was making. She can't help the fact that she is white. Why should her chance at getting into law school depend on a factor she can't control? And then Hannah who is advancing an argument last time said Harvard has the rightto define its mission any way it wants to, it's a private institution. And it's only once Harvard defines its mission that we can identify the qualities that count. So no rights are being violated. Now, what about that argument? What I would like to do is to hear objections to that reply. And then, see whether others have an answer.

Yes? And tell us your name.

Student: “Da”

Da, right you spoke up last time. How do you answer that argument?

Student: “Well, I think there was two things in there. One of them was that a private institution could define its mission however it wants. But that doesn't make however it defines it,right, like I could define my personal mission as I want to collect all the

money in the world. But does that make it even a good mission? So you can't like, you can't say that just because a college is a private institution it can just define it as whatever it wants, you still have to thing about, what are the way it's defining it, it's right. And in the case of affirmative action, a lot of people have said that since there's a lot of other factors involved, why not race? Like if we already know that…”

Let's, I want to stick with your first point, Da.
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Student: “Okay.”

Here's Da's objection. Can a college or university define its social purpose any way it wants to and define admissions criteria accordingly? What about the University of Texas Law School not today, but in the 1950s? Then, there was another Supreme Court case, against the admissions policy of the University of Texas Law School because it was segregated. It only admitted whites. And when the case went to court back in the '50s, the University of Texas Law School also invoked its mission. "Our mission as a law school, is to educate lawyers for the Texas bar, the Texas law firms. And no Texas law firm hires African Americans. So to fulfill our mission, we only admit whites."

Or consider Harvard, in the 1930s when it had anti-Jewish quotas. President Lowell, the president of Harvard in the 1930s said, that he had nothing personally against Jews, but he invoked the mission, the social purpose of Harvard he said, "which is not only to train intellectuals, part of the mission at Harvard," he said, "is to train stockbrokers for Wall Street, presidents and senators and there are very few Jews who go into those professions." Now, here's the challenge. Is there a principle distinction between the invocation of the social purpose of the college or university today, in the diversity rationale and the invocation of the social purpose or mission of the university by Texas in the 1950s or Harvard in the 1930s? Is there a difference in principle? What's the reply? Hannah?-

Student: “Well, I think that the principle different here is basically the distinction between inclusion versus exclusion. I think that it's morally wrong of the university to say "We're going to exclude you on the basis of your religion or your race." That's denial on the basis of arbitrary factors. What Harvard is trying to do today with its
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diversity initiatives, is to include groups that were excluded in the past. ”

Good, let's see if, stay there, let's see if someone would like to reply. Go ahead.

Student: “Actually this is kind of in support of Hannah, rather than a reply but…”

That's alright.

Student: „I was going to say another principle difference malice being the motivation for the historical segregation act, so it's saying that we're not going to let blacks or Jews in because they're worse as people or as a group.”

Dood, malice isn't present. And what's your name?

Student: “ Stevie.”

Stevie says that in the historic segregationas racist, anti-Semitic quotas or prohibitions. malice, a certain kind of judgment that African Americans or Jews were somehow less worthy than everybody else. Whereas present dayaffirmative action programs don't involve or imply any such judgment. What it amounts to saying is, so long as the policy, just uses people in a way as valuable to the social purpose of the institution, it's okay provided it doesn't judge them, maliciously, as Stevie might add, as intrinsically less worthy. I'd like to raise a question. Doesn't that concede that all of us when we compete for positions or for seats in colleges and universities in a way are being used, not judged, but used, in a way that has nothing to do with moral desert. Remember we got into this whole discussion of affirmative action when we were trying to figure out whether distributive justice shouldbe tied to moral desert or not. And we were launched on that question by Rawls and his denial, his rejection of the
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idea that distributive justice whether its positions or places in the class or income and wealth It's a matter of moral desert.

Suppose that were the moral basis of Harvard's admissions policy, what letters would they have to write to people they rejected or accepted for that matter? Wouldn't they have to write something like this: "Dear unsuccessful applicant, we regret to inform you that your application for admission has been rejected. It's not your fault that when you came along society happened not to need the qualities you had to offer. Those admitted instead of you are not themselves deserving of a place nor worthy of a praise for the factors that led their admission. We are in any case only using them and you as instruments of a wider social purpose. Better luck next time."

What was the letter you actually got when you were admitted? Perhaps it should have read something like this: "Dear successful applicant, we are pleased to inform you that yourapplication for admission has been accepted. It turns out, lucky for you, that you have the traits that society needs at the moment, propose to exploit your assets for society's advantage. You are to be congratulated. deserve credit for having the qualities that led to your admission, but only in a sense that the winner of a lottery is to be congratulated. And if you choose to accept our offer, you will ultimately be entitled to the benefits that attach to being used in this way. We look forward to seeing you in the fall."

Now, there is something a little odd, morally odd, if it's true that those letters do reflect the theory, the philosophy underlying the policy. So here's the question they pose. And it's a question that takes us back to a big issue in political philosophy. Is it possible,and is it desirable, to detach questions of distributive justice from questions of moral desert and questions of virtue? In many ways, this is an issue that separates modern political philosophy from ancient political thought. What's at stake in the
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question of whether we can put desert, moral desert aside? It seemed when we were reading Rawls, that the incentive, the reason he had, for detaching distributive justice from moral desert was an egalitarian one. That if we set desert to one side, there's greater scope for the exercise of egalitarian considerations. The veil of ignorance. The two principles, the difference principle, helping the least well off, redistribution and all that. But what's interesting, is if you look, at a range of thinkers we've been

considering, there does seem to be a reason they want to detach justice from desert that goes well beyond any concern for equality. Libertarian rights oriented theorists, the kind we've been studying, as well as egalitarian rights oriented theorists, including Rawls, and for that matter, also including Kant, all agree, despite their disagreements over distributive justice, and the welfare state and all of that, they all agree that

justice is not a matter of rewarding or honoring virtue or moral desert. Now why do they all think that? It can't just be for egalitarian reasons not all of them are egalitarians. This gets us to the big philosophical question we have to try to sort out. Somehow they think tying justice to moral merit or virtue is going to lead away from freedom, from respect for persons as free beings.

Well, in order to see what they consider to be at stake, and in order to assess their shared assumption, we need to turn to a thinker, to a philosopher, who disagrees with them. Who explicitly ties justice to honor, honoring virtue, and merit and moral desert. And that thinker is Aristotle. Now, in many ways Aristotle's idea of justice is intuitively very powerful. In some ways it's strange. I want to bring out both its power, its plausibility and its strangeness, so that we can see what's at stake in this whole debate about justice and whether it's tied to desert and virtue. So, what is Aristotle's answer to the question about justice? For Aristotle, justice is a matter of giving people what they deserve, giving people their due. It's a matter of figuring out the proper fit between persons, with their virtues, and their appropriate social roles. Well, what does this picture of justice look like, and how does it differ from the conception that seems
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to be shared among libertarian and egalitarian rights oriented theorists alike? Justice means giving each person his or her due, giving people what they deserve. But what is a person's due? What are the relevant grounds of merit or desert? Aristotle says that depends on the sort of things being distributed. "Justice involves two factors: Things and the persons to whom the things are assigned. In general we say," Aristotle writes, "That persons who are equal should have equal things assigned to them." But here there arises a hard question. Equals in what respects? Aristotle says that depends on the sort of thing we're distributing. flutes. What is the relevant merit or basis of desert for flutes? Who should get the best ones? What's Aristotle's answer? Anyone? The best flute players, right. Those who are best in the relevant sense, the best flute players. Is it just to discriminate in allocating flutes? Yes. All justice involves discrimination, Aristotle says. What matters is that the discrimination be according to the relevant excellence, according to the virtue appropriate to having flutes. He says it would be unjust to discriminate on some other basis. In giving out the flutes, to, say, wealth. Just giving the best flutes to the people who can pay the highest price, or nobility of birth, just giving flutes to aristocrats, or physical beauty, giving the best flutes to the most handsome, or chance, having a lottery. Aristotle says birth and beauty may be greater goods than the ability to play the flute, and those who possess them may surpass the flute player more in these qualities than he surpasses them in his flute playing.

But the fact remains that he is the person who ought to get the best flute. It's a strange idea, this comparison, by the way, that could you say, "Am I more handsome than she is a good lacrosse player?" That's a strange kind of comparison. But putting that aside, Aristotle says, we're not looking for the best overall whatever that might mean. We're looking for the best musician. Now, why this is important to see. Why, should the best flutes go to the best flute players? Well, why do you think? Anybody? What? They'll produce the best music. Well, and everybody will enjoy it more. That's not Aristotle's
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answer. Aristotle is not a utilitarian. He's not just saying, that way there'll be better music and everyone will enjoy it, everyone will be better off.

His answer is the best flutes should go to the best flute players because that's what flutes are for. To be played well. The purpose of flute playing, the purpose, is to produce excellent music. And those who can best perfect that purpose, ought properly to have the best ones. Now, it may also be true, as a welcome side effect. That everyone will enjoy listening to that music. So that answer is true enough, as far as it goes, but it's important to see that Aristotle's reason is not a utilitarian reason. It's a reason that looks, here's where you might think it's a little bit strange, it looks to the purpose, the point, the goal, of flute playing. Another way of describing this, looking to the goal to determine the just allocation, the Greek for goal or end, was 'telos'. So Aristotle says, you have to consider the point, the end, the goal, the telos of the thing in this case of flute playing. And that's how you define a just allocation. A just discrimination. So this idea of reasoning from the goal, from the telos, is called "teleological reasoning".

Teleological moral reasoning. And that's Aristotle's way. Reasoning from the goal, from the end. Now, this may seem, as I said a strange idea, that we're supposed to reason from the purpose, but it does have a certain intuitive plausibility. Consider the allocation, let's say, at Harvard, of the best tennis courts squash courts. How should they be allocated? Who should have priority in playing on the best courts? Well, you might say, "Those who can best afford them." Set up a fee system, charge money for them. Aristotle would say "No". You might say, "Well, Harvard big shots, the most influential people at Harvard, who would they be"? The senior faculty should have priority in playing on the best tennis courts. No, Aristotle would reject that. Some scientist may be a greater scientist than some Varsity tennis player is a tennis player, but still the tennis player is the one who should have priority for playing in the best
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tennis court. There is a certain intuitive plausibility to this idea. Now, one of the things that makes it strange is that in Aristotle's world, in the ancient world, it wasn't

only social practices that were governed, in Aristotle's view, by teleological reasoning and teleological explanation. All of nature was understood to be a meaningful order and what it meant to understand nature, to grasp nature, to find our place in nature, was to inquire into and read out the purposes or the telos, of nature. And with the advent of modern science, it's been difficult to think of the world that way and so it makes it harder perhaps to think of justice in a teleological way, but there is a certain naturalness to thinking about even the natural world, as teleologically ordered, as a purpose of whole. In fact, children have to be educated out of this way of looking at the world. I realized this when my kids were very young and I was reading them a book Winnie the Poo. And Winnie the Poo gives you a great idea of how there is a certain, natural, childlike way of looking at the world in a teleological way. You may remember a story of Winnie-the-Poo walking in the forest。

One day, "He came to a place in the forest, and from the top of the tree there came a loud buzzing-noise. Winnie-the-Poo sat at the foot of a tree, put his head between his paws, and began to think..Here's what he said to himself, “'That buzzing-noise means something. You don't get a buzzing-noise like that just buzzing and buzzing without its meaning something. If there's a buzzing-noise, somebody's making a buzzing-noise. And the only reason for making a buzzing-noise that I know of, is because you're a bee.”Then he thought for another long time and said, “And the only reason for being a bee that I know of, is making honey.” And then he got up, and he said, “And the only reason for making honey, is so I can eat it.' So he began to climb the tree.”

This is an example of teleological reasoning. It isn't so implausible after all. Now, we grew up, and we're talked out of this way of thinking about the world. But here's the
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question, even if teleological explanations don't fit with modern science, even if we've outgrown them in understanding nature, Isn't there something still intuitively, and morally plausible, even powerful, about Aristotle's idea that the only way to think about justice is to reason from the purpose, the goal, the telos, of the social practice? And isn't that precisely what we were doing when we were disagreeing about affirmative action? You can almost recast that disagreement consists in. Reasoning from the purpose or from the telos. Or from the end. Aristotle says that's indispensable to thinking about justice. Is he right? Think about that question as you turn to Aristotle's politics.

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Lecture 19 The Good Citizen

We turn to Aristotle after examining theories, modern theories, of justice that try to detach considerations of justice and rights from questions of moral desert and virtue. Aristotle disagrees with Kant and Rawls. Aristotle argues that justice is a matter of giving people what they deserve. And the central idea of Aristotle's theory of justice is that in reasoning about justice and rights we have, unavoidably, to reason about the purpose,or the end, or the telos, of social practices in institutions. Yes, justice requires giving equal things to equal persons, but the question immediately arises,in any debate about justice, equal in what respect? And Aristotle says we need to fill in the answer to that question by looking to the characteristic end, or the essential nature, or the purpose, of the thing we're distributing.

And so we discussed Aristotle's example of flutes; who should get the best flutes. And Aristotle's answer was the best flute-players. The best flute-player should get the best flute because that's the way of honoring the excellence of flute playing. It's a way of rewarding the virtue of the great flute-player. What's interesting though, and this is what we are going to explore today, dispense with teleological reasoning when we're thinking about social institutions and political practices. In general it's hard to do without teleology when we're thinking about ethics, justice, and moral argument. At least that is Aristotle's claim. And I would like to bring out the force in Aristotle's claim by considering two examples. One is an example that Aristotle spends quite a bit of time discussing; the case of politics. How should political offices and honors, how should political rule be distributed? The second example is a contemporary debate about golf and whether the Professional Golfers Association should be required to allow Casey•Martin, a golfer with a disability, to ride in a golf cart.

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Both cases bring out a further feature of Aristotle's teleological way of thinking about justice. And that is that when we attend to the telos, or the purpose, sometimes we disagree and argue about what the purpose of a social practice really consists in. And when we have those disagreements part of what's at stake in those disagreements is not just who will get what, not just a distributive question, but also an honorific question. What qualities, what excellences, of persons will be honored? Debates about purpose and telos are often, simultaneously, debates about honor.

Now, let's see how that works in the case of Aristotle's account of politics. When we discuss distributive justice these days we're mainly concerned with the distribution of income and wealth and opportunity. Aristotle took distributive justice to be mainly not about income and wealth but about offices and honors. Who should have the right to rule? Who should be a citizen? How should political authority be distributed?

Those were his questions. How did he go about answering those questions? Well, in line with his teleological account of justice, Aristotle argues that to know how political authority should be distributed we have, first, to inquire into the purpose, the point, the telos, of politics. So, what is politics about? And, how does this help us decide who should rule? Well, for Aristotle the answer to that question is, politics is about forming character, forming good character. It's about cultivating the virtue of citizens. It's about the good life. The end of the State, the end of the political community, he tells us in Book Three of the Politics, is not mere life, it's not economic exchange only, it's not security only, it's realizing the good life. That's what politics is for according to Aristotle.

Now, you might worry about this. You might say, "Well, maybe this shows us why those modern theorists of justice, and of politics, are right". Because remember, for Kant and for Rawls, the point of politics is not to shape the moral character of citizens.
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It's not to make us good. It's to respect our freedom to choose our goods, our values, our ends, consistent with a similar liberty for others. Aristotle disagrees. “Any polis which is truly so called, and is not merely one in name, must devote itself to the end of encouraging goodness. Otherwise political association sinks into a mere alliance.” Law becomes a mere covenant, a guarantor of man's rights against one another, instead of being - as it should be - a way of life such as will make the members of a polis good and just." That's Aristotle's view. "A polis is not an association for residents on a common site, or for the sake of preventing mutual injustice and easing exchange." Aristotle writes. "The end and purpose of a polis is the good life, and the institutions of social life are means to that end.

Now, if that's the purpose of politics, of the polis, then, Aristotle says, we can derive from that the principles of distributive justice; the principles that tell us who should have the greatest say, who should have the greatest measure of political authority. And what's his answer to that question? Well, those who contribute the most to an association of this character, namely an association that aims at the good, should have a greater share in political rule and in the honors of the polis. And the reasoning is, they are in a position to contribute most to what political community is essentially about. Well, so you can see the link that he draws between the principle of distribution for citizenship and political authority and the purpose of politics.

"But why," you'll quickly ask, "Why does he claim that political life, participation in politics, is somehow essential to living a good life?" "Why isn't it possible for people to live perfectly good lives, decent lives, moral lives, without participating in politics?" Well, he gives two answers to that question. He gives a partial answer, a preliminary answer, in Book One of the Politics where he tells us that only by living in a polis, and participating in politics, do we fully realize our nature as human beings. Human beings are, by nature, meant to live in a polis. Why? It's only in political life
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that we can actually exercise our distinctly human capacity for language, which Aristotle understands is this capacity to deliberate about right and wrong, the just and the unjust.

And so, Aristotle writes in Book One of the Politics, that the polis,the political community, exists by nature and is prior to the individual. Not prior in time, but prior in its purpose. Human beings are not self-sufficient, living by themselves, outside a political community. "Man who is isolated, who is unable to share in the benefits of political association, or who has no need to share, because he's already self-sufficient, such a person must be either a beast or a god." So we only fully realize our nature, we only fully unfold our human capacities, when we exercise our faculty of language, which means when we deliberate with our fellow citizens about good and evil, right and wrong, just and the unjust. "But why can we only exercise our capacity for language in political community?" you might ask. Aristotle gives a second part, a fuller part, of his answer in the Nichomachean Ethics; an excerpt of which we have among the readings. And there he explains that political deliberation, living the life of a citizen, ruling and being ruled in turn, sharing in rule, all of this is necessary to virtue. Aristotle defines happiness not as maximizing the balance of pleasure over pain but as an activity, an activity of the soul in accordance with virtue. And he says that every student of politics must study the soul because shaping the soul is one of the objects of legislation in a good city. But why is it necessary to live in a good city in order to live a virtuous life? Why can't we just learn good moral principles at home or in a philosophy class or from a book, live according to those principles, those rules, those precepts, and leave it at that?

Aristotle says virtue isn't acquired that way. Virtue is only something we can acquire by practicing, by exercising the virtues. It's the kind of thing we can only learn by doing. It doesn't come from book learning. In this respect, it's like flute playing; you
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couldn't learn how to play a musical instrument well just by reading a book about it. You have to practice, and you have to listen to other accomplished flute-players. There are other practices and skills of this type. Cooking; there are cookbooks but no great chef ever learns how to cook by reading a cookbook only. It's the kind of thing you only learn by doing. Joke-telling is probably another example of this kind. No great comedian learns to be a comedian just by reading a book on the principles of comedy. It wouldn't work. Now, why not? What do joke-telling and cooking and playing a musical instrument have in common such that we can't learn them just by grasping a precept or a rule that we might learn from a book or a lecture? What they have in common is that they are all concerned with getting the hang of it. get the hang of when we learn how to cook, or play a musical instrument, or tell jokes well? Discerning particulars, particular features of a situation. And no rule, no precept, could tell the comedian or the cook or the great musician how to get in the habit of,the practice of, discerning the particular features of a situation. Aristotle says virtue is that way too. Now, how does this connect to politics? The only way we can acquire the virtues that constitute the good life is to exercise the virtues, to have certain habits inculcated in us, and then to engage in the practice of deliberating with citizens about the nature of the good. That's what politics is ultimately about. The acquisition of civic virtue, of this capacity to deliberate among equals, that's something we couldn't get living a life alone outside of politics.

And so, that's why, in order to realize our nature, we have to engage in politics. And that's why those who are greatest in civic virtue, like Pericles, are the ones who properly have the greatest measure of offices and honors. So, the argument about the distribution of offices and honors has this teleological character, but also an honorific dimension. Because part of the point of politics is to honor people like Pericles. It isn't just that Pericles should have the dominant say because he has the best judgment, and that will lead to the best outcomes, to the best consequences for the citizens. That's
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true, and that's important. But a further reason people like Pericles should have the greatest measure of offices, and honors, and political authority, and sway in the polis, is that part of the point of politics is to single out and honor those who possess the relevant virtue, in this case civic virtue, civic excellence, practical wisdom, to the fullest extent. That's the honorific dimension bound up with Aristotle's account of politics.

Here's an example that shows the link in a contemporary controversy; the link to which Aristotle draws our attention between arguments about justice and rights on the one hand and figuring out the telos or the purpose of a social practice on the other. Not only that, the case of Casey Martin and his golf cart also brings out the link between debates about what the purpose of a social practice or a game is, on the one hand and the question of what qualities should be honored on the other; the link between teleology and honor-based principles of distributive justice. Who was Casey Martin? Well, Casey Martin is a very good golfer. Able to compete at the highest levels of golf but for one thing; he has a rare circulatory problem in his leg that makes it very difficult for him to walk; not only difficult but dangerous. And so he asked the PGA, which governs the pro tour in golf, to be able to use a golf cart when he competed in professional tournaments. PGA said no, and he sued under the Americans for Disabilities Act; he sued in a case that went all the way to the United States Supreme Court. The question the Supreme Court had to answer was, does Casey Martin have a right that the PGA provide him, allow him, to use a golf cart on the tour, or not?

How many here think that, from a moral point of view, Casey•Martin should have a right to use a golf cart? And how many think that he should not have a right to a golf cart, in the tournaments? So the majority are sympathetic to Casey•Martin's right, though a substantial minority disagree. Let's first hear from those of you who would
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rule against Casey Martin. Why would you not say that the PGA must give him a golf cart? Yes.

Student 1: “Since the inception of golf, because it has been part of the sport it is now intrinsically part of golf; walking the course. And thus, because it's intrinsic to golf, I'd argue that not being able to walk the course is just not being able to perform an aspect of the sport, which is necessary to performing at a professional level.”

Good. Stay there for a minute. What's your name? Student 1: “Tommy. ”

Are you a golfer, by the way, Tom?

Student 1: “Not so much but, yeah, a little bit. ”

Are there any golfers here, I mean, real golfers?

Student 1: “Thank you, professor, that was... ”

No, no. taking your word for it. Is there someone here on the golf team? Yes? Tell us your name, and tell us what you think.

Student 2: “My name is Michael and I usually take a cart. So . . . I'm probably the wrong person to ask. ”

Is that why your hand went up slowly when I asked?

Student 2: “Yes.”
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Alright, but Tom is saying, Tom said a minute ago that at least at the professional level walking the course is essential to the game. Do you agree?

Student 2: “I would, yes.”

You do? Then why do you take a cart? And you call yourself a golfer? No, no, no. I'm kidding, I'm kidding. What do you say to that?

Student 2: “When I have walked the course it does add tremendously to the game. It makes it a lot harder. It really does. ”

Yeah? Alright let's hear, Michael and Tom stay there, let's hear from people who say that he should have a right to a golf cart. Why? Who is prepared to defend that position? Yes.

Student 3: “Well, I think the PGA should definitely be required to give him a golf cart because they argue in the decision that it's not just a matter of, he's not experiencing fatigue. For him he's still walking about a mile, the cart can't go everywhere with him, and in that mile he is still experiencing more fatigue and pain than a healthy player would. So, it's not as if you're removing the disadvantage. ”

What's your name? Student 3: “Riva.”

Riva, what do you say to Tom's point that walking the course is essential to the game? It would be as if a disabled player could play in the NBA but not have to run up and down the court.
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Student 3: “Well, I think there are two responses to that. First, I don't think it's essential to the game, because most golfers who play, particularly recreationally, play with a cart. -- Like Michael. And on several of the tours you can play with a cart; on the Senior PGA Tour, on the Nike Tour, in a lot of the college events. And those events are just as competitive and just as high level as the PGA Tour. So, really it's just a matter of selective reasoning if you argue it as an important part of the sport. But, even if it is he still does have to walk, he still plays golf standing up, it's not as if he's playing golf from a wheelchair. ”

Alright. Who else? Go ahead.

Student 4: “I think the whole point of a competition is that it calls out the best, you know, from the second best or from the third best. And when we're talking about the national level, we're talking about the highest of the highest. I think what they're arguing about here is the purpose of competition. And I think in the sake of competition you can't change the rules. So, the purpose of the competition includes walking? That's an essential, you agree with Tom. ”

And what's your name?

Student 4: “David.”

The Supreme Court ruled that the PGA did have to accommodate Casey Martin and they did it on grounds that Riva mentioned, that walking isn't really part of, an essential part of the game. They cited testimony saying that walking the court consumes no more calories than you get eating a Big Mac. That's what walking is in golf, according to the majority. Scalia was in dissent. Justice Scalia agreed with David.
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He said there is no purpose, and it's certainly not your course to try to figure out the essential purpose of golf. Golf is like any game, it's strictly for amusement. And if there's a group that wants to have one version of the game they can have that version of the game. And the market can decide whether people are amused and like and show up for that and watch the television broadcasts. Scalia's dissent was an anti-Aristotelian dissent, because notice two things about the argument; thrust into a discussion about what the essential nature, or purpose,or telos of golf really is. Does it include walking? And, here's something I think is rumbling beneath the surface of this debate, whether walking partly determines whether golf is really an athletic competition. After all, the ball sits still. You have to put it in a hole. Is it more like basketball, baseball, and football? Golf, an athletic competition? Or is it more like billiards? The ball sits still there too. You can be out of shape and succeed. It involves skill but not athletic skill. Could it be that those professional golfers, who excel at golf, have a stake in golf being honored and recognized as an athletic event, not just a game of skill like billiards? And if that's what's at stake, then we have a debate about the purpose, the teleological dimension, and also a debate about honor. What virtues, really, does the game of golf honor and recognize? Two questions to which Aristotle directs our attention. We'll continue on this case next time.

（想谢网友“长沙—翾狼”参不本读掋版工作）

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Lecture 20 Freedom VS. Fit

When we ended last time we were talking about whether Casey Martin has a right to ride in a golf cart in the PGA Tournament. And it's worth remembering how we got into this debate and what's at stake for an understanding of political philosophy. Remember, we were looking at Aristotle's theory of justice and one way of describing his approach to justice, we've called it 'teleological'. Teleological, because he says to allocate rights we first have to figure out the purpose, or the end, of the social practice in question. Another way of describing Aristotle's account of Justice is that justice is, for him, a matter of fit; it's a matter of fitting persons with their virtues and excellences to the appropriate roles.

Now, I want to finish our discussion about Casey Martin and his claim for a golf cart, and then go back to one more consequential application in Aristotle, namely, the question of slavery. What do you think about Casey Martin's request? Should there be an accommodation or not, given the nature of the game and of the tournament and its purposes? "Isn't it discrimination if he's not provided the golf cart as an accommodation", say some. Others reply, "No, if he got a cart it would be unfair to the other golfers because they exert themselves, become winded, fatigued, walking the course". That's where we left it. What about the fairness argument? OK, Jenny.

Student 5: “My question was why doesn't the PGA just make the option of a cart available to all golfers? From our readings I learned that there are many golf tournaments, other than the PGA, where using a cart is not prohibited. For instance, the Seniors Tournament it's even allowed and encouraged. So why doesn't the PGA just do that? Let everybody use a cart? Give everyone the option of using a cart and let them pick. So then the traditionalists can then still say, "Well, I still choose to walk the course but I do that knowing that I will be more tired at the end than the people
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who took the cart."

Good. Alright, so what about Jenny's solution? For the sake of fairness, don't give Casey Martin an advantage, if indeed there is an advantage to riding in a cart. Let everyone who wants to use a cart. Is everyone happy with that solution? Does it put to rest this whole dilemma? Who has an answer for Jenny?

Student 6: “Yes. As was brought up last time, if you do that you kind of ruin some of the spirit of golf as a lot of people like to see it. If you let everybody take a cart. Even though it gives everybody the same playing field now, it sort of makes golf less of an athletic game, like people pointed out last class. It's just like if someone decides to go into another sport and they want an advantage. Like, if you have swimming and then you say, "OK, he wants flippers so why don't we just allow everyone to have flippers when they're swimming?"

And what would that do to the Olympic Swimming Competition, if people were free to use, Jenny, we better let Jenny reply to this. David says it would sort of spoil the spirit of the athletic competition as if in Olympic swimming you let anyone who wanted to swim with flippers. Alright, Jenny, what do you say to David?

Student 5: “It would spoil the spirit of it. You're also ruining the spirit of golf by not letting people who are really passionate about the game, and very good at it, compete simply because of an aspect of golf which is not, the main point of golf is you use the club to make strokes and hit it into a hole. I'm sorry, I'm not a golfer but that's basically the gist of the game from what I see it. And I was reading the PGA versus Casey•Martin decision that was one of the sentences that they said is because walking the course is not an inherent part of golf, only swinging the club is. ”

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Good. So, Jenny replies to David, well, it isn't really essential anyhow to walk the course. So, we're back to the purpose.

Student 5: “I mean, I'm sure there are, like wheelchair basketball, there are certain different competitions that can be made for people who may only be able to use their arms. ”

Right. Yes. Michael what do you think?

Student 7: “Jenny just said that there is stuff like wheelchair basketball where if you can't play basketball there is another option. I think there are other options in the PGA Tour. But the PGA Tour is the best, is the pinnacle, and you have to have certain requirements fulfilled to perform. ” Alright, Michael, you want to say to Casey Martin there is such a thing as a Special Olympics for those who are disabled. Go play in the golfing version of the Special Olympics. That's what you would say Michael?

Student 7: “Yeah. I think that walking is part of the sport of golf. And Casey Martin, you know if he can't walk the course then I don't think he should be able to play in the PGA. ”

Alright, thank you very much for that exchange. What comes out of this exchange that goes back to Aristotle's theory of justice? Well, one thing is the question, is walking an essential part of golf? And the very fact that deciding whether there is a right for Casey Martin that the PGA must respect, seems to depend, as Aristotle suggests it must, on debating and resolving the question, is walking essential to the game of golf? That's one moral of the story. But there's a second moral to the story from an Aristotelian point of view. What's at stake here, this is the second Aristotelian
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stake in this debate, is honor. Casey•Martin wants the accommodation so that he can compete for the honor of winning the best tournaments. Now, why is it that the professional golfers, the great golfers, testified in this case - Jack Nicklaus, Tom Kite in the readings, against letting him use a cart and they, I would suspect, would be equally vehement, Jenny, in opposing your suggestion of letting everyone ride in a cart, and this goes back, in a way, to David's point. How to put this gently? Professional golfers are sensitive about whether their sport is really a sport. Because if everyone rode around in a cart, or could, then it would become clear, or clearer, depending on your point of view, that golf is not really an athletic competition but rather a game; a game of skill but not a sport. And so not only the question of debating the purpose, the teleological feature, but also from the standpoint of viewing debates about the purpose of golf. What's essential to golf? Those debates, Aristotle suggests, inevitably are also debates about the allocation of honor. Because part of the purpose of golf is not just to amuse spectators; Scalia's wrong about that, from Aristotle's point of view. It's not just to provide entertainment, it's not just to make people happy. It's not a mere amusement. It's honoring, it's rewarding, it's recognizing a certain kind of athletic excellence, at least those who have achieved the highest honors have a powerful stake in maintaining that view.

Now, some of you took the position the Scalia position. "This is an incredibly difficult and silly question", Scalia said. "What is the essential nature of golf?" It's not the kind of thing that the United States Supreme Court is equipped to decide, or should decide. That's Scalia. But he only he says that because he takes a very strong, and as it happens, anti-Aristotelian position on what a game is. "It is the very nature of a game to have no object, " no point, "except amusement" says Scalia, "That is what distinguishes games" he says, "From productive activity." You can just imagine what kind of sports fan Scalia must be. "And so", he says, "It's impossible to say that any of the game's arbitrary rules is essential." disparaging remark about golf. He says,
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"Many consider walking to be the central feature of golf. Hence, Mark Twain's classic criticism of the sport 'a good walk spoiled'." But Scalia misses an important feature of games and the arguments about rights and fairness that arise from games, when he casts games, sports, athletic competitions, as solely for the sake of amusement; as solely an utilitarian activity. But an Aristotelian view of sports says, no it's not just about amusement, real sports, real athletic events, are also about appreciation, not just amusement. And people who follow sports and care about sports and play sports know this. Which is another way of saying, there's a difference between a sport and a mere spectacle. And the difference is that a sport is a practice that calls forth and honors and prizes certain excellences, certain virtues. And the people who appreciate those virtues are the true fans, the informed fans, and for them watching the sport is not mere amusement. But that means that it's always possible to make sense of the debate about what feature of a sport is essential to it. We can make sense of these arguments. Never mind the question whether the court should decide. The PGA in its own internal deliberations can make sense of that debate, which is why they cared very much about their view, insisting on their view, that walking, an exertion, and fatigue are essential, not peripheral, parts of sport. Well, this is all to illustrate the teleological and the honorific feature of debates about rights, which Aristotle says we need to take account of in thinking about justice. Now, I want to begin for us to consider whether Aristotle's theory of justice is right or wrong; whether it's persuasive or unpersuasive. I want to get your thoughts about that. But I want to anticipate one obvious and important objection. If justice is about fit, fitting persons to roles, matching virtues to the appropriate honors and recognition. If that's what justice is, does it leave room for freedom? And this is one of the main objections to Aristotle's teleological account of justice. If certain roles, social roles, are fitting, or appropriate, to me where does that leave my right to choose my social roles, my life purposes, for myself? What room does teleology leave for freedom? And in fact, you may remember, Rawls rejects teleological accounts of justice because he says that teleological theories of justice
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threaten the equal basic rights of citizens. So, let's begin to examine whether Aristotle is right, and in particular, whether his teleological way of thinking about justice is at odds with freedom. Now, one obvious reason to worry is Aristotle's defense of slavery. He defends slavery, which existed as an institution in the Athens of his day. Well, what is his defense of slavery? Two things, two conditions, have to be met for slavery to be just. First, it has to be necessary. and Aristotle says, at least in our society, slavery is necessary. Why is it necessary? If there are to be citizens who are freed from manual and menial and household chores to go to the assembly, to deliberate about politics, there have to be some who look after those menial tasks; the mere necessities of life. He says, unless you could invent in some science-fiction a technological fix then there are going to be those who have to do the hard and difficult and menial labor if there are going to be citizens deliberating about the good and realizing their nature. So slavery is necessary for the life of the polis for there to be open to citizens. The life of deliberation, of argument, of practical wisdom. But there's a further condition that has to be met. Slavery has not only to be necessary for the community as a whole to function, but it also has to be the case, remember the criterion of fit? It also has to be the case that there are some people for whom being a slave is the just, or the fitting, or the appropriate condition. Now, Aristotle agrees that by his own standards, both of those conditions must be met, must be true, if slavery is to be just. And then, in a deplorable passage, he says, well, it is true that there are some people who are fit by nature who are cut out to be slaves. These are people who differ from ordinary people in the same way that the body differs from the soul. These are people who are meant to be ruled, and for them their nature is best realized if they're slaves. They can recognize reason in others but they can't partake of it, they can't exercise it. And somehow we can know this. dodgy, something strained about this claim, because he quickly acknowledges that those who disagree may have a point. And what those who disagree point out is that there are a lot of people in Athens who are slaves not
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because they were born to be slaves, or fit to be slaves, but because they were captured, they were losers in a war. And so, Aristotle admits that as practiced in ancient Athens, slavery didn't necessarily line up with who actually is fit or born to be a slave, because some actual slaves just were slaves by bad luck, by being captured in a war. And on Aristotle's own account even if it's necessary to have slavery for the sake of citizenship it's unjust if people who aren't properly slaves are cast in that role. There is a misfit. Aristotle recognizes that slavery for those who aren't fit for the task is a kind of coercion. The reason slavery is wrong is not because it's coerced. Coercion is an indicator that it's wrong, because it's not natural. If you have to coerce someone into a role that's a pretty good indication that they don't belong there, that that role isn't fitting for them. And Aristotle recognized this. So, all of this is to say the example of slavery, Aristotle's defense of it, doesn't show that there isn't anything wrong in principle with teleological argument, with the idea of justice as fit between persons and roles, because it's perfectly possible within Aristotle's own terms, to explain what's wrong with this application, this practical application that he made of his theory. I want to turn to the larger challenge to Aristotle in the name of freedom. But before I do that I want to see what people think of Aristotle's account of justice as fit, his teleological way of reasoning about justice and the honorific dimension of rights and of distributive justice that immerged in our discussion of flutes and politics and golf. Questions of clarification about Aristotle or objections to his overall account.

Yes.

Student 8: “My objection to Aristotle is that he wants to match a person to a role. And, you know, if you walk like a pirate and you talk like a pirate, you know, you should be a pirate. And that is what is right. And so what's strange and seems paradoxical to me about Aristotle's view point is that if you walk like a pirate and you talk like a pirate
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you shouldn't be an investment banker, because that's not what you're inherently supposed to do. If you have a peg leg and an eye patch and a disgruntled disposition, you know, high seas. So he doesn't... ”

Some would say that the distinction between the two vocations is not as clear as you suggest. Alright, but that's good. take your point. Yes, go ahead.

Student 9: “It just seems to ignore individual rights. So, I might be the perfect janitor in the whole world and I can do that job the most efficiently out of anybody that exists right now, but I might not want to do that. I might want to do any other number of pursuits and it seems to say that that isn't really a good option for me. ”

Alright, and what's your name?

Student 9: “Mary-Kate. ”

Good. Alright, let's take a couple more. Yes.

Student 10: “ I think that the golf cart exchange sort of brought up what I see as my main objection to this teleological mode of reasoning. I mean, Michael, I think that's

your name, right? Believes that walking is an inherent part of golf. Myself, I believe that walking is not an inherent part of golf. And I feel that no matter how long we debate this particular point of contention we're never going to reach an accord. The teleological framework of reasoning, I believe, doesn't really allow us to come to any sort of agreement. ”

Alright, and what's your name?

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Student 10: “Patrick.”

Patrick. Alright, let me try to address this set of objections to Aristotle. Let me start with Patrick's; it's an important objection. We had a debate about whether walking is essential to golf, and even in so seemingly trivial, or at least contained, a case as that, we couldn't agree. How can we possibly hope to agree? When the stakes are higher and when we're debating the fundamental purposes, or ends, of political community. And so, if we can't agree in what the ends or the goods of our shared public life consist in, how can we base justice and rights on some notion of what the end, or the purpose, or the good consists in? That's an important objection. So much so that much modern political theory takes that worry about disagreement over the good as its starting point, and concludes that justice and rights and constitutions should not be based on any particular conception of the good or the purposes of political life, but should, instead, provide a framework of rights that leaves people free to choose their conceptions of the good, their own conceptions of the purposes of life. Now, Mary-Kate said, "What if a person is very well suited to having a certain role, like the role of being a janitor, but wants something else, wants to reach higher, wants to choose another way of life?" So, that goes back to this question about freedom. Take our bearings as persons from roles that are said to fit our nature, shouldn't it at least be up to us to decide what those roles are? In fact, shouldn't it be up to us to define what roles are suitable to us? And that's going to take us back to the confrontation between Aristotle on the one hand and Kant and Rawls on the other. Kant and Rawls think Patrick has a point. They say precisely because people disagree in pluralist societies about the nature of the good life, we shouldn't try to base justice on any particular answer to that question. So they reject teleology, they reject the idea of tying justice to some conception of the good. What's at stake in the debate about teleology, say Rawlsian and Kantian liberals, is this; if you tie justice to a particular conception of the good, if you see justice as a matter of fit between a person and his or her roles,
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you don't leave room for freedom, and to be free is to be independent of any particular roles, or traditions, or conventions that may be handed down by my parents or my society. So, in order to decide as between these two broad traditions, whether Aristotle is right, or whether Kant and Rawls are right, we need to investigate whether the right is prior to the good, question one, and we need to investigate what it means to be a free person, a free moral agent. Does freedom require that I stand for toward my roles, my ends, and my purposes as an agent of choice? Or as someone trying to discover what my nature really is? Two big questions and we'll take them up next time.

（想谢网友“长沙—翾狼”参不本读掋版工作）

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Lecture 21 The Claims of Community

Kant thinks that Aristotle just made a mistake. You remember Aristotle says in order to investigate the ideal constitution. We have first to figure out the best way to live. Kant would reject that idea. He says that constitutions and laws and rights should not embody or affirm or promote any particular way of life. For Aristotle the whole point of law, polis is to shape character, to cultivate the virtue of citizens, to inculcate civic excellence, to make possible a good way of life. For Kant, on the other hand, the purpose of law, the point of a constitution is not to inculcate or to promote virtue. Within which citizens may be free to pursue their own conceptions of the good for themselves. So we see the difference in their theories of justice. We see the difference in their account of law or the role of a constitution, the point of politics, and underlying these differences are two different accounts of what it means to be a free person.

For Aristotle we are free insofar as we have the capacity to realize our potential. And that leads us to the question of fit. Fit between persons and the roles that are appropriate to them. cut out for. Kant rejects that idea and instead substitutes his famously demanding notion of freedom as the capacity to act autonomously. Freedom means acting according to a law I give myself. Freedom is autonomy. Part of the appeal, part of the moral force of the view of Kant and of Rawls consists in the conception of the person as a free and independent self capable of choosing his or her own ends. The image of the self is free and independent offers a, if you think about it, a powerful liberating vision because what it says is that as free moral persons we are not bound by any ties of history And that means that we are free and independent sovereign selves.

Communitarian critics of Kantian and Rawlsian liberalism acknowledge that there is
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something powerful and inspiring in that account of freedom, the free independent choosing self, but they argue it misses something. It misses a whole dimension of moral life and even political life. And these include obligations of membership, loyalty, solidarity, Alasdair MacIntyre gives an account what he calls a narrative conception of the self. Human beings are essentially storytelling creatures, MacIntyre argues. That means I can only answer the question 'what am I to do?' if I can answer the prior question of what story or stories do I find myself a part? What does this have to do with the idea of community and belonging? MacIntyre says this, once you accept this narrative aspect of moral reflection you will notice that we can never seek for the good or exercise of the virtues only as individuals. We all approach our circumstance as bearers of particular social identities. a citizen of this or that city, I belonged to this clan, that tribe, this nation. Hence, MacIntyre argues, what is good for me has to be the good for someone who inhabits these roles. I inherit from the past of my family, my city, my tribe, my nation a variety of debts, inheritances, expectations, and obligations. These constitute the given of my life, my moral starting point. This is in part what gives my life its moral particularity. Encumbered, at least to some extent, Now, MacIntyre recognizes that this narrative account, encumbered self, puts his account at odds with contemporary liberalism and individualism. From the standpoint of individualism I am what I myself choose to be.

Unless I choose to assume such responsibility, unless I choose to assume such responsibility. But MacIntyre says this reflects a certain kind of moral shallowness even blindness. He says, involves collective responsibility or responsibilities that may flow from historic memories. And he gives some examples. Such individualism is expressed by those contemporary Americans who deny any responsibility for the effects of slavery upon black Americans saying "I never owned any slaves." Or the young German who believes that having been born after 1945 means that what Nazis did to Jews has no moral relevance to his relationship to his Jewish contemporaries.
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MacIntyre says all of these attitudes of historical amnesia abdication. Once you see that who we are and what it means to sort out our obligations The contrast, he says, with a narrative account, is clear, For the story of my life is always embedded in the story of those communities from which I derived my identity. I am born with the past and to try to cut myself off from that past is to deform my present relationships. So there you have in MacIntyre, a strong statement of the idea from its particular ties of membership, history, story narrative. Communitarian critique of the individualist or the voluntarist, the unencumbered self. by looking at the two different accounts of moral and political obligation that arise depending on which of these conceptions of the person one accepts. On the liberal conception, moral and political obligations arise in one of two ways. as such. qua persons. These obligations are universal.

Then, as Rawls points out, there are also voluntary obligations. Obligations that we owe to particular others insofar as we have agreed whether through a promise or a deal or a contract. Now, the issue between the liberal and communitarian accounts of the self, Is there another category of obligation or not? The communitarian says there is. There is a third category that might be called obligations of solidarity or loyalty or membership. The communitarian argues that construing all obligations as either natural duties or voluntary obligations fails to capture obligations of membership or solidarity. Loyalties whose moral force consists partly in the fact that living by them is inseparable from understanding ourselves as the particular persons we are.

What would be some examples? And then I want to see how you would react to them. Examples of obligations of membership but rather from membership, narrative, community, one situation. The most common examples are ones to do with the family. The relation between parents and children, for example. Suppose there were two children drowning. You could save only one of them. Would you have an obligation to
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flip a coin obtuse if you didn’t rush to save your child? Now, you may say, well, parents have agreed to have their children. There is that asymmetry. And yet consider two aging parents, one of them yours, now, is this traceable to consent? Not likely or take a couple of political examples. During World War II, French resistance pilots flew bombing raids over occupied France. One day, one of the pilots received his target and noticed that the village he was being asked to bomb was his home village. He refused, not disputing that it was as necessary as the target he bombed yesterday. bring himself. It would be a special moral crime for him to bomb his people cause of liberating France. Now, do we admire that?

If we do, the communitarian argues, take another example. Some years ago there was a famine in Ethiopia. Hundreds of thousands of people were starving. The Israeli government organized an airlift to rescue Ethiopian Jews. They rescued several hundred Ethiopian Jews. Is that a kind of morally troubling partiality, a kind of prejudice? Or as the Israeli government thought, is there a special obligation of solidarity that this airlift properly responded to? Well, that takes us to the broader question of patriotism. What, morally speaking, is to be said for patriotism? There are two towns named Franklin. One is Franklin, Texas, and the other is just across the Rio Grande River, Franklin, Mexico.

What is the moral significance of national boundaries? Why is it, or is it the case that we as Americans have a greater responsibility for the health and the education and the welfare and public provision for people who live in Franklin, Texas, than equally needy people just across the river, living in Franklin, Mexico? According to the communitarian account, membership does matter. And the reason patriotism is at least potentially a virtue is that it is an expression of the obligations of citizenship. How many are sympathetic to the idea that there is this third category of obligation? The obligations of solidarity or membership. How many are sympathetic to that idea? And
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how many are critical of that idea? How many think all obligations can be accounted for in the first two ways?

Student, “Yes, binding, then there is a greater occurrence of overlapping obligations, a greater occurrence of good versus good. allows us to choose between them..”

Good, and what's your name?

Student, “Patrick.”

So you worry that if we recognize obligations of membership or solidarity, since we inhabit different communities, their claims might conflict, and what would we do if we have competing obligations? Yes. Well, one solution is that we could view ourselves as ultimately, members of the human community and that then within that we have all these smaller spheres, of that, you know, I am American or I am a student at Harvard. and so the most important community to be obligated to is the community of human beings. And then from there you can sort of, evaluate, which other ones are most important to you. So, Nichola, you say the most universal community we inhabit, the community of human kind, precedence?

Student1, “Yes.”

Patrick, are you satisfied?

Student, “No.”

Why not?

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Student, “It seems rather arbitrary that we should choose the universal obligation over the more specific obligation. I might also say that I should be obligated first to the most specific of my obligations. For instance, take my family as a small unit of solidarity. Perhaps I should be first obligated to that unit and then perhaps to the unit of my town, and then my country, and then the human race.”

Good, thank you. I want to hear from another critic of the communitarian view. We have the objection, well, what if goods collide? Who objects to the whole idea of it? Who sees patriotism as just the kind of prejudice that ideally we should overcome? Yes.

Studen2, “Patriotism reflects a community membership. I think the problem is that where some memberships are natural narratives, the narrative of citizenship is a constructed one. And I think a false one because, as the river is just a historical accident, it makes no sense that because the lottery of birth threw me into the United States as opposed to Mexico that Elizabeth.”

Who has a reply? Yes.

Student3, “I think in general, we have to ask where do our moral obligations arise from anyway. One would be kin and the other one would be reciprocity. You interact with the neighbors on your street, with the other people in your country through economic arrangements. any more than you know the people in Franklin, Mexico, do you?”

Good. Who else? Go ahead.

Student4, “Yeah, I think that a lot of the basis for patriotism can be compared to like
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school spirit or even house spirit that we see here where freshmen are sorted into houses and then within a day they have developed some sort of attachment or a pride associated with that house. And so I think that we can probably draw a distinction between a moral obligation for communitarian beliefs and sort of just a sentimental, emotional attachment.”

Rina. What about... Go back to my example about the obligation of the child to the parent. Would you say the same thing there? It just may or may not be a sentimental type and it has no moral weight? Something that will preclude moral obligations later. Just because we are randomly sorted into a house or Yeah, I mean, I would say that if you look at cases of adoption where, and then you have a parent who adopted you, most people would say that if you had to pick between them in the case of aging parents, that your obligation would lie more with the person who raised you and who had exchanges with you meaningfully.

May I ask you one more question about the parent?

Student 4: “Sure.”

Do you think that a person with a bad parent owes them less?

Student 4: “I don‟t know because I‟ve never had a bad parent.”

I think that’s a good place to end. Thank you. We’ll continue with this next time. Thank you.

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Lecture 22 Where Our Loyalty Lies

Today I’d like to take, I’d like to consider the strongest objections to the idea that there are obligations of solidarity or membership. Then I want to see if those objections can be met successfully. One objection emerged in the discussion last time. Patrick said, if obligations flow from community membership and identity, we inhabit multiple communities, And then Rina said these examples meant to bring out the moral force of solidarity and membership, examples about parents and children, about the French resistant fighter asked to bomb his own village and withdrawing back. About the airlift by Israel of the Ethiopian Jews. These examples, they maybe intuitively evocative, Rina said. Not true moral obligations. And then there were a number of objections, as such. But to patriotism understood as an obligation of solidarity and membership beyond consent. This objection allowed that there can be obligations to the communities we inhabit including obligations to patriotism. But this objection argued that all of the obligations of patriotism, or of community or membership, are actually based on liberal ideas and perfectly compatible with them. consent, either implicit or explicit or reciprocity.

Julia Ratthel for example on the web site said that liberalism can endorse patriotism as a voluntary moral obligation. Patriotism and familial love both fall into this category because after all, Julia points out, the Kantian framework allows people free reign to choose to express virtues such as these if they want to. To capture the moral force of community values. Where is Julia? Okay, so did I summarize that fairly? Julia actually is in line with what Rawls says about this very topic. You weren't aware of that? You came up it within your own. That's pretty good. they are making a voluntary choice. But Rawls says there is, I believe, no political obligations, strictly speaking, for a citizens generally. and who has performed it. So Rawls acknowledges that for ordinary citizens there is no political obligation except in so far as some particular
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citizen willingly, through an act of consent, undertakes or chooses such an obligation. to express our loyalty to our country or to our people or to our family within the framework acknowledging the priority that is of the universal duties. The view of those who say that obligations of membership really are kind of collective selfishness, why should we honor them?

Perhaps of those of you who have agreed, who wrote and who have agreed to press these objections, perhaps if you could gather down all together, now there were a number of people who argued in defense of patriotism as the communitarian view conceives it. So let me go down now and join the critics, the critics of communitarianism. Okay, thanks Kate. Who as the critics of patriotism, communal patriotism gather their forces here? Patrick if you want to you can join as well or Rina. Others who have spoken or addressed this question are free to join in. But I would like to hear now, from those you who defend patriotism, where is AJ Kumar? AJ, everybody seems to know you. You said, in the same way I feel I owe more to my family than to the general community, I owe more to my country than to humanity in general. Because my country holds a great stake in my identity. It is not prejudice for me to love my country So AJ what would you say to this group? Stand up.

Student5, “I think that there is some fundamental, a moral obligation that comes from a communitarian responsibility to people in groups that form their identity. there are a lot of things about our government, right now, that America values a free society where we can object to certain things And, I go back to the parent example, even at Harvard, I think, I owe more to my roommates because they make up my identity, than I do it to the Harvard community as a whole.”

But it makes up part of our identity. Okay, who would like to take that on? Mike?

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Student6, “Yeah about the obligation to the others simply by virtue of being in their, being influenced by them. Then I would have been a citizen of Nazi Germany. I would have to feel obligated towards Germany because I had benefited from actions of Nazis. I mean I guess my response to that would be you have hundreds of thousands of protesters in the United States right now who hold up signs that say, „Peace is patriotic.‟ I personally do and I would say that they are strongly objecting to basically everything the Bush administration is doing right now but they still consider themselves loving their country And I tend to agree with that as a patriotic movement. Where is the obligation there? Rina？Yeah not to bring this back to John Locke, but I would like to bring this back to John Locke. So, I mean in his conception of, when people join society, you do have a means of exit even though he still provides that option. If we want to say that your obligation to society is a moral one, that means that prior to knowing exactly what that society is going to be like or what your position is going to be in that society, that means that you have a binding obligation to a complete unknown body that could be, completely foreign to all of your personal beliefs or what you would hold to be correct. Do you think that that kind of communal obligation or patriotism means writing the community a blank moral check? Basically, yeah. that you acquire some type of obligation based on reciprocity but to say that you have a moral obligation I think requires a stronger justification.”

Who else? Anyone else who would like to address that? I guess we could say you could argue that you are morally obliged to society by the fact that there is that reciprocity. this is why we could say that we owe something to society, that we are members of the society itself that we owe at anything. Gives us protection, safety, security, then we owe the society something but nothing beyond what we give the society. Who want to take that on? Raul？I think we only give it a blank moral check when we abdicate our sense of civic responsibility and when we say that the debate
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does matter because patriotism is a vice. I think that patriotism is important because it gives us a sense of community, a sense of common civic virtue that we can engage in the issues. And I think because out of that love of county, you can debate with other people and have respect for their views but still engage them in debate.

If you just say that, patriotism is a vice, you drop out of that debate cede the ground to people who are more fundamentalist, who have a stronger view and who may coerce the community. Instead we should engage the other members of the community on that same moral ground. Now this, what we hear from AJ and Raul. Whereas what we hear from Ike and the critics of patriotism here is the worry that to take patriotic obligation in a communal way, seriously, AJ and Raul, that may happen to be embodied in our community or not as the case may be. And if not then we can reject its course. Go ahead Julia. Yeah I think that patriotism you need to define what that is. It sounds like, you would normally think that we are given a more weak definition here of patriotism amongst us but almost sounds like your definition is merely to have some sort civic involvement in debating within your society. and I think that that kind of undermines maybe some of the moral worth of patriotism as a virtue as well. I think if you can consent to a stronger form of patriotism if you want what we really need to sharpen the issue is an example from the defenders of communitarianism of a case where loyalty can actually compete with and possibly outweight universal principles of justice. Or, any among you who would like to defend obligations of membership or solidarity independent of ones that happened to embody just principles. Who has an example of a kind of loyalty that can and should compete with universal moral claim respect for persons? Go ahead.

Student7, “Yeah, if I were working on an „economics‟ problem set, for example and I saw that my roommate was cheating, that might be a bad thing for him to do because of my obligation to him. Slipping out by saying he‟s invoking, in the name of
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community, some universal principles of justice.”

What's your name? Stay there. What's your name?

Student7, “Dan.”

But a truer test. How many agree with Dan? So loyalty... Dan loyalty has its part, if that's it. How many disagree with Dan? Peggy. You're saying well that's a matter of choice, but what's the right thing to do? Most people put up their hands saying Dan would be right to stand by his roommate and not turn him in. Yes, go ahead. Also I think as a roommate you have insider information and that might not be something you want to use. That might be something unfair to hold against. You're spending that much time with the roommate, obviously you're going to learn things about him and I don't think it's fair to reveal that to a greater community. But it's loyalty, Vojtech. You agree with Dan that loyalty is the ethic at stake here? Absolutely. You don't have a duty to tell the truth,to report someone who cheated? Not if you've been advantage into getting that kind of information.

Before our critics of patriotism leave, I want to give you another version, a more public example of what, I guess we should call it Dan's dilemma. Dan's dilemma of loyalty and I want to get the reaction of people to this. This came up a few years ago in Massachusetts. Does anyone know who this man is? Billy Bulger that's right. Who is Billy Bulger? He was president of the Massachusetts State Senate for many years. One of the most powerful politicians in Massachusetts and then he became president of the University of Massachusetts. Now Billy Bulger, did you hear the story about him that bears on Dan's dilemma? Billy Bulger has a brother named Whitey Bulger and this is Whitey Bulger. His brother Whitey is on the FBI's most wanted list alleged to be a notorious gang leader in Boston, responsible for many murders and now a
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fugitive from justice. But when the US attorney... They called Billy Bulger, then the president of the University of Massachusetts, before the grand jury and wanted information on the whereabouts of his brother, this fugitive, and he refused to give it. US attorney said, "Just to be clear Mr. Bulger, you feel more loyalty to your brother than to the people of the commonwealth of Massachusetts?" And here's what Billy Bulger said, "I never thought of it that way but I do have a loyalty to my brother, I care about him. I hope that I'm never helpful to anyone against him. I don't have an obligation to help anyone catch my brother."

Dan you would agree. How many would agree with the position of Billy Bulger? Let me give one other example and then we'll let the critics reply, the critics of loyalty as we'll describe it. Here's an even more fateful example from a figure in American history, Robert E. Lee. Lee. Now Robert E. Lee on the eve of the civil war, was an officer of the Union Army. He opposed secession, in fact,regarded as treason. When war loomed, Lincoln offered Lee to be the commanding general of the Union Army, and Lee refused. And he described in a letter to his sons why he refused. I have not been able to make up my mind to raise my hand against my relatives, my children, my home. By which he meant Virginia. “If the union is dissolved I shall return to my native state and share the miseries of my people. Now here's a real test, Dan, for your principle of loyalty. Because here is the cause of the war against, not only to save the union but against slavery. And Lee is going to fight for Virginia secede. Now the communitarian would say there is something admirable in that. Whether or not the decision was ultimately right, there's something admirable. And the communitarian would say we can't even make sense, Rina, we can't make sense of Lee's dilemma as a moral dilemma unless we acknowledge that the claim of loyalty arising from his sense of narrative of who he is tug.

All right, who would like to respond to Dan's loyalty, to Billy Bulger's loyalty or to
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Robert E. Lee's loyalty to Virginia? What do you say Julia? Okay, well I think that these are some classic examples of multiple spheres of influence. And that you have conflicting communities that your family and your country. I think that's one reason why the idea of choice in your obligation is so important because how else can you resolve this? If you're morally obligated and there's no way out of this need for loyalty to the both communities, you're trapped, there's nothing you can do. You have to make a choice. And I think that being able to choose based on other characteristics, than merely the arbitrary fact that you're a member of this community is important, otherwise it's left to, I guess, randomness. Well, Julia, the issue isn't whether Dan makes a choice, or Billy Bulger or Robert E. Lee, of course they make a choice. The question is on what grounds, on what principle should they choose? The communitarian doesn't deny that there is choice to be made. The question is which choice, on what grounds and should loyalty, as such, wait... Andre now you want to, all right, go ahead. What do you say?

Student8, “Well one of the things we've noticed in the three examples is that the people of all chosen the most immediate community of which they're a part. The more local one.”

And I think there's something to be said for that. It's not just random. I mean, there doesn't seem to be a conflict because they know which one is more important. And it's their family over the Ec10 Class. Their state over their country, and their family over the Commonwealth on Massachusetts. So I think that's the answer to which is more important. Do you think that the local, the more particular, is always the weightier morally, Andre?

Student8, “Well I mean there's seems to be a trend in the three cases.”

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I would agree with that. And I think most of us would agree that precedence over the United States perhaps. Which is why you go with Dan? Loyalty to the roommate over Ec10 and the truth?

Student7, “Yeah, exactly. I would because it... I mean truth telling, not the truth of Ec10. Yes.”

Alright, so we understand. Yes. But on the same example in terms of family, you had cases in the civil war where brother was pitted against brother on both sides of the war, where they chose country instead of family. So I think the exact same, more shows, that different people have different means of making these choices and that there is no one set of values, or one set of morality that communitarians can stick to. And personally, I think that's the biggest problem with communitarians, that we don't have one set of standard moral obligations. And tell me your name.

Student9, “Samantha.”

So Samantha, you agree with Patrick. Patrick's point the other day that there may be... If we allow obligations to be defined by community, identification or membership, they may conflict, they may overlap, they may compete. And there is no clear principle. Andre says here's a clear principle, the most particular. The other day, Nichola who was sitting over here, where's Nichola? Said that most universal. You're saying, Samantha, the scale of the community as such can't be the decisive moral factor. So there has to be some other moral judgment. All right, let's first... Let's let our defe... our critics of communal patriotism, let's express our appreciation and thank them for their having stood up and responded to these arguments. Let's turn to the implications for justice of the positions that we've heard discussed here. One of the worries underlying these multiple objections to the idea of loyalty or membership as
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having independent moral weight is that it seems to argue that there is no way of finding principles of justice that are detached from conceptions of the good life as they may be lived in any particular community.

Supposed the communitarian argument is right. Suppose the priority of the right over the good can't be sustained. Suppose instead, that justice and rights unavoidably are bound up with conceptions of the good. Does that mean that justice is simply a creature of convention, of the values that happen to prevail in any given community at any given time? One of the writings we have among the communitarian critics is by Michael Walzer. He draws the implications of justice this way. “Justice is relative to social meanings. A given society is just if its substantive life is lived in a certain way, in a way that is faithful to the shared understandings of the members. bear out the worry that if we can't find independent principles of justice, independent that is, from conceptions of the good that prevail in any given community, that we're simply left with justice being a matter of fidelity or faithfulness to the shared understandings or values or conventions that prevail in any given society at any given time. But is that an adequate way of thinking about justice? Well, let's take a look at a short clip from the documentary "Eyes on the Prize." It goes back in the 1950s in the south. Here are some situated American Southerners who believed in the tradition and the shared understandings of segregation. Listen to the arguments they make about loyalty and tradition And see if they don't make you uneasy about tying arguments about justice to the shared understandings or traditions that prevail in any given society at the moment.

Let's run the clip. 'This land is composed of two different appearances. A white culture and a colored culture. And I've lived close to them all my life. But I'm told now that we've mistreated them and that we must change. And these changes are coming faster than I expected. And I'm required to make decisions on the basis of a
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new way of thinking and it's difficult. It's difficult for me, it's difficult for all southerners.' Well there you have it, narrative selves, situated selves invoking tradition. Doesn't that show us that justice can't be tied to the shared understandings of goods that prevail in any given community at any given time? Or is there a way of rescuing that claim from this example? Think about that question and we'll return to it next time.

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Lecture 23 Debating Same-Sex Marriage

We ended last time talking about the narrative conception of the self. We were testing the narrative conception of the self and the idea of obligations of solidarity or membership that did not flow from consent, that claimed us for reasons unrelated to a contract or an agreement or a choice we may have made. And we were debating among ourselves whether there are any obligations of this kind or whether all apparent obligations of solidarity and membership can be translated into consent or reciprocity or universal duty that we owe persons qua persons.

And then there were those who defended the idea of loyalty and of patriotism. So the idea of loyalty and of solidarity and of membership gathered a certain kind of intuitive moral force in our discussion. And then, as we concluded, we considered what seems to be a pretty powerful counter example to that idea. Namely, the film of those southern segregationists in the 1950s. And they talked all about their traditions, their history, and the way in which their identities were bound up with their life history. Do you remember that? And what flowed from that history, from that narrative sense of identity for those southern segregationists? They said we have to defend our way of life. Is this a fatal or a decisive objection to the idea of the narrative conception of the self? What I would like to do today is to advance an argument and see what you make of it.

And let me tell you what that argument is. I would like to defend the narrative conception of the person as against the voluntarist conception. I would like to defend the idea that there are obligations of solidarity or membership. Then, I want to suggest that there being such obligations lends force to the idea, when we turn to justice, that arguments about cannot be detached after all, from questions of the good. But I wanted to distinguish two different ways in which justice might be tied to the good
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and argue for one of them.

Now, the voluntarist conception of the person of Kant and Rawls we saw was powerful and liberating. A further appeal is its universal aspiration. The idea of treating persons as persons without prejudice, without discrimination, okay, maybe there are obligations of membership but they are always subordinate. They must always be subordinate to the duties that we have to human beings as such, the universal duties.

But is that right? If our encompassing loyalty should always take precedence over more particular ones, then the distinction between friends and strangers should ideally be overcome. A special concern for the welfare of friends would be a kind of prejudice, a measure of our distance from universal human concern But if you look closely at that idea, what kind of a moral universe, what kind of moral imagination, would that lead you to? The enlightenment flows from Montesquieu gives perhaps the most powerful, and I think, the ultimately, the most honest account of where this relentless universalizing tendency leads the moral imagination. He said, "A truly virtuous man would come to the aid of the most distant stranger as quickly as to his own friend." And then he adds, listen to this, "If men were perfectly virtuous, they wouldn't have friends." in which persons were so virtuous that they had no friends, only a universal disposition to friendliness.

Would be difficult to bring about, that it's unrealistic. The deeper problem is that such a world would be difficult to recognize as a human world. The love of humanity is a noble sentiment but most of the time we live our lives by smaller solidarities. This may reflect certain limits to the bounds of moral sympathy, but more important, it reflects the fact that we learn to love humanity, not in general, but through its particular expressions.
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So these are some considerations. But considerations, of the kinds that we've been discussing and arguing about all along. One way of assessing whether this picture of the person and of obligation is right, is to see what its consequences are for justice. And here is where is confronts a serious problem, and here we go back to our southern segregationists. They felt the weight of history. Do we admire their character, these segregationists, who wanted to preserve their way of life? Are we committed to saying, if we accept the idea of solidarity and membership, are we committed to saying that justice is tied to good in the sense that justice means whatever a particular community or tradition says it means, including those southern segregationists.

In which justice can be tied to the good. One is a relativist way. To think about rights, to think about justice, look to the values that happened to prevail in any given community at any given time. But instead conceive justice as a matter of being faithful to the shared understandings of a particular tradition. The problem is that it makes justice wholly conventional. A product of circumstance, and this deprives justice of its critical character.

But there is a second way in which justice can be tied with or bound up with the good. On a second non-relativist way of linking justice with conceptions of the good, principles of justice depend for their justification not on the values that happened to prevail at any given moment in a certain place, but instead on the moral worth or the intrinsic good of the ends rights serve. On this non-relativist view the case for recognizing a right depends on showing that it honors or advances some important human good. The second way of tying justice to the good is not strictly speaking, communitarian, if by communitarian you mean, just giving over to a particular community the definition of justice.

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Now, what I would like to suggest that of these two different ways of linking justice to the good, the first is insufficient. Because the first leaves justice the creature of convention. It doesn't give us enough moral resources to respond to those southern segregationists who invoke their way of life, their traditions, and their way of doing things. But if justice is bound up with the good in a non-relativist way, there is a big challenge, a big question to answer. How can we reason about the good?

What about the fact that people hold different conceptions of the good? Different ideas about the purposes of key social institutions. Different ideas about what social goods and human goods are worthy of honor and recognition. We live in a pluralist society, people disagree about the good. So is there a way to reason about the good? Before addressing that question, I want to address a slightly easier question. Is it necessary, is it unavoidable, when arguing about justice， to argue about the good? It's necessary.

So for the remainder of today, I want to take up... I want to try to advance that claim, that reasoning about the good, about purposes, and ends, is an unavoidable feature of arguing about justice, Let me see if I can establish that. Now, same sex marriage draws on, implicates, deeply contested and controversial ideas, morally and religiously. To embrace a conception of justice or of rights on those hotly contested moral and religious questions. About the moral permissibility of homosexuality. About the proper ends of marriage as a social institution. To sort out those moral and religious disputes that would be very attractive. So what I would like to do now is to see, using the same sex marriage case, about the moral permissibility of homosexuality and about the purpose, the end of marriage, detach those questions from the question of whether the state should recognize same sex marriage or not. So let's begin.
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I would like to begin by hearing the arguments of those who believe that there should be no same sex marriage but that the state should only recognize marriage between a man and a woman. Do I have volunteers? I had two. There were two people I asked, people who had voiced their views already on the justice blog. Mark Loff and Ryan McCaffrey where are you? Okay, Mark. And where is Ryan?

Mark: “I have sort of a theological understanding of the purpose of sex and the purpose of marriage. And I think that for people like myself, who are a Christian and also a Catholic, the purpose of sex is, one, for its procreative uses, and two, for a unifying purpose between a man and a woman within the institution of marriage.”

You have a certain conception of the purpose or the telos...-

Mark: “Yeah. ...of human sexuality, which is bound up with procreation.”

Right. As well as union. - Yeah. And the essence of marriage, the purpose of marriage as a social institution is to give expression to that telos and to honor that purpose, namely, the procreative purpose of marriage. Is that a fair summary of your view?

Mark: “Yeah.”

Where is Ryan? Go ahead.

Ryan: “Yes, I agree. I think that the ideal of marriage involves procreation. All right, so the government should not encourage homosexual behavior by conferring the recognition of marriage. Yeah, it would be wrong to outlaw it but encouraging it is not necessary.”
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Who has a reply? Yes. Hannah？

Hannah: “I just like to ask a question to Mark. You did not have sex with her before marriage, and then when you became married it became evident that do you think that it should illegal for you to engage in sex if children will not result from that act? So like a woman, say... I think older couples can get married, because I think that sex has these... It has purposes beyond procreation. I hate to be uncouth but have you ever engaged in masturbation?”

Right, make your... Make that point as a general argument rather than, Rather than as an interrogative.

Hannah: “Okay.”

But make the point.

Mark: “Alright. Well, biblically...”

Put it in the third person.

Mark: “Yeah, okay.”

Rather than... rather than in a second person. Make the argument.

Mark: “Okay. Biblically, masturbation or onanism, is not permissible or reinforce the marriage bond. - Right. That masturbation is permissible, if masturbation, obviously,
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is not going to create a child? Where they say this is what we hold as a virtue. Yes, every day we fall short and people fall short in so many different other ways, but I think that if you personally fall short, and some morals fear, as we all do.”

All right, I want you, to stay there. I want to bring in some other voices and we'll continue. Stay there if you would. Go ahead.

Steve: “I think that the response to the masturbation.”

Wait, tell us your name.

Steve: “My name's Steve.”

Steve, go ahead.

Steve: “The response to the masturbation issue is, if masturbation is something that you do.”

Well, all right, Hannah. Alright, Steve has drawn... Alright, that's a good argument. Steve has drawn our attention to the fact that there are two issues here. One of them is the moral permissibility of various practices. The other is the fit between certain practices, whatever their moral permissibility, with the honor or recognition that the state should accord in allowing marriage. So Steve has a pretty good counter argument. What do you say to Steve?

Hannah: “Is something that is inherent in, I believe, most people homosexuals are people too. If you want to marry yourself, as if legislators, what the law should be. Does that mean as a legislator you would vote for a law of marriage that would be so
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broad that it would let people marry themselves? Beyond the pale of anything that would really happen but I don't think that- - But in principle.”

Yeah, in principle?

Hannah: “Yes. Yeah, sure, I mean if Steve wants to marry himself I'm not going to stop him. And you would confer state recognition on that solo marriage? Sure. What about consensual polygamous marriages? I actually think that if the male and the female, or that if the wives and the man, of the husbands and the wife are consenting, it should be permissible.”

Who else? I know there are a lot of people who... Yes, okay, down here. Stand up and tell us your name.

Victoria: “Victoria.”

Victoria: “Whereas, the theological, and the point to marriage could be completely different. The theological reasoning for Catholicism on everyone in the state. Which is what my problem is with not allowing same sex marriage. But civil union is not marriage within the Catholic Church. And the state has a right to recognize a civil union between whoever it wants, but does not have a right to impose the beliefs of a certain minority or majority of whoever it is based on religion within our state.”

Alright, Victoria, good. A question. Do you think the state should recognize same sex marriage or just same sex civil unions as something short of marriage?

Victoria: “Because that is not their place. But whereas civil union, I see civil union as essentially the same thing except not under a religion and that state has a right to
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recognize a civil union. Decide the question of what the telos of marriage is.”

Who else?

Cezanne: “The state should recognize marriages at all. That the state should not recognize any marriages because I believe it is a union between male and a female or two males or two females. And some might say that, if the state recognizes these marriages, it will help children, it will have a binding effect.”

Alright, tell us your name.

Cezanne: “Cezanne.”

Differ from earlier parts of the conversation. They say of honoring or recognizing or affirming any particular telos, or purpose of marriage, or of human sexuality. And Cezanne is among those who say; therefore, maybe the state should get out of the business of recognizing marriage at all. No state recognition of any kind of marriage is it possible to choose between... to decide the question of same sex marriage without taking a stand on the moral and religious controversy over the proper telos of marriage. Thank you very much to all of you who have participated. We’ll pick this up next time. You did a great job.

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Lecture 24 The Good Life

We have two remaining questions to answer. First, is it necessary; is it unavoidable to take up questions of the good life in thinking about justice? Yes. And is it possible to reason about justice? Yes, I think so. Let me try to develop those answers to those two questions.

Now, as a way of addressing those questions, we began last time to discuss the question of same sex marriage. And we heard from those who argued against same sex marriage on the grounds that the purpose, or telos, or marriage is at least in part, procreation, the bearing and raising of children.

And then there were those who defended same sex marriage and they contested that account of the purpose, or telos, of marriage that couples be able or willing to procreate. We allow infertile couples to marry. This was Hannah's point in the exchange with Mark. Then there was another position expressed at the end our discussion by Victoria, who argued we shouldn't try to decide this question. We shouldn't, at least at the level of the state, at the level of law, try to come to any agreement on those questions about the good because we live in a pluralist society where people had different moral and religious convictions. And so we should try to make law in the framework of rights, neutral with respect to these competing moral and religious views. Now, it's interesting that others, some others, who favor the idea of neutrality argued, not in favor of restricting marriage to a man and a woman, nor in favor of permitting same sex marriage, they argued in the name of neutrality, for a third possibility. Which is that government getting out of the business of recognizing any kind of marriage? That was the third possibility. Now, Andrea Mayrose had an interesting contribution to this debate. She had a rejoinder to people who argue for neutrality.
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Where is Andrea? Alright, Andrea, would you be willing... Share with us the view. If we can get you a microphone. Share with us your view. Why do you think that it's a mistake for the state to try to be neutral moral and even religious questions like same sex marriage?

Andrea: “I don't know that it is possible because people's lives are completely embedded in how they view the world. And maybe I just agree with Aristotle that the role of the government is helping people live in a sort of... Having a collective understanding what is wrong and what is right. Is it possible, and one could ask the same question of abortion, that we've been asking of same sex marriage. Do you think it's possible to decide whether abortion should be permitted or prohibited without taking a stand or making a judgment about the moral permissibility of abortion? No, I don't think it is and I think that's why it's such a controversy because people are so deeply committed to, their fundamental beliefs about whether a fetus is a life or if it isn't. If I believe that, a fetus is a living being and has rights and has fundamentally the right to live, then it's very hard for me to say, "But I can put that aside and let you do what you want," because that's like me saying, "well, despite my beliefs, I'm going to let you commit what to me is murder." So, I mean, that's just one... Alright, and the analogy in the same sex marriage case is,”

You said, you're a defender of same sex marriage.

Andrea: “Yes.”

But you only came to that view once you were persuaded on the underlying moral question.

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Andrea: “Right, well, I think particularly, in the US so many people's beliefs are driven by their religious beliefs and like Mark the other day, I'm a Christian, I'm Catholic, and I had to decide for myself on a lot of thought, a lot of prayer, a lot of conversations with other people that I disagreed with the Catholic standpoint that homosexuality itself isn't a sin. And once I came to that, sort of conclusion, in my personal relationship with god, I mean, that's sounds hokey, right? That's like, oh, religious! But a lot of people are religious and that's where they draw their beliefs and their views from. That's when I could say, yeah, I'm down with the state saying, "Go same sex marriage!" because I'm okay with that and I think that's morally okay.”

Good, thank you. Now, who would like to reply? If you can, perhaps, hang on there for a moment. Who would like to reply to Andrea's idea that in order to decide the question of same sex marriage, it's necessary to sort out the question about the moral status of homosexuality and figuring out the purpose, the telos, the proper end, of marriage. Who disagrees with Andrea on that point?

Daniel: “Yes. Well, I think you absolutely can separate your moral opinion and what you think the law should be. For example, I think abortion is unequivocally morally wrong. But I do not believe that illegalizing abortion makes it go away. I don't believe illegalizing abortion stops it. pro choice and I do believe the woman should have the choice as it gives it more safety just as, maybe, morally, I don't want to get married to a man, but I'm not going try to, impede someone else's freedom to do what they wish to do in terms of the law.”

Andrea? Whether the law makes something legal or illegal, it's implicitly approving or disapproving something. So if you say, by making abortion legal, we're saying it's okay. As a society, collectively, we're saying it's okay with us in our society to abort a fetus. If we make it illegal, then we're saying collectively as a society it's not okay,
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and that's why societies have different beliefs.

Tell us your name before you...

Daniel: “My name is Daniel.”

Daniel, what do you say? Are we saying collectively that it's okay? Or are we saying that collectively we don't want women who are going to have an aboration anyway to go to clinics in the side alleys and have unsafe conditions? Alright, bring it to the same sex marriage case. Why don't you have to decide that which position you're in favor of same sex marriage, Daniel, being legally permitted?

Daniel: “I think it absolutely should be legally permitted because it's not something telling me that I need to have... I need to marry a man. I absolutely don't, I don't see, if two men are consenting adults and want to get married, and I don't see how I could even object to that. Alright, there's no harm. There's no harm done. There's no harm done either way, even if it is morally wrong according to me.”

Alright, let me turn to the way the Massachusetts court, who made this landmark ruling in the same sex marriage case, grappled with the very issue that Andrea and Dan had been discussing here. Thanks to both of you very much. What did the court say? This was in the Goodridge case which required the state of Massachusetts to extend marriage to same sex couples. The court started out, well, the court was conflicted. If you read that opinion carefully, the court was conflicted as between the two positions we've just been hearing, defended by Andrea and by Dan. The court begins, and this is Chief Justice Margaret Marshall's opinion, it begins with an attempt at liberal neutrality. Many people hold deep-seated religious, moral and ethical convictions that marriage should be limited to the union of one man and one woman,
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and that homosexual conduct is immoral. Many hold equally strong religious, moral, and ethical convictions that same sex couples are entitled to be married, that homosexual persons should be treated no differently than their heterosexual neighbors.

This is the court. Neither view answers the question before us. What is at stake is "respect for individual autonomy and equality under law." At stake is an individual freely choosing the person with whom to share an exclusive commitment. In other words, the issue is not the moral worth of the choice but the right of the individual to make it. So this is the liberal neutral strand in the court opinion, voluntarist strand, the one that emphasizes autonomy, choice, and consent. But the court seemed to realize that the liberal case, the neutral case, for recognizing same sex marriage doesn't succeed, doesn't get you all the way to that position, because if it were only a matter of respect for individual autonomy, if government were truly neutral on the moral worth of voluntary intimate relationships, then it should adopt a different policy. Which is to remove government and the state all together from according recognition to certain associations, certain kinds of unions, rather than others. If government really must be neutral, then the consistent position is what we here have been describing as the third position, the one defended in the article by Michael Kinsley, who argues for the abolition of marriage, at least as a state function. Perhaps a better term for this is the disestablishment of religion. This is Kinsley's proposal. He points out that the reason for the opposition to same sex marriage is that it would go beyond neutral toleration stamp of approval. That's at the heart of the dispute.

In Aristotle's terms, at issue here is the proper distribution of offices and honors, a matter of social recognition. Same sex marriage can't be justified on the basis of liberal neutrality or non-discrimination or autonomy rights alone because the question at stake in the public debate is whether same sex unions have moral worth, whether
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they're worthy of honor and recognition, and whether they fit the purpose of the social institution of marriage. So Kinsley says, you want to be neutral? Then, let churches and other religious institutions offer marriage ceremonies. Let department stores and casinos get into the act if they want to. This is Kinsley. Let couples celebrate their union in any way they choose and consider themselves married whenever they want. And if three people want to get married, or if one person wants to marry himself or herself, and someone else wants to conduct a ceremony for them and declare them married, let them. If you and your government aren't implicated, what do you care? This is Kinsley. But this is not the position that the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts wanted. They didn't call for the abolition or for the disestablishment of marriage. The court did not question government's role in conferring social recognition on some intimate associations rather than others. To the contrary, waxes eloquent about marriage as, "one of our community's most rewarding and cherished institutions." And then it goes on to expand the definition of marriage to include partners of the same sex.

And in doing so it acknowledges that marriage is more than a matter of tolerating choices that individuals make. It's also a matter of social recognition and honor. As Justice Marshall wrote. In a real sense there are three partners to every civil marriage: two willing spouses and an approving state. Marriage is at once a deeply personal cimmitment, but also a highly public celebration of the ideals of mutuality, companionship, intimacy, fidelity, and family. This is the court. Now, this is reaching well beyond liberal neutrality. This is celebrating and affirming marriage as an honorific, as a form of public recognition. And, therefore, the court found that it couldn't avoid the debate about the telos of marriage. Justice Marshall's opinion considers and rejects the notion that the primary purpose of marriage is procreation. She points out that there is no requirement that applicants for marriage license, who are heterosexuals, conceive children. Fertility is not a condition of marriage. People
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who cannot stir from their deathbed, they marry. So she advances all kinds of arguments, along the lines that we began last time, about the proper and the essential nature, the telos of marriage, is. And she concludes, not procreation but the exclusive and permanent commitment of the partners to one another is the essential point and purpose of marriage.

Now, nothing I've said about this court opinion is an argument for or against same sex marriage. But it is an argument against the claim that you can favor or oppose same sex marriage while remaining neutral on the underlying moral and religious questions. So all of this is to suggest that at least in some of the hotly contested debates about justice and rights that we have in our society, the attempt to be neutral, the attempt to say, it's just a matter of consent and choice and autonomy, we take no stand. That doesn't succeed. Even the court, which wants to be neutral on these moral and religious disputes, finds that it can't.

What then about our second question? If reasoning about the good is unavoidable in debates about justice and rights, is it possible if reasoning about the good means that you must have a single principle or rule or maxim or criterion for the good life that you simply plug in every time you have a disagreement about morality, then the answer is, no. But having a single principle or rule is not the only way, not the best way of reasoning either about the good life or about justice. Think back, think back to the arguments that we've been having here about justice and about rights and sometimes about the good life. How have those arguments proceeded? They've proceeded very much in the way that Aristotle suggests moving back and forth between our judgments about particulars, particular cases, events, stories, questions, back and forth between our judgments about particular cases and more general principles that make sense of our reasons for the positions we take on the particular cases. This dialectical way of doing moral reasoning goes back to the ancients, to
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Plato and Aristotle, but it doesn't stop with them, because there is a version of Socratic or dialectical moral reasoning that is defended with great clarity and force by John Rawls in giving an account of his method of justifying a theory of justice.

You remember it's not only the veil of ignorance and the principles that Rawls argues for. It's also a method of moral reasoning, reasoning about justice that he calls reflective equilibrium. What is the method of reflective equilibrium? It's moving back and forth between our considered judgments about particular cases and the general principles we would articulate to make sense of those judgments. And not just stopping there, because we might be wrong in our initial intuitions. Not stopping there but then sometimes revising our particular judgments in the light of the principles once we work them out. So sometimes we revise the principles, sometimes we revise our judgments and intuitions in the particular cases. The general point is this, and here I quote Rawls. A conception of justice can't be deduced from self evident premises. Its justification is a matter of the mutual support of many considerations, of everything fitting together into one coherent view. And later in the theory of justice, he writes, moral philosophy is Socratic. We may want to change our present considered judgments once their regulative principles are brought to light. Well, if Rawls accepts that idea and advances that notion of reflective equilibrium, the question we're left with is, he applies that to questions of justice, not to questions of morality and the good life. And that's why he remains committed to the priority of the right over the good.

He thinks the method of reflective equilibrium can generate shared judgments about justice in the right but he doesn't think they can generate shared judgments about the good life, about what he calls comprehensive moral and religious question. And the reason he thinks that is that he says that in modern societies there is a fact or reasonable pluralism about the good. Even conscientious people who reason well, will
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find that they disagree about questions of the good life, about morality and religion. And Rawls is likely right about that. He's not talking about the fact of disagreement in pluralist societies. He's also suggesting that there may be persisting disagreements about the good life and about moral and religious questions. But if that's true, then is he warranted in his further claim that the same can't be said about justice? Isn't it also true, not only that we, as a matter of fact, disagree about justice in pluralist societies, but that at least some of those disagreements are reasonable disagreements? In the same way, some people favor a libertarian theory of justice, others are more egalitarian theory of justice and they argue. And there is pluralism in our society as between free market laissez faire, libertarian theories of justice and more egalitarian ones. Is there any difference in principle between the kind of moral reasoning and the kind of disagreements that arise when we debate about justice and the meaning of free speech and the nature of religious liberty?

Look at the debates we have over appointees to the Supreme Court. These are all disagreements about justice and rights. Is there any difference between the fact of reasonable pluralism in the case of justice and rights and in the case of morality and religion? In principle I don't think that there is. In both cases what we do when we disagree is interlocutor, as we've been doing here for an entire semester. We consider the arguments that are provoked by particular cases. We try to develop the reasons that lead us to go one way rather than another. And then we listen to the reasons of other people. And sometimes we're persuaded to revise our view. Other times we're challenged at least to shore up and strengthen our view. But this is how moral argument proceeds, with justice, and so it seems to me, also with questions of the good life.

Now, there remains a further worry and it's a liberal worry, what about if we are going to think of our disagreements about morality and religion as bound up with our
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disagreements about justice, how are we ever going to find our way to a society that accords respect to fellow citizens with whom we disagree? It depends I think on which conception of respect one accepts. On the liberal conception, to respect our fellow citizens' moral and religious convictions, is, so to speak, to ignore them, for political purposes. To rise above or to abstract from or to set aside those moral and religious convictions. To leave them undisturbed, to carry on our political debate without reference to them.

But that isn't the only way, or perhaps even the most plausible way of understanding the mutual respect on which democratic life depends. There is a different conception of respect according to which we respect our fellow citizens' moral and religious convictions, not by ignoring, but by engaging them. By attending to them. Sometimes by challenging and contesting them. Sometimes by listening and learning from them. Now, there's no guarantee that a politics of moral and religious attention and engagement will lead in any given case to agreement. There is no guarantee it will lead even to appreciation for the moral and religious convictions of others. It's always possible, after all, that learning more about a religious or a moral doctrine will lead us to like it less. But the respect of deliberation and engagement seems to me a more adequate, more suitable ideal for a pluralist society. And to the extent that our moral and religious disagreements reflect some ultimate plurality of human goods. A politics of moral engagement will better enable us, so it seems to me, to appreciate the distinctive goods our different lives expressed.

When we first came together some 13 weeks ago, I spoke of the exhilaration of political philosophy and also of its dangers. About how philosophy works and has always worked by estranging us from the familiar by unsettling our settled assumptions. And I tried to warn you that once the familiar turns strange, once we begin to reflect on our circumstance, it's never quite the same again. I hope you have
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by now experienced at least a little of this unease because this is the tension that animates critical reflection and political improvement and maybe even the moral life as well. And so our argument comes to an end, in a sense, but in another sense goes on. Why, we asked at the outset, why did these arguments keep going even if they raise questions that are impossible ever, finally, to resolve?

The reason is that we live some answer to these questions all the time. In our public life, and in our personal lives, philosophy is inescapable even if it sometimes seems impossible. We began with the thought of Kant, that skepticism is a resting place for human reason. Where it can reflect upon its dogmatic wanderings, but it is no dwelling place for permanent settlement. To allow ourselves simply to acquiescence in skepticism or in complacence, Kant wrote, can never suffice to overcome the restlessness of reason. The aim of this course has been to awaken the restlessness of reason and to see where it might lead. And if we had done at least that, and if the restlessness continues to afflict you in the days and years to come, then we together have achieved no small thing. Thank you.

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