Skinner v. Oklahoma

1. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942)
This case touches a sensitive and important area of human rights. Oklahoma deprives certain individuals of a right that is basic to the perpetuation of a race-the right to have offspring. Oklahoma has decreed the enforcement of its law against petitioner, overruling his claim that it violated the Fourteenth Amendment. Because that decision raised grave and substantial constitutional questions, we granted the petition for certiorari. The statute involved is Oklahoma’s Habitual Criminal Sterilization Act.Petitioner was convicted in 1926 of the crime of stealing chickens and was sentenced to the Oklahoma State Reformatory. In 1929 hewas convicted of the crime of robbery with firearms and was sentenced to the reformatory. In 1934 he was convicted again of robbery with firearms and was sentenced to the penitentiary. He was confined there in 1935 when the Act was passed. In 1936 the Attorney General instituted proceedings against him. Petitioner in his answer challenged the Act as unconstitutional by reason of the Fourteenth Amendment. It is true that the Act has a broad severability clause. But we will not endeavor to determine whether its application would solve the equal protection difficulty. The Supreme Court of Oklahoma sustained the Act without reference to the severability clause. We have therefore a situation where the Act as construed and applied to petitioner is allowed to perpetuate the discrimination which we have found to be fatal. Whether the severability clause would be so applied as to remove this particular constitutional objection is a question which may be more appropriately left for adjudication by the Oklahoma court.That is reemphasized here by our uncertainty as to what excision, if any, would be made as a matter of Oklahoma law. It is by no means clear whether if an excision were made, this particular constitutional difficulty might be solved by enlarging on the one hand or contracting on the other the class of criminals who might be sterilized.

Held. No. Supreme Court of Oklahoma ruling reversed.
Justice William Douglas (J. Douglas) notes that sterilization of habitual offenders in no way guarantees that new offenders will not be born. Furthermore, there is no guarantee that habitual offenders would spawn offenders themselves.
J. Douglas cannot justify the distinction between larceny (involving moral turpitude) and embezzlement (not involving moral turpitude) in the eyes of the statute. This is clear discrimination in J. Douglas’s view. In terms of fines and imprisonment the crimes are identical to the State. Only when it comes to sterilization do the crimes differ. As such, equal protection is violated.
Concurrence. Chief Justice Harlan Stone (J. Stone) concurs in the judgment, but rests his decision on due process grounds, arguing that the invasion of personal liberty is too great.

Discussion. Skinner represents the Supreme Court of the United States’ growing awareness of the right to reproductive autonomy. Unlike later cases that focus on due process and a right to privacy, the majority in Skinner holds that sterilization in the present situation violates equal protection principles.

Litowitz v. Litowitz

Case Summary: * Facts—Mr. and Mrs. Litowitz married in 1982 at which time they already had one biological child together and two children from a prior marriage of Mrs. Litowitz. Mrs. Litowitz was unable to have further children because of a hysterectomy after the birth of her third child. In 1996, the couple consulted with the Center for Surrogate Parenting, Loma Linda University Gynecology and Obstetrics Medical Group to have another child by in vitro fertilization. Five pre-embryos were created from the combination of donor eggs and Mr. Litowitz’ sperm. Three of the pre-embryos were implanted in a surrogate mother and the remaining two pre-embryos were cryopreserved for possible future use. The Litowitz’ fourth child was born to the surrogate mother in 1997, but by then the Litowitz’ had already separated. In the marriage dissolution proceedings Mr. Litowitz asked the court to allow him to put the two frozen embryos up for adoption by another infertile couple, but Mrs. Litowitz asked the court to allow her to use another surrogate mother to bring the frozen pre-embryos to term as her own children. * Law—Basic contract law was applied to the facts to arrive at a decision. The relevant contract provision signed by Mr. and Mrs. Litowitz and the Loma Linda Clinic under the heading Legal Status and Dispositional Choices, stated “We agree that because both the husband and wife are participants in the cryopreservation program, that any decision regarding the disposition of our pre-embryos will be made by mutual consent. In the event we are unable to reach a mutual decision regarding the disposition of our pre-embryos, we must petition to a Court of competent jurisdiction for instructions concerning the appropriate disposition of our pre-embryos.” * Ruling—The Cryopreservation Agreement authorized the Loma Linda clinic to thaw out the pre-embryos and allow them to expire after five years. It had been more than five years since the agreement was signed so the pre-embryos should be allowed to expire.
- See more at: http://embryo.asu.edu/pages/litowitz-v-litowitz-brief-2002#sthash.5vLna0Gr.dpuf

Johnson v. Calvert

CASE SYNOPSIS
Appellant surrogate sought review of an order from Court of Appeal for the Fourth District, Division Three (California), which, under the Uniform Parentage Act, Cal Civ. Code §§ 7000-721 (repealed 1994), affirmed the trial court's ruling that respondents, genetic parents, were the natural parents of a child born as a result of a surrogacy contract.

CASE FACTS
Appellant surrogate entered into a contract with respondents, genetic parents, whereby she would gestate a zygote conceived of respondents genetic material. Respondents filed a declaratory judgment action seeking a determination that they were the natural parents of the child. The appellate court affirmed the trial court's holding that they were.
In Johnson, a married couple contracted with a surrogate mother to carry an embryo created by the sperm of the husband and the egg of the wife. The relationship between the surrogate mother and the couple deteriorated, and the couple filed a lawsuit seeking a declaration that they were the legal parents of the unborn child. The court found that because there was no question as to who was claiming the mother and child relationship, there was no need to resort to section 7611 which establishes a presumption of paternity based on the man’s conduct towardthe child, or his marriage or attempted marriage to the child’s mother. Finding that both women had presented acceptable proof of maternity, the court held that the wife who had intended to procreate the child was the natural mother under California law.

DISCUSSION * On further appeal, the court affirmed, holding that although the Uniform Parentage Act, Cal Civ. Code §§ 7000-721 (repealed 1994), recognized both genetic consanguinity and giving birth as means of establishing a mother and child relationship, when the two means did not coincide in one woman, she who intended to procreate the child and raise as her own, was the natural mother. * The court held that the surrogacy contract was not barred by public policy. * The court held that the determination that respondents were the natural parents of the child did not deprive appellant of her constitutional rights as appellant was not exercising her own right to make procreative choices. * Rather she agreed to provide a necessary and profoundly important service without any expectation that she would raise the child as her own.

CONCLUSION
The court affirmed the judgment that respondents, genetic parents, were the natural parents of a child gestated by appellant surrogate. Although the Uniform Parentage Act recognized both genetic consanguinity and giving birth as means of establishing a mother and child relationship, when the two means did not coincide in one woman, she who intended to procreate the child and raise as her own, was the natural mother.
- See more at: http://www.lawschoolcasebriefs.net/2013/11/johnson-v-calvert-case-brief.html#sthash.ziM9ouZL.dpuf

US v. Krizek

CASE SYNOPSIS
Plaintiff government filed suit against defendants, a doctor and his billing clerk, alleging false billing for Medicare and Medicaid patients in violation of the False Claims Act (Act), 31 U.S.C.S. §§ 3729-3731, and common law.

CASE FACTS
The government argued that the doctor and his billing clerk submitted bills coded for a service with a higher level of reimbursement than was provided by the doctor. The government also alleged that the doctor performed services that should not have been performed at all in that they were not medically necessary.

DISCUSSION * The court found that the doctor did submit claims when he did not provide patient services for the amount of time that was billed. * The court found that the doctor and his billing clerk acted with reckless disregard as to the truth or falsity of the submissions, and their conduct constituted a violation of the Act. * The court issued an injunction that enjoined the doctor and his billing clerk from participating in Medicare and Medicaid until they could show the court that they could abide by the relevant rules.

CONCLUSION
The court found the doctor and his billing clerk liable for submitting false claims for payment to the government.

The government alleged that Dr. Krizek billed for 45-50 minute psychotherapy sessions when, based on the time spent, he should have billed for 20-30 minute sessions. Because this alleged billing practice took place over a six year period and involved 8,000 claims, the potential liability for Dr. Krizek under the Federal Civil False Claims Act was in excess of 80 million dollars. Although the court eventually found that the alleged damages were unreasonable and submitted the case to a master for calculation of damages, this case is a good example of the lengths to which the government may be allowed to go under the statute, and the lengths to which the government may in fact go to force a plea.

Under the statutory definition of “knowing” conduct the Court is compelled to conclude that the defendants acted with reckless disregard as to the truth or falsity of the submissions. As such, they will be deemed to have violated the False Claims Act. - See more at: http://caselaw.findlaw.com/us-dc-circuit/1097064.html#sthash.b39YRz1f.dpuf

The question, therefore, is whether “reckless disregard” in this context is properly equated with willful misconduct or with aggravated gross negligence. In determining that gross negligence-plus was sufficient, the District Court cited legislative history equating reckless disregard with gross negligence. A sponsor of the 1986 amendments to the FCA stated,
Subsection 3 of Section 3729(c) uses the term “reckless disregard of the truth or falsity of the information” which is no different than and has the same meaning as a gross negligence standard that has been applied in other cases. While the Act was not intended to apply to mere negligence, it is intended to apply in situations that could be considered gross negligence where the submitted claims to the Government are prepared in such a sloppy or unsupervised fashion that resulted in overcharges to the Government. The Act is also intended not to permit artful defense counsel to require some form of intent as an essential ingredient of proof. This section is intended to reach the “ostrich-with-his-head-in-the-sand” problem where government contractors hide behind the fact they were not personally aware that such overcharges may have occurred. This is not a new standard but clarifies what has always been the standard of knowledge required.
- See more at: http://caselaw.findlaw.com/us-dc-circuit/1097064.html#sthash.9uFhINqL.dpuf

US v. McClatchey