Leadership in the 2nd Battalion, 29th Infantry Regiment, U.S. Army:
An Evaluation & Critique

by
RAB

April 2015

Table of Contents

Foreword …………………………………………………………………………….………….. 1

Introduction ………………………………………………………………….…….……………. 2

Organization & Objectives ………………………………….……………...…….………………3

Figure 1: 2/29th IN Organizational Structure …………………………………………….4

Theory of Leadership & Leadership Practices..………………………………….……….…….. 7

Figure 2: James Collins Level Five Leadership Model…………………………………..8

Effects of Leadership Practices on Organizational Culture ……………………….………….... 10

SWOT Analysis ………………………………………………………………………..…….… 11

Application of the Level Five Leadership Theory …………………………….…………….… 13 Conclusion ………………………………………………………………………………...…… 16

Figure 3: James Collins Level Five Leadership Model, applied………………………..17

NOTES …………………………………………………………………………………….. 18
Foreword
This leadership critique is an analysis of my own personal thoughts and impressions of a unit in the U.S. Army. While I was in the Army, I was a young company grade officer. I want to stress that this is one young officer’s opinion. When I cite a fact or research, I will source it. Otherwise, please take this as a young officer’s critique and analysis. In other words, this critique is intended as a spring board for a discussion; it is not a multi-page paper designed to be entered as evidence in a court. This evaluation is my attempt to reconcile how my particular unit could have seen improvement in both its command climate and in its mission attainment. It is not intended to be an indictment on the U.S. Army or the Infantry on a macro level.
Also, when I am referring to the Army as a whole, I will try to remain gender neutral as much as possible. When I refer to someone in a generic infantry unit or an actual infantry unit, for the sake of brevity, I will use masculine gender references. While the Army is currently undergoing a transition to open up combat units to women, at the time that I was in this unit, this was not the case. Therefore, please understand, my use of the masculine gender is not an instance of insensitivity to gender diversity; it is simply an effort to be accurate.

Introduction To have a proper perspective of the leadership atmosphere, challenges, and issues facing 2/29th Infantry Regiment, one must have an understanding of a few key terms. There exists a certain dichotomy in the U.S. Army. In the Army, there are two types of units—there are units that are deployable, and there are units that are not deployable. The units are referred to by the acronym associated with their respective property books. A deployable unit is referred to as Modified Table of Organization and Equipment (MTOE) unit, while a non-deployable unit is referred to as a Table of Distribution of Allowances (TDA) unit (see website). The MTOE unit performs a traditional function of an Army unit. Therefore, for the infantry, and MTOE unit is focused on preparing for a deployment, performing in the deployment, or recuperating from the deployment. To put it bluntly, the MTOE infantry unit’s primary focus is preparing to destroy our nation’s enemies. The TDA unit on the other hand, will focus year-round on performing a necessary function for the Army (e.g. training, school houses, or permanent staff operations in the Pentagon or some other non-deployable command).
For an infantry leader, whether a commissioned officer or a non-commissioned officer (NCO), it is my opinion that it is widely considered detrimental to one’s career if one spends too much time in a TDA unit. Even though a TDA unit performs a vital function form the Army, if one spends too much time in a TDA unit, it is perceived as combat or deployment avoidance.
That said, it is not difficult to understand, even if one has never worn a uniform, that the MTOE-TDA dichotomy can have an effect on which people are assigned to a TDA unit. From my own personal observation, there are essentially three types of people in a TDA unit:
Type A) the soldier that is assigned to the TDA unit for his or her specific expertise,
Type B) the soldier that came in kicking and screaming, and is eager to get back to the “real” mission of the Army , and
Type C) the soldier that is intentionally using the assignment to the TDA unit as a way of decreasing his or her operations tempo.
While there are frequently very legitimate reasons for the third reason, this division of rationales for assignment to the TDA unit affects not only who comes into the TDA units, but it can also affect leaders’ perceptions and impressions of soldiers’ motives for being there.
2nd Battalion, 29th Infantry Regiment
Organization and Objectives This particular infantry regiment, hereafter referred to as 2/29th IN (and locally referred to and much easier to read as “two-two-nine infantry”) is a non-deployable, TDA infantry unit. This is a critical piece of information, because it helps the reader understand the unit’s mission and source of people for the various positions in the organization. 2/29th IN’s structure is organized as a typical MTOE infantry battalion. The command structure or organization of the leadership cell consisted of a battalion commander, the battalion executive officer, and the battalion command sergeant major. The battalion commander (BC) was the primary leader of the organization as a whole. His role was to lead and direct the company commanders to ensure mission attainment of the battalion. The battalion executive officer (XO) was the primary leader of the staff officers of the battalion. The XO was in charge of the human resources officer (S1), the operations officer (S3), and the combined logistics and battalion maintenance officer (S4). The battalion command sergeant major (CSM) was responsible for the general health and welfare of all the soldiers in the battalion. The battalion was broken down into six companies (A through D, Flight Detachment, and Headquarters Company) of approximately 100 men each. Each company has its own leadership and staff cell that interacted with the battalion command and staff officers. The mission of 2/29th IN was to educate and train the entire U.S. Army on vital infantry skills. Here is a breakdown by company to give the reader a perspective on the scope of the organization and its objectives:
Battalion Commander
A Co
B Co
C Co
D Co
HHC
FLT
BN XO
BN CSM
S1 Shop
S2 Shop
S3 Shop
S4 Shop
BN Motor Pool
Figure 1. Each company has a company commander that reports directly to the Battalion Commander. The BN XO’s primary job was to ensure all of the support shops completed their mission of supporting the companies. The purpose of this paper is to examine the relationship of the BN XO to the shops.
Battalion Commander
A Co
B Co
C Co
D Co
HHC
FLT
BN XO
BN CSM
S1 Shop
S2 Shop
S3 Shop
S4 Shop
BN Motor Pool
Figure 1. Each company has a company commander that reports directly to the Battalion Commander. The BN XO’s primary job was to ensure all of the support shops completed their mission of supporting the companies. The purpose of this paper is to examine the relationship of the BN XO to the shops.

Alpha Company (A Co) was responsible for small arms training for the entire U.S. Army Infantry. A Co conducted small arms and basic rifle marksmanship for all enlisted soldiers attending basic training and all infantry officers attending the Infantry Officer Basic Course. Bravo Company (B Co) was responsible for training infantry officers and NCO’s to become mechanized infantry leaders. As such, B Co ran the Bradley Leader Course, which taught leadership how to assume their role as a vehicle commander. Charlie Company (C Co) was responsible for running the U. S. Army Sniper School. In addition to running the sniper school at Fort Benning, C Co also instituted and ran a more flexible training program for a Designated Squad Marksman course. Delta Company (D Co) was responsible for training infantry officers and NCO’s to become mortar infantry leaders. Mortar sections in MTOE units had a unique task that the typical infantryman did not encounter in their everyday infantry training. The Mortar Leader Course was an excellent method of ensuring officers and NCO’s quickly attained the skills they needed when assigned to a mortar platoon or section. Flight Detachment was responsible for running all helicopter operations on Fort Benning for the purposes of the other U. S. Army Schools (i.e. enlisted Infantry Basic Training, Officer Basic Course, Ranger School, and the Pathfinder Course). Headquarters and Headquarters Company (HHC) was responsible for running the staff operations of the entire battalion. This company consisted of the command cell (i.e. BC, XO, and CSM), the HHC Commander, and the staff officers with each of their requisite subordinate NCO’s and personnel (S1 shop, S2 shop, S3 shop, and the S4 shop). The S1 shop is the equivalent of a Human Resources department. The S2 shop handled risk management and security. The S3 shop was the operations shop. Their primary mission was project management and scheduling. The S4 shop handled all logistics, budgetary, and transportation concerns. The objective of the staff shops in HHC was to provide the services, support, logistics, and operations management to keep the companies A through D running. The officer in charge of each shop (with the exception of the S3 shop) was a junior infantry officer, and the second-in-command in each shop was an NCO that had the specific skill identifier for that particular job (i.e. a supply NCO was a supply sergeant rather than an infantry sergeant). While the HHC Commander was responsible for the entire company, the XO was responsible for directing the activities of the staff shops.
Companies A through D and the Flight Detachment carried the primary missions of the battalion. Recall the discussion of the three types of personnel that receive the assignment to a TDA unit. Virtually all of the officers and NCO’s that came to the battalion fell into the first two categories. These individuals received their assignment to 2/29th IN because they were unquestionably experts in their role. The battalion commander was the primary leader for the company commanders. His primary goal was to attain the battalion’s mission, and he had the soldiers, NCO’s and Officers with the highest level of expertise at his disposal. Headquarters Company on the other hand, was overloaded with the third category of soldiers mentioned previously. This meant that soldiers who had health problems or family problems (and thus required a lighter operations tempo), were funneled into HHC to run the staff operations of the battalion. It follows, then, that the officers in the leadership cell might have been predisposed to think that the caliber of soldier, NCO, and officer in HHC was lower than that of those in the companies A through D. On multiple occasions, the junior staff officers in the battalion bore witness to two different leadership styles. The BC focused on the mission and commanders of companies A through D. The battalion XO, on the other hand, was the primary leader of the staff officers in HHC.

Theories of Leadership & Leadership Practices In the course of our studies, we have considered several theories of leadership. When considering the best theory to measure the XO of 2/29th IN, I considered Level Five Leadership, Servant Leadership, and Authentic Leadership. While each of these leadership theories could potentially be used as a measuring stick to analyze an organization, I was looking for the model that demonstrated a close fit. According to Robert Greenleaf in his book, servant leadership is most represented when the leader places the needs of both the organization and the employees above his or her needs and lives to serve the organization (Greenleaf, 1970). According to Dr. Sattar Bawany, authentic leadership is demonstrated when leaders know themselves, expose “their ‘true’ personality” and core beliefs to employees, and place the goals of the organization over their own (Bawany, 2015). Of these three theories of leadership, I felt the most appropriate theory was Level Five Leadership. According to James Collins, the “hallmark” of Level Five Leadership is humility (Collins 2001b). This struck me as particularly representative of the XO’s style of leadership. I believe it is important to note, that implied in the definition of humility, one must have a reason not to debase oneself. For example, it is not the same level of humility for a trainee to defer to an experienced person’s judgment. Rather, that is simply discernment, or wisdom. Humility is far more expressly demonstrated when a person has a legitimate reason not to remain humble.
I chose Level Five Theory to explain the XO’s leadership style, because I observed his obvious humility. This is not to say that his leadership style complete encompassed everything about the theory. There were also some circumstances that, through a Level Five lens, demonstrated some weaknesses in his leadership style. However, since the hallmark of Level Five theory is the overt humility in the leader, it still seemed the most useful lens with which to evaluate 2/29th Infantry. Below is a figure pulled from Collins book, Good to Great.

Contributes talent, skills, knowledge
Capable
Level I - Individual
Contributes individually; works well in group
Contributing
Level 2 – Team Member
Manages team members and assets to reach set objectives
Competent
Level 3 - Manager
Stimulates high standards; champions dedication to vision
Effective
Level 4 - Leader
Builds excellence through dedication and humility
Level 5
Level 5 - Executive
Contributes talent, skills, knowledge
Capable
Level I - Individual
Contributes individually; works well in group
Contributing
Level 2 – Team Member
Manages team members and assets to reach set objectives
Competent
Level 3 - Manager
Stimulates high standards; champions dedication to vision
Effective
Level 4 - Leader
Builds excellence through dedication and humility
Level 5
Level 5 - Executive

Figure 2: James Collins Level Five Leadership Model (Collins, 2001a).
I was impressed with the XO’s consistent practice of approaching the organization with an obvious level of humility on a regular basis. It is important to note that the XO was a Special Forces officer. In other words, he was originally an infantry officer, but he had completed the Special Forces training, and therefore, he retained the largest level of measureable expertise of any officer in the battalion. While it was true that when it came to infantry operations, no one in the organization was more knowledgeable, he still did not beat us over the head with his credentials. Not only was he the most proficient infantry officer, and therefore, the epitome of the Type A category mentioned previously, he was in charge of most of the officers that could be perceived as the Type C category. He was particularly well-suited to leading those officers. Due to personal circumstances, he had taken some time away from the Army, and after 9/11 he returned to active duty to finish his career. It is my opinion that his hiatus gave him perspective and empathy for the officers that he would one day lead in 2/29th IN.
I have several lasting impressions of the XO. Chief among them was one of our first conversations. It was a conversation that was oft-repeated, because it led directly to his both his leadership style and his management processes. Very soon after we met in his office for the first time, he downplayed the fact that he was a Special Forces officer. More importantly, he told me that everyone in the U. S. Army was replaceable, whether it was him, the highest ranking general, or the lowest private.
His purpose in reiterating this theme was emphasizing that every office needs to have a process in place that explains what we do, how we do it, what we are doing currently, and when the next few items are due. It was this emphasis on a codified process for each shop that helped him demonstrate his second leadership practice of managing the team members to reach set objectives. This documented process, what he referred to as a continuity book, was born directly out of a leadership style that de-emphasized the importance of the individual running a shop. The XO told me on more than one occasion that my job was to implement systems; it was not to solve problems. It was the XO’s belief that since the needs of the organization outweighed the needs of the individual for recognition for mission attainment, we needed to focus on codifying processes so our shops could run smoothly, whether we came to work or not. The XO would frequently remind us that there are circumstances beyond our control, and the continuity book would serve the battalion in the event the shop supervisor suddenly could not come to work.
The third practice the XO implemented was setting high standards for the organization. He implemented a system of defining deliverables that was readily translatable to the infantrymen in the shops. The XO related the schedule of deliverables as targets on a rifle range. He defined the shop supervisor’s role as the system developer and manager. It was the XO’s belief that none of the shops should have to operate in crisis mode. The XO set a standard that no deliverable should be a “50 meter target,” i.e. no deliverable should ever cause a crisis in the shop since almost every deliverable was scheduled months in advance. This combination of his humble approach, management through codified processes, and the setting of high standards created an atmosphere that facilitated succession. Succession was no longer something to be feared; the next person to step into a supervisory position would know what had been completed, what needed to be done immediately, and what was expected in the long-term.
The Effect of Level Five Leadership on the Organizational Culture
Once the junior officers understood the XO’s leadership style, we each had our marching orders to develop our continuity books. Whereas before, our organization had depended on mission attainment by force of our own personalities, we were codifying our processes so that we could create systems. It was the XO’s contention that organizations should run off of systems rather than personalities. While of all people, he could have certainly driven the organization by his own personality and expertise, he chose to humble himself.
Whenever he came to an area in which he did not have expertise, he would defer to a knowledgeable person. His goal was to have each junior officer in his charge become an expert in each shop. Whenever there was a staff meeting and a question arose, the XO would turn to the junior officer first for his input. If it was obvious that the shop supervisor was not knowledgeable yet, the XO would push him to become so. He would frequently state that the shop supervisors were to become experts so that he did not have to become one. The organizational hierarchy was flat, which led to empowerment of junior level supervisors.
The language of the shops began to revolve around components of the continuity book. We began to refer to deliverables as targets on an infantry target range. The goal was to create processes so that we could keep each target at 100 meters – 200 meters. In other words, we wanted to keep tasks manageable and stress-free. The common phrase for dropping the ball was allowing something to become a “50 meter target” or worse yet, “a bayonet fight.” The idea here is fairly simple; the XO wanted the shops to develop processes so that the rhythm of the year was manageable and so that the shops were not in a constant state of crisis-mode. If there were processes in place for known deliverables, then it lessened the risk of missing deadlines.
Regarding goal setting and achievement, the shops of HHC placed the most emphasis on developing the processes in the continuity books. There were absolutely growing pains. Before, the organization had depended on knowledgeable NCO’s. Due to budget constraints, the battalion was receiving fewer and fewer NCO’s that had the required skill sets to run the minutiae in the shops. This in turn, highlighted the need for these codified processes. The shops that were able to develop robust policies received growing levels of autonomy and credibility.
SWOT Analysis 2/29th IN was very competent in two key areas. First and foremost, the trainers in 2/29th IN were among the most proficient in the world at their specific field of expertise. Additionally, the motivation level of the organization as a whole in achieving the mission was extremely high. As the XO reminded me on several occasions, no one wakes up in the morning hoping they do not do a good job in our organization. Everyone in the battalion knew how his specific role in the unit affected the organization and indirectly affected the U.S. Army as a whole.
One primary weakness of 2/2th IN was its sourcing pool for talent. Due to budget constraints, 2/29th IN frequently did not have the NCO’s with the specific knowledge required to run a personnel shop, supply shop, logistics shop, or maintenance motor pool. On those occasions, the infantry officer in charge of that shop was in a situation in which he had to learn how his employees’ performance should be measured in a field with which he had no familiarity. Another weakness was the nexus of the gung-ho attitude of the infantry leadership pulling double duty as the officer and NCO leader of a shop. The infantry officer is taught to find a solution to any problem. Frequently, there were laws governing the actions of the shops that did not have a work-around. When one combines a lack of NCO talent at the shop level with the never-say-die attitude of the young infantry officer, it was all too easy to get the organization into hot water with regards to U.S. regulations compliance. Since HHC 2/29th IN did not always have the NCO’s skill-specific expertise in the shops to avoid regulation pit-falls, the staffing would have to be considered a prominent weakness.
One opportunity for great success was the organization’s position to change how the infantry fought an asymmetric enemy in an on-going war. As long as the leadership remained aggressive and forward-thinking it would be possible to make a large impact on how the infantry in the entire U.S. Army fights its battles. Another opportunity for success at 2/29th IN was the developmental opportunity for the leadership that ran the shops. Given that there was a dearth of NCO leadership in the shops, it was incumbent upon the junior officers to learn their employees’ skill sets. This lack of NCO experience in different fields provided the junior officers an opportunity to learn cross-functional skill sets.
The main threat facing 2/29th IN was complacency. The U.S. Army at that time was—and still is as of this writing—facing an enemy that was constantly changing. It was imperative that the experts in 2/29th IN stay abreast of all changes in military doctrine that the enemy might bring to the battlefield. Another threat facing the organization was the potential for the staff shops to fail a logistical concern that would cause one of the primary companies to fail their mission. For example, one constant threat for the S-4 shop was the possibility of failing in the acquisition of end items vital to the sniper school. If the S-4 shop failed, then the quality of the product of the sniper school, and by extension, the battalion as a whole would be diminished.
Application of the Level Five Leadership Theory By demonstrating his humility, the XO affected the organization culture greatly. Whereas previously, the shops were based on the personality of each supervisor, the XO used his humility to guide the shops from the first level to the fourth level while I was there. By acknowledging his own personal limits, he generated an environment of learning. He created an atmosphere of hunger for codified processes. The implementation of the processes facilitated the shops in attaining the high standards set by the XO. He expected his subordinates to become respective experts in each of their fields, and he wanted to be able to trust our expertise. Once we had attained a level of expertise, he fostered an environment of trust and empowerment. The XO’s greatest strengths were his ability to motivate subordinates, to stimulate high standards, and to remain dedicated to his vision of how the shops should run. He constantly motivated the junior officers by checking on their progress in developing their continuity books. He stimulated the attainment of high standards by reminding the shops that success was not simply avoiding failure to meet a goal, but success was also recognizing a problem before it was a 50 meter target.
However, there were a few major areas in which he diverted quite a bit from the Level Five Leadership Theory. One of the first tasks he should have taken in accordance with Level Five Leadership Theory, is “getting the correct team members on the bus” even before he began to pursue his vision (Collins, 2001b). In all fairness to the XO, one could not criticize him too much for working with the people that he had. In this particular unit, it was next to impossible to find replacements for people, and pulling one person from one part of the organization would simply just shift a problem from one side of the organization to another. Truth be told, this author was the greatest beneficiary of the difficulty the XO would have faced in assembling the right team. At the time, I had the most to learn, and I would have been the first to be eliminated had the XO been given the latitude to move the right people into the right position. I consider it a possibility that the XO thought of the development of the junior officers as a mission that was just as important as the battalion’s overall mission. That would explain why he did not give up on one junior officer in particular.
While he was excellent at confronting the “brutal facts” of a current situation, he did not always keep “hope” alive (Collins, 2001b). There were times that he could really get down emotionally because he was not accustomed to working in units that had so far to go before they were excellent. At times, his annoyance and impatience would become apparent, and the junior officers would occasionally lose hope of ever getting things right enough for the XO. When he became frustrated at the lack of progress, his reaction could be interpreted as “aloofness”, which according to the research of Burke is a common characteristic in a failure of leadership (Burke, 2006). Additionally, the XO only partly exemplified one of the practices of humility delineated by Doctors Owens and Hekman. Regarding “modeling teachability,” the XO would ask questions of others, but he would occasionally interject before he heard the complete answer (Owens & Hekman, 2012) .
There are three practices from Level Five Leadership theory, which if implemented, could have helped maximize the future success of the XO, the shops and the organization as a whole. First, assuming the XO had more control of his human resources assets, he could have shifted the supervisors around until he had the right mix. His S4 Supervisor was pulling double duty as the S4 Supervisor and also for the Battalion Maintenance Officer, which was a position that ordinarily required a more senior officer. Due to budget constraints, however, the S4 Supervisor was required to fill both positions. When the XO first took leadership, his S4 Supervisor lacked the skill and experience to successfully handle both positions. Had the XO been able to put the right person in this position, then the shops could have reached a Level 4 Leadership environment much sooner.
Another practice that the XO could have implemented to better the organization would have been to “keep hope alive” while uncovering uncomfortable stories of failure or incompetence as Collins suggested (Collins 2001b). Before the XO’s arrival, the shop supervisors had relied on their respective NCO subordinate leaders to run the details of the shop. As the process of normal re-assignment attrition took place, the NCO leadership positions were no longer filled, and the junior officers had to step in to run the minutia to ensure successful management of the shops. After the XO’s arrival, several shops’ errors came to light, and the XO was eager to fix the situation. While he was able to face the ugly situation successfully the first few instances, the sheer volume of corrections to be made began to wear on the XO. His previously accepting, humble demeanor began to change, and he lost his positivity. Had he been able to keep hope alive, then the junior officers would have been even more dedicated to the XO’s vision.
Finally, the XO needed to ensure that he waited to hear the answers that his subordinates gave him after he asked his questions. According to Owens and Hekman, had he been able to remain patient enough to do so, then it would have fostered an atmosphere that reinforced “openness, experimentation, and learning (Owens & Hekman, 2012). If the XO was able to listen for his subordinates’ answers after asking questions, that in turn would have fostered a better perception of employee empowerment. From the research of Bryman, Greasly, and others, we find that there is frequently a disconnect between the actual and perceived level of employee empowerment (Bryman 2005).
Additionally, one in a leadership position should probably be a little more versed in psychology. The XO used to wonder aloud why certain junior officers would make consistent mistakes. If he had applied his curiosity in just a cursory manner, he would have realized some of the problems of his officers were not based on a lack of motivation, but they were medical in nature. For example, one of his key subordinate leaders had a major problem with procrastination. If the XO had examined this situation from psychological standpoint, then he might have realized that his subordinate might have a mental condition like ADD/ADHD, bipolar disorder, etc. If he had known that possibility, then he could have recommended any number of sources of assistance to the junior officer, and he might have corrected much of the problems in that particular shop.
Conclusion

Overall, both the battalion as a whole and the headquarters shops were successful. The XO was able to move the shops from a group of segregated shops that depended on individual personalities to team of teams that retained a new culture. If one referred back to Collins model of Level Five Leadership, one would see the transition of shops from Level 2 leadership to Level 4 leadership. Please see below:

Contributes talent, skills, knowledge
Capable
Level I - Individual
Contributes individually; works well in group
Contributing
Level 2 – Team Member
Manages team members and assets to reach set objectives
Competent
Level 3 - Manager
Stimulates high standards; champions dedication to vision
Effective
Level 4 - Leader
Builds excellence through dedication and humility
Level 5
Level 5 - Executive
May
2004
Feb 2003

Contributes talent, skills, knowledge
Capable
Level I - Individual
Contributes individually; works well in group
Contributing
Level 2 – Team Member
Manages team members and assets to reach set objectives
Competent
Level 3 - Manager
Stimulates high standards; champions dedication to vision
Effective
Level 4 - Leader
Builds excellence through dedication and humility
Level 5
Level 5 - Executive
May
2004
Feb 2003

Figure 3: Evaluation of 2/29th IN Leadership Level over the course of the XO’s tenure, adapted from Good to Great (Collins 2001a)

This conversion is due to the leadership style of the XO and the steadfast adherence to his vision. He wanted to create an atmosphere in which supervisors empowered their subordinates. He set the example of humility. He inculcated a desire to meet a high standard. Given time and more latitude in who he was allowed to put into key positions on the staff, it is this author’s belief that he could have pushed the organization to a high Level 4. It is important to keep in mind that of Collins’ study, only 11 out of 4000 companies were able to transition from good to great (Collins, 2001a). With this strict definition of ‘great’ and with the XO’s weaknesses in mind, it would be fair to assess his headquarters shops as a good, but not great organization.
References
http://fas.org/man/dod-101/army/unit/toe/toenum.htm
Greenleaf, R. (1970). Servant Leadership: A journey into the nature of legitimate power and greatness. Mahwah, NJ: Paulist Press.

Bawany, S. (2015). Discovering your authentic leadership: How can you become and remain an authentic leader? Leadership Excellence Essentials, presented by HR.com, March 2015.

Hekman, Davide & Owens, Bradley. (2012). Modeling how to grow: an inductive examination of humble leader behaviors, contingencies, and outcomes. Academy of Management Journal, August 2012, Vol 55, Issue 4, pp 787-813.

Collins, J. 2001a. Good to Great. Why some companies make the leap…and others don’t.
New York: HarperCollins.

Collins, J. 2001b. Level 5 leadership: The triumph of humility and fierce resolve. ‘ Harvard Business Review, 79(1): 67-76.

Bryman, A. 2004. “Employee perceptions of empowerment”.
Employee Relations. Volume 27 issue 4 pp354-368. Other authors Kay Greasley, Andrew Dainty, Andrew Price, Robby Soetanto, Nicola King

Burke, R. J. 2006. Why leaders fail: Exploring the darkside.
Intemational Joumal of Manpower, 27(1): 91-100.