On February 8, 1904 war was declared between Imperial Russia and Imperial Japan. Within 17 months, the war ended with peace talks (Treaty of Portsmouth) led by President Theodore Roosevelt following an impressive naval battle at Tsushima. After the Russo-Japanese War, both Alfred T. Mahan and Sir Julian Corbett provided their literary insights on the war and used the outcome to further illustrate their views on the role of sea power and its’ link to national greatness. Both strategic philosophers made credible justifications using the back drop of the war to support their theories, but only Corbett's analysis and previously published theories fully explained how an inferior force consisting of the Japanese Imperial Navy and the Imperial Army ultimately defeated the great power of Russian. Corbett's writings highlighted the need not only for a powerful Navy but also a powerful army to win a nation's wars. Corbett believed in a diverse naval force that would be used for battle, protection of commerce, protection of sea lines of communication, and commerce raiding rather than seeking a decisive battle. In contrast, Mahan believed in having full control/command of the sea to fight numerous battles using capital ships, ultimately culminating in a decisive battle that would tip the scales towards victory. Even though Mahan's theories were not completely supported throughout the Russo-Japanese War, many of his theories were applicable and still are today.
Corbettian War
Unlike Alfred T. Mahan, Sir Julian Corbett did not have any naval service or experience to directly support his theories on war. He instead developed his views solely as a naval historiographer and a sincere follower of Carl von Clausewitz. In the late 1800s and early 1900s, Corbett published a few collections of his theories; trailing the literary path of Mahan by almost 20 years. His theories opposed Mahan’s supremacist view of naval power and instead centered around the role of the Navy as a function of diplomatic effort to protect a nation’s interests and support the soldiers on the ground. Corbett did not believe in the purest form of command of the sea as Mahan had described, instead, he believed that since the vast limits of the sea were too great to control, it would be almost impossible for anyone to ever really control it. Corbett’s theory of the object could be summarized as “either to secure the command of sea or to prevent the enemy from securing it.” (Corbett Classics of Sea Power, 94) He further defined command of the sea as the control of maritime communications; either military or commercial. He continued, “…since men live upon the land and not upon the sea, the great issues between nations at war have always been decided – except in the rarest of cases – either by what your army can do against your enemy’s territory or national life or else fear of what the fleet makes it possible for your army to do.” (Corbett Classics of Sea Power, 94 and 16) Thus to Corbett, maritime strategy was developed once you had determined the interrelationship between the army/navy and in most cases the navy would fulfill a supporting role. This philosophy explains the reason behind Japan's preventive/defensive naval strategy during the first phase of the war. Admiral Togo realized early on the importance surrounding Port Arthur as Russia's “fleet in being” and based on Japan's naval shortcomings he decided to contain the fleet, preventing its' escape to Vladivostok, in order to further their land campaign while protecting their vital lines of communication. Admiral Togo stated, “With the army lies the offensive part of the war plan, and his part is to provide the defensive support by confining the enemy's main fleet to an area from which it cannot interfere with the army's progress.” (Corbett Russo-Japanese War, 383)
With his broader view of the navy, Corbett also stressed the importance of having more than just capital ships. He believed that the classification of ships should be based on the material and the strategical/tactical ideas that prevail at that time. (Corbett Classics of Sea Power, 107) A fleet comprised on battleships, cruisers, torpedo boats, convoys, and torpedo boat destroyers would be necessary to support the multitude of roles of the navy in defense of nation and its’ commerce during times of war and peace. The Japanese also believed in a diverse fleet and prior to the Russo-Japanese War, Japan built a navy consisting of 6 battleships, 6 cruisers, various torpedo boats, and various torpedo boat destroyers. Throughout the war, Japan employed these vessels to conduct commerce raiding, conduct mine warfare, fire torpedoes, and establish a blockade at Port Arthur. Corbett also postulated on the concentration of forces and the strategy of assembling the right force at the right time. (Corbett Classics of Sea Power, 128) His views differed from his contemporaries in that he believed that concentration of forces did not refer to sending the whole fleet to the fight. He supported a more flexible battle plan that allowed the forces to separate in order to cover a greater range of operations while still being able to mass quickly for battle. The ability to divide the forces would also assist with concealment of the forces. Admiral Togo used this Corbettian strategy and divided his First, Second, and Third fleets in order to achieve the strategic objectives of landing the army, confining the Russian fleet at Port Arthur, and controlling maritime communications to support the army. (Corbett Russo-Japanese, 384) Along the same lines of his strategy on concentration of forces, Corbett once again strayed from other strategists by going against the need to fight decisive battles. Corbett viewed sea power as important but it wasn't as decisive as using force multipliers like joint operations. Corbett also concluded that decisive battles could be avoided by the enemy and in the end costing the opponent a waste of resources, time, and funding. History has shown that wars are hardly ever won on the seas, especially since the purist form of the command at sea cannot be achieved. Admiral Togo, just as Corbett, understood that command of the sea was difficult and time-consuming. With Japan’s inability to secure an early decisive battle at Port Arthur, Admiral Togo realized the relative strength of his forces could not match Russia nor could he fully support the wide range of naval operations needed to support the army, thus he did not pursue the enemy by offensive methods nor did he seek a decisive battle. (Corbett Russo-Japanese, 385) As the war continued to play out, Japan also felt the upper hand given to Russia’s Far East by their refusal to give an opportunity to the Japanese for a decisive naval battle. This supported Corbett’s theory that maritime warfare differed from land warfare in that it is easier to avoid decisive battles at sea. During the first stage of war, the Japanese government also knew that they did not have the resources to support a decisive battle, especially with a “Fleet in Being” lurking in the background. Therefore, Admiral Togo’s defensive strategy remained, ultimately dividing his fleet in support of controlling the sea lines of communication to benefit the Imperial Army, until he could go on the offensive. (Corbett Russo-Japanese, 387) It wasn’t until after several months of fighting with some successes that the Japanese gained the confidence and ability to gain command of the sea by capitalizing on Russia’s fatigue by seizing 30 Russian vessels and defeating them at the Battle of the Japan Sea; which ended the second stage of war. After the achieving successes on land and sea, Japan was able to shift to a more offensive war effort culminating in the destruction and neutralization of Russia’s army and navy at Mukden and Tsushima.
Mahanian War – Counterargument / Rebuttal Although Julian Corbett writings make a strong case to support his views, citing a few examples from the Russo-Japanese War, some might argue that Alfred T. Mahan’s theories on sea power were better represented throughout war. During the 19th century Alfred T. Mahan was the premier naval strategist. His book “The Influence of Sea Power Upon History” used the outcomes of the conflicts in England, France, and Spain from the 1600s-1900s to formulate his strategic views. Just like Corbett, Alfred T. Mahan used the British Empire as the role model, however, he differed from his contemporary by using the Royal Navy as the direct link to the British Empire’s success. As an American naval officer and a professor at the Naval War College his writings also directly supported the build-up of American sea power in pursuit of imperialism. His strategies were heavily taught and translated throughout the world and hence studied by both Russia and Japan prior to the Russo-Japanese War. Mahan strongly contended that a country’s power and national greatness were directly linked to command of the sea, glamorizing the need to maintain a battle fleet. Mahan believed that the primary purpose of the navy was to seek and destroy/neutralize the enemy fleet in a decisive battle utilizing a well trained fleet of capital ships. Additionally, Mahan believed the navy's secondary roles included protection of commerce, commerce raiding, amphibious raids, and supporting roles to include mine warfare, torpedo boats, and landing craft. In the “Influence of Sea Power Upon History,” Mahan described the six elements that influence the ability of a nation to become a sea power: geographic position, physical conformation, extent of territory, number of population, character of the people, and the character of the government. For Japan, their geographic position, extent of territory, the character of their people, and the character of their government all attributed to their success during the Russo-Japanese War. As an island nation close to the Manchuria and Korean coast, Japan capitalized on their geographic position in order to deploy their naval forces and support the land war. The Japanese government also played an important role as war planners by introducing the “Ga-Shin-Sho-Ton” campaign which proved to be very successful in uniting the Japanese people against Russia. (Koda, 16) Mahan would argue that Russia lacked a few of the key elements to become a sea power. Although Russia's population and extent of territory overpowered Japan, their numbers did not accurately portray the theory behind his six elements since they did not reflect a nation that was built on naval principles since Russia lacked a maritime population and favorable naval coastline/rivers. However, I would argue that Mahan's view on Japan's victory, or Russia's demise, based on the elements of sea power is an oversimplified statement. Russia and Japan's naval strengths and weaknesses were evenly matched and it was the combination of Japan's use of Corbettian theory behind joint operations and Russian missteps/misfortunes that ultimately led Japan to victory. Even before the war, Japan realized the importance of controlling the sea lines of communication and the importance behind neutralizing Russia's fleet at Port Arthur to support the Imperial Army. Japan did not believe it could effectively manage command of the sea in the Mahanian sense. Thus, Japan successfully implemented a preventive naval strategy employing various ship types to neutralize Russia's fleet at Port Arthur in order to land, reinforce, and supply the army throughout the war. On the other side, Russia’s downfall was attributed to the naval support, lack of national will, and their inability to prolong the war until reinforcements arrived (referring to the Trans-Siberian railway and naval forces). Mahan would also contend that Port Arthur was a “perpetual menace to the sea communications of Japan, the absolutely determining factor of the war.” (Mahan Restrospect, 147) Mahan goes on to state that through Japan’s preparations and fear of losing such command of the sea, they continued to advance in hopes of victories. (Mahan Restrospect, 147) Mahan also did not believe in the theory of a “fleet in being”; the presence of a strong force, even though inferior, would produce a profound effect on the enemy’s action or lead to inaction. To Mahan, Port Arthur only harbored the fleet and Japan had met that threat by maintaining the position of the fleet for reconnaissance purposes. I would argue though, one cannot support Mahan’s definition of command at sea. At the start of the war, Japan’s was almost equal to that of the Russian fleet. With thousands of miles needed to be covered by the Japanese fleet, in order to establish presence in the Yellow and Japan Seas, support of the army, and protect commerce, it is unrealistic to think they would have ever command of the sea. Japan also did not believe the Russian Navy to be inferior but instead they considered the Russian fleet a menace to their objectives hence their focus on wanting to contain (and eventually destroy) the East Sea Fleet. Japan also was not just concerned with the fleet in Port Arthur but also the prospect of the Baltic Fleet’s arrival and the fleet in Vladivostok. Together the threat of Russia’s fleets aptly curbed the way both Admiral Togo and the Japanese government handled the war and formulated their military strategies. Many would also argue that the Battle of Tsushima showcased Mahan’s idea of a decisive battle. The foundation of Mahan’s naval strategy surrounded the idea of possessing a concentrated fleet of capital ships able to destroy the enemy in a decisive battle. It is true that Japan ventured for a decisive victory at the start of the war by attempting a surprise attack on Port Arthur. It is also true that the Battle of Tsushima was an impressive battle in which 28 of 34 Russian ships were sunk. However, I would argue the Battle of Tsushima was not decisive battle in the broad sense but instead a decisive naval battle. By the time the Battle of Tsushima had occurred, Japan had already won the land war (Battle of Mukden, February-March 1905) due to Russia’s inability to transition to the offensive and due to the lack of national support of the war. With the Russia forces being succumbed by mutiny, heavy losses, and lack of supplies, Japan was able to maintain the upper hand after the Battle of Mukden enabling the start of war termination talks.
Conclusion
At the end of a historical event it is important to conduct analysis and reflect on the many lessons learned. During this reflection, it can be easy to draw conclusions that fit into one's theories based on interpretation. Although both Mahan’s and Corbett’s theories were based on Britain’s military and naval history, their conclusions were dramatically different. After reflecting on the Russo-Japanese War, Corbett's theories were truly represented, emphasizing that war cannot be won on the high seas alone. Alfred T. Mahan will always be regarded a premier naval strategist, however, his theories did not hold up against the back drop of the Russo-Japanese War in regards to his overemphasis on command of the sea, winning decisive battles, and disdain for joint operations.
Bibliography
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